“It is my hope that we will all love and guard our beautiful sign language as the noblest gift God has given to Deaf people.” —George Veditz, 1913 1 [Page left intentionally blank] 2 [Page left intentionally blank] 3 [Page left intentionally blank] 4 Acknowledgements................................................................................................................... 2 Chronology of Eucharistic Doctrine ......................................................................................... 4 Table of Contents.................................................................................................................. 5 Prolegomena ......................................................................................................................... 7 Part I: The Dogmatic Way ..................................................................................................... 13 The Early Fathers on Eucharistic Consecration.................................................................. 15 The Latin Fathers: St Justin Martyr and St Irenaeus of Lyons ...................................... 15 The Greek Fathers: St Athanasius of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and St John Chrysostom ..................................................................................................................... 18 St Ambrose of Milan....................................................................................................... 22 St Augustine of Hippo .................................................................................................... 29 The Synod of Rome, 1059 and 1071 .................................................................................. 32 The Council of Florence ..................................................................................................... 34 The Council of Trent........................................................................................................... 37 The Second Vatican Council: Dogmatic Constitution Sacrosanctun concilium and the Reform of the Liturgy ......................................................................................................... 40 Dogmatic Decree of 17 January 2001 and the Guidelines for Admission to the Eucharist Between the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East................................. 46 XI Ordinary Assembly of the Synod of Bishops: “The Eucharist: Source and Summit of the Life and Mission of the Church”................................................................................... 57 Summary of Part I............................................................................................................... 62 Part II: The Systematic Way .................................................................................................. 64 St Thomas Aquinas on Sacramental Hylemorphism .......................................................... 92 Summary of Part II............................................................................................................ 106 Putting the Pieces Together .............................................................................................. 107 5 Meaning of the Tradition of «Verba consecratione» ........................................................ 108 The Sacramental Word as the Verbum fidei ..................................................................... 112 Trajectories for Further Study........................................................................................... 118 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 121 6 This essay arises out of two very specific incidents and is developed for one very specific reason. In the winter of 1995, I held a conversation with a presbyter who works with the Deaf community who, at the time, was assigned by the local Ordinary to promote pastoral formation for Deaf Catholics. His office was located at a prestigious seminary in the United States. He indicated to me in A.S.L. that a particular seminarian asked him whether he “says” the words of consecration while celebrating Mass. “I knew what he was getting at, so I said ‘Yes.’” What, then, was this seminarian “getting at”? His implication, obviously, was that in order for the Eucharistic consecration to ‘take effect,’ it was necessary for the words to be speech. By telling a white lie, our presbyter was avoiding a rabbitJhole of a discussion; seminarians are probably the most difficult contingent of Catholics when it comes to intellectual formation. More recently, my professor of canon law invited me to write a response to the liturgical columnist of Zenit, Fr Edward MacNamara L.C., and critique his article “Accommodating the Deaf” as a term paper for the course. Fr McNamara seeks to answer the question, “Will there ever be a day when the deaf will be allowed to enter convents, monasteries, for the religious life? When all Catholic churches will have American Sign Language and closedJcaptioning available for the Mass? I believe even the deaf are equal before God and should be equal before the Church.”1 My conclusion was that there were no canonical impediments for admitting Deaf men to Holy Orders, despite the fact that many Deaf people’s preferred mode of communication is sign language and that they often have 1 On the Web at www.zenit.org/articleJ21400?l=english, retrieved 27 April 2009. 7 difficulty enunciating clearly. In the background of this complete lack of canonical impediments for candidates to Orders was an absence of any presupposing theology that places the locus of the words of consecration’s efficacy at the speech of the Eucharistic presider.2 McNamara had sidestepped the question completely. When my professor raised the question in class, a vigorous discussion ensued. One student insisted that it was indeed necessary to speak the words of consecration because (a) the presider is speaking to the Host and (b) the breath emanating from the presider must touch the Host in order for transubstantiation to take place. Against to this position, which appears to be a somewhat widespread opinion, I will argue that sign language is a sacramentally valid medium for proclaiming the words of consecration. In essence, the ministerial intention of the presider is what gives the ‘form’ of the Eucharist its efficacy. Already, our question presupposes a number of anomalies that need to be corrected. First, there is a tendency to equate ‘Real Presence’ and ‘Eucharist,’ which in so doing sets our present question off in the wrong direction. Second, the notion of ‘matter’ and ‘form’ in the sacramental economy does not enjoy the theological certitude of either dogma or authoritative doctrine, in which case we may even be asking the wrong question of whether the ‘Eucharistic Form’ must be enunciated in order for it to be effective. Third, many people are simply unaware that it has been established by the scientific community that sign language is indeed a true and proper language.3 2 On the Web at www.scribd.com/doc/12990117/DeafJCandidatesJtoJHolyJOrdersJImpedimentJorJOpportunity. We must establish this with utter clarity before moving on. The first, and groundbreaking, study was established by Dr William Stokoe, professor of linguistics at Gallaudet College (now Gallaudet University). See W. STOKOE, “Sign Language Structure: An Outline of the Visual Communication Systems of the American Deaf”, in Studies in Linguistics: Occasional Papers, vol. 14 (Buffalo, NY: University of Buffalo Press, 1960), on the Web at http://jdsde.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/10/1/3. Since the career of Dr Stokoe, countless studies have been published, e.g., E. KILMA and U. BELLUGI, The Signs of Language (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); C. BAKER and R. BATTISON, ed., Sign Language and the Deaf Community: Essays in Honor of William C. Stokoe (Silver Spring, MD: 3 8 Why is the question, ‘Can sign language be used to validly confect the Eucharist?’ such an important one? To answer: Pastoral necessity. The last five years have seen a growth in Deaf vocations to the presbyterate and it is owed to both these Deaf presbyters and to the Deaf Catholics whom they serve a sound doctrinal validation of celebrating the Eucharistic Prayer silently and in sign language. Not only that, but as early as 10 December 1965, Pope Paul VI gave permission for Mass to be celebrated in sign language4: The following is the text of a letter of December 10, 1965, from the Consilium for the Implementation of the Constitution on the Liturgy, addressed to Archbishop Dearden, chairman of the Bishops’ Commission on the Liturgical Apostolate. “On July 8 this year, the question of mass for congregations of dead persons was submitted to the Consilium by the American Bishops’ Commission on the Liturgical Apostlate. “In November, suggestions concerning the question were approved by the Bishops of the Consilium and the matter was put before the Holy Father on December 2. “The question revolved around the use of sigh language. It was asked whether it were fitting: 1. that the readings should be communicated to the people by means of signs; 2. that the deaf people should reply, in those parts pertaining to the congregation, by means of signs. “It was asked in general whether sign language could be used in all those parts of the Mass that were in the vernacular, and more specifically: (a) whether texts proffered by the celebrant should be at the same time spoken and signified with the hands; (b) if in those texts that were said together by the celebrant and by the people, the people could follow the sign language of the celebrant, they themselves also using sign language. “With great willingness and kindness, the Holy Father has given his full approval to these suggestions, and said moreover that sign language could be used with and by deaf people throughout 5 the Liturgy, whenever it was judged to be pastorally desirable.” This essay, therefore, seeks to provide theological justification for this universal law issued by the great reforming pope and to press for a better articulation of this law that is suitable to the contemporary experience of Deaf culture. National Association of the Deaf, 1980); C. VALLI and C. LUCAS, Linguistics of American Sign Language, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Gallaudet University Press, 1992, 1995, 2000). At the time of this writing, studies arguing against the linguistic veracity of sign language could not be discovered, thus indicating it to be an extremely minority position, if at all held by professional linguists. 4 The decree, nevertheless, is ambiguous and operates on several typically European anomalies. It would appear that permission is given to celebrate Mass speaking and signing, which is not sign language at all but ‘total communication.’ The grammar of authentic sign language is so radically different from spoken language that it is impossible to communicate both in tandem. 5 DOL, 2119; cf. BISHOPS’ COMMITTEE ON THE LITURGY, Thirty(Five Years of the BCL Newsletter, 1965(2000 (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2004), 31J32; L. T. BOUSCARDEN and J. I. O’CONNOR, “Canon 819”, in Canon Law Digest, vol. 6 (New York, NY: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1969), 552J553; F. R. MCMANUS, “Use of the Sign Language at Mass”, in The Jurist: A Quarterly Review, vol. 26 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1966), 388J389. 9 Early in 2009, in a survey, six Deaf presbyters were asked: (1) What objections, if any, were expressed regarding the possibility of you signing (and not speaking) the words of consecration? (2) Did anyone think that not speaking (but signing) the words of consecration would not be sacramentally efficacious? (3) Are you aware of any exchange between your superiors and the Holy See in granting you the faculty to celebrate Mass with respect to this concern? Of the six, only four replied, three indicated they had at least one person object to a signed Consecration: One received an email from a presbyter from Czech Republic who insisted that signing the words of consecration was invalid; the other presbyter received at least one objection from a seminarian and one of these two actually had a presbyter who insisted on concelebrating so as to provide the ‘backup voice’ to supply the silence that accompanied a signed Consecration. My impression of the ‘climate’ of seminary curricula today suggests that objections to celebrating the Eucharist in sign language is a formidable issue, usually grounded in the decontextualization of the sacramental economy from a broader liturgical theology and from blatantly erroneous conceptions of the ‘Sacramental Word.’ Some have objected that the question is an unnecessary one. The following alternatives have been proposed to a Deaf presbyter celebrating the Eucharist: 1. a hearing presbyter celebrates the Eucharist, but with an interpreter for Deaf congregations; 2. a Deaf priest signs the Eucharistic Prayer but hearing ‘reverse’ interpreter speak the words of consecration; 3. a Deaf priest signs the Eucharistic Prayer, but a hearing presbyter coJpresides or at least is present ‘in choir’ by providing the ‘backup’ voice for the words of consecration. None of these solutions are satisfactory because (1) inasmuch as a Chinese Catholic Community or an Inuit Catholic community would want ‘one of their own’ to preside at the 10 sacred liturgy, so too a Deaf Catholic community would want a Deaf presbyter to preside on their behalf; (2a) a reverse interpreter usually does not have the grace of Holy Orders in order to ‘supply’ the sacramentally valid speech (assuming the contrary position) or (2b) were the interpreter an ordained presbyter, he could very well preside instead of reverseJinterpreting6; (3a) a hearing presbyter who celebrates by providing the ‘backup’ speech for a valid enunciation of the words of consecration presupposes a convoluted theory of the sacramental economy and misses the point of coJpresidency; (3b) the meaning of celebrating the liturgy ‘in choir’ does not permit the kind of liturgical action presupposed by lending voice to the presider. The fact that these suggestions have been raised by people who object to sign language as a liturgical language, far from proposing valid solutions to the ‘problem’ of Deaf presbyters, actually displays a theologically bankrupt sacramentalJliturgical praxis. Our present discussion is not warranted by only the pastoral question raised by the Catholic Deaf community; since it deals with the theology of consecration, it has repercussions for the wider Church as well. During the Eleventh Ordinary Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, which convened on 2J23 October 2005 on the topic of “The Eucharist: Source and Summit of the Church’s Life and Mission,” the question of the ‘consecration’ at Mass received significant attention. In the Instrumentum laboris of the Synod, we read— Transubstantiation takes place in the consecration of the bread and wine. The responses recommend that the theology of the act of consecration be explained by drawing from the ecclesial traditions of both East and West. In particular, the consecration should be seen as the faithful imitation of what the Lord did and commanded at the Last Supper and as the result of the invocation of the Holy Spirit in the 6 A ‘reverse interpreter’ is a professionallyJtrained translator who voices the sign language of the presenter into spoken language for members of the audience who do not know sign language. Reverse interpreters are employed by most Deaf parishes since many hearing parents attend such Deaf parishes for the benefit of their Deaf children. 11 epiclesis. A clearer theology on the act of consecration would be very useful in ecumenical dialogue 7 with the Eastern Churches which are not yet in full communion with the Catholic Church. Thus the Synod of Bishops have invited further theological reflection on the “theology of the act of consecration”, one that takes into account the Roman emphasis on the Words of Institution and the Byzantine emphasis on the epiklesis. It is in response to the Synod Fathers that I offer this investigation into the sacramental efficacy of sign language at the Eucharist, in hopes of contributing to the wider discussion on the ‘mechanics’ of the Consecration. Before asking ‘Whether sign language can validly and efficaciously be used as a liturgical language in proclaiming the words of consecration,’ we must ask whether the presupposing hylemorphic theory of the sacraments enjoys the ‘theological note’ of either dogma or authoritative doctrine, because we would be getting ahead of ourselves if the assumption was made that the words of consecration must be speech when in fact our grasp of the notion of sacramental ‘matter’ and ‘form’ has never been taught by the magisterium. Thus we must pursue the first of all: determining exactly which teachings of the Church related to our present discussion has been solemnly, or at least authoritatively, taught.8 That is to say: whether the notion of ‘sacramental form’ presupposes either the primary or secondary object of infallibility. In essence, the question involves asking whether it has been divinely revealed that the words of consecration must be proclaimed as speech, i.e., as having a vocal and audible quality that lends to its efficacy. Very often, those who object to sign language as a sacramentally valid medium for proclaiming the words of 7 On the Web at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20050707_instrlaborJ xiJassembly_en.html (no. 38, par. 3), retrieved 30 January 2009. 8 It was my original intention to include a treatise on the Biblical accounts of the Institution Narrative, since this belongs properly to the dogmatic way. In the end, I decided that (1) such an analysis merits a study of its own and (2) it would have expanded the present essay well beyond its limitations established by the M.Th. guidelines. 12 consecration fail to indicate which dogma or authoritative doctrine supports their own position. Only after we have been able to establish precisely what has been taught by the Magisterium—and with which degree of certainty—can we proceed to answer our present question. To do otherwise would be to remove oneself from the specifically Catholic way of doing theology. Once we have navigated the dogmatic way, which will take up Part I of this essay, can we proceed to the , taking up Part II, which seeks to assemble out in logical order and in a speculative manner the theological data of the ‘Sacramental Word’ and its relation to the virtue of faith, with particular attention to the ‘Words of Institution.’ In our case, the systematic way will ‘revisit’ those parts of Scripture related to Eucharistic doctrine in particular and the sacramental principle in general. Since the systematic way is much broader than the dogmatic way, we will limit ourselves to the thought of St Thomas Aquinas, in particular, his mature theology represented by the Summa theologiae. In the conclusion, I offer a number of trajectories for ongoing, as this essay does not pretend to be anything more than an inaugural study of the question.9 “No doctrine is defined till violated,”10 goes a saying of venerable John Henry Newman. Eucharistic doctrine is scarcely an exception. In the years following the First Vatican Council, it was customary to pinpoint the Protestant movement as the catalyst for Tridentine Eucharistic doctrine. Today, more competent theologians look at the controversy surrounding Berengarius of Tours’ reaction to St Paschasius Radbertus’ hyperJrealism as the 9 For a clear exposé of the differences between the ‘dogmatic way’ and the ‘systematic way’, see B. Lonergan, The Triune God (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 10 J. H. NEWMAN, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (New York, NY: Cosimo, 2007), 151. 13 major turningJpoint in the development of a peculiarly Roman Eucharistic doctrine, even though its roots can be identified with that of Sts Ambrose of Milan and his protégé Augustine of Hippo. At least four specific instances in the history of dogma can be identified as pivotal to our question: (1) the Eucharistic doctrine of the two great Latin Fathers Sts Ambrose and Augustine, though not without consideration of the patrimony of the Fathers before them; (2) the Synod of Rome (1059, 1071) in response to the errors of Berengarius of Tours; (3) the growing influence of Aristotle’s writings from which came the soJcalled ‘hylemorphic theory’ of the sacraments, especially of the Eucharist, formulated for the first time by William of Auxerre (Guillaume d’Auxerre; Guilelmus Autissiodorensis, d. 1231) and further developed by the Scholastics, especially St Thomas Aquinas11; and (4) the Eucharistic doctrine which comes down to us today largely dependent on the doctrinal formulations of the Council of Trent. We will look at of these event in turn. Though not included on the list, we will devote space to the oftenJmisunderstood Council of Florence with respect to the sacramental economy and the question of the ‘form’ of the Eucharist. In so doing, we must remember that our question is a specific one: What is the relationship between the sacramental word and the sacrament in se? Or, to frame the question anachronistically, how does the Eucharistic Form, qua form, effect the sacrament? We are not here interested in the variations or shades of nuances with regards to the Fathers’ conception of the Lord’s presence in the Eucharistic Gifts; we are, rather, focused on the nature of the sacramental ‘Word’ in the celebration of the Eucharist. Such a narrower focus should serve to limit the data for which we are searching in our investigation. 11 Since this pertains, more properly, to the ‘systematic way’ we will discuss this in Part II. 14 Since we are here dealing with a question of dogmatic theology, it follows that our target is one which bears the force of a dogmatic definition or at least authoritative doctrine. What ‘theological note’ is to be given to the doctrine of the Eucharistic Form? It is to this question we now turn. Our data regarding the efficacy of the Words of Institution specifically can be gleaned from only a handful of Fathers in the first four centuries: Sts Justin the Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyons, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom. The salient feature of their teaching, however, lies not so much in the efficacy of the Words of Institution qua Words of Institution, but qua Word of God, if in fact they are speaking of a liturgical formula. However, many of these texts can be understood differently; for example, that the presider is invoking the indwelling of the Logos (hence “Word of God”) rather than repeating a sacred text. It would not be until Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostom that one begins to see traces of a doctrine that ‘locates’ a kind of efficacy in the Words of Institution. St Justin the Martyr (d. ca. 163/7) describes an early Eucharist in his First Apology: “Then there is brought to the president of the brethren bread and a cup of water and of watered wine; and taking them, he gives praise and glory to the Father of all, through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; and he himself gives thanks [ ] at some length in order that these things may be deemed worthy…” In what fashion does the presider “give thanks” or to put it in colloquial terms, ‘eucharistize’? Towards the end of the section, Justin points to the Synoptic tradition of the Institution Narrative: “The Apostles, in the Memoirs which 15 they produced, which are called Gospels, have thus passed on that which was enjoined upon them: that Jesus took bread and, having given thanks, said, “Do this in remembrance of Me; this is My Body.” And in like manner, taking the cup, and having given thanks, He said, “This is My Blood.”12 Explaining Justin’s understanding of the Words of Institution, Maurice Jourjon says: “…in our opinion, the statement ‘through the word of prayer that comes from him the food over which the thanksgiving has been spoken becomes the flesh and blood’ certainly refers to the words of institution. What Justin is saying, however, is rather that the Eucharistic prayer has its origin in Christ (it is based on his action) than that the words of institution are part of the eucharistic prayer of his day.”13 At this stage, there does not seem to be any conscious grasp of the ‘efficacy’ of the Words of Institution’s bearing on the eucharistized gifts. Yet he is the first of the Fathers to draw an explicit connection between the two since St Paul wrote 1 Cor 11:27. St Irenaeus of Lyons (d. ca. 202) follows, but there is a significant shift in the liturgical vocabulary. In his Against Heresies, the first systematic theologian in the Latin Church writes: “When, therefore, the mixed cup and the baked bread receives the Word of God [ ] and becomes the Eucharist, the Body of Christ, and from these the substance of our flesh is increased and supported, how can they say that the flesh is not capable of receiving the gift of God, which is eternal life—flesh which is nourished by the Body and Blood of the Lord, and is in fact a member of Him?” Instead of explicitly mentioning the Words of Institution, Irenaeus speaks of the bread and wine that 12 First Apology, 65; FEF 128, cf. EP 128. Maurice Jourjon, “Justin”, in W. RORDORF, ed., The Eucharist of the Early Christians (New York, NY: Pueblo Publishing Company, 1978), 76J77. 13 16 “receives the Word of God.” To which “Word of God” does Irenaeus refer? The Institution Narrative taken from the Synoptic Gospels or the Logos? A short while later, Irenaeus adds: […] In the same way that the wood of the vine planted in the ground bears fruit in due season; or as a grain of wheat, falling on the ground, decomposes and rises up in manifold increase through the Spirit of God who contains all things; and then, through the Wisdom of God, comes to the service of men, and receiving the Word of God [ ], becomes the Eucharist, which is the Body and Blood of Christ; so also our bodies, nourished by it, and deposited in the earth and decomposing therein, shall rise up in due season, the Word of God favoring them with resurrection in the glory of God the Father.14 What does Irenaeus mean by “receive” or “receiving the Word of God”? In each instance, he employs different verbs. In the first instance, , from meaning “admit besides or in addition;” “receive besides”; “receive, welcome.”15 In the second instance, he uses a different verb, , from , meaning “take or receive besides or in addition, get over and done”16, which the Latin translators have used percipientia, from percipio, (cepi, (ceptum, “to take wholly, to seize entirely.”17 The behavior of these two verbs may not necessarily indicate that “Word of God” is being used differently in each instance. John Behr, dean and professor of patristics at St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, is hesitant to draw clear lines of demarcation between “Word of God” as the second person of the Trinity or as a verbal expression.18 However, the section of Against Heresies 5.5.3 does end with the following statement: “For as bread from the earth, receiving the invocation of God [ ] is no longer common bread but a Eucharist composed of two things, both an earthly and a heavenly one, so also our bodies, partaking of the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of eternal resurrection…” Irenaeus now speaks of an ‘epiclesis’ but does not indicate whether it 14 Against Heresies 5.5.3.; FEF 249, cf. EP 249. LSJ, 630. 16 LSJ, 1518. 17 LEWIS and SHORT, 1334. 18 In a private correspondence, dated 17 March 2009. 15 17 includes the Words of Institution. John McKenna concedes that our information about Irenaeus’ own views as to the role or efficacy of the Words of Institution is inconclusive.19 ! The same kind of ambiguity in Irenaeus is found again in St Athanasius of Alexandria’s Sermon to the Newly Baptized. He does not mention the Words of Institution but instead focuses upon the anaphora in its totality: “You shall see the Levites bringing loaves and a cup of wine, and placing them on the table. So long as the prayers of supplication and entreaties have not been made, there is only bread and wine. But after the great and wonderful prayers have been completed, then the bread is become the Body, and the wine the Blood, of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Notice the use of the plural “prayers” ( ). Athanasius continues: “Let us approach the celebration of the mysteries. This bread and this wine, so long as the prayers and supplications [ ] have not taken place, remain simply what they are. But after the great prayers and holy supplications [ ] have been sent forth, the Word of God comes down into the bread and wine—and thus is His Body confected.”20 Thus the Word of God comes “into” the bread and wine as a result of the “prayers and holy supplications.” Again, there is no mention of the Words of Institution. “Word of God” here means precisely the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. Still, for all the mention of “prayers” and “supplications”, Athanasius is silent as to whether the Words of Institution are to be found among them. 19 20 MCKENNA, Eucharistic Epiclesis, 47J48. Sermon to the Newly(Baptized; FEF 802, cf. EP 802. 18 With St Gregory of Nyssa, curiously, one begins to see faint beginnings of the ‘Roman’ emphasis on the Words of Institution. In a rather lengthy explanation in his Great Catechism which we reproduce here at length, Gregory writes: For that which is characteristic of all men was acknowledged in that flesh also, that the body also was maintained by bread, while through the indwelling of God the Word, it was translated to divine dignity. With good reason, then, do we believe that now also the bread which is sanctified by the word of God is changed into the body of God the Word [ ! ]. For that body, too, was potentially bread, and it was sanctified by the indwelling of the Word who dwelt in the flesh. The manner, then, whereby the bread which was changed in that body was changed to divine power is the same which now brings about the like result. For in that case the grace of the Word sanctified the body which derived it subsistence from bread and, in a sense, was itself bread; whereas in this case, likewise, the bread, as the Apostle says, is sanctified by the word of God and prayer [1 Tim 4:5]. Not by the process of being eaten does it go on to become the body of the Word, but it is changed immediately into the body through the word, even as the Word has said: “This is my body” [ ’ " # ! «$ »].21 Only now does a Father of the Church make an explicit connexion between the ‘Word of God’ as Logos and the ‘word of God’ as prayer to explain the Eucharistic mystery; in fact he poetically makes a connexion between the two: “With good reason, then, do we believe that now also the bread which is sanctified by the word of God [= prayer] is changed into the body of God the Word [= Logos].” In the texts from Irenaeus and Athanasius, it is said that the Word of the Father comes ‘into’ the gifts, thereby confecting the Eucharist. Only now does one see a wordJplay between the ‘consecratory’ word (hence ) and the ‘Word.’ Again, what is the “word of God” here spoken at the consecration? St Gregory does in fact mention the Words of Institution, but does it mean that these same Words of Institution—in and of themselves—invoke the indwelling of the Logos in the Eucharistic bread and wine? The copulative which is often used to introduce a direct discourse (as in our present case) marking it as the antecedent of the preceding premise: The Logos is 21 Cited in D. SHEEHAN, Message of the Fathers of the Church, vol. 7: The Eucharist (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1986), 62J63; cf. EP 1035. 19 present in the eucharistized bread because the same Logos said “This is my body,” the pronoun “my” referring to the hypostasis of the Logos himself. However, the emphasis seems to be placed upon the Incarnate Word’s own utterance of “This is my body,” rather than on that of the priest, as though the eucharistized bread, having the indwelling of the Logos, is himself saying “This is my body.” This should not exclude the possibility of the presider reciting the Words of Institution. The question, rather, is whether Gregory locates the efficacy of the Words of Institution in the Incarnate Word’s first utterance of them at the Last Supper or whether they become ‘once again’, as it were, effective, whenever the Eucharist is celebrated. The growing ‘crystallization’ towards the Roman position takes another step with St John Chrysostom (d. 407), who appears to be the first Father to point out explicitly the connexion between the Words of Institution and its enduring efficacy by the Incarnate Word at the Last Supper. In his Homilies on the Treachery of Judas (388), he writes, “Christ is present. The One who prepared that [Holy Thursday] table is the very One who now prepares this [altar] table. For it is not a man who makes the sacrificial gifts become the Body and Blood of Christ, but He that was crucified for us, Christ Himself. The priest stands there carrying out the action, but the power and the grace are those of the Lord. ‘This is My Body,’ he says. This statement transforms the gifts [ ].”22 If Gregory of Nyssa is ambiguous as to what the “action” entails, the Patriarch of Constantinople here offers a clarification: The Words of Institution uttered by the priest « » and they are identical to the words, “This is my body.” 22 Homilies on the Treachery of Judas, 1.6.; FEF 1157, cf. EP 1157, emphasis added. 20 Significantly, John Chrysostom provides a different nuance to the Eucharistic “action.” Later, he writes: It is not man who causes what is present to become the body and blood of Christ, but Christ himself, who was crucified for us. The priest is the representative when he pronounces those words, but the power and the grace are those of the Lord. “This is my body,” he says. This word changes the things that lie before us; and just as that sentence, “increase and multiply,” once spoken, extends through all time and gives to our nature the power to reproduce itself; likewise that saying, “This is my body,” once uttered, from that time to the present day, and even until Christ’s coming, makes the sacrifice complete at every table in the churches. The one called the “goldenJmouth” offers an analogy: at Eden, God commanded that humankind should procreate: “Increase and multiply”, a command that, though once issued, is eternally applicable. In the same way, the Words of Institution, once issued by the Lord Jesus, is likewise eternally applicable. As a result, the onceJuttered “This is my body; this is my blood” by the Lord Jesus in the Upper Room makes present the sacrifice on every altar “even until Christ’s coming.” John H. McKenna elaborates on this interpretation of John Chrysostom, and one I find to be plausible: [O]ne should mention a further interpretation or nuance espoused by a number of writers. This view maintains that the great Antiochene orator was not teaching that the consecration power was in the words of institution recited afresh at each celebration of the Eucharist. The theory that the consecration was effected by the priest’s recital of our Lord’s words is, according to these writers, a misunderstanding of the teaching of Chrysostom and other Eastern Fathers. Such a misunderstanding ends up in “…changing the idea of the word spoken once for all yet ever effective, being brought into action (so to say) though the invocation, into that of the effect being produced at each [M]ass by the celebrant’s iteration of that word.” In reality Chrysostom was, according to the interpretation now under consideration, trying to show that in the last analysis it is Christ who is the “consecrator” and that the priest is merely the minister. The priest speaks the words but it is God who gives them their power. Thus the words, “This is my body,” received divine power form God once and for all. The priest, nevertheless, has to apply them here and now to the offerings through the epiclesis.23 The issue of the epiklesis is not of immediate concern here, that is, whether the invocation of the Holy Spirit is directly responsible for making present and contemporary the words once spoken by Jesus. What is of immediate concern is that John Chrysostom sees the Words of Institution as being eternally efficacious: Jesus Christ, who once said “This is my body; this 23 J. H. MCKENNA, Eucharist and the Holy Spirit: The Eucharistic Epiclesis in 20th Century Theology (Great Wakering, UK: MayhewJMcCrimmon, 1975), 59. 21 is my blood,” now confects the Eucharistic mystery through the agency of his sacred ministers. This opinion is held by no less than Archimandrite Robert Taft SJ: “Note that Chrysostom assigns consecratory power not to the priest’s liturgical repetition of Jesus’ words now, but to the historical institution itself, i.e., to the original utterance of Jesus whose force extends to all subsequent eucharistic celebrations.” The great Patriarch of Constantinople is not alone on this issue. Although the Tradition on this point of doctrine appears to be dormant (even to this day), it was taught by the last and greatest of the Eastern Fathers, St John of Damascus, in his compendium On the Orthodox Faith. It would seem that John Chrysostom’s interpretation of the Words of Institution have been left dormant in the Christian tradition, at least until a decree signed by Pope John Paul II on 17 January 2001, which we will discuss at the end of Part I. In a stunted way, however, the interpretation of Chrysostom passed over into the theology of St Ambrose of Milan. !" Having thus passed through the more outstanding Fathers of the Church, we are prepared to look closely at the teachings of the greatest of the Latin Fathers, Sts Ambrose of Milan and Augustine of Hippo, both of whom the Roman Church is greatly indebted for its peculiar Eucharistic doctrine. St Ambrose of Milan (d. 397), born in Triers, was a Roman consular prefect and later a governor in northern Italy. In 374, then only a catechumen, Ambrose attended the episcopal election for the See of Milan, only to find Catholics and Arians at odds over the succession. When Ambrose, wishing to subdue the rising tensions appealed for peace, a member of the assembly exclaimed, “Ambrose, bishop!” Within the span of a week, 22 Ambrose received the Sacraments of Initiation and Orders, including episcopal consecration. He held the episcopal ministry for twentyJfour years, laboring to counter the Arian heresy especially through his composition of liturgical hymns. Although a ‘Latin Father,’ Ambrose was an heir of the Antiochene School, having studied the Greek Fathers after his episcopal consecration, particularly John Chrysostom and pseudoJCyril of Jerusalem.24 He has been credited with developing a peculiarly ‘Roman’ doctrine of the Eucharist, especially by way of trying to identify the means of the elemental change of the Holy Gifts. Three of his writings especially command our attention in this regard: De fide, ad Gratianum, composed in 378 or 379, De Mysteriis, composed around 387, and De Sacramentis, composed in 390 or 391. Both are mystagogical catecheses offered by the bishop of Milan to neophytes. Ambrose’s De fide contains what is probably his earliest statement regarding the consecration: «Caro mea vere est esca, et sanguis meus est potus» [Jn 6 :56]. Carnem audis, sanguine audis, mortis dominicae sacramenta cognoscis ; et divinitati calumniaris? Audi dicentem ipsum: «Quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet» [Lk 24 :39]. Nos autem quotiescumque sacramenta sumimus, quae per sacrae orationis mysterium in carnem transgifurantur et sanguinem, mortem Domini annuntiamus.25 The Gifts are “transfigured” (transfiguratur) by the “mystery of the sacred prayer” (sacrae orationis mysterium); it would seem, also, that the “transfiguration” of the Gifts, by virtue of the “mystery of the sacred prayer,” is coextensive with the Anamnesis; hence “we announce the death of the Lord” in virtue of the “sacred prayer.” What is this “sacred prayer” of which Ambrose speaks? At the risk of getting ahead of ourselves, let us look at a portion of the anaphora used by Ambrose in his De Sacramentis (5.5.21, 22), here given in English: 24 Cf. R. A. KERESZTY, Wedding Feast of the Lamb: Eucharistic Theology from a Historical, Biblical and Systematic Perspective (Mundelein, IL: Hillenbrand Books, 2004), 119.7y 25 EP 1270. 23 Perform for us this oblation written, reasonable,26 acceptable, which is a figure of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. On the day before He suffered He took bread in His holy hands, looked toward you, holy Father omnipotent, eternal God, giving thanks, blessed, broke, and having broken it gave it to the Apostles and His disciples, saying: “Take and eat of this, all of you; for this is my body, which shall be broken for many.” […] Similarly also, on the day before He suffered, after they had dined, He took the chalice, looked toward heaven, toward thee, holy Father omnipotent, eternal God, and giving thanks He blessed it, and gave it to His Apostles and disciples, saying: “Take and drink of this, all of you; for this is my blood.”27 In virtue of Ambrose’s statement that the “mystery of the sacred prayer” is responsible for the “transfiguration” of the Gifts, we must ask whether (a) the whole prayer is consecratory, including the Words of Institution, (b) the imperative statement «Fac nos…» at the beginning is consecratory, or (c) somewhat anachronistically, the Words of Institution alone are consecratory. The phrase, “mystery of the sacred prayer,” seems to render option (a) most reasonable at this point. Yet Ambrose seems to understand the Words of Institution as a sine qua non of the Eucharistic Liturgy in light of his mystagogical catecheses, De mysteriis and De sacramentis. Chapter 9 of de Mysteriis offers a clearer explanation of the Eucharist which the neophytes had received for the first time. Divided into ten sections, the first half directly addresses the consecration. In 9.50, Ambrose writes: Perhaps you may say: “I see something else; how do you tell me that I receive the Body of Christ?” This still remains for us to prove. Therefore, we make use of examples great enough to prove that this is not what nature formed but what benediction consecrated [benedictio consecravit], and that the power of benediction [maioremque vim esse benedictionis] is greater than that of nature, because even nature itself is changed by benediction [benedictione]. 26 The notion of the rationabile obsequium constitutes an important aspect of our present study. Due to constraints of space, unfortunately, we cannot consider it here; in Part III, however, it will be listed among the trajectories for further study on the question of the Consecration in sign language. 27 Fathers of the Church 44:304J305. 24 In other words, the neophyte asks, “Is this really the Body of Christ? How do I know?” The mystagogue answers, “You know because of the benediction.” What is this benediction? In 9.52, Ambrose answers, So we notice that grace is capable of accomplishing more than is nature, and yet thus far we have mentioned only the benediction of a prophet. But if the benediction of man had such power as to change nature, what do we say of divine consecration itself, in which the very word of our Lord and Saviour function? For this sacrament, which you receive, is effected by the words of Christ. But if the words of Elias had such power as to call down fire from heaven, will not the words of Christ have power enough to change the nature of the elements? You have read about the works of the world: “that He spoke and they were done; He commanded and they were created.” So, cannot the words of Christ, which were able to make what was not out of nothing, change those things that are into the things that were not? For it is not of less importance to give things new natures than to change natures.28 Now Ambrose speaks of, on the one hand, the “benediction,” and, on the other, the “consecration,” as though the consecration represents a small concentric circle within the larger concentric circle of the benediction. Here he links ‘consecration’ with “the very word of our Lord and Saviour,” presumably the Words of Institution. The ambiguity regarding the ‘fault’ of the elemental change, whether it be the ‘benediction’ or the ‘consecration’, may be best interpreted as though there was a seamlessness between the two aspects of the Eucharistic Prayer: the broader act of blessing or thanksgiving, and the specific act of the consecration or the Words of Institution. This ‘seamlessness’ seems to be more emphatic when one reads 9.54: The Lord Jesus himself declares: “This is my body.” Before the benediction of the heavenly words another species is mentioned; after the consecration the body is signified. He Himself speaks of His blood. Before the consecration it is mentioned as something else; after the consecration it is called blood. And you say “Amen,” that is, “It is true.” What the mouth speaks, let the mind within confess; what words utter, let the heart feel.29 Ambrose is still inconsistent in his use of “benediction” and “consecration.” He speaks of the “benediction of the heavenly words” before which the element of bread is “mentioned,” 28 29 Fathers of the Church, 44:25. Fathers of the Church, 44:26. 25 presumably in virtue of the Milanese anaphora’s “…on the day before he suffered he took bread into his sacred hands…” On the other hand, it is “…after the consecration that the body is signified.” Yet, parallel to the bread/body pair, he speaks of “…before the consecration it is mentioned as something else; after the consecration it is his blood.” Why does he speak of the wine/blood pair in terms of “before the consecration’ but the bread/body pair in terms of “before the benediction”? By method of elimination, it would initially seem that the whole anaphora is understood as a ‘benediction.’ When, however, the phrase “Perform for us this oblation written, reasonable, acceptable, which is a figure of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ” is completed, a transition from the broader ‘benediction’ to the narrorwer ‘consecration’ thus takes place, as though the ‘consecration’ is the domain which is situated within the ‘benediction’. Our next question has to do with the nature of the “words of Christ.” Obviously they refer to the Words of Institution. In the first place, they are understood as proofs that it is not ordinary bread and wine that the neophytes consume, but because of the truth and trustworthiness of Christ, they are what He says they are. But do the words themselves effect the change? Ambrose indeed speaks of the creative power of the Word in 9.52; in 9.54, however, his language seems a bit more pointed: it is “declared” to be the body of the Lord; after the consecration of the bread, the body is “signified”; after the consecration of the wine, it is “called” blood. Then, “What the mouth speaks, let the mind within confess; what words utter, let the heart feel.” The emphasis here appears to be signification, designation, declaration, rather than—anachronistically—causation or effecting. But Ambrose’s mystagogy would develop further still. 26 In his mystagogical treatise De sacramentis, Ambrose follows a pattern similar to De Mysteriis 9.50, in which the neophyte’s assessment of the bread is ‘ordinary,’ only to be contradicted by the words of Christ. We give the text here in Latin: Tu forte dicis. Meus panis est usitatus. Sed panis iste panis est ante verba sacramentorum; ubi accesserit consecratio, de pane fit caro Christi. Hoc igitur adstruamus. Quomodo potest qui panis est corpus esse Christi ? Consecratione. Consecratio autem quibus verbis est, cuius sermonibus? Domini Iesu. Nam et reliqua omnia quae dicuntur in superioribus, a sacerdote dicuntur, laudes Deo deferuntur, oratio petitur pro populo, pro regibus, pro ceteris; ubi venitur ut conficiatur venerabile sacramentum, iam non suis sermonibus utitur sacerdos sed utitur sermonibus Christi. Ergo sermo Christ hoc conficit sacramentorum.30 Ambrose here is careful to distinguish ordinary bread from the Sacred Body. The neophyte says, “My bread is ordinary,” to which the mystagogue replies: “But this bread is bread prior to the words of the sacraments [verba sacramentorum]; when the consecration falls onto it, from bread it becomes the flesh of Christ.” Ordinary bread ceases to be ordinary when the verba sacramentorum indicate otherwise; this consecration “becomes [fit]” the flesh of Christ. Now comes the crucial question: “The consecration, on the other hand, which words is it, whose words? [That of] the Lord Jesus.” Note the inadequacy of English in translating this phrase: Ambrose switches from verbum to sermo: “Which words [verbis] is it,” then “whose words [sermonibus]?” The ‘words of the sacraments’ or verba sacramentorum are in fact the “words [sermones]” of the Lord Jesus. It would seem that if Ambrose intends to maintain John Chrysostom’s interpretation of the eternally efficacious power of Christ’s words at the Last Supper, then the historical utterance of Christ is represented by the «sermones Christi» which become liturgically repeated as the «verba Christi».31 Without noting the language in Ambrose’s employ, Robert Taft maintains that he still intends to carry 30 De Sacramentis 4, 4, 4; EP 1339, emphases added. The only extant English translation of this text is found in R. J. Deferrari, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 44: Saint Ambrose, Theological and Dogmatic Works (Washington, D.C.: 1963) features too colloquial a translation for our purposes. 31 We will address the distinction between verbum and sermo in Part II. 27 on Chrysotom’s unique interpretation; he explains this in a different context which we will address at the end of Part I: Does this mean the words of institution are not consecratory? Not at all. For the fathers of the church they are indeed consecratory, for they are eternally efficacious in the mouth of Jesus. The classic Latin doctrine on the words of institution as “words of consecration” can be traced back to St. Ambrose (339J97), who states the teaching unambiguously though not restrictively in his treatises On the Sacraments IV, 4.14J17, 5.21J23, and On the Mysteries IX, 52J54. But Ambrose is not speaking of the words as a “formula.” In On the Sacraments IV, 4.14J17, for example, he attributes the efficacy of Jesus’ words to the indefectible effectiveness of the Word of God: “...it is the word of Christ which produces this sacrament. Which word of Christ? The one by which all things were made.... You see, then, how effective the word of Christ is. If then there is such power in the word of the Lord Jesus that things which were not began to be, how much more effective must they be in changing what already exists into something else!” This is exactly what St. John Chrysostom, in his Homily on the Betrayal of Judas 1/2, 6, teaches: “‘This is my body’, he says. This word...once uttered, from that time to the present day...makes the sacrifice complete at every table in the churches.”32 We are not as certain of Ambrose’s supraJhistorical interpretation of the Words of Institution as we are of John Chrysostom’s. The likelihood that De sacramentis carries on this supraJ historical interpretation may be based upon four arguments: first, Ambrose is in receipt of the theology of the Eastern Church, particularly that of John Chrysostom and pseudoJCyril of Jerusalem; second, the shifting between verbum and sermo in his explanation of the efficaciousness of the Words of Institution may represent a liturgicalJversusJhistorical incidence of the Words of Institution; third, Ambrose compares the once(spoken words by which the world was made to the words of Christ by which the Holy Gifts are changed—this appears to indicate once(spoken Words of Institution; fourth, we have the important scholarly opinion of Robert Taft, whose authority on the Byzantine Eucharist and the Eastern Fathers is difficult to dispute. This unique doctrine of the ‘verbum Christi’ versus the ‘sermones Christi’, however, which had its genus in John Chrysostom, would disappear in the theology of St Augustine, only to reJemerge in the theology of St John of Damascus. 32 R. TAFT, “Mass Without the Consecration?” In America 12 May 2003. 28 # $$ We now turn to St Augustine of Hippo, whom Ambrose had the privilege of receiving into the Catholic Church along with his son in 387. If the dating for the composition of De mysteriis is correct, then it is possible that Augustine was among the neophytes who listened to this mystagogical catechesis and thus received the origin of his Eucharistic doctrine from Ambrose. Minimally, we know that Augustine received the Faith from Ambrose; maximally, we might be able to pinpoint Augustine’s Eucharistic theology to be derived from Ambrose’s De mysteriis. It is only with caution that we can approach Augustine’s Eucharistic theology, for, as J. N. D. Kelly notes, “If Ambrose’s influence helped to mediate the doctrine of a physical change to the West, that of Augustine was exerted in a rather different direction. His thought about the eucharist, unsystematic and manyJsided as it is, is tantalizingly difficult to assess.”33 Fortunately, our specific question about the sacramental Word is known to be better developed in the mind of Augustine, given his Platonic bias.34 The Platonic cosmology, to which Augustine more or less subscribed, understood the universe as ‘twoJstoried’: it is encountered through signs to the realities themselves. As William R. Crockett explains, “As a Platonist, Augustine distinguishes between a sign (signum) and the reality (res) that is signifies. In line with the ancient understanding of symbols, a symbol not only represents that which it signifies, but it also participates in that reality and mediates the reality to those who participate in the symbol. Symbolism, 33 34 KELLY, Early Christian Doctrines, 446. See E. KILMARTIN, The Eucharist in the West (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1998) 28J30. 29 therefore, is not opposed to realism, but presupposes it.”35 How does the sign come to participate in the reality, in order to become a symbol? In his Sermon 227, Augustine teaches that “…that Bread which you see on the altar, consecrated by the word of God, is the body of Christ. That chalice, or rather what the chalice holds, consecrated by the word of God, is the Blood of Christ.” What is meant by “word of God”? Does Augustine refer to the Logos or to a liturgical formula? The gamut of possibilities narrows slightly once one reads Sermon 234: “…the faithful understand what I am saying; they know Christ in the breaking of the bread. For, not all bread, but only that which receives the blessing of Christ becomes the body of Christ.” Can we say that the ‘consecration of the word of God’ is coextensive with ‘the blessing of Christ’? Or does the ‘word of God’ refer specifically to the Words of Institution, which was the “blessing” pronounced by Christ at the Last Supper? Or does it not even refer to the Words of Institution, but to the invisible presence of Christ at the liturgy who confects the Eucharist? Augustine places strong emphasis on the theological virtue of faith in the Eucharistic celebration. His Tractatus super Ioannem (80.3), which will play a decisive role in the development of the Eucharistic ‘theology of consecration’, finds Jn 15:3 to be the starting point for the ‘sacramental Word.’ Commenting on “You are already made clean by the word which I have spoken to you,” Augustine explains: Why does he not say, you are clean through the baptism with which you have been washed, but ‘through the word which I have spoke unto you,’ save only that in the water also it is the word that cleanses? Take away the word, and the water is neither more nor less than water. The word is added to the element, and there results the sacrament, as if itself also a kind of visible word. …And whence has water so great an efficacy…save by the operation by the word; and that not because it is uttered but because it is believed? For even in the word itself the passing sound is one thing, the abiding efficacy another. ‘This is the word of faith which we preach,’ says the apostle, ‘that if you shall confess with your mouth that Jesus is the Lord, and shall believe in your heart that God has raised him from the 35 W. R. CROCKETT, Eucharist: Symbol of Transformation (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1989), 89; hereafter CROCKETT, Eucharist. 30 dead, you shall be saved. …The cleansing, therefore, would on no account be attributed to the fleeting and perishable element, were it not for that which is added, ‘by the word.’36 It is the verbum fidei, then, that Augustine locates the ‘efficaciousness’ of the sacraments, including the Eucharist. Concerning the theological dictum, Accedit verbum ad alementum et fit sacramentum which comes from Augustine himself (cf. Tractatus super Ioannem 80.3, above), Edward Schillebeeckx observes: “This word is a confession of faith. It is, that is to say, Christ’s own proclamation of the word, made known by means of the Gospel, accepted through the faith of the Church, and confessed with regard to the sacramental action in a verbum fidei, a word of faith. Unquestionably the Fathers attributed a value to the word of faith above that of the element in the sacraments.”37 Another aspect of Augustine’s thought to be considered with respect to the question of sign language in proclaiming the verbum fidei and which space does not permit us to discuss in this present essay, would have to be that of his philosophy of language. How does Augustine view language? How do language and the verbum fidei relate to each other? To answer this, one would have to turn to his Confessions (esp. I.8 [13]), On Christian Doctrine (1.2.2; 2.1.2J2.2.3) Philip Burton’s Language in the Confessions of Augustine38, Andrew Louth’s article “Augustine on Language,”39 and Christopher Kirwan’s chapter “Augustine’s Philosophy of Language.”40 Thus a separate study on the question on the fittingness of sign language to proclaim the sacramental Word according to Augustine’s theory of language is warranted. 36 CROCKETT, Eucharist, 91. E. SCHILLEBEECKX, Christ, the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (New York, NY: Sheed and Ward, Lt., 1963), 92; hereafter SCHILLEBEECKX, Christ. 38 P. BURTON, Language in the Confessions of Augustine (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). 39 A. LOUTH, “Augustine on Language,” in Journal of Literature and Theology 3:2 (1989), 151J158. 40 C. Kirvan, “Augustine’s Philosophy of Language,” in E. Stump and N. Krezmann, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 186J204, esp.191J195. 37 31 How should we assess the Eucharistic theologies of Sts Ambrose and Augustine? Since we are dealing here with the dogmatic way, it would be helpful to recall the following statement issued by the Fifth Ecumenical Council, held at Constantinople in 553: We further declare that we hold fast to the decrees of the four Councils, and in every way follow the holy Fathers, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Theophilus, John [Chrysostom], Augustine, Proclus, Leo and their writings on the true faith.41 Both Ambrose and Augustine represent two very different, but complementary, thoughts on Eucharistic theology; Ambrose places emphasis on the Words of Institution being spoken by Christ himself, even in the contemporary celebration of the Eucharist. Augustine takes Ambrose’s doctrine of the Word in the Eucharistic celebration and insists on its efficacy precisely because it is a verbum fidei—it is faith which invests the sacramental Word with power, not the mere “utterance” or the “passing sound” of it. For Augustine, nonetheless, the ‘act of faith’ presupposed in the verbum fidei is not restricted to the miracle of the Eucharist but to the totality of Christ’s mystery which is symbolized in the Eucharistic celebration. For this reason, then, we can insist on the appropriateness of sign language in communicating the Words of Institution because it relays the verbum fidei in “signs” that are ‘manual’ rather than ‘vocal.’ ! " #$%& #$'# Without rehearsing the specific objections of Berengarius to Paschasius’ De corpore et sanguine Domini, what does the Council of Rome—being the first dogmatic formulation concerning the Eucharist—say regarding the Words of Institution? Ego Berengarius … cognoscens veram et apostolicam fidem, anathematizo omnem haerisem, praecipue eum, de qua hactenus infamatus sum: quad adstruere conatur, panem et vinum, quae in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem solummodo sacramentum, et non verum corpus et sanguine Domini nostril Iesu Christi esse, nec posse sensualiter, nisi in solo sacramento, minibus sacerdotum tractari vel frangi vel fidelium dentibus atteri. Consentio autem sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae et 41 Session I. 32 Apostolicae Sedi, et ore et corde profiteer de sacramento dominicae mensae eam fidem me tenere, quam dominus et venerabilis papa Nicolaus et hae sancta Synodus auctoritate evangelica et apostolicae tendendam tradidit mihique firmavit: scilicet pamen et vinum, quae in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem non solum sacramento, sed in veritate, manibus sacerdotum tractari et frangi et fidelium dentibus atteri, iurans per sanctam and homousion Trinitatem et per haec sancrosancta Christi evangelia. Eos vero, quo contra hanc fidem venerint, cum dogmatibus et sectatoribus suis, aeterno anathemate dignos et pronuntio.42 The occurrence of “anathema” in identifying the “heresy…in particular…” of asserting that the wine and bread placed upon the altar, “after the consecration”, is in fact “not the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ,” indicates that one is dealing with a matter of dogmatic certitude. Toward the end of the profession, another “anathema” is pronounced upon those who would contradict what is defined, i.e., the presence of the Lord’s Body and Blood on the altar after the consecration. Significantly, the profession of faith leaves ambiguous the nature of the “consecration.” Not only is it the earliest dogmatic formulation concerning the Eucharist, it is likewise the earliest with any mention of the “consecration.” It does not identify the “consecration” with what is now called the “Words of Institution” (nor is it excluded). Further light is shed on Berengarius’ second profession of faith at the Synod of Rome in 1079: Ego Berengarius corde credo et ore Confiteor, panem et vinum, quae ponuntur in altari, per mysterium sacrae orationis et verba nostri Redemporis substantialiter converti in veram et propriam ac vivificatricem carnem et sanguine Iesu Christi Domini nostril et post consecrationem esse verum Christi corpus, quod natum est de Virgine et quod pro salute mundi oblatum in cruce pependit, et quod sedet ad dexteram Patris, et verum sanguinem Christi, qui de latere eius effuses est, non tantum per signum et virtutem sacramenti, sed in proprietate naturae et veritate substantiae. Sicut in hoc Brevi continetur et ego legi et vos intelligitis, sic credo, nec contra hanc fidem ulterius doceco. Sic me Deus adiuvet et haec sancta Dei Evangelia. 43 The profession of faith now offers a refined conception of various moments in the Eucharistic celebration: “through the mystery of the sacred prayer and the words of the 42 43 Denzinger, 690. Denzinger, 700; cf. Neuner and Dupuis, 1501. 33 Redeemer,” the bread and wine are changed; but “after the consecration, they are Christ’s true Body…” It would appear here that the formulation distinguishes the moment of «per» and the moment of «post». Moreover, it seems that the «post consecrationem» formula was conscious and intentional, since the same pattern is found in the profession of 1059. Two questions emerge. First, why does the formulation read “consecration” but not “words of consecration”? Second, why does the profession distinguish the “words of the Redeemer,” through which the bread and wine are substantially changed, from the “consecration,” after which the Lord’s true Body and Blood are present upon the altar? Up to this point, we have only appealed to the Synod of Rome as an instance of the Magisterium with respect to the question of Eucharistic Form, and even there we do not see with absolute clarity the manner of causality between the Sacramental Word and the event resulting thereof. Generally speaking, four documents are commonly appealed to as evidence for the doctrine of the Eucharistic Form44 as the efficacious means of confecting transubstantiation: (1) The “Decree for the Armenians” Exsultate Deo issued by Pope +Eugenius VI, (2) the Council of Trent, Session 13, chapter 3, (4) the Roman Catechism issued after the Council of Trent, and finally (4) the decree of Pope +Pius X, De defectibus. Our task is to weigh the magisterial force of each of these documents and to determine whether they meet the test of a dogmatic definition. Only then can we properly approach the doctrine of the Eucharistic Form. The same ambiguity regarding the “consecration” found at the Synod of Rome is repeated at the Council of Florence’s “Decree for the Greeks.” In reading the Decree, one significant 44 P. RADÓ, Enchiridion Liturgicum: Complectens theologiae sacramentalis et dogmata et leges (Rome : Herder and Herder, 1961), 522J523. 34 problem emerges: the acts of the Council are contradictory. We must identify the language of solemn teaching in the often confusing array of texts produced by the Council. The “Decree for the Greeks,” Laetentur caeli (6 July 1439), on the other hand, offers a rare glimpse of clarity by its use of «Idem…» in referring to the previous canon’s opening «Diffinimus insuper…»: Idem, in azymo sive fermentato pane triticeo corpus Christi veraciter confici; sacerdotesque in altero ipsum Domini corpus conficere debere, unumquemque scilicet iuxta suae Ecclesiae sive occidentalis sive orientalis consuetudinem.45 It would seem here that we are dealing with at least a definitive doctrine46 that recognizes a vague matter/form pairing that is inclusive of both the Roman and Byzantine praxis: for the Romans, the use of unleavened bread and its anaphoral pattern of first the epiklesis and then the Words of Institution or, for the Byzantines, leavened bread and the anaphoral pattern of first the Words of Institution and then the epiklesis. The “consecration” of the Lord’s Body is truly effected by either rubric. Again, the meaning of “consecration” is not given, nor do we read of the “words of consecration.” Instead, there is the ambiguous phrase, “…and that priests must consecrate the body of the Lord in one way or another, namely each following the custom of their Church, either the Western or the [Eastern] Church.” The fusion of two apparently contradicting ideas, namely the Words of Institution versus the epiklesisJ consecration, makes the interpretation of this text all the more difficult. In either case, one still discovers a reluctance to describe what precisely the “form” of the sacrament is. It would appear that the “Decree for the Armenians,” Exsultate Deo, contradicts Laetentur caeli. Whereas the former allows for a variation of praxis of either leaven or 45 Denzinger1301; cf. Neuner and Dupuis 1508. F. Sullivan and Y. Congar, on the other hand, thinks that Laetentur caeli intends a ‘definitive dogma’; cf. Creative Fidelity, 75. 46 35 unleavened bread and either the Roman or Byzantine anaphoral patterns, in Exsultate Deo, however, the Roman praxis seems to prevail: “The form of the sacrament is the words of the Saviour with which he effected this sacrament; for the priest effects the sacrament by speaking in the person of Christ. It is by the power of these words that the substance of bread is changed into the body of Christ, and the substance of wine into his blood…”47 Neuner and Dupuis are of the opinion that Exsultate Deo “…cannot be considered a document of faith…”48 Francis Sullivan49, Richard Gaillardetz50, Yves Congar51, and Joseph de Guibert52 agree. Enrico Mazza does not even mention it in his studies on the Eucharist.53 One of the foremost contemporary sacramental theologians, Kenan B. Osborne, has the following to say with regard to the decree Exsultate Deo: Eugene IV, in the section on the sacraments, presented the Armenians with the basic teaching of St Thomas Aquinas as found in his De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis. Since the Decree, because of this, presents many theological opinions, rather than assured statements, it is more than difficult to use the Decree as a solemn teaching of the Church on the sacraments. […] As a result, we are cautioned in making a carte blanche use of this Decree, nor did the Council of Trent subscribe in an official way all that we find in this Thomistic Decree. For these reasons one must use the Decree for the Armenians in a most circumspect way.54 In a sense, then, the bearing of Exsultate Deo on our present discussion is irrelevant because it is not an instance of the Church’s solemn teaching authority. Though the theological manuals prior to the Second Vatican Council sometimes made mention of this as an instance of the Church’s solemn teaching, dogmaticians have been able to demonstrate that it is in fact 47 Neuner and Dupuis 1510; cf. Denzinger 1321. Neuner and Dupuis, The Christian Faith, 613. 49 Sullivan, Creative Fidelity, 77. 50 In a private communiqué, dated 29 September 2008. 51 Y. CONGAR, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, vol. 3 (New York, NY: Seabury, 1983), 189, n. 23. 52 J. DE GUIBERT, «Le décret du Concile de Florence ‘pour les Arméniens.’ Sa valeur dogmatique,» Bull. Lit. Eccl. 20 (1919) 81J85, 150J62, 195J215. 48 53 E. MAZZA, The Celebration of the Eucharist: The Origin of the Rite and the Development of Its Interpretation (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999). 54 K. B. OSBORNE, The Christian Sacraments of Initiation: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 157J158. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, De articulus fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis, in Opera omnia issu Leonis XII P.M., vol. 42 (Rome, Italy: Editiori San Tommaso, 1979), 207J257. 36 not a dogmatic canon, and therefore cannot have any bearing on our present question. Exsultate Deo, ultimately, is irrelevant while Laetuntur caeli represents an important witness to the Church’s dogmatic tradition. The next relevant act of the magisterium is to be found in the thirteenth, twentyJfirst, and twentyJsecond Sessions of the Council of Trent. Here, and only here, will the dogmatic theologian find the most comprehensive content of the Church’s dogma on the Eucharist. However, none of these teachings can be understood apart from the 7th Session of the Council which offers an overview of the sacramental economy and praxis. The Seventh Session, which issued the “Decree on the Sacraments” on 3 March 1547, consists of a foreword and thirteen canons. A brief outline of the canons can be given as follows: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Christ instituted exactly seven sacraments; The sacraments of the New Law supersede that of the Old Law; There is in fact a hierarchy of dignity to the sacraments; Salvation and the sacramental economy bear an intimate connexion; The sacraments do not exist “only for the sake of nourishing faith”; The sacraments do in fact convey the graces they signify; God does not vary in the gift of graces though the sacraments according to the recipients; The sacraments dispense grace ex opere operato and not through the faith of the ministers; Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders imprint an indelible mark on the soul; Not all Christians have the power to administer all of the sacraments; Intention to do as the Church does is indispensible for sacramental validity; A minister in the state of mortal sin does not invalidly administer the sacraments; The rites authorized by competent ecclesiastical authority may not be dismissed. Of the above thirteen canons, 11 will have immediate relevance to our study. In its entirety, the canon reads thus: “If anyone says that the intention, at least of doing what the Church 37 does, is not required in the ministers when they are performing and conferring the sacraments, anathema sit.”55 The Thirteenth Session, which took place between 7 February 1550 and 23 March 1555 during the papacy of Julius III, resulted in the “Decree on the Most Holy Eucharist,” promulgated on 11 October 1555. It contains a forward, eight chapters touching on various themes of Eucharistic doctrine, and finally a series of canons anathemizing certain propositions. According to the forward, the reader is informed that the Council, “…under the special guidance and direction of the Holy Spirit, has assembled to set forth the true and ancient doctrine on the faith and on the sacraments…” Curiously, the ecclesial dimension of the Eucharist, often lost by neoscholastic distortions, is retained: “[the] Eucharist which our savior has left in his Church precisely as a symbol of the unity and charity with which he desired all Christians to be joined together and united.” The explicitly dogmatic authority of the Decree is reasserted at the end of the forward: “And so this holy Council teaches the true and genuine doctrine about this venerable and divine sacrament of the Eucharist—the doctrine which the Catholic Church has always held and which it will hold until the end of the world, as it learned it from Jesus Christ our Lord himself, from his apostles, and from the Holy Spirit…” Again, “The Council forbids all the faithful of Christ henceforth to believe, teach, or preach anything about the most holy Eucharist that is different from what is explained and defined in this present decree.”56 Our question is interested in the dogmatic aspects of the Words of Institution; consequently chapter four, «De Transsubstantiatione» is of immediate relevance: 55 Neuner and Dupuis 1321; Denzinger 1611. 56 Neuner and Dupuis 1512; cf. Denzinger 1635. 38 Quoniam autem Christus redemptor noster corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis offerebat, vere esse dixit, ideo persuasum semper in Ecclesia Dei fuit, idque nunc denuo sancta hae Synodus declarat: per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fiery totius substantiae panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostril, et totius substantiae vini in substantiam sanguins eius. Quae conversion convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia transsubstantiatio est appellata.57 Whereas at the Synod of Rome, we read «post consecrationem», the Council of Trent reads «per consecrationem». Still, one does not find the phrase “words of consecration”, nor is the formula of consecration recounted. But in canon 4 of the “Canons on the Sacrament of the Eucharist”, we read: “If anyone says that after the consecration [peracta consecrationem] the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ are not in the marvelous sacrament of the Eucharist…”58 Now a different verb is introduced: peracta, from pĕrăgo, which, according to the present context, means “to carry through, go through with, execute, finish, accomplish, complete, etc.”59 In other words, it is in virtue of the consecration that the bread and wine are no longer present substantially on the altar. But what are the words of consecration? Again, none are given. The TwentyJFirst Session deals with Communion under both species and the Communion of young children. Nothing is said about the Eucharistic Prayer or the consecration and, therefore, does not bear any relevance for our study. The TwentyJSecond Session, on the other hand, deals with the aspect of sacrifice in the Eucharist and has minor implications for our study, except canon 9 of the “Canons on the Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.” It is not until the twentyJfirst session that we find the phrase “words of consecration”: “If anyone says that the rite of the Roman Church prescribing that part of the Canon and the words of consecration [verba consecrationis] be recited in a low voice, must 57 Denzinger 1642; cf. Neuner and Dupuis 1519. Neuner and Dupuis 1529; cf. Denzinger 1654. 59 LEWIS and SHORT, 1333. 58 39 be condemned…anathema sit.”60 Here, the Council Fathers wish to counter the Reformers’ objection to the soJcalled ‘silent Canon.’ It was customary, until the liturgical reforms of Pope Paul VI, for the Words of Institution—according to the received tradition of the Roman Rite—to be recited in a low tone, audible to the presider alone. Despite the ambiguity outlined above, the conclusion ‘words of consecration = Words of Institution’ is inescapable; the real difficulty is that the Council of Trent refrains from explicating any theology of ‘causality’ from the Words of Institution to the Real Presence. None of the various theories of sacramental causality in vogue during the Council of Trent receive any official approbation except that the Words of Institution, liturgically repeated by the presider having the Church’s intention, effects the change in the elements of bread and wine. What conclusions can we draw from the relatively few (but significant) dogmatic formulations outlined above? It would seem that at least three moments in the Eucharistic action are outlined: (1) The Institution proper, whereby Christ handed over the Sacrament of the Eucharist in virtue of the Words of Institution; (2) The “sacred prayer” and repetition of the “words of the Redeemer” effect a change in the substance of bread and wine to the substance of Christ’s Body and Blood, and (3) “Through” or “after” the “consecration”, the Lord’s Body and Blood are in fact present upon the altar. ( % ! % ) % % ! The first of the sixteen documents issued by the Second Vatican Council took place during the Second Session and addressed the need for reforming the Roman Rite. The Dogmatic 60 Neuner and Dupuis 1563; cf. Denzinger 1759. 40 Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum concilium, was promulgated on 4 December 1963 by Pope Paul VI scarcely a year after the Council had opened. The convergence of the title and the subject of Sacrosanctum concilium points to the Council’s understanding of the centrality of the sacred liturgy in Christian life: This sacred council has several aims in view: it desires to impart an ever increasing vigor to the Christian life of the faithful; to adapt more suitably to the needs of our own times those institutions which are subject to change; to foster whatever can promote union among all who believe in Christ; to strengthen whatever can help to call the whole of mankind into the household of the Church. The Council therefore sees particularly cogent reasons for undertaking the reform and promotion of the liturgy. Outlining the necessity of renewing the vigour of Christian life, institutional adaptation to the modern world, unity in the confession of Christian faith, and strengthening the task of the evangelization of souls geared towards ecclesial, communion warranted “the reform and promotion of the liturgy.” In other words, the sacred liturgy is the culmination of the Council’s pastoral aims. Sacrosanctum concilium is divided into seven chapters: “I. General Principles for the Restoration and Promotion of the Sacred Liturgy”; “II. The Most Sacred Mystery of the Eucharist”; “III. The Other Sacraments and the Sacramentals”; “IV. The Divine Office”; “V. The Liturgical Year”; “VI. Sacred Music”; and “VII. Sacred Art and Sacred Furnishing.” Since our present concern is the Eucharist within the sacramental economy, chapters I and II will be the most relevant to our discussion. After a few sentences outlining the meaning of the Incarnation, S.c. teaches that “For His humanity, united with the person of the Word, was the instrument of our salvation.” Because of this, the document continues, quoting the Veronese Sacramentary: in Christ “the perfect achievement of our reconciliation came forth, and the fullness of divine worship was 41 given to us.”61 The sacramental economy thus bears a certain parallelism to the Incarnation and indeed draws on it as the source of its graces. The genius of the Council, however, was to relocate the sacraments in the Church qua Church rather than actions ‘by’ the Church: Christ “achieved His task principally by the paschal mystery of His blessed passion and resurrection from the dead, and the glorious ascension, whereby ‘dying, he destroyed our death and, rising, he restored our life’. For it was from the side of Christ as He slept the sleep of death upon the cross that there came forth ‘the wondrous sacrament of the whole Church.’”62 In the next paragraph comes a revolutionary teaching, and one that subordinates the munera sanctificandi that is the sacramental economy to the munera docendi: Just as Christ was sent by the Father, so also He sent the apostles, filled with the Holy Spirit. This He did that, by preaching the gospel to every creature, they might proclaim that the Son of God, by His death and resurrection, had freed us from the power of Satan and from death, and brought us into the kingdom of His Father. His purpose also was that they might accomplish the work of salvation which they had proclaimed, by means of sacrifice and sacraments, around which the entire liturgical life revolves. Thus by baptism men are plunged into the paschal mystery of Christ: they die with Him, are buried with Him, and rise with Him; they receive the spirit of adoption as sons “in which we cry: Abba, Father” ( Rom. 8 :15), and thus become true adorers whom the Father seeks. In like manner, as often as they eat the supper of the Lord they proclaim the death of the Lord until He comes. For that reason, on the very day of Pentecost, when the Church appeared before the world, "those who received the word" of Peter "were baptized." And "they continued steadfastly in the teaching of the apostles and in the communion of the breaking of bread and in prayers . . . praising God and being in favor with all the people" (Acts 2:41J47). From that time onwards the Church has never failed to come together to celebrate the paschal mystery: reading those things "which were in all the scriptures concerning him" (Luke 24:27), celebrating the eucharist in which “the victory and triumph of his death are again made present”, and at the same time giving thanks “to God for his unspeakable gift” (2 Cor. 9:15) in Christ Jesus, “in praise of his glory” (Eph. 1:12), through the power of the Holy Spirit. The pivotal statement here is that “[Christ’s] purpose also was that they might accomplish the work of salvation which they had proclaimed by means of sacrifice and sacraments [quod annuntiabant, opus salutis per Sacrificium et Sacramenta], around which the liturgical life revolves.” The work of salvation—the life, ministry, and teaching of Jesus Christ—is 61 62 S.c. 5. S.c. 5. 42 proclaimed liturgically and sacramentally. Indeed, as the Council of Trent taught, the sacraments confer grace; here, now at the Second Vatican Council, it is proclaimed that they also proclaim the Gospel. The sacraments are thus intensely evangelical moments in the life of the Church! The sacred liturgy is the Gospel in drama. This ‘subordination’ of the munera sanctificandi to the munera docendi explains precisely why, in Presbyterorum ordinis, the task of preaching and teaching is prior to the task of sacramental celebration (n. 4); the Code of Canon Law, which flows from the Council63, places first the “Teaching Office of the Church” to the “Sanctifying Office of the Church” (Book III and Book IV, respectively). It also legislates that the first task of pastors is to see that the Ministry of the Word is set in order at their parishes (canon 528). The mystery of Christ proclaimed in the sacramental economy is precisely the mystery of His pasch: in baptism, the Council teaches, the candidate participates in the death and burial of Christ (cf. Rom 6:3f); in the Eucharist, the believer proclaims the event of His death and resurrection. These two sacraments are highlighted because they most intensely proclaim the Paschal Mystery. Inasmuch as the four gospels are “Passion narratives with a long introduction” (Martin Kähler), the sacraments likewise proclaim the Lord’s Passion by way of a “long introduction” consisting of a Penitential Rite or a Psalmody and a Liturgy of the Word. The Second Vatican Council intends to present the sacraments not merely as ‘holy things’ but also as a proclamation that translates the act of faith into elements, actions, and words. “They not only presuppose faith, but by words and objects they also nourish, strengthen, and express it; that is why they are called ‘sacraments of faith.’”64 63 JOHN PAUL II, Apostolic Constitution Sacra disciplinae leges (25 January 1983). 64 S.c., 59. 43 Moving from the discussion of the sacraments in particular to the liturgy in general, the Council teaches that the sacramental actions are truly actions performed by Christ Himself: “To accomplish so great a work, Christ is always present in His Church, especially in her liturgical celebrations.” Consequently: “Rightly, then, the liturgy is considered as an exercise of the priestly office [sacerdotalis muneris excercitato] of Jesus Christ. In the liturgy the sanctification of man is signified by signs perceptible to the senses, and is effected in a way which corresponds with each of these signs; in the liturgy the whole public worship is performed by the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and His members.”65 Here we notice an echo from St Thomas Aquinas’ sacramental theology: the signs effect what they signify. “In the liturgy the sanctification of the [human person] is signified by signs perceptible to the senses, and is effected in a way which corresponds with each of these signs.” Chapter II of Sacrosanctum concilium does not go into the question of the Eucharist with the same depth that it does with that of the Sacred Liturgy in chapter I. It does contain, though, a teaching on the paschal significance of the Eucharistic celebration: At the Last Supper, on the night when He was betrayed, our Saviour instituted the Eucharistic sacrifice of His Body and Blood. He did this in order to perpetuate the sacrifice of the Cross throughout the centuries until He should come again, and so to entrust to His beloved spouse, the Church, a memorial of His death and resurrection: a sacrament of love, a sign of unity, a bond of charity, a paschal banquet in which Christ is eaten, the mind is filled with grace, and a pledge of future glory is given to us.66 65 S.c., 7. 66 S.c., 47; On the first Maundy Thursday, Christ instituted the Eucharist; this Eucharist, as “sacrifice”, was established in order that the “sacrifice of the Cross” may be “perpetuated.” Perhaps no article of faith in Catholic dogma has aroused so much confusion, both among Catholic believers and Protestant controversialists. The confusion arises from the two words, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘perpetuate.’ The Latin infinitive verb «perpetrāre» has the meaning of ‘to accomplish,’ ‘to perform,’ ‘to complete.’ The dogma of the Eucharist as a perpetuation of the sacrifice of the Cross most certainly does not mean that the sacrifice is ‘repeated.’ The Church has repeatedly condemned the notion that the Eucharist repeats the event of that first Good Friday. The need to condemn such a doctrine, I would propose, arises from a failure to distinguish ‘sacrifice’ from ‘death,’ more precisely a ‘death of a religious nature.’ Consider the words of the Roman Canon: “Be pleased to look upon them [= Sacred Body, Precious Blood] with serene and kindly countenance, and to accept them as you were pleased to accept…the sacrifice of Abraham, our father in faith.” The allusion is to Gen 15:7J21 and 22:1J14; with regard to the narrative of Abraham and the sacrifice of Isaac, we must ask: Did Abraham indeed sacrifice his son Isaac, though at the last minute his life was spared? Yes, of course, 44 Readers who hope to find a discussion on the nature of sacramental causality in the Eucharistic mystery in Sacrosanctum concilium will be disappointed, because none is given except where it is mentioned in passing in articles 7 and 59. The Second Vatican Council marks a significant shift of emphasis in its teaching on the sacred liturgy. First, instead of emphasizing the ‘mechanics’ of the sacramental signs, the Council emphasizes the sacraments as acts of faith: “His purpose also was that they might accomplish the work of salvation which they had proclaimed, by means of sacrifice and sacraments, around which the entire liturgical life revolves… In like manner, as often as they eat the supper of the Lord they proclaim the death of the Lord until He comes”67; “…because they are signs they also instruct. They not only presuppose faith, but by words and objects they also nourish, strengthen, and express it. That is why they are called ‘sacraments of faith.’” 68 It is for this reason that in the reform of the Roman Missal, according to the Apostolic Constitution Missale Romanum issued by Paul VI69, the older form of the words of Consecration were rearranged so that the “Memorial Acclamation” would follow the “Words of Institution”—thus emphasizing the proclamatory nature of the Canon actionis. Second, the doctrine of Christ’s eternal high priesthood is taught with renewed forcefulness: “Rightly, then, the liturgy is considered as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ. … From this it follows that every liturgical celebration, because it is an action of Christ the priest and of His Body which .s the Church, is a sacred action because ‘sacrifice’ does not mean ‘ritual killing’ or ‘religious death.’ It comes from the Latin noun «sacrificium», related to the infinitive verb «sacrare», to ‘make sacred’ by way of ‘dedicating to a deity.’ The gift of Isaac to God by Abraham, although no death was incurred, is why we maintain the tradition of calling the narrative of Gen 22:1J14 a “sacrifice.” 67 S.c., 6. 68 S.c., 59. 69 PAUL VI, Apostolic Constitution ‹Missale Romanum› (3 April 1969), % 9. 45 surpassing all others.”70 Again, “[f]or [Christ] continues His priestly work through the agency of His Church, which is ceaselessly engaged in praising the Lord and interceding for the salvation of the whole world. She does this…by celebrating the eucharist.”71 This doctrine of Christ being the chief and only true liturgical presider was historically implied by the Scholastic tendency to assign to God the principal causality in the sacraments. How does this bear on the question of signing the Words of Institution? Framed precisely in the thought of the Second Vatican Council, we must reJphrase the question as follows: can sign language proclaim the death of the Lord? The Words of Institution proclaim the death, first obliquely, by its reference to the separation of the Sacred Body and Precious Blood and by the additional sentences “…which will be given up for you” and “…it will be shed for you…” Once again, the discussion shifts to the question of whether sign language is equipped to relay such ideas, and again, the burden of proving otherwise rests with those who disagree that sign language can be used to administer validly the Eucharist. But such disagreement presupposes a ‘mechanistic’ view of sacramental causality and forgets that, in reality, it is Christ himself who consecrates, not only the priest. With this, the discussion shifts again: what is the nature of the presider as the ‘instrumental cause’ of the sacraments? #' * ! ' ( % +$$# & % % & “One of the tasks of theologians is to explain the authentic decisions of the church’s magisterium,” wrote Robert Taft in his article “Mass without the Consecration?” for the 70 71 S.c., 7. S.c., 83. 46 journal America. “And the Guidelines for Admission to the Eucharist Between the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East, dated Oct. 26, 2001, is surely one such decision. It was approved by the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and Pope John Paul II himself.” Our next item of investigation in Part I is the Guidelines for Admission to the Eucharist Between the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East.72 It is a tremendously important document, as it addresses a problem that has been under investigation by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith since the removal of dogmatic barriers between the Apostolic See and the Patriarchate of the Assyrian Church of the East73 and the ecumenical rapprochement between the respective synods of the Assyrian Church of the East and the Chaldean Catholic Church. However, given the unrest and dangerous quality of dayJtoJday living in the Near East, many Chaldean Catholics have discovered that the Eucharistic celebration with the Assyrian Church is often more feasible than participating at a Eucharistic celebration hosted by their own Church sui iuris. The question addressed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith was a straightforward one: May a Chaldean Catholic share in the Eucharistic celebration of the Assyrian Church of the East? The foil to the question was this—the Eucharistic anaphora used by the Assyrian Church of the East lacks the words of consecration. So would a Chaldean Catholic in fact be participating in an invalid Eucharist? 72 The document was never published in the Acta Apostolica Sedia, though it is available on the Web at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20011025_chiesaJcaldeaJ assira_en.html (retrieved 20 February 2009). 73 On the Web at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_11111994_assyrianJ church_en.html, retrieved 20 February 2009. 47 Before probing this, we must explain why the witness of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari is crucial to our present study. Those who object to sign language in communicating the Words of Institution refuse to accept the scientific consensus of linguistic scholars that sign language is no less a true and natural language than any spoken or written language. Consequently, those who reject the sacramental validity of sign language in communicating the Words of Institution assume that a signed Consecration ‘is as good as’ no Consecration at all. We have here two anomalies: first, a poor knowledge of linguistics and, second, a casuistic view of the ‘words of consecration.’ But if the Apostolic See has been able to decree that the Anaphora of Addai and Mari lacks the words of Consecration (at least according to the neoscholastic framework), then it follows that it is possible for sign language to communicate validly the Words of Institution. Why? Because, by way of an a fortiori argument, a signed Consecration displays the Words of Institution infinitely more than does an anaphora without the Words of Institution. Again, the testimony of the Guidelines for Admission to the Eucharist is pivotal to our argument because, in the minds of many who object to the sacramental validity of sign language to proclaim the Words of Institution, it is in fact ‘as good as’ no Words of Institution at all. The Eucharistic anaphora, however, which does not have the Words of Institution ad litteram,74 has been decreed to be valid by the Magisterium. Therefore, it is hoped, by way of an a fortiori argument, sign language can be used to proclaim validly the Words of Institution. The possibility of recruiting the argument from the Guidelines for Admission to the Eucharist has been suggested innumerable times, and it promises an argument with significant merit. 74 E. MAZZA states the problematic more clearly: “The Anaphora of the Apostles Addai and Mari, which belongs to the East Syrian or Chaldean Church, has a peculiarity that has made it famous: it lacks the account of the institution in the form of an account of the Last Supper.” See his Celebration of the Eucharist: The Origin of the Rite and the Development of Its Interpretation (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 72. 48 The Eucharistic ananphora used by the Assyrian Church of the East is commonly called the ‘Anaphora of Addai and Mari’ who, according to the Assyrian Christian tradition are two of the Seventy sent out by Jesus in Luke 10. It is one of the most ancient—perhaps the oldest—anaphoras in continuous use. For decades, scholars, inhibited by a misinterpretation of the Decree for the Armenians Exsultate Deo, assumed a priori that the original version of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari must have had the Words of Institution which, through the course of centuries, became lost. Even the noted liturgist Louis Bouyer insisted that the “institution narrative” had an “original presence in the eucharist of Addai and Mari.”75 Other liturgists have made similar claims. Such statements are founded upon a deeply flawed methodology, that of subordinating the theologia secunda to the theologia prima: it is patently erroneous to supersede the dictum of lex orandi, lex credendi by theological formularies. In any case, the Apostolic See undertook an extensive investigation of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari because “The principal issue for the Catholic Church…related to the question of the validity of the Eucharist… [since] it has been used without a recitation of the Institution Narrative.” The Guidelines go on to state: The Anaphora of Addai and Mari, however, as reproduced in the oldest codices retrieved, as well as in the uninterrupted liturgical practice of the Assyrian Church of the East, does not contain a coherent Institution Narrative. For many years, scholars discussed which version of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari might have been the original one. Some scholars argued that the original formula of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari was longer and did contain an Institution Narrative. Other scholars are convinced that the Anaphora of Addai and Mari did not contain a coherent Institution Narrative and that the short version is consequently the original one. Nowadays, most scholars argue that it is highly probable that the second hypothesis is the right one. Anyhow, this historical question cannot be resolved with absolute certainty, due to the scarcity or absence of contemporary sources. The validity of the Eucharist celebrated with the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, therefore, should not be based on historical but on doctrinal arguments.76 75 L. BUOYER, Eucharist: Theology and Spirituality of the Eucharistic Prayer (Notre Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 306. 76 Emphasis added. 49 Thus the Guidelines argue that the consensus of liturgical historians is that the original Anaphora of Addai and Mari very likely did not include the institution narrative. The project of determining what the Anaphora looked like originally has been abandoned in favour of determining its merits on doctrinal rather than historical grounds. However, “[after] a long and careful study was undertaken of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, from a historical, liturgical and theological perspective, at the end of which the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith on January 17th, 2001 concluded that this Anaphora can be considered valid. Pope John Paul II has approved this decision.” The Guidelines then proceeds to outline three major arguments to support the decision of the supreme magisterium. First, the Anaphopra of Addai and Mari is “one of the most ancient Anaphoras, dating back to the time of the very early Church; it was composed and used with the clear intention of celebrating the Eucharist in full continuity with the Last Supper and according to the intention of the Church; its validity was never officially contested, neither in the Christian East nor in the Christian West.” We see here an appeal to Tradition, not according to its original or earliest format, but according to the continuous, living praxis of the liturgical patrimony of the Assyrian Church. Important though it be, the appeal to Tradition does not address our present study. Second, the Apostolic See “recognises the Assyrian Church of the East as a true particular Church, built upon orthodox faith and apostolic succession.” Thus, valid ordination derived from the Apostles is affirmed as one of the conditions of a valid Eucharistic celebration, and one that is still retained by the Assyrian Church of the East, despite the many centuries of estrangement between the Apostolic See and the Patriarchate of 50 the Assyrian Church. As in the appeal to Tradition, the appeal to valid Orders, likewise, does not address our present study. Third and most significantly, “the words of Eucharistic Institution are indeed present in the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, not in a coherent narrative way and ad litteram, but rather in a dispersed euchological way, that is, integrated in successive prayers of thanksgiving, praise and intercession.” Though it is the briefest paragraph among the three reasons for affirming the sacramental validity of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, it nonetheless represents the most significant criterion. The Words of Institution, therefore, are seen to be something broader than merely the statements “This is my body”; “this is my blood” in various languages. Rather, it sees the Words of Institution as subsisting in “dispersed,” “euchological” and “not ad litteram” ways. A fuller argument is given in a subsequent document, Provision for the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East. Outlining the problematic in clearer terms, the Provision states: The Catholic Church considers the words of the Institution as a constitutive part of the Anaphora or Eucharistic Prayer. The Council of Florence stated “The form of this sacrament are the words of the Saviour with which he effected this sacrament. A priest speaking in the person of Christ effects this sacrament. For, in virtue of those words, the substance of bread is changed into the body of Christ and the substance of wine into his blood” (D.H. 1321). The same Council of Florence also characterised the words of the Institution as “the form of words [forma verborum] which the holy Roman Church […] has always been wont to use [semper uti consuevit] in the consecration of the Lord’s body and blood” (D.H. 1352), without prejudice to the possibility of some variation in their articulation by the Church. Although not having any authority as to the substance of the sacraments, the Church does have the power to determine their concrete shaping, regarding both their sacramental sign (materia) and their words of administration (forma) (cf. CCEO, can. 669). Hence the doctrinal question about the validity of the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, when used in its short version without a coherent Institution Narrative. Do the words of administration (forma) correspond to the conditions for validity, as requested by the Catholic Church? To answer this question, three major arguments have to be taken into due consideration.77 77 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN UNITY, Guidelines for Admission to the Eucharist Between The Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East (Protocol 88J1995/1), n. 2, 20 July 2001. 51 The argument opens by noting that the Words of Institution is a “constitutive part” of the Eucharistic Prayer. It goes on to quote the Council of Florence’s decree Exsultate Deo which we have already discussed. Note, however, the use of the weak verb “considers” which appears to highlight a lower degree of theological certitude than what would be suggested if the document employed “teaches” or “defines.” As we have already argued, there is no convincing reason for reading Exsultate Deo as an instance of a dogmatic definition or even an authoritative doctrine. It would seem that the conjunction “considers,” along with a partial citation of Exsultate Deo, highlights its specifically nonJmagisterial role, but rather a merely ‘instructional’ one that highlights the liturgical patrimony of the Roman Rite. Instead of being used as an instance of dogma or authoritative doctrine, Exsultate Deo serves to provide a background for the discussion at hand, namely, the uniquely Assyrian liturgical tradition against the Roman liturgical tradition. Appeal is then made to canon 669 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches: “Since the sacraments are the same for the entire Church and belong to the divine deposit, it is for the supreme authority of the Church alone to approve or define [est approbare vel definire] those things which are required for their validity.” Thus canon law points to the supreme authority of the Church to approve (as in ‘approbation’) and to define “those things which are required for their validity.” Does definire here mean ‘define’ in the usual English sense of ‘explaining’ or rather in the sense of ‘determining’ or ‘deciding’, i.e., constituting? The verb definire in the infinitive is used a total of six times throughout the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (cc. 116, 1105, 1293, 1363), and is translated “decide,” “resolve,” “decided,” “determine” respectively, all of which suggest a juridical meaning; indeed, the last four canons fall under those titles which pertain to the Church’s power of governance. 52 More to the point, definire is understood to mean “To bound, to set bounds to; to limit, terminate, define.” As we have argued above, it is within the Church’s authority “to bound, to set bounds to; to limit, terminate, define” the sacramental rites provided that their essential elements are maintained. We will discuss in what these central elements are Part II below. Minimally, the Provision outlines the Church’s prerogative to approve or reject a particular mode of sacramental rites. The question about to be addressed by the Provision is simply this: does the Anaphora of Addai and Mari preserve the essential form of the Eucharist even though it lacks the coherent Words of Institution? After, again outlining the three criteria of Tradition, apostolic succession, and the Eucharistic Form (though not ad litteram), the third criteria is given the most attention: Finally, it must be observed that the eastern and western Eucharistic Anaphoras, while expressing the same mystery, have different theological, ritual and linguistic traditions. The words of the Eucharistic Institution are indeed present in the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, not in a coherent way and ad litteram, but rather in a dispersed euchological way, that is, integrated in prayers of thanksgiving, praise and intercession. All these elements constitute a “quasiJnarrative” of the Eucharistic Institution. In the central part of the Anaphora, together with the Epiclesis, explicit references are made to the eucharistic Body and Blood of Jesus Christ (“O my Lord, in thy manifold and ineffable mercies, make a good and gracious remembrance for all the upright and just fathers who were pleasing before thee, in the commemoration of the body and blood of thy Christ, which we offer to thee upon the pure and holy altar, as thou hast taught us”), to the lifeJgiving mystery of Jesus’ passion, death and resurrection, which is actually commemorated and celebrated (“that all the inhabitants of the world may know thee ... and we also, O my Lord, thy unworthy, frail and miserable servants who are gathered and stand before thee, and have received by tradition the example which is from thee, rejoicing and glorifying and exalting and commemorating and celebrating this great and awesome mystery of the passion and death and resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ”), to the eucharistic offering for the forgiveness of the sins, to the eschatological dimension of the eucharistic celebration and to the Lord’s command to 'do this in memory of me' (“And let thy Holy Spirit come, O my Lord, and rest upon this offering of thy servants, and bless it and sanctify it that it my be to us, O my Lord, for the pardon of sins, and for the forgiveness of shortcomings, and for the great hope of the resurrection from the dead, and for new life in the kingdom of heaven with all who have been pleasing before thee”). So the words of the Institution are not absent in the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, but explicitly mentioned in a dispersed way, from the beginning to the end, in the most important passages of the Anaphora. It is also clear that the passages cited above express the full conviction of commemorating the Lord’s paschal mystery, in the strong sense of making it present; that is, the intention to carry out in practice precisely what Christ established by his words and actions in instituting the Eucharist. Two premises can be discerned as constitutive of the third criterion. 53 1. Despite its “different theological, ritual and linguistic tradition,” the Words of Institution are present “not in a coherent way and ad litteram, but rather in a dispersed euchological way.” Otherwise put, the Words of Institution are scattered, as it were, throughout the actions of “thanksgiving, praise, and intercession,” all of which constituted a combined “quasiJnarrative.” The key idea here is that the Words of Institution are scattered, dispersed, not ad litteram. This would mean that the Words of Institution are present somewhat in the following form: “…this…is…my…body…” with the ellipses representing a series of words. It may even be the case that each of the words are present in a different order as Syriac nouns and verbs have a complex system of declensions and conjugations, respectively, that would allow for a high degree of inflection which is nonexistent in the English language. Additionally, it is now possible to understand the “Words of Institution” not simply as a fixed series of words but rather as a series of actions with a fixed meaning. In the present case, the fixed meaning is simply to point out the sacrament as being Real Presence of Christ and a commemoration of his death and resurrection.78 2. “In the central part of the Anaphora, together with the Epiclesis, explicit references are made to the Eucharistic Body and Blood of Jesus Christ.” This statement is similar in content found in the preceding Guidelines but follows the second criterion: “The Assyrian Church of the East has also preserved full Eucharistic faith in the presence of our Lord under the species of bread and wine and in the sacrificial character of the Eucharist.” The mystery of the Real Presence is maintained by the Assyrian Church of the East, not only in terms of doctrine, but more importantly, in terms of liturgy. The Provision cites an 78 Due to constraints of scope and space, suffice it to say that those who object to sign language in the Eucharistic Prayer often begin with the wrong startingJpoint. The Eucharist was not instituted by Christ primarily to ‘confect’ the Real Presence. The Eucharist, above all, is a commemoration of the Lord’s death and resurrection; from that flows the Real Presence, not the other way around! 54 example of the Anaphora which evidences belief in the Real Presence: “O my Lord, in thy manifold and ineffable mercies, make a good and gracious remembrance for all the upright and just fathers who were pleasing before thee, in the commemoration of the body and blood of thy Christ, which we offer to thee upon the pure and holy altar, as thou hast taught us.” The body and blood of Christ are professed to be on the altar, which takes up the euchological substance of the form “This is my body,” with the phrase “as thou hast taught us” being euchologically identical to “Do this in remembrance of me.” What is important, it seems, is that the Eucharistic Form is less concerned with word( choice and the pattern of words than the meaning of the actions and the proclamation of this meaning (hence “euchological”). Without elaboration here, we can say that the verba of “This is my body; this is my blood” are indeed present in the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, though the sermones is not. That Christ is present and that this presence is proclaimed would seem from a careful reading of the document in question to provide the reason why the Anaphora of Addai and Mari is indeed sacramentally valid. The locus of its validity is that the meaning of the Eucharistic Form has remained intact.79 We have only here discussed the document of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, dated 20 July 2001. The document of real interest, however, is the act of the supreme magisterium promulgated five months earlier by Pope John Paul II on 17 January 2001. Curiously, neither the document of 17 January nor 20 June have been published in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis and, as per a private correspondence with the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, the decree is not available for public dissemination. Some have questioned the authority of the decree as an act of the magisterium because of its nonJpublic 79 Cf. P. A. KWASNIEWSKI, “Doing and Speaking in the Person of Christ: Eucharistic Form in the Anaphora of Addai and Mari,” in Nova et vetera 4:2 (2006), 313J379. 55 character.80 In the first place, Robert Taft, a consultor to Congregation, who insists that it is an instance of the supreme magisterium, and to this date he has not been corrected or contested, by the Apostolic See or otherwise. As Taft has noted, however he is not a dogmatician. We must ask, therefore, what ‘theological note’ should be attached to the decree of 17 January 2001. Dr Richard Gaillardetz81 and Revd Dr Francis Sullivan SJ82 are of the opinion that it is “authoritative doctrine.” Some have argued that, despite the fact that sign language can and does accurately convey the Eucharistic Form according to the Roman liturgical praxis, it remains invalid. The supreme magisterium, on the other hand, would dispute this because it has already decreed that an anaphora, namely the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, is indeed valid because it maintains the Eucharistic Form in a scattered, intermittent literary format while preserving the meaning of the Words of Institution. The watchword here is that, throughout the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, it maintains the meaning of the Eucharistic Form, and that is what preserves its validity. As a result, this retention of the meaning of the Eucharistic Form, without its recital ad litteram, places the locus of its significance not in speech by pronouncing the Anaphora, but in the prayer which maintains the sense of what Jesus said at the Last Supper. Analogously, with respect to sign language, communicating the Eucharistic Form does indeed relay the sense of the signed Words of Institution. Thus, in light of the supreme magisterium’s decree that the Anaphora of Addai and Mari is in fact valid, arguments against sign language to proclaim the Words of Institution because it is ‘as good as’ no Words of Institution at all, evaporates. 80 See, for instance, http://rorateJcaeli.blogspot.com/2008/02/declarationJonJanaphoraJofJaddaiJand.html. In a private correspondence, dated 29 September 2008. 82 In a private correspondence, dated 26 February 2009. 81 56 , - . / 0 ) 1 2 The Synod of Bishops, established by Pope Paul VI in virtue of his motu proprio Apostolica sollicitudo (15 September 1965)83, represents the fullest expression of episcopal collegiality in communion with the successor of Peter. The Synod of Bishops does not necessarily possess the prerogative of infallibility, but its pronouncements are most certainly an exercise of the ordinary and universal magisterium. They qualify as ‘ordinary’ magisterium because the represent an exercise of the episcopal charism of authoritatively handing on the faith This is because some two hundred and fifty to three hundred bishops worldwide convene with the successor of Peter to exercise a specifically pastoral task, which includes teaching documents, especially the “Message to the People of God” at the conclusion of each Synod of Bishops. One can understand the teaching authority of the Synod of Bishops according to four broad categories. The two most important would be the Instrumentum laboris or “working document” submitted by the General Secretary of the Synod of Bishops to the Synod Fathers, and the Lineamenta, the “outline” of discussion topics to be deliberated. Next are the “Interventions,” the classic element in any gathering of the Church outside of the sacred liturgy. In the case of the Synod of Bishops, each Synod Father is allocated a specific time period in which to share his opinion or concern being addressed by the Synod. Next are the homilies in the context of either the Eucharist or the Liturgy of the Hours, in which the homilist addresses some aspect of the question under consideration by the Synod. The most 83 Paul VI, Apostolic Letter issued motu proprio Apostolica sollicitudo, on the Web at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/motu_proprio/documents/hf_pJvi_motuJproprio_19650915_apostolicaJ sollicitudo_en.html, retrieved 18 March 2009. 57 important of these, arguably, is the “Message of the Synod of Bishops to the People of God,” issued at the closing liturgy. Finally, there are the Propositio or “proposals” submitted by the Synod to the Pope, offering concrete steps that the hierarchy should take in addressing the question under consideration by the Synod. Since our question deals with the ‘theology of the consecration,’ the first encounter with this comes in the Preface of the Instrumentum laboris: “The Risen Lord is present in his Church in various ways, but he is present in a particularly unique way in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Through the words of consecration and the grace of the Holy Spirit, the bread and wine become the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ for the praise and glory of God the Father.” In n. 38 of the Instrumentum laboris, the document reads: Transubstantiation takes place in the consecration of the bread and wine. The responses recommend that the theology of the act of consecration be explained by drawing from the ecclesial traditions of both East and West. In particular, the consecration should be seen as the faithful imitation of what the Lord did and commanded at the Last Supper and as the result of the invocation of the Holy Spirit in the epiclesis. A clearer theology on the act of consecration would be very useful in ecumenical dialogue with the Eastern Churches which are not yet in full communion with the Catholic Church. The Synod Fathers have therefore asked for a “theology of the consecration” that draws upon both the Roman and Byzantine doctrinal patrimonies. John M. McKenna, professor of systematic and liturgical theology at St John’s University in Queens, has indicated in his recent The Eucharistic Epiclesis, that “[t]he moment of consecration still looms large in any attempt to appreciate the importance of the eucharistic epiclesis.”84 The text cited above from the Instrumentum laboris clearly states that the change in the elements takes place in the consecration, but does not admit an equivocation of terms between ‘transubstantiation’ and ‘consecration.’ This is a significant break with Scholastic thinking. Instead, the Instrumentum laboris asks for a retrieval of both the importance of the Words of Institution 84 J. MCKENNA, The Eucharistic Epiclesis: A Detailed History from the Patristic to the Modern Era, second ed. (Chicago/Mundelein, IL: Hillenbrand Books, 2009), 188. 58 and the “invocation of the Holy Spirit in the epiclesis.” While no solution is proffered, the document nevertheless moves toward a departure from eitherJor categories of thinking: ‘either the Words of Institution or the epiclesis’ is no longer the method to be employed in developing our “theology of the consecration.” With respect to our present discussion, we ask what, precisely, is the role of the Words of Institution. In the “Message of the Synod of Bishops to the People of God,” we find the following teaching: On the eve of his passion, “Jesus took the bread, blessed it, broke it, and gave it to the disciples, saying, ‘Take, eat, this is my body.’ Then he took the cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave it to them saying, ‘Drink of it all of you; for this is my blood, the blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins” (Mt 26:25J28). “Do this in memory of me” (Lk 22:19; 1 Cor 11:24J25). From its beginnings, the Church has remembered the death and resurrection of Jesus with the same words and actions of the Last Supper, asking the Spirit to transform the bread and wine into the Body and into the Blood of Christ. We firmly believe and we teach in the constant tradition of the Church that the words of Jesus pronounced by the priest at the Mass, in the power of the Holy Spirit, effect what they signify. They bring about the real presence of the risen Christ (CCC 1366). The Church lives from this gift par excellence that gathers it, purifies it and transforms it into the one body of Christ, animated by the one Spirit (see Eph 5:29). In another movement towards a solution, the document specifies that the Words of Institution serve to recollect “the death and resurrection of Jesus with the same words and actions of the Last Supper…” The stress is not placed upon the Words alone, but also on the actions, which here refers to the fourfold movement of the Eucharistic Liturgy pinpointed by Gregory Dix.85 The strong language employed in “We firmly believe and we teach in the constant tradition of the Church that the words of Jesus pronounced by the priest at the Mass, in the power of the Holy Spirit, effect what they signify,” is indicative of at least an authoritative doctrine. Yet the nomenclature is a specific one: the text nowhere speaks of “consecration” (even in the entire “Message”); instead it retrieves the specifically Thomistic dictum that the 85 G. DIX, The Shape of the Liturgy (Westminster, UK: Dacre Press, 1954), 48J50. 59 sacraments effect what they signify. The consecratory import of the Words of Institution, therefore, are not derivative of its phonetic or auditory function, but rather of its signifying function: it recalls the dictum The emphasis on the signification is, of course, also reminiscent of S.c. 33: “And the visible signs used by the liturgy to signify invisible divine things have been chosen by Christ or the Church. Thus not only when things are read ‘which were written for our instruction’ (Rom 15:4), but also when the Church prays or sings or acts, the faith of those taking part is nourished and their minds are raised to God, so that they may offer Him their rational service and more abundantly receive His grace.” It also makes reference to the Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 1366, which in turn refers to the Council of Trent (cf. n. 187), cited in Denzinger 1740.86 Again, the clause relevant to our question is, “We firmly believe and we teach that the words of Jesus pronounced by the priest at the Mass, in the power of the Holy Spirit, effect what they signify.” But does “pronounced” here specifically mean a verbal, audible quality to the Words of Institution? Francis Sullivan indicates that it indeed does.87 On the other hand, this pronouncement does not state that the Words of Institution can be communicated only by vocal means, i.e., it does not exclude other possibilities for communicating the “words of Jesus”. The stress, rather, is upon the clause “effect what they signify,” alluding to the Scholastic dictum « sacramenta significando efficiunt gratiam ». We should also add, however, that the consecration takes place “in the power of the Holy Spirit,” according to the above document, and not “in the power of the spoken words.” It echos the earlier sentence which says, “…asking the Spirit to transform the bread and wine into the Body and into the Blood of Christ.” It is critical that “in the power of the Holy 86 87 Cf. Neuner and Dupuis 1546. In a private email correspondence, dated 6 May 2009. 60 Spirit” constitutes the dependent clause, with the predicating “in”, verb “power”, and subject “Holy Spirit.” The emphasis, then, is in the power of, not the speech of, the Words of Institution, but in the power of the Holy Spirit. In other words, it is the Holy Spirit, not the words of the ordained presbyter that effects the change in the Holy Gifts; the Holy Spirit, to be precise, invests the Words of Institution with its transformative power. In his postJsynodal apostolic exhortation, Sacramentum caritatis, nn. 12J13, Pope Benedict XVI teaches that the change in the Holy Gifts is the “decisive role of the Holy Spirit”: […] Thus it is through the working of the Spirit that Christ himself continues to be present and active in the Church, starting with her vital center which is the Eucharist. Against this backdrop we can understand the decisive role played by the Holy Spirit in the eucharistic celebration. An awareness of this is clearly evident in the Fathers of the Church. Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, in his Catecheses, states that we “call upon God in his mercy to send his Holy Spirit upon the offerings before us, to transform the bread into the body of Christ and the wine into the blood of Christ. Whatever the Holy Spirit touches is sanctified and completely transformed. Saint John Chrysostom too notes that the priest invokes the Holy Spirit when he celebrates the sacrifice: like Elijah, the minister calls down the Holy Spirit so that “as grace comes down upon the victim, the souls of all are thereby inflamed. The spiritual life of the faithful can benefit greatly from the richness of the anaphora: along with the words spoken by Christ at the Last Supper, it contains the epiclesis, the petition to the Father to send down the gift of the Spirit so that the bread and wine will become the body and blood of Jesus Christ and that “the community as a whole will become ever more the body of Christ.” […]88 Benedict XVI’s emphasis on the “decisive role of the Holy Spirit” in bringing about the Real Presence is unmistakable. What, then, is left of the Words of Institution? Benedict XVI appears to teach that the epiclesis is the means whereby the presider petitions the Holy Spirit to ‘invest’ the Words of Institution with his power, thus bridging two moments in the same anaphora. Later, in the postJsynodal apostolic exhortation, he teaches: In a particular way, eucharistic spirituality and theological reflection are enriched if we contemplate in the anaphora the profound unity between the invocation of the Holy Spirit and the institution narrative whereby “the sacrifice is carried out which Christ himself instituted at the Last Supper.” Indeed, “the Church implores the power of the Holy Spirit that the gifts offered by human hands be consecrated, that is, become Christ’s Body and Blood…” (n. 48, emphasis added). 88 BENEDICT XVI, Post(Synodal Apostolic Exhortation « Sacramentum caritatis » (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007), 12J13. 61 Again, as in the “Message to the People of God,” Synod Fathers emphasizes that the change takes effect by the Holy Spirit. There is no evidence whatsoever that the speech has any transformative power, and reiterates n. 79d of the General Instruction on the Roman Missal. The question, again, is the power of the change: How does the change take place? Not by speech, but by the Holy Spirit. For those who contest the validity of sign language in proclaiming the anaphora, then, the burden of proof is on them to account for (a) the innovation they are proposing and, more problematically, (b) the much more questionable theology of the sacerdotal office that would afford so much power to the priest’s speech and breath. Nothing in the Tradition can be put forward to substantiate either (a) or (b). We have examined the dogmengeschichte of not only the Eucharist, but especially of the ‘theology of consecration’—beginning with the earliest Fathers of the Church, through the Synod of Rome, the Councils of Florence, Trent, and Vatican II, the papal magisterium of John Paul II with respect to the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, and ultimately to the XI Ordinary Assembly of the Synod of Bishops. We have discovered a general reluctance to explain the ‘mechanics’ of the Consecration vis(à(vis the Words of Institution, although all of the documents have clearly indicated that there is at least a relation between the Canon actionis and the change from bread and wine into the Sacred Body and Blood of Christ. With the (highly improbable) exception of the 2005 Synod of Bishops, none of these documents locate the power of the Words of Institution in their vocal or audible quality. Moreover, the Second Vatican Council was careful to point out that the Eucharistic Prayer, and especially the Canon actionis, is above all proclamatory; it does not work as an 62 ‘incantation’ or ‘conjuration.’ As a proclamation of the Lord’s Pasch, the sacramental Word must be—above all—a linguistic symbol, and indeed sign language exhibits every characteristic of a true and natural language. In addition to the ‘dogmatic certainties’ of the Councils, the Synod of Bishops, and the decision of Pope John Paul II on 17 January 2001, there remains the possibility of a ‘forgotten’ teaching of the Fathers, especially Sts Ambrose of Milan, John Chrysostom, and John of Damascus. This ‘forgotten’ teaching is that the historical utterance of Christ remains eternally efficacious by way of being transJhistorical; the ordained presider only repeats this utterance in the context of the liturgy. If we are to retrieve this tradition, then it must be done within the context of the liturgy as anamnesis and further include the Last Supper within the wider ‘paschal mystery.’ If this is indeed the case, then the question of the inefficaciousness of sign language in the Canon actionis becomes moot, because it was spoken by Christ “once for all” and is repeated by the agency of the priest who presides at the Eucharist. With the above series of statements from the Fathers and the Church’s solemn teaching, therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to dispute the sacramental validity of liturgically repeating the Words of Institution in sign language. As mentioned above, the burden of proof lies with those who dispute the validity of sign language to demonstrate (1) that it is not a language, (2) that the Eucharistic Prayer, and especially the Words of Institution is not a proclamation but rather a conjuration which requires specific tonal patterns in order to be efficacious, and (3) Christ is not the chief liturgist and principal cause of the sacraments. 63 Traditional theological manuals always included the tractatus de sacramentis, to which the tractatus de Eucharistia was subordinated. The methodological flaw in sacramental theology, until recent times, has been a nearJtotal lack of a tractatus de liturgia in which the sacraments are properly contextualized. In answering the question ‘can sign language be a valid means of communicating the Eucharistic Form?’, we must take into account the structure of the sacred liturgy and not only of the sacramental economy. The fragmentation afforded by any discussion of the sacramental economy apart from its liturgical context already points the discipline of sacramental theology in the wrong direction. As Aidan Nichols recently wrote, “But sacramental theology…does not flourish when sundered from a theology of the Liturgy as a whole.”89 Happily, the dogmatic constitution on the sacred liturgy, Sacrosanctum concilium, seeks to remedy this methodological flaw. Why does our present question fall under the treatise on the sacred liturgy? In addition to “because the Church says so!”, we can add that the sacraments are never celebrated outside of its liturgical context. It would be unthinkable, for example, to celebrate the Eucharist with only bread and wine with the Words of Institution—without a Liturgy of the Word, the prayers and petitions of the anaphora, and communion. In other words, there is no such thing as a ‘Rite of the Eucharist.’ The fact that any sacramental celebration necessarily resists any kind of reduction points to the fact that it is inescapably contextualized in language, among people, at places, and for intentions. These prepositional aspects of the sacraments are precisely what liturgy is about. The objection here is that the postJTridentine 89 A. NICHOLS, “St Thomas and the Sacramental Liturgy,” in The Thomist 72:4 (2008), 572; hereafter Nichols, “Sacramental Liturgy.” 64 and subsequently neoscholastic emphases on the ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of the sacraments is reductionist, and such reductionism makes answering our present question impossible. We must break free from the quintessentially Roman obsession of finding minimal conditions for sacramental celebrations; the irreducible complexity of the sacraments points to the fact that they are always liturgy. 3 4 3) 4 What, then, is ‘liturgy’? The very first document issued by the Second Vatican Council teaches: The liturgy, then, is rightly seen as an exercise of the priestly office [sacerdotalis muneris] of Jesus Christ. It involves the presentation of [humanity’s] sanctification under the guise of signs perceptible by the senses and its accomplishment in ways appropriate to each of these signs. In it full public worship is performed by the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and his members. From this it follows that every liturgical celebration, because it is an action of Christ the Priest [] and of his Body, which is the Church, it is a sacred action surpassing all others. No other action of the Church can equal its efficacy by the same title or to the same degree (S.c., 7, emphasis added). Sacrosanctum concilium stipulates the following conditions of the liturgy: 1. An exercise of the sacerdotal office of Christ 2. through the “guise of signs” 3. perceptible by the senses 4. which sanctifies in a manner corresponding to these signs. The sacred liturgy, then, is the incomparable mode of presence of Christ in the midst of the Church: “But [Christ] also willed that the work of salvation which [the Apostles] preached should be set in train through the sacrifice and sacraments, around which the entire liturgical life revolves (S.c., 6). Thus, “[t]o accomplish so great a work Christ is always present in his Church, especially in her liturgical celebrations” (S.c., 7). This is precisely why, in the dogmatic constitution on the Church, the Council teaches that “…the Church, in Christ, is in 65 the nature of sacrament—a sign and instrument—that is, of communion with God and unity among all [peoples]…” (L.g., 1). The lack of any understanding of the Church as a sacrament withheld the possibility of a tractatus de liturgia in which the sacramental economy finds its matrix as an intensely ‘ecclesial’ and ‘Christic’ moment in the world. It is ‘ecclesial’ because the liturgy, as , is a ‘work of the people,’ especially the People of God; it is ‘Christic’ because as St Leo the Great teaches, “…what was visible in Christ has passed into the sacraments” and it is there that we, as St Ambrose of Milan teaches, meet him “face to face.” Jesus Christ, as the Great High Priest, is the one and only true celebrant of the sacraments. The sacerdotal office of Christ ‘breaks through’ or ‘emerges’ in the visible world in the celebration of the sacred liturgy. It is precisely this visibility that renders the sacraments to be what they are: signs. As Sacrosanctum concilium reminds us, each sacrament accomplishes our sanctification “in ways appropriate to each of these signs.” Immediately, we must ask how the ‘signs’ of the Eucharistic celebration accomplish our sanctification: how are the elements of bread and wine and the Words of Institution, all of which are “signs”, efficacious for our sanctification? In speaking of ‘signs,’ however, we necessarily speak of ‘symbols’ as well, as these symbols are those phenomena or things which indicate the locus of these signs. For example, the symbol motif of ‘water’ locates the sign of baptismal regeneration. The symbol of the words, “Be sealed with the gift of the Holy Spirit” is a sign of the fullness of the indwelling Holy Spirit. But we do not have here a regurgitation of the old hylemorphic theory? No, because whereas the hylemorphic theory was interested in the minimal conditions for sacramental validity, our investigation seeks to uncover an hermeneutic of symbols. Why? 66 Because symbols mean. The question, then, is no longer ‘what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a valid sacrament’ but rather ‘what do the sacramental symbols mean’? It is by grasping the meaning of the sacraments that we come to perceive what Christ is doing in the midst of the Church. This is precisely why the sacraments cannot be anything except in the context of the liturgy, because they are worked by people and for people. This is why the Church has always taught that the liturgy is always an act of public worship. Even though thousands of people have converged to pray the rosary with Father Peyton, we do not have an instance of ‘public’ worship; even though only a handful of people may have celebrated the Eucharist in the Soviet Gulag, we indeed have an act of public worship, an act of the entire Church. The sacramental sign is always posterior to symbol, and the symbol, or what the Scholastics called the sacramentum tantum, are the sensible aspects of the moment of the Church’s rendezvous with Christ. The distinction between a ‘symbol’ and a ‘sign’ is critical, since the symbol is usually the motif or the locus of the sacrament. We thus identify each sacrament by the symbols which convey them. A ‘sign,’ on the other hand, is the reality that the symbol points to. For example, the consecrated bread and wine are symbols because they represent. The consecrated bread and wine, as symbols, remain irrevocably symbols, because their symbolic import informs us what the sacraments mean: nourishment, food, sustenance. The symbols are signs of the Lord’s Body and Blood because they point to the real presence of Christ. Here I would propose that the sacramentum tantum is not just the motif (such as bread, water, chrism), but also the Word: thus the sacrament itself of the sacramentum tantum consists of both a material and a linguistic symbol. The ‘conjunction’ of the material 67 and linguistic symbol is the moment when the sacramental sign is revealed: it is an uncovering. What is uncovered is both the res or the ‘reality’ of the sacrament; the moment of ‘grasping’ the sacraments in the liturgical celebration is therefore the sacramentum et res, because both the perceived signs and what the signs point to jointly reveal the saving work of Christ. !! In this section, we will examine the Summa theologiae of St Thomas Aquinas, which represents his mature thinking on the theology of the sacraments, as he moves beyond certain ideas in his Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum and Summa contra gentiles. Our question will revolve around Thomas’ understanding of the sacramental Word (q. 60) and how it would bear on our present question, i.e., whether sign language would fulfill the basic requirements entailed by the Eucharistic Form. ! ) * % + % ! , Under the question “What is a sacrament?” (S.th. IIIa, q. 60), St Thomas Aquinas discusses the notion of ‘sacramental form,’ which he prefers to call the “signification” of the sacraments. It is here that we will find the clearest answer (even if only partially) to our present investigation. Question 60 is divided into eight articles; the first four articles discuss the nature of sacraments as signs, and the remaining four discuss the notion of Sacramental Word within the sacramental economy. It would be premature, however, to proceed to St Thomas’ discussion of the Sacramental Word without a note on how he divides the subject matter at hand. In the 68 Summa theologiae, there is no ‘treatise on the sacraments’90 as one would expect, as there is a ‘treatise on the creation’ or a ‘treatise on the angels’ (Ia, qq. 44J64). Although St Thomas does not specifically use the word “treatise”, the tertia pars discusses the whole of the mystery of the Incarnation, to which the sacramental economy is subordinated. In a real sense, then, the Angelic Doctor intends to show a seamlessness of the New Law as a consequence of the Incarnation. Bearing in mind that the Summa theologiae was never finished, the tertia pars contain ninety articles: qq. 1J6 discuss the Incarnation as its proper subject; qq. 7J26 discuss the ontological character of Christ as the Incarnate Word; qq. 27J35 discuss the role of the Blessed Virgin with respect to the Mystery of Christ, especially of his conception and Nativity; qq. 36J46 discuss the events in the life of the Incarnate Word from the Epiphany until the Passion; qq. 47J49 discuss the salvific import of the Passion, followed by a discussion of the Resurrection in qq. 51J56; qq. 57J59 discuss the Ascension and the judiciary power of Christ at the Father’s right hand; finally, beginning with q. 60 to the end of the terita pars, St Thomas discuss the sacraments and other rites (e.g. circumcision) of the Church. The subordination of St Thomas’ discussion of the sacramental economy to the Incarnate Word and subsequently to the discussion of the Paschal Mystery reveals something about his method. He does not shift awkwardly from the Mystery of the Incarnation to the sacraments, but says “After considering those things that concern the mystery of the Incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which derive their efficacy from the Word Incarnate Himself” (IIIa,, q. 60). Whereas in the past, the treatise de sacramentis was subordinated to a de doctrina signorum (such as in Book IV of Peter 90 See Laim Walsh, “Sacraments”, in R. V. NIEUWENHOVE and J. WAWRYKOW, The Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 326; hereafter Walsh, “Sacraments.” 69 Lombard’s Liber sententiarum), Thomas opts to situate his discussion of the sacramental economy within the larger treatise de Incarnatione Verbi and so maintains a ‘seamlessness’ in his theology. In the tertia pars of his Summa theologiae, Thomas discusses the reditus of the human person to God, beginning with the Incarnation of the Word and then moves on to discuss how the rest of us humans can be ‘caught up’ in the Incarnate Word’s union with God—by way of the sacraments. As Liam Walsh explains, The tertia pars makes the God/human relationship that has been explored throughout the first two parts of the Summa historically concrete in the Person of the Word Incarnate. All that has previously been said about the divine and the human is being said again, but now about a historical event and Person. This account of Christ, carrying with it everything that has already been said about God and humans, is the master theological key to understanding what Aquinas says about the sacraments at the end of the Tertia Pars [sic]. The sacraments of the Church are the ultimate concretizing of God’s action, in Christ and the Spirit, on the universe God has created. They bring to fulfillment at the end of human history the human moral striving for blessedness, in which all that God has made is brought back to God. Thus the theology of the sacraments is the most concrete level of the theology that Aquinas as been building from the beginning of the Prima Pars. It is eschatology in the flesh.91 Following St Augustine, Thomas retains the customary definition of a ‘sacrament’ that comes from him: a sacrament is a sign of an invisible sacrifice. “But now we are speaking of sacraments in a special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a sacrament is a kind of sign” (IIIa, q. 60, art. 1, respondeo). The ‘signness’ of a sacrament, nevertheless, must be sensible, for the reason that “it is part of [humanity’s] nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But a sign is that by means of which one attains the knowledge of something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs consist in sensible things” (art. 4, respondeo). He says again in the same article that “it is that sensible 91 L. WALSH, “Sacraments,” in R. VAN NIEUWENHOVE and J. WAWRYKOW, The Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 327J328; hereafter WALSH, “Sacraments.” 70 things are required for the sacraments,” and then refers to the Celestial Hierarchy of pseudoJ Dionysius. Following the method of Fr Servais Pinackers O.P. in reading the Thomistic corpus, it is necessary to make a brief excursion into the corpus Aeropagiticum92; St Thomas’ understanding of the necessity of sensible signs in the sacramental economy is derived largely from the first chapter of pseudoJDionysius the Aeropagite’s The Celestial Hierarchy. Divided into three sections, the first has dramatically NeoJPlatonic overtones, especially in its understanding of the Light of Christ. In the second section, the anonymous author encourages the reader to focus his attention upon this Light of Christ who “enlightens every [person] coming into the world”93 and by whom access to the Father has been obtained. Then: “To the best of our abilities, we should raise our eyes to the paternally transmitted enlightenment coming from sacred Scripture and, as far as we can, we should behold the intelligent hierarchies of heaven and we should do so in accordance with what Scripture has revealed to us in symbolic and uplifting fasion.”94 Referring to the Scriptures and the sacred liturgy, pseudoJDionysius continues, “[T]his divine ray can enlighten us only by being upliftingly concealed in a variety of sacred veils which the Providence of the Father adapts to our nature as human beings.”95 Finally, in writing of the “most pious hierarchy,” by which pseudoJDionysius means the liturgical and sacramental institutions of the Church, he explains: All this accounts for the fact that the sacred institution and source of perfection established our most pious hierarchy. He modeled it on the hierarchies of heaven, and clothed these immaterial hierarchies in numerous material figures and forms so that, in a way appropriate to our nature, we might be 92 All quotations of pseudoJDionysius the Aeropagite are taken from J. Farina, ed., Pseudo(Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. C. Luibheid (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1987), hereafter Luibheid, Pseudo(Dionysius. 93 LUIBHEID, Pseudo(Dionysius, 145. 94 LUIBHEID, Pseudo(Dionysius, 145. 95 LUIBHEID, Pseudo(Dionysius, 146; cf. n. 7. 71 uplifted from these most venerable images to interpretations and assimilations which are simple and inexpressible. For it is quite impossible that we humans should, in any immaterial way, rise up to imitate and contemplate the heavenly hierarchies without the aid of these material means capable of guiding us as our nature requires.96 The ‘otherness’ of heavenly realities—what the Scholastics would later call the res of the sacraments—is unreachable on because of humanity’s creatureliness. By clothing these heavenly realities with earthly “images” and “forms”, humanity is thus enabled to intelligibly ascend to these heavenly realities for which they have been created. Here, then, we see the intensely mystagogical meaning of the Church’s liturgy. It is this mystagogical import of the sacraments’ signness that St Thomas tries to put his finger on in IIIa,, q. 60, art. 4, respondeo. In the subsequent replies to the objections, Thomas reiterates the same premise: Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of [humanity’s] knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by some other thing, i.e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are offered to the senses; hence Augustine says that a sign ‘is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses.” But intelligible effects do not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat further on (ad 1).97 In a slow progression, after St Thomas, after establishing the necessity of signs in the sacramental economy, turns to the question of whether they must be of determinate things. His frank answer is that “Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for [humans] to decide what things should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by Divine institution” (art. 5, respondeo). He continues, Though the same thing can be signified by divers[e] signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means of the sensible 96 97 LUIBHEID, Pseudo(Dionysius, 146. Cf. IIIa, q. 63, art. 1, ad 2; art. 3, ad 2; q. 73, art. 6; q. 74, art. 1, ad 3. 72 things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy [Spirit] decides by what similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what things are to be employed for the purpose of signification of this or that sacrament. The watchword ‘similitude’ is put forward as narrowing the set of possible signifying things for each sacrament, yet is ultimately selected by Providence. The ‘signs’ or determinate, signifying things, however, do not have a physical causality. Thomas excludes, in passing, the possibility of a physical causality of the sacramental signifiers: “Yet they [= sensible things] are ordained unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally, but only in virtue of the Divine institution.” In other words, the sacramentum tantum, i.e., the accidents or the physical structure of the sacraments, do not convey sanctifying grace. Where, then, do we locate the Sacramental Word or the ‘form’ of the sacraments among the sacramentum tantum—sacramentum et res—res tantum of the sacramental economy? St Thomas does not offer an explicit answer to this question, though he tends towards one. In the very next article (art. 6), St Thomas asks, “Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?”, and thus commences a complex discussion of the sacramental Word. It is here that the bulk of our answer will be sought, at least within the Thomistic framework. He begins with three objections: first, as Augustine says, a sacrament is already a “visible word,” and hence an audible, vocal sacramental Word becomes unnecessary; second, it seems counterintuitive for the determinate thing of the sacrament to consist of two genera, namely the sacramental Word and the ‘element’ or ‘matter’ of the sacrament; third, by way of an a fortiori argument, since the Old Law did not require determinate words in the celebration of the Temple liturgies and since the New Law supersedes the Old, then the perfection of the sacraments of the New Law should not only supersede in actually giving 73 grace, but also in its lack of determinate words. In the sed contra, Thomas refers to Eph 5:25J26, “…Christ loved the Church and gave himself up for her, in order to make her holy by cleansing her with the washing of water by the word.” He also refers to St Augustine’s Tractatus super Ioannem, 80.398, which is instrumental for the bulk of St Thomas’ understanding of the sacramental Word: “The word is added to the element, and there results the Sacrament.” The ‘wordness’ of the sacraments, according to St Thomas, derives from the Incarnate Word. He notes that the sacramental Word is in fact part of the sacramental sign; “Consequently they can be considered in three ways: and in each way it is fitting for words to be added to the sensible signs. For in the first place they can be considered in regard to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word Incarnate: to Whom the sacraments have a certain conformity, in that the word is joined to the sensible sign, just as in the mystery of the Incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh” (respondeo). Put otherwise, Thomas sees a certain likeness between the sacramental Word being added to the elements and the Word of the Father being assumed in the human person of Jesus Christ: there is a Christological parallelism between the Incarnation and the sacraments. In the second part of his respondeo, we touch upon the first solution to our problem: since the sacramental remedy is adjusted to the human person who is composed of soul and body, it contains intelligible and physical genera, being the sacramental Word and the determinate thing, respectively: “…[the] sacraments may be considered on the part of [the human person] who is sanctified, and who is composed of soul and body: to whom the 98 The parenthical reference in the English edition of the Summa theologiae (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa theologica [New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947], 2349) erroneously locates the text as “Tract. xxx, in Joan.”, when in fact it should read “lxxx”, i.e., 80. 74 sacramental remedy is adjusted, since it touches his body through the sensible element, and the soul through faith in the words” The third part of the respondeo continues his discussion of the relationship between the power of the soul as intelligibility and the role of words in the specifically human species: Now Augustine says that ‘words are the principal signs used by men’; because words can be formed in various ways for the purpose of signifying various mental concepts, so that we are able to express our thoughts with greater distinctness by means of words. And therefore in order to insure the perfection of sacramental signification it was necessary to determine the signification of the sensible things by means of certain words.99 Here, St Thomas touches upon St Augustine’s linguistic theory, and thus a brief excursus is warranted, especially by the mere use of the English word ‘linguistics’. Though the two Doctors may be speaking of ‘linguistic theory,’ they do not refer to the linguae of the Sacramental Word, from which ‘linguistics’ is derived. The lingua points to the tongue as the organ by which phonemes are created and a series of phonemes constitute a morpheme, a semantically meaningful sound. As we will discover as we progress through the rest of q. 60, the importance of the sacramental Word for St Thomas is never related to the morpheme but to the meaning which may be carried by the morpheme, namely its signification. As Thomas writes in ad 1, “The sensible elements of the sacraments are called words by way of a certain likeness, in so far as they partake of a certain significative power, which resides principally in the very words.” What ‘this’ sacrament means is conveyed by means of words, i.e., by means of language. He says in this same vein, Although words and other sensible things are not in the same genus, considered in their natures, yet they have something in common as to the thing signified by them: which is more perfectly done in words than in other things. Wherefore in the sacraments, words and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one thing, in so far as the signification of things is completed by means of words, as above stated. And under words are comprised also sensible actions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: because they have a like signification with the things. 99 Emphasis added. 75 Thomas thus agrees with Augustine that language is the highest activity of the human person, since it is a power of the soul. The use of the sacramental Word to significate the sacraments, therefore, is to share in the highest power of the human person, namely language. And, despite the fact that words and things are of different genera, we still have one sacrament because both signify the same reality: the res of the sacraments because it is significated over the things to identify the sacramentum et res and to explicate the res tantum of the same sacrament. By way of summary, then, Aquinas sees three reasons for the Sacramental Word. From a theological vantageJpoint, it renders the sacraments as ‘imitators’ of the Incarnate Word, as though by an ‘hypostatic union’ of word and element inasmuch as the Incarnate Word is an hypostatic union of the divine and human natures of Christ. From an anthropological vantageJpoint, it corresponds to the body/soul duality, whereas the sacramental element is adjusted to the body and the sacramental word is adjusted to the soul (hence the language of ‘sacramental form’ and the common understanding of the soul as the ‘form’ of the person). Finally, from an epistemological vantageJpoint, “[w]ords carry signification more precisely than things [i.e., the mere sacramental element]. The human mind can manage them in a way that lets it express its finest thoughts in them. The signification of things is largely given, and it is often polyvalent. Words pin down the signification of things.”100 One of these three reasons, the reader will note, indicates any kind of ‘causeJandJeffect’ relationship from the Sacramental Word to the achievement of the sacraments. 100 Walsh, “Sacraments”, 338. 76 After establishing the necessity of the signification of the sacraments by means of words, Thomas then asks “Whether determinate words are required in the sacraments” (art. 7). In so doing, he narrows the range of discussion: Yes, words are needed, but must we use certain words? He proceeds with three possible objections: first, not all people use the same words, i.e., there is a diversity of languages in the human family; second, since various words can have similar meanings, it is not necessary to have a determinate collection of words for the signification of the sacraments; third, the mispronunciation of words opens up the possibility of defective sacraments. It is here, in IIIa, q. 60, art. 7, that we come to a Thomistic solution to our problem. The fact remains that, since the sacraments were instituted by Christ, this was brought about by determinate words. “Our Lord used determinate words in consecrating the sacrament of the Eucharist, when He said: ‘This is My Body.’ Likewise He commanded His disciples to baptize under a form of determinate words, saying: ‘Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy [Spirit]’” (sed contra). Next, in his respondeo, he engages the hylemorphic theory of the sacraments and raises the question of ‘determinate things’ and ‘determinate words’ in the sacramental economy. As stated above, in the sacraments the words are as the form, and sensible things are as the matter. Now in all things composed of matter and form, the determining principle is on the part of the form, which is as it were in the end and terminus of the matter. Consequently for the being of a thing the need of a determinate form is prior to the need of determinate matter: for determinate matter is needed that it may be adapted to the determinate form. Since, therefore, in the sacraments determinate sensible things are required, which are as the sacramental matter, much more is there needed in them of a determinate form of words. The objection to sign language to consecrate the Eucharist arises from a profound and entrenched way of thinking about the sacraments that is rooted in a misunderstanding of the 77 hylemorphic theory. It is common, for example, for catechisms written in the NeoJScholastic tradition to blithely teach that the ‘matter’ of the sacrament refers to the material and that the ‘form’ of the sacraments refers to the formula. The reality, however, is far more complex. It is therefore necessary to understand clearly what Thomas has in mind when he speaks of Aristotle’s hylemorphic theory. When the Scholastics spoke of ‘matter’ and ‘form,’ they had in mind primary matter as the material principle and substantial form as the formal principle, respectively. Any student of philosophy should instinctively be reminded of Socrates’ “Allegory of the Cave” recorded in the seventh book of Plato’s Republic. The theory was developed by Plato’s successor, Aristotle, who understood the primary matter/material principle as the potential of something reaching its perfection of being in its substantial form/formal principle. The principal Aristotelian texts on the hylemorphic theory are Physics II, Metaphysics VIII, and Principles of Nature. Aristotle used several words to describe his understanding of and & , ‘matter’ and ‘form’ respectively. For the sake of conceptual clarity, it might be helpful to consider the word ‘metamorphosis,’ in which one thing shifts from form (a) to form (b), while remaining essentially the same ‘thing’. For example, the insect of the order Lepidoptera, while always remaining Lepidoptera, changes its form from a caterpillar, to pupa, and ultimately to the imago or butterfly. Aristotle understood form synonymously as ‘shape’ or ‘nature.’ Matter, on the other hand, would be the ‘essence’ of the thing, though he sometimes calls it ‘nature’ as well. % ! * !+ The sacraments, according to Aquinas (inherited from the early Scholastics), likewise require a hylemorphic structure: it consists of determinate things and determinate forms, the forms 78 being the abstraction of the sacraments. Reiterating art. 6, ad 2, Thomas recalls his earlier assertion that “Wherefore in the sacraments, words and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one thing, in so far as the signification of things is completed by means of words as above stated.” Careful reading of Thomas’ use of the word verbum and its relation to the Greek conceptual & should lead one to grasp that Thomas does not have in mind ‘word’ as sermo or even morpheme, but rather as ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ or ‘meaning.’ It is for this reason that Thomas lays great emphasis on the “signification” of the sacrament, because in the “signification of things” one identifies that the thing in fact is. A table, for example (in Thomas’ day), was composed of the matter or substance called ‘wood’; the appellation ‘table’ is fundamentally conceptual, and only later emerges as the morpheme <tā'b’l>. The fact that this wooden object with a ledge supported by four wooden legs is conversationally identified as <tā'b’l> is wholly irrelevant to the fact that this object is indeed a “table.” The morpheme serves to create a mental bridge from one conversant to another in order to establish a common point of reference. It is this ‘point of reference’ that Thomas understands the ‘form’ to be: it signifies something to be what it is. To push the distinction further, recall the first objection in art. 7: Aristotle is cited in saying that “words are not the same for all.” The concept of ‘table’, pronounced one way in English, yet differently in French; both are spelled the same way, but pronounced differently, and the same concept or notion is communicated. In Spanish, the concept or notion called ‘table’ in English and French, is indicated by the spelling ‘mesa,’ with its own morpheme. Though the spelling and morpheme differ from that of English and French, the concept or notion remains the same. Were this not the case, it would then be impossible to be bilingual. In q. 7, ad 1, Thomas answers the objection specifically: 79 As Augustine says, the word operates in the sacraments not because it is spoken, i.e., not by its outward sound of the voice, but because it is believed in accordance with the sense of the world which is held by faith. And this sense is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to their sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter in what language this sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete (emphasis original). The English, French, and Spanish conversants, though employing various spellings and morphemes, are still able to locate the common point of reference in their conversation, namely a table. Their mental structure affords such a conceptualization of ‘table’ that the abstraction is universal but emerges in different languages. It is this ‘conceptualization’ that Thomas understands, in a minimal way, to be “held by faith.” As we will see, though, the sacraments, since they belong to the supernatural order, require the theological virtue of faith. Thomas takes up the question of the variety of languages in his next reply (ad 2): “Although it happens in every language that various words signify the same thing, yet one of those words is that which those who speak that language use principally and more commonly to signify that particular thing: and this is the word which should be used for the sacramental signification.” This is precisely what was argued with reference to the concept or notion of ‘table’; Thomas here applies it to the sacraments. What matters is not the pattern of morphemes, but the signification afforded by words or language in pronouncing the sacramental formula. In his last objection, Thomas approaches the more interesting question of misJ pronunciation. Here, also, he introduces the notion of the ‘sacramental intention’, which will bear critically on our investigation. “If he who corrupts the pronunciation of the sacramental words—does so on purpose, he does not seem to intend to do what the Church intends: and thus the sacrament seems to be defective. But if he does this through error or a slip of the tongue, and if he so far as mispronounces the words as to deprive them of sense, the 80 sacrament seems to be defective.” The emphasis is the same—the sense of the words. In the first instance, the minister might deliberately mispronounce the words (as was often the case when Soviet authorities commissioned members of the KBG to enter the ranks of the Orthodox hierarchy in order to disturb the faithful); since the minister does not share in the Church’s intention to celebrate the liturgy and sacraments, but rather to disrupt the peace of the Church, the ministration is defective. Similarly, if words are mispronounced to the point that the sense of the words change, then the ministration is defective. He uses the example of the baptismal formula, «In nomine Patris…», except «Patris» is mispronounced as «matris»; in this case, only one consonant is needed to render the ministration defective, because a ‘father’ and a ‘mother’ are different concepts. There is a range, however, in which Thomas allows mispronunciation to retain its original sense. “If, however, the sense of the words be not entirely lost by this pronunciation, the sacrament is complete.” He goes on to say, taking as an example the wrong declensions for the Latin nouns pater and filius in the baptismal formula, “For although the appointed words thus mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we allow them an accommodated meaning corresponding to the usual forms of speech. And so, although the sensible sound is changed, yet the sense remains the same.” Again, “Nevertheless the principle point to observe is the extent of the corruption entailed by mispronunciation: for in either case it may be so little that it does not alter the sense of the words; or so great that it destroys it.” The emphasis remains upon that of the sense of the words, not the sound or the morphemes. In the next article (IIIa, q. 60, art. 8), Thomas expands his discussion on the sense or meaning of the words by asking, “Whether it is lawful to add anything from the words in which the sacramental form consists?” Three objections follow: first, the sacramental 81 formulae “are not of less importance than are the words of Holy Scripture,” and therefore should not be changed; second, taking more seriously Aristotle’s hylemorphism, any addition or subtraction from the form radically changes the species, and so any alteration would render the sacrament defective; third, the ordering (or inflection) of words in sacramental formulae are as important as the words themselves, and changing their order of arrangement would constitute an alteration. In the sed contra, Thomas compares the Roman and Byzantine baptismal formulae: whereas the Romans begin the formula with the first person singular pronoun “I baptize you…” and the active voice of the verb to baptize, the Byzantines begin with “The servant of God, N., is baptized,” using the passive voice of the same verb. “Yet both confer the sacrament validly. Therefore it is lawful to add something to, or to take something from, the sacramental form[ulae].” Then, Thomas offers a lengthy respondeo, which revolves around two premises, the minister who celebrates the sacraments and the meaning of the words used by the minister. As for the minister, Thomas writes, “Wherefore if he intends by such addition or suppression to perform a rite other from what is recognized by the Church, it seems that the sacrament is invalid: because he seems not to intend to do what the Church does.” In other words, the validity of the sacramental formulae is contingent upon the intention of the minister to celebrate the sacraments in accordance with the Church’s doctrine. We will discuss this more thoroughly in our review of IIIa, q. 64, art. 8J10 below. “The other point to be considered is the meaning of the words” (emphasis added). Thomas explains at length his doctrine of sacramental signification conveyed by the formulae: 82 For since the sacraments, the words produce an effect according to the sense which they convey, as stated above, we must see whether the change of words destroys the essential sense of the words: because then the sacrament is clearly rendered invalid. Now it is clear, if any substantial part of the sacramental form be suppressed, that the essential sense of the words is destroyed; and consequently the sacrament is invalid. Whereas Didymus says (De Spir. Sanct. ii): “If anyone attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one of the aforesaid names,” i.e., of the Father, Son, and the Holy [Spirit], “his baptism will be invalid.” But if that which is omitted be not a substantial part of the form, such an omission does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently the validity of the sacrament. Thus in the form of the Eucharist, JJ“For this is My Body,” the omission of the word “for” does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently cause the sacrament to be invalid; although perhaps he who make the omission may sin from negligence or contempt. Thomas does not waver on his doctrine of the sense of the words. To use typical Scholastic terminology, insofar as the res of the sacrament—in both the sacramentum et res and the res tantum—remain essentially significated, the sacrament remains, and is valid. Let us look into this further. The sacramentum et res refers to the determinate thing and to what the determinate thingJbecomeJsacrament really is. They refer to the objectively identifiable sacramental celebration. The sacramentum et res, then, points to the absolute mutuality of the determinate thing and the determinate word conjoined. This mutuality, moreover, requires close proximity. A minister does not baptize if he is on the telephone with a candidate in a bathtub elsewhere. Similarly, a minister does not celebrate the Eucharist with himself in one building and the altar with the bread and wine in another. In other words, the “I baptize you…” presupposes a physical proximity between the minister and the candidate; the demonstrative pronoun “this” in the formulae “This is my body” presupposes the minister is consecrating a loaf of bread before him. We have thus spoken of the object and subject of the sacramental celebration. This is part of the ‘sense of the words’ to which Thomas refers. It refers to the sacramentum aspect of the sacramentum et res. The res aspect, on the other hand, is predicated by the remaining words apart from the object and subject pronouns, e.g., “baptize…in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit” or “…my body.” 83 What is predicated of the sacrament in virtue of the Sacramental Word extends to the res tantum, which points to its ultimate meaning. In the case of the Eucharist, the res tantum would be the Body of Christ and its growth in unity and charity. It is precisely for the reason of significating the res of the sacramentum et res and the res tantum that the essential sense of the formula remain intact; any addition or subtraction of words must maintain the sense of the formulae. As Thomas continues his respondeo, he establishes a scenario where the addition of words would in fact render the baptism invalid, such as an Arian interpolation of the baptismal formula, “ I baptize thee in the name of the Father Who is greater, and of the Son Who is less…” Thomas does not even argue that it would be invalid because it is not a verbatim repetition of Mt 28:19; rather it would be invalid because it violates the sense of the formula held by orthodox faith. Another example he puts forward is the formula, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy [Spirit], and of the Blessed Virgin Mary,” since the theology of baptism does not warrant at all a baptism into someone who is not divine, i.e., the Virgin Mary. Even though the first eighteen words (in English) are all that is required of a valid baptism, it becomes automatically disqualified by the addition of the clause “and of the Virgin Mary,” because, as he says, “such a sense would be contrary to faith, and would therefore render the sacrament invalid.” In fact, Thomas does not even allow for the sequence of words which is orthodox up to and including “…Holy Spirit” to be valid before reading the clause “…and of the Blessed Virgin Mary…” as if the baptism is valid before it ‘gets a chance’ to become invalid! What we have here, then, is a decidedly unmechanistic understanding of the behaviour, as it were, of sacramental formulae: 84 it exhibits or manifests the ministerial intention. What matters for Thomas, ultimately, is the sense of the formulae. By the same token, an alteration of the sacramental formulae which does not violate the sense held by Catholic faith can be said to render a valid and true sacrament. Thomas puts forth the following example: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father Almighty, and of the Only Begotten Son, and of the Holy [Spirit], the Paraclete.” Thus his response in ad 2: “Words belong to a sacramental form by reason of the sense signified by them. Consequently any addition or suppression of words which does not add to or take from the essential sense, does not destroy the sacrament.” He states yet again in ad 3 that the sacramental formula’s validity may be destroyed if the “words are interrupted to such an extent that the intention of the speaker is interrupted…” Yet, “…this is not the case if the interruption of the speaker is so slight, that his intention and the sense of the words is not interrupted.” It is clear, from our examination of IIIa, q. 50, that St Thomas understands the validity of the sacramental Word to be contingent upon two things: (1) the preservation of the sense of the words as verba and (2) the intention of the minister in proclaiming the sacramental Word. Before moving into our discussion of the ministerial intention in the celebration of the sacraments, let us conduct a thoughtJexperiment based upon the above considerations, namely that the sense of the sacramental formulae is carried by the Word (or language) which significates. Thomas nowhere gives evidence that the words, qua morphemes, carry any power. Let us suppose that Catholics had a sacrament, called ‘Eucharist’, but over the course of time, they had forgotten what the sacrament meant. Let us also suppose that the 85 ritual of the Eucharistic liturgy preserved the very Words of Institution pronounced by Christ himself, though no one is able to speak or comprehend Aramaic. Would the sacrament be valid, though the very words of Christ himself—even in his own language—were pronounced at the Eucharist? Since the sense of the words is not known by any living member of the Church, it seems unlikely that a valid Eucharist could be celebrated by the very words of Christ despite the loss of knowledge as to what the words mean. If not even the Aramaic Words of Institution pronounced by Christ could not be valid by reason of universal ignorance as to what they significate, then a fortiori, words, qua morphemes, cannot have any power in and of themselves; it is only by words qua signification that the Sacramental Word is able to effect what it proclaims. We will return to this thoughtJ experiment at the end of our discussion on ministerial intention. 1 Thomas’ doctrine of sacramental and ministerial intention is taken up in IIIa, q. 64, beginning with art. 8, “Whether the minister’s intention is required for the validity of a sacrament?” We already know that Thomas firmly holds the necessity of adhering to the Church’s intention when the minister celebrates a sacrament. “What is unintentional happens by chance. But this cannot be said of the sacramental operation. Therefore the sacraments require the intention of the minister” (sed contra). It seems that there are three possibilities for understanding how a sacramental Word may be valid: it could either be mechanistic, by chance, or intentional. We have already discussed that Thomas appears to exclude the possibility of a mechanical validity of the sacraments in IIIa, q. 60, art. 8, respondeo). Now, at IIIa, q. 64, art. 8, Thomas excludes the possibility of the sacraments working by chance. 86 When a thing is indifferent to many uses, it must needs be determined to one, if that one has to be effected. Now those things which are done in the sacraments can be done with various intent; for instance, washing with water, which is done in baptism, may be ordained to bodily cleanliness, to the health of the body, to amusement, and many other similar things. Consequently, it needs to be determined to one purpose, i.e. the sacramental effect, by the intention of him who washes. And this intention is expressed by the words which are pronounced in the sacraments; for instance the words, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father,” etc. (respondeo, emphasis added). The key phrase here is “And this intention is expressed by the words which are pronounced in the sacraments…” Thomas obviously holds that the sacramental Word serves to express the intention: it ‘exhibits’ and ‘manifests’ the intention of the minister. There are three possible objections to the need for ministerial intention raised by Thomas. First, since the minister is the instrumental cause of the sacraments (cf. IIIa, q. 64, art. 8, obj. 1), and as such the “perfection of an action does not depend on the intention of the instrument [i.e., the instrumental cause], but on that of the principal agent.” Second, “one man’s intention cannot be known to another” and those who receive the sacraments cannot know whether they have in fact received a valid sacrament. Third, “a man’s intention cannot bear on that to which he does not attend,” i.e., a minister might absentJmindedly celebrate a sacrament, and it is suggested that this nullifies the ministerial intention. Thomas’ refutation of these objections throws further light on his doctrine of ministerial intention. The first objection would be valid only if the instrumental cause were an inanimate object. In such a case, it is moved by the principal cause, and that principal cause is that which carries the intention. “But an animate instrument, such as a minister, is not only moved, but in a sense moves itself, in so far as by his will he moves his bodily members to act. Consequently, his intention is required, whereby he subjects himself to the principal agent…”101 Only now does Thomas explain how an intention ‘works’: the instrumental cause ‘perpetuates’ the intention of the principal cause, i.e., the minister 101 Emphasis added. 87 ‘perpetuates’ or ‘continues’ the intention of the principal cause of the sacraments (cf. IIIa., q. 64, sed contra and respondeo). Thus, “…it is necessary that he [= the minister] intend to do what Christ and the Church do.”102 Regarding the second objection, namely, that a person’s intention can never be known, Thomas notes two opinions. One is that the mental intention is necessary for a valid sacrament, which he roundly rejects. “Consequently, others with better reason hold that the minister of a sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, whose minister he is; while in the words uttered by him, the intention of the Church is expressed; and that this suffices for the validity of the sacrament, except the contrary be expressed on the part either of the minister or of the recipient of the sacrament.” As in the respondeo, the sacramental Word serves to ‘express’ the minister’s intention. A person’s intention may be known; in the celebration of the sacraments, however, it must always be apparent. The third objection is refuted by suggesting that while a minister might absentJ mindedly celebrate a sacrament, he would, ideally, have “habitual intention, which suffices for the validity of the sacrament.” Taking baptism as his example, “when a priest goes to baptize someone, he intends to do to him what the Church does. Wherefore if subsequently during the exercise of the act his mind be distracted by other matters, the sacrament is valid in virtue of his original intention.”103 102 Though we cannot get into the question here, this is precisely why it is necessary for an ordained minister to celebrate the sacraments: by the presbyter being configured as the alter Christus et capitis ecclesiae. By this sacramental ‘configuration,’ the minister is thus ‘equipped’ for the continuity between the principal cause and instrumental cause of the sacramental celebration in such a way that the minister, being the instrumental cause, is able to carry on the intention of the principal cause in the distribution of sacramental graces. 103 It seems likely that St Thomas is speaking here of the candidate’s formation and proximate preparation for Holy Orders. In contemporary praxis, this exercise of committing oneself to the Church’s intention is carried out in a special way by the prerequisite handJwritten petition to the candidate’s bishop for the reception of Holy Orders and the subsequent canonical retreat that serves to lead the candidate to reflect deeply on the ministry he is about to undertake. 88 It is important, as we progress through the articles of IIIa, qq. 60 and 64, to keep in mind the words of St Augustine in his Tractatus super Ioannem, 80.3, which Thomas mentions numerous times but especially in q. 60, art. 7, ad 2. Though Thomas uses the word “pronounce” as a way of putting the sacramental Word ‘to use,’ his understanding of the sacramental Word’s efficacy is governed by the fact that its efficacy is contingent upon the act of faith which it entails and not the sound of the utterance. That having been said, we turn now to the next article, art. 9, “Whether faith is required of necessity in the minister of the sacrament.” Frankly, Thomas does not see that a defective faith on the part of the minister can invalidate the sacramental celebration. His argument rests on the fact that the minister is only the instrumental cause of the sacraments. “Wherefore, just as the validity of a sacrament does not require that the minister should have charity, and even sinners can confer sacraments, as stated above; so neither is it necessary that he should have faith, and even an unbeliever can confer a true sacrament, provided that the other essentials be there” (respondeo). Here, then, Thomas nuances carefully between ‘faith’ and ‘intention,’ though they are indeed related. The first objection is that the minister must have faith in order to celebrate a sacrament validly. Thomas replies that we can discern two different kinds of defective faith (or even unbelief): first, with regards to something other than the sacrament, and second, with regards to the sacrament itself. “But if his faith be defective in regard to the very sacrament that he confers, although he believe that no inward effect is caused by the thing done outwardly, yet he does know that the Catholic Church intends to confer a sacrament by that which is outwardly done. Wherefore, his unbelief notwithstanding, he can intend to do 89 what the Church does, albeit he esteem it to be nothing” (ad 1). Naturally, one must ask whether it is possible for an unbelieving minister to have the right intention to celebrate the sacraments. Thomas seems right, because stories of presbyters who struggle with their faith often strive mightily to keep their doubts secret so as not to disturb the faithful, and it is with this striving that they preserve the intention of the Church and thus celebrate the sacraments validly. But can a minister backpedal and violate the ministerial intention, thus rendering the sacramental celebration invalid? In the respondeo, Thomas reiterates, as he will again and again, that the minister is only the instrumental cause of the sacraments: “…since the minister works instrumentally in the sacraments, he acts not by his own but by Christ’s power.” Thomas then draws a comparison between the theological virtues of charity and of faith in relation the ministerial intention: “Now just as charity belongs to a man’s own power so also does faith. Wherefore, just as the validity of a sacrament does not reuire that the minister should have charity, and even sinners can conver sacraments…; so neither is it necessary that he should have faith, and even an unbeliever can confer a true sacrament, provided that the other essentials are there.” Thomas would respond in the affirmative. In ad 2, he argues, Some heretics in conferring sacraments do not observe the form prescribed by the Church: and these confer neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. But some do observe the form prescribed by the Church: and these confer indeed the sacrament but not the reality. I say this in the supposition that they are outwardly cut off from the Church; because from the very fact that anyone receives the sacraments from them, he sins; and consequently is hindered from receiving the effect of the sacrament. Thomas is here presupposing that the minister is excommunicated from the Church. Naturally, one should ask whether an act of unbelief incurs automatic excommunication from the Church and, in the case of an automatically excommunicated minister, whether a valid 90 sacrament is conferred. A more pressing question is occasioned by a significant lacuna in Thomas’ system: on one hand, he maintains that it is the “sense of faith” which is essential in the sacramental Word (cf. Tractatus super Ioannem 80.3); here, on the other hand, Thomas maintains that the faith of the minister is not necessary for the perfection of a sacrament. We have here what appears to be a glitch in Thomas’ system, and one that needs to be addressed. Priority should be given, however, to Augustine, whom Thomas takes as his master in his sacramental theology. The final article asks “Whether the validity of a sacrament requires a good intention in the minister.” Note carefully that Thomas speaks of a perverse intention in addition to the Church’s intention and not a perverse intention instead of the Church’s intention. He then distinguishes two ways in which the intention may be perverted: first, in regard to the sacrament and, second, in regard to what follows the sacrament. In the case of the first kind of defective intention, he takes the example of “a man does not intend to confer a sacrament, but to make a mockery of it. Such a perverse intention takes away the truth of the sacrament, especially if it is manifested outwardly.” The second kind of defective intention, Thomas maintains, does not invalidate the sacrament: “the minister’s intention may be perverted as to something that follows the sacrament: for instance, a priest may intend to baptize a woman so as to be able to abuse her; or to consecrate the Body of Christ, so as to use it for sorcery.” In the example of the candidate for baptism, no mention is made of her intention to receive the sacrament, but only of the minister’s; the second instance is more credible, since a sorcerer would be wasting his time to blaspheme what is not the Blessed Sacrament. As he says, “And because that which comes first does not depend on that which follows, 91 consequently such a perverse intention does not annul the sacrament; but the minister himself sins grievously in having such an intention.” In ad 3, Thomas is careful to retain the principal causeJinstrumental cause distinction between the minister and Christ (cf. art. 8, ad 1) in the celebration of the sacraments; since the sacraments are principally actions of Christ himself, it is the intention of Christ that overrides the celebration, even the perverse intention of the minister, who celebrates the sacraments as the instrumental cause. “A perverse intention perverts the action of the one who has such an intention, not the action of another. Consequently, the perverse intention of the minister perverts the sacrament in so far as it is his action: not in so far as it is the action of Christ, Whose minister he is.” Thomas then uses the simple analogy of a king who sends alms by way of a wicked messenger: the wicked messenger fulfills the externals of bringing alms in the name of the king, but he disobeys in his interior disposition because he acts contrary to the king’s intention. What should emerge, above all, is that the sacraments are actions of Christ himself, not merely of the minister. The minister’s role as the instrumental cause is an inescapable dimension of the sacramental celebration because, as Thomas says earlier, “The power of administering the sacraments belongs to the spiritual character which is indelible” (q. 64, art. 9, ad 3). 5 6 / The presumption against sign language as a valid means of “saying Mass” arises not only from a profound ignorance of the , but also from an / inability to read and weigh the pronouncements of the Church’s supreme teaching authority. It is often thought that the question of ‘matter and form’ in the sacraments presupposes the necessity of speech corresponding to the sacramental form. Such a misJreading of ‘matter 92 and form’ however, commits the error of deJcontextualizing the ‘hylemorphic theory’ from Aristotle’s philosophy and the original intent of Stephen Langton and William of Auxerre in applying this category to the sacramental economy. It is therefore necessary to retrieve Thomas’ own understanding of ‘matter and form’ in the sacraments, particularly in the Eucharist, in order to progress in our Thomistic evaluation of the sacramental validity of the Consecration in sign language. ‘Hylemorphism’ is defined as “an effort to explain the nature of innerJworldly things. All bodies are essentially composed of matter ( ) and form ( & ) which in the concrete thing combine to make a unified whole.” It is thus distinguished from other cosmic theories such as atomism and monism. The Greek noun , literally ‘lumber’104, was employed by & , Aristotle in reference to the ‘building blocks’ of the material world. But without ‘form’, the ‘whatness’ of the artefact remains indeterminable. The Greek noun distinguished from ' ()* & is thus , “that which is seen” in that it refers to touchable shape.106 Conversely, without ‘matter,’ form remains indeterminable as well. An artefact is always a compound of matter and form. As a “direct consequence of [Aristotle’s] doctrine of act and potency”—because the potential towards which the artefact tends is the form—matter is the antecedent ‘stuff’ out of which artefacts are determined. Aristotle departs from Plato in that he believes that “form somehow structures or informs the matter, not the other way around.”107 Plato, on the other hand, believed that matter was joined to form in the creation 104 A. Preus, “Hylē”, in Historial Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy (Toronto, ON: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 141; hereafter, Preus, Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy. 105 LSJ, 482. 106 Preus, “Morphē”, in Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy, 175. 107 J. Kim and E. Sosa, “Matter/Form”, in A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 1995), 303, hereafter Kim and Sosa, Companion to Metaphysics. 93 of artefacts, hence his “Theory of Forms” in his Allegory of the Cave in book VII of The Republic. Aristotle’s Physics, Bk II, discusses the two ‘senses’ of nature (= ‘physics’), namely “the form and the matter”; neither can exist independently. In the celebrated example of a bronze statue, on one end the lump of bronze alloy, though not yet shaped by the artisan, still has a ‘form’ though with little influence by the artisan in shape. By his craft, the artisan is able to shape the bronze alloy into the statue according to a form he intends. In the end, the form of the statue emerges, not only from the material of bronze alloy, but also from the intention of the artisan. In the system of causality, the bronze alloy constitutes the ‘material cause’, the endJproduct of the statue is the ‘formal cause’, and the artisan’s conception of his endJproduct is the ‘final cause.’ The ‘efficient cause’, also called the ‘instrumental cause’, is the artisan himself, who works as a sculptor.108 Thomas’ thought on ‘matter and form’ comes principally from his brief work De principiis naturae, an essay on the philosophy of nature. Significantly, when Catholics speak of ‘matter and form’, they forget (or never learned) that Aquinas spoke of nature as tripartite, of ‘matter and form’ and ‘privation.’ ‘Matter’ and ‘privation’ are the paired principle of the terminus a quo of an artefact; the ‘form’, on the other hand, is the terminus ad quem, or the resultant product when ‘privation’ is removed from the artefact, leaving only ‘matter’ and ‘form.’ In a classic analogy of the bronze statue, Aquinas explained, In order, therefore, that there be generation, three things are required: namely, being in potency, which is matter; nonJbeing in act, which is privation; and that through which a thing comes to being in act, namely form. When, for example, a statue is made out of bronze, the bronze which is in potency to the form of the statue is the matter; the unshaped, or the unarranged, is the privation; and the shape from which the statue gets to be called a statue is the form. But this form is not a substantial form because the bronze, before the coming of that form, already has actual existence, and its existence does not 108 Cf. Metaphysics V:1 (1013a). 94 depend on that shape. This form is, rather, an accidental form. All artificial forms are accidental forms. For art works only on what has already been put into existence by nature (6). Thomas identifies ‘matter’ with the ‘beingJinJpotency,’ that is, the thing on the way to being an artefact; ‘form’, as ‘beingJinJact’, and ‘privation’, as ‘nonJbeingJinJact’, are complementary aspects of the same artefact existing on a continuum from matter towards a specific artefact; this ‘specification’ or ‘determination’ from mere matter to artefact happens as the matter sheds its privation and gains form. Accordingly, Thomas defines ‘form’ by distinguishing it from the terminus a quo: “There are therefore three principles of nature, namely matter, form[,] and privation. The second of these, namely form, is that toward which generation moves; the other two lie on the side of that which generation departs.” Matter and privation, again, are that which an artefact moves away from, i.e., potential towards a being. In other words, the ‘form’ of an artefact is the endJproduct, and hence the terminus ad quem; it is the finality towards which the artefact tends, as the matter sheds its privation. Although “matter and form are in the same subject” as Aquinas says, matter is a principle per se, whereas privation is a principle only per accidens. The ‘form’ of the artefact is further subdivided into two kinds: substantial form and accidental form. As Aquinas says, “Now, because form causes actual existence, form is said to be an act. What causes actual substantial existence is called a substantial form; and what causes actual accidental existence is called an accidental form.”109 In the case of the bronze statue, the shapelessness of the bronze alloy is its substantial form; as the artisan crafts the alloy into the subject, it takes on the accidental form of its prototype, thus becoming a statue. 109 De principiis naturae, 3. 95 Because generation is a motion to form, there are two kinds of generation corresponding to the two kinds of form. There is generation simply, which corresponds to substantial form. And there is generation with respect to something or other, and this corresponds to accidental form. When a substantial form is introduced, something is said to come to be simply. We say, for example, that a man comes to be, or that a man is generated. But when an accidental form is introduced, it is not said that something comes to be simply, but that it comes to be this. When a man comes to be white, for example, we do not say simply that the man comes to be, or that he is generated; but that he comes to be, or is generated as, white.110 The human person, being substantially a human being, also has the substantial form of a human being that is generated simply, and emerges with the form that is common to all human persons. An extrinsic application of something imposes an accidental form, as in the case of the human person’s whiteness since a person’s ethnicity is an accidental form; the negation of one ethnicity for another (such as Asian instead of Caucasian) does not render the substantial form of ‘human person’ any less or any more than if the accidental form of ethnicity was something else. But there is a third element to matter and form/privation: intention. The artisan must intend to shape the bronze alloy into the form he wills. In animate bodies, such as organic things, there is an intention inherent in the structure. Inanimate things, on the other hand, require an external body to form them into something which they do not have an inherent intention to do, such as the artefact of braided palm leaves on Passion Sunday. Palm trees do not have an intention to braid their own palm fronds, so an external cause must exercise its influence to create braided palm leaves. Accordingly, as the principal cause of the bronze statue, the artisan exercises his influence in order to intend that the bronze alloy become a statue. It is the intention, therefore, that bridges matter and form on the way to its being an artefact. 110 De principiis naturae, 4. 96 The best scholarship assigns to William of Auxerre and Stephen Langton the distinction of applying Aristotelian hylemorphism to the sacramental economy.111 In his Commentary on the IVth Book of Sentences, William of Auxerre writes: Sicut de essentia baptismi dicuntur esse tria: scilicet materia et forma verborum et intentio baptizandi; similiter de essentia sacramenti eucharistiae dicuntur esse tri: scilicet ordo sacerdotalis et forma verborum et materia scilicet panis et vinum; eodem modo in essentia huius sacramenti dicuntur esse tria; scilicet ordo sacerdotalis et oratio fidei et materia, scilicet oleum consecratum ab episcopo. After the Council of Trent, the sacramental economy tended to be understood as ‘matter and form’, the original application of the hylemorphic theory insisted on a tripartite constitution of the sacraments: matter, form, and intention. However, whereas William of Auxerre assigns the “intention to baptize” as the intention of the sacrament of baptism, he appears to understand “the order of priests” in the place of ministerial intention: «…similiter de essentia sacramenti eucharistiae dicuntur esse tri: scilicet ordo sacerdotalis et forma verborum et material scilicet panis et vinum…». The correspondence of the ordo sacerdotalis to the intention lies in a nonJfragmentary understanding of the sacerdotal office, namely, that there is a network of factors under the umbrella of ‘intention’: ordination, rite, disposition, and so on. 36 / 4 The Dictionnaire de théologie catholique reminds us that since the inception of sacramental hylemorphism, it was intended to be understood only as an analogy.112 Francis Sullivan113, a dogmatic theologian and expert on the magisterium, says this regarding the application of hylemporhism to the sacramental economy, “…I have no doubt about the fact that St Thomas 111 Cf. Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology, 404. 112 A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, E. Amman, “Matiere et forme”, in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, vol. 10:1 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1928), col. 351. 113 It should be noted that F. Sullivan was the doctoral supervisor of H. Em. William Cardinal Levada at the Pontifical Gregorian University, now Prefect for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 97 applied the terms ‘matter and form’ to the component parts of a sacrament by analogy with the meaning of those terms in hylemorphism. My conviction about this is based on the Latin words he used.” He then cites S.th. IIIa, art. 60, art. 60, q. 6, ad 2, « Et ideo ex verbis et rebus fit quodammodo unum in sacramentis sicut ex forma et materia, inquantum scilicet per verba perficitur significatio rerum, ut dictum est » and IIIa, art. 60, q. 7, « Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in sacramentis verba se habent per modum formae, res autem sensibiles per modum materiae. » Sullivan thus concludes, “I take the words ‘quodammodo’, ‘sicut’, and ‘se habent per modum’ as clear signs that he is referring to an analogy between matter and form in sacraments and matter and form in substances.”114 Bernard Leeming reminds us that “The analogical nature of the terms ‘matter’ and ‘form’ as applied to the sacraments should never be forgotten.”115 The Thomist Liam Walsh has the following to say in this regard: Unfortunately this analogy between the constitution of sacramental signs and the constitution of material substances often lost its status as an analogy in the theology of the sacraments. Matter and form were turned into canonical categories that had the effect of separating words and elements instead of uniting them in the making of a single sign. The canonists were happy to have a way of classifying the different requirements they prescribed for elements and for words so that one could be sure of having a canonically valid sacrament. Requirements for the element were said to constitute the matter of the sacrament; those concerning the words constituted the form. Medieval theology allowed itself to be heavily influenced by canon law, and nowhere more than in its discussions on sacraments. The distinction between matter and form came to be seen as convenient for theological analysis. Aquinas uses it again in dealing with individual sacraments. But this use of what came to be called ‘sacramental hylomorphism’ [sic] was too easily caught up in, and itself contributed to, a forgetfulness of signification as the key to understanding what sacraments are. It materialized the components of the sacraments: it made a preoccupation with getting things and words right get in the way of making the words and elements come together to be a telling sign of the presence and action of God in Christ.116 It is precisely in this failure to appreciate sacramental hylemorphism as nothing more than an analogous application of the hylemorphic theory to the sacramental economy which accounts for objections to the validity of sign language to proclaim the Words of Institution. 114 In a private email correspondence, dated 5 March 2009. Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology, 407. 116 Walsh, “Sacraments”, 339. 115 98 An analogy117 is always ‘a manner of speaking’; in the case of the sacraments, since they are supernatural events in the natural world, it is not possible to employ the mere powers of observation to explain how the sacraments exercise their effects. In the Eucharist, especially, since it differs from the rest of the sacraments in that it remains even after its celebration,118 the utter and radical break between the accidental form (= sacramentum tantum) and the substantial form (= sacramentum et res) prevents the full exercise of mere powers of observation, especially since the form of the Eucharist is fundamentally an act of faith. How, then, is sacramental hylemorphism or, by extension, the four causes applied to the sacramental economy, said to be analogous? The answer lies, fundamentally, in the relationship between the formal cause (= ‘form’ of the sacrament) and the efficient cause (= the ‘intention’ of the minister). Whereas the sculptor Auguste Rodin, for example, has the intention of forming or shaping the statue of a seated, thinking man, Le Penseur emerges as the form, the actuality or the realization of what was intended. Notice, however, that the sculptor brings his intention to reality by the actual craft of the artisan, i.e., by his use of the hammer and chisel. At the end of his project, we have “a bronze statue,” called Le Penseur. The relationship between the words “a bronze statue” to the whole enterprise of forming bronze alloy into the form of Le Penseur according to the intention of the sculptor is 117 For Aquinas’ own understanding of ‘analogy’ in theological discourse, see S.th. I, q. 13; cf. Frederick Ferré, “Analogy in Theology,” in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1 (New York, NY: The MacMillian Company and the Free Pres, 1967), 94J97. 118 This must be approached with the utmost caution, because the reserved Sacrament does not have same value as the Eucharistic Liturgy: the ‘Sacred Body and Precious Blood’ are not coterminous with ‘the Eucharist’ because whereas the Eucharist is a fourfold liturgical action of taking—thanksgiving/blessing—breaking—giving, the Holy Gifts are really an ‘extension’ of act of ‘giving’ (= Communion) after the liturgy has concluded. So, though the res of the Real Presence remains in the tabernacle, the res of the reJpresentation of the Lord’s Pasch does not. Untold amounts of error have proceeded from a failure to attend to this basic yet fundamental distinction between the reserved Holy Gifts and the action of the Eucharistic Liturgy. More to the point, this is precisely why the Church frowns on ‘Communion Services’—because it does not share the same value as the Eucharistic Liturgy, even though the Real Presence of Christ is no less ‘real’ in the Holy Gifts. 99 precisely what differentiates ‘the order of things’ from the sacramental economy. The words “a bronze statue” (or some variant) does not effect a bronze statue. In other words, the ‘signification’ or ‘identification’ of this object, i.e., a bronze statue, is irrelevant because it belongs to none of the four causes. . 7 Bronze alloy Sculptor’s conception Sculptor and tools Object of art 1 % ! ! Wheaten bread Words of Institution Minister Actional reJpresentation of the Paschal Mystery; Real Presence; Ecclesial unity and charity The italicized words, “Words of Institution,” corresponding to the form or to the formal cause is precisely why the application of the hylemorphic theory to the sacramental economy is only analogous: if we recall that ‘form’ is what makes the thing to be what it is, we must ask how an articulation of the form actually constitutes the form itself. A sculptor does not create a bronze statue by saying “this is a bronze statue” over the matter of bronze alloy! Instead, he employs a mallet and chisel—precisely because the sentence “a bronze statue” cannot behave like a mallet and chisel. In what sense, then, is the application of hylemorphic theory understood to be analogous? The analogous import of the hylemorphic theory lies in the fact that hylemorphism has for its subject the natural world, observable by the powers of perception. The sacramental economy, on the other hand, pertains to a supernatural order that can only be perceived by faith. Thus understanding ‘sacramental hylemorphism’ means that one applies the hylemorphic theory to the sacramental economy “in a manner of speaking” since the res of the sacraments can only be beheld by faith and not by the powers of natural observation. 100 # ! $ %* !+ The refusal to understand sacramental hylemorphism analogously also reduces the nomenclature of verba sacramentae to nonsense because, as we have seen (albeit briefly), verbum does not share the semantic domain of either sermo or lingua. Rather, verbum indicates an idea, category, or mental concept, not unlike the Greek noun . Thomas derives his understanding of the sacramental word from St Augustine, whose Tractatus super Ioannem 80.3 he quotes repetitiously throughout IIIa, q. 60: “Now you are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you.” Why does He not say, “You are clean through the baptism wherewith you have been washed”, but “through the word which I have spoken unto you”, save only that in the water also it is the word that cleanses? Take away the word, and the water is neither more nor less than water. The word is added to the element, and there results the Sacrament, as if itself were also a kind of visible word. For He had said also to the same effect, when washing the disciples' feet, He that is washed needs not, save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit. And whence has water so great an efficacy, as in touching the body to cleanse the soul, save by the operation of the word; and that not because it is uttered, but because it is believed? For even in the word itself the passing sound is one thing, the abiding efficacy another. “This is the word of faith which we preach”, says the apostle,” that if you shall confess with your mouth that Jesus is the Lord, and shall believe in your heart that God has raised Him from the dead, you shall be saved. For with the heart man believes unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” Accordingly, we read in the Acts of the Apostles, “Purifying their hearts by faith”; and, says the blessed Peter in his epistle, “Even as baptism does also now save us, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience.” This is the word of faith which we preach, whereby baptism, doubtless, is also consecrated, in order to its possession of the power to cleanse. For Christ, who is the vine with us, and the husbandman with the Father, loved the Church, and gave Himself for it. And then read the apostle, and see what he adds: “That He might sanctify it, cleansing it with the washing of water by the word.” The cleansing, therefore, would on no account be attributed to the fleeting and perishable element, were it not for that which is added, by the word. This word of faith possesses such virtue in the Church of God, that through the medium of him who in faith presents, and blesses, and sprinkles it, He cleanses even the tiny infant, although itself unable as yet with the heart to believe unto righteousness, and to make confession with the mouth unto salvation. All this is done by means of the word, whereof the Lord says, “Now you are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you.” Augustine is here commenting on Jn 15:1J3, especially v. 3, “I am the true vine, and my Father is the vineJgrower. He removes every branch in me that bears no fruit. Every branch that bears fruit he prunes to make it bear more fruit. You have already been cleansed by the words that I have spoken to you.” He asks: why doesn’t Christ say that his hearers are cleansed by their baptism? He replies, “Take away the word, and the water is neither more 101 nor less than water.” But the baptism is effected not by the outward washing, but by the “word,” presumably the text of Mt 28:19. The power of the word, however, is not effected by the audible sound it makes, but by the profession of faith it expresses: “And when has water so great an efficacy, as in touching the body to clease the soul, save by the operation of the word; and that not because it is uttered, but because it is believed.” Augustine then cites Rom 10:9J10, Acts 15:9, and 1 Pt 3:21 to argue for the primordially salvific power of the act of faith. In terms of baptism, he reiterates Eph 5:26, “…in order to make her [= the Church] holy by cleansing her of the washing of water by the word.” These four Biblical citations converge into Augustine’s argument that “the cleansing, therefore, would on no account be attributed to the fleeting and perishable element, were it not for that which is added, by the word.” This “word” exhibits the act of faith: “This word of faith possesses such virtue in the Church of God, that through the medium of him who in faith presents and blesses, and sprinkles it, He cleanses even the tiny infant, though itself unable as yet with the ear to believe unto righteousness, and to make confession with the mouth unto salvation.” The “virtue” of the word, or its power, is indicated in the next statement, “All this is done by means of the word…” Augustine clearly does not understand the sacramental word to be a Christianized ‘incantatation’ or magical formula whereby the deity is compelled to act as a Deus ex machina; rather, it is the faith, expressed by the determinate words, that is efficacious. Granted, Augustine speaks here in terms of the sacrament of baptism, but can it be applied to the whole sacramental economy? The Summa theologiae points to an affirmative answer in two places: in the first place, Tractatus super Ioannem 80.3 governs Thomas’ 102 discussion of the sacraments in general in IIIa, q. 60, even before he reaches his discussion of baptism in particular, which does not arrive until q. 66 In Eucharistic discourse, by comparison, Catholics speak of the substance of the “Body, blood, soul, and divinity” of Christ under the appearance of bread and wine. In the case of the sacramentum et res of the Eucharist, then, the accidental form is that of bread and wine and the substantial form is that of Christ’s body and blood. Prior to the Consecration, then, the ‘privation’ of the Real Presence was due to the unity of both the accidental and substantial form: the bread and wine, though it looks and tastes like bread and wine, were in fact bread and wine.119 On account of the Consecration, however, a shift takes place in the substantial form: it ceases to be bread and wine and becomes the body and blood of Christ. During the course of the Eucharistic Prayer, the privation of the Real Presence gives way to the actuality of the Real Presence. It is for this reason that it is necessary to distinguish between the sacramentum tantum and the sacramentum et res; the accidents or appearance of the sacraments can never look like what they are, but only resemble its effects. Certainly the ‘ordinary magisterium’120 has taught much on the notion of ‘matter and form.’ At the Council of Constance, Pope Martin V issued Inter cunctas121, a questionnaire aimed at the teachings of John Wycliffe and Jan Hus. The document presupposes knowledge of ‘matter and form’ at n. 22: «Item, utrum credit, quod malus sacerdos cum debita materia et forma et cum intentione faciendi, quod facit Ecclesia, vere conficiat, vere absolvat, vere baptizet, vere conferat alia sacramenta.»122 The decree for the Armenians Exsultate Deo at 119 Aquinas sharply differentiates ‘privation’ from ‘negation’; cf. De principiis naturae, 8. Granted, it is premature to speak properly of an ‘ordinary magisterium’ prior to the First Vatican Council; here we take the meaning of the Church’s teaching office exercised by the College of Bishops in communion with the Successor of Peter without intending to define something as dogma or authoritative doctrine. 121 Denzinger, 1247J1279. 122 Denzinger, 1262. 120 103 the Council of Florence123, as we have seen, does not count as an instance of solemn judgment, since Pope Eugene IV only intended to establish the praxis of the Roman Church; it is a conciliar reJstatement of St Thomas Aquinas’ In articulos fidei et sacramenta Ecclesiae. At the Council of Trent, the doctrine of “matter and form” is never applied to the Eucharist (Sessions 13, 21, and 22). It is, however, applied to the sacraments of baptism and penance in order to distinguish them from each other (Session 14).124 In none of these cases, however, does the teaching Church define ‘matter and form’ in the sacraments. This strongly suggests that the notion of ‘matter and form’ was common theological parlance and, as such, did not stand in need of a solemn definition. As a matter of fact, its presentation in catechesis is strongly discouraged by the Catechism of the Council of Trent.125 The reason for this lies in the fact that the hylemorphic theory, as proposed by Aristotle, applied by the early Scholastics, and clarified by Aquinas, cannot be applied to supernatural realities except as an analogy. Therefore, when taking into account the question of the ‘form’ of the Eucharist vis(à(vis its proclamation in sign language, the analogous nature of the Words of Institution in the context of an instrumental cause cannot be neglected. And because sacramental hylemorphism is applied to the Eucharist only analogously, the ‘form’ or the ‘Sacramental Word’ cannot effect but only significate. We have the following clues from the Thomistic corpus arguing in favour of this: (1) the sacramental economy perpetuates and parallels the economy of the Incarnate Word; (2) the ‘Sacramental Word’ of the Eucharist serves to indicate a given sacrament to be what it is, 123 Denzinger, 1310J1327. Denzinger, 1671. 125 “The form to be used in the consecration of the bread is next to be treated of, not, however, in order that the faithful should be taught these mysteries, unless necessity require it; for this knowledge is not needful for those who have not received Holy Orders”, in Catechismus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V. Pont. Max. iussu editus, trans. J. A. MCHUGH and C. J. CALLAHAN (New York, NY: Joseph F. Wagoner, Inc., 1934), 223. 124 104 hence the nomenclature of “form”; (3) Thomas’ language is explicit in understanding the application of the hylemorphic theory as being analogous. But we must push this further. Poor catechesis, arising from the neoscholastic distortion of Aquinas, has failed to point out that the Angelic Doctor’s teaching that the Sacramental Word does not accompany merely the ‘element’, but also the action of the element. The experience of liturgical praxis is sufficient to remind us that a body of water and the formula for baptism is insufficient for the sacrament of baptism to take place; there must be a washing. And so the liturgical action must accompany the element and the word: “And under words are comprised also sensible actions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: because they have a like signification with the things” (IIIa, q. 60, art. 6, ad 2, emphasis added). As Liam Walsh notes, “This is an important qualification of the matter/form analogy. It might be canonically convenient to call water the matter of baptism. But water signifies in the sacrament only when something is being done with it. The words ‘inform’ by saying what the action means, rather than simply what the water means.” Here, then, is why the rupture of the sacraments from its horizon of liturgical actions leads to an improper understanding of the sacramental economy: it fails to note what the Church is doing in the celebration of the sacraments—the presider does one thing, the assembly another, and so forth. “And since both words and actions require a person to make them happen, matter and form can never mean impersonal objects waiting around for someone to pick them up. There is matter and form, and therefore a sacrament, only when persons are doing and saying something significant.”126 126 Walsh, “Sacraments”, 339J340. 105 It is difficult to conceive of an interpretation of St Thomas Aquinas that would disallow the celebration of the sacraments in sign language, especially given his reiteration of St Augustine’s Tractatus super Ioannem 80.3: “…the word operates in the sacraments ‘not because it is spoken,’ i.e., not by the outward sound of the voice, ‘but because it is believed’ in accordance with the sense which is held by faith. And this sense is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to their sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter in what language the sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete” (S.th. IIIa, q. 60, art. 7, ad 1). The question of ‘sacred languages’ is a nonJissue for Thomas, because Although it happens in every language that various words signify the same thing, yet one of those words is that which those who speak that language use principally and more commonly to signify that particular thing: and this is the word which should be used for the sacramental signification. So also among sensible things, that one is used for the sacramental signification which is most commonly employed for the action by which the sacramental effect is signified… (ad 2). Granted, Thomas uses such language as “speak” and “pronounce” in discussing the sacramental Word. Coupled with ad 1, it is not possible to press on an ‘audist’ or ‘oralist’ interpretation of Thomas without doing damage to his main premise: the sacramental Word serves to articulate the sense of faith, not to create a ‘miraculous utterance.’ At the same time, one must admit the high likelihood that for Thomas, to conceive a nonJ phonetic language simply escaped him. The earliest documented instance of sign language does not emerge until the middle of the sixteenth century, when Don Pedro de Ponce began to use Cistercian sign language to teach deaf children placed in his care.127 It may even be that Thomas would have been biased against any deafJrelated questions, including sign 127 See Marilyn Daniels, “The Benedictine Roots of Sign Language”, in American Benedictine Review 44:4 (1993) 383J402, esp. 387J390. 106 language, given his assimilation of Aristotle who, in particular, thought that deaf people were “senseless and incapable of reason” (On the Parts of Animals, IV.9). What remains, then, is to go back further to discover the roots of Thomas’ sacramental system—Augustine—and to discover what he had to say about language. Since this essay is only an inaugural study, subsequent research will have to bring Augustine’s philosophy of language128 to bear on the possibility of signing—rather than speaking—as a language. It is here, then, that the system of St Thomas Aquinas reaches an impasse. Servais Pinackers reminds us, however, that Thomas expects his readers to return to the sources of his system, and for his sacramental theology, this is almost always St Augustine. After our survey of the dogmatic canons on the Eucharist and of St Thomas Aquinas’ theology of the sacraments, how can we begin to pull together the pieces to form a coherent answer to our present question? We have already seen the constant Tradition of the Church which accords the “Consecration” by the priest as the ‘locus’ of efficacy changing bread and wine into the Lord’s body and blood. However, the most explicit teachings on the “Consecration” exhibit a kind of doctrinal ambivalence: whereas today one would speak of the ‘Words of Institution’ (or, perhaps archaically, the ‘words of Consecration’), the Synod of Rome and the Council of Trent referred only obliquely to it. The second oath of Berengar of Tours (1079) referred to the “…mystery of the sacred prayer and the words [verba] of our Redeemer…” The TwentyJSecond Session of the Council of Trent made reference to the Words of Institution, again in an oblique manner: “If anyone says that the rite of the Roman 128 C. KIRWAN, “Augustine’s Philosophy of Language,” in E. STUMP and N. KRETZMANN, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Andrew Louth, “Augustine on Language”, in Journal of Literature and Theology 3:2 (1989) 151J158. 107 Church prescribing that part of the Canon and the words of consecration [verba consecrationis] be recited in a low voice, must be condemned…” Even in the decree Exsultate Deo, which is hardly a dogmatic definition, the same ambiguity is found: “The form of the sacrament is the words of the Saviour with which he effected this sacrament; for the priest effects the sacrament by speaking in the person of Christ. It is by the power of these words that the substance of bread is changed into the body of Christ, and the substance of wine into his blood…” 1 8- " 9 Why not state the obvious? For all the insistence on the exact phraseology “This is my body; this is my blood” found among the neoscholastic manuals following the First Vatican Council, why do we find a ‘tweaking of the nose’ when referring to the Words of Institution? Instead of “words of our Redeemer”, “words of the Saviour”, and “words of Consecration”, why not simply reproduce the formula “This is my body; this is my blood” or at least refer to the “Words of Institution”? I would propose a twofold answer to the question. First, there is the possibility of a ‘pneumatological undercurrent’ in the dogmatic canons whereby the Spirit of Truth intends to disclose the Church’s authentic doctrine by way of careful nuance. Beginning with St Ambrose of Milan, there appears to be a doctrine of the «sermones Christi» and of the «verba Christi» which distinguishes between the historical utterance of Christ’s words at the Last Supper (= sermones) and its liturgical repetition in the celebration of the Lord’s Supper (= verba Christi). St John Chrysostom carries this further in his doctrine of the eternal validity of Christ’s utterance of the Words of Institution. Finally St John of Damascus 108 reiterates this same teaching in his On the Orthodox Faith: ““God said ‘This is my body’ and ‘This is my blood,’ and ‘do this in memory of me.’ And by his all( powerful command it is done until he comes: For that is what he said, until he should come, and the overshadowing power of the Holy Spirit becomes, through the invocation, the rain to this new tillage.”129 The ‘semantic ambivalence’ of such phraseology as “words of our Redeemer” and “words of Consecration” serves to highlight not only the liturgical repetition of the Words of Institution, but rather to emphasize the onceJforJall, historic utterance of Christ that comes to be applied when it is repeated by the presider at the Eucharist. Put in Scholastic language, it serves to emphasize that Christ is the principal cause of the Consecration, hence Ambrose’s «sermones Christi», the Synod of Rome’s «verba nostril Redemporis», and the traditional “words of Consecration.” Second, and closely related to our first answer, the celebration of the liturgy, since it always takes place in the kairos Theou, is above all an anamnesis. The Church does not simply commemorate the Paschal Mystery by ‘looking back’ on what happened wayJbackJ when; rather, the Church makes herself present in the Paschal Mystery by becoming contemporaneous130 with the ‘Hour of Jesus’. As Michael Kunzler explains, In obedience to Jesus’ command of anamnesis, the Church in her liturgical actions as real symbol, makes it possible for the timeless sacrificial attitude of Christ to become visible reality now, salvation reality in time and place—in her time and at a given placeJJ, “so that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross really becomes present in the place and at the time indicated by the act of worship.” This making “visible” in time and space of Jesus’ sacrificial attitude is the prerequisite for the Church as a reality in time and space to be able to enter in Christ’s sacrificial movement.131 129 St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 86.4.13; cf. EP 2371. Referring to the Greek word anamnesis, Gregory Dix wrote: “It is not quite easy to represent accurately in English, words like ‘remembrance’ or ‘memorial’ having for us a connotation of something itself absent, which is only mentally recollected. But the scriptures both of the Old and New Testament, anamnesis and the cognate verb have the sense of ‘reJ calling’ or ‘reJpresenting’ before God an event of the past, so that it becomes here and now operative by its effects.” Dix, Shape of the Liturgy, 161. 131 M. KUNZLER, The Church’s Liturgy (New York, NY: The Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2001), 54. Hereafter, KUNZLER, The Church’s Liturgy. 130 109 But if the ‘Hour of Jesus’—which is the language of the Fourth Evangelist in referring to the Paschal Mystery—begins with the thirteenth chapter of John, then the pasch of Christ begins not at the Cross but at the Last Supper. “Now before the feast of the Passover, when Jesus knew that his hour had come [ ' ] to depart out of this world to the Father, having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end. And during supper…” (13:1, 2a). Thus, the Church is not only present at the Cross and Resurrection; she is also present at the Last Supper. Therefore, the liturgical assembly is not only contemporaneous with the dying and rising of the Lord Jesus, but also contemporaneous with the Guest of Honour who said, “This is my body; this is my blood.” In this context, when the Church’s dogmatic canons speak of the “words of the Redeemer” or the “words of Consecration”, she intends us to understand them within the context of anamnesis, because it is really the Lord Jesus who utters them (sermones Christi) and we become contemporaries with him by witnessing these words liturgically repeated (verba Christi). After all, it was at the Last Supper that Christ commanded that the anamnesis be made: “Do this [ remembrance [ ] of me” (Lk 22:19; cf. 1 Cor 11:24J25). The demonstrative pronoun referred to by evidenced by ] in cannot refer only to the “words” but to the ‘action’, as . It is the whole Supper, not simply the Words of Institution, which is the subject of the command . I would suggest, furthermore, that St Thomas’ doctrine of the ‘instrumental causality’ of the signs is to be understood in this regard: the convergence of the elements, the form, and the action, all converge to create a liturgical moment which instrumentally causes the syntaxis to become present before Christ himself, who is actually administering the 110 sacraments as the principal cause. Whereas Thomas would have used the language of “instrumental causality” as a means of “applying” the graces of the sacraments in the hereJ andJnow, the recovery of the sense of anamnesis situates the notions of ‘instrumental’ and ‘principal’ cause within a more Biblically authentic framework. This is why, then, the Church has long used the phraseology of verba consecrationis rather than sermones consecrationis or even lingua consecrationis. The “Word” of the sacrament is not efficacious because it says something; rather, the sacramental Word is efficacious because it means, carrying within itself the act of faith. Liam Walsh unrelentingly insists upon taking St Thomas Aquinas on his own terms when describing the role of the ‘Sacramental Word’: “The words are neither an enlightenment, nor a mantra, nor a reassuring spell: they are a call to saving faith. They work, as Augustine says, ‘not because they are said but because they are believed.’ The sacramental word signifies, and therefore makes a sacrament, only as a word of faith. …Words carry signification more precisely than things. The human mind can manage them in a way that lets it express its finest thoughts in them.”132 The emphasis is not on words qua utterance, but rather qua act of faith. As the sacramental celebration moves from elements to liturgical action, and finally to words, the signification of the sacrament becomes complete. “The signification of things is largely given, and it is often polyvalent. Words pin down the signification of things.” The watchword is “act of faith.” Walsh continues, “[Aquinas] puts the sacramental words in their worship setting when he talks about the liturgical rites of the individual sacraments. And of course the fact 132 Walsh, “Sacraments”, 338. 111 that he presents the sacramental words as words of faith entrails that they belong to the most fundamental of liturgical acts, which is the profession of faith.” Moreover— There are other consequences to be drawn from the faith standing of sacramental words. Aquinas explains in his replies to the difficulties of a.7 that because words work in sacraments as expressions of faith, not as vocal sounds (non quia dicitur sed quia creditur, as Augustine said), it is their meaning for faith that has to be maintained, not their oral accuracy. They can be in any language as longa sthe faith meaning is maintained. So, there is no question of giving preference to any “sacred languages” in sacraments. Nor does Aquinas think that the wording in sacraments should be exotic: they use the most common words available in the particular language. The words can be garbled, especially the ending of words, and yet hold their meaning. The awareness of linguistic complexity shown in these replies to practical difficulties should prevent us from interpreting in a rigid manner Aquinas’ use of the matter/form analogy in the body of the sed contra to indicate that he is basically trying to understand why the Church has always considered itself bound to use the set Gospel words given by Jesus for baptism and the Eucharist.133 From this careful reading of Aquinas, we can conclude that the sacramental economy, since they are “visible words” (Augustine), it would be appropriate to understand the ‘ministry of the Word’ as the primordially liturgical act to which the sacraments are subordinated. - " ! Following St Augustine, then, of preaching and teaching remains the larger context within which the celebration of the sacraments takes place; the Ordinary and Propers of the Church’s liturgical books are above all fixed sermons, and the ‘sacramental form’, especially the Words of Institution, represent a most pointed instance of the Church’s preaching. Again, Michael Kunzler offers a helpful reJorientation of the sacred liturgy as a ministry of the Word. Speaking of the Church’s sacramental formulas, he writes: There are also considered forms of the proclamation of the [W]ord. Accompanying formulas—e.g. the words used when distributing Holy Communion—are intended to highlight the liturgical action and its spiritual intention. Thus these formulas have an important mystagogical function, especially when they elicit a response from the recipient—such as the “Amen” in Communion. In the case of sacramental formulas, the effect of scholastic sacramental theology has been a tendency to isolate these words by seeing them as the “essential words” (verba essntialia) through which the sacrament comes into being. In Fischer’s opinion this tendency towards isolation is still strong in the renewed liturgy. In addition, the emphasis on the minister—the “I” formula—strengthens that formula at the expense of 133 Walsh, “Sacraments”, 340. 112 the epicletic element. Again, without understanding sacraments merely as proclamations of the [W]ord strengthened by external symbolic actions, the sacramental formulas are indeed in a profound sense “proclamations of the [W]ord” since they express and made effective the Lord who is acting in them, the [I]ncarnate [W]ord of God.134 Understood in terms of the Church’s evangelical mission, we cannot escape the conclusion that the ‘sounds’ or the ‘utterance’ of the Eucharistic Form—or any sacramental Word for that matter—misses the point entirely. What matters is the signification of the sacraments, i.e., what they mean and, more importantly, what they proclaim. This is exactly why the Church’s doctrinal tradition insists on such language as verba consecratione and the like; it never employs such phrases as sermones consecratione or lingua consecratione because the Latin verbum, like the Greek , stresses not the morpheme but the idea or the category of what is being relayed. The sermo merely facilitates the communication of the verba between the herald of the Word and the believer. But the proclamation of the Word does not have its medium in only speech—but also in sign language because sign language no less than speech, and sometimes even more than speech, is able to proclaim the Word. Let us suppose that this were not the case, that is, the sounds uttered by the minister did indeed have miraculous ‘properties.’ In this case, then, the Church’s Tradition has fallen short in her doctrine of the sacramental economy because nothing has been taught regarding the ‘sacramental’ powers of the ordained minister’s breath or vocalisms. Of course any such notion is utterly absurd, superstitious and falls well within the domain of religious speech reprobated by our Lord, “And in praying do not heap up empty phrases [ 134 KUNZLER, The Church’s Liturgy, 113, emphasis added. 113 , lit. “repetitiously”; “babble”; “use the same words again and again”135] as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be heard for their many words” (Mt 6:7).136 Both speech and sign language equally mediates the Verbum Dei; nothing of the Word of God is lost when it is proclaimed between persons137 by means other than spoken language. As the Second Vatican Council teaches, Moreover the prayers addressed to God by the priest who, in the person of Christ, presides over the assembly, are said in the name of the entire holy people and of all present. And the visible signs which the sacred liturgy uses to signify invisible divine things have been chosen by Christ or by the Church. Thus not only when things are read “which were written for our instruction” (Rom. 15:4), but also when the Church prays or sings or acts, the faith of those taking part is nourished, and their minds are raised to God so that they may offer him their spiritual homage and receive his grace more abundantly.138 Flowing from this very principle arises the liturgical reform permitting the use of the vernacular: “But since the use of the vernacular, whether in the Mass, the administration of the sacraments, or in other parts of the liturgy, may frequently be of great advantage to the people, a wider use may be made of it…”139 As a matter of fact, the notion of a “sacred language” had been rejected by Pope John VIII in 880 and the Eastern Church had always been consistent with the intrinsic Gospel value of inculturation and therefore had retained the custom of celebrating the liturgy in the language of people. It was primarily the influence of 135 W. C. Trenchard, A Concise Dictionary of New Testament Greek (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23; BDAG, 137. 136 Scholars think that Mt 6:7 refers to magical epithets or incantations that achieve a desired end by the manipulation of a deity. Cf. C. K. Barrett, New Testament Background: Selected Documents (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1961), 31J 35. 137 Between persons is the crucial stipulation. One cannot, for example, proclaim the Word—whether Biblical in the Liturgy of the Word or sacramental in the Liturgy of the Eucharist—by holding up a cue card with the sacred text, because the cue card represents a breach within the process of interpersonal communication in the form of ‘herald →Word→(Word written on cue card)→(Word read from cue card)→believer.’ The true proclamation of the Word must take place between persons in the form of ‘herald→Word→believer.’ This why we must approach the use of communication technology in the liturgy with caution since, for example, projecting the Propers and the Ordinary of Mass onto a screen divides the liturgical action into two by bifurcating the syntaxis’ attention onto both the proclaimer and the screen. This, I would suggest, is the underlying reason for liturgical law’s proscription of recorded music in the sacred liturgy in that it disrupts the personJtoJ person communication. 138 S.c., 33. 139 S.c., 36, 2; cf. 63, a; 114 a prelate of the Eastern Church who had swayed the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council to adopt legislation authorizing the vernacular in the reformed liturgy: The almost absolute value assigned to Latin in the Liturgy, in teaching, and in the administration in the Latin church strikes us from the Eastern church as strange [assez anormal]. Christ after all spoke the language of his contemporaries. …[In the East] there has never been a problem about the proper liturgical language. All languages are liturgical, as the Psalmist says, “Praise the Lord, all ye people.” …The Latin language is dead. But the Church is living, and its language, the vehicle of grace of the Holy Spirit, must also be living because it is intended for us human beings and not for angels.140 Did the Patriarch of Antioch understand the full implications of what he said? Did he realize that what he was saying was essentially this: angels communicate mentally141; human beings do not and thus stand in need of language? It is in the mode of communication with each other that humans are differentiated from the angels, and it is thus in language that humans exercise one of their noblest capacities, and it is in the capacity of language that the grace of the Holy Spirit is communicated, not excepting the verba fidei of the Sacramental Word, especially the Words of Institution. As Archbishop Annibale Bugnini reminds us, “Pope Paul VI was to say with St. Augustine: ‘It is better to have the learned reproach us than to have the liturgy remain unintelligible to the people.’”142 This renewed appreciation of the Word is what led the Second Vatican Council to decree the restoration of the vernacular in the sacred liturgy since Pope Gregory VII imposed a uniform language in the Roman Liturgy at the turn of the second millennium. We know that even after the legitimate authority of Pope Gregory VII imposing Latin in the liturgy, St Thomas Aquinas nevertheless insisted on the validity of vernacular languages in the celebration of the sacraments. 140 J. W. O’MALLEY, What Happened at Vatican II (New York, NY: Belknap Press, 2008), 136. E. BOYLAN, This Tremendous Lover (Notre Dame, ID: Christian Classics, 1987), 9. 142 A. BUGNINI, The Reform of the Liturgy 1948(1975 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1990), 45J46. 141 115 «Verbum caro, panem verum, verbum carnem efficit»; “WordJmadeJflesh, the true bread by his word to Flesh he turns.” What remains of our study, as Karl Rahner has indicated, is a more developed theology of the Word, of a tractatus de Verbo divino.143 Fortunately, however, Rahner has provided us with some direction in relating Word to sacrament. Fr Ranerio Cantalamessa, O.F.M.Cap., the preacher to the papal household, has provided the community of theologians with an excellent springboard for discussion in his short The Mystery of God’s Word.144 The more urgent question is how the Word is mediated between persons; what is essential in the celebration of the sacraments is that the symbolic manifestation of the Word must facilitate interpersonal contact. When a presider says “This is my body,” the Word that encapsulates the mystery of faith is enshrined in the vocal patterns that are transmitted and received audibly by the liturgical assembly. How these words sound is utterly irrelevant; what these words evoke in the minds of believers in the liturgical assembly is all that matters. Similarly, when a presider signs the Canon actionis, the symbols manifested by sign language transmits the same mystery of faith to the Deaf liturgical assembly. The mystery of faith evoked by sign language is no more impoverished than by spoken language: it is the same mystery of faith, and ultimately the same Word proclaimed. The “symbolic medium,” whether it be spoken language or sign language, facilitates the encounter between persons; what is symbolized, whether by spoken language or by sign language is the Word. The same mystery of faith is evoked by the proclamation of the presider in virtue of the sacramental Word and the reception of the same sacramental 143 K. RAHNER, “The Word and the Eucharist,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Pres, 1966), 253J286, esp. 255J256; consider the following statement by Rahner: “In view of all this, it is really astonishing that we Catholics provide no space, no systematic place for a theology of the [W]ord in the average theology of our schools, in Latin manuals, etc.” (255). 144 R. CANTALAMESSA, The Mystery of God’s Word (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994). 116 Word in the mind of the assembly. Whether spoken or signed, the same mystery of faith is evoked by the sacramental Word.145 Neither spoken language nor sign language lend more or less truth to the mystery of faith proclaimed by the sacramental Word. If the sacraments are a confession of faith, how can it be proclaimed meaningfully to a people who are unable to hear, if not by sign language? Recently, we had examined how linguistic symbols mediate between persons. If we insist on a spoken sacramental Word, with the same relayed by a sign language interpreter, the personJtoJperson contact between the presider and the assembly becomes disrupted; the Word is not proclaimed but relayed, a model which fails to conform to the economy of the Incarnate Word by which God inculturated himself to the human race in order to reveal himself as a human Person being to humans beings. In order for the Word—whether Biblical or sacramental—to be proclaimed to Deaf people, it must be in the language manual signs. Yet some insist that the Word be spoken, and that the Deaf should ‘assume’ what is spoken. After all, what else is said at the Canon actionis if not the Words of Institution? Given the uniformity of Rites and prayers, is it all that necessary to grasp what is immediately proclaimed? ‘Reception’ of the Word must happen at its proclamation; it must be received and not ‘assumed’. When the proclaimed Word is assumed in the minds of people who cannot hear, there is a break in the continuity not only in the interpersonal communication but also in the liturgical action, since the ‘assumption’ of what is proclaimed happens in ‘tandem’ with the proclaimed Word, and not from it. The liturgy, then, is reduced to mere pageantry and drama 145 While this is hardly the place to expand such a discussion, I would strongly suggest that the WestJEast controversy of the ‘Words of Institution versus the Eucharistic epiclesis’ misses the point entirely, because the sacramental Word and the invocation of the Holy Spirit are equally necessary for equally different reasons: as a confession of faith and as a prayer. 117 and falls woefully short of its divine ordination as the dialogue between God and his People.146 The katabasisJanabasis147 of the sacred liturgy is thus disrupted. A spoken liturgy to a Deaf assembly is an impoverished liturgy and one inconsistent of the intrinsic genius in the divine plan of the Incarnate Word. To encapsulate what we have been saying so far: the “complexus of signs” that is the sacred liturgy is composed of three genera of symbols: (1) the element or material, (2) the action, and (3) language. The convergence of material symbol, actionable symbol, and linguistic symbol together constitute the single liturgical sign which, insofar as the proper ministerial intention runs undercurrent through the whole of the event, becomes a sacrament. Sign language no less than spoken language is able to effect a valid celebration of the Eucharist on the basis of these three conditions. ; What remains to be studied, however, are the following. First, in terms of “instrumental causality,” there needs to be a through understanding of how the sacerdotalis of both presbyters and bishops operate as instruments in the perfection of a sacrament, especially the Eucharist, especially when there is actually a complexus of instrumental causalities at work. Second, the philosophy of language and the theory of signs according to the mind of St Augustine needs to be explored, since there is an ‘Augustinian priority’ to the Thomistic corpus, especially in his theology of the sacraments. Third, a linguistic analysis of both the Canon actionis as applied to sign language, especially given the rarity of auxiliary verbs in some national sign languages, is needed in order to develop translations of the Words of 146 Cf. MARTIMORT, Principles of the Liturgy, 131J171, esp. 157J161. 147 Cf. KUNZLER, The Church’s Liturgy, 2J6, 75J83. 118 Institution that conveys the sense of the words as theologically rich as possible. Fourth, following the lead of Karl Rahner, a development of the tractatus de Verbo divino under which the sacred liturgy, especially the sacramental Word, is understood as being truly and properly a ministry of preaching and teaching, thus falsifying the ‘dichotomy’ between the munera docendi and the munera sanctificandi—while maintaining their distinction—as being of themselves the katabasis(anabasis structure of the life of grace. Fifth, a thorough study on the theory of sacramental hylemorphism must be undertaken in order to bring out with clarity and forcefulness the analogous nature of ‘matter and form’ in the sacramental economy. Sixth and finally, a fuller argument must be developed, which has only begun to be explained here in the Conclusion, for the priority of a signed celebration of the Eucharist—and not merely interpreted—in order that the integrity of the liturgy as the ‘dialogue between God and his People’ may be preserved. We have only discussed, within a dogmatic and Thomistic framework, the question of the sacramental validity of the Eucharistic Form in sign language, and concluded in favour of the use of sign language in the celebration of the Eucharist. With further study of the above five trajectories above mentioned, it can only be hoped that the Apostolic See can put to rest the doubts raised by wouldJbe theologians with no awareness of Deaf culture and language who insist that Deaf Catholics ‘pretend’ to be hearing at Mass. Moreover, we hope for a clarification of Pope Paul VI’s permission of 10 December 1965 that explicitly allows for a celebration of Mass in sign language without any reference to spoken language or any allusion to ‘total communication.’ Deaf people no less than those who can speak and hear without any impairment are equal recipients of the Gospel and equal participants in the liturgical dialogue between God 119 and his people. It is hoped that this essay launches a fruitful discussion towards this end, namely, the “full, active, and conscious participation in the sacred liturgy”148 among Deaf believers. No less than an Ecumenical Council summons us to do just that. 148 S.c., 14. 120 . / 1. 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