External Debt and International Trade:
Another Mismatch
Eiji Fujii
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 5519
CATEGORY 7: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
ORIGINAL VERSION: SEPTEMBER 2015
THIS VERSION: APRIL 2016
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ISSN 2364-1428
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CESifo Working Paper No. 5519
External Debt and International Trade:
Another Mismatch
Abstract
Currency mismatch makes a debtor country suffer from domestic depreciation by magnifying
the burden of its external debt. Because external debt can be repaid by exporting more than
importing, a crucial channel for inducing recovery is net exports. However, the argument that
domestic depreciation correspondingly boosts net exports is not warranted if currency
compositions differ substantially between debt and trade. This study examines the association
between the debt revaluation and trade competitiveness gain effects of exchange rate
fluctuations for middle- and low-income countries. The empirical results suggest that currencycompositional discord between debt and trade has significant welfare implications.
JEL-Code: F340, F310.
Keywords: currency mismatch, effective exchange rate, external debt, original sin, net export.
Eiji Fujii
School of Economics
Kwansei Gakuin University
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho, Nishinomiya
Japan – Hyogo 662-8501
efujii@kwansei.ac.jp
This version: April 19, 2016
I am grateful to Mahir Binici for helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank
Frank Westermann, Andreas Steiner, Michel Beine, Mark Spiegel, Xingwang Qian, Etienne
Farvaque, and participants of the CESifo workshop on International Currency Exposure and the
9th Workshop of Methods in International Finance Network for comments. All remaining errors
are solely mine. This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25285087.
1. Introduction
In theory, international borrowing and lending is beneficial for all parties. When
inter-temporal trade is immune to market segmentation by political borders, it can
achieve more efficient resource allocation. However, in reality, the world
asymmetrically consists of diverse countries with various currencies. To realize the
benefit, borrowers and lenders separated by national borders must first concur on the
currency in which their contracts will be denominated.
When debt is denominated in currencies with a high devaluation risk, investors
demand a premium. International debt, unsurprisingly, tends to be denominated in
currencies with prominent credibility and thick markets, represented most notably by
the US dollar (USD). As a consequence, many countries, especially less developed ones,
borrow abroad typically in foreign currencies, a phenomenon referred to as the “original
sin.” Because their assets are more likely to be denominated in domestic currencies,
currency mismatches exist between the two sides of the balance sheets. The original sin
and currency mismatch have drawn significant attention in academic and policy circles
as important factors contributing to recurrent financial crises around the globe. 1
For emerging economies, currency mismatch is a double-edged sword (Ranciere,
Tornell, and Vamvakidis, 2010a). Although currency mismatch can reduce borrowing
constraints to boost economic growth, it also increases vulnerability to exchange rate
variability. A debtor country lacking foreign currency assets that provide a buffer suffers
severely from depreciation of its domestic currency as it magnifies burden of its
1
See, for instance, Hausmann and Panizza (2003), Goldstein and Turner (2004),
Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2007), and Ranciere, Tornell, and Vamvakidis
(2010a).
1
external debt liabilities. 2 In such circumstances, a key channel remaining for debt-laden
countries to induce recovery is international trade. Because external debt can be repaid
by exporting more than importing, it is vital to boost net exports to alleviate this
problem. 3
In general, domestic depreciation makes a country’s exports more competitive and
imports more expensive, boosting net exports as a result. Nevertheless, the argument
that domestic depreciation will boost net exports in a corresponding fashion to debt
revaluation is unwarranted if currency composition differs substantially between
external debt and international trade. 4 This currency-compositional discord between
external debt and international trade―referred to as “another mismatch”― is the theme
of this study.
The following example may help depict the issue. Consider Mexico and Liberia.
These countries have external debt denominated primarily in USD in approximate equal
proportions. The decade average indicates that approximately 76% of the long-term
public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt of Mexico is denominated in USD.
The corresponding share for Liberia is similar at 74%. 5 In contrast, the shares of the
United States as their export destination (import origin) differ strikingly―at
2
Hereafter, “depreciation” is used to refer to a decline in a currency value regardless of
whether it occurs as a market adjustment of a floating rate or devaluation of a fixed rate
by authority.
3
In general, foreign exchange reserves are the primary buffer assets for external PPG
debt. However, as the notion of currency mismatch indicates, less developed countries
typically do not possess sufficient reserves to cover their external debt. In such
circumstances, net exports assume an important role in partially offsetting the debt
revaluation effects of domestic depreciation. In the empirical exercise in section 4, we
incorporate the reserves to GDP ratio to ensure robustness of the results.
4
See the chapter by Sokolova in this volume for issues related to the choice of currency
in international trade.
5
The figures are the averages for 2003–2012.
2
approximately 82% (52%) for Mexico and only 10% (1%) for Liberia. Thus,
depreciation of the same magnitude of the Mexican peso and Liberian dollar against the
USD, although similarly increasing the external debt burden of the two countries, is
likely to have different effects on their international trade. An extent of domestic
depreciation that may significantly vitalize Mexican net exports will not be nearly as
igniting for Liberian net exports.
When the currency compositions are accordant between debt and trade, the effects
of domestic depreciation in terms of an increasing debt burden are more likely to be
offset, at least partly, by a subsequent increase in net exports. In a sense, having the
“right” currency compositions to denominate a country’s external debt may be deemed
as a built-in alleviation mechanism. Thus, we hypothesize that the debt–trade currency
compositional mismatch can have important welfare implications for borrowing
countries.
In this study, we first investigate recent trends in currency denominations of external
debt of middle-income countries (MICs) and low-income countries (LICs). Further,
using data on debt-denominating currency compositions and nominal exchange rates,
we construct debt-weighted effective exchange rate (DEER) indices to examine their
association with the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate (TREER) series. The
DEER–TREER correlation depicts the interaction between the two effects arising from
domestic depreciation: the revaluation effect on external debt and the trade
competitiveness gain effect. Furthermore, using growth regressions, we test whether
variations in the extent of debt–trade currency discord significantly determine
cross-country differences in growth performance.
Our chief findings are as follows. For the long-term PPG debt of MICs and LICs,
3
we find little evidence of the alleviation of the original sin during the past three decades.
Overall, their external debt continues to be characterized by the striking―even
increasing―predominance of the USD as the currency of denomination. We find
substantial cross-country variations in the association between the DEER and TREER
indices, which turn out to have significant implications. Our growth regression
estimates suggest that for countries with substantial debt–trade currency-compositional
discord, marginal increases in nominal exchange rate variability exert significantly
negative effects on growth. However, the sign of the effect is reversed as the extent of
the debt–trade mismatch declines to remain lower than a certain threshold. In other
words, nominal exchange rate variability can exert either a negative or positive effect on
a country’s economic growth, depending on the degree of harmony of the currency
compositions between debt and trade. Given these novel findings, this study contributes
to the literature on currency exposure from a unique angle.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
examines the trends in the currency composition of external debt of MICs and LICs.
Section 3 constructs the DEER indices to quantify the extent of their co-movements
with the TREER series as our measures of mismatches. Section 4 examines the
implications of the debt–trade mismatch by estimating growth regressions. Finally,
section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. Currency composition of external debt
2.a
Data and preliminaries
We adopt the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) as our primary data
source. Supplementary data are extracted from the Bank’s World Development Indicator
4
Database, and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and
Direction of Trade Statistics. The baseline sample period is 1980–2012, with occasional
curtailment for countries with limited data availability.
The IDS provides information on the currency denomination of external debt but not
assets. Therefore, we do not observe currency mismatches in the usual sense. 6 Instead,
we focus on the currency compositional discord between external debt and trade and its
implications under nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
In the IDS database, the currency composition of external debt is available only for
PPG debt. Although this availability may seem to severely limit the scope of our
analyses, the share of PPG debt in total debt turns out to be quite high for both MICs
and LICs. As Panel A of Table 1 indicates, more than an average of seventy percent of
all debt stock of MICs is PPG debt. For LICs, the share of PPG debt is even higher, at
approximately eighty-four percent. Replacing the debt stock with debt service will not
significantly alter the picture. The average PPG share remains at seventy percent for
MICs and increases to ninety-six percent for LICs. Therefore, PPG debt serves as a
reasonable proxy for the total external debt of those countries. 7
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the currency composition of PPG debt stock. The
average shares are noted for the USD, euro, Japanese yen (JPY), British pound (GBP),
and Swiss franc (CHF). The sample period is 1980–2012, except for the euro, to which
6
For the definition of currency mismatch, see Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza
(2007) among others. Given data constraints, we consider the currency denomination of
external debt without netting out the value of foreign assets. Thus, our investigations are
more closely related to original sin than currency mismatch.
7
PPG debt is a reasonable, although imperfect, measure for the purpose of this paper
for the following reason. The distinction between public and private sectors in less
developed economies tends to be obscure in that their export and import sectors are
often run by public or quasi-public agents, such as state enterprises (Claessens, 1992).
Correspondingly, PPG debt includes not only sovereign debt but also debt by
government-backed (quasi-)private enterprises.
5
2001–2012 applies for obvious reasons. The shares of the deutsche mark (DM) and the
French franc (FF) are also provided for the period of 1980–2000.
For both MICs and LICs, the USD is by far the most dominant currency with an
average share of approximately fifty percent. The euro, the next on the list, is only
approximately sixteen percent and eight percent for MICs and LICs, respectively. Thus,
the dominance of the USD is outstanding. When combined, the aforementioned major
currencies take up more than eighty percent and close to seventy percent of the external
debt of MICs and LICs, respectively. These numbers unambiguously manifest the
prevalence of original sin across MICs and LICs.
Because the currency compositional shares can shift over time, we provide time
series plots of the country average shares in Figure 1. For both MICs and LICs, the
graphs indicate that the USD is not just dominant but also exhibits a long-term
increasing trend. The 2012 figures show that the shares of the USD well exceeded fifty
percent and approached sixty percent.
2.b
Trends in currency composition
Over time, do the borrowing countries show a significant diversification or
concentration trend in the currency in which their debt is denominated? 8 Are certain
currencies gaining or losing importance in the debt denomination, and for whom? To
answer these questions, we fit a linear trend to the time series of the compositional
shares of the major currencies using
PPG j ,t
PPGt
= α j + β j t + ε j ,t .
(1)
8
It is noted that the currency compositions can shift not only for new issues but also
the existing debt stock via currency conversion options in rescheduling negotiations.
6
For a given country, PPG j ,t is the currency j-denominated PPG external debt in year t.
PPGt is the total PPG debt of the country in the same year.
Panel C of Table 1 presents the numbers of countries for which the denoted
currencies exhibit a significant upward or downward trend (noted with + and −,
respectively) in their shares. The USD is evidently becoming even more dominant over
time for both MICs and LICs because the number of countries with a significant upward
trend far exceeds that with a downward trend. Specifically, the balance is forty-nine
positives versus seventeen negatives for MICs, and twenty-one versus two for LICs. In
contrast, more countries reduced their share of the euro than the number that increased
such share, presumably attributed to recent debt crises. For the JPY, more MICs with an
increasing trend exist than do those with a decreasing one. In contrast, the number of
LICs with a downward JPY trend exceeds that with an upward trend.
Table 1 shows that the GBP and the CHF have been losing their ground as external
debt denomination currencies. For both currencies, the number of MICs exhibiting a
downward trend far exceeds that with an upward trend. Additionally, although no LICs
show an upward trend in their shares, twenty-five and sixteen LICs have a significant
downward trend in the shares of the GBP and the CHF, respectively.
Finally, the entries for currencies other than the major ones provide little signs of
dissolving original sin. Overall, the external debt of MICs and LICs continues to be
characterized by striking dominance of the USD and, to a lesser degree, a few other
major currencies. Furthermore, in general, the dominance of the USD is increasing over
time.
2.c Regional stratification
7
Conceivably, the geographical distributions of debtor countries and the countries of
popular denominating currencies generate region-dependent non-homogeneous trends in
currency composition. To examine this possibility, Tables 2.A and 2.B provide
information on external debt by regionally-stratified sub-samples. 9 In general, the
major denominating currencies indicate a strong presence in the regions of geographical
proximity and strong historical ties. For instance, the USD has the highest share, at
sixty-seven percent, in Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, twenty-one out
of twenty-four countries in the region indicated an increasing trend in their USD share.
Similarly, the share of the JPY is higher in East Asia and the Pacific than in other
regions. The euro shows an eminent presence in Europe and Central Asia, and the
Middle East and North Africa, although it also has a surprisingly high share in South
Asia.
However, despite the aforementioned regional specificity, we observe the universal
dominance of the USD. Even in East Asia and the Pacific, the share of the USD is more
than twice that of the JPY. By the same token, the share of the USD dominates the euro
in Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa. These observations
stress that excessive reliance on USD-denominated debt is a global phenomenon, rather
than a regional one.
As an alternative to summarizing the data, Figure 2 plots for each region the average
share by currency as a time series. With possible exceptions of the Middle East and
North Africa (Figure 2.E), where the euro almost caught up to the USD before the crisis,
the predominance of the USD seems unshakable. In contrast, the trends in the average
shares of the euro differ widely by region. Aside from the Middle East and North Africa,
9
The regional categories are as defined by the World Bank.
8
the currency has steadily increased its share since its birth in Europe and Central Asia,
and South Asia (Figures 2.B and 2.C). In South Asia, the increase in the euro’s share is
observed to be concurrent with a decline in the shares of the USD and the JPY.
Taken together, our findings on the currency compositions of PPG debt thus far
make an interesting contrast to, for instance, those on private bond issuances as reported
by Hale, Jones, and Spiegel (2014). These authors find a substantial decline in the share
of international bonds denominated in the major currencies and an increase in bonds
denominated in an issuer’s home currencies during the last two decades. Nonetheless,
aside from the difference in public versus private issuances, we note two additional
sources of differences in the findings. Their country sample consisted primarily of
advanced economies, including those of the major currencies. Additionally, they
considered the new issuances, whereas we consider the stock.
3. Fluctuations in exchange rates and debt burdens
3.a
Debt-weighted effective exchange rates
Depreciation of a domestic currency can have various consequences depending on
the currencies against which it depreciates. A major concern for many MICs and LICs is
the extent to which the depreciation increases the burden of their external debt. To
capture the extent of the debt revaluation effect, constructing an index that measures the
overall value of a debtor’s currency against the currencies in which its external debt is
denominated would be useful.
Using data on the currency composition of PPG debt and bilateral nominal exchange
rates, we construct the DEER index
9
S i , j ,t
DEERi ,t = ∏ j
S
i
,
j
,
2010
γ i , j ,t
(2)
for which γ i , j ,t is the share of currency j for country i’s external PPG debt in year t,
and S i , j ,t is the bilateral nominal exchange rate between i’s currency and currency j ∊
{USD, euro, JPY, GBP, CHF, others}. To make the index consistent with the real
effective exchange rate series in the next sub-section, we use the bilateral nominal
exchange rate measured by the number of currency j per i’s currency (i.e., the number of
foreign currencies per domestic currency), and it is indexed to its 2010 value. 10
One data issue to note is how to treat debt denominated in currencies other than the
major currencies. More specifically, the IDS database contains composition categories
labeled “All other currencies” and “Multiple currencies” without further specifications
on which currencies they actually are. Constrained by data limitations, we make a
simplifying assumption that the debt in categories other than the major currencies is
denominated in a debtor’s own currency. This assumption makes the constructed DEER
index appear more stable than it actually is. We keep this phenomenon in mind when
interpreting the empirical results. Nonetheless, given the dominance of the major
currencies in debt denomination as documented in the previous section, we believe that
fluctuations against the major currencies draw the essential picture.
3.b
Debt revaluation and cost competitiveness gain in trade
It is not only the value of foreign-currency-denominated debt that is affected when a
debtor’s exchange rate fluctuates. If a domestic currency depreciates against the
currencies of a debtor’s trading partners, then this depreciation can also translate into
10
An increase in the debt-weighted effective exchange rate index indicates domestic
appreciation.
10
cost competitiveness gains in international trade. 11 Consequently, this phenomenon
should assist the indebted country to invigorate its economy and repay part of its
external debt. The extent of the cost competitiveness gain effect depends on the
currency compositions of debt and trade, which can vary substantially by country.
Therefore, implications of domestic depreciation should also be diverse across countries
accumulating external debt. The point is not sufficiently addressed in the previous
literature on currency mismatch and original sin.
In this sub-section, we examine the association between the aforementioned two
effects arising from exchange rate changes: the debt revaluation effect and the cost
competitiveness gain effect. We do so by estimating the correlations between the DEER
and TREER series. The novelty of this measure is that it succinctly reflects how the two
distinct effects of exchange rate fluctuations interplay for a borrowing country. 12 The
feature is absent from the extant indices of currency mismatch that rely on the total
value of external liabilities in relation to that of export and other assets at a given point
in time. 13
Unfortunately, the real effective exchange rate series are available only for a subset
of the sample countries. Consequently, we have both the DEER and TREER indices for
only fifty countries―the MICs and the LICs combined. As a supplementary indicator
we consider the ratio of total debt stock (DSTC) to exports of goods, services, and
primary income. In addition, we estimate the correlations between the DEERs and the
11
The relative inflation is assumed to be stable and does not offset exchange rate
movements, at least in the short run.
12
The actual trade of a debtor country can be shaped in part by factors outside its own
trade network. In this sense, the measure we propose does not exclude the third country
effects since the TREER is based on the actual trade. The point should be borne in mind
when interpreting the empirical results.
13
For instance, see Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2007), Goldstein and Turner
(2004), and Ranciere, Tornell, and Vamvakidis (2010b).
11
bilateral nominal USD exchange rates (USDX) to use as a reference. To avoid spurious
correlations, we use the first differences of logged data for all series.
Table 3 summarizes the correlations between the DEER and other series. Panel A
presents the descriptive statistics when using all available observations. As a benchmark
reference, we first report the correlation between the DEER and the USDX. The DEER–
USDX correlation is notably high at 0.84 on average, confirming the dominance of the
USD as a debt-denominating currency. Almost all countries in the sample exhibit a
positive DEER–USDX correlation. 14
The average correlation between the DEER and the TREER is 0.55. The positive
correlation implies that exchange rate changes that increase the domestic currency value
of external debt also tend to improve cost competitiveness in trade, albeit not in a
one-for-one fashion. Nonetheless, the DEER–TREER correlation appears substantially
lower than the DEER–USDX correlation. 15 This finding implies that the heavy
concentration on the USD in debt denomination drives a wedge between the extents of
debt revaluation and trade competitiveness gains as the debtor’s exchange rate
fluctuates. Further, we notice that the DEER–TREER correlation is more variable than
the DEER–USDX one. The minimum (−0.50) and the maximum (0.89) are recorded by
Ukraine and Nigeria, respectively.
The positive DEER–TREER correlations suggest that domestic depreciation
increases the burden of external debt on the one hand and improves the cost
competitiveness in international trade on the other hand. What is the balance between
14
The only country that exhibits a negative correlation is Azerbaijan. At the other
extreme, Kosovo shows a correlation of unity implying that all of their PPG debt is
denominated in USD.
15
The result is not an artifact of different sample sizes. As shown in Panel B of Table 3,
using the identical samples does not alter the conclusion.
12
the two effects? The bottom row of the panel reports the DEER correlations with debt
stock as a percentage of the export of goods, services, and primary income. A decline in
the value of the DEER indicates domestic depreciation. Although the ratio between the
debt stock and exports can translate into both revaluation of external debt and growth in
exports, it can increase or decrease to generate a negative or positive DEER–DSTC
correlation. 16
As displayed in the bottom row of Panel A, the DEER–DSTC correlation varies
substantially by country and ranges from −0.68 (Ethiopia) to 0.92 (Myanmar), with a
mean near zero. The distributional balance between positive and negative correlations
also reveals the non-unanimity of the countries. Specifically, sixty-eight and fifty
countries exhibit positive and negative correlations, respectively. Again, the main
message is that countries are diverse in their experiences of debt revaluation and cost
competitiveness gain effects under exchange rates fluctuations.
Although we have used all available observations so far, the differences in the
samples make it difficult to compare the entries across rows in Panel A of Table 3. Thus,
we recalculate the statistics using a common sample consisting only of countries and
years for which all necessary data are available. This recalculation reduces the sample
size to forty-five. The common sample results are summarized in panel B. They turn out
quite comparable to those in panel A, requiring no significant alteration to our
conclusions.
Figure 3 presents the DEER–TREER correlation estimates by subsamples to
visualize possible heterogeneity. As displayed, LICs tends to have a higher correlation
and, hence, more accordant currency compositions than MICs. When classified by
16
Note that the ratio of debt to exports and not net exports is observable from the
available data.
13
region, Europe and Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, respectively, have the lowest
and highest correlations. Their difference is statistically significant. 17
4.
Implications of the debt–trade “mismatch”
4.a
Augmented growth regression specifications
In view of the aforementioned results, we are now poised to raise an essential
question: Does the extent of the currency-compositional discord between external debt
and international trade have significant welfare implications as hypothesized in the
introduction section? We answer the question by estimating growth regressions to test
whether the extent of the debt–trade mismatch exerts a significant effect on a country’s
growth performance.
Specifically, we estimate the following cross-country regression equation
∆Y i = α + γ ' X i + φ1VOLi + φ2CORi + φ3 (VOLi × CORi ) + ε i ,
(3)
for which ∆Yi is the average growth rate of per capita real GDP of country i. X i is a
vector of standard growth regression variables included as controls. They are the initial
level of GDP per capita (in logarithm), investment, government consumption,
population growth rate, secondary education school enrollment rate, trade openness (i.e.,
total trade to GDP), and debt stock. 18 Investment, government consumption, and debt
stock are measured in relative terms to GDP. With the exception of the initial level of
GDP per capita, the control variables are measured in their sample average terms.
17
The subsample averages are tested for equality. We additionally investigated whether
the DEER–TREER correlations differ by exchange rate regimes using the three-way
classification scheme of Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). The cross-regime
differences in average correlations are found to be statistically insignificant.
18
Investment is measured using gross fixed capital formation. For the choice of
controls, see Barro (1991), Durlauf and Quah (1999), Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011),
and Panizza and Presbitero (2014), among many others.
14
The regressors of our primary interest are those with ϕ coefficients. Namely, VOLi
is the exchange rate volatility measured using variances of the first differences of
logged nominal effective exchange rates. CORi is the DEER–TREER correlation. A
larger CORi value indicates closer co-movement driven by more accordant currency
compositions and, hence, a smaller extent of the debt–trade mismatch.
We emphasize that the interaction term, VOLi × CORi , in (3) is indispensable
because the growth effect of the debt–trade mismatch should depend on how much i’s
nominal exchange rate actually changes. For instance, when a country’s exchange rate
stays perfectly still, no revaluation effect on its external debt exists. 19 Only to the extent
that a country’s nominal exchange rate actually fluctuates, its external debt valuation
also changes. Then, considering how much of the debt revaluation effect will be
compensated by the cost competitiveness gain effect that also arises from the exchange
rate fluctuations becomes meaningful. Omitting the interaction term from (3) results in a
specification that restricts the extent of the debt–trade mismatch to affect all countries in
an identical manner regardless of the extent of exchange rate variability, and vice versa.
Note that in (3), the effect of the DEER–TREER correlations on growth is measured
by φ2 + φ3VOLi . We stress that φ2 does not represent the marginal effect of the DEER–
TREER correlations on growth. Instead, it measures the effect of the DEER–TREER
correlations when no nominal exchange rate variability exists. Because nominal
effective exchange rates fluctuate even for countries with a successful fixed exchange
rate regime, VOLi takes a positive value for all countries.
4.b
19
Empirical results
Consequently, currency mismatch is not even an issue.
15
Table 4 summarizes the estimates of (3) and its variants. We begin with a
bare-boned specification that includes only the conventional growth regression variables.
The estimates are provided in Column 1 of Table 4. The signs of the coefficient
estimates are in accordance with the expectations based on the literature. The effect of
the initial income level is significantly negative, implying convergence. The investment
ratio exerts a highly significant positive effect, whereas government consumption has a
negative effect with only moderate significance. Although statistically insignificant, the
population growth and school enrollment rates obtain negative and positive coefficients,
respectively, which is in line with the conventional theoretical predictions and the
existing evidence. The effect of the trade openness variable also turns out to be
insignificant. The debt to GDP ratio has a significantly negative effect on growth, which
is consistent with the findings of recent studies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010 and 2011). 20
In columns 2 and 3, we report the estimates when incrementally including VOLi
and CORi without allowing their interaction. These constrained estimates suggest that
exchange rate volatility by itself does not exert a significant effect on growth. A similar
observation is made on the effect of CORi . The adjusted r-squared estimates indicate
deterioration of the model’s explanatory power relative to the bare-boned specification.
In contrast, the unconstrained specification estimates of (3) reported in column 4
reveal significant effects. The exchange rate volatility variable obtains a significant
negative coefficient, whereas the interaction term VOLi × CORi attains a significant
positive effect. Further, the adjusted r-squared estimates attest noticeable improvement
in terms of explanatory power.
20
Panizza and Presbitero (2014) noted that for a sample of OECD countries, negative
debt–growth correlation may be driven by a third factor and is not the product of a
direct causal effect. See also Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013) for related evidence.
16
As already noted, the coefficient estimate on VOLi (i.e., φˆ1 ) does not represent
the marginal effect of exchange rate volatility on economic growth. Instead, it gauges
the exchange rate volatility effect when CORi is zero. Because φˆ3 , the coefficient on
the interaction term, is significantly positive, as the value of CORi increases (i.e., as
the extent of debt–trade mismatch diminishes), the negative effect of exchange rate
volatility is reduced. In fact, the combined effect, φˆ1 + φˆ3CORi , turns positive once
CORi exceeds a certain threshold. That is, nominal effective exchange rate volatility
can exert either growth-hindering or growth-enhancing effects depending on the level
of the debt–trade currency-compositional discord. 21
For the combined effect of exchange rate volatility to be positive for growth, the
DEER–TREER correlation must exceed 0.65. This threshold value slightly exceeds the
median value (0.63). More specifically, of the 45 countries in the sample, 21 possess
DEER–TREER correlation values greater than 0.65. 22 For these countries, the DEER–
TREER correlation is substantial (i.e., the debt–trade currency-compositional
mismatch is small) enough for marginal increases in exchange rate variability to have
an overall stimulating effect on growth. In contrast, the majority of the countries
experience downward pressure on growth when their exchange rates become more
volatile.
21
In considering the effects of capital account liberalization, Henry (2007) argues that
purely cross-sectional growth regressions are problematic since they cannot identify
temporary shifts in growth rates. In our regressions, exchange rate fluctuations can
occur repeatedly unlike the one-shot permanent liberalization of capital account in
Henry (2007). Thus, even though each shock may have only temporary effects,
recurrent shocks can lead to differences in average growth rates.
22
Specifically, the 21 countries are Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Dominica, Gabon, Georgia, Grenada, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Philippines, Romania, South Africa and Venezuela (17 MICs); and Central
Africa Republic, Gambia, Malawi, and Togo (four LICs).
17
To check the robustness of the results, we additionally estimate a specification that
controls for the amount of foreign exchange reserves relative to GDP. As discussed in
the introduction, reserves can play an important role as buffer assets and, thus, may
affect growth performance. However, the estimates reported in column 5 indicate no
significant changes to our findings. The reserve variable is insignificant, whereas the
effects on the key regressors remain virtually intact, suggesting robustness of our chief
results.
5.
Conclusions
For emerging and less developed economies, borrowing abroad typically means
borrowing in foreign currencies. Heavy reliance on foreign currency-denominated debt
makes the borrowing countries more vulnerable to the debt revaluation effect of
domestic depreciation. Although the predominance of USD as a debt denomination
currency has been recognized as a significant factor behind recurrent crises, the
empirical evidence in this study shows no indication that this predominance is subsiding.
In fact, we find that the USD is becoming more dominant than ever as the choice of a
denominating currency for external debt among many MICs and LICs.
Even though many countries need to borrow abroad in foreign currencies, more
than just one foreign currency exists to denominate the debt. When the currency
compositions of external debt and international trade are in adequate accordance,
domestic depreciation that increases the burden of external debt also leads to cost
competitiveness gains for international trade. Thus, the debt revaluation effect is more
likely to be offset, at least partially, by a subsequent increase in net exports. In a sense,
18
a self-alleviation mechanism can be built by having the “right” currency compositions
to denominate a country’s external debt.
The correspondence between the currency compositions of external debt and
international trade can have important implications for the economic performance of
debtor countries. Indeed, our growth regression results attest that countries with more
accordant debt–trade currency compositions tend to have growth advantages. In other
words, from the countries with original sin and currency mismatches, certain ones suffer
from “another mismatch” and others do not. The issue is not whether to borrow in
foreign currencies; instead, the issue is who borrows in which foreign currencies and
trades with whom. Thus, the implications of seemingly excessive USD-debt, for
instance, are not the same across countries. In summary, not all original sin is equally
sinful.
Needless to say, borrowers cannot unilaterally and freely select the currencies in
which their debt will be denominated. Nonetheless, lenders should also be interested in
avoiding debt crises and detrimental economic consequences. In this sense, the findings
of this study suggest that it is worth reconsidering the currency denomination strategies
of the external debt of MICs and LICs. In doing so, it is also important to understand the
strategic currency choice by exporting firms examined in the other chapter.
Countries with significant debt–trade currency compositional mismatches bear
implicit costs in terms of growth that might be avoided by revising the currency
compositions of their external debt denomination. The cost is implicit in that the
significant growth-suppressing effect of another mismatch has not been explicitly
recognized in the previous literature.
19
Of course, altering the currency composition of external debt is not costless. For
instance, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) found that financial underdevelopment in
emerging markets makes agents undervalue insuring against domestic depreciation. A
crucial consequence is that they choose, rather than being forced, to use excessive dollar
debt. If so, domestic financial development needs to precede rebalancing of the currency
compositions of the external debt. In general, the extent of financial development can be
a factor influencing the relationship between the choice of currency compositions of
debt and economic performance.
In addition, the real cost of the debt–trade currency compositional mismatch needs
to be evaluated by netting out its benefit. With the USD as the debt denomination
currency, borrowers are likely to have better access to external capital. Thus, the balance
between accessibility and risk needs to be considered.
Finally, although the analytical focus of this study is set specifically on the debt–
trade mismatch, examining whether the growth effects we find extend to a broader
measure of currency exposure, such as that proposed by Lane and Shambaugh (2009),
would be interesting. These issues are reserved for future research.
20
Data Appendix
Sources
The data used in this study are obtained from the following sources:
International Debt Statistics, World Bank.
World Development Indicators, World Bank.
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Sample period
The primary sample period is 1980–2012. Depending on data availability, some
countries have shorter samples.
Euro: exchange rate 1999–2012; currency composition 2001–2012.
Deutsche mark and French franc: exchange rate 1980–1998; currency composition
1980–2000. The exchange rates for 1999 and 2000 are set to 1 euro = 1.95583 DM and
1 euro = 6.55957 FF.
Sample countries
Our sample consists of all middle- and low-income countries in the WDI for which
data on external debt currency composition are available. The MIC and LIC samples,
respectively, consist of ninety-one and thirty-three countries listed below. For the
analyses in sections 3 and 4, the number of countries in the samples is further reduced
because of limited data availability.
Middle-income countries (91 countries): Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize*, Bhutan, Bolivia*, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria*, Cabo Verde, Cameroon*, China*, Colombia*, Republic of
Congo, Costa Rica*, Cote d'Ivoire*, Djibouti, Dominica*, Dominican Republic*,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji*, Gabon*, Georgia*, Ghana*, Grenada*, Guatemala,
Guyana*, Honduras, Hungary*, India, Indonesia, Iran*, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho*, Macedonia*, Malaysia*,
Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico*, Moldova*, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Morocco*, Nicaragua*, Nigeria*, Pakistan*, Panama, Papua New Guinea*, Paraguay*,
Peru, Philippines*, Romania*, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa*, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia*, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines*, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia*,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine*, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela*, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia.
Low-income countries (33 countries): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Burundi*, Cambodia, Central African Republic*, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of Congo*, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia*, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi*, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone*, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo*, Uganda*, Zimbabwe.
“*” indicates countries for which data availability allows us to calculate the DEER–
TREER correlations. These 45 countries constitute the sample for the growth
regressions in section 4.
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Table 1.
Currency composition of PPG external debt
Middle-income countries
Low-income countries
Number of countries
91
33
A. Share of PPG debt (%)
Debt stock
Debt service
70.22
70.24
83.62
95.93
B. Currency composition (%)
US dollar
Euro
Deutsche mark
French franc
Japanese yen
British pound
Swiss franc
Major currencies
Others
50.14
16.15
3.49
5.26
6.76
2.07
0.95
81.35
9.78
49.05
8.22
1.64
5.52
4.49
1.94
0.93
68.17
17.21
C. Trends by currency
US dollar
Euro
Japanese yen
British pound
Swiss franc
Others
+49, −17
+22, −33
+36, −20
+2, −56
+5, −45
+31, −43
+21, −2
+4, −12
+6, −8
+0, −25
+0, −16
+12, −13
Notes: In panel A, the average shares of public and publicly guaranteed debt stock
(service) in total debt stock (service) are reported. The sample period is 1980-2012. In
panel B, “Major currencies” refers to the total shares of the U.S. dollar, euro, Japanese
yen, British pound, and Swiss franc. For 1980–2000, the euro is replaced by the German
mark and the French franc. “Others” indicates the shares of all currencies other than
those in “Major currencies.” The sample period is 1980–2012 except for the euro
(2001–2012), deutsche mark (1980–2000), and French franc (1980–2000). In panel C,
entries with a “+ (−)” sign denote the numbers of countries exhibiting a positive
(negative) trend in the share of the corresponding currency in the first column. Trends
are estimated by (1) in the main text.
Table 2.A Currency composition of PPG external debt by region
East Asia & the
Pacific
Europe &
Central Asia
South Asia
Number of countries
16
21
8
A. Share of PPG debt (%)
Debt stock
Debt service
72.90
69.15
55.57
52.91
85.10
78.71
B. Currency composition (%)
US Dollar
Euro
Deutsch mark
French franc
Japanese yen
British pound
Swiss franc
Major currencies
Others
40.71
5.17
2.80
2.99
16.56
1.72
0.46
74.77
11.53
54.99
25.43
5.23
0.82
6.88
0.19
1.60
91.02
3.19
47.12
6.55
2.11
0.96
10.17
2.16
0.15
67.54
12.09
C. Trends by currency
US Dollar
Euro
Japanese yen
British pound
Swiss franc
Others
+10, −2
+0, −6
+6, −4
+0, −11
+1, −8
+5, −6
+6, −6
+10, −6
+9, −2
+2, −6
+1, −8
+10, −9
+3, −1
+1, −3
+5, −1
+0, −7
+0, −3
+1, −6
Notes: The entries are for the countries that belong to the regional categories denoted at
the top. See also the notes for Table 1.
Table 2.B Currency composition of PPG external debt by region
Latin America
& the Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Number of countries
24
10
45
A. Share of PPG debt (%)
Debt stock
Debt service
73.06
71.96
77.23
80.97
80.21
74.24
B. Currency composition (%)
US Dollar
Euro
Deutsche mark
French franc
Japanese yen
British pound
Swiss franc
Major currencies
Others
67.18
5.70
1.95
2.03
3.58
2.98
0.23
89.28
4.74
43.52
28.80
3.76
10.77
7.33
0.93
0.66
79.49
16.15
43.35
14.38
2.58
9.40
2.52
2.73
1.42
68.15
18.53
C. Trends by currency
US Dollar
Euro
Japanese yen
British pound
Swiss franc
Others
+21, −1
+2, −12
+5, −9
+0, −18
+0, −13
+2, −17
+3, −7
+5, −2
+6, −1
+0, −5
+1, −6
+5, −3
+27, −2
+8, −16
+11, −11
+0, −34
+2, −23
+20, −15
Notes: See the notes for Table 2.A.
Table 3.
Correlations between debt-weighted effective exchange rate and other indices
Sample size
Positive
A. Maximum sample
(DEER, USDX)
(DEER, REER)
(DEER, DSTC)
111
50
118
110
48
68
B. Common sample
(DEER, USDX)
(DEER, REER)
(DEER, DSTC)
45
45
45
45
43
22
Negative
Mean
Std. dev.
Minimum
Maximum
1
2
50
0.84
0.55
0.02
0.19
0.30
0.28
−0.37
−0.50
−0.68
1.00
0.89
0.92
0
2
23
0.85
0.53
−0.02
0.15
0.31
0.26
0.30
−0.50
−0.53
0.99
0.89
0.59
Notes: The entries indicate correlations among the followings: debt-weighted effective exchange rates (DEER), trade-weighted real
effective exchange rates (TREER), bilateral USD rates (USDX), and external debt stocks (DSTC) as percents of exports of goods,
services, and primary income. The correlations are based on the first difference of the logged series. Panel A contains statistics based on
all available observations. In panel B, the correlations are calculated using the identical country and year samples.
Table 4.
Growth regression estimates
1
−.857*
(.336)
Investment
.205**
(.065)
Government cons. −.114†
(.064)
Population growth −.181
(.313)
School enrollment .016
(.013)
Trade openness
−.003
(.007)
Debt stock/GDP
−1.184*
(.508)
VOL
Initial GDP
2
3
4
5
−.906*
(.348)
.201**
(.064)
−.117†
(.065)
−.190
(.317)
.015
(.013)
−.001
(.007)
−1.547*
(.621)
.097
(.225)
−.960*
(.369)
.198**
(.062)
−.109†
(.063)
−.207
(.325)
.019
(.014)
−.001
(.007)
−1.534*
(.625)
.097
(.202)
.677
(.877)
−1.032**
(.355)
.179**
(.063)
−.123*
(.056)
−.086
(.343)
.024
(.015)
−.001
(.007)
−1.559*
(.568)
−1.852*
(.695)
−.517
(1.035)
2.848**
(.985)
.520
45
.521
45
.562
45
−.962**
(.322)
.171**
(.055)
−.119*
(.055)
−.093
(.353)
.023
(.015)
−.001
(.008)
−1.301*
(.571)
−1.854*
(.712)
−.564
(1.055)
2.817**
(1.004)
.003
(.006)
.557
45
COR
VOL×COR
Reserves/GDP
Adjusted R2
n
.527
45
Notes: The entries summarize the estimates of the cross-country growth regression (3)
in the main text and some variant specifications. The sample size is 45 for all estimates.
Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. VOL is the
variances of the nominal effective exchange rates. COR is the correlation between
debt-weighted effective exchange rates and trade-weighted real effective exchange rates.
First differences of the logged data are used for all exchange rates.
Figure 1. Average PPG share by denominating currency (%)
A. Middle-income countries
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
USD
Euro
JPY
GBP
CHF
Others
0
B. Low-income countries
60
50
40
USD
Euro
30
20
JPY
GBP
CHF
10
Others
0
Notes: The figures depict the cross-country averages of the percentage shares of PPG
debt by denominating currency.
Figure 2. Regional average PPG share by denominating currency (%)
A. East Asia and the Pacific
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
USD
EURO
JPY
GBP
CHF
OTHERS
0
B. Europe and Central Asia
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
USD
EURO
JPY
GBP
CHF
OTHERS
Figure 2. Regional average PPG share by denominating currency (%)
C. South Asia
70
60
50
40
USD
EURO
JPY
30
20
10
GBP
CHF
OTHERS
0
D. Latin America and the Caribbean
90
80
70
60
USD
50
EURO
40
30
20
10
0
JPY
GBP
CHF
OTHERS
Figure 2. Regional average PPG share by denominating currency (%)
E. Middle East and North Africa
60
50
40
USD
EURO
30
20
10
JPY
GBP
CHF
OTHERS
0
F. Sub-Saharan Africa
60
50
40
USD
EURO
30
20
10
0
JPY
GBP
CHF
OTHERS
Figure 3.
Average DEER-TREER correlations by country groups
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Middleincome
Low-income
East Asia &
the Pacific
Europe &
Central Asia
South Asia Latin America Middle East Sub-Saharan
& the
& North
Africa
Caribbean
Africa