CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 2
Facit and the Displacement of
Mechanical Calculators
Christian Sandström
Chalmers University of Technology and the Ratio
Institute, Sweden
Facit, a successful Swedish manufacturer of mechanical calculators
and typewriters, collapsed in the shift from mechanical to electronic
calculators in the early 1970s. This article describes how Facit
struggled during this transition and explains why the company lost its
competitive advantage after almost 40 years of successful expansion
and continued profitability.
Gordon Moore, the cofounder of Fairchild
Semiconductor and Intel, suggested in 1965
that digital technology would become exponentially cheaper and better during the following decades. His prediction that the
number of transistors on an integrated circuit
would double in 18 months became a surprisingly accurate forecast of how digital technology has evolved since then.1
His colleague, Robert Noyce, who coinvented the integrated circuit, argued in
1977 that this development would both create entrepreneurial opportunities and displace other technologies.2 It is frequently
argued in literature on the economics of innovation that technological innovations create extensive uncertainty and industrial
turbulence. Industry incumbents often struggle to sustain their competitiveness when facing a technological discontinuity.3
This article seeks to describe and explain
how Facit, a Swedish incumbent firm in the
office machine industry, lost its competitive
advantage in the shift from mechanical to
electronic calculators. After almost 40 years
of successful expansion and continued profitability, Facit’s success abruptly ended in
1971–1972. Facit’s management was accused
by the Swedish press of having failed to recognize the microelectronic revolution. Although this myth has been debunked by
other scholars,4 more knowledge is needed
concerning why Facit struggled in the shift
to electronics. How could Facit encounter
such difficulties despite having understood
that electronics would displace its mechanical calculators?
2
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
The article begins with a brief review of literature on technological discontinuities. This
is followed by more detailed background on
the company and the office machine industry. Lastly, the article explores the shift to
electronics and Facit’s actions to counter
this threat.
Literature on Technological
Discontinuities
‘‘It is not the owner of stage-coaches who
builds railways.’’
— Joseph Schumpeter5
Technologies tend to evolve along certain
trajectories. Occasionally, these trajectories
are punctuated by a discontinuous change
that upsets the established paradigm.6 It is
well documented that established firms
often encounter difficulties when the underlying technology is altered. An abundant
body of literature has explored under what
conditions incumbents struggle to handle
such changes.
Some scholars have argued that a key determinant of incumbent failure is the extent
to which existing competencies are rendered
obsolete.7 When firm competencies have
been built and refined in relation to an established technological paradigm, this knowledge is often considered to be path
dependent and difficult to change.8 Discontinuous changes may therefore turn core
competencies into core rigidities, hampering
a firm’s attempts to develop a radically different technology. This logic does not only
Published by the IEEE Computer Society
1058-6180/13/$31.00
2013 IEEE
c
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 3
relate to technological skills, but also the cognitive capabilities of a firm’s employees.9
Another stream of research has pointed
out that incumbent firms frequently lack
incentives to invest in new ventures because
they are already committed to an established
product portfolio and therefore face a high
opportunity cost.10 Because new technologies often start out as inferior and initially
prosper in fringe markets, large, established
firms are usually not able to prioritize small,
uncertain markets that offer lower profits.11
A third category of explanations is related
to changes in industry structure and firm
linkages to the market. Technological discontinuities that distort established customer
relations are considered particularly difficult
to manage.12 An incumbent’s performance
will also be affected negatively if a new technology lowers the barriers to entering the industry because such a change often increases
competition.13
Although the available literature points
out some of the factors that influence an
incumbent’s response to a technological discontinuity, it is not exhaustive. There are
determinants of incumbent failure, the role
of which has not been sufficiently explored
by previous literature. In other academic
domains, scholars have shown that differences in country-specific institutional settings
generally affect the performance of firms. Access to skilled labor, innovative suppliers, and
lead customers are factors that influence the
competitiveness of a firm.14 Although we
would expect that the location of a firm
shapes its response to a technological transition, this issue needs to be further explored.15
The empirical description in this article illustrates that this was indeed the case for Facit.
The contribution of this article is therefore
twofold. Apart from providing a detailed empirical account of Facit’s decline, it adds to
our theoretical understanding of technological discontinuities by suggesting that factor
conditions in a firm’s environment partly determine how it handles a technological
discontinuity.
Industry and Company Background
The office machine industry can be traced
back to the late 19th century when mainly
American firms developed typewriters, adding and calculating machines, and cash registers. The industry became increasingly
consolidated during the first half of the
20th century and remained stable until the
rise of electronics in the 1960s and 1970s.
These companies were vertically integrated
and had their own R&D, production, and
marketing organizations. Another reason for
being vertically integrated was the need for
specialized components, and hence, the industry was capital intensive. Facit’s mechanical calculators contained approximately
2,300 components that required specialized
machinery to be produced. In combination
with the fact that electromechanical technology had been incrementally enhanced over
several decades, this implied that there were
high barriers to entering the industry.16 At
times, the industry was referred to as ‘‘the office machine club,’’ implying that there were
only a few, well-established firms and little
opportunity for entry.17 Firms such as Olivetti, Olympia, and Facit dominated their respective domestic markets in Europe.
Up until 1965, Facit was called Åtvidabergs
Industrier. The company had gone bankrupt
in the early 1920s when the Swedish economy experienced a significant downturn. By
the time it was taken over by Elof Ericsson,
there were only 200 employees. In 1928,
Ericsson acquired a calculator patent. Unlike
other mechanical calculators, this design
had only 10 digits, making it lighter and
cheaper to manufacture. After years of refinements, the company launched the world’s
first mechanical calculator using only 10 digits in 1932. It was called Facit and experienced a remarkable success that fuelled the
firm’s growth in the following decades. By
that time, the Facit calculator was arguably
one of the most profitable products in Sweden. As the calculator became the flagship
of the firm, its name was changed to Facit
AB in 1965. Apart from some aesthetic modifications over the years, the Facit calculator
essentially remained the same for 40 years.18
Based on the calculator’s success, Facit became the dominant force in the Swedish office machine industry. It acquired
typewriter manufacturer Halda (1938) and
the calculating machine company OriginalOdhner (1942). Because Halda did not have
any sales organization, it was easily integrated into Facit’s business. However, Original-Odhner was left intact with its own
sales force up until 1966,19 even though the
benefits of integrating them were numerous.
After these acquisitions, Addo was the
only remaining competitor in Sweden. Over
time, Addo was outperformed by Facit, largely thanks to more efficient operations and a
stronger sales organization. Facit eventually
acquired Addo in 1966 and emerged as the
July–September 2013
3
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 4
Facit and the Displacement of Mechanical Calculators
Table 1. Facit turnover and profits, 1960–1971.
Year
Revenue
(million SEK)*
Earnings before
income tax
(million SEK)*
Operating
margin (%)
1960
299
35.4
11.8
1961
343
47.7
13.9
1962
381
28.6
7.5
1963
408
32.6
8
1964
467
47.6
10.1
1965
519
58
11.1
1966
696
49.1
7
1967
723
30.5
4.2
1968
804
40.5
5
1969
879
42.9
4.9
1970
1,002
25
2.5
1971
953
–54.4
–5.7
* Five Swedish krona (SEK) corresponds to approximately one US
dollar.24
national champion of the Swedish office machine industry with a broad portfolio of mechanical calculators, typewriters, and office
furnishings. Although the scope of Facit was
broadened in these years, mechanical calculators remained its main source of profit.20
For instance, in 1967, 52 percent of its corporate profit could be attributed to sales of mechanical calculators.21
The company also expanded to other geographical markets and established subsidiaries in Norway (1948), France (1949), the
United States (1950), Brazil (1950), Germany
(1951), and Mexico (1958). Throughout Latin
America, Africa, India and Australia, Facit’s
products were sold both via their own sales
organization and through special dealers. In
1964, the company had more than 100
such dealers. Facit also established several
manufacturing sites across the world, for example, in Brazil, India, and Mexico.
Much like its American competitors, Facit
remained vertically integrated and developed
a large market organization that gave the
firm a competitive advantage. In the small
Swedish market, Facit had approximately 90
sales offices and 120 engineering workshops
where machines could be repaired. These
offices exhibited Facit’s calculators, typewriters, and office furniture. About five salespersons would work in one office. They
visited customers frequently and invited
them to meetings, dinners, and various
events to maintain good relations.
Because calculators were capital goods
in those days and cost about 3,000 Swedish krona (SEK, approximately US$600),
4
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
purchasing one was a considerable investment, and often, customers would first borrow a calculator for a couple of weeks.
Bearing inflation in mind, 3,000 SEK in the
1950s would correspond to an amount
about 10 times larger in today’s currency
(US$6,000). Before a transaction was made,
the salesperson would both install the machine and briefly educate customers on
how to use it. The sales force and service networks were a key source of competitive advantage for manufacturers of mechanical
calculators and further increased barriers to
entering the industry. This observation has
been confirmed elsewhere; a senior executive for one such firm stated once that,
‘‘You don’t have a chance in this business
without this capability.’’22
Facit’s strong sales organization made it
possible to establish long-lasting relationships with customers, and this has been referred to as a key success factor for Facit.
The sales force was well trained and had a
strong common identity. Even today, more
than 40 years after Facit’s decline, former
sales staff still get together occasionally in
Sweden.
After World War II and up until the mid1960s, Facit experienced remarkable growth
as a result of the high demand for its products. In this era, demand exceeded supply
and customers were often clamoring for
Facit’s machines. At its peak, Facit had
about 10,000 employees in Sweden and
about 3,500 abroad.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the main task
of Facit’s directors seems to have been one of
managing growth along a defined and certain
trajectory. The CEO of Original-Odhner
reported to the board of Facit in 1966 concerning how the company had performed in
comparison to its 10-year plan implemented
in 1959. Original-Odhner had exceeded
expectations and was in fact two years ahead
of its plan regarding revenue growth.23 Factories across Sweden increased their capacity to
cope with demand for Facit’s products.
Although Facit was still a profitable company, evidence suggests that the company
entered a stagnant phase as early as 1965, before electronic calculators had any significant
impact. Table 1, which shows the turnover
and profits of Facit between 1960 and 1971,
clearly illustrates that both the profit in absolute numbers and the operating margin
peaked in 1965. The revenue growth between
1965 and 1966 can be attributed to the acquisition of Addo.
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 5
A couple of factors contributed to Facit’s
declining financial performance in these
years. First, by the mid-1960s markets became increasingly saturated as the long economic growth period after World War II
gradually came to an end. Customers were
no longer in desperate need of Facit’s products, and price competition, which had
been virtually nonexistent before, now
started to increase.
Second, Facit’s acquisition of Addo in 1966
decreased profitability as Addo was losing
money. Moreover, Addo was not integrated
at all into the Facit corporation. Sales, marketing, and product development was performed
in parallel by Addo and Facit,25 and thus, no
synergies were obtained from this acquisition.
In retrospect, CEO Gunnar Ericsson has stated
that it was a mistake to buy Addo. His main
rationale for doing so was fear that a foreign
competitor would take over Addo and enter
the Swedish market. Addo was in fact inferior
to Facit in most regards, so it can be questioned whether anyone was interested in
acquiring the company.26
Even though Facit’s performance declined
from the mid-1960s, minutes from board and
top management meetings in 1965 and 1966
do not reveal any concerns. Rather, management seems to have been occupied with expansion plans. In 1966, a company forecast
was presented to management projecting
that sales of mechanical calculators would
continue to increase 12 percent annually
over the coming years, which implied that
the number of employees in the calculator
business in Åtvidaberg would increase from
1,060 to 1,830. The only expressed reason
why this would be unrealistic was that the
local labor market would not cope with this
demand.27 Thus, in the years prior to the transition to electronics, top management seemed
positive about the company’s future. CEO
Gunnar Ericsson has often been described as
a genuinely optimistic person. Having experienced decades of continued expansion
and profitability, it can be argued that this
success also shaped the mindset of Facit’s
management.
Early Versions of Electronic Calculators
Calculators based on individual transistors
started to emerge in the early 1960s. These
devices were more reliable than the vacuum
tubes that had previously been the dominant
technology for electronic calculators. The
products were still complex and expensive
to manufacture because they contained
numerous discrete parts, and thus, their
production was a labor-intensive and timeconsuming process. Therefore, Japanese companies had a competitive advantage over
European and American manufacturers of
calculators as wages in Japan were approximately one-tenth of the wages in the Western world.28
The first electronic products were aimed at
niche applications such as specialized technical and scientific segments, a part of the market that Facit was not present in.16
Nevertheless, Facit made its first entry into
electronics in the 1950s when it created the
subsidiary Facit Electronics. Some of Sweden’s best electronic engineers were recruited
to the company between 1956 and 1962, and
significant investments were made to develop large computers. (These efforts have
been documented previously in IEEE
Annals29 and will therefore not be covered
in further detail here.) According to Gunnar
Ericsson (the CEO by that time), some
attempts were made to direct the group’s
efforts toward electronic calculators in these
years, but the potential was deemed to be
limited, especially considering how labor intensive electronic products were prior to the
introduction of integrated circuits. Additionally, competence in electronics was scarce in
Sweden in these years, and Facit had difficulties finding skilled employees.30
In the late 1950s, Facit had also established a relationship with North American
Aviation (NAA), a company that supplied
advanced electronics to NASA and for some
military applications. NAA’s subsidiary Autonetics considered developing electronic
products aimed at nonmilitary purposes. A
collaboration was set up between Facit and
Autonetics with the initial goal of developing
and manufacturing electronic products for
scientific and technical purposes that could
be sold throughout Facit’s global sales organization. The first versions would be delivered
in early 1966, and both parties hoped to
build a long-term relationship and later on
develop products for office use.
Autonetics experienced some technical
difficulties and was unable to specify a price.
The agreement would nevertheless last for
five years, but the eventual outcome of it is
unclear. This issue was scarcely mentioned
in board and top management meeting
minutes over the coming years, so the general
impression is that little came out of the collaboration. Other sources state that NAA
later licensed its know-how to Hayakawa
July–September 2013
5
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 6
Facit and the Displacement of Mechanical Calculators
Table 2. Calculators manufactured by Japanese companies
in March 1970.
Company
Sharp
Canon
Casio
Toshiba
Hitachi
Busicom
Rico
Others
Total volume
Volumes sold
41,500
17,600
10,500
10,500
7,400
7,200
5,500
13,300
113,500
Market share (%)
36.5
15.5
9.3
9.3
6.5
6.3
4.9
11.7
and other Japanese firms and that Facit may
have missed a unique opportunity here.31
One plausible explanation for why Facit
never went further with Autonetics could be
that an agreement with Hayakawa Electric
in Japan was set up at about the same time.
Hayakawa had launched its first all-transistorized electronic desktop calculator in 1964 and
later on changed its name to Sharp, which
was the brand that had been used for most
of its products. Having considered other potential partners such as Canon and IME, it
was clear to Facit’s directors that Sharp
offered the best products for office use.
Sharp would emerge as the dominant manufacturer of electronic calculators in the coming years.
Table 2 provides information on the volumes of calculators manufactured by Japanese companies in the industry in March
1970. Approximately 50 percent of this volume was exported.32 The table clearly shows
that Sharp was the undisputed market leader
at this time.
The agreement with Sharp would give
Facit the right to sell Hayakawa’s desktop
Table 3. Selection of Japanese manufacturers of electronic
calculators and the companies that sold them.
6
Manufacturers
Companies selling these calculators
Sharp
Canon
Hitachi
Busicom
Casio
Matshushita
Sanyo
Tatcichi
Sharp, Facit, Addo, Burroughs
Canon, Monroe
Hitachi, Friden
Busicom, NCR, IME
Casio, Commodore, Remington
National, Olympia
Sanyo, Dictaphone
Adler-Triumph, Oxron
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
calculator Sharp CS-10A on a nonexclusive
basis via its sales organization over the following two years. Sharp would still be able
to sell the machine on its own, and the
Facit version would have different colors
and use the Facit brand.33 An initial order
of 1,400 calculators at the unit price
US$530 was placed, with deliveries starting
in January 1966.34
According to CEO Gunnar Ericsson in
2009, this collaboration departed from Facit’s
method of operations because Facit had previously not sold products developed by
others. He points out two important reasons
for the agreement with Sharp. First, Facit had
to obtain a position in electronic calculators
and doing so was difficult because the company had little experience with electronics.
Second, it would have been virtually impossible for Facit to produce these calculators in
Sweden, considering the high wages and
labor-intensive nature of electronic calculators at this point.30 The reviewed material
does not indicate that Facit’s management
ever considered manufacturing electronic
calculators at this point. By the late 1960s,
several Western manufacturers of mechanical
calculators such as Burroughs, Monroe, Friden, and Olympia set up similar agreements
to Facit’s (see Table 3).
Table 3 shows a selection of Japanese manufacturers of electronic calculators and the
companies that sold them. The table illustrates that most Western manufacturers of
mechanical calculators tried to gain a foothold in electronics by collaborating with Japanese firms. Collaborations with Japanese
companies seem therefore to have been a
common strategy among firms similar to
Facit.
A new agreement with Sharp was signed
in 1967.35 Although electronic calculators
exhibited high growth rates in 1965–1967,
sales started from low levels and were insignificant when compared with mechanical
calculators. In 1966, Facit sold 773 of the
1,400 electronic calculators ordered from
Sharp, and the remaining ones were sold in
the coming years. This figure corresponds to
less than 1 percent of total calculator sales.
Having increased to about 3 percent in
1967, the total amount was still negligible
in terms of revenue and profit.36 Reading
minutes from board and management meetings in 1965–1966, one gets the impression
that little attention was paid to electronics
apart from the collaboration with Sharp,
which is mentioned occasionally.
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 7
The Shift to Electronics
‘‘The shift from mechanics to electronics was
a revolution.’’
— Lars Hallgren, CFO of Facit28
The early transistorized calculators were
larger and heavier, and they cost about
twice as much as Facit’s mechanical calculators. There was extensive media coverage of
electronics in these years, and curiosity
among certain price-insensitive customers
seems to have been the main rationale for
purchasing these calculators.
This started to change when individual
transistors were replaced by integrated circuits. A 25 to 35 percent price reduction
occurred almost instantly. With the introduction of medium-scale integrated (MSI)
electronics and later large-scale integrated
(LSI) electronics, electronic calculator prices
entered a phase of steep decline from 1966
on.37 For example, a nonprinting electronic
calculator cost about 6,500 SEK (US$1,300)
in 1966, and four years later it cost 2,600
SEK (US$520).38 A few years later, they
would cost approximately 1,000 SEK
(US$200), about one-third of what Facit usually charged for its mechanical calculators.
The rapid decline in prices, combined
with continued miniaturization fueled an explosive growth in sold volumes (see Figure 1).
Japanese manufacturers dominated the industry in these years, controlling 66 percent
of the global market in 1967 and 75 percent
in 1972. The number of sold units increased
by 18,000 percent between 1967 and
1972.39 New products were launched at an
accelerated pace, and older versions of electronic calculators were replaced quickly. At
the large Hannover fair where manufacturers
of calculators exhibit their latest products, 22
electronic calculators were presented in 1968.
This figure more than doubled the following
year, and in 1970, 68 electronic calculators
were exhibited, out of which only 13 had
been shown the previous year.40 In 1972,
160 electronic calculators were shown and
only 33 of them were left from 1971.39
Hence, the intensity of product launches
was in fact accelerating in these years.
Interestingly, Facit’s sales of electronic
products also increased rapidly during this
period (see Figure 2), mainly thanks to the
collaboration with Sharp. At the corporate
level, sales of electronic calculators increased
from 8,800 units in 1968 to 41,000 units in
1970 and was predicted to rise to 64,000
Figure 1. Global sales of mechanical, electromechanical, and electronic
calculators, 1968–1972. Figures are in thousands of units.39
units in 1971.41 In 1972, sales of electronic
calculators increased by 28 percent.42
Facit’s growth in sold electronic calculators however did not compensate for the decline in sales of mechanical calculators in
terms of revenues and profits. Margins on
electronic calculators were about 60 percent
lower than margins on mechanical calculators in 1968 and 1969.43 As order intake of
mechanical calculators decreased by almost
50 percent between 1970 and 1971, the company had to replace a high margin product
with a low margin product.44 This steep decline also forced Facit to lower prices on mechanical calculators,45 so the shift to
electronics had a considerable impact on
the corporation’s total profit.
Electronic calculators offered lower profits
for several reasons. First, because Japanese
companies dominated the electronic calculator business, their share of the total market
Figure 2. Facit’s sales of different calculators, 1966–1969. The graph only
includes the Swedish market and Facit’s international subsidiaries, but
not all dealers. Addo is not included in these figures.41
July–September 2013
7
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 8
Facit and the Displacement of Mechanical Calculators
became progressively larger and Facit’s market share smaller. Second, a significant increase in firms entering the industry could
be observed in 1971 and 1972, in both
Japan and the United States.46 In the US,
semiconductor manufacturers such as Texas
Instruments and Rockwell launched their
own calculators in 1972. From 1969 on,
Facit’s customers were approached by an
increasing number of manufacturers, forcing
Facit to lower prices. Thus, competitive rivalry in the industry became more intense
in these years, and price wars were more frequent. In late 1970, Sharp lowered its prices
by 50 percent.47 With only about six electronic calculators to offer in 1969, Facit’s
product portfolio was narrower than
Sharp’s, so Facit struggled to keep up with
competition.48
As new products were introduced at an
accelerating pace from 1970 and on, it became increasingly difficult for Facit to handle
inventories of both mechanical and electronic calculators. For instance, in July
1970, manufacturing had received information that 16,000 units of mechanical calculators should be made, but only 1,051 were
sold that year. Eventually, 6,000 units were
sold.49 Electronic calculators could be sold
for about one year, and consequently, there
was a great risk that inventories had to be
written off, especially when selling Sharp’s
products that had already been launched.
This trend was already visible in 1967 when
Facit had to get rid of its transistorized calculators because products using integrated circuits were taking over the market.50 In the
first quarter of 1971, Facit’s inventories rose
almost 30 percent,51 and by early autumn,
Addo had inventories corresponding to
seven or eight months of sales.52
The situation was worsened by the fact
that Sharp only offered limited technical support and maintenance of their calculators.53
Because products were continuously replaced
by better and cheaper models, Sharp saw little reason to offer extensive support or to provide spare parts. At one point, Sharp’s
deliveries to Facit contained 7 to 25 percent
dysfunctional products,54 and fixing them
turned out to be complicated and expensive55 since Facit’s service network lacked
the capability to do so.
As mentioned previously, having a large
service network had been a key source of
competitive advantage in the mechanical
era. With the shift to electronics, Facit
could no longer take full responsibility for
8
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
their calculators vis-à-vis customers. The conflicts between Facit and Sharp concerning
spare parts and dysfunctional products illustrate how service networks became less important once the shift to electronics gained
momentum.
The continued decline in prices and miniaturization of electronic calculators also affected Facit’s sales organization. With 90
sales offices in Sweden and its own subsidiaries abroad, Facit was extensively integrated
vertically. The firm’s sales model was
designed to build strong customer relations
and sell small volumes with high margins
per sold unit. By 1972, calculators had become so cheap that it made little sense to
sell them through Facit’s sales organization.56 Already in 1968, concerns were
expressed by Facit’s management that Sharp
would sell its calculators through other channels such as retailers.57 Additionally, with the
rise of small and simple pocket calculators,
sales staff no longer had to install machines
and instruct customers. During a top management meeting in 1971, a discussion took
place concerning whether or not Facit should
manufacture electronic calculators in the
long term. The CEO by that time, Gunnar
Agrell, answered that Facit should do so, provided that these products could be sold
through Facit’s sales organization and that
they were not aimed for retailers or other distribution channels.58
When calculators later on became consumer products, Facit’s extensive sales organization lost its value because profitability
could not be reached by selling small volumes of cheap products. Calculators were increasingly sold via bookstores, discount
retailers, and other channels that could handle the large volumes needed to remain profitable. This shift had only started to take
place in 1971–1972, however, and therefore
is probably not the main explanation for
the downfall of Facit.59
Facit’s Attempts to Develop Electronic
Calculators
‘‘The cogwheels in the mechanical calculators
were the soul of the company.’’
—Gert Persson, former employee
at Facit Electronics60
As stated previously, reading meeting
minutes from 1965 and 1966, one gets the
impression that Facit at this point had not
recognized the full impact of electronics.
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 9
From 1968 on, however, there is a much
higher sense of urgency and electronics receive more attention. During a meeting in
August 1968, the CEO stated that ‘‘electronic
calculators are growing rapidly. If we want to
remain competitive it is necessary to focus
our efforts on electronic machines.’’ At that
same meeting, it was also stated that it
would be many years before the company
had an electronic calculator of its own.61
An investigation in autumn 1968 suggested
that attempts at developing an electronic calculator would not be profitable for about four
years.
Nevertheless, there were some efforts at
making electronic calculators. The strategy
was to focus on higher segments while purchasing cheaper versions from Sharp.62 Development took place both at Addo
Electronics in the United Kingdom and in
Sweden, first in Stockholm and then in
Åtvidaberg.
In Sweden, Facit aimed to manufacture
8,000 calculators in 1971 and to sell 70,000
units in 1971–1972. This work turned out
to be more problematic than the company
had anticipated for a number of reasons.
More than 60 employees with skills in electronics had to be recruited to Åtvidaberg,
and it proved difficult to find people with
this competence.63 Also, Facit struggled to
reeducate its staff,64 and calls were made
for further education activities and a larger
diffusion of knowledge throughout the
company.65
Partly due to a lack of competence in
electronics, several technical difficulties
were encountered and resulted in severe
delays. An electronic calculator was shown
at several exhibitions in October and November 1971, and according to internal
sources, it was generally well received, but
sales could not take off as only about 100
machines were manufactured per week. 66
The situation had essentially not improved
by mid-1972 when a high degree of dysfunctional machines made it impossible to
meet demand.67
Facit’s efforts continued in the following
years, but in the end, the company failed to
launch any competitive products. They did
not stop these initiatives, however, until
1977.68 A couple of attempts at collaborations were also initiated in these years, for example, with Philips and Hewlett-Packard, but
they did not result in anything. Facit continued its collaboration with Sharp and the sold
electronic calculators still came from Japan.
The Crisis
‘‘We sit out in the forest and have no idea
what is going on in the world.’’
— Göran Arvidsson,
member of top management, 197169
Although Facit still made a profit of 25 million SEK (US$5 million) in 1970, the company had entered a period of steep decline.
In 1971, sales deteriorated and the company
reported a loss of 54.4 million SEK. About
1,500 employees were laid off that year.
Moreover, Gunnar Ericsson’s brother-in-law
Lennart von Kantzow had only been Facit’s
CEO for a short time when he was also fired
in late 1971 and temporarily replaced by
the CEO of Addo, Gunnar Agrell. In combination with the surprisingly large losses and
layoffs, this created a great deal of negative
publicity for Facit in 1971–1972. The situation got worse in 1972 when it was decided
that an additional 2,400 employees would
be dismissed. Because the situation was desperate, calls were made in the Swedish
media to nationalize Facit. Most of media attention focused on the fact that a previously
successful and well-reputed company had
suddenly entered a state of crisis. Few articles
tried to explain what had actually happened
to the company.
Facit’s stock had peaked at 390 SEK in
1966, and by 1972, it had declined to 60
SEK. Eventually, Electrolux, a Swedish manufacturer of stoves, vacuum cleaners, and
refrigerators acquired Facit, paying 64 million
SEK (80 SEK per share) in late 1972.28 Electrolux made several acquisitions at this time; the
rationale for buying Facit was probably its
balance sheet, where for example forests
worth 40 million SEK could be found.70
Facit continued to report losses in the following years despite extensive rationalizations.
In 1982, the company was sold to Ericsson,
a manufacturer of telecommunications
equipment, for 200 million SEK.31 It is hard
to tell whether Electrolux actually made a
profitable acquisition. Inflation was high
during those years so the numbers are difficult to compare. Moreover, the size of Facit’s
losses in the 1970s are unknown.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has sought to describe and explain why the office machine manufacturer
Facit struggled in the shift to electronic calculators, despite having recognized it at an
early point. The study shows that Facit
July–September 2013
9
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 10
Facit and the Displacement of Mechanical Calculators
made some strategic mistakes in the 1960s,
such as the acquisition of Addo, which weakened its balance sheet and implied that
Facit’s efforts to develop electronic calculators were distributed throughout several
divisions.
Clearly, these endeavors augmented Facit’s
problems, but in retrospective, the encountered challenges seem almost insurmountable
for a number of reasons, especially bearing in
mind that other manufacturers of mechanical
calculators experienced the same problems.
First, Facit’s competencies were related to mechanics, not electronics. The company’s R&D,
its machineries, and the skills of its employees
had been refined over the years for the purpose of developing, producing, and selling
mechanical calculators. These core competencies now became core rigidities. Once the
technology shift came into motion, electronics went from being bulkier and more expensive to cheaper and better within only a few
years. Because competencies are generally
considered to be rigid and path dependent
and electronics became exponentially better
between 1968 and 1972, Facit was indeed
put in an awkward position. Facit obtained a
position in electronics, but it could only be
done by drawing upon Sharp’s competencies.
The market for electronic calculators was
insignificant by 1966–1967, and thus, too little attention was paid to it at this point. Once
Facit’s management realized this in 1968, it
was too late because the entire competence
base had to be transformed in only a few
years. Moreover, Facit’s management had
for the preceding decades primarily been
concerned with administrating growth
along a predefined trajectory. They were not
used to acting under conditions of high turbulence and discontinuous change.
The shift to electronics also had considerable impact on the industry structure. The
mechanical era was characterized by high
entry barriers and little competition. With
the shift to electronics, Japanese and later
American firms entered the industry, increasing competitive rivalry. Consequently, the
overall industry profitability declined in
these years, and in Facit’s case, sales of high
margin mechanical calculators were replaced
by low margin electronic products.
Additionally, electronics affected the vertical scope of Facit. Sales organizations and extensive service networks had previously been
an important source of competitive advantage. Facit’s sales model was aimed at small
volumes, high margins, and strong ties to
10
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
customers, whereas pocket calculators and
later consumer calculators demanded much
larger volumes to be profitable. From 1972
on, calculators were increasingly sold via
other distribution channels.
The description here also illustrates how
being situated in the small town of
Åtvidaberg in Sweden augmented Facit’s
problems. Facit’s location hampered the
firm in a couple of ways. First, the labor-intensive nature of the first transistorized calculators seems to have prevented Facit from
entering this business. In retrospective, several directors have stated that the comparatively high wages in Sweden made it
difficult for Facit to develop electronic calculators in the years 1964 to 1966. When Facit’s
management realized the urgency a few years
later, the company struggled to find competencies in Sweden related to electronics. Åtvidaberg was a small company town dominated
by Facit and skills related to mechanics; developing electronic calculators in this setting
therefore proved more difficult than first
anticipated.
Generally speaking, Facit seems to have
been disconnected from the groundbreaking
innovations driving the industry. Integrated
electronics was pioneered and developed in
California while the Japanese industry
made large efforts to launch products based
on the technology. The quote from Göran
Arvidsson about Facit’s directors sitting in
the forest not knowing what’s happening
in the world provides a good summary of
how the company’s decline is partly related
to economic geography. This article therefore contributes to our theoretical understanding of incumbent failure by providing
an illustration of how a firm’s location
affects its response to a technological discontinuity. More research is needed concerning
how economic geography and factor conditions can explain the fate of firms undergoing technological transitions.
To conclude, the shift to electronics implied
huge changes not only to Facit and its competencies, but also to the industry’s structure. Because all this happened within only a few
years, Herculean efforts would have been
required to remain competitive under these circumstances of rapid structural change.
References and Notes
1. G. Moore, ‘‘Cramming More Components onto
Integrated Circuits,’’ Electronics, 19 Apr. 1965,
pp. 114–117.
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 11
2. R. Noyce, ‘‘Microelectronics,’’ Scientific American, vol. 237, no. 3, 1977, pp. 63–69.
3. C. Sandstrom, ‘‘Hasselblad and the Shift to Digital Imaging,’’ IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, vol. 33, no. 3, 2011, pp. 55–66.
4. T. Pettersson, I teknikrevolutionens centrum: företagsledning och utveckling i Facit 1957–1972
[The Technology Revolution Center: Management and Development in Facit, 1957–1972],
Uppsala Papers in Financial and Business History, report 16, 2003.
5. J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Harvard Univ.
Press, 1936, p. 66.
6. G. Dosi, ‘‘Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation
of the Determinants and Directions of Technical
Change,’’ Research Policy, vol. 11, no. 3, 1982,
pp. 147–162.
7. M. Tushman and P.W. Anderson, ‘‘Technological
Discontinuities and Organizational Environments,’’ Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 31,
no. 3, 1986, pp. 439–465.
8. K. Clark, ‘‘The Interaction of Design Hierarchies
and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,’’ Research Policy, vol. 14, no. 5, 1985,
pp. 235–251.
9. M. Tripsas and G. Gavetti, ‘‘Cognition, Capabilities and Inertia: Evidence from Digital Imaging,’’ Strategic Management J., vol. 21,
nos. 10–11, 2000, pp. 1147–1161.
10. K.J. Arrow, ‘‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions,’’ The Rate and
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, R. Nelson, ed., Princeton Univ.
Press, 1962.
11. C.M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
12. W.A. Abernathy and K.B. Clark, ‘‘Innovation:
Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction,’’
Research Policy, vol. 14, no. 1, 1985, pp. 3–22.
13. G.R. Carroll and M. Hannan, ‘‘Density Delay in
the Evolution of Organizational Populations: A
Model and Five Empirical Tests,’’ Administrative
Science Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3, 1989,
pp. 411–430.
14. M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Free Press, 1990.
15. M. Tripsas, ‘‘Unraveling the Process of Creative
Destruction: Complementary Assets and Incumbent Survival in the Typesetter Industry,’’ Strategic Management J., vol. 18, S1, 1997,
pp. 119–142.
16. J. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How Companies Can Seize Opportunities in
the Face of Technological Change, Harvard Business School Press, 1994.
17. G. Arvidsson, interview by C. Sandström, 6 July
2009.
18. Facit Annual Report, 1965.
19. Facit board meeting minutes, 11 Mar. 1965.
20. Facit top management meeting minutes,
23 Nov. 1967.
21. Facit top management meeting minutes,
12 Jan. 1971.
22. B. Majumdar, ‘‘Innovations, Product Development, and Technology Transfer: An Empirical
Study of Dynamic Competitive Advantage, The
Case of Electronic Calculators,’’ doctoral dissertation, Case Western Univ., 1977.
23. Facit board meeting minutes, no. 6, 1966.
24. Facit Annual Reports, 1960–1971.
25. Facit top management meeting minutes,
15 Aug. 1966.
26. G. Arvidsson, interview by C. Sandström,
3 Mar. 2009.
27. Facit top management meeting minutes,
16 May 1966.
28. B. Torekull, ed., ‘‘Med Facit i hand: en reportagebok om ett familjeföretags uppgång och fall’’
[With Hindsight: A Documentary About the Rise
and Fall of a Family Business], Östgöta correspondenten, 1982.
29. T. Petersson, ‘‘Facit and the BESK Boys: Sweden’s Computer Industry (1956–1962),’’ IEEE
Annals of the History of Computing, vol. 27,
no. 4, 2005, pp. 23–30.
30. G. Ericsson, interview by C. Sandström,
13 Mar. 2009.
31. L. von Kantzow, ‘‘Istället för guldklocka’’
[Instead of a Gold Watch], Åtvidaberg,
1991.
32. Facit internal company memo, 1970.
33. Facit top management meeting minutes,
19 Oct. 1965.
34. Facit board meeting minutes, 30 Aug.
1965.
35. Facit Annual Report, 1967.
36. Facit board meeting minutes, 14 Mar.
1968.
37. Facit top management meeting minutes,
19 Aug. 1968.
38. Internal company memo on electronic calculators, presented by G. Arvidsson at top management meeting, 12 Jan. 1971.
39. Facit top management meeting minutes,
23 May 1972.
40. Facit internal company memo on electronic calculators, presented by G. Arvidsson, 12 Jan.
1971.
41. Facit top management meeting minutes,
12 Jan. 1971.
42. Facit Annual Report, 1972.
43. Facit top management meeting minutes,
11 Nov. 1970.
July–September 2013
11
CS-ANNALS-3503-130002.3d
12/8/013
17:38
Page 12
Facit and the Displacement of Mechanical Calculators
44. Facit board meeting minutes, 9 Mar. 1972.
45. Facit top management meeting minutes,
14 Nov. 1968.
46. Facit board meeting minutes, 12 June 1972.
47. Facit board meeting minutes, 12 Jan. 1970.
48. Facit Annual Report, 1969.
49. Facit top management meeting minutes,
23 Mar. 1971.
50. Facit top management meeting minutes,
11 Oct. 1967.
51. Facit top management meeting minutes,
16 Mar. 1971.
52. Facit board meeting minutes, 2 Sept. 1971.
53. Facit top management meeting minutes,
7 Oct. 1968.
54. Facit top management meeting minutes,
4 Dec. 1968.
55. Facit top management meeting minutes,
30 Oct. 1968.
56. Facit top management meeting minutes,
25 May 1972.
57. Internal memorandum by L. Kullerstrand,
13 Dec. 1968
58. Facit top management meeting minutes,
12 Jan. 1971.
59. ‘‘Use of LSI in Consumer Areas Picks Up, But
Problems Remain,’’ Electronic Design, 7 Jan.
1971, p. 22.
60. P. Rittsel, ‘‘Facit av en era’’ [Facit of an Era],
Computer Sweden, 2004.
61. Facit top management meeting minutes,
19 Aug. 1968.
12
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
62. Facit top management meeting minutes,
7 Oct. 1968.
63. Facit board meeting minutes, meeting 6, 1970.
64. Facit board meeting minutes, 18 Jan. 1972.
65. Facit internal memorandum by S. Ljungdell,
16 Feb. 1971.
66. Facit board meeting minutes, 7 Dec. 1971.
67. Facit board meeting minutes, 12 June 1972.
68. Facit Annual Report, 1977.
69. Facit top management meeting minutes,
23 Mar. 1971.
70. G. Arvidsson, interview by C. Sandström,
6 July 2009.
Christian Sandström is a
postdoctoral researcher at
Chalmers University of Technology and the Ratio Institute,
Sweden. He currently holds a
three-year postdoctoral scholarship from the Jan Wallander
and Tom Hedelius’ foundation. His research interests concern the digitization
of industries and the challenges it presents for established firms. Among other things, Sandström has
studied how electronics have emerged in cameras,
calculators, and video surveillance. Contact him at
christian.sandstrom@chalmers.se.