

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS UNDER THE CFE TREATY



Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III

DIRIAC 45675



Defense Threat Reduction Agency

45045 Aviation Drive
Dulles, VA 20166-7517

1 November 1998

Dear Reader:

For the past ten years, quietly, professionally, effectively, American and Russian inspectors have been monitoring the elimination and destruction of intermediate and shorter-range missiles under the INF Treaty. More than 800 on-site inspections have been conducted. More than 2,600 missiles have been destroyed. At the portals of a missile factory site in each nation, on-site inspections have been conducted continuously, 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year for the past nine years. An account of this remarkable effort has been told in a narrative history.

Please accept this copy of *On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty*. It narrates, using American and Russian sources, the story of how treaty inspectors carried out the precedent-setting on-site inspections at remote, restricted military sites in the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union.

This book also relates the interesting history of a new Department of Defense agency, its origin, growth, and subsequent development. Today, the On-Site Inspection Agency has the mission of conducting, planning, and preparing for the monitoring of a series of international arms control treaties: Intermediate and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Strategic Arms Reduction, Threshold Test Ban, and Open Skies Treaties, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As we prepare for these new treaty missions, the recent past becomes prologue for the near future. We hope that you find this book informative and interesting.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Joseph P. Harahan".

Joseph P. Harahan
Historian

TREATY HISTORY SERIES



*ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
UNDER THE CFE TREATY*





A History of the On-Site Inspection Agency
and CFE Treaty Implementation, 1990-1996

Joseph P. Harahan
John C. Kuhl, III

THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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FOREWORD

For the past decade Europe has been in transformation. For more than four decades the European continent had been divided into two heavily armed military alliances. That sharp division softened after 1986, as old forms of government were cast off and new nations emerged. Within a few years, across the length and breadth of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, nations assumed new responsibilities and rights under a series of new treaties, agreements, and international accords. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty played a pivotal role in this transformation. This history details the implementation of the CFE Treaty. In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of contemporary Europe.

In the American constitutional system, the government is accountable to its people. This history, the second in a series by agency historians, tells the American people about a significant treaty mission undertaken by their national government. It is based on extensive research in government documents, treaty records, inspector and escort interviews, and statistical reports. The result is an interesting history, one that will be used in treaty courses and disseminated widely to the public and national agencies throughout Europe and the United States. We hope that you will enjoy reading and learning how the United States conducted "On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty."

Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force
Director

AUTHORS

Joseph P. Harahan is the senior historian at the On-Site Inspection Agency. Prior to joining the Agency, he was a historian in the Office of Air Force History and a faculty member at the University of Richmond and Michigan State University. He received a B.A. from the University of Virginia, an M.A. from the University of Richmond, and a Ph.D. from Michigan State University. He is the author of *On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty* (1993) and the co-editor of a multivolume Air Force history series, *Warrior Studies* (12 volumes). While completing this history he lectured at colleges, universities, and military academies in the United States and abroad.

John C. Kuhn, III, joined the On-Site Inspection Agency in 1992. As an Air Force historian, he authored organizational histories at the 2nd Bombardment Wing and contributed to the annual histories at the 8th and 15th Air Forces in the Strategic Air Command. At the On-Site Inspection Agency he assisted in the final stages of production of the Agency's first history, *On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty* (1993) before turning to researching and writing this book.

PREFACE

When the Cold War ended suddenly in 1989-90, the signposts were dearly visible. Communist governments collapsed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. Germany was unified in October 1990. In the same period, the Soviet Union announced that it would withdraw, within four years, all of its 680,000 stationed troops from Eastern Europe. The United States countered by declaring major withdrawals of its forces from Western Europe. Against this background of political revolution, unification, and massive military force withdrawals, the leaders of Europe, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed the Peace of Paris in November 1990. Two multinational agreements constituted the heart of that peace: the Accords for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

Following national ratification, the CFE Treaty entered into force in July 1992. By then the Soviet Union had collapsed as an empire and eight new republics had emerged to become treaty signatory states. In all, 30 Atlantic-Eurasian states implemented the CFE Treaty. On-site inspection played a critical role in monitoring treaty compliance. Every treaty state established new, or expanded existing, verification agencies and staffs to conduct and host on-site inspections. This history narrates the efforts by the United States and other nations to plan, staff, train, equip, and conduct on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty.

The book begins with the CFE Treaty's signature in November 1990, and it concludes with the signing of the Final Document at the First Review Conference in May 1996. Between those years, the treaty nations collectively reduced more than 50,000 conventional weapons-tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, fighters, and helicopters. Hundreds, if not thousands, of on-site inspectors monitored these reductions in accordance with the protocols of the treaty. Inspection standards were established and sustained across national borders. A rule of law was replacing the rule of force. Many of the inspectors had been soldiers of the Cold War; now they were monitoring force reductions under a complex peace treaty. Quietly, professionally, effectively these inspectors and their respective governments ensured that the new rule of "law," as detailed in the CFE Treaty, was being enforced.

Agency support for the research and writing of this history was directly attributable to the support of Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., USAF, OSIA Director (1995-), and Brigadier General Gregory G. Govan, USA, OSIA Director (1993-1995). Dr. Joerg H. Menzel, OSIA's Principal Deputy Director, took a personal interest and shepherded the project from the sharp knives of those hostile to major long-term efforts. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA, OSIA's Chief of Staff, read the manuscript and encouraged the authors at every step along the way in the final two years. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, OSIA European Operations Command, read every word, wrote incisive comments, and then discussed each comment with us personally. His intellect and professionalism strengthened the final book in numerous ways. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, Commander of the OSIA's European Operations Command, contributed his support to the project in its final year.

We would like to acknowledge the assistance and helpful suggestions of all of the people of OSIA's European Operations Command. We interviewed many of the team chiefs, inspectors, planners, logisticians, and commanders; their opinions and insights helped straighten out the often confusing references to treaty protocols, tables, paragraphs, and subparagraphs. In particular the follow-

ing NCOs and officers shared their time and experiences: Stephen Barneby, Mark Bumala, David Carter, William Chesney, Joe Drach, Tom Dudley, Ed Gallagher, Les Garrison, David Gessert, Jan Karcz, Gary Karstens, Michael Lukes, Jack Monahan, Keith Oatman, Richard O'Shea, George Partridge, Ken Periman, Tom Regan, Larry Schultz, Mike Slifka, Bill Smith, and Ron Tait. In the review process, senior officials in the JCS, OSD (Policy), and OSD(Acquisition) read and critiqued the manuscript for policy and operations considerations. In that process, Mary Margaret Evans, OSD, Acquisition, was especially helpful.

When it came time for assembling the final book in all of its parts-the tables, charts, appendices, bibliography, and fact checking-we are indebted to David Willford of the History Office. His diligence and intelligence made it a better history. Stephen Jimenez contributed to the chronology and appendices. Rolan Maddox helped cross-check every name, place, figure, and bibliographic reference. Bob Coleman and Tom Pearlman developed the cover art and maps, and assisted with other photographs throughout the book. At EEI, Judy Cleary and Gayle Dahlman guided the book through production, Baiba Seefer edited the manuscript, and Jennifer Whittington created the design and layout, with the assistance of Lynn Whiteley. Rey Ovalle steered the finished design through the government bureaucracies to final publishing. Everyone knows that publishing a textbook of this nature is both an individual and a collective work. Individually, the authors researched and wrote the book, and they are credited on its cover and title pages. Collectively, the contributions of the others are mentioned only here. This fact obscures the appreciation we hold for their work and contributions. We simply could not have completed this history without them.

Joseph P. Harahan
John C. Kuhn, III
July 24, 1996

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Chapter 1

THE TREATY AND THE MISSION



President Bush and the leaders of 21 nations sign the CFE Treaty in Paris, France, on November 19, 1990.

On November 19, 1990, the leaders of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and Central Europe gathered in Paris to sign the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.¹ The CFE Treaty came amidst profound historical changes that were sweeping across the European continent at the end of the Cold War.² During this time of transition, the treaty served as an international structural bridge. The CFE Treaty was both an arms reduction treaty, which mandated the signatory states to collectively reduce more than 38,500 military weapons, and a conflict prevention treaty. To prevent (or, more accurately, reduce the probability of) conflict in Central Europe, the CFE Treaty required the signatory nations to permanently reduce their stationed military forces in designated geographical zones in Central and Western Europe and on the flanks of the Soviet Union. Under the CFE Treaty, verification measures were the most extensive, intrusive, and complex of any modern arms control agreement. The heart of verification was and remains *on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty*.



Moscow streets during August 1991 coup attempt; the Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991.

The process of implementing this cross-European treaty, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, began with the signatory nations' exchange in thousands of pages of military force data, establishing verification agencies to conduct thousands of on-site inspections, developing new data systems for monitoring the presence of tens of thousands of military weapons, and traversing millions of miles of territory to inspect declared sites, objects of verification; and specified areas. While the leaders of 22 nations had signed the CFE Treaty in November 1990, there were 29 nations that provisionally implemented the treaty at entry into force in July 1992. The increase in signatory nations was the direct consequence of larger historical forces reshaping the European continent: Eastern Europe's political revolutions, Germany's unification, and the Soviet Union's collapse. As a result, seven new nations, all drawn from the former Soviet Union, became signatory states. In 1993, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as a nation resulted in two new nations, the Czech and Slovak Republics, becoming signatory states. Thus, 30 nations implemented the CFE Treaty.¹

By the fall of 1990, European stability, characterized by the post-World War II division of East and West Europe and the "German Question," had changed decisively. For more than four decades, ever since the Berlin Blockade of 1948, the threat of a continental European war had been present. In 1989-90 that threat was ending. For the new Europe, the CFE Treaty represented a practical measure, especially with its extensive, intrusive verification process, for establishing a new international process that would both reduce and establish lower levels of offensive military forces and their deployment for the 1990s and beyond.

In retrospect, it seemed so straightforward. The Cold War era had ended and the post-Cold War era had begun. Events of historic proportions came so rapidly in 1989-92 that all of Europe seemed, for a few years, to move in one, and only one, direction—toward democratic revolution. But as people swept up in contemporary events know, change is straightforward only in history books. The present rarely is so clear. This realization was particularly true for the men and women entrusted with implementing and monitoring the CFE Treaty "on the ground." As military professionals, they had to build new treaty verification agencies and staffs. As on-site inspectors monitoring a multinational treaty,

they had to cross bridges that stretched across Europe's older, west-to-east national boundaries. These new bridges crossed to places, peoples, and military sites not visited, much less inspected, for more than 45 years. Consequently, there were days, even months, when the footing secured by the treaty seemed unsure. At times, the treaty's very foundation-its legal authority sanctioned by national ratification-seemed certain to collapse. At other times, the treaty appeared to be carrying more of Europe's security structure than it was designed to carry. Uncertainty was the rule for months and months. It is this uncertainty that makes this history interesting. A rule of law was replacing a rule of force. No one was certain if the historical circumstances that created the political and military consensus for the signing of the CFE Treaty would continue throughout its implementation.

The CFE Treaty signing in Paris in November 1990 came at the midpoint of a series of political and military changes occurring in Europe, the Soviet Union, and to a far lesser degree, the United States. Arms control treaties and agreements in the late 1980s had legitimized many of these changes and, in a few instances, they set the stage for more revolutionary developments. The Stockholm Agreement of 1986 was the first step. Then, in December 1987, President Ronald W. Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington, D.C. That treaty was a diplomatic and military watershed; its elimination provisions and implementation measures set precedents for all subsequent modern arms control treaties. In the next five years, the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies negotiated and signed two bilateral and five multilateral treaties: Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1990), Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (1990), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991), Vienna Document Agreements (1990, 1992, and 1994), Open Skies Treaty (1992), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (1993), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993).⁵

All these treaties incorporated on-site inspection as an important element in monitoring compliance. The first treaty, the INF Treaty, stipulated extensive on-site inspection rights. These rights were so extensive that President Reagan authorized the establishment of a new agency to conduct U.S. inspections of Soviet facilities and to escort Soviet inspection teams at U.S. military facilities. That new agency, established in the U.S. Department of Defense on January 26, 1988, was the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). While the small but growing cadre of OSIA men and women organized, trained, and conducted inspections in the initial phases of the INF Treaty, negotiations continued in Vienna and Geneva on other, more extensive, arms control treaties. One of these, the Treaty Between the Twenty-Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduction of Their Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, became known as the CFE Treaty.⁶



EARLY NEGOTIATION TO SIGNATURE

The Helsinki Process, officially called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), provided the platform for CFE Treaty negotiations. The Cold War had divided Europe politically, economically, and militarily. On July 3, 1973, more than 25 years into the Cold War, delegates from 35 nations, including neutral and nonaligned European nations, the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, met in Helsinki, Finland, to bridge those divisions. This meeting was the first in a continuing series of CSCE conferences and meetings held in national capitals across Europe. At these meetings, delegates from the CSCE nations attempted to define and agree upon a set of legal principles that would apply to all European states and peoples. The first significant phase of this process culminated in August 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.⁷



Security

Human Rights

Technology/Science/Environment

Through the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE nations declared that issues concerning the future of Europe should be discussed in terms of three areas, or "baskets." Basket one dealt with security in Europe, including issues such as national self-determination, territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Basket two covered progress in science, technology, and the environment. Basket three contained human rights and other issues. To enhance military security, the 35 CSCE states agreed to the concept of negotiating "confidence-building measures (CBMs)." The objective of these measures, which were initially quite limited in scope because of the rigidity of the east-west European divisions in the Cold War, was to make each nation's military capabilities and intentions more transparent. The theory was that if nations knew of their neighbors' military capability and intentions, then these nations might develop confidence in their international relations and possibly reallocate their security resources to other national concerns. Collectively, the European continent was the most heavily armed of any continent in the world. National armies and air forces were large, well equipped, and modern. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had stationed large, combat-ready armies and air forces in Central Europe. The first confidence-building measure, signed in 1975, required all 35 CSCE nations to provide every other nation a 21-day advance notice of any military exercises involving more than 21,000 troops. Other provisions stipulated the voluntary notification of smaller exercises as well as large-scale troop movements on an annual calendar.

In contrast to the successful negotiation and institution of these CSCE confidence-building measures, another set of cross-European diplomatic-military negotiations, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFRs), did not fare well. These negotiations were between the representatives of two alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw

Treaty Organization (WTO). Initiated in 1973, the negotiations lasted intermittently for 17 years. They were never able to get past several stumbling blocks. NATO sought reductions in military personnel stationed in Europe, whereas WTO proposed equal reductions in both military personnel and weapons. The objective, NATO argued, would be to achieve, after several phased withdrawals, end-strength parity in the forces of both alliances. The Warsaw Pact, as the WTO was commonly known, countered that both alliances should be reducing the same number of personnel and weapons, leaving the end strength unbalanced. Neither alliance would agree during the lengthy negotiations whether to make the cuts in equal slices or through gradual reductions leading to parity. Nor could they agree on whether the cuts should be made on an alliance-to-alliance or a nation-by-nation basis. In addition, a major U.S. concern was that there was no satisfactory method to verify personnel cuts. In lieu of any agreement in these protracted and frustrating MBFR negotiations, both NATO and WTO modernized their conventional weapons and maintained their focus on combat readiness. Huge, modern, massed armies and air forces continued to face each other across a line running through a divided Germany.⁸

Throughout these years, the 35 CSCE nations continued meeting in a series of lengthy conferences in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna. The Madrid meetings began in November 1980 and

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A U.S. team observes a Russian exercise—a CSCE-negotiated confidence-building measure.

led to the delegates agreeing on a September 1983 CSCE Mandate. This mandate called for all delegates to negotiate agreements implementing not only confidence-building measures among the states of Europe, but also new treaties leading to the gradual disarmament of Europe. At the Madrid meeting, the CSCE nations accepted a broader definition of Europe as envisioned first by French President Charles de Gaulle, then by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and finally strongly articulated and argued by the United States. It defined Europe as stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.⁹ This meant that any future agreement or treaty would include military forces and equipment stationed across the length and breadth of Europe, including the interior of the Soviet Union. This definition had significant implications for the CFE Treaty.

Three years later in Stockholm, in September 1986, CSCE delegates agreed to new confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). These measures required notification of military exercises involving more than 13,000 troops and provided for on-site inspection of field activities involving 17,000 or more ground forces or 5,000 or more airborne troops, with no right of refusal by the inspected nation. Known as the Stockholm Document of 1986, this was the first multinational agreement that the Soviet Union signed permitting on-site inspections on its own territory to verify an arms control accord.¹⁰

In agreeing to the Stockholm Document, Gorbachev signaled his intent to accelerate negotiations for reducing military armaments across Europe. Throughout 1986-87, Gorbachev gave a series of dramatic speeches, calling upon European and American leaders to consider phased reductions in conventional and nuclear forces based on the European continent. He changed the course of all previous negotiations by conceding that since the Soviet Union had numerically superior conventional forces in Europe, the NATO nations might reasonably conclude that these forces were a threat. He further stated that under any negotiated all-European arms control treaty, the side with the greater number of forces ought to take a larger share of the reductions, provided there was adequate verification through on-site inspections. Under the Soviet Union's leadership, the seven-nation Warsaw Treaty Organization met in Budapest and endorsed Gorbachev's proposals.¹¹

Responding to these significant new Soviet and Warsaw Pact initiatives, the foreign ministers of NATO created a High Level Task Force (HLTF) in May 1986 to develop a coordinated alliance proposal for a conventional arms reduction treaty. Following long and difficult internal discussions within the 16-nation alliance, this NATO task force produced a negotiating position in December 1986. The NATO foreign ministers in their December meeting



NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

proposed a two-track negotiating strategy. One would consist of the 35 CSCE nations' pursuing broader and more transparent confidence-building measures. The other would have the NATO nations and the WTO nations negotiate phased reductions and stability provisions for their conventional forces in Europe. This two-track strategy was adopted.¹²

Just five weeks later, negotiators from 23 states (16 NATO, 7 WTO) met in Vienna on February 17, 1987, to discuss treaty negotiating guidelines. Nearly two years of detailed, often technical discussions, both among the allied nations and between the alliances, produced on January 14, 1989, the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This mandate established the fundamental negotiating principles for the CFE Treaty. Specifically, the treaty would include provisions to reduce or prevent the capability of any nation, or group of nations, to mass military forces on the European continent in order to launch a surprise attack across national borders. The treaty would seek to significantly reduce offensive military hardware; these reductions would be asymmetric, with the objective of an end-strength parity between alliances. In addition, the treaty would contain provisions for a robust and intrusive verification regime.¹³

NATO Nations

Belgium	Luxembourg
Canada	Netherlands
Denmark	Norway
France	Portugal
Germany	Spain
Greece	Turkey
Iceland	United Kingdom
Italy	United States

Twenty-three states began negotiations under the Cold War structure of Europe. The NATO alliance, 16 nations including the United States, formed one side; the Warsaw Pact, 7 nations dominated by the Soviet Union, constituted the other. Although these nations shared negotiating goals and strategies as members within their alliances, they were independent, sovereign nations. Under the treaty being negotiated, the individual signatory states would hold all rights and obligations. Recognizing this fact, French negotiators successfully argued for not identifying in the formal treaty language either the NATO or the Warsaw Pact alliance. Instead, the French persuaded the other nations to use the term "group of state parties" to refer to the two alliances.¹⁴ This became a critical treaty term since it allowed negotiators to incorporate the existing bloc-versus-bloc structure as an integral element of the treaty while holding the individual states responsible for treaty implementation. This dualism remained in the treaty despite revolutionary changes that transpired in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union in 1990-92.

In late 1989, the East Germans revolted; the Berlin Wall fell, and the German Democratic Republic's communist government collapsed. German unification became a serious possibility. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, British Prime Minister Margaret H. Thatcher, French President Francois Mitterrand, and American President George Bush participated in a series of dramatic meetings in 1990. These negotiations culminated in a series of international agreements that recognized Germany as a single, unified nation, effective October 3, 1990. While these events unfolded, the Warsaw Pact collapsed. This collapse was a direct consequence of the "velvet" revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1988-89 as the peoples of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria rejected their communist governments. Equally important was the fact that Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet Union allowed the revolutions to proceed. Previous attempts by Warsaw Pact nations to depart from communism had resulted in forceful Soviet military intervention. In 1989-90, by contrast, Soviet troops were withdrawing from Eastern Europe.¹⁵


Warsaw Pact Nations

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Soviet Union

All these events influenced the CFE Treaty. The issue of German unification posed several concerns for treaty negotiators. A united Germany would possess a large, modern armed force. It would have the largest national army and air force in Central Europe. Twice in the 20th century, Germany had sought to dominate continental Europe. Acknowledging this legacy, German Chancellor Kohl pledged that his government would reduce the size of the new nation's military forces. Germany submitted a special declaration to be included in the CFE Treaty. The "Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Personnel Strength of German Armed Forces" stated that

Germany would cut its troop strength to 370,000 three to four years from the day the CFE Treaty entered into force.¹⁶ This declaration persuaded other nations to declare their willingness to negotiate "to limit the personnel strengths of their conventional armed forces." Although negotiators did not reach agreement on this issue in time for the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris in November 1990, they continued negotiations throughout 1991 and 1992. By July 1992, the time of the treaty's entry into force, national personnel limits were contained in a separate document, entitled the CFE IA Concluding Act.

Another event, also larger than the treaty and influencing it, was General Secretary Gorbachev's unilateral declaration at the United Nations in December 1988 to withdraw six tank divisions (50,000 men) from the nations of Central Europe.¹⁷ This unprecedented, massive Soviet military withdrawal, coupled with the Eastern European nations discarding communist governments for democratic rule, resulted in a weakened, impotent military alliance among the Warsaw Pact nations. Just five months before the CFE Treaty's signature, the Hungarian National Assembly on June 26, 1990, voted 232-0 to initiate negotiations for Hungary to leave the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.¹⁸ Since the framework of the CFE Treaty rested on a group of states as the basic unit for all reductions and end-strength parity, a breakup of the WTO presented the possibility that those nations would no longer act as a group. This did not happen. The Eastern European states did not want the possible dissolution of the alliance to prevent the CFE Treaty from entering into force.



The CFE Treaty was negotiated under a NATOIW TO scenario.

Ambassador Grinevsky on Soviet Negotiations



A professional diplomat, Oleg Grinevsky led the Department of Mid-Eastern Affairs, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1978 through 1983. During the next two years, he served as the Soviet Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Then, in 1985, he became the Chief Arms Control Negotiator for the USSR for the CFE Treaty. For the next five years, he worked directly with President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to negotiate the treaty).

On Soviet leaders and the concept of on-site inspections: "In December 1985, Gorbachev had a one-on-one with each of his arms control negotiators. He wanted to start 'real negotiations' with 'real reductions' in armaments to make Europe and the world less militarized and less dangerous. During the time of [Conference on Disarmament in Europe] negotiations in Stockholm, I suggested that we accept one or two on-site inspections every year of Soviet forces because it would convince the West of our good intentions and [it] would not harm our military position in any way."

On resistance within the Soviet Politburo: "In the meetings on arms control, the sides were generally Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakolev, and Grinevsky against Marshal Akhromeyev, the KGB Chief, the Director of the Central Committee's International Department, and the Military Departments. Marshal Akhromeyev was the key member of the Politburo who opposed the CDE measures. As the head military officer, his ideas were important and persuasive. But he was very 'explosive,' and would speak out forcefully on his views."

"The Politburo met on weekends. I would return from Stockholm and present the results of that week's negotiations. The arguments were heated. Usually, they took the form of my introducing a proposal and, if it was unacceptable, Akhromeyev would 'explode,' explaining that the proposal endangered the military security of the

state. Gorbachev would then step in and 'mediate' the dispute, making sure at the end that everyone on the Politburo agreed. This happened on the discussions on the on-site inspection measures, and that is how it was resolved."

On Gorbachev and Soviet participation in the more radical arms control treaty negotiations: "First of all, there was the economic situation in the country. The USSR needed time and resources to improve its economic situation.... Second, to do this we had to improve relations with the West to reduce tensions, to make economic relations easier by getting rid of the West's biggest fear, the size and power of the Soviet military forces in Europe. We wanted to change our military profile in Europe and reduce our dominance over Eastern Europe."

"We actually succeeded, especially after the CFE Treaty, which, by the way, only Shevardnadze really supported. Shevardnadze realized that only after this treaty would the USSR be safe from a Western attack. The country would be able to save resources from the conventional force reductions to use elsewhere."

"Conventional forces are very expensive, and the money saved would be considerable. But virtually all of the others opposed the CFE Treaty because the USSR would be giving up its 'overwhelming military advantage' in Europe. They could not visualize a Soviet Union that did not have a huge and powerful military, even if it meant better living conditions for the people."

Ambassador Hansen on U.S. Negotiations

Lynn M. Hansen was the U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992-93. In 1989-90, he served on the U.S. delegation negotiating the CFE Treaty. Educated at Utah State University, Hansen was a Fulbright Scholar to the Free University of Berlin. The recipient of an M.A. and a Ph.D., he is fluent in German, Dutch, Swedish, and Russian. Currently, Ambassador Hansen is Vice Chairman for Evaluation, National Intelligence Council.



On the Bush administration's decision to pursue the CFE Treaty: "The United States made the decision to push the treaty sometime in 1989. It began in March 1989, but there was a little bit of time before they really made the decision that, by golly, we are going to get this agreement. They brought in Jim Woolsey [as Chief Negotiator], and I came with him. That was in November 1989. It was precisely the time when the Berlin Wall came down."

The INF Treaty as a precedent: "The INF experience was both a positive and negative model for us. It was positive insofar as we and the Soviet Union had an experience which we shared, and we knew what had to be done. But this very fact was resented by some, particularly the French, who took some pains to make sure that we did not use INF terminology very much. But since it was the only experience anyone had, we still used it. So it was very, very important to us in terms of methodologies and procedures...."

"Clearly, there were two things that influenced us. One was, of course, the INF Treaty. The second was the shared experience everybody had with the Stockholm Agreement. That was a European-dominated experience, and it was very, very important. I think it was every bit as important to the Europeans and to the negotiation of the CFE Treaty as was the INF Treaty. Thirty-five nations had shared in that experience, but only 23 were in the CFE negotiations-and all of them had been involved in the Stockholm Agreement, every one."

Negotiating the final CFE Treaty verification issues: "As we proceeded through negotiations we were able to resolve most of the issues up until October 1990. We were within a month of treaty signing and

didn't have the basic question of a site versus an object of verification resolved. It was the basis for calculating the number of inspections, and what we were to inspect. In October 1990, the Russians paid a visit to Washington. A small team of us took Soviet Ambassador Grinevsky into a room in the State Department and we talked about the CFE Treaty, specifically verification.

"The [U.S.] interagency community, or more accurately, decisionmakers at a high level, had decided that they would accept the Soviets' object of verification concept, provided the Soviets would agree to the way it would be implemented. We put this proposition to Ambassador Grinevsky. He indicated that he wanted the appropriate people involved. We requested that he send his verification negotiator to the U.S. He called him over. His name was Gennadiy Yefstaviyev. We met in New York. The idea was that while the UN First Committee was in session, we would attempt to resolve the final parts of the CFE Treaty.

"I arranged my room in the Waldorf Astoria to be a little negotiating room. As it turns out, only I and Yefstaviyev used it. One on one, we wrote out the final parts of the verification protocol, which included the concept of object of verification and access to the declared sites. We also developed the definition of a declared site and other definitions which have stood the test of time rather well.


"Basically, we did it this way. My negotiating style was to write everything down. Then, these texts were given to Mr. Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker. They would meet, discuss, and bless them. By the time that New York meeting was over, we had, for all intents and purposes, an agreement on the verification protocol."

Consequently, throughout 1990, the Central European Warsaw Pact nations, specifically Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, continued to negotiate as a "group of state parties," although most believed that the Warsaw Pact would dissolve by the end of 1991. In the negotiating sessions, these nations took positions that reflected their independent national status, but in the final treaty text and implementing protocols, they agreed to retain the terminology of bloc-to-bloc limits and zones. Since Soviet military forces were still withdrawing from Eastern Europe, no nation wanted to impede this withdrawal. This deliberate political act allowed the basic framework of the treaty to remain in place while the East European nations strengthened their new independent governments.¹⁹

By October 1990, most major treaty provisions, protocols, and statements had been agreed to; however, the basis for calculating the number of inspections had not been determined. The United States argued that the location of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) and military units, known as a "declared site," should be the basis for calculating the number of inspections. The declared site was what an inspection team would inspect. The Soviets countered that the number of inspections should be based on the "objects of verification" (OOVs). The OOV was a declared military organization that held equipment limited by

the treaty. An OOV could also be a designated permanent storage site that held TLE not associated with a specific unit, or any location, where TLE would be found routinely. The Soviet position was that a team would inspect the OOV—the organization, storage depot, or location and its TLE, not the entire site where they were located. For many, this distinction was difficult to understand; yet, it was important to the Soviet High Command because they colocated many military organizations at a single location. The Soviet Army often had several OOVs on a single declared site. Here was a major disagreement, declared site versus OOV, and neither the NATO nations nor the Warsaw Pact nations were willing to compromise.

In an eleventh-hour effort, American CFE Treaty negotiator Lynn M. Hansen and Soviet CFE Treaty negotiator Gennadiy Yefstaviyev held a series of meetings in the weeks and days before the treaty was signed.²⁰ There was little time for extended deliberations. President Bush had stated that he would not attend the Paris CSCE Conference, scheduled for mid-November 1990, if a CFE Treaty was not ready for signa-



ture. Time was running out; in late October Ambassador Hansen met with Ambassador Grinevsky and others at the U.S. State Department to resolve the impasse. Their solution recognized the OOV as the item for inspection, but also granted inspectors access to the entire site except for areas belonging exclusively to another OOV. Declared site areas that were not part of an OOV, were colloquially referred to as common areas. This ambiguous solution resolved a treaty negotiating impasse, but it created problems later during treaty implementation.

Long before this issue would surface during actual on-site inspections, the treaty text and protocols had to be finalized, signed, and ratified. To complete the treaty, Soviet CFE negotiator Yefstaviyev went to New York, where he and the American negotiator Hansen developed the final segments of the inspection protocol. They in turn persuaded members of their respective blocs in Budapest and Brussels to accept the negotiated provisions. However, this U.S.-USSR agreement came at a cost. These end game negotiations brought to a head a belief held by many of the other signatory states: the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, were resolving too many issues bilaterally. From this point forward, the CFE Treaty negotiators from the European states began meeting among themselves. A stronger "European" perspective on the CFE Treaty and its implementation began to emerge. Despite this development, the march toward final agreement continued. After delegates agreed to all of the final provisions, the CFE Treaty was ready for signature.

CFE TREATY SIGNA I

In mid-November 1990, the three-day meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe convened in Paris. The leaders of 22 nations, including Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl, Mitterrand, and Thatcher, signed the CFE Treaty on November 19, 1990. At that point, the signatory states included Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States. Amidst all the historic changes sweeping across the European continent, the CFE Treaty constituted a new legal and diplomatic framework for reducing military forces and limiting national aggression in post-Cold War Europe.²¹

The CSCE Conference's political and diplomatic dimensions were revealed the next day as the leaders of 34 states signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.²² This charter codified statements on human rights, democratic values, and the rule of law for all European states and peoples. At the same session, leaders of the



Leaders of CSCE nations at the November 1990 Paris Summit.

16 NATO nations, 6 WTO nations, and 12 neutral and non-aligned European nations pledged to seek a nonconfrontational security structure for all of Europe. That structure began, of course, with their endorsement of the objectives of the CFE Treaty. Next, they agreed to establish and strengthen CSCE institutions.²³ A new, small CSCE Secretariat would be established in Prague; a CSCE Conflict Resolution Center would be set up in Vienna, and a new CSCE Election Monitoring Office would be located in Warsaw. At the same time, the 35 national leaders affirmed their commitment to follow the provisions of the Vienna Document 1990, an important new cross-European confidence and security building measure that expanded the provisions of the earlier Stockholm Document of 1986.²⁴ The new Vienna Document 1990 stipulated annual exchanges of military force data, regular military-to-military contacts, and on-site inspections as confidence and security building measures. When the three-day CSCE Conference concluded, it was seen as another significant step in the transition to post-Cold War Europe.

President Bush, in his remarks to the 69 assembled presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers, cited the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the courage of the European peoples who worked to

implement the CSCE objectives. He noted that three of the European leaders present, the presidents of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, had been jailed or persecuted for exercising their rights under the Helsinki Act. President Bush asserted that the treaty was the military dimension of the CSCE process and that it was "the most far-reaching arms agreement" ever negotiated.²⁵ In his remarks, President Gorbachev praised the CFE Treaty and called for action on the other arms control treaties then under negotiation, especially in the areas of strategic nuclear weapons.²⁶ When they spoke, both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand took a longer, European view. In the last 200 years, Kohl said, "Europe, and my country in particular, became the epicenter of worldwide catastrophes." Now, he declared it was time for European peace. Mitterrand observed that for the first time in European history the massive changes occurring across the continent were "not the outcome of war or bloody revolution."²⁷

Between the hyperbole and the history lay the signed CFE Treaty. But before it could enter into force, it had to be ratified. That process would take nearly two years; in the interim, the treaty became the subject of intense scrutiny by those responsible for implementation.


APPENDIX 1 OF THE CFE TREATY

Text and Clarifications

The CFE Treaty contained 23 articles that spelled out treaty definitions and requirements in terms of equipment, quantities, locations, and time periods. The treaty outlined requirements for exchanges of information, reductions (elimination or conversion of TLE), and on-site inspections. It also authorized the formation of a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) of all signatory nations to resolve issues that might arise during the life of the treaty. Eight protocols provided detailed procedural guidance on the requirements outlined in the 23 articles. Finally, three important declarations were included in the treaty.²⁸

The first declaration defined and limited the number of land-based naval aircraft and attack helicopters. This declaration was but one element of a larger problem that treaty negotiators faced. Combat aircraft had been a particularly difficult issue during treaty negotiations. The Eastern group of states held an advantage of more than 2,000 land-based combat aircraft over the NATO nations' air forces. The Soviet Union wanted the CFE Treaty limits to codify that advantage. If the NATO nations wanted an equal number of combat aircraft, the Soviet negotiators argued, they would have to build up to the Eastern group

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Several issues concerning combat aircraft, like the MiG-29, were contentious in negotiations.

of states' treaty-authorized totals. NATO representatives countered that the goal should be to achieve a treaty-authorized end-strength figure that would put the two groups of states on an equal footing in regard to the final number of combat aircraft. NATO's proposal would require the Soviets to eliminate thousands of combat-ready aircraft. This was unacceptable to the Soviet High Command.²⁹

Another aspect of the same problem was how to define a combat aircraft. The NATO states offered a definition that focused on the capability of the aircraft. If an aircraft could fly and deliver munitions, they argued, it was a combat aircraft and should be limited by the treaty. The Eastern group of states, however, preferred a definition that categorized military aircraft by mission. Using this definition, they recommended excluding aircraft such as defensive fighter interceptors and combat aircraft used as trainers. These aircraft, they asserted, did not have offensive missions—they did not support ground forces—therefore they should not be limited by the treaty. In addition, the Soviets had reassigned 500 land-based aircraft from ground to naval units, and they wanted to exclude them from consideration arguing that the treaty did not apply to naval forces. These aircraft were important to the Soviet High Command because they constituted a counterbalance to NATO's carrier-based aircraft, which were not limited by the treaty. The NATO states were concerned that any treaty exclusion of combat aircraft based on mission would sanction a legal hiding place. Further, they were troubled by the Soviets' reassigning ground-based combat aircraft to naval forces. What would limit the Soviet military from simply assigning an increasing number of aircraft to naval forces? Painting a fighter's tail and wings with naval unit insignia, NATO negotiators argued,

offered little evidence that the fighter would not be used for offensive operations within the treaty area.³⁰

The issue became so contentious that as late as September 1990, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, commented in a news interview that combat aircraft might not be an element of the treaty. He suggested that these aircraft might become a consideration for subsequent CFE negotiations. Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met in New York City in late September to consider the final items of the treaty. By early October, they had worked out a compromise agreement on 5,150 as the total number of combat aircraft a single country could possess in the treaty area. This ceiling reflected the Soviet High Command's minimum needs. Concurrently with the Baker and Shevardnadze discussions in New York City, NATO's High Level Task Force continued to review the issue in Brussels. Once Baker and Shevardnadze had reached an agreement, they presented it to each group of states. In Vienna, after treaty negotiators approved the single-nation limit, they moved forward on October 15, 1990, to agree on a ceiling of 6,800 combat aircraft per group of state parties.³¹

This 6,800 combat aircraft limit left the Eastern group of states with a 900 aircraft advantage. However, the new limits meant that the Soviet Armed Forces would have to eliminate 1,295 aircraft, and the remaining members of its group of states, 277 aircraft. The treaty limits included interceptor aircraft and Soviet Backfire bombers. Mission was not the basis for inclusion. Treaty limits excluded primary flight training aircraft, whereas combat aircraft trainers were included because of their offensive capabilities. The inclusion of combat aircraft trainers affected the Eastern group of states' totals, primarily the Soviet Union's. The NATO states, however, were not affected because their holdings were approximately 900 aircraft below the treaty ceiling. To compensate the Eastern group for agreeing to the lower combat aircraft ceiling, the NATO negotiators acceded to a treaty provision that allowed the reclassification of up to 550 unarmed training aircraft. Seven models of combat training aircraft could be reclassified. Key systems could be removed to render the aircraft useless for offensive operations. Reclassification of the MiG-25U fighters was limited to 130 aircraft. Once modified and certified by on-site inspectors, these reclassified aircraft would not count against the 6,800 aircraft ceiling.

In the final negotiations, the Soviet delegates were adamant on the issue of excluding their land-based naval aircraft from consideration. Ultimately, negotiators could not resolve the problem within the structure of the legally binding treaty. Instead, they inserted into the treaty a political declaration that allowed each group of states, although in reality it applied only to the Soviet



*U.S. Secretary of State
James A. Baker, III.*



*Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze.*

*Soviet delegates were
adamant on the issue of
excluding their land-based
naval aircraft.*

Union, to possess a certain number of land-based naval aircraft that did not count against the 6,800 ceiling for combat aircraft.

The CFE Treaty did contain some limits, however. The total number of land-based naval aircraft was limited to 430 per group of states, with no nation allowed more than 400. This declaration recognized the initial Soviet advantage in combat aircraft going into treaty negotiations, but it limited the number of Soviet land-based naval aircraft to 400, and, most important, it sealed for the future the issue of combat aircraft being assigned to naval forces and being outside the treaty. Naval combat aircraft did not present the only unresolved issue as the time for treaty signature approached. The complex issue of setting and verifying limits on national military personnel could not be solved in the weeks leading up to treaty signature, and produced another treaty declaration.

By inserting this second declaration into the CFE Treaty, negotiators stated that limits on national military personnel were an aspect of the CFE Treaty, but that such limits required further negotiations to reach agreement on specific figures and verification protocols.³² Verification was the major stumbling point. U.S. negotiators believed that while counting CFE military equipment would be challenging, counting military personnel could become impossible, particularly during periods of extensive military reorganizations, massive force reductions, and especially during rapid military expansions. There were other difficult issues associated with tracking military manpower. Just who would be counted: military reserves? naval infantry? military transients? In the end, negotiators agreed to continue manpower negotiations with a goal of reaching agreement by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Helsinki in July 1992.³³ Consequently, they included in this second CFE Treaty declaration a statement that all signatory states would not increase their current levels of peacetime personnel. Germany was the only state that made a treaty declaration to limit its military forces. Its pledge to limit its military forces to not more than 370,000 constituted the third declaration of the CFE Treaty.³⁴

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Scope

The scope of the treaty in terms of nations, military equipment, and geography was enormous. In November 1990, 22 nations with military forces stationed over 2.3 million square miles had committed themselves to the CFE Treaty. The TLE fell into five major categories: *tanks*, *combat aircraft*, *attack helicopters*, *armored combat vehicles*, and *artillery*. Further, in each of those categories there were many types of equipment: 24 types of tanks, 55 types of combat aircraft, 17 types of attack helicopters, and more than 50 types of armored combat vehicles (ACVs). Armored combat vehicles, a term coined for the treaty, grouped armored

personnel carriers (APCs), armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), and heavy armament combat vehicles into a single category. Heavy armament combat vehicles included vehicles that were not tanks, APCs, or AIFVs but had an integral gun of at least 75 millimeter (mm) caliber and weighed at least 6 tons. Artillery included guns, howitzers, mortars, multiple launch rocket systems, and artillery pieces that combined the characteristics of guns and howitzers. There were more than 100 types of artillery and all were of at least 100mm caliber. The five categories of TLE contained more than 240 different types of equipment. The combined holdings of TLE for both groups of states surpassed 200,000 pieces.

The treaty also had provisions for reporting conventional armaments and equipment that were inventoried but not limited by the treaty. The Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment listed all conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty. Known by its acronym, CAEST, this equipment included the five categories of TLE, plus combat support helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, and Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters; primary trainer aircraft; armored-vehicle-launched bridges; and armored personnel carrier and armored infantry fighting vehicle "look-alikes." Armored look-alikes were vehicles built on ACV chassis that were similar in appearance to an APC or an AIFV, except that they could not transport a combat infantry squad. They also did not have guns or cannons of 20 millimeter (mm) or greater caliber. There were 21 types of look-

Table 1-1. CFE Treaty Ceilings

	TLE	In ATTU*	In Each Alliance	In One Country	Sufficiency Rule Percent in ATTU
	Tanks	40,000	20,000	13,300	33%
	Artillery	40,000	20,000	13,700	34%
	ACVs	60,000	30,000	20,000	33%
	Aircraft	13,600	6,800	5,150	38%
	Helicopters	4,000	2,000	1,500	38%

Atlantic to the Urals.

Source: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1990, Articles IV, V, VI.

Table 1-2. NATO Declared Holdings and Liabilities

TLE	CFE Limit	Declared	Liability*	Percentage of Holdings
Tanks	20,000	25,091	5,949	24%
Artillery	20,000	20,620	2,334	11%
ACVs	30,000	34,453	4,631	13%
Aircraft	6,800	5,939	0	0%
Helicopters	2,000	1,736	0	0%

*Collectively, NATO nations set their CFE limits below the treaty limits. All figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.

Source: CFE Treaty Declarations and Residual Ceilings, United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense, November 1990.

alikes for the M-113 APC chassis alone, and these were not limited by the treaty. In deference to the Geneva Convention of 1949, armored ambulances were not considered ACVs or look-alikes under the CFE Treaty. Thus, they *were* not reportable.

Armored vehicle launched bridges were also subject to the CFE Treaty. Although they were not considered TLE, limits were placed on them. The treaty allowed each group of states to have 740 armored bridges in use with their active forces. Any bridges in excess of this limit had to remain in storage. The treaty contained specific guidelines both for storing them and for removing them during an emergency.

In the first official treaty information exchange, held in Vienna on November 18, 1990, the 22 nations declared an aggregated total of 201,005 pieces of TLE. By category, there *were* 58,282 tanks, 77,402 ACVs, 47,573 artillery, 14,311 aircraft, and 3,437 helicopters within the treaty area, from the Atlantic to the Urals.³⁵ By November 1995, the total number of TLE within the area had to *be* below the treaty ceiling of 157,600 pieces. This final figure is the total of the *five* categories of offensive weapons: 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft, and 4,000 attack helicopters (see table 1-1). These totals included a subtotal designating the maximum amount of equipment that active units could hold collectively, with the remainder stored in designated permanent storage sites. These maximum equipment figures, again one-half for each group of states, permitted active units to hold 33,000 tanks, 54,600 ACVs, and 34,000 pieces of artillery.

To lessen the possibility of any one nation's becoming too dominant or unilaterally launching a massive surprise attack, the treaty stipulated limits on the amount of equipment that any one nation could have within the treaty area. Known as the "suffi-

Table 1-3. WTO Holdings and Liabilities*

TLE	CFE Limit	Declared	Liability	Percentage of Holdings
Tanks	20,000	33,191	13,191	40%
Artillery	20,000	26,953	6,953	26%
ACVs	30,000	42,949	12,949	30%
Aircraft	6,800	8,372	1,572	19%
Helicopters	2,000	1,701	0	0%

*All figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991, *World Armaments and Disarmament*, p. 426.


ciency rule," this provision allowed a nation sufficient forces to defend itself, but limited its forces and offensive equipment to approximately one-third of the total amount permitted for its group of states. As the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, this provision, which was originally a NATO proposal, took on an additional importance as the Central European nations sought to minimize the strength of the neighboring Soviet Union.

Area

The treaty's area of application encompassed the territory of the European signatory nations stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Known as the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals), the area consisted of four zones, three of which were concentric rings centered on Germany, and one that defined the flanks of a European theater (see map). These four zones defined the areas in which the signatories agreed to limit the number of TLE for stationed ground forces. Because of their mobility and range, combat aircraft and attack helicopters were not subject to zone restrictions. The smallest zone encircled Central Europe, a focal point of the Cold War. It encompassed Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, and designated European island territories. Military forces in this zone could not exceed 15,000 battle tanks, 22,500 ACVs, and 10,000 pieces of artillery.

The next, larger concentric zone extended beyond Central Europe and included additional nations. At treaty signature, the second zone included Denmark and the Faroe Islands, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, and Soviet territory encompassing the Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Baltic Military Districts. By the time of treaty ratification and entry into force in July 1992, the Soviet Union had dissolved and these military






districts were located in the independent states of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and the Baltic nations. Equipment allowed in this zone totaled 20,600 battle tanks, 38,520 ACVs, and 18,200 pieces of artillery. Put another way, this larger zone, which included the smaller zone, could hold the equipment authorized in the smaller zone plus an additional 5,600 battle tanks, 16,020 ACVs, and 8,200 pieces of artillery.

The largest of the three zones at treaty signature encompassed the two smaller zones plus Portugal with the Azores and Madeira Islands, Spain and the Canary Islands, and the Soviet territories west of the Ural mountains encompassing the Moscow and Volga-Ural Military Districts. When the treaty entered into force, this expanded area, which stretched literally from the Atlantic to the Urals, included the independent states of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and portions of Kazakhstan. This zone allowed for 10,000 more battle tanks, 9,680 more ACVs, and 9,800 pieces of artillery for a total of 30,600, 48,200, and 28,000 pieces of equipment in their respective categories. The remaining pieces of TLE were authorized in the flank areas.

The original treaty defined the flank areas as Bulgaria, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Turkey west of the Urals, and the Soviet territory encompassing the Leningrad, Odessa, Northern Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts. By July 1992, when the treaty entered into force, portions of these former Soviet military districts were located in the new nations of Moldova, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. Other portions encompassed the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and

NATO REDUCTION LIABILITY




Lithuania, nations that chose not to be CFE Treaty participants. Although the Baltic states were not subject to inspection, the Russian forces stationed there were, and Russia's reduction liability included the equipment not yet removed from the Baltic states. The total military equipment allowed under the treaty for the flank areas was 9,400 battle tanks, 11,800 ACVs, and 12,000 pieces of artillery.

Reductions

Two of the CFE Treaty's main objectives were to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack and to lower the probability of confrontation by reducing the total number of tanks, artillery, ACVs, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft the respective group of states could hold. To achieve these reductions, the treaty set specific schedules for reaching the final limits. As implementation unfolded, inspection teams monitored the pace and level of reduction efforts. Inspections became important benchmarks for measuring treaty compliance.

During the initial reduction phase, known by the term "first reduction year," each nation had to reduce 25 percent of its holdings that exceeded treaty limits at entry into force (EIF). The initial reduction phase began at the provisional EIF on July 17, 1992, and lasted for 16 months. It encompassed the 120-day baseline inspection period followed by the first reduction year. A second reduction year followed, during which an additional 35 percent of the excess equipment had to be reduced. Treaty states would





The treaty authorized converting tanks and ACVs to nonmilitary equipment .

reduce the remaining 40 percent of their excess equipment during a third and final reduction year. This schedule gave each group of states 40 months to reduce all their weapons in excess of the final treaty limits.

Article VIII of the CFE Treaty specified the methods allowed to reduce TLE. Reduction methods varied by equipment category, although destruction and placement on static display were options common to all categories of TLE. Nations could also convert tanks and ACVs for nonmilitary purposes or use them as training targets. A reduction option for the Soviet MT-LB armored personnel carrier was modification that rendered the MT-LB incapable of transporting a squad of combat infantrymen. The only additional option authorized was to use the carriers as ground targets. Combat aircraft could also be modified for ground instructional use, and seven specific models of aircraft could be modified and reclassified as unarmed training aircraft. Helicopters, attack or multi-purpose attack, could be modified for ground instruction purposes, and the multi-purpose helicopters could also be modified and recategorized as support helicopters.

The Protocol on Reduction provided specific guidance on implementing the various methods of reduction listed in Article VIII. Authorized methods for destroying TLE included cutting, exploding, deforming, and smashing. The protocol also dictated the specific components to be destroyed for each category of equipment as well as the damage required to render a piece of TLE permanently ineffective as a military weapon. The protocol dictated the results, not the particular technology used to achieve them. How to accomplish a cut of a specific length in a specific location, for example, was an option of the state reducing the equipment. It was not necessary to destroy the entire weapon to achieve reduction. Unless specified in the reduction protocol as a component to be destroyed, some equipment, such as communication systems, could be salvaged and the debris scrapped.

For aircraft, the fuselage was the critical component for a successful reduction by destruction; any other component could be salvaged. The first of the two authorized destruction methods to reduce an aircraft on the ground was severing, which required technicians to cut the nose and tail sections off the fuselage. The other option, deformation, required technicians to compress the fuselage to reduce its height, length, or width by at least 30 percent. In either case inspectors would have specific criteria and tangible evidence of an aircraft reduction. Using aircraft as target drones was an additional authorized destruction procedure for aircraft. Authorized methods of helicopter destruction were severing, explosive demolition, and deformation. The fuselage and the transmission mounting area were the key components for a successful reduction, and specific damage criteria were outlined for each destruction method.

Destruction methods for tanks and armored combat vehicles included severing, demolition, and smashing. Also allowed were procedures to reduce tanks by deformation, including welding or severing components of gun systems in addition to deformation of the hull and turret. The critical components to be damaged were gun tubes, breech systems, trunnions and their mounts, hulls, turrets, and integral main armament.

Reducing artillery by destruction included severing, demolition, smashing, and deformation. Specific criteria of damage were stipulated for components critical to making the piece of equipment a weapon. Those components were the tube, breech system, cradle with trunnion and mounts, and rails; launcher tubes or rails and their bases; mortar tubes and base plates; and vehicle hull and turret for self-propelled artillery pieces.



The fuselage was the key component for an aircraft reduction, either by deformation or by severing, as shown on this MiG-21 "Fishbed."



Severing was the primary reduction method for all treaty-limited equipment (TLE).


While destruction was the most common option selected for reduction, the treaty permitted other means as well. States owning the equipment were allowed to put it to use as something other than a weapon. Certain tanks and ACVs could be converted to nonmilitary equipment such as bulldozers, fire fighting equipment, and rescue vehicles. Any item could be reduced for static displays or placed in military museums. Tanks, ACVs, and artillery could be reduced for ground targets, and aircraft and attack helicopters could be reduced for ground instruction purposes. The key concept in these reductions was that specific components required disabling damage before certification for use for other purposes. However, the number of items that could be reduced using these treaty options was limited.

Recategorization presented another reduction option, such as in the case of multipurpose attack helicopters. By treaty definition, these helicopters performed multiple military functions and employed guided weapons. By removing their weapon systems, mounting points, fire control systems, and wiring, the owning state could recategorize these helicopters as combat support helicopters not limited by the treaty. Well before any nations began these reductions, however, they collected and exchanged specific treaty data concerning their own forces and equipment.

Data Exchange

The initial, massive CFE Treaty data exchange occurred on November 18, 1990, the day before treaty signature. Freely provided, this data exchange listed the order of battle for every signatory nation's conventional forces stationed on the European continent. Experts scrutinized these data immediately, and they became one of the primary sources for preparing and planning treaty implementation. Previously, a small army of intelligence officers would have been necessary to gather this information; now signatory nations were exchanging these data as part of their initial treaty obligation. Article XIII, the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, and its Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information required each signatory party to provide all other parties specific information on the status of its forces. The information was provided in six charts.

Chart I provided the command structure for each nation's conventional ground and air forces stationed in the ATTU. This chart identified each unit and assigned it a designator used in subsequent charts. Chart I also indicated the next two higher echelons in the unit's chain of command. Charts IIA and IIB listed each nation's total holdings of TLE. Chart IIA identified a state's total holdings in treaty-limited tanks, ACVs, and artillery. It also revealed the quantity of TLE in each treaty area by category, subcategory, and type. Chart IIA also showed TLE in designated



On November 18, 1990, all CFE nations exchanged detailed information on their military forces.

permanent storage sites (DPSSs). Chart IIB provided the same information for treaty-limited aircraft and helicopters, with two exceptions. There was no reporting by treaty zones for aircraft and helicopters nor did DPSSs apply. In Charts IIIA and IIIB, states reported all of their conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST). They reported not only those units holding TLE, as required in Chart I, but also those holding equipment not limited but nonetheless subject to the treaty, including naval units. In addition, the states reported all DPSSs, reduction sites, and locations where CAEST were routinely present, such as repair facilities or training establishments. Chart IIIA dealt with ground forces, and Chart IIIB covered air units. Any TLE located in the ATTU, but not in service with a state's conventional armed forces, was reported in Chart IV. Also, internal security military organizations and their equipment that were not trained for combat against another military force were reported on Chart IV. Equipment being refurbished or held for export—for example, tanks and ACVs that had been reduced or were awaiting conversion—and equipment that had been decommissioned and was awaiting disposal were reported on Chart IV.

On Chart V, states reported their objects of verification (OOVs). An OOV was any unit at the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion level, independent squadron, or equivalent unit holding TLE. Designated permanent storage sites, maintenance units, military training establishments, and airfields where TLE was permanently or frequently present were also OOVs. Reduction sites were OOVs as well, because of the excess TLE positioned on these sites. States also reported their declared sites on Chart V.

While a nation's total number of OOVs dictated the number of inspections it was liable to receive during the various phases of the treaty, the definition of a declared site dictated what was inspectable. A declared site was a precisely delineated geographic location containing one or more OOVs. Examples of declared sites were specific air bases, army posts, and storage depots on which

Chart IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number	Formation or Unit Record Number	Designation of Formation or Unit	Peacetime Location	NOT USED	Combat Aircraft	Reclassified CCT Aircraft	Primary Trainer Aircraft	Attack Helicopters	Combat Support Helicopters	Unarmed Transport Helicopters	Other
(a)	(h)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)


The Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information provided specific formats for presenting treaty-required exchange data.

the OOVs were located. A declared site included all territory within its natural or man-made boundaries. A declared site also encompassed areas associated with the operations of the unit that might not be colocated, such as a railhead or a training area, but where CAEST and TLE were routinely present. For example, the 36th Fighter Wing, a U.S. OOV, operated from a declared site, the Bitburg Air Base in Bitburg, Germany. This ratio of one OOV to one declared site was typical of most U.S. air unit OOVs, but ground units frequently colocated OOVs on a single declared site. For instance, three OOVs-the 3rd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery; 82nd Engineering Battalion, 3rd Engineering Brigade; and 2nd Battalion, 14th Field Artillery-operated from one declared site: Warner Barracks in Bamberg, Germany. A declared site containing multiple OOVs was typical for the national militaries of the Eastern group of states. Declared sites and OOVs were critical for treaty implementation.

Chart V listed the points of entry (POEs) associated with each declared site. Inspection teams entered and exited the inspected nation through the specific POEs designated for each declared site. Chart VI provided a listing of all designated POEs, categorized by the means of transportation used to reach them. In November 1990, Greece, for example, reported two POEs on Chart VI, one at Athens International Airport for air arrivals and the other at the Port of Piraeus for arrivals by sea. The Greek government designated both POEs as acceptable for 47 of their declared sites, while designating only one POE for the remaining declared sites.

Treaty Periods

Negotiators developed the treaty so that implementation took place in four different periods. The initial 120-day baseline validation period, referred to as the CFE Treaty baseline, was expected



CFE Treaty Periods

to be an extremely busy period for inspection teams. During baseline each state party was prepared to receive inspections at a portion of its declared sites. During treaty negotiations, a consensus developed that there were too many declared sites to inspect each one during the brief baseline period. Consequently, negotiators agreed that it was not necessary to inspect each site to determine if a nation had been accurate in its data exchange. They agreed that each nation would be liable for inspections based on 20 percent of the total number of the OOVs declared in the initial exchange of data. These baseline inspections would occur when the amount of TLE and the number of OOVs would probably be at their highest and before nations could complete any significant TLE reductions. On-site inspections during baseline allowed states to take a significant sample of the data exchanged to determine its accuracy and to establish a base for planning future treaty activities.

The second period, the reduction phase, occurred after baseline, when the pace of the declared site inspections slowed to a rate of 10 percent of the total declared OOVs per year. This rate remained in effect during the three reduction years. During those years, inspectors would be no less busy because of the requirement to conduct reduction inspections. After these initial baseline and reduction periods, the third phase would consist of a 120-day residual level validation period. During this phase, states would inspect at a 20 percent rate to confirm the amount of equipment remaining following the reductions. On completion of the residual validation period, the declared site inspections would be conducted at a rate of 15 percent of each state's OOVs per year for the duration of the treaty, known as the residual period.

On-site Inspections

Article XIV of the CFE Treaty allowed each state to verify compliance with all provisions of the treaty by giving each the right to conduct inspections. The same article obligated the treaty states to accept on-site inspections. Under the CFE Treaty there were four types of on-site inspections: declared site inspections, challenge inspections, reduction inspections, and certification inspections. One purpose of these inspections was to ascertain if each state was observing the numerical limitations on TLE located in the treaty zones and the flanks. These inspections also monitored the reduction of TLE, the certification of recategorized attack helicopters, and the reclassification of combat-capable training aircraft. Each served a specific purpose, and the Protocol on Inspections outlined procedures for conducting each type of inspection.

The declared site inspection was a critical tool for confirming the accuracy of exchanged treaty data. In theory and in fact, on-site inspections contributed to national security across Europe.

Types of Inspections:

- *Declared Site*
- *Challenge*
- *Reduction*
- *Certification*

The status of each state's forces and equipment became transparent to other states through inspection team reports and observations. An inspected state could not refuse a declared site inspection. It was a legal obligation under the treaty. Over the life of the treaty, the hundreds, indeed thousands, of on-site inspections allowed each state to conclude that other states were fulfilling their legal obligations and complying with the treaty's requirements. This important conclusion could, when combined with other information, lead to a new level of trust and confidence across national borders. Allowing treaty inspectors on-site was one key to developing and maintaining successful relationships among the signatory nations.

Negotiators recognized that nations could not rely solely on the declared site inspections to monitor compliance with treaty procedures. Article XV addressed their right to use national technical means such as satellites or reconnaissance aircraft to monitor treaty compliance. That article also prohibited the concealment of equipment to circumvent reconnaissance efforts. Negotiators also realized that to maintain a spirit of openness and cooperation, nations would have to open all of their territory to inspections, not just the sites where they had declared conventional military equipment.

Challenge inspections allowed teams to inspect for the presence of TLE in areas other than declared sites.

Challenge inspections gave participating nations the right to inspect a specific and limited area other than declared sites in any signatory nation within the ATTU. This inspection right increased the likelihood of detecting weapons at sites not declared in the exchanged data. As in declared site inspections, quotas were applied to challenge inspections. Starting the day the treaty entered into force and continuing through the residual level validation period, challenge inspections operated within a quota. It was not more than 15 percent of a state's declared site inspection obligations. That quota increased to 23 percent over the subsequent life of the treaty. The procedures for challenge inspections were similar to those in declared site inspections, but there were differences.

In a challenge inspection, the inspection team provided a geographic description of the specified area, delineating the boundaries of the area it wanted to inspect. By comparison, in a declared site inspection, the inspected party declared its site and the treaty defined the site. A challenge inspection team, however, could request any location within a country, excluding declared sites. There was a limit to the size of the inspection area, namely, 65 square kilometers and no more than 16 kilometers between any two points within the area.



The major difference in a challenge inspection, however, was not area size, but the fact that the inspecting state could only request an inspection. The inspected state could refuse or accept the inspection within two hours after the inspection challenge was issued for a specified area. This was a critical right for any state in that it protected each state from inspection by another whose intent might not be associated with the CFE Treaty. An inspected state could refuse a challenge inspection request for reasons of safety or security. If the inspected state refused a challenge inspection request, however, it was obliged to assure the requesting state that there was no TLE in the specified area, a difficult task if reconnaissance photography indicated TLE present at that site. If the inspected state held TLE assigned to peacetime internal security forces within the specified area, it had to allow visual confirmation of the TLE present. Following a refusal, the inspection team could designate another challenge or declared site inspection. A refusal of the inspection did not reduce inspection quotas.

Surprise was a key element for both the declared site and challenge inspections. Treaty provisions dictated specific timelines for different actions during each inspection. As a consequence, an inspected state had very little time to move or reposition TLE. The treaty's Protocol on Inspection stipulated that an inspecting state had to provide only 36 hours' notice prior to an inspection team's arrival at the point of entry. After their arrival, the inspection team



Inspection teams moved quickly—within nine hours after declaring the site to be inspected.

Safety briefings were particularly important at sites with rough terrain, harsh climate, and aging facilities.



had from 1 to 16 hours to announce which declared site or specified area it intended to inspect. Following that announcement, the treaty required the inspected state to expeditiously transport the inspection team to the declared site. Nine hours was normally the maximum time to transport the inspection team to the site. In mountains or difficult terrain, the treaty permitted a 15-hour travel time to the site, but only 9 of those hours counted against the inspection team's time in country. Regardless of whether the permitted travel time was 9 or 15 hours, the treaty allowed the inspected state 6 hours to prepare the site for inspection.

Upon arrival at a declared site, the inspected state's escort team ushered the inspection team to a briefing facility, where escorts presented a site diagram to the inspection team. The site diagram showed the perimeter of the declared site, the boundaries of all OOVs on the site, major buildings and roadways, entrances to the declared site, and the location of an administrative area designated for the inspection team's use. Within 30 minutes of receiving the site diagram, the inspection team had to declare the OOV they would be inspecting.

Once the team chief announced the OOV for inspection, the inspected party gave a preinspection site briefing that "should" not last more than one hour. This briefing was important because it could, and often did, set the tone for the entire inspection. Included in this briefing was information on local safety and administrative procedures, communications and transportation systems, and holdings and locations of all CAEST on the site, including CAEST in any common areas. A common area was any area on the site that was not a part of an OOV, such as a parade ground, administrative facilities, equipment parking areas, and training areas. If the amount of TLE briefed varied from the most recent notification given by the inspected state, the inspected party was to

provide explanations for the differences. Explanations would include information on where the additional equipment came from, when it arrived, how long it would be there, and the location of any temporarily absent equipment. The time from notification to the beginning of the actual inspection could be as short as 44 hours: 36 hours' notification, 1 hour at the POE prior to the site declaration, 6 hours' minimum time to prepare the site, and the 1-hour preinspection briefing. For challenge inspections the timeline was similar, except that the inspected nation had two hours to decide if it would accept the inspection. In theory and in fact, these treaty-mandated timelines left very little time to move or conceal large quantities of military forces or equipment.

While the declared site and challenge inspections confirmed the presence or absence of TLE, the reduction inspection allowed states to monitor the reduction of TLE excess to the treaty limits. There were no quotas for reduction inspections because all reductions were open to inspection. There was no right of refusal. Each state scheduled and conducted its reductions in periods that lasted for at least 30 days, but no longer than 90 days. These announced calendar reporting periods were not accountable schedules; instead, they reflected the reduction goals of a state for that period. The notification of a calendar reporting period, given not less than



Russian team inspects severed main guns of American M-47 tanks at Buccino, Italy.

Europe. The United States, for instance, had nearly 325,000 U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel deployed throughout Europe in 1990. The Soviet Union had 17 army divisions and 363,700 military personnel stationed in East Germany and another 337,000 stationed on military bases in the other Central European countries. Under the CFE Treaty, nations that stationed conventional forces and equipment outside their own state, but within the ATTU, were considered "stationing states." Stationing state forces were subject to the provisions of the CFE Treaty and to inspection. The treaty recognized the sovereignty of a stationing state, authorizing it to escort CFE inspectors during an inspection of its forces. The treaty specifically required an inspecting state to notify the stationing state as well as the "host state" of an impending inspection. This notification gave the stationing state sufficient time to assemble and dispatch an escort team to the site, as a host state would if an inspection team had selected one of its declared sites for inspection. Under the CFE Treaty, the United States initially had 169 OOVs that were subject to declared site inspections.

A significant problem for the United States was that U.S. European forces, equipment, and facilities were located at more than 1,500 sites throughout Europe. Some of these sites contained sensitive or classified programs. Most of these programs were located on U.S. military sites, but a number had been placed on military bases or sites owned by the host state. Under early drafts of the treaty's inspection protocol, all U.S. stationed forces and facilities were subject to inspection. Here was a serious issue for the United States. In treaty negotiations, the United States supported the inclusion of a comprehensive, intrusive, on-site inspec-



Sergeant First Class Gilbert Sierra, Jr., and David Carter document the reduction of A CVs.

tion regime for monitoring the treaty, but at the same time it recognized that it had to protect classified programs and facilities critical to combat readiness and military operations of the U.S. forces in Europe. To resolve this dilemma, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed a thorough review in early 1990. Out of that intensive evaluation, key American officials concluded that the existing, tabled inspection protocol had to be modified.³⁶

In early March 1990, the United States introduced a new NATO-endorsed inspection protocol. It provided procedures to deal with sensitive points, authorized the shrouding of non-TLE items, and inserted a two-meter access *rule*. This rule preserved the treaty right of the inspection team to observe, count, and record the CFE Treaty's TLE-tanks, artillery, APCs, fighters, and attack helicopters-without entering and inspecting every building, barracks, container, and shrouded object. Doors to buildings could be opened for visual inspection, but inspectors could enter only when the doors exceeded two meters. The two-meter rule also came into play when dealing with shrouded sensitive items or containers. If none of the width, length, height, or diameter measurements of a shrouded item or container *exceeded* two meters, the inspectors had no right to access because there was no TLE that measured less than two meters. These changes were discussed and approved by the treaty negotiators in the spring and summer months of 1990. They were incorporated into the final CFE Treaty's inspection protocol.³⁷



Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, and Major Henry T. Storey discuss the inspection with Russian escorts under a canopy of tank barrels in Maykop, Russia.

Another critical concept, the right of the inspected party to declare a "sensitive point," was part of the final treaty. Under this concept an inspected state could declare equipment, locations, or structures sensitive to its security. This declaration allowed the inspected state to delay, limit, or deny inspectors access to or overflight of the sensitive point. An inspected state could also shroud a sensitive piece of equipment while still providing an inspection team access to a facility. Although a state could declare a sensitive point, it also had to declare whether the sensitive point contained any TLE. If TLE was present, the escort team had to either display the equipment or take steps to satisfy the inspection team that only the declared amount and type of TLE was present.¹⁸

A third, significant concept developed in the final stages of negotiations. As explained previously, the United States had military units and equipment that were not subject to the treaty but were located on host states' military bases and facilities. The United States wanted its trained, treaty-knowledgeable escort officers to be present at inspections in host states to protect American rights and interests. In addition, the United States had other forces and facilities that were not on a declared site of any state but that were still vulnerable to being inspected during challenge



The CFE Treaty required nations to reduce their massive holdings of TLE across Europe.

inspections of a host state area. Protecting U.S. rights in these situations was a major concern for the U.S. government. In the last few weeks of treaty negotiations, U.S. representatives developed a new provision that allowed for a liaison officer.

This concept required the stationing state party, prior to an inspection, to designate a liaison officer to *serve* on the host state's escort team. Liaison officers *were to be* available to represent their government during an inspection in case the inspection team came upon any of the stationing state's forces or facilities. Because the treaty protocols provided little guidance on how to carry out this liaison function, the United States negotiated bilateral agreements with the host states, outlining procedures for U.S. liaison and host escort officers during CFE Treaty inspections. These bilateral agreements varied from nation to nation, ranging from extensive interaction in Germany to minimal contact in other states. To reinforce the liaison officer provision, the treaty stipulated that a representative of a stationing state must be present for an inspection of any of its forces or facilities.

NOTES

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 33. Hopmann, "From MBFR to CFE," p. 981; *Arms Control Reporter 1990*, p. 407.B.412.
 34. For the specific parts of the treaty, see "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)," Appendix A.
 35. Sharp, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe" (1991), p. 426.
 36. Interview with Mary Margaret Evans, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Control and Compliance, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., December 8, 1993, and February 21, 1996; and Interview, Hansen.
 37. Interview, Hansen.
 38. Interview, Evans, February 21, 1996.

Chapter 2

INITIAL PREPARATIONS: UNITED STATES AND THE NATO NATIONS



Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney speaking at NATO Headquarters following the first meeting of NATO and former Warsaw Pact delegations in April 1992.

On May 29, 1990, President Bush signed National Security Directive 41, instructing the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to prepare to conduct on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty.¹ Simultaneously, the President expanded OSIA's mission by directing it to recruit, train, and plan for conducting on-site inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, and the Nuclear Testing Treaties. On-site inspection was a common element in monitoring and verifying compliance with these new arms control treaties. In December 1987 President Reagan had signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which laid the groundwork for future arms control agreements. "Trust but Verify," Reagan's oft-repeated phrase for characterizing American attitudes toward arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, remained a powerful policy objective throughout all treaty negotiations in the early 1990s.²

Ratification and entry into force of these treaties would allow the United States and other signatories to conduct on-site inspections at military and industrial sites in as many as 160 nations. Hundreds of different weapon systems and thousands of individual weapons would be subject to inspection. With inspection rights came escort responsibilities. Under all the treaties, the U.S. government assumed an obligation to escort foreign inspection teams at U.S. sites and facilities. Inspectors and escorts with expertise on these divergent treaties and their weapon systems would be drawn from many different fields: conventional arms, strategic nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and underground nuclear testing. In addition, the demand for linguists would increase in response to new treaty requirements. The On-Site Inspection Agency would expand significantly to fulfill the United States' obligations under these treaties.³

In fact, the expansion began in 1990. President Bush signed three major arms control agreements: new protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) with the USSR on June 1, 1990; a new agreement on the Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons with the USSR, also on June 1, 1990; and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) with 20 European nations and Canada on November 19, 1990.⁴ On-site inspection, a key element in each of these agreements, provided critical information for verifying that other nations were complying with their treaty obligations. For the U.S. government, the determination of treaty compliance rested with the president. In 1990, President Bush stated his administration's policy in his annual arms control report to the U.S. Congress⁵:

"Without exception, the United States expects meticulous fulfillment of all existing and future arms control agreements, and all obligations that they entail. I am committed to ensuring that there is scrupulous compliance with all arms control agreements and related undertakings. We cannot and will not accept any lesser standard. Put simply, arms control commitments must be precisely defined and scrupulously observed. Nothing less will do."



The On-Site Inspection Agency prepared to implement several other treaties and agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

DEFINING CFE TREATY ROLES AND MISSIONS

In accordance with precedents established in implementing the INF Treaty, the On-Site Inspection Agency had a strictly operational role in implementing the CFE Treaty. President Bush, in National Security Directive 41, directed Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, Director of OSIA, to prepare to conduct on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty. In that same May 1990 directive, the presi-

dent stipulated that the secretary of defense would be responsible for ensuring that the U.S. government was in compliance with all CFE Treaty provisions.⁶ After considerable debate within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services, General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in April 1991 that the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) be designated the Department of Defense's (DoD) executive agent for treaty implementation. On June 14, 1991, Secretary Cheney gave General John R. Galvin, USA, USCINCEUR, authority to task all DoD forces and organizations within the CFE Treaty's area of application.⁷ Responsibilities of the executive agent included developing procedures to monitor the status of U.S. forces and equipment subject to the treaty and reporting periodically on that status to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the executive agent was to ensure that all U.S. forces developed and carried out plans to receive foreign on-site inspectors. The plans had to incorporate provisions to protect sensitive points and special access programs. General Galvin and the USCINCEUR staff would supervise the transfer of U.S. treaty-limited equipment (TLE) to allied nations under the NATO Harmonization Plan. Finally, he was responsible for any treaty-required reduction of U.S. equipment.

General Galvin directed treaty implementation through the U.S. European Command and three subordinate commands: U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR). For U.S. forces and facilities stationed in the Azores and in Iceland, which were subject to the CFE Treaty but were not under USCINCEUR's command, the U.S. Atlantic Command issued directives ordering them to comply with the secretary of defense's memorandum. To define the roles, missions, and responsibilities required to implement the CFE Treaty, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and OSIA developed a joint Memorandum of Understanding.⁸

Essentially, this key memorandum delineated the responsibilities for training, logistics, and inspection operations. It tasked American land, air, and naval forces within the treaty's area of application to plan and train to receive on-site inspections by Eastern group inspection teams. The memorandum also defined the type of logistical support U.S. military units and site commanders would provide for the inspection teams, specifically, security, ground transportation, emergency medical care, medical evacuation, and administrative work areas. Site commanders were to provide meals and accommodations, if available on the installation, for the inspection and escort teams. If this was not possible, then that responsibility fell to OSIA. U.S. site commanders were to facilitate the inspection process by having their equipment and facilities ready for the foreign inspection teams, and by providing



General John R. Galvin, U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe.



helicopter overflights when required. They would also designate sensitive sites to the OSIA personnel escorting the on-site inspection teams.

Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding required that OSIA assist military commanders in training site personnel and evaluating their site preparations. The memorandum explicitly stated that the OSIA escort team chief represented the U.S. government in all treaty-related matters during inspections. A related provision required that OSIA provide liaison officers to meet arriving inspection teams at the designated points of entry and during the inspection to maintain continuous communications with the U.S. European Command. Finally, the memorandum stipulated that the U.S. Atlantic Command would provide the necessary logistical and operational support for U.S. military facilities subject to inspection in Iceland and the Azores.⁹

Several aspects of this memorandum were contentious. For example, the U.S. Army Europe's position on feeding and housing inspection teams was that their units would be hard pressed to support the requirement. Most U.S. Army units in Europe, they maintained, did not have adequate facilities to house inspection and escort teams. Feeding the teams would be difficult, unless they ate during regular meal hours in the dining hall. Since the chief of the inspection team set the schedule for the conduct of the inspection, teams often took their meals very late, after dark, or very early, before first light. Therefore, General Crosbie E. Saint, USA, USAREUR Commander-in-Chief, recommended that OSIA be responsible for providing housing and food for the inspection and escort teams. The new director of OSIA, Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, countered that the agency had no housing or messing facilities, and that the U.S. Army personnel at each site knew the surrounding area better than did OSIA escort or liaison teams.¹⁰

It took many months to resolve this dispute of defining responsibilities for the support mission. While USAREUR and OSIA ironed out these support issues, the first order of business for OSIA was to evaluate the inspection/escort mission: just how many people, teams, and support personnel would it take to conduct and escort on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty?

OSIA III THE CFE TREATY MISSION

To implement the INF Treaty, OSIA set up a small field office in 1988 at Rhein-Main Air Base in Frankfurt, Germany. This office became the gateway for U.S. teams conducting on-site inspections of Soviet INF missile sites located in the western USSR. Inspection teams originated in Washington, D.C., flew to Germany where they received inspection equipment and briefings, and then proceeded to Moscow, the point of entry for INF Treaty inspec-

*Lt Colonel Joseph J. Drach, fl.;
and Sergeant Bill Robinson
preparing for a helicopter flight
over a Ukrainian declared site.*



tions. On completion of their inspection missions, the American teams returned to Germany, turned in their inspection equipment, and flew back to the United States. The personnel assigned to OSIA's Rhein-Main office also escorted Soviet teams inspecting U.S. I F missile sites in Europe. From 1988 through 1991, this small office assisted in more than 200 INF Treaty inspection and escort missions. With the CFE Treaty, OSIA's Field Office, Europe assumed a far larger and more significant role.¹¹

All CFE Treaty inspection, escort, and liaison operations would originate from this field office. It would also manage all gateway activities in support of the INF Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Three experienced senior officers, Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Chief of the Field Office, Europe; Lt. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA; and Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, USA, former INF inspection team chiefs and current headquarters planners, began in the spring of 1990 to examine treaty requirements to determine manpower needs. In May 1990, 20 people were assigned to OSIA's European Operations Command, to support the INF Treaty mission. This number would increase to more than 127 by July 1992, when the CFE Treaty entered into force. Initially, projections for this sixfold increase had been much greater. In January 1990, a key headquarters planner, Commander Edward J. Higgins, USN, had projected that the agency would need 159 people in Frankfurt and 49 in

¹¹The European component of the On-Site Inspection Agency underwent several redesignations over the years. In 1988, OSIA's detachment at Rhein-Main Air Base was called the Field Office, Europe. On December 1, 1990, it was made a stand-alone directorate and redesignated as OSIA-Europe. On 9 March 1992, another reorganization of OSIA gave this directorate status as a command, and it was renamed the European Operations Command. Throughout this history, the designation of European Operations Command will be used.

European Operations Command carried out OSIA's INF escort

responsibilities.



Washington to carry out its CFE Treaty responsibilities. Higgins had estimated that OSIA's European Operations Command would need 81 inspectors, 51 escorts, and 27 logistics, administrative, and operations center personnel. Senior DoD policy and acquisition committees reviewed and approved OSIA's manpower projections.¹²

Later, some of Commander Higgins's assumptions proved to be incorrect. This was understandable, since they had been formulated in January 1990, nearly 10 months before the treaty was signed and two-and-a-half years before it entered into force. One assumption concerned the size of inspection teams. The INF



Dual-qualified OSIA teams-Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an escort team in Germany.

Treaty provided an early planning model for a 10-person team; negotiators for the CFE Treaty, however, agreed to a maximum of only 9 inspectors per team. This treaty change lowered manning projections. Another change came when Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, OSIA European Operations Command's new Chief of Operations, redefined what constituted a "qualified" inspection team. Under the INF Treaty, teams qualified either as escorts or inspectors, and during treaty operations they operated exclusively in that role. Under the CFE Treaty, Kelley directed that all OSIA CFE Treaty teams would be dual qualified: capable of conducting both inspections and escorts. This redefinition further reduced the manning projections for the number of OSIA CFE Treaty teams, inspectors, and escorts.¹³

There were other changes as well. Perhaps the most decisive change came in the projected number of CFE Treaty baseline inspections that the U.S. would conduct. American planners anticipated that the level of inspection activity would be at its zenith during baseline, the treaty's first 120 days. This assumption was decisive in determining manning authorizations. Two factors affected all U.S. projections for baseline inspections: the number of inspections to be conducted by the NATO states, and the United States' portion of the NATO inspections.

During October-November 1990, the number of inspections to be conducted by the NATO states decreased significantly from previous projections. Two events contributed: Germany's unification in October 1990, and the Soviet Union's first official treaty



Dual-qualified OSIA teams-Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an inspection team in Romania.

data exchange. In the first event, East Germany's CFE Treaty sites—the designated military bases, depots, and installations—became German sites. NATO allies had agreed that there would be no inspections within the alliance. Further, the NATO states agreed that following unification, only Germany would inspect Soviet forces still stationed on the territory of the former East Germany.¹⁴

Second, there was a decrease in the total of Soviet CFE Treaty objects of verification (OOVs). At treaty signature, the Soviet Union exchanged data that indicated one-third fewer OOVs subject to inspection than their senior representatives had disclosed during treaty negotiations.¹⁵ This was a major surprise for the NATO states despite the fact that in the two months before treaty signature, satellite reconnaissance had revealed that the Soviet Army was moving thousands of pieces of equipment out of Central Europe to areas east of the Ural Mountains.¹⁶ Since the treaty was not yet signed, these large-scale redeployments were legal, but they raised questions of treaty circumvention. In addition to having substantially fewer forces and equipment in the treaty zones and flanks, the Soviet High Command had reassigned some forces to naval infantry and coastal defense units. The Soviets interpreted the treaty as not applicable to naval forces, including naval infantry. The Soviet position followed that there was no obligation to report naval forces as inspectable units under the CFE Treaty. Treaty experts would wrestle over these Soviet issues for months following treaty signature.¹⁷ In fact, these issues became so contentious that they delayed ratification. The more immediate issue for OSIA, however, was how to revise manning projections. In order to identify, train, and relocate people to Europe, it was vital to know how many inspectors, escorts, and support personnel would be needed. Clearly, the number of inspections available to the NATO states had decreased; but so too had the United States' proportion of those inspections.¹⁸

NATO states agreed that there would be no inspections within the alliance.



The treaty did not address the allocation of inspection quotas within each group of states—that process rested with each group. Under the CFE Treaty, each Eastern group state was subject to a specific number of inspections per treaty period.¹⁹ The allocation of inspections among the NATO allies was a give-and-take process. A Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) handled this allocation process at Headquarters NATO. The VCC was a new organization, established in 1990 specifically to coordinate the alliance's implementation of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document.¹⁹ Initial U.S. planning had American inspection teams conducting at least 20 percent, and perhaps as many as 50 percent, of

¹⁹Under the CFE Treaty, there were four treaty periods: baseline, reduction, residual level validation, and residual.

all the CFE baseline inspections available to the NATO states. This estimate proved too high because most of the other NATO nations asserted their treaty rights to conduct CFE inspections. After considerable internal discussion among the NATO nations and within NATO's VCC and its staff to determine a fair share of the inspections, the committee allotted the United States 18 percent of NATO's active inspection quota for the CFE baseline period.²⁰ As a consequence of the decrease in the total number of inspections to be conducted by the NATO states and the decrease in the United States' portion of NATO's baseline inspection quota, the United States reduced its projections for conducting inspections from an estimated 60-150 to approximately 44-45 inspections. This new figure proved to be quite accurate.²¹

As discussed in the next chapter, Ratification Delayed, the Soviet movement of TLE east of the Urals and its reassignment of forces to the naval infantry seriously threatened treaty ratification and entry into force. Resolution of these issues required seven months of negotiation before a political-military-diplomatic solution emerged that addressed the other parties' apprehensions. In the interim, OSIA's European Operations Command had to redefine its manpower requirements based on the projected figure of 44-45 baseline inspections. Ultimately, the command was authorized 112 people to conduct the CFE Treaty's baseline period. This authorization specified 15 team chiefs and deputies, 18 linguists, 14 weapons specialists, and 65 other personnel responsible for planning, communications, logistics, transportation, command and control, and administration. From this number, the United States would man, equip, and train seven complete CFE Treaty inspection teams and one partial team.²²



The VCC coordinated the NATO alliance's implementation of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document.

THE EUROPEAN COE

Massive Military Force Withdrawals

Two events profoundly changed the military context of the European continent as preparations for implementing the CFE Treaty were under way: the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Central European Communist governments. In response to these events, Soviet leaders accelerated the massive withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central Europe. On October 1, 1990, the Soviet Union had 17 divisions (363,700 military personnel) stationed in East Germany. Organized into five armies, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) was the largest military force outside the USSR. The Soviets withdrew all of these armies, along with another 337,000 Soviet military personnel stationed in the Central European and Baltic nations, over a five-year period, 1989-94.²³ President Bush, in turn, ordered substan-

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

1990-6,700

1994-0



The deployment of thousands of pieces of equipment to the Persian Gulf coincided with the inactivation of U.S. units in Europe.

tial withdrawals of U.S. military forces stationed in Western Europe. In 1990 the U.S. Army Europe had 217,000 military personnel; three years later, it had 92,200.²⁴

Simultaneous with this American withdrawal, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force deployed a substantial number of their European combat units to the Persian Gulf in late 1990 in support of the Gulf War deployment, Desert Shield. Following the decisive coalition victory over Iraq in February 1991, many of these American units did not return to Europe but were sent to garrisons and training bases in the United States. Thus, the combination of the Soviet Union's massive force withdrawal and the United States' military redeployments, coupled with the sudden transfer of personnel and materiel to the Gulf, caused massive troop movements across the length and breadth of the European continent during 20 months of the CFE Treaty preparations.

General Crosbie E. Saint, Commander-in-Chief, USA REUR, said that in 1992, his command was "averaging 500 soldiers a day leaving Europe."²¹ In 1991-92, General Saint inactivated or rotated back to the States 125 army battalions. Compared with 1990 strengths, these battalion reductions were striking: in infantry (54%), armor (62%), armored cavalry (50%), field artillery (71%), and

U.S. Army Europe:
/ 1990-2 17,000()
/ 1993-92,200

air defense artillery (48%). USAREUR inactivated so many of its sites that the United States returned 157 installations, mostly in Germany, to their European host nations. Commanding and managing this American withdrawal was a time-consuming effort that demanded detailed planning. At one point, General Saint compared a battalion leaving a German caserne to painting a floor in a house. "You have to start at the far end and paint yourself out the door. But the 'whole system' does not stop until you are out the door."²⁶ Complicating this extraction process was the American military's practice of announcing and quickly enforcing field grade officer retirements, and accepting voluntary separations from all ranks with alacrity. At the same time, General Saint demanded that the traditional American standards of combat readiness be maintained. In 1992 he had every USAREUR infantry, armor, attack helicopter, engineer, and air defense artillery battalion train in a force-on-force battle at the large range at Hohenfels, Germany. "Soldiers in Europe," Saint declared, "don't have time to sit around feeling sorry for themselves. They train; and when they're finished with that, they train some more."²⁷ The combination of USAREUR's maintaining combat readiness and managing the substantial force withdrawal meant that the CFE Treaty preparations, especially the mock inspections at U.S. Army installations, could become contentious. At OSIA's European Operations Command, the American commanders responsible for preparing inspection teams for implementing the CFE Treaty had to work with the U.S. Army and Air Force in Europe. Those American forces would be subject to CFE inspections; they needed training to be ready. Tensions developed, especially during 1991-92 when CFE Treaty training was most intense and when the U.S. military force reductions were at full flood.²⁸



Thousands of American forces in Europe deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield. Most did not return to Europe after the Gulf War.

New National Verification

Even before the CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990, some European nations had begun to establish their treaty verification agencies. Two of the largest CFE Treaty nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, already had established professional military inspection agencies. The INF Treaty's extensive on-site inspection provisions had caused both nations to act; the United States set up the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the USSR established the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. INF Treaty inspections began in July 1988, and the U.S. and USSR agencies had conducted more than 400 on-site inspections by the time the CFE Treaty was signed. The agencies had recruited, trained, tested, equipped, and deployed hundreds of inspectors and dozens of teams. They had accumulated experience that was directly transferable to implementing the CFE Treaty.



Seal of the German verification agency, Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZV BW).

Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Canada, Luxembourg, and the other CFE Treaty signatories had had only limited experience with on-site inspections. The Stockholm Document of 1986, a product of the Helsinki Process, was the earliest modern European agreement permitting on-site inspections of military units and sites. It contained provisions that would provide experience in some aspects of implementing an on-site inspection regime. The Stockholm Document mandated notification procedures for the United States, Canada, and each of the 33 European signatory states when they scheduled and conducted military activities involving at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks. Moreover, to confirm that the activities were nonthreatening, each state had the right to observe field military activities of another state when participating forces exceeded 17,000 ground troops or 5,000 airborne or amphibious troops. Across Europe, there were few such large-scale events. When an exercise occurred, however, a state would issue a simple declaration that "compliance was in doubt" and the state being inspected had to accept the inspection team. There was no right of refusal by the nation to be inspected. Each state, however, was liable for only three inspections per year of its field exercises, and no nation could inspect another twice in the same year. Thus, the opportunities for inspections were infrequent.²⁹

By any measure, the number of people required to implement the inspection rights and requirements of the Stockholm Document of 1986 was minimal. In fact, the number was so small that no European nation saw fit to establish a full-time treaty verification center to carry out those provisions. The Stockholm Document signatories assigned the inspection missions to a section of their military staffs at national military headquarters. In contrast, the bilateral INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR contained on-site inspection rights that allowed more than 250

inspections in the first year alone. The CFE Treaty's inspection, escort, reduction, and data functions were so substantial that all of the European signatory states set up separate verification agencies or specific military staff offices. Their mission was to assist their military forces to comply with the treaty and to monitor other nations' compliance.

Among the NATO nations, Germany, France, and Great Britain elected to establish separate treaty verification agencies. Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loquai, Director of the Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) (Federal Armed Forces Verification Center), said that Germany's decision-making process began in 1989, with the new center being established in October 1990. "The main reason," he explained, "for the establishment of the center was Germany's foreseeable workload in the area of the CFE Treaty. Germany had more CFE sites than did the Soviet Union."³⁰ The mission of the new German verification center was to inspect, escort, and monitor all activities under the CFE Treaty. It also had responsibility for inspections under the Vienna Document 1990, which substantially broadened the scope of inspection activities of the earlier Stockholm Document agreement. In the fall of 1990, the ZVBW had 65 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs); two years later it had 400.³¹

The French government established its treaty verification unit, L'Unité Française de Vérification (UFV), in September 1990 at the Creil Air Station, 65 kilometers north of Paris. The new French unit consisted of an inspection and escort staff of approximately 100 officers and NCOs drawn from all the military services, army, navy, and air force. The mission of this new unit, led by Brigadier General Jean-Paul Huet, was to implement the CFE



Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loquai, ZVBW Director welcomes Major General Robert Parker, Director, OS/A, to the ZVBW

Treaty and the Vienna Document 1990. According to Colonel Francois Rozec, the UFV's second commandant, "The Arms Control Division of the General Staff in Paris and their political equivalents, it is their concern to inform our [political] authorities on all aspects of verification. We are strictly implementers."³²

Great Britain's experience with inspections under international arms control agreements prior to the CFE Treaty was similar to Germany's. For the Stockholm Document of 1986, the British Ministry of Defense assigned the mission to a small cadre of military officers and NCOs, principally people with experience in the British Military Liaison Mission in Berlin. This small staff carried out both inspecting and escorting missions. In August 1990, the British Ministry of Defense established the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG), under the leadership of Colonel Roy Giles, at RAF Scampton in Lincolnshire. Its mission was to carry out the United Kingdom's commitments and entitlements under the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1990. Initially, the new group's manpower strength was 120 officers, NCOs, and civilians; after review it decreased to slightly less than 100. It was a four-service group, with Royal Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force personnel.³³

Among the other NATO nations, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy chose a different organizational concept when they set up their units to implement the CFE Treaty. They used a cadre model of organization. This meant that the national military command, usually the ministry of defense, authorized the establishment of a small unit responsible for implementing the treaty, usually composed of 20-30 military officers. Organized at the level just below the senior military headquarters, this unit's mission was to recruit, train, conduct inspection and escort missions, transmit treaty data, and monitor reductions mandated by the treaty. The Belgian verification agency, L'Unite Beige de Verification (UBV), located in Brussels, was typical. Its mission was to lead all CFE Treaty inspection teams and to participate as inspectors on the team. For the escort mission, the Belgian agency had complete responsibility for the logistics, preparations, and presentation of the sites and units to be inspected by the Eastern states' CFE Treaty inspection teams. They also had responsibility for collecting all treaty-mandated data on the Belgian armed forces and for transmitting that data to all other CFE Treaty signatory nations. During CFE inspection and escort operations, personnel from the military forces augmented the staff of the Belgian verification agency. These military officers and NCOs had studied the treaty in special courses led by the agency's senior officers. In most cases, especially during escort missions, the bulk of the Belgian team consisted of augmentees from its military forces.³⁴



Colonel Roy Giles, head of the United Kingdom's verification agency, Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG).



Major General Joseph DiMaria, Director of Italy's verification agency, Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi (CIVA).

Italy had a similar organizational structure. The Director, Major General Joseph DiMaria, of the Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi (CIVA), explained that initially a cadre of approximately 250 personnel went through training on the CFE Treaty.³⁵ Once they had completed the course, they returned to their military units, and were available for inspection duty as needed. According to General DiMaria, "They come and they stay a couple of days in the agency; they have a refresher course, some particular training, or some special training for the target." The Italian agency, he reported, kept one team on duty 24 hours a day "in case Italy is notified a CFE Treaty inspection team is arriving."

The Netherlands had a small arms control treaty coordination section in the Ministry of Defense at The Hague.¹⁶ The Dutch military forces carried out the bulk of Holland's CFE Treaty inspection and escort activities. The Dutch Army had approximately 80 officers and NCOs trained as CFE inspectors, the Dutch Air Force 35, and the Dutch Navy 1. The actual size of the Netherlands' professional staff committed to implementing the CFE Treaty was much smaller, with the Dutch Army providing 10-12 personnel, the Air Force 4-5, and the Navy 1. According to Navy Commander C.N.M. Wierema, Ministry of Defense Coordinator, the Netherlands set up a "decentralized organization," with the "bulk of the work done in the arms control sections of the forces."

In general, the NATO nations established their CFE Treaty verification organizations along two lines. Nations with the largest military forces and the most sites subject to inspection—the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain—set up separate verification agencies. Led by senior military officers and staffed with

career officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians, these agencies ranged in size from 100 to 400 personnel, depending on the number of treaties and ancillary functions assigned to them. NATO nations with smaller military forces and fewer sites included in the treaty, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, adopted a cadre model. Led by a senior colonel or general officer, these verification units were considerably smaller and relied on augmentees drawn from the military forces for inspection and escort responsibilities. In general, these national verification agencies and staffs had six basic functions: force data presentation, communication, inspection, escort, treaty training for national military forces, and coordination among the other verification agencies.

NATO

During CFE Treaty negotiations, the NATO alliance had been deeply involved in every aspect of developing the treaty's text, protocols, and annexes. Yet in the final document neither NATO nor the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) were identified as alliances in the formal treaty provisions. Instead, the treaty dealt with two "groups of states," and each state was responsible for properly implementing the treaty. However, NATO constituted an experienced, bureaucratic organization for its group of states to develop group objectives and negotiating positions, and to coordinate treaty planning efforts. During treaty negotiations, NATO's

NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee

Under the CFE Treaty, the execution of all treaty rights and obligations is reserved to the signatory nations. However, during negotiations the NATO states had worked closely together; and during implementation they continued this cooperation, agreeing to work through NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC).

This VCC is a joint political-military coordinating organization with two representatives from each of the 16 NATO nations. It meets at HQ NATO, usually in monthly sessions. A small professional staff, the Verification and Implementation Coordination Section (VICS) facilitates the work of the larger committee. For most meetings, the head of the professional staff chairs the VCC sessions. All actions are taken by consensus.

The VCC has several important functions. For the NATO Alliance it apportions the CFE Treaty inspection quotas to the 16 member states. It coordinates the CFE Treaty declared site inspections to ensure compliance with treaty protocols and to ensure maximum coverage. The VCC establishes and maintains a common treaty database for the NATO nations. It also assists the

NATO states in collating and assessing the treaty data concerning treaty compliance. In the area of training, the VCC supports formal NATO CFE Treaty courses to ensure a "common approach" to implementation. Finally, the VCC has responsibility to exchange, among the signatory states, "information" on verification matters.

High Level Task Force (HLTF) at Brussels had served as an important coordinating body for screening and approving proposals for discussion in the formal sessions in Vienna.¹⁷ Collectively, the NATO nations would be reducing more than 12,900 TLE items under the CFE Treaty, and they would have a total of 2,447 OOVs subject to inspection throughout the alliance. Clearly, after treaty signature, NATO as an organization would continue its strong commitment to the CFE Treaty throughout implementation.

In fact, six months before the treaty was signed in Paris, NATO established the Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) in Brussels in May 1990. Its purpose was to coordinate the implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements among the 16-nation alliance. General John R. Galvin, USA, USCINCEUR, was instrumental in encouraging Headquarters NATO to establish this important committee. General Galvin insisted that NATO had a central role in treaty implementation, specifically in coordination, training, and scheduling. NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Gebhardt von Moltke, became the VCC's permanent chairman. The committee set up a small professional staff for its Verification Coordination Implementation Section. Led by Leo Verbruggen, a retired navy captain from the Netherlands, this professional staff became an important element in carrying out the CFE Treaty.³⁸

Just what did the VCC do? Much of the work in the first 18 months consisted of examining the CFE Treaty's bloc-to-bloc quotas for declared site inspections and establishing a schedule of inspections among NATO's 16 states. In addition, it developed an approach to scheduling reduction inspections of the Eastern states. Aided by initiatives from the member states, in 1991 the VCC developed a plan for "deconflicting" the schedule of national inspections. "Deconfliction" was vital because the treaty limited each state's inspection obligations in several ways. The treaty limited a nation's inspection liability during any treaty period. It also limited simultaneous inspections in a nation or specific military district to two, as well as allowing no more than one inspection team on-site at any time.

To comply with these restrictions and yet permit NATO nations to conduct all inspections available to them, the VCC evaluated a deconfliction schedule concept in December 1990. Authored by Colonel John C. Reppert, USA, OSIA, this concept called for a matrix system that had the six Eastern nations and the Soviet Union's military districts with inspectable sites along one axis. The other axis had three-day increments for conducting the actual inspections. Working with the number of inspections allowed, each NATO nation under this system would "sign up" to conduct an inspection during a particular three-day block of time against a particular state. Next, the VCC staff would compare the

exhibition inspections. But its principal activity, beginning in late summer 1990, was to organize, prepare, train, and be ready to conduct inspections and escorts under the CFE Treaty.

Both Colonel Grosick and Colonel Kelley had considerable experience in commanding, planning, and developing military units.⁴⁰ Grosick was a command pilot with over 3,100 flying hours. A graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, he held an advanced degree from Indiana University. He had served in operational and staff jobs in the Strategic Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Headquarters USAF. Just prior to commanding OSIA's European Operations Command, Colonel Grosick had served as Deputy Commander for Operations of the 42d Bombardment Wing, a B-52 and KC-135 wing located at Loring AFB, Maine. Colonel Kelley was a Princeton University graduate who had studied at Leningrad State University, the U.S. Army Russian Institute, and Georgetown University (master of arts). In Vietnam, Kelley was a Marine attack pilot, flight instructor, infantry company commander, and battalion air liaison officer. A Russian foreign area officer (FAO), who spoke German as well, he served as a presidential translator on the Washington-Moscow Hot Line. In 1983 he went to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in Potsdam, German Democratic Republic, as the naval representative and later as deputy to the Chief of the Mission, General Lajoie. Early in 1988, Lt. Colonel Kelley came to OSIA as an INF inspection team chief, leading 15 inspection missions in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Following a two-year stint as a senior instructor at the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany, he returned to OSIA as General Lajoie's choice to be OSIA European Operation Command's Chief of Operations.

The two officers brought different strengths and personalities to the operation. At Rhein-Main Air Base, Colonel Grosick used his Air Force experience to address issues of personnel, transportation, office space, communications, housing, and facilities. The command would expand sixfold in less than two years; that growth required attention to all manner of personnel and organizational details. At the same time, Colonel Kelley focused on defining the CFE Treaty's operational mission. He drew upon his experience as an INF Treaty inspection team chief, his knowledge of NATO and the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, and his extensive study of Soviet military forces. The personalities of these two colonels were quite different. Grosick was a tall, robust, gregarious aviator experienced in handling the details of an active operational field command. Kelley was a lean, ascetic, ramrod Marine who had an exceptionally clear concept of the CFE Treaty, the NATO alliance, and the Soviet Union. In the early months, planning dominated. At Rhein-Main, there was more work than time, people, or resources; the division of leadership responsibilities worked well.



*Colonel Frederick E. Grosick,
Commander, OS/A European
Operations Command.*

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps, was the Chief of Operations, OSIA European Operations Command, from October 1990 through January 1995. He recruited, organized, planned, trained, and led OSIA's CFE Treaty on-site inspection operations.

When you came to the command, did you have an operational concept?

"Yes. I planned to replicate what we did in the INF Treaty. I planned to use integral teams, as we had during the baseline period for INF. The numbers changed somewhat, but I thought that the composition of the team would be similar. Over the first several months after I arrived at Frankfurt, the manning document was the center of our attention.

"For the team chiefs, I looked for the kind of personnel that we had at the beginning of the INF period and which we had and routinely looked for in U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM).

"The team chiefs would be, to use an analogy, the independent patrol leaders, with whom you'd have precious little contact once they deployed, and on whom you had to rely implicitly. You had to train them up as far as you could, give them adequate guidance, fill them full of treaty specifics, provide them the kind of surrogate wisdom that they might not otherwise have at the outset, give them 'what if' situations to death, force them to do all of the homework that this required, and then count on them to apply the tools of their trade to get the job done."

How did the command deal with the shifting planning assumptions?

"The primary reason why the treaty data changed was not because of German unification, but [because of] internal decisions made within the Soviet Union. Initially, as a round figure, the Soviets had said that their data would contain 1,500 objects of verification. That had been the estimate of U.S. authorities, and it was confirmed as a working figure by the Soviets during treaty negotiations. However, when the data were actually submitted, on 17 November 1990, there were only about 900 Soviet objects of verification.

"The result was that, although our manning document had been crafted for 16 teams, we were directed by OSIA's Chief of Staff to reduce man-


power. Ultimately we acquiesced, reducing it to eight teams, with some misgivings on my part because it took away any operational reserve that we had in the event that anything went wrong. But we did so, nonetheless."

What was your concept for inspector and team training?

"I expected them to learn the treaty as part of a treaty course, initially. But then would come a great deal of self-study and study in groups, such as with the team or in the Inspectors and Escorts branch.

"I made a conscious decision very early on to foster the team as the unit with which I wanted the inspectors to identify. Prior to their identification within the branch or even the unit as a whole, I wanted them to think of themselves first and foremost as a member of Team One, or Two, or Six, or Team Jones, or Team Kelley, or whatever it would be. That is where I wanted the allegiance to be initially. That is where I wanted the identification. That's where I wanted the standards to be set. That's where I anticipated that the key to training and success ultimately would come, as a matter of cohesiveness. Because of their internal training, because of knowing each other, backing each other up, bonding, and so forth, they would develop into a cohesive unit: a team. I think that was a very important operational concept that we started within the INF Treaty, and were successful in continuing throughout the INF Baseline Period, although OSIA later abandoned it for reasons of convenience.

"I have always been a very firm believer in unit cohesiveness. So I consciously set the teams up that way, and insisted that they work as units, think as units, act as units."



The first months, Kelley said, were largely spent working and reworking the manning document. This effort involved extensive coordination with senior treaty planners at Headquarters OSIA: Colonel John C. Reppert, USA; Lt. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA; and Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, USA. By December 1990 the manning document had gone through more than 25 versions. Following the Soviet Union's February 1991 decision to reclassify its CFE Treaty TLE, the manning document changed again in March 1991. Throughout the process, the focus of the numerous planning efforts was on the inspection team: just what was the right number of teams, the type of leadership, the degree of language competency, and the mixture of inspection skills. Another consideration was the availability of potential team members—when could they be identified and report to Europe for individual treaty training, team training, and full-scale mock inspections?⁴¹

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The American CFE Treaty Inspection Teams

A Treaty-specified limit of nine inspectors per team drove the design of all inspection teams. The U.S. teams consisted of inspectors who were professional military officers and noncommissioned officers; other U.S. augmentee inspectors were civilian specialists. The team chiefs would be, in Colonel Kelley's terms, "independent patrol leaders."⁴² Based on OSIA's experience with the INF Treaty inspections, General Lajoie and Colonel Kelley decided that the team chiefs would be experienced field grade officers. During an inspection, these officers and their teams would be traveling under escort to remote places in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and at times they would have to lead inspections in extremely severe weather conditions on the Eurasian continent. As Kelley saw it, the team leaders were officers "with whom you would have precious little contact once they deployed, and on whom you had to rely implicitly."⁴³ From the beginning, he wanted a specific type of officer: a U.S. Army or Marine Russian foreign area officer (FAO) or Air Force officers with similar skills, although the Air Force did not have a comparable program. FAOs were career military officers who had served in one of the combat branches and then had specialized in Russian language and Soviet military force structure. Highly trained and educated, Russian FAOs were in demand as attaches, arms control specialists, and plans/analysis staff officers. In fact, the demand for them was so great that they were not available for assignment to fill all the CFE team chief positions.

Consequently, Headquarters OSIA and its European Operations Command accepted a different composition of team chiefs: some Russian FAOs, some West European FAOs, and some line officers—artillery officers, aircraft commanders, or armor officers. The U.S. Army's European FAOs had similar education, training,


and experiences to the Russian FAOs, except that they had spent much of their career working with NATO armies, air forces, and staffs. The line officers had served nearly all of their Army or Air Force careers working with combat units in armor, infantry, artillery, or tactical aircraft. They knew U.S. military force structure, weapons, units, and personnel, specifically how the soldiers, marines, and airmen combined to make an operational unit. Equally important, they were experienced in serving in and evaluating operational military units. So it was from these three groups that the CFE team chiefs came. As for the deputies, Colonel Kelley and Colonel Grosick decided that the second officers would be field grade officers, ideally at the rank of major. Their backgrounds would complement those of the team chiefs, so that if one officer could not speak Russian, the other would.

How did these plans work out? Six of the eight team chiefs were lieutenant colonels. The eight deputy team chiefs, except for one captain and one warrant officer, were majors or major selectees. Noncommissioned officers filled the two team positions for treaty linguists. Trained as Russian linguists, these NCOs had served in the U.S. military with its high standards for noncommissioned officer leadership and training. They were professional soldiers. Two other inspection team members were also NCOs; they were weapons specialists who had direct experience with conventional armed forces in the European theater. Rounding out the nine-person inspection team were three specialists who were knowledgeable in Soviet and Central European military forces.⁴⁴

This purposeful mix of military skills and experiences among team members gave Colonel Kelley flexibility in assigning inspection teams to missions. Any American team could inspect either a Polish armor regiment or a Soviet tactical air unit because someone on the team had firsthand experience with armor and someone else had worked on or flown aircraft. The CFE Treaty's Protocol on Inspections allowed each inspection team to break into three subteams, and it was American policy to routinely use three subteams. The protocol, however, required each subteam to possess linguistic capability in the inspected country's language. Since every U.S. team had two linguists, either the team chief or deputy had to speak Russian to allow the team to break down into three subteams for greater operational coverage at an inspection site.

At treaty signature in November 1990, the best estimate for entry into force was April 1, 1991. To be ready to inspect and escort on that date, OSIA's European Operations had to have the team chiefs, deputies, linguists, and weapons specialists in place in Europe by January 1, 1991. This did not happen. Because of the Gulf War, the limited availability of FAOs, and the drawdown of American forces, the U.S. military personnel system could not provide qualified officers and COs rapidly for reassignment to

Military Experience



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U.S. inspectors were professionals in their fields.

Europe. Frustrated because the unit had to be ready regardless of the U.S. military's systemic problems, Colonel Kelley recalled that they "were totally unable to acquire personnel until, at the earliest, January 31, 1991," and even then the fill was only partial. This delay was serious: individual treaty training would be postponed, team training could not begin, and mock inspections evaluating the readiness of U.S. CFE sites in Western Europe could not be undertaken. Nominations came late, arrivals still later. Not until the summer of 1991 did six of the eight team chiefs arrive at Rhein-Main. Two of the deputy team leaders did not reach Germany until December 1991, 12 months behind initial expectations.⁴⁵

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There was an unforeseen development. No nation had ratified the CFE Treaty in time for the projected April 1991 entry into force date. In fact, the national ratification process was not completed at all in 1991; it was not until July 1992 that the treaty entered into force provisionally. This delay allowed time for five parallel developments.

First, it allowed time for the national ratification processes to conclude in 1991-92 in the congresses, parliaments, and governments of all the CFE Treaty signatory states. Next, it allowed time for intense diplomatic negotiations by the CFE Treaty states with the Soviet Union over two significant issues: the relocation and transfer of its TLE beyond the Ural Mountains, and the redesignation of forces as naval infantry. Because of those diplomatic discussions, the NATO nations delayed treaty ratification until the summer and fall of 1991. Third, it gave the Western and Eastern European national verification agencies, many of which



U.S. inspectors received experience during training in Czechoslovakia.

were newly established, time to develop leadership cadres, inspection teams, escort teams, communications systems and procedures, and operational plans for conducting on-site inspections and escorts. Fourth, there was time for the new verification agencies to conduct extensive practice, or mock, inspections with their own national military forces, with the military forces in their respective alliances, and in a few instances, with the military forces of nations in the opposing alliance. Finally, it allowed time for the consequences of the Soviet Union's demise to unfold. That epochal development resulted in the establishment of 15 successor nations and set in motion a series of political, military, diplomatic, and economic developments. Six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the successor states agreed in May 1992 at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to partition the former USSR's military forces and accept all of its CFE Treaty obligations.

These five developments profoundly influenced the CFE Treaty. Discussed in the next chapter, they demonstrated how the changing international order profoundly altered the mission of implementing a signed arms control treaty. The CFE Treaty was essentially a European arms reduction and conflict prevention treaty. When Europe changed profoundly in 1991-92, so too did the context for planning the treaty's implementation. There is a simple historical truth, known to every experienced verification agency director: "Every treaty has its own particular history." This was never more apparent than in 1991-92 with the ratification process and operational preparations for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

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2. For the attitude of the Reagan administration (1981-1988) regarding U.S.-USSR relations, arms control treaties, and verification, see Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era-The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991); and George P. Schultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993). For accounts of the Bush administration (1988-1992) see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, Mass.:

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 5. President George Bush, *The President's Report to Congress on Soviet Non-Compliance with Arms Control Agreements*, February 23, 1990.
 6. President George Bush, National Security Directive 41, *Organizing to Manage On-Site Inspections for Arms Control*, May 29, 1990. The impact of this directive on the agency was discussed by Gen. Parker, in his statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on March 21, 1991.
 7. General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "CFE Treaty Executive Agent," April 3, 1991; Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Services, "Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense for the CFE Treaty," June 14, 1991. Later, these directives were incorporated into the final instruction; see President George Bush, National Security Directive, *Organizing to Manage On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty*, February 11, 1992.
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13. Interview, Kelley.
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17. See this book, Chapter 3, Ratification Delayed.
18. P. Terrence Hopmann, "From MBFR to CFE, Negotiating Conventional Arms Control in Europe," in Richard Dean Burns, ed., *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, Vol. 11, pp. 983-984. For a good insight into the internal pressures on the senior officers responsible for mission readiness, see Interview, Kelley.
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24. President George Bush, "State of the Union Address, January 31, 1990," published in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991), pp. 18-21.
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Chapter 3

RATIFICATION DELAYED, EUROPE IN TURMOIL, SOVIET UNION IN REVOLUTION



East German guard on patrol hours before the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.

As Europe entered the 1990s, it was in turmoil. From 1989 to 1992—coinciding with the years of the CFE Treaty's negotiation, ratification, and entry into force—nations on the European continent were experiencing their greatest changes since the end of World War II. There was the unification of Germany; the "velvet" political revolutions casting out Communist systems in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; the bloody revolution in Romania; the continuous integration of the European Union; the recurrent economic and political crises in the Soviet Union presaging its collapse; the national independence movements in the former Soviet republics; and, running throughout, the large-scale military withdrawals from Central and Western Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States. Politically,

diplomatically, and militarily, the European continent was in the midst of revolutionary changes. It was in this context that ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty proceeded.

FROM TREATY SIGNATURE TO RATIFICATION

In constitutional governments, treaties require two acts for legitimacy: executive signature and legislative ratification. For the United States, President Bush signed the CFE Treaty in Paris on November 19, 1990. That same day, the leaders of 21 other NATO and Warsaw Pact nations signed the treaty. Ratification, however, took nearly two years. On October 30, 1992, just 20 days short of two full years, the final two states, Belarus and Kazakhstan, ratified the treaty and deposited their instruments of ratification at The Hague in the Netherlands. Why did it take so long?



U.S. ratification- December 26, 1991.

One CFE Treaty signatory state, the Soviet Union, was in such turmoil in 1991 and 1992 that its very existence was in question. When the USSR collapsed in late December 1991, its successor states had to form new governments, and those governments had to work out military and security relationships with Russia, the largest and most powerful of the former republics.

So great were the repercussions from the Soviet Union's internal difficulties that the CFE Treaty signatory states had to convene four separate extraordinary meetings to approve, authorize, and incorporate new statements, understandings, declarations, and agreements into the treaty regarding entitlements and obligations. In June 1991, the signatory states met at The Hague; in October 1991 they convened in Vienna; in June 1992 they met in Oslo; and, finally, in July 1992, they assembled just before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Helsinki. At each of these meetings, the diplomats took up specific treaty issues for the group to resolve before the individual states would proceed with ratification and implementation. *Every* issue was a consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse as an empire. Throughout these extraordinary meetings across Europe, the commitment of the European and North Atlantic states to the CFE Treaty as the "cornerstone of European security" proved to be remarkably strong and durable.

THE FIRST CRISIS: SURPRISES AT THE DATA EXCHANGE

The first, and most serious, issue arose at the time of the CSCE/CFE Treaty summit in November 1990. On November 18, one day before treaty signing, representatives from each of the

signatory states placed stacks of treaty-mandated data books on long rows of tables in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. The books listed detailed information on force structure, force size, military units and organizations, and military weapons in the five treaty categories of armaments: tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and combat aircraft. Shortly thereafter, state delegates moved from table to table scooping up copies of these invaluable military force data. U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator Lynn M. Hansen, who was in the Hofburg Palace that morning, characterized the exchange as having the "aura of a bazaar." He remembered military officers and specialists excited and buzzing at the opportunity to compare treaty declarations against current estimates.² Within days, however, the atmosphere changed for the worse as serious questions arose about the Soviet Union's force data (see table 3-1).³

It appeared to many of the state delegates in Vienna that the Soviet Union had underrepresented its treaty holdings by a significant degree. In July 1988, when all the states had presented their force data to the negotiating teams, the Soviet Union had given out one set of data. Now in November 1990, at treaty signature, it had presented a much different set of data. When compared, there were major discrepancies. U.S. officials reported to President Bush that the Soviet discrepancy was between 20,000 and 40,000 items: 6,000 to 11,000 tanks, 12,000 armored fighting vehicles, 12,000 artillery pieces, and 3,000 combat aircraft.⁴ This was a serious discrepancy, one that clearly threatened ratification. Was there a Soviet explanation?

In Vienna, Soviet diplomats explained that during the two years of treaty negotiations, 1989-90, the Soviet High Command had conducted a large-scale operation that withdrew thousands of military personnel, weapons, and units from Central and Eastern Europe. It was this military equipment, they asserted, that accounted for the difference.⁵ They explained that in one category alone, tanks, the Soviet Army had destroyed, exported, or converted more than 4,000 items since 1989. The Soviet military had sent another 8,000 tanks to motor rifle and other divisions stationed in Asia, or to military storage depots located beyond the Ural Mountains. In addition, they pointed out that the Soviet military had sent thousands of items from other treaty-limited equipment (TLE) categories—artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), and helicopters—to military depots and active units stationed beyond the Urals.⁶ The Ural Mountains were the CFE Treaty's easternmost boundary; military equipment located east of the Urals was not subject to any of the treaty's requirements. There would be no requirement for its inclusion in the initial data, for on-site inspection teams to count it, or for it to be reduced within a set period of time. Finally, the Soviet diplomats explained that since much of this equipment had been transferred from spe-



Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze detailed the movement of TLE east of the Urals.

Table 3-1. Declared National CFE Holdings in November 1990

Nation	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters
Warsaw Treaty Organization States					
USSR	20,694	13,828	29,348	6,445	1,330
Bulgaria	2,416	2,474	2,010	387	44
Czechoslovakia	3,035	3,485	4,359	369	56
Hungary	1,345	1,047	1,720	110	39
Poland	2,850	2,300	2,377	654	128
Romania	2,851	3,819	3,135	407	104
Total WTO	33,191	26,953	42,949	8,372	1,701
NATO States					
Belgium	359	376	1,282	191	0
Canada	77	38	277	45	12
Denmark	419	553	316	106	3
France	1,358	1,330	4,125	700	429
Germany	7,133	4,644	9,598	1,064	357
Greece	1,725	1,941	1,639	480	0
Italy	1,912	2,222	3,591	584	169
Netherlands	913	838	1,467	196	91
Norway	205	532	146	90	0
Portugal	146	334	259	96	0
Spain	854	1,373	1,259	252	28
Turkey	2,888	3,202	1,554	589	0
UK	1,198	636	3,193	842	368
USA	5,904	2,601	5,747	704	279
Total NATO	25,091	20,620	34,453	5,939	1,736

Source: *Arms Control Reporter* 1990, p.407, E-0.7.

cialized combat support units, those units no longer held any TLE.⁷ Those units, by the treaty's inspection protocols, would not be objects of verification (OOVs). As a result, the Soviet Union's OOVs dropped from approximately 1,500 to fewer than 1,000.

Further, the Soviet diplomats asserted that this information should not have come as a surprise. In early October, Soviet General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, had announced the specific details of many of these force movements at a Pentagon press conference in Washington, D.C. Just four weeks before the Vienna meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had sent a detailed letter on October 13, 1990, to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker listing the number and category of equipment removed from Central Europe to the east.⁹ But some Soviet officials had made statements that indicated a far different situation. In early October, Soviet Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky spoke informally with the other CFE Treaty diplomats in Vienna, stating that the USSR would have 1,600 OOVs at treaty signature, and approximately 1,500 OOVs at the end of the 40-month reduction phase.¹¹ Therefore, when the Soviet Union revealed in Vienna, just one day before the official signing of the treaty in Paris, the scope of its unilateral military equipment relocation and the decrease in its inspectable sites, it surprised and disturbed many diplomats from the other CFE nations. At the very least, it raised serious questions of credibility.

Within a few weeks, diplomats linked these questions to other unilateral treaty-related actions by the Soviet Union. The Soviet High Command, according to the USSR's data books, had resubordinated three motor rifle divisions to naval infantry forces. In terms of CFE Treaty equipment, this meant they had transferred to the naval forces 120 tanks, 753 armored personnel vehicles, and 234 artillery pieces. The Soviet High Command also had established a new kind of naval unit, the coastal defense forces, and assigned to it 813 tanks, 972 ACVs, and 846 artillery pieces. In addition, the Strategic Rocket Forces received 1,791 ACVs.¹¹ During treaty negotiations, delegates considered all this equipment to be a part of the USSR's CFE Treaty TLE ceilings, subject to reduction quotas and inspection protocols. In Vienna, Soviet diplomats argued that since the Soviet High Command had reassigned this equipment to naval units, which they asserted were not included in the treaty, the equipment would not be subject to treaty inspections or ceilings. Further, they asserted that the Strategic Rocket Forces' 1,791 ACVs should be classified as internal security equipment, again outside the treaty's quantitative provisions. Finally, the Soviet data omitted 18 PT-76 armored combat vehicles, which had belonged to the civil defense forces, from the TLE category of heavy armament combat vehicles. Neither in their data submission nor in subsequent discussions did the Soviets give any explanation for this omission.¹²

Despite these discrepancies, the treaty was signed on November 19, 1990. Nonetheless, four states—the United States, Germany, Canada, and Great Britain—raised specific questions about the Soviet data. The forum they used was the newly established CFE Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG).¹³ One of this group's responsibilities was to seek resolutions of ambiguities in data or differences of interpretation resulting from treaty implementation. Clearly, the dispute with the Soviet Union, a major signatory party, over its initial data submission fell within the scope of the JCG. Article V of the treaty, and a separate protocol, authorized and set forth the responsibilities and procedural rules governing this important joint treaty group. Consisting of representatives from every signatory state, the JCG was to meet in Vienna twice a year, with each session lasting four weeks. In fact, the initial issues were so contentious that the JCG met in nearly continuous monthly sessions beginning in late November 1990.

The state parties had 90 days—until February 15, 1991—to correct any discrepancies in their initial data and to respond to ambiguities. The United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Canada urged the Soviet Union to reconsider its initial submission. During this 90-day period, diplomats from the United States and several other NATO nations sought to use bilateral diplomacy to resolve the issue. Early in December, Ambassador R. James Woolsey, U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator, Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman, USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative, and a small team flew to Moscow to meet with Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, General Moiseyev, and other members of the Soviet Supreme High Command.¹⁴ Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was not present. Defense Minister Yazov refused categorically to consider any changes to the Soviet position on the former TLE equipment assigned to naval and civil defense units. That equipment, he asserted, might become part of a possible future treaty on conventional naval forces, but the Soviet military did not have to count it with the Soviet Union's TLE for the CFE Treaty. Ambassador Woolsey rejected Yazov's assertion out of hand. He regarded the Soviet defense minister's position as directly contravening the negotiated and signed treaty. An angry confrontation ensued. Woolsey told Yazov that the United States would accept the Soviet position "over my dead body!"¹⁵

This exchange hardened the impasse. At subsequent U.S.-USSR diplomatic meetings in Houston, Texas, and Brussels, Belgium, in December 1990 and January 1991, Soviet military leaders remained obdurate. Then, on February 14, 1991, the Soviet Union presented its updated treaty data to the JCG in Vienna. It retained every essential element under dispute—the exempted TLE reassigned to the coastal defense forces, naval infantry forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and civil defense units. Given this fact,

"Over my dead body!"

—Ambassador R. James Woolsey
U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator



U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared on the same day that President Bush would not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification.¹⁶

It is interesting that in the midst of this frosty atmosphere, the diplomats resolved one issue: the 20,000-40,000 discrepancy in the Soviets' data. Analysis of two key documents supported the Soviet position. First, Soviet Minister Shevardnadze's letter to Secretary of State Baker, dated October 13, 1990, had contained specific figures on the Soviet forces and equipment in the treaty's zones as well as details on the TLE transfers from 1988 to 1990. Excerpted, the data revealed the following information:

Table 3-2. Soviet Union's ATTU* Holdings and Transfers, 1988-1990

	1 Jul 88	1 Aug 90	18 Nov 90	Transferred	Percent
Tanks	41,580	24,898	20,694	20,886	50%
Artillery	42,400	18,300	13,828	28,572	67%
ACVs	57,800	32,320	29,348	27,452	47%
Totals	141,780	75,518	63,870	76,910	54%

*Atlantic to the Urals.
 Source: Jane M.O. Sharp, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe," *SJPRJ Yearbook 1991*, p. 430.

Secretary Baker and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received these Soviet figures in late October. Then, three weeks later, the Soviets had presented these same figures in Vienna at the initial data exchange. Consequently, continued U.S. objections in the winter of 1990-91 stood on thin ice. The ice got even thinner in January 1991 when U.S. intelligence estimates confirmed that the Soviet Union's data discrepancy was not in the 20,000-40,000 range, but probably entailed 2,000-3,000 items.¹⁷ With this new estimate, the issue melted away, losing its power to influence treaty ratification.

What did not disappear, however, was the Soviet High Command's insistence on the legitimacy of resubordinating the three motorized rifle divisions to the naval infantry and the coastal defense forces. This position alone meant that on February 14, 1991, the date when the Soviet Union submitted its updated data, the CFE Treaty was at an impasse. Some believed that the Soviet High Command wanted to stop the CFE Treaty ratification process cold and substitute for the treaty a "status-quo" military



Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov meets with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

relationship of the Soviet Union with Central and Western European nations.¹⁸ If this were true, the Soviet military's vision proved to be shortsighted in view of subsequent events.

In the spring and summer months of 1991, the Soviet Union's internal and external policies were subject to larger and more powerful events. In late February, a United Nations coalition, led by the United States, won a decisive victory in the Gulf War over Iraq, a former Soviet ally. Simultaneously, in late January and February, the people of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania rebelled against Soviet imperialism.¹⁹ Following a brief, violent confrontation, they won recognition of their sovereignty from Moscow. Then, throughout April, May, and June, President Gorbachev and the Communist central government gradually lost power to Boris Yeltsin, Russian reformers, and nationalistic leaders in the republics. The Soviet High Command's desire to establish a Soviet-dominated imperial security system based on the military status quo became untenable as the Soviet Union unraveled both as an empire and a nation.

While the old system was untenable, it would take many months for the new reality to emerge. The Soviet Union remained a great military power and a major CFE Treaty state party.

Following the Gulf War, President Bush began a series of arms control initiatives.²⁰ He directed Secretary of State Baker to initiate diplomatic discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A. Bessmertnykh. Baker focused on resolving both the CFE Treaty impasse and the outstanding issues of the still-unsigned Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In the White House, President Bush set up a small, high-level experts group on arms control to draft presidential letters and new treaty positions and to formulate immediate responses. Led by Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council, this four-person group worked closely with Secretary Baker, Ambassador Woolsey, CFE Treaty Negotiator Hansen, and the START Treaty negotiators. Initially there was little change. In March, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met with Secretary Baker in Moscow. He asked Baker to reconsider the United States' opposition to the Soviet High Command's resubordination of CFE TLE to naval and coastal defense units. Baker replied: "I don't know what there is to talk about. Twenty-two countries have signed this treaty, and only one has changed the rules."²¹

Next, President Bush wrote directly to President Gorbachev asking him to resolve the dispute on the reassignment of the military equipment. Secretary Baker made a direct appeal to Bessmertnykh in Russia in late April. Neither Bush's letter nor Baker's personal diplomacy had much effect. Then in late May a breakthrough occurred. President Gorbachev sent General Moiseyev to Washington for a two-day meeting with the president, senior military leaders, and treaty negotiators.²² He brought with him new proposals. General Moiseyev stated the Soviet Union's final position: all equipment in the Soviet naval infantry and coastal defense forces would remain in their units, but they would be counted against the USSR's overall CFE Treaty ceilings. The number of armored personnel vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) would be limited to 1,701, but they would not be counted against the Soviet Union's aggregate number of treaty ACVs. The naval forces would not be counted as OOVs, limiting the number of inspections the Soviets would be liable for, but these units would still be vulnerable to inspection under the challenge inspection provisions. More important, the naval forces equipment would be counted in Soviet TLE totals. The issue of armored personnel vehicles in the SRF was countered somewhat by the U.S. concern for the security of Soviet nuclear materials if the Soviet Union became less stable. After consideration, U.S. experts accepted the Soviet position. The next day General Moiseyev met with President Bush in the White House. According to a recent account, President Bush was insistent and very firm on the United States' commitment to the treaty and the consequences of any nation trying to back out at this late stage.²³ General Moiseyev agreed, stating his support for President Gorbachev, perestroika, and arms control.



Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.



The Baltic states-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-gained sovereignty from the Soviet Union in January and February 1991.



President George Bush.

The CFE Treaty was multilateral, with 22 signatory nations; no one could deny, however, that bilateral negotiations had resolved this treaty impasse. The United States and the Soviet Union acted decisively, but bilaterally, in reaching these settlements. At times allies were informed; other times they were not. Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany complained that the United States and the USSR were settling multilateral treaty issues among themselves.²⁴ Yet during months of turmoil and real uncertainty, U.S. and Soviet political leaders focused again and again on the CFE Treaty; their persistence produced results.

It was only a matter of weeks from the time of General Moiseyev's Washington visit in May 1991 to the USSR's formal declaration to all other treaty states in Vienna. In early June, Secretary Baker and Ambassador Woolsey flew to Moscow and met with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Soviet CFE Treaty Negotiator Grinevsky. The result was a complex, three-part solution.²⁵ First, France, as a CFE Treaty signatory state, would request that the Netherlands convene an extra-

ordinary conference of state parties to the treaty at The Hague. Next, the Soviet Union, at that conference, would issue a legally binding statement explaining the obligations it would undertake "outside of the framework of the treaty" to account for its TLE holdings within the treaty's area of application. The Soviet Union would declare its willingness to limit the equipment in its naval infantry forces, coastal defense forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces to the exact number previously announced in Vienna. Then, they would declare that 40 months after entry into force, the USSR's maximum TLE holdings would include the total TLE assigned to the naval infantry forces, coastal defense forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces. This meant that the Soviet Union would reduce an equivalent number of TLE elsewhere to meet its maximum holdings. Specifically, the Soviets pledged to destroy or convert 933 tanks, 1,725 ACVs, and 1,080 artillery pieces. They would reduce one-half of the 933 tanks and 1,080 artillery pieces from forces within the ATTU and the other half from forces east of the Urals. The Soviets also stated that they would modify 753 of the 1,725 ACVs to become MTLB-AT types. These were "look-a-likes" and thus, not limited by the treaty.²⁶

The Soviets were adamant in their position that the coastal defense forces and naval infantry units were not OOVs and therefore not subject to declared site inspections. They agreed, however, that this equipment would be subject to challenge inspections. They also declared that they would limit the number of armored combat vehicles of the SRF, but that these limits would not count against the total number of ACVs allocated under the CFE Treaty

to the Soviet Union. In response to the Soviet Union's statement, each of the other 21 states at the extraordinary conference would issue a statement accepting the Soviet Union's declaration as legally binding and the basis for proceeding toward ratification and implementation. When the extraordinary conference convened at The Hague on June 18, 1991, the respective ambassadors read their carefully crafted, legally binding statements into the record and, with no objections, the chairman accepted them as official treaty documents.²⁷

On the issue of the Soviet military equipment positioned east of the Ural Mountains, the Soviet government presented a politically binding statement to the state delegates attending the CFE's Joint Consultative Group in Vienna. The Soviet Union pledged to destroy or convert to civilian use no fewer than 6,000 tanks, 1,500 ACVs, and 7,000 artillery pieces located beyond the Ural Mountains. They would reduce these items by November 1995 in such a way as to provide "sufficient visible evidence" of their destruction or their having been rendered militarily unsuitable. Essentially, the pledge meant that the Soviet Union would display this equipment so that treaty states could use satellite reconnaissance to monitor and confirm its reduction.²⁸

*East of the Urals:
Soviets would destroy or
convert at least
6,000 tanks
1,500 ACVs
7,000 artillery pieces*

Once these Soviet legal and political statements had been accepted as official treaty documents, most of the CFE Treaty signatory states turned to ratification. President Bush submitted the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate on July 9, 1991, stating, "The CFE Treaty is the most ambitious arms control agreement ever concluded."²⁹ He declared that the treaty was in the "best interests of the United States" and that it was an important step in "defining the new security regime in Europe." Other states went through the ratification process as well. Czechoslovakia was the first nation to ratify the treaty and deposit the instruments of ratification in the treaty depository at The Hague. Other nations followed and by the end of 1991, 14 nations, including Hungary, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, and the United States, had ratified the treaty. Before all the original 22 treaty signatories could complete the ratification process, however, three new developments influenced the treaty.

HI I D C R I I : Hf B I Sr T

This issue dealt with the legal status of the Soviet Union's TLE in the three Baltic nations-Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.³¹¹ Resolution came expeditiously. None of the Baltic states wanted to become parties to the CFE Treaty. None wanted the Soviet military forces, which they considered to be armies of occupation, to be stationed permanently on their national territory. They were concerned that any treaty participation by a Baltic state would lend

legitimacy to a Soviet presence in the Baltics. All desired, however, that the Soviet Union's conventional military equipment and units subject to the treaty still count against the Soviet Union's TLE ceilings and, if possible, be reduced in accordance with the protocols of the treaty.

Recognizing the Baltic nations' demands, and sensing that the Soviet Foreign Ministry was willing to discuss a diplomatic solution, U.S. diplomats in Moscow informally raised the possibility of another "agreed statement" regarding the Soviet Union's CFE Treaty obligations. As a direct consequence of this bilateral diplomacy, the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group convened another extraordinary meeting in Vienna on October 18, 1991.³¹ The chairman read statements from the Soviet Union and other state parties that stipulated that the three Baltic nations were not parties to the CFE Treaty and that all Soviet TLE on the territory of those states would count against the USSR's treaty ceilings. Read aloud to the assembled state delegates, the statements were accepted without comment. Following procedure, the statements were sent to the treaty depository at The Hague for deposit with the official treaty.³²

By this time the Soviet Union as a nation was in a tenuous state. Its government had barely survived a failed coup d'etat in mid-August, its ruling Communist party had been outlawed, and



Soviet forces in Moscow during failed coup attempt in August 1991.

its national leadership appeared incapable of stemming the twin forces of a collapsing empire and rising nationalism. By December 1991, the creation of an independent Ukraine and Belarus, and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, sealed the fate of the USSR. On December 25, 1991, the USSR formally dissolved as a nation and was replaced by 15 newly independent states. Eight of these new states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine—had former Soviet military forces and units stationed on their territory that were subject to the CFE Treaty. What would be their fate? Would these new nations simply nationalize the military forces stationed on their territory? Or would they seek to join the all-European CFE Treaty and commit themselves to destroying conventional military equipment that could be used by their new armies and air forces? And under what aegis would they discuss joining the CFE Treaty states? They were not members of any international forum such as the CSCE, Warsaw Pact, or NATO.³⁴

THE THIRD CRISIS: NEW STATE PARTIES

On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus gathered in Minsk, Belarus, to place their signatures on the document creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Within a week, the leaders of five other republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—had met in Ashgabad, Turkmenistan, and pledged to join the new commonwealth. All the military forces of the collapsing Soviet Union would be placed under the control of this commonwealth. These events signaled not only the end of the Soviet Union as a nation but also its end as a state party to the CFE Treaty. In Vienna, the CFE state delegates sought some mechanism to bring the new republics into the CFE Treaty orbit.³⁵

In the late fall of 1991, a new pan-European organization, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was set up with U.S. and German leadership. By December, its membership consisted of the 16 NATO nations, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the 15 newly independent states from the former Soviet Union. Shortly after the creation of the CIS in December, the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council invited all member states to meet in Brussels at NATO headquarters on January 10, 1992. The objective was to convene a high level working group to discuss the future of the CFE Treaty. Every state accepted and attended, with the exception of Kazakhstan. This was the first time the new CIS nations, represented by their foreign and defense ministers, had been at NATO headquarters. At this historic meeting, they participated as sovereign independent nations, sitting beside the leaders of the former Warsaw Pact nations and, of course, the foreign and defense ministers of the NATO nations.³⁶

In their opening statements, the foreign ministers of the newly independent states declared that the CFE Treaty was "the cornerstone of European security." In his statement, Vladimir Petrovskiy, the Russian representative, asserted that only Russia needed to ratify the CFE Treaty.³⁷ He said that Russia would subsequently negotiate the "necessary adjustments" with the other republics. All other NACC states rejected this Russian interpretation. Instead, they proposed that each of the newly independent states be considered a successor state. Furthermore, following signature and ratification, each would become an original state party to the treaty. This concept carried the day, and after lengthy discussion, the delegates agreed on the following points:³⁸

- The CFE Treaty should enter into force without renegotiation and should be fully implemented as soon as possible.
- Treaty obligations of the former USSR should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent states and apportioned among them in a manner acceptable to all parties to the treaty.
- All newly independent states in the area of application of the CFE Treaty should ratify the treaty.
- Some updating of the treaty would be necessary, but it would be done after its entry into force.



First meeting of North Atlantic Cooperation Council defense ministers at NATO Headquarters, April 1, 1992.



Severing of a turret in Belarus.

- The deadline for entry into force should be as soon as possible, preferably by the time of the Helsinki Review Conference (March-July 1992).
- Further work by the high level working group was warranted.

The NACC high level working group met again in February, March, April, and May of 1992. These were extraordinary months for the newly independent states. First, as new nations, they had to define their relationships with the nations of Central and Western Europe. The CFE Treaty lay at the center of the military dimension of this relationship. Second, they had to define their relationship with Russia, the largest and most powerful of the former Soviet republics. Here the CFE Treaty was also a focal point, since it mandated reductions in the former Soviet Union's vast arsenal of conventional weapons. The question of how the USSR's arsenal would be partitioned among the successor states, and then how these national portions would be subject to the treaty, had to be decided. The two issues were related, and the working group resolved them in the first six months of 1992.

On January 16, 1992, Russia proposed at a CIS meeting in Minsk that it should receive two-thirds of the ground weapons of the former Soviet Union. At that meeting, Valery Shustov, Russia's CFE Treaty Negotiator, declared that Russia would coordinate the inspection, escort, and reduction activities of all the CIS states implementing the CFE Treaty.³⁹ The other CIS states, especially Ukraine, rejected this assertion. Two weeks later, on January 30, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) admitted 10 CIS states as members. The new states signed letters pledging to "move forward promptly with the ratification of the CFE Treaty and to assume ... all CFE obligations of the former



Ukrainian Foreign Minister (later President) Leonid Kravchuk.

Soviet Union."⁴⁰ With this important international diplomatic and political act completed, the CIS nations turned to the tough negotiations on partitioning the former Soviet Union's conventional armed forces. They set up a group of experts, largely consisting of senior military officers, who examined force structure, treaty ceilings, and treaty reduction requirements. Throughout February, March, and April of 1992, this group labored to devise a distribution formula acceptable to all states.

It was not easy. At one point, Leonid Kravchuk, then Ukrainian foreign minister, complained about the CIS nations' failure to resolve the CFE Treaty TLE problem: "Not one major military question has been resolved ... within the framework of the Commonwealth."⁴¹ Then, in early April, the Russian Parliament voted not to ratify the CFE Treaty, even though the USSR Supreme Soviet had ratified it in 1991. At that point, President Yeltsin intervened, stating that Russia would accept all treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union.⁴² In separate actions, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan complained that they should be allocated more tanks than proposed by the group of experts. These two nations were locked in an intense ethnic war over separatist Nagorno-Karabakh; consequently, they sought more conventional arrangements.

Amidst these internal CIS negotiations, the monthly NACC meetings of the foreign ministers at NATO headquarters continued. These meetings put pressure on Russia and the other successor states to divide the Soviet Union's entitlements and obligations in an equitable manner. In April 1992, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, the U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator who had replaced Ambassador R. James Woolsey in June 1991, led a small delegation to Minsk, Kiev, Chisinau, and Moscow to discuss treaty ratification and implementation.⁴³ On this same trip, Ambassador Hansen's delegation met in Moscow with representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. Over the course of 10 days, Hansen learned that all the newly independent states had the political will to achieve an agreement on the CFE Treaty TLE. He also discovered that the smaller states distrusted Russia's tactics and attitudes. Characteristically, Hansen went directly to see the Russian first deputy foreign minister; they discussed ratification of the treaty. Hansen told him "an agreement was there for the taking, if they would just modify the way they negotiated."⁴⁴ The Russian minister listened, but action would not come until mid-May.

Finally, following further CIS negotiating sessions in Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, and other capitals, the leaders of the successor states met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on May 15, 1992. There they signed an agreement on the division of the former Soviet Union's CFE Treaty obligations and entitlements.⁴⁵ The Russian military was

Table 3-3. The Tashkent Agreement: Allocation of Soviet TLE

	Tanks			ACVs			Artillery		A/C Helos		
	Total	Active	Stored	Total	Active	Stored	Total	Active	Stored	Total	Total
Russia	6,400	4,975	1,425	11,480	10,525	955	6,415	5,105	1,310	3,450	890
Ukraine	4,080	3,130	950	5,050	4,350	700	4,040	3,240	800	1,090	330
Belarus	1,800	1,525	275	2,600	2,175	425	1,615	1,375	240	260	80
Armenia	220	220	0	220	220	0	285	285	0	100	50
Azerbaijan	220	220	0	220	220	0	285	285	0	100	50
Georgia	220	220	0	220	220	0	285	285	0	100	50
Moldova	210	210	0	210	210	0	250	250	0	50	50
Kazakstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	13,150	10,500	2,650	20,000	17,920	2,080	13,175	10,825	2,350	5,150	1,500

Source: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, May 21, 1992

instrumental in devising this agreement; without their detailed work it would not have happened. The division at Tashkent is detailed in table 3-3.

With the Tashkent accords signed on May 15, 1992, attention turned to Vienna where the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group was meeting in preparation for a third Extraordinary Conference. In Vienna, the state delegates drafted a document, to be signed on June 5, 1992, at an Extraordinary Conference in Oslo. This document made legal both the entry of the new state parties and their acceptance of all the obligations and entitlements of the former USSR. In short order, the JCG delegates and technical specialists drafted new treaty annexes containing treaty understandings, notifications, confirmations, and commitments. They incorporated the new annexes into the "Final Document," which changed the wording in the treaty to reflect the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the inclusion of eight new state parties. The Final Document set a deadline of July 1, 1992, for each signatory state to provide to all other states information concerning inspections and verification. In addition, it stated that the TLE reduction liabilities of the new state parties collectively would be no different from those of the former Soviet Union. It also reaffirmed the two previous JCG statements: the Soviet Union's June 15, 1991, statement regarding the TLE reassigned to the naval infantry and coastal defense forces, and the October 18, 1991, Soviet statement on the status of TLE stationed on the territory of the three Baltic nations. Finally, it addressed the problem of stationing armored



**Tashkent,
Uzbekistan**

*Tashkent Agreement-
May 15, 1992*

infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) on the flanks; but it left resolution to the JCG forum following entry into force.

All of these changes and new annexes were incorporated into the treaty, translated into the six treaty languages, and presented at the Oslo Extraordinary Conference. There, delegates from the now 29 signatory states signed the new documents on June 5, 1992. The CFE Treaty stipulated that from that moment the eight new states were "original state parties" and that each assumed the same rights and obligations that every other state party had under the treaty.⁴⁶

THE LAST CRISIS: FINAL RATIFICATION

Following the Oslo conference, attention turned to completing ratification and exchanging final treaty documents at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on July 9-10, 1992. Of the 29 states that were party to the treaty, 11 had not ratified and deposited their instruments of ratification at The Hague as of mid-June. As stipulated by the treaty, entry into force would occur 10 days after all the states had deposited their ratification articles. Turkey ratified on June 18, Moldova on July 1, and Russia on July 8. Five other nations deposited their ratification articles on July 6, 8, and 9. That left three nations—Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—that would not, or could not, act in time for the CSCE summit in Helsinki, slated for July 9-10. Treaty diplomats in Vienna viewed this inaction as disastrous; the 26 states that had completed ratification held more than 90 percent of the treaty's TLE, units, territory, and zones. Further delay might dissipate the momentum created in the past seven months.

When Ambassador Hansen returned to Vienna from Oslo in mid-June, he realized that the Helsinki summit might be held without a ratified CFE Treaty and no entry into force. "Near panic struck," he recalled. "One night, in the middle of the night, I concluded what we had to do. I said: 'We have to provisionally implement the whole treaty.'"⁴⁷ For a multinational, 29-nation treaty, this was a radical idea. The next day when Hansen called Washington and discussed the idea with U.S. international treaty lawyers, "They rejected it totally." Then, he recalled, "We had a bit of a screaming match."⁴⁸ Hansen won; but the president and key U.S. senators had to approve the concept before U.S. officials could discuss it with the NATO allies and the other signatory nations. When the secretary of state, the president, and the senators approved, events moved swiftly.

Over the next 10 days, Ambassador Hansen and the other state negotiators in Vienna explained, cajoled, and succeeded in persuading their colleagues to accept the concept of provisional implementation of the CFE Treaty. Meanwhile, new documents

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were prepared in six languages for the 29 states to approve and sign in Helsinki. On July 10, 1992, representatives of all state parties met in Helsinki for the fourth extraordinary conference on the CFE Treaty. They signed three documents. In the first, the individual states agreed to provisionally implement the CFE Treaty. In the second, the individual states affirmed the relationship between the CFE Treaty and the CFE IA agreement, officially titled: The Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Essentially, CFE IA was a "political" statement by each of the treaty states declaring that they would not exceed self-imposed limits on military manpower strength. The limits were, in fact, quite high. Consequently, the treaty's national manpower figures were not as significant as the fact that they were declared in a politically binding treaty. These figures were subject to monitoring and questioning, and if exceeded, the guilty states would be subject to international censure. This was the first time in the twentieth century that the European nations, acting collectively, had agreed to limits on their national military forces. In the third document, each signatory state declared it would provisionally implement the CFE IA Concluding Act. Then, and only then, could treaty implementation begin.⁴⁹

These actions set the clock running on entry into force, but they did not complete the formal ratification process. Armenia deposited its ratified CFE Treaty instruments at The Hague on October 12, 1992. Belarus and Kazakhstan completed the group of original states by depositing their instruments of ratification on October 30. Ten days later, on November 9, the CFE Treaty and the CFE IA Concluding Act officially entered into force.⁵⁰

SUMMING Ur

It had taken 24 months-November 1990 to November 1992-to move from treaty signature through the national ratifications to official entry into force. Along the way a series of treaty-related crises had been resolved: TLE relocations, resubordinations, reclassifications, new state parties, redistribution of the former USSR's entitlements and obligations, and new national manpower ceilings. But the larger, more serious crisis of the Soviet Union's collapse struck at the existence of the CFE Treaty. In the face of turmoil and revolution, German, French, American, Russian, British, and Central European leaders and diplomats had fought hard to retain the treaty. Throughout these difficulties, the CFE Treaty retained its importance for the future of Europe. With treaty operations about to start, attention turned to the national inspection agencies and their inspectors who would monitor the treaty, and the military services that would reduce and account for thousands of items of treaty-limited equipment.

Table 3-4. CFE Treaty Original State Parties

State	Ratified	Deposited
Czechoslovakia	19 July 1991	5 August 1991
Hungary	9 September 1991	4 November 1991
Netherlands	6 November 1991	8 November 1991
Bulgaria	13 September 1991	12 November 1991
United Kingdom	November 1991	19 November 1991
Canada	7 November 1991	22 November 1991
Poland	22 November 1991	26 November 1991
Norway	29 November 1991	29 November 1991
Belgium	November 1991	17 December 1991
Germany	December 1991	23 December 1991
Iceland	14 December 1991	24 December 1991
Denmark	December 1991	30 December 1991
Luxembourg	19 December 1991	22 January 1992
United States	26 December 1991	29 January 1992
France	16 March 1992	24 March 1992
Romania	NA	21 April 1992
Italy	21 December 1991	22 April 1992
Spain	26 February 1992	1 June 1992
Georgia	NA	6 July 1992
Moldova	1 July 1992	6 July 1992
Greece	28 May 1992	8 July 1992
Turkey	18 June 1992	8 July 1992
Azerbaijan	NA	9 July 1992
Ukraine	NA	9 July 1992
Portugal	NA	14 August 1992
Russia	8 July 1992	3 September 1992
Armenia	NA	12 October 1992
Belarus	21 October 1992	30 October 1992
Kazakstan	NA	30 October 1992

For the United States, the On-Site Inspection Agency had the mission of conducting the CFE Treaty inspections and escorts. During the long and arduous two-year ratification process, OSIA's European Operations Command underwent what Colonel Lawrence Kelley, Chief of Operations, called "Standing Up the Unit."

NOTES

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6. *Arms Control Reporter 1990*, pp. 407.B.4 14-415; Sharp, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe" (1991), pp. 429-430.
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11. *Arms Control Reporter 1990*, pp. 407.B.4 14-415.
12. "Chernychev on CFE Treaty, Soviet Implementation," *TASS* (Moscow), November 22, 1990, in *FBIS-Soviet Union*, November 27, 1990.
13. Smith, "U.S., Soviets Disagree on Arms Cuts," *Washington Post*, December 17, 1990, pp. A1, A20; *Arms Control Reporter 1990*, pp. 407.B.413-414. For insights into the CFE Treaty delegations in Vienna, see Interview with

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 24. *Arms Control Reporter* 1991, pp. 407.1.444-446.
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36. *Arms Control Reporter 1992*, pp. 407.B.463-465.
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38. *Arms Control Reporter 1992*, pp. 407.B.463-464.
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Chapter 4

STANDING UP THE UNIT



OSIA's operations expand significantly throughout Europe in preparation for the CFE Treaty.

OSIA's EUROPEAN OPERATIONS COMMAND: THE YEAR OF EXPANSION, 1991

The major influx of people into OSIA's European Operations Command began in January 1991. Thirty people arrived that month, primarily filling support positions, but including nine weapons specialists. Most of the January arrivals came from units in Europe. A month later, OSIA European Operations had doubled in size, expanding from 27 to 57. By the end of April, 18 more people had arrived, including Lt. Colonel David P. Geert, USAF, the first of the CFE Treaty team chiefs. Through July another 18 had come on board, and by the end of 1991, more than 100 personnel were on duty. All CFE inspection team members, except for one weapons specialist, two linguists, and two deputy team chiefs, were in some phase of treaty training. As people continued to arrive, the number and precise function of U.S. liaison officers remained unresolved. OSIA would not have a final answer on liaison officers until mid-1992, just before the treaty entered into force.¹

Key Operational Concepts:

- *Treaty Knowledge*
- *Team Chief Responsibility*
- *Team Identity*

Colonel Fred Grosick, Commander, and Colonel Lawrence Kelley, Director of Operations, shaped the rapidly expanding CFE inspection force around three key operational concepts. The first was knowledge of the treaty, especially its inspection protocol. The treaty was the "alpha and omega" of the inspectors' training, preparation, and operational mission. Over and over in small team meetings and in individual sessions, Colonel Kelley stressed the importance of knowing the treaty "inside and out, chapter and verse," because the "other side would." Kelley's long experience with the Soviet/Russian officer corps had made him aware of their professionalism, thoroughness of preparations, suspicion of foreigners, and their insistence on the letter of the law in granting treaty rights to inspectors. If inspectors from other nations knew the treaty well, Kelley and Grosick believed that U.S. inspectors had to know the provisions of the treaty even better.

The second concept placed extraordinary personal responsibility on the team leader for each inspection/escort mission. Carefully chosen, personally interviewed, and continuously observed, these Army and Air Force field grade officers were responsible for their team, the mission, and the exercise of the U.S. government's CFE Treaty rights and entitlements. Colonel Kelley interviewed each new team chief when he reported to OSIA's European Operations Command. It was, by all accounts, an intense session, combining a treaty tutorial with a lecture on leadership and personal standards of conduct. It also included a detailed explanation of the U.S. objectives in implementing the CFE Treaty. It was neither subtle nor collegial; it was a serious meeting. Colonel Kelley later recalled that at some point he would tell the new CFE team chief, "I wanted to have confidence that when the going got tough, when the team had not slept for 24 hours, when team members felt ill, when the pressure was on, the temperature was low, the plan had fallen apart, the team personnel were not performing as expected, the Russians were applying pressure, and the team chief encountered a point in the inspection which had not been anticipated, that I could still trust his judgment. Would he make the right call?" These standards of leadership set the tone for the developing inspection organization.

The third concept was integral inspection teams. The "inspection team" was the primary operational unit for inspections under the CFE Treaty. Teams would have designated leaders, permanently assigned inspectors, and specific training programs designed to build treaty knowledge, team cohesiveness, and team recognition of inspection objectives. Here too Kelley and Grosick knew what they wanted: inspection team identity, inspector allegiance to the team, and absolute standards of conduct by all team members. "I have always been," Kelley said, "a firm believer in unit cohesiveness. So I consciously set the teams up that way, and insisted that they work as units, and act as units." Given these three clear,

fixed concepts, the new inspection team leaders and inspectors entered a rigorous, detailed training program.²

Initial Training

The CFE Treaty on-site inspections would be challenging because the mission required different people to bring various skills together in a team effort. Team chiefs, deputies, linguists, and weapons specialists all needed individual and small team training to develop and refine their specific skills. It was also important for those in support positions to fully understand their contribution to the success of the mission. The range of training topics was broad, including several courses on the treaty and its protocols, three levels of instruction on equipment identification, and several Russian language courses. Individual training, like improving language skills, was important, but as individual needs were met, the focus shifted to team training.

Both in personal and team training, knowledge of the treaty formed the cornerstone for all training. The CFE Treaty Inspector/Escort course was the fundamental course for everyone. The first CFE Treaty course was taught February 4-14, 1991, at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, D.C. Bill Parsons and David Sloss, members of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and active participants in CFE negotiations, provided 25 hours of instruction on the treaty and its protocols. Experts from the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center contributed 15 hours of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) familiarization. This initial course also dealt with topics such as the history of arms control, Warsaw Pact forces, Congress and treaty ratification, health, and public affairs. Inspectors assigned to OSIA's European



Training was continuous at OSIA's European Operations Command; here Colonel Kelley discusses an upcoming mission with inspectors.

Operations Command would receive significantly more training after the course. This included a three-tiered program on equipment recognition developed by and for inspectors.

Twenty people from OSIA's European Operations attended the first CFE Treaty course in Washington, D.C., along with 170 others from Headquarters OSIA and other agencies. In April 1991, OSIA's European Operations Command sponsored a CFE Treaty course for an additional 90 people at Rhein-Main Air Base in Frankfurt, Germany. By October 1991, 24 other inspection team members had completed a two-week CFE Treaty course sponsored by NATO at Oberammergau, Germany. Colonel Kelley drew from his experience with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty to design the NATO course. The objective was to establish CFE Treaty inspection standards across the NATO group of states. Instructors from OSIA's European Operations focused on inspection and escort techniques based on the U.S. experience under the INF Treaty. On April 8, 1992, OSIA presented a five-day CFE Treaty course in Washington, D.C. Treaty negotiators and experienced OSIA European Operations officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) taught the course, focusing on the treaty and the inspection process. A videotaped version of this April course allowed newly assigned inspectors to receive the required training without waiting for another formal class. The treaty course remained the fundamental building block, but it was only one required element to qualify as a CFE inspector/escort.³

When treaty ratification lagged in the fall of 1991, teams were able to build more inspection-related issues into their training program. The Inspection/Escort Branch assembled inspection teams weekly. The teams reviewed and discussed treaty inspection and reduction protocols, standardized inspection and reporting procedures, and studied current presidential and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) guidance. Individually, each team trained daily on the treaty and its protocols. They discussed inspection scenarios they might confront and worked through problems they might encounter. In addition, TLE recognition was a part of each team's daily regime.



The U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, Germany, was a primary source for CFE inspectors.

Equipment Recognition Training

A group of Army weapons specialists who came to OSIA's European Operations Command on a temporary basis beginning in October of 1990 played a key role in the TLE recognition training program. Sergeant First Class George A. Partridge, Staff Sergeant Thomas A. Favia, and Sergeant Joseph S. Nelson were members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, Germany. The Mission was staffed by NCOs and foreign area officers (FAOs) with a strong working knowledge of Soviet and East German armies, their equipment, units, and force structure. Because of



Photo of a T-72 tank used in level one recognition training.

German unification, however, this Cold War outpost was no longer needed and was closing. Having served at the Mission, Colonel Kelley knew the caliber of the people associated with it and its reputation for excellence. He made a point of actively recruiting weapons specialists from the Mission.

These specialists contributed immediately to the command. They laid the groundwork for OSIA's European Operations' equipment recognition program. From October 1990 through January 1991, while still assigned to the Mission in Potsdam, they developed courses on treaty-related ground equipment and conducted training classes. They traveled from Berlin to work at Rhein-Main during the week, returning home to Berlin on weekends. They acquired photos and slides of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces' treaty-related equipment. Their sources were within the Department of Defense, other U.S. government agencies, NATO allies, commercial publications, and from the training kits they had developed at the Mission. They also took their own photos of treaty-related equipment during mock inspections and on field trips.

Weapons specialists from the Army and Air Force later joined the specialists from the Mission and added to the growing stock of information. Sergeant First Class Curtis E. Ingram, USA, focused his efforts on tanks while Master Sergeant Richard D. DiFormato, USA, gathered information on armored combat vehicles, and Staff Sergeants Gilbert Sierra, Jr., and Cecil L. Ward, USA, concentrated on artillery. The U.S. inspection teams also required a working knowledge of treaty-related aircraft and helicopters. Senior Master Sergeant Clifford A. Schroder, USAF, and Technical Sergeants Paul R. Angus and James L. Towne, USAF, provided that expertise. Their knowledge of aircraft and helicopters complemented the information their Army counterparts had assembled. The weapons

An armored vehicle launched bridge on display during Czechoslovakian training course.



specialists' collection of information and photographs were the basis for a three-level training program on equipment identification.⁴

Level one covered 10 categories of equipment: tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), heavy armament combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, helicopters, mortars, armored vehicle launched bridges, and multiple-launch rocket systems. There were also subdivisions in several categories; helicopters for example, could be broken down into three categories—attack, support, and transport. *Level one* training, a requirement for inspector certification, enabled inspectors to identify all Soviet, Eastern European, and U.S. TLE.

Level two training dealt with Soviet, Eastern European, and U.S. equipment, listed in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, that was reportable but not limited under the treaty. Instructors broke this equipment down into 17 areas. This equipment included "look-alike" armored personnel carriers and armored infantry fighting vehicles, training aircraft, combat support helicopters, and transport helicopters. The armored look-alikes were vehicles built on the chassis of a treaty-limited vehicle but modified for purposes other than transporting a combat infantry squad. By treaty definition, these modified vehicles could not be armed with a 20 millimeter or greater gun or cannon. The two levels of training encompassed more than 400 pieces of Soviet, Eastern European, and U.S. equipment.

Level three training differed from the other two levels covering equipment not listed in the treaty. Although not limited to weapons specialists, level three training was geared to maximizing weapons specialists' capabilities, whereas levels one and two were for all team members. Level three dealt with recognition and iden-

tification of the thousands of pieces of Soviet, Eastern European, or U.S. equipment that a team might encounter during an inspection. This equipment varied from communications vans to engineering vehicles to motorcycles. Training would enable an inspector to make more accurate observations about the inspected unit's mission and status. Training also included order of battle, organizational structures, and equipment markings. Level three training could vary to prepare inspectors for a particular mission. Inspectors supplemented their classroom training on weapons identification with field trips to locations with large concentrations of equipment. Teams traveled to the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Combat Threat Facility at Einsiedlerhof, Germany, to U.S. Army Europe's (USAREUR's) Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, and to other NATO sites. These trips provided inspectors direct experience with Soviet and Eastern European equipment, as well as U.S. and allied equipment. As development of the different levels of training progressed, however, a problem arose concerning space to conduct the training.⁵

Rhein-Main, normally an active and somewhat congested base, served as a focal point for tons of supplies, equipment, and thousands of troops headed for the Middle East in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Facilities on Rhein-



During a CfE mock inspection at the Hohenfels Training Area in Germany, inspectors checked these armored personnel carriers.

Main were at a premium. The OSIA facilities at the Air Force base were taxed heavily by OSIA's increased manning and equipment to implement the CFE Treaty. Weapons specialists did not have adequate facilities to conduct equipment recognition classes. The solution to their problem came from the man who would become the first OSIA CFE team chief.

Although not yet assigned to OSIA, Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF offered the use of his squadron's facilities, which were adjacent to OSIA European Operations' building. Colonel Gessert commanded the Air Force's 7580th Aerospace Squadron, known as the Berlin Corridor Flyers. Its mission ended with Ger-

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, was the first CFE team chief selected at OSIA's European Operations Command. An Air Force Academy graduate, he was a command navigator with 3,000 flying hours. Just prior to this assignment, Lt. Colonel Gessert had commanded the Air Force's 7580th Squadron, the Berlin Corridor Flyers.

On the initial months-recruiting, training, enlisted force: "I was the first team chief here. My deputy, Chief Warrant Officer Mike Lukes, was an old INF Treaty inspector; he had a lot of experience. In all honesty, he probably trained me more than anybody else did. He and I went out as the team chief and deputy for all the initial NATO mock inspections. We had the opportunity to take out all of the enlisted teams. There were four enlisted members on each team, and we had eight teams. There were two interpreters and two weapons specialists, and it was a mix and match of Air Force and Army guys. Chief Lukes and I essentially set the teams up and initiated their training. The first real mock inspection we did was with the French, and we took our teams out and escorted the French; then we worked with the Luxembourgers, Belgians, Dutch, and Germans.

"We had all these extremely qualified NCOs, but they were either qualified in rocket systems or they were qualified in tanks, master gunners, etc. We also had some very, very qualified Air Force maintenance personnel who worked on F-4s or



F-15s or F-111s, but they didn't know tanks, our own tanks, let alone Russian tanks. So we were pretty much starting at ground zero. Everybody was extremely professional; there was real expertise in certain fields, but no one had expertise in all of the Russian equipment, or in the variety of Russian equipment. What helped was that these guys were professional NCOs, and they were operators. They knew how to turn a wrench, so they weren't guys who just looked at pictures from behind a desk or some intelligence analysts. These guys were soldiers, they knew how to walk into a wing, a brigade, or a regiment, and decide quickly if they had their act together or not. That's why they were hired. So we had all these real smart guys, soldiers and airmen. These guys could walk and chew gum; they'd done some stuff in their life."

man unification. While closing down the 7580th, he allowed OSIA's weapons specialists to develop and conduct equipment identification classes in the squadron's briefing rooms. These classes, while important for all inspectors, were critical for weapons specialists because none were expert on all weapons systems. U.S. Air Force weapons specialists, for example, knew U.S. aircraft, but they had little or no knowledge of U.S. Army weapons and equipment, much less the weapons of the Warsaw Pact's ground forces. The same was true for U.S. Army weapons specialists, who were expert in U.S. and some Soviet ground forces, albeit using NATO designations, but had little exposure to U.S. and Soviet aircraft.⁶

continued

On the initial mock inspections: "The initial mock inspections were very brutal, especially with our allies. The allies looked at this CFE mission initially as an opportunity to talk and to celebrate together. From our own INF experience, we knew that the Russians were very professional, and that we had to approach it that way. We exercised every aspect of the treaty and made it very, very tough and very, very difficult. The allies, at first, regretted it. They didn't like it. They didn't think the Americans were nice. What we tried to explain to them was that you train harder than what you actually do in reality. By the time the inspections began, I think the allies became tougher and we became easier. But when I say easier, it's because we were not reasonable in our mocks, for we always pushed to the extreme to make treaty points. Many times we would purposely be unreasonable with the allies for training purposes.

"Mock inspections taught you how to orchestrate an inspection, how to organize an inspection, the mechanics of trying to get a crew of eight people underneath the team chief to work together as subteams. You did it so that when you hit the ground you weren't worried about who had what room or where's the equipment going. You had to learn how to do the mechanical things to make an inspection work. When you hit the site, your time was very limited. You had to use it wisely.

"It takes organization and some thought. I believe I've used the example before that we learned that it takes a much longer time to do a treaty inspection report than ever anticipated because of the legal aspects, using the proper verbiage, and referencing the proper points in the treaty. These things just took longer than anticipated. There are also some straight mechanical things you have to do to facilitate and to keep your inspection going."

On leading multinational inspection teams: "I think that actually made the mocks more important. Learning how to put together and orchestrate an inspection with three new people helped. We always have three new people on every one of our real inspections, in addition to the core six-man team. During the mock inspections we learned how to make it work. How to make it task-oriented, to know what task you want to give to a new member, and what you want to give to an experienced inspector. You learned how to organize and how to set up a true, thorough inspection. Sometimes it was very, very tough because you had to learn how to use somebody from another country who had a slightly different agenda than yours. But if you know how to facilitate an inspection, how to organize-which we learned during the mock regime-it made it much easier. That's what the training really taught us to do, how to conduct a good, well-orchestrated, well-organized inspection. And it took a while to learn that. You don't go into it blindly."

Source: Interview, Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 12, 1993.

Training for linguists

While weapons specialists developed their lesson plans in equipment identification, linguists had their own training requirements. Once selected for duty with OSIA, most linguists attended the Defense Language Institute's (DLI) Intermediate Russian



Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California.

Course in Monterey, California. The 27-week course provided linguists intense training to expand their ability to speak Russian. The course also introduced students to arms control treaty terminology. After successful completion of the DLI course, linguists arrived at OSIA's European Operations, and shortly thereafter attended a two-week course at the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) at Garmisch, Germany. This course, sponsored by the Treaty Verification Division of USARI, put linguists into classrooms where they spoke only Russian as they studied terminology specific to the CFE Treaty. Freed from the daily pressures and distractions of individual and team training at Rhein-Main, students at Garmisch focused on the treaty's complex, technical language for six to seven hours a day. Back at Rhein-Main, in addition to individual daily practice, linguists gathered in small groups led by Alan J. French, OSIA European Operations' in-house Russian language professional. They drilled in Russian three to five hours a week, for practice in conversation and interpretation. Linguists enhanced their training by viewing taped Russian television broadcasts and reading any available written materials. Most linguists agreed, however, that the most realistic training for the inspection teams, short of an actual treaty inspection, was the mock inspections.⁷

Mock INSPEC 10

One lesson Americans had learned in preparing to implement the INF Treaty was that mock inspections were an extremely valuable training tool. These inspections enabled teams to practice inspection and escort procedures, make and correct mistakes on the spot, uncover unanticipated problems or situations, and improve their procedures in accordance with treaty protocols. Teams went beyond scenario development and discussion in their offices to exercising their treaty knowledge at an inspectable site on a military installation.⁸ Seventeen months into treaty implementation, Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, an experienced OSIA CFE Treaty team chief, led a series of training classes and a mock inspection with Moldovan inspectors in December 1993. He told the Moldovan team about the approach American inspectors took during mock inspections:

"Our experiences during the mock inspections before baseline and during the real treaty inspections, both inspecting and escorting, were very similar. This (fact) indicates that our level of realism during training was very high. That is always one of the main goals in training, to train the way you would fight, to be as realistic as you can."⁹

Initial OSIA mock inspections for the CFE Treaty placed OSIA inspectors and escorts opposite their NATO counterparts. This was realistic training-teams traveled, lost sleep, missed meals, inspected unfamiliar military facilities, discussed treaty rights and obligations with foreign officers, and completed the inspection reports as required by the treaty. As inspectors, they aggressively demanded all of their government's treaty rights; as escorts, they made certain that their government's interests were fully protected. Colonel Kelley was a strong proponent of mock training inspections because his INF Treaty experience had convinced him that-

"The mock inspections are now and have always been the single most important training tool that we have at our disposal for a number of reasons. First, they force you to put into practice the skills that you have developed individually in these various areas over time. Second, the experience forces a team-or, in many cases, multiple teams-to function as a team. Mocks develop the cohesiveness that we wanted to see and permit the teams to further test each other on knowledge of the treaty, and knowledge of policy."¹⁰

Colonel Kelley turned the responsibility for the detailed coordination and planning of mock inspections over to Captain David R. Carter, USAF. As Chief of European Operations' Plans Branch, he worked directly with other NATO nations' treaty verification agencies to plan each series of mock inspections. Much of the initial coordination was completed over the phone, but final planning was done in person, approximately one month prior to inspection. Face-to-face, the planning officers from the nations ironed out the details of the exercise. After several planning meetings Colonel Kelley opted for a higher ranking team chief, a lieutenant colonel, to accompany Carter as a matter of protocol for the usually senior allied counterparts. For inspections of U.S. facilities, United States European Command (USEUCOM) relinquished the coordination of site selection to OSIA. Captain Carter or one of the Plans Branch NCOs then dealt directly with the component commands to determine which U.S. sites would be available to participate, either ground forces assigned to USAREUR or air forces under USAFE. With a list of U.S. sites available for mock inspection, U.S. planners and their NATO counterparts developed an agenda for the mock inspection including dates, units, locations, notification procedures, expenses, and team composition.¹¹




Seal of the French verification agency L'Unite Francaise de Verification.

The initial U.S. mock inspections were conducted with France's verification agency, L'Unité Française de Vérification. Lt. Colonel Gessert led this mission and the next five U.S. mock inspection missions. Because Lt. Colonel Gessert was new to the on-site inspection process, he relied heavily on his deputy, Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) Michael R. Lukes, USA, who was an experienced INF Treaty inspector. On this first mission, Gessert's nine-person team drove from Rhein-Main Air Base on May 14, 1991, to Strasbourg, France, the point of entry (POE) for this mission. The following day they continued on to Nancy-Ochey Airfield, where Lt. Colonel Gessert declared the French Air Force's 3rd Fighter Wing the object of verification (OOV) for the first OSIA CFE mock inspection. Because the French airfield was very large and there was much to be inspected, Lt. Colonel Gessert surprised his hosts by declining the prepared, formal luncheon.

At the site, Gessert divided his team in two subteams for the inspection, with CW4 Lukes leading the second team. The U.S. teams set out on foot to inspect the site, overlapping each other's efforts to ensure double coverage. Their approach was strictly business, as if the inspection were an actual CFE inspection in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. "We exercised every aspect of the treaty," Gessert recalled, "and made it very, very tough and very, very difficult" for the French escorts. After both U.S. subteams counted all the TLE and confirmed their counts to be correct, Lt. Colonel Gessert declared a sequential inspection. He then signed the inspection report, completing the mock inspection. The following day the American team traveled to Chenevieres for the sequential inspection. There Gessert declared the French Army's 3rd Tank Battalion as the OOV his team would inspect. During this second inspection, Gessert observed that the French military escorts had become much more aggressive in their escort procedures, trying to minimize U.S. access and photography, but always remaining within the guidelines of the treaty. These first mock inspections mirrored what would become the U.S. trademark for all future CFE inspections: an aggressive, "letter of the law" approach to gaining all rights allowed under the treaty.

These missions confirmed that a detailed knowledge of the treaty was the key to a successful mission. Without a thorough knowledge of the treaty, team members could not effectively exercise all their government's treaty rights. Lt. Colonel Gessert also recognized the importance of teamwork and planning. Because an inspection team had limited time on-site, the team needed to develop a plan that allowed all team members to carry out their specific tasks, while allowing for a thorough inspection of the declared site, inspecting all areas and equipment twice. Each individual had to understand his role as an inspector so that the team could complete an inspection effectively. With a strong base of



preparation and training, the team leader could make adjustments on-site as circumstances dictated.¹²

At Rhein-Main, OSIA inspection teams continued to hone their skills in areas such as treaty knowledge, equipment identification, language, and photography. The allied mock inspections allowed teams to test those skills, to encounter different approaches to the same treaty, and to establish inspection standards. Over time nearly all the Eastern countries, as well as the allies, pressed U.S. representatives to commit to scheduling mock inspections. Colonel Kelley believed that the United States had an obligation to give preference to the NATO nations to conduct mock inspections because they "had stuck with us in hard times and been true allies to us." In addition to loyalty to allies, it was also in the U.S. interest that all NATO inspections of Eastern nations be thorough and consistent to provide reliable and accurate information for a confident assessment of treaty compliance.

From May 1991 until the treaty entered into force in July 1992, OSIA inspectors participated in mock CFE inspections with inspection teams from 13 NATO nations. All allied nations except Turkey and Italy participated in 27 OSIA missions, during which U.S. inspection teams conducted mock inspections at more than 50 sites. In addition to mock inspections with NATO teams, OSIA inspectors deployed on 11 missions to U.S. declared sites throughout Western Europe to conduct mock inspections with other OSIA teams. These OSIA-on-OSIA mock inspections provided training not only for the U.S. teams but also for the American military units that would receive Eastern inspection teams when the treaty entered into force. On several occasions, OSIA teams provided classroom training followed by demonstration mock inspections at U.S. declared sites. These missions, known as "road shows,"



Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., briefing Greek inspectors during a mock inspection at Bitburg Air Base, Germany, October 18, 1991.

allowed OSIA inspectors to reach various groups of people who would be responsible for treaty implementation, usually as installation escorts during inspections.

One such mission began on October 28, 1991, when Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, led a team to Sembach Air Base, Germany. During this mission OSIA inspectors trained CFE points of contact (POCs) from USAFE units on treaty escort and challenge inspection procedures. Participants from the 16th Air Force bases in Greece, Italy, Crete, and Turkey gathered, along with Colonel Schuyler (Sky) Foerster, USAF, a member of the U.S. delegation at Vienna, representatives from the 17th Air Force, USAFE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, European Command (EUCOM), and Team Karcz at Sembach Air Base, Headquarters of the 17th Air Force. On October 28th, Colonel Foerster provided classroom treaty training, emphasizing the inspection protocol. Representatives from JCS, EUCOM, and USAFE then offered their organizations' current guidance on treaty escort and challenge inspection procedures. The final blocks of the course provided instruction on working with linguists and with the U.S. government's liaison procedures. The next day Lt. Colonel Karcz demonstrated on-site the lessons taught in the classroom, leading his inspection team through the mock inspection at Sembach Air Base.

Participation in mock inspections enabled OSIA CFE team members to gel as competent, professional inspection teams. Individuals traveled as a team to new and unfamiliar locations, carried out specific tasks as part of an overall team effort to exercise all treaty rights, and gained valuable experience on how best to implement the CFE Treaty. The next step in preparation for the treaty's entry into force was mock inspections with teams from the Eastern group of states. ■

1st U.S./Eastern Mock Inspections

October 7-9, 1991



Czechoslovakian Inspection Team

EASTERN Mock Inspections

The United States participated in mock inspections with Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria before the treaty entered into force in July 1992. A major reason for the success of those missions was Germany's participation as the host state. As a stationing state, the United States needed the cooperation and permission of the German government to bring in Eastern inspection teams. Germany was to be a major player during treaty implementation because there were more than 900 declared sites in the newly unified Germany, including the sites of stationing states such as the United States, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom. These mock inspections offered Germany's Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) an opportunity to test many aspects of implementing the treaty as a host state—these included procedures at the POE, transportation

to the declared site, and providing lodging and food when required.

The first of these inspections occurred on October 8, 1991, when a Czechoslovakian inspection team came to Germany to inspect U.S. forces at Camp Vilseck and the Merrill Barracks. Major Elmer G. (Guy) White, USA, the escort team chief, noted that the drawdown of U.S. forces, coupled with the deployments to the Gulf War, had dramatically changed U.S. forces in Europe. Consequently, the information exchanged at treaty signature was no longer accurate. Because there would be no exchange of data until 30 days after the treaty's entry into force, OSIA escorts would be busy explaining differences between the old data and the status of forces during the initial days of baseline.



Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.

Major White also highlighted a communications problem between his team and Headquarters EUCOM. This problem would recur later during other mock inspections, and it came up during the treaty's baseline phase. One of the duties of U.S. escort team chiefs and liaison officers was to communicate the inspection team's status to EUCOM, which in turn initiated a series of notifications to U.S. forces in Europe. Because of limited phone lines or poor connections through various phone systems, and the compressed time during an inspection, OSIA team chiefs and liaison officers were sometimes unable to contact EUCOM. Instead, they passed the information on to OSIA's European operations center at Rhein-Main. From the operations center, team status was passed to Headquarters EUCOM. It worked, but it was not the way that it had been envisioned. Communications in the future would routinely go through OSIA's operations center and then on to EUCOM.

The next mock inspections with an Eastern nation, and the first opportunity to train outside a NATO nation, were to occur in January and February of 1992, following preliminary discussions in December 1991.¹⁴ As Christmas 1991 approached, Colonel Kelley and Major Henry J. Nowak, USA, traveled from Frankfurt to Moscow, accompanied by Lt. Colonel Peer Schwan of the ZVBW, the German treaty verification organization, to arrange trilateral mock inspections at CFE facilities in both the Soviet Union and Germany. Again, Germany's cooperation was pivotal. As a stationing state, the United States owned none of the territory in the ATTU; consequently, it turned to the sovereign host state before arranging a visit by Soviet inspection teams. Major Griffith S. Hughes, USA, of the Arms Control Implementation Unit of the American Embassy in Moscow, accompanied Colonel Kelley,

Major Nowak, and Lt. Colonel Schwan in Moscow. On December 18, 1991, these four officers met a Soviet delegation of 10 officers led by General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, head of the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Jointly, they planned two mock inspection missions.

The first mission was scheduled for January 1992 in Germany. The inspection sites were the German Artillery Branch School at Idar-Oberstein, the U.S. Air Force's 52d Tactical Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, and the U.S. Army's 200th Theater Army Materiel Command (TAMC) at the Germersheim Army Depot. The second mission, planned for February 1992, would be held in the Leningrad Military District. There, the designated sites were the Soviets' 67th Bomber Regiment at Siverskiy Air Base and the 457th Howitzer Artillery Regiment at Pushkin.

The parties then turned to discussing the ground rules for these mock inspections. These included planning administrative breaks to allow for discussion of possible technical difficulties as they occurred. This provision contributed to a major aspect of these training missions—allowing key treaty participants time to iron out problems before the real inspections took place. The parties also modified treaty inspection timelines to allow for overnight stays. Another deviation from treaty requirements was designating Frankfurt as the single POE for the Soviet mission into Germany. Normally Frankfurt could not be a POE for the three declared sites selected for the inspections. The officers determined that the Soviets would fly into Rhein-Main Air Base and be bussed across the shared runway to Frankfurt International Airport. There German escorts would exercise host state POE procedures; Americans would test their liaison officer procedures; and the Soviets would perhaps avoid airport fees by landing at Rhein-Main. The conferees also discussed notification procedures, the number of inspectors/observers, team composition, inspection languages, dining schedules, equipment markings, and distribution of expenses.

These detailed planning discussions in Moscow, as had been the case with all planning sessions, prevented problems that would have detracted from the quality of training during the mock inspections. For example, Colonel Kelley reminded the Soviets that U.S. inspectors occasionally skipped lunch when conducting inspections, and that escorts were obliged to assist inspectors in carrying out an inspection, even if that meant a missed meal. Other discussions confirmed the U.S. intent to record all external markings of TLE. The Soviets stated that there would be no access to the interior of any equipment for the purpose of recording serial numbers. The planning agendas for both inspection series were reviewed, and both sides agreed to hold postinspection discussions ("hotwashes") at each site to clarify points they had discussed



General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, Director, Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.



Colonel William R. Smith checks the serial number on an AC

du ring each inspection. The group also agreed to discuss any problems encountered during the two missions and to pursue how each nation planned to conduct its inspections.

During this conference several issues arose that were beyond the authority of the conferees and required resolution by their respective governments. A change of inspection dates for the mock inspections in the Leningrad Military District required U.S. government approval. Lt. Colonel Schwann, the ZVBW representative, turned to the German government for approval of a Soviet request to allow a Soviet military aircraft to use Sperenberg Air Base in transit, either before or after dropping off the Soviet inspection team in Frankfurt. Sperenberg Air Base would provide the Soviets an opportunity to refuel their aircraft without purchasing fuel in Frankfurt, which had been a common practice during the INF Treaty implementation. Once those decisions were made, and despite the fact that the Soviet Union had collapsed as a nation on Christmas Day 1991, only seven days after this meeting, planning for the tri-nation mock inspections moved forward.¹⁵

For OSIA, these mock inspections in Russia differed from all previous CFE mock inspections. Colonel Kelley elected to forgo the usual team structure. Instead, he formed teams using only team chiefs and deputies, with the one exception of Technical Sergeant Joseph A. Amen, USAF. He did this because many of the American team leaders had never been in the Soviet Union. As Kelley put it:

"I wanted very badly to avoid a situation in which our team leaders would be rendered ineffective for the first several hours, if not a day, after their entry into the former Soviet Union for the first time, by virtue of awe. They had to get over that awe. The best way to do it was to do so at some time other than when they were performing a real inspection."

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Colonel Kelley wanted to be certain that team leaders realized that military superpower status did not equate with a strong economy; that they held no misconceptions as to whom and what they would be dealing with in the Soviet Union. If team leaders were going to be distracted by their surroundings, Colonel Kelley wanted it to happen in a benign environment, during a mock inspection. When the CFE Treaty entered into force, he wanted the team leaders to be focused on the actual inspection. Kelley thought that this would probably be the only opportunity for team chiefs and deputies to enter the Soviet Union before baseline started—it was a one-shot deal. The team chiefs and deputies would then share their experiences with their teams in preparing them for baseline inspections.¹⁶

A total of 13 American team chiefs or deputies got firsthand exposure to Russian CFE inspection/escort techniques during these mock inspections. Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director of OSIA, was an observer on both missions. Five OSIA team chiefs and three deputies were on the escort team in Germany, January 27-31, 1992, when the Russians visited Spangdahlem Air Base and Germersheim Army Depot. In addition to augmentees and observers, five U.S. team chiefs and two deputies were assigned to the American team that inspected Russian forces at Siverskiy Air Base and at Pushkin, February 10-14, 1992. These nation-to-nation mock inspections revealed differences in treaty interpretation that simply would not have been uncovered except for these exercises.

Captain David R. Carter, USAF, of the Plans Branch at OSIA European Operations, coordinated the effort among USAFE, USAREUR, the German ZVBW, and OSIA to bring about the Russian/German/U.S. mock inspections. The official U.S. escort team chief was Lt. Colonel Donald C. Snedeker, USA, and his deputy was Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, USA. The liaison officers for this mission were Majors Richard J. O'Shea, USAF, and Keith A. Oatman, USA. Major Oatman was an excellent resource for facilitating these inspections because he spoke German and Russian, a benefit derived from the emphasis placed on language skills when manning the unit. Technical Sergeant Joseph A. Amen, USAF, the only enlisted member of the team, was the logistics coordinator, a position usually referred to as the "bagman." Technical Sergeant Amen's role was to make certain that inspectors and escorts were billeted and fed when it was the U.S. government's responsibility to do so. Before departing on the mission, he withdrew funds from the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing accounting and finance center to cover anticipated expenses. He arrived with the escort team at the declared site ahead of the inspectors. There, he made arrangements and paid for billeting or hotel rooms if the teams were spending the night. He also paid for all meals.¹⁷



Captain David R. Carter coordinating a mock inspection at the Operations Center.

At the first Russian/American/German CFE mock inspection, January 27-31, General Parker greeted the incoming inspectors and briefly spoke of the importance of this series of inspections. He welcomed the opportunity for joint training, continued cooperation, mutual trust, and most important-developing a "key blueprint for the CFE verification regime."

On January 27, 1992, little more than a month after the Soviet Union had collapsed, a Russian inspection team arrived in Frankfurt to conduct mock inspections, thus maintaining continuity in arms control treaty implementation. The Russian inspection team and six Russian observers underwent POE procedures with the host German escort team. The U.S. liaison team, General Parker, and Colonel Kelley were also there. The Russians declared their first inspection site, Idar-Oberstein, and departed with the German host state escorts. After an overnight administrative hold, the Russian inspectors arrived at Idar-Oberstein at 0830 for the mock inspection. Following the inspection, the two teams held an informal discussion, reviewing the procedures and inspection issues. Then, the Russian team chief followed treaty protocol procedures and declared a sequential inspection at Spangdahlem Air Base. Finally, again following treaty protocols precisely, the two team chiefs signed the inspection report. While the Russian inspectors and observers, the U.S. liaison team, and General Parker and Colonel Kelley spent the night at Idar-Oberstein, the U.S. escort team traveled ahead to Spangdahlem Air Base. There they made final, last-minute preparations for the next day's inspection.

Upon leaving Idar-Oberstein, the German escort team continued their responsibilities for the Russian inspection team and transported them to the next inspection site. The U.S. escort team greeted the Russian and German teams upon arrival at Spangdahlem Air Base and once again assumed escort responsibilities from the Germans. After providing refreshments and the site diagram to the Russians at the Officers' Club, Lt. Colonel Snedeker and his team waited 30 minutes for the Russians to declare the OOV to be inspected. The Russian team chief declared the 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing, and the Americans began the site briefing.

Following this briefing, the entire Russian inspection team participated in a bus ride around the base. Colloquially known as a "windshield tour," this bus ride gave the inspection team a chance to compare the site diagram with the actual facilities, a practice that many nations would later adopt in escorting inspection teams. After the windshield tour the Russian team broke into three subgroups, which departed immediately for different areas on the base to begin their inspections. The Russian inspectors requested access to all doors that exceeded the treaty's two-meter limit and were satisfied with visual access if they could readily determine there was no TLE present in a building. If the inspectors

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U.S. escorts confirm a two-meter opening during a mock inspection at Lakenheath Air Base, England.



could not immediately determine that there was no TLE in a facility, the American escorts provided them access as far into a facility as necessary to confirm there was no TLE there, or until they encountered doors that did not exceed two meters.

When one subgroup requested access to the Munitions Storage Area, Lt. Colonel Snedeker responded that the area was a sensitive point with limited access. He offered the inspectors an option to select four of the bunkers within the storage area for visual access only. The inspectors however, wanted either total access or no access to the area. Lt. Colonel Snedeker referred to the treaty definition of a sensitive point as allowing total, limited, or no access. At that point the Russian inspectors declined the American offer for limited access and proceeded to inspect other areas. By evening, the Russian team had finished its inspection, conducted a briefing, declared the sequential inspection (the 200th TAMC at Germersheim Army Depot), and completed the inspection report. After a dinner at the NCO Club, all teams left for Germersheim, where they remained overnight. The next day the Russians conducted their inspection, participated in a briefing, completed their report, and departed promptly for Rhein-Main, where they remained overnight before returning to Moscow the next day.¹⁸

Several issues arose during the inspections of the two U.S. sites. Photography was a point of contention on several occasions, specifically, the framing of photos. The U.S. escorts insisted that inspectors photograph an entire object, not just a part of it. U.S. escorts stated that an inspection team's photos were a tool in counting equipment, not a means to focus on an aspect of a specific piece of equipment or the area around it. Subsequently, in February 1992, during the U.S. mock inspection at Siverskiy Air

Base, Russian escorts reciprocated by changing the framing of U.S. photos of Russian aircraft. Announcing when inspectors were going to take a picture also became an issue when the Russians declared that, under the treaty, they were required to announce their intention to take photos only once. In December 1991 at Vienna, however, General Il'edvedev had stated that an announcement should be made prior to each photo. Later, Russian escort officials concurred with that position during a U.S. mock inspection at Pushkin.

Because the treaty does not define a container, differences of interpretation arose during the mock inspections at U.S. facilities. The inspection protocol allows for the inspection of any container that exceeds two meters in all dimensions. The Russian inspectors defined a container as anything that "contains," to include the trailer of a tractor trailer rig or a communications vehicle. The U.S. position was that the back of a truck was a piece of equipment, and if the vehicle was not a piece of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST), inspectors had no right to inspect the vehicle. Later, in April 1992, Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance on containers allowed inspectors to view the interior of cargo vehicles or tractor trailers. Other vehicles that had been modified for other uses, such as communications vehicles, called for different procedures. If the modification to the vehicle were not readily apparent, an effort would be made to show that it was a modified piece of equipment and did not contain TLE.¹⁹

Another question was sparked by the presence of two Egyptian F-4 fighters at Spangdahlem. The Russian inspectors felt the fighters should have been declared as CAEST; the U.S. response



U.S. site escorts open a container during a mock inspection.



SU-24 parked outside aircraft shelter at Siverskiy Air Base, Russia, during mock inspection in February 1992.

was that since Egypt was not a signatory to the treaty, the Egyptian fighters were not subject to the treaty, and the United States would not report it during a site briefing or through formal CFE reporting channels.

Shortly after these Russian mock inspections in Germany were complete, a nine-man American inspection team led by Lt. Colonel Gallagher conducted the mock inspections in Russia. The inspection team and six observers departed Rhein-Main on an Air Force C-141 on February 10, 1992. They arrived in Moscow around noon and, after a brief greeting, the Russians immediately initiated POE procedures. After Gallagher declared Siverskiy Air Base to be the first inspection site, the teams agreed to stop the inspection clock. The team—along with General Parker, Colonel Kelley, and other observers—remained overnight in Moscow. The following morning all departed for Siverskiy Air Base, where they conducted the first inspection. The American team departed for Pushkin the next day, where it conducted its inspection of the Russian Army artillery site over the next two days. After completing the second inspection on the 13th, Lt. Colonel Gallagher's team spent the night in Pushkin, returning to Moscow the next morning and then to Rhein-Main to complete the mission.

Photography again proved to be a source of questions during these inspections. One situation dealt with the number of photographs inspectors were allowed to take of CAEST. Escort officials questioned the need to take more than one photo of any piece of CAEST. Lt. Colonel Gallagher countered that photos were allowed

to account for CAEST. He added that there was no way of determining how many subteams had photographed a piece of equipment and that treaty-authorized use of video cameras made the question moot. This issue was resolved when the Russian escorts reluctantly agreed that there was no limit. Reciprocity, which was an element of operations under INF inspections, also came into play during these CFE mock inspections when the Russians required U.S. inspectors to frame photos of SU-24s, just as U.S. escorts had required Russian inspectors to frame F-16 photos in January.

In addition to photo questions, a site diagram issue arose during the inspection at Pushkin. Russian escorts presented to the American inspectors a site diagram that did not indicate common areas, only the areas specific to the two OOVs at Pushkin. The American team chief, Lt. Colonel Gallagher asserted that the diagram was not complete because it did not show the extent of its manmade external boundary. This limited the inspection team's access on the site. The Russian escorts did not agree with his interpretation of the treaty and did not alter the boundary of the site on the diagram. Lt. Colonel Gallagher noted the problem on the inspection report. It was a problem that would resurface during the baseline period and become the focus of a concerted allied effort to change the Russian interpretation.²⁰

The February 1992 mission to Russia was the first CFE mock inspection deployment into the Eastern group of states. Following that mission, from March 15 through May 9, OSIA teams con-

7. COMMENTS BY STATES PARTIES INVOLVED (CONTINUED)

b. OTHER COMMENTS

INSPECTING STATE PARTY	STATE PARTY WHOSE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ARE BEING INSPECTED
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Extract of re/J ort from 1 mock inspection at Pushkin, Russia, February 1992.

ducted mock inspections in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland before the treaty entered into force in July 1992. The final OSIA mock inspection with an Eastern nation before the treaty's entry into force occurred on May 11, 1992, when Bulgarian inspectors deployed to Belgium. Each of these missions uncovered problems that were corrected on the spot, or noted and passed on for resolution by the U.S. government. One problem that inspectors could not correct was the presence of look-alike equipment in Czechoslovakia that was not included in the protocol on existing types of conventional armaments and equipment.

Site diagrams also proved to be a problem at several locations. In Czechoslovakia, an escort team gave a thorough site briefing using wall charts; however, the site diagrams provided to the inspection team were not as accurate. The Czech escorts believed that the treaty requirement to provide a site diagram was satisfied by the wall charts and that giving diagrams to the inspectors exceeded treaty requirements. The Czechs later changed their view on this issue. In Romania, escorts presented a site diagram that included the entire town adjacent to the military installation. The American inspection team discussed treaty requirements for site diagrams with their hosts, whereupon the Romanians narrowed the scope of their site diagram. In several states the U.S. teams experienced difficulties communicating with the U.S. Embassy. National phone systems were sometimes inadequate, and often U.S. Embassy personnel were not yet aware of notification requirements mandated by the treaty.

In all, from May 14, 1991, through July 5, 1992, OSIA inspection teams deployed on 44 mock inspection missions. During these missions, OSIA inspectors participated in nearly 100 mock inspections. American inspectors trained with inspectors from 18 nations and shared their knowledge with representatives or units from USAREUR, USAFE, and U.S. Navy Europe. Typically, a mission lasted for several days and involved two or more mock inspections. Although the stay at any one location was brief, the mock inspections provided an understanding of how U.S. teams would conduct an inspection and how U.S. teams would work with foreign teams inspecting U.S. forces. In addition, these inspections familiarized U.S. inspectors with the environment of the Eastern states, which would prepare them for contingencies that might arise during an actual inspection mission. These missions also tested the efficiency of the logistics system used to prepare and transport U.S. teams. One group that did not benefit from this series of mock inspections, however, was the U.S. liaison personnel, who would not be ready to perform until days before the treaty entered into force.

ROI OF THE LIAISON OFFICERS

During treaty negotiations, U.S. delegates were satisfied that proposed escort provisions would protect American interests when Eastern teams conducted CFE inspections at U.S. installations. It wasn't until late in negotiations that the United States recognized that there were many U.S. facilities, equipment, and personnel throughout Western Europe that were not subject to the treaty but were nonetheless vulnerable to CFE inspections. These forces were located on allied installations or at separate locations, not on U.S. installations. They were vulnerable during challenge inspections of specified areas or inspections of allied forces. Consequently, the United States insisted that the treaty contain a provision requiring a liaison officer's presence during any inspection of a nation's forces. OSIA's European Operations Command was not manned to carry out these liaison duties. The manning document allowed for two liaison officers; however, their planned duties did not include deployments throughout Western Europe whenever Eastern teams conducted CFE inspections.

The first American liaison officer (LNO), Major Richard J. O'Shea, USAF, arrived at OSIA's European Operations Command in February 1991. One of O'Shea's first tasks was to develop a list of the locations of American forces throughout Europe. OSIA LNOs needed to know exactly what U.S. interests could be vulnerable to an Eastern CFE Treaty inspection team. The list proved difficult to start and impossible to complete. No single headquarters in Europe maintained a list of all U.S. forces in Europe. Lists of major units—units that would be reportable under the treaty as well as non-CFE units—were readily available from USAFE and USAREUR. Determining the whereabouts of the many small groups of U.S. military people and equipment, however, proved extremely difficult. Within a few months, Major O'Shea determined that his list encompassed more than 1,200 locations throughout the NATO treaty area; in Germany alone there were 140 U.S. OOVs as well as 741 U.S. facilities that were not on U.S. declared sites. In addition, the drawdown of U.S. forces from Europe caused movements of people and equipment, much of which were not reportable under the CFE Treaty. This made it difficult to maintain a current list.

Two NCOs assigned to the Plans Section—Technical Sergeant Ronald S. Fox, USAF, and Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Bradley, USAF—assisted Major O'Shea by designing and building a computer database nicknamed "Big Hog" to identify U.S. forces, declared sites, and POEs throughout Europe. The numerous locations made the list difficult to compile; the locations of classified programs made it impossible to complete. The JCS placed responsibility for the CFE liaison mission on OSIA; however, OSIA was not privy to ongoing classified programs. Consequently, the



Major Richard J. O'Shea, first U.S. Liaison Officer.

"working" list that Major O'Shea developed provided OSIA liaison teams the most reliable and current information available in Europe. It was clear, however, that U.S. teams could be called to protect U.S. interests, whatever they might be, at any place and at any time within the NATO states.²¹

Although the JCS guidance on the OSIA liaison mission spelled out what was to be accomplished, manpower to carry out that mission was not addressed. The JCS guidance required that a U.S. liaison team be available to the NATO states' escort team whenever Eastern inspectors arrived at a POE to conduct CFE inspections. Each U.S. liaison team would arrive ahead of the inspection team and remain available to the host escort team throughout the Eastern team's mission in case U.S. interests were involved. By October 1991, OSIA European Operations did not have sufficient manning to accomplish the liaison mission during baseline, and Major O'Shea remained the lone LNO assigned. Colonel Kelley turned to Headquarters to press for a solution. He indicated that 13 temporary duty two-person teams would be required during the 120-day baseline period. Kelley recommended 13 teams based on the inspection quotas of the U.S. and the NATO allies, travel time to all NATO POEs compared to notification times, and the assumption that the Eastern states would conduct all inspections available to them in Western Europe. He also pointed out that following the baseline period, OSIA would require four officers to carry out the continuing liaison mission; therefore, three additional officers should be assigned permanently. Colonel Kelley emphasized the importance of experience with life in Europe and a proficiency in a European language—German, French, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, Greek, or Portuguese (in that order)—when selecting officers for liaison duty.²²



OS/A inspectors inside bomb bay of B-52 bomber during mock START inspection.

The issue of who would supply the 13 temporary teams was not resolved until the summer of 1992. Headquarters and other OSIA locations had sufficient personnel to execute the CFE liaison mission. However, many of these people were preparing to implement other treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. When the issue of CFE liaison support arose, Headquarters personnel pointed to the possibility that these treaties might enter into force simultaneously, requiring a maximum effort from Headquarters to implement these other treaties. Outside OSIA, an increasingly smaller USA REUR also balked at providing teams for the 120-day temporary duty. In February 1992, Major General Robert W. Parker, USA F Director of OSIA, decided that unless START and CFE entered into force simultaneously, OSIA would provide the temporary liaison support. By June 1992, it became apparent that in the following month the CFE Treaty would enter into force, and it was equally clear that START, stranded in the ratification process, would not enter into force. The liaison teams would come from OSIA Y


On each team, the temporary liaison team members, one officer and one enlisted, were knowledgeable and experienced in one of the other arms control treaties, but not the CFE Treaty. All would require training on the CFE Treaty and on the specific duties and responsibilities of a U.S. LNO. In addition to LNOs, two additional temporary teams for escort and reduction inspections would receive CFE Treaty training at the same time. Major O'Shea recommended that European Operations conduct the training at Rhein-Main so that students would be free of the distractions of Headquarters and home. At Rhein-Main the future team members could focus on their upcoming duties.

During the course Major O'Shea provided more than a third of the classroom treaty instruction and nearly all the liaison-specific instruction. Throughout the course he stressed activities expected to occur in Germany. Other treaty experts taught equipment familiarization and demonstrated an escort mission, while representatives of the German and the British verification agencies provided their



Headquarters OSIA near Washington, D.C., was the primary source for liaison officers during CFE haseline.

U.S. CFE LIAISON TEAM DEPLOYMENTS



agencies' perspectives on liaison operations.

Three days after the CFE Liaison (7-11 July) and CFE Treaty (13-16 July) courses, half the graduates were in place throughout Europe awaiting Eastern inspection teams, while the rest returned to their duty sections. Midway through baseline, at the end of 60 days, the two groups would rotate positions.¹⁴

The concenwnion of American and NATO forces in Central Europe dictated that the U.S. liaison mission focus on Germany. Conversely, the flanks or outlying areas, such as Portugal, held far fewer U.S. or NATO forces, would be subject to fewer Eastern inspections, and therefore would require fewer American LNOs. The primary consideration in team placement was

response time. Six liaison teams in Germany could operate effectively from Rhein-Main to meet inspection teams in Germany, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece. Commercial airline schedules were not timely enough, and military airlift was too limited to support LNO missions that could be unpredictable and possibly frequent in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain, or Portugal. To satisfy the U.S. government policy to have a liaison team available for each Eastern inspection team, two teams deployed to the United Kingdom while two teams traveled to Turkey, and one team deployed to Spain to stand by to carry out liaison operations. The single team in Madrid was also prepared to respond to an Eastern team in Portugal.

Luxembourg, Iceland, and France were exceptions for U.S. liaison operations. There were no U.S. forces in France, only six M47 tanks. In the unlikely event of an inspection of those tanks, the U.S. would forgo its right to be present at the inspection. Luxembourg and Iceland had no OOVs of their own, but there were U.S. OOVs and declared sites located on their territory. When an Eastern state announced its intent to inspect in one of these nations, an entire U.S. escort team would deploy because the inspection had to be on a U.S. declared site.²⁵

FJNAL PREPARATIO S

During the 30 days prior to the CFE Treaty's entry into force, Colonel Kelley provided the inspection teams one last opportunity to shore up any weak spots in their readiness to conduct their missions. He directed the support branches to provide the inspection division with briefings and refresher training programs on specific topics he felt would be critical to a successful baseline effort. The Logistics Division reviewed and refined "bagman"

procedures, vehicle operations, supply, and procuring air transportation under several different scenarios. Plans and Analysis briefed inspection teams on target folders, special databases, and other areas of direct assistance. The Plans Branch also reminded inspectors of their responsibility to provide accurate information needed to develop treaty notification messages. The Operations Branch provided training on its capabilities for assisting teams through communications and current information on different countries. Other briefings and training dealt with team equipment, photography, TLE identification, emergency medical training, and preparation of CFE Treaty reports.²⁶

Transportation

Transportation was critical for successful implementation of the treaty. Inspection teams traveled hundreds or even thousands of miles to arrive at distant points of entry (POEs) at the notified time. Liaison and escort teams had to react with minimal notice to the arrival of Eastern inspection teams at NATO states. The escort teams had to transport up to 10 people, including a bagman. Escort and liaison teams needed flexible and timely transportation to meet the limited notifications allowed in declared site or challenge inspections. Trains and commercial planes in the region were excellent, but they ran only on fixed schedules and didn't go directly to the inspection sites or all POEs. Because automobiles could satisfy mission requirements for 90 percent of the U.S. OOVs, escort and liaison teams in Germany and the nearby Benelux countries relied on minivans. Vans allowed teams to leave at any time and to go directly to the inspection site or POE. During baseline, each escort team was assigned two minivans to transport all team members and their gear. The two-person LNO teams deployed by station wagon. The motor pool at Rhein-Main could not support OSIA with a fleet of 15 minivans and 7 station wagons, so OSIA leased them from two local companies. Liaison teams pre-positioned outside Germany normally used rental cars in their missions. Motor vehicles, however, could not satisfy all of OSIA's mission requirements.²⁷

To conduct CFE inspections in the Eastern states, U.S. teams would deploy to national entry points as far away as Moscow. American escort teams would also respond, on short notice, to areas across Western Europe from the United Kingdom to Turkey. Airlift was the only way to implement the treaty in those circumstances. In early planning Major Steven E. Pestana, USAF, of the Mission Coordination Branch, studied the possibility of using C-20 class aircraft. These small business jets were perhaps the best suited for the mission, although there was concern that all the inspectors and their belongings could exceed weight limits of the aircraft. With the Gulf War and the drawdown of American forces in Europe, however, the C-20s were no longer an option. There



Minivans and station wagons were primarily transportation for escort and liaison teams.



A C-141 from the 437th MAC prepared to depart Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, on an OSIA mission.

were not enough suitable U.S. aircraft in Europe to support the

CFE mission. In January 1990, the director of operations at Headquarters USAFE announced that the Military Airlift Command (MAC) would provide C-141, C-130, or C-5 airlift for the CFE mission, based on passenger or load requirements. In addition, USAFE would provide C-130 aircraft to support the CFE mission. The 435th Tactical Airlift Wing at Rhein-Main, a USAFE unit,¹ and the 437th and 438th Military Airlift Wings from Charleston AFB, South Carolina, and McGuire AFB, New Jersey, both MAC wings, would provide airlift support to OSIA teams.

The 435th crews flew C-130s on inspection missions into Eastern Europe, and also were tasked to support CFE escort missions outside Central Europe. To perform that mission, which could be on short notice for escort operations, the 435th kept two crews and one C-130 on alert. Meanwhile, crews of the 437th and 438th flew C-141s on inspection missions into the former Soviet Union. The MAC wings alternated support with two C-141s that were pre-positioned at Rhein-Main. Wilbur Lewis, Jr., of OSIA's Military Airlift Coordination Branch, arranged for the C-141

¹During the same time OSIA was preparing for CFE Treaty implementation, the U.S. Air Force underwent a reorganization. As a part of this reorganization, control of Rhein-Main Air Base and its host unit, the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, passed from MAC to USAFE. Previously, while USAFE played a major role in scheduling the 435th's C-130 theater airlift forces, it did not actually own the unit. The reorganization also resulted in many redesignations, both to field units and major commands. On 1 June 1992, MAC inactivated and was replaced by the Air Mobility Command (AMC). In addition, both Military Airlift Wings and Tactical Airlift Wings were redesignated simply as Airlift Wings.

support from OSIA Headquarters. The Plans Branch at European Operations (EO) coordinated C-130 missions at Rhein-Main.

One of the elements of coordinating airlift support was tracking vital information on all aircrew members.²⁸ The protocol on inspection required that each signatory provide a list to all other treaty nations of aircrew members (600 maximum) and inspectors (400 maximum) designated to support or participate in CFE inspections. The list included names, gender, date and place of birth, and passport number. The long, detailed U.S. list was compiled by OSIA's Treaty List Management Branch. Once the list was compiled, OSIA turned it over to the U.S. State Department for dissemination to other nations at Vienna. The inspection protocol required each state to provide this list to all other signatories within 90 days after treaty signature. The next opportunity to update lists came within 30 days of treaty implementation. In addition, the treaty allowed a nation receiving the list up to 30 days to review it and request that the originating state delete certain names from the list; there was no right of refusal to delete names. Because of the long period between signature and entry into force, the U.S. list was outdated at entry into force. Some people were no longer available for duty but were still on the list, and others who arrived after the original list was submitted were available for duty but not listed. This situation would affect OSIA's early baseline operations.²⁹

Communications

Communications under the INF Treaty had been relatively simple. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRRC) at the U.S. State Department passed information directly to the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Moscow. A single conduit passed all required data. Under the CFE Treaty, a new system, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) communications network, was only partially functional when the treaty's baseline inspection phase started in July 1992.

The CSCE members had anticipated a communications network linking 35 CSCE capitals and three CSCE institutions 24 hours a day. The system, designed to support the Vienna Document, was linked by a central switching center at The Hague. Unfortunately, when the system was designed, the Soviet Union required only one terminal, in Moscow. With the breakup of the USSR, however, a glaring weakness in the CSCE communications system surfaced. No nation in the former Soviet Union, except Russia, had the hardware to connect to the system. Hardware was expensive, and newly emerging nations opted to apply their limited resources to other pressing matters. As a result, during CFE baseline the U.S. NRRRC transmitted CFE messages to only those nations that were operating on the CSCE network.



The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the Department of State sent and received treaty messages.

To reach those nations that were not yet on the network, and as a back up in case of a system failure, the State Department also sent CFE notification messages through diplomatic channels. Diplomatic channels sometimes entailed hand-carried messages from the U.S. Embassy to the appropriate officials in that state. Acknowledgment of receipt and acceptance of an inspection required additional hand-carried notes from state agencies to the U.S. Embassy. This added a burden to some embassy staffs that were already extremely busy and, as was discovered during mock inspections, were sometimes unaware of notification requirements of the CFE Treaty. Meanwhile, the Plans Branch and

Operations at EO had opened an informal "back door" communications network that eclipsed the formal system during the early stages of baseline.

This informal communications system was based on the excellent working relationships of staff with their counterparts in verification agencies throughout Europe. This informal system developed with the initial outreach for mock inspections and grew day to day as the agencies—particularly the German, French, British, and U.S. agencies—repeatedly looked to each other for reliable and timely information. This informal network would prove valuable during baseline, when the formal notification system occasionally failed. Fortunately, the informal communication system provided a safety net, and frequently OSIA liaison teams had to prepare or deploy based on information from this network.

As baseline drew near, the teams were trained and eager, equipment was in place, transportation stood ready, and several communications systems were operating.³⁰

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Chapter 5

FINAL PREPARATIONS: NATO AND WTO NATIONS



Defense ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council meet at NATO headquarters.

What was the status of the other CFE Treaty states as they prepared to implement the treaty? On the first day of the treaty's entry into force, every state had to be ready to carry out its treaty obligations and rights. Obligations meant that states had to be prepared to display and account for their treaty-limited equipment (TLE); ready to send and receive treaty-required communications regarding force data, reduction activities, and notifications of all inspections; and ready to receive inspection teams, transport them to the declared sites, host and escort them on-site, and return them to the point of entry (POE) after completion of the inspection. Treaty rights focused on the selection, preparation, and training of inspection teams that would monitor the different phases of the treaty. They also included the opportunity to send national delegates to serve on the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), which was responsible for facilitating the treaty's implementation. A survey of the 29 CFE Treaty states on

The Russian N R R C-the largest, most experienced verification agency in the Eastern states.



the eve of the treaty's entry into force on July 17, 1992, revealed a wide degree of preparedness, as one might expect from a wide array of nations-large and small, stable and unstable, and spread over a continent.

Within NATO, four nations-the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain-had established new agencies or expanded existing on-site inspection organizations in 1990-91. Other NATO nations, such as Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, set up small arms control verification staffs in their ministries of defense or on their general staffs. Generally, nations with larger military forces set up separate agencies to implement the treaty, while smaller nations opted for military staff offices to satisfy CFE requirements.

Within the Eastern group of states, the Soviet Union/Russia had the largest and most experienced inspection agency. Established in 1987 to implement the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Soviet Union's inspectorate, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), became the new Russian nation's inspection agency late in 1991. To implement the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union's NRRC had established treaty support organizations in the Soviet military districts. From 1988 to 1991, when all INF treaty items had been eliminated, these support elements gained invaluable experience working with inspection regimes, reduction protocols, notification requirements, and timelines. Consequently, when Belarus and Ukraine set up their CFE Treaty verification agencies in 1992, they had a cadre of people experienced in implementing arms control treaties. Six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, eight of the newly independent states became parties to the CFE Treaty in June 1992 at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Oslo. They were Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and

Kazakhstan. Of these states, only Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine possessed a professional cadre of inspectors, escorts, reduction facilities, and institutional relationships with national military forces. The other states, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, had little or no direct treaty experience. Many of these new nations were caught up in internal and external wars and had little time or interest in any treaty that would reduce conventional armaments.

As with agencies of the NATO nations, the size and structure of the Eastern European nations' inspectorates varied considerably. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania established CFE Treaty verification agencies either before treaty signature in November 1990, or shortly thereafter in early 1991. In 1991, Poland established a separate verification agency with an authorized force of 85 military officers and civilians, and placed the new organization in the Ministry of National Defense. Hungary, by contrast, set up a small arms control section within its national armed forces in 1990.

CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN AND RUSSIA CFE TREATY INSPECTION TEAMS

When Germany established its Federal Armed Forces Verification Center, the Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW), in October 1990, it had an authorized staff



German team chief signing reduction inspection report in Slovakia.



German officers of the ZVB W training to implement the Open Skies Treaty.

of 65 inspectors, communicators, trainers, logisticians, and administrators.¹ For its initial cadre of CFE Treaty inspectors, the new German center drew upon a small group of military officers who had been conducting inspections of large-scale military exercises of the CSCE states under the Stockholm Document of 1986. A few of these experienced officers became CFE inspection team leaders. For the other CFE team leaders, the German Bundeswehr requested volunteers. Many officers applied, and by December 1989, some 11 months before the CFE Treaty was signed, all the German CFE team leaders had been selected and enrolled in an intensive Russian language course. Colonel Joern Steinberg recalls that he and the other German team leaders studied for nine months at the national language school at Hurler, Germany.² All German team leaders were professional military officers, 40 to 50 years old, with 15 to 25 years of service in the German army, air force, or navy.

The German verification center opened in October 1990 at Geilenkirchen and immediately began the process of organizing inspection teams. Each team trained as a unit, concentrating on learning the treaty as well as the current military force structure and the TLE of a single signatory state or group of states. German CFE Treaty inspection teams were led by colonels, with lieutenant colonels serving as deputies and captains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as inspectors. [In 1991 and 1992, the German verification center grew rapidly, acquiring new missions under the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992. By July 1992, the center had 400 personnel on board. A considerable part of this growth reflected the incorpora-

army, air force, and navy. Under the CFE Treaty, France declared 1,355 tanks, 1,392 artillery pieces, 4,154 armored combat vehicles, 376 helicopters, and 688 fighter aircraft. As a state party, France declared 168 sites and 211 objects of verification. Brigadier General Jean-Paul Huet served as the first Commandant; in April 1992, Colonel Rozec assumed command.⁷

From the beginning, the French inspectorate developed "organic teams," each with a dedicated team leader, deputy, linguists, and inspectors. Their approach to preparing for an inspection mission was similar to the German inspection teams'-studying a specific nation's TLE holdings, current force structure, and organizational lines. For part of their time, each French inspection team worked directly with French army and air force units and installations subject to CFE Treaty inspections, providing training on the treaty, inspection protocols, and reduction procedures.⁸

Great Britain had experience with on-site inspections under the Stockholm Document of 1986 and with the British Military Liaison Mission in Berlin from 1947 to 1991. Its officers were professional, knowledgeable, and at the forefront in analysis and evaluations. In August 1990, the British Ministry of Defense selected Colonel Roy Giles, RAF, to lead the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG). Located at RAF Scampton, the new four-service group drew personnel from the Royal Navy, Marines, Army, and Air Force. It had an assigned strength of 120 officers, NCOs, and civilians. From the beginning, Colonel Giles directed that the British group would use full-time inspection and escort teams. Most of the initial cadre of inspectors had served in Berlin with the British Military Liaison Mission or had worked as interpreters in the Berlin Corridor. They were very knowledgeable on the Soviet Union, its armed forces, and its military equipment. Colonel Giles encouraged volunteers, especially officers and NCOs with Russian language skills.⁹



The Belgian concept of operations called for the establishment of a small professional verification staff attached to the Ministry of Defense in Brussels. This staff would organize, train, and lead the Belgian CFE Treaty inspection and escort teams, which were composed of inspectors drawn from the ranks of the military services. Early in 1990 the General Staff selected two groups of five midlevel officers, all lieutenant colonels, and enrolled them in an intensive Russian language course.¹⁰ According to Lt. Colonel Fred Janssen, Director of Operations, L'Unite Beige de Verification, initial language training for the team leaders would enable them "to express themselves in normal, ordinary daily talks" with their Russian military escorts.¹¹ For treaty issues and technical questions that might arise during the inspection, Janssen indicated that each team would have some inspectors who were qualified interpreters. It is interesting that the leaders of the

Belgian verification agency envisioned, almost from the beginning, multinational CFE inspection teams composed of inspectors from several different nations. Inspectors from Luxembourg joined the Belgian agency's initial language training course, as did officers from the Dutch inspectorate. For the three Benelux nations, this joint language training signaled a willingness to participate in other joint activities in implementing the treaty.¹²

In the Netherlands, in early 1990 the Ministry of Defense set up a small treaty verification staff called the Arms Control Branch. Its mission was to assume responsibility for the nation's CFE Treaty compliance and to coordinate with the Dutch military forces on all aspects of treaty implementation. According to Navy Commander C.N.M. Wierema, Director of the Arms Control Branch, the Netherlands operated under a "cadre" concept in implementing the CFE Treaty, meaning that the Arms Control Branch would be a small, joint-service staff, with approximately 16 to 18 military officers. Their principal role was compiling the Netherlands' required treaty data submissions, developing all official treaty notifications, coordinating the scheduling and conduct of inspections and reductions with the military forces, and representing the nation at the Verification Coordinating Committee meetings held at Headquarters NATO. The Dutch army identified 80 to 85 officers and NCOs to be trained as CFE Treaty inspectors and escorts, and the Dutch air force dedicated 30 to 35 officers to assist in implementing the treaty. When it came to conducting CFE Treaty inspections in the Eastern nations, the Arms Control Branch selected senior army or air force officers, usually in the rank of lieutenant colonel, to serve as team chiefs. The Dutch required their inspectors to speak and understand Russian. According to Commander Wierema, "It takes about a year and a half before the inspectors reach the required level in their language skills. Russian is very difficult."¹³

When Poland established its verification agency in 1990, the Polish government was in the midst of a general restructuring of its armed forces. Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Director of the Polish Verification Unit, explained that Poland had elected to place the new center in the civilian component of the Ministry of National Defense, outside the military structure of the armed forces. He added, "It cooperates very closely with the military component."¹⁴ After CFE Treaty signature in November 1990, the Ministry of National Defense determined that the verification center's initial staffing was not sufficient to carry out Poland's treaty requirements. In its November 1990 data submission, Poland stated that it had 124 declared sites and 149 military units, or objects of verification (OOVs) with TLE. At the same time, Poland's reduction liability was approximately 1,120 tanks, 690 artillery pieces, 1,130 armored personnel vehicles, and 91 aircraft. Consequently, the Ministry of National Defense organized special



*Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski,
Director, Polish Verification Unit.*



General-Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygankov, Deputy Director, Russian NRRC.

arms control sections in each of the Polish army's military districts and at the Polish Armed Forces Headquarters. Colonel Malinowski explained, "The center's present activities are, among other things, to supervise activities of these divisions in the military structure."¹⁵ For CFE inspection and escort team leaders, Poland used professional military officers who were experienced and knowledgeable about armaments and equipment included in the CFE Treaty. Competence in a foreign language was an important criterion for selection. Colonel Malinowski said that from their initial planning, they had anticipated hosting many national inspection teams at Polish reduction facilities and declared sites.¹⁶

The largest CFE Treaty state, Russia, had significant advantages in recruiting, selecting, and training its CFE inspection teams because of its experience in implementing the INF Treaty. The Soviet Union's inspection agency, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), was located in Moscow. When Russia emerged as a successor state, the NRRC retained all the agency's missions, functions, and personnel. Thus, Russia had an existing treaty verification organization, experienced leaders, and a corps of professional inspectors and escorts steeped in the procedures and processes of conducting and escorting on-site inspection teams.¹⁷ To carry out the provisions of the CFE Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the other arms control agreements, the Russian center had approximately 150 to 200 personnel.

General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, Director of the NRRC, selected General-Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygankov to lead CFE Treaty operations. Six months before state representatives signed the CFE Treaty in Paris, Tsygankov arrived in Moscow to become Deputy Director of the NRRC. He began all of his preparations, he said, "with the treaty theory."^x He also drew upon his years of service with the Soviet Armed Forces Group of Western Forces, where he had participated in inspections under the Stockholm Document. In selecting CFE team chiefs, deputies, and inspectors, General Tsygankov worked closely with General Medvedev and Colonel S.N. Slepnev, Director of Operations for the CFE Treaty Section. For team leaders they selected career military officers with at least 15 years of service. General Tsygankov indicated that some of Russia's CFE team chiefs had been "regimental commanders," others had held important "staff positions," and all "were considered professionals." The key element, he declared, in the selection of team chiefs was their "leadership skills." He observed, "Almost every officer in the center works as an inspection team leader or as an escort team leader. When they go on an inspection, they are responsible for supervis-

ing at least nine people. When you are assigned to the escort team, you are to some extent the leader of the inspection facility, so you are in charge of that facility. The inspection team leader, or the escort team leader, is the representative of Russia. This is a very important appointment because everything that he says is on behalf of Russia."¹⁹

The Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspection (NAKI) was established in June 1992, just weeks before the CFE Treaty entered into force. Under the treaty, Belarus had 87 sites subject to inspection. Even more important, the nation had a reduction liability of 1,873 tanks, 441 armored personnel vehicles, and 130 fighters. This was a significant reduction liability, especially since Belarus was a newly independent nation, having achieved its independence in December 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When the national verification agency was set up, the president made it directly subordinate to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Military Policy of the Republic. General-Major Viktor K. Vakar served as the agency's first Commander.

Although the Belarussian agency was set up just weeks before the CFE Treaty entered into force, the initial cadre of inspectors, escorts, and linguists had had experience under the Soviet Union in implementing arms control treaties and agreements. Belarus had been a Soviet military district with 27 sites subject to inspection under the INF Treaty. From 1988 through 1991, U.S. inspection teams had conducted more than 100 INF Treaty inspections in Belarus. Two major INF Treaty reduction centers, Lesnaya and Stankovo, had been located within the Byelorussian Military District. Most of the officers and specialists who operated these reduction centers were incorporated into the new Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspection.

The Belarus NAKI had five divisions: planning, operational communications and information systems, international relations, escorting and inspecting, and support and logistics. Colonel M.Y. Melomedov, Deputy Chief of NAKI, explained that the escort and inspection division had responsibility for hosting all foreign inspection teams that would be monitoring Belarus's substantial reduction liabilities. To reduce its large quantities of allotted tanks, artillery, and armored personnel vehicles, Belarus set up three reduction centers at Borisov, Stankovo, and Baranovich. According to Lt. Colonel I.G. Gerus, Group Leader, CFE Treaty Reduction Division, the first task was to "prepare the reduction sites. There, the most complicated issue was to prepare a technology for setting up a reduction line."²⁰ The reduction of all 1,837 tanks in accordance with the provisions of the treaty's reduction protocols, Lt. Colonel Gerus explained, took considerable planning and expense by the Belarus NAKI and the armed forces. He observed that "We spent a lot of effort just organizing the reduction effort."



Lt. Colonel I.G. Genis, Group Leader, CFE Reduction Division, Belarus, and Lt. Colonel Steven A. Barneby, OSIA Team Chief, sign inspection report.

The initial manning for the Belarussian verification center called for an authorized strength of 87, although the actual number of officers and specialists at the treaty's entry into force was less than 50. The agency's headquarters was located in Minsk, the nation's capital. Under the CFE Treaty, Minsk was designated as a point of entry for arriving and departing inspection teams.²¹

Ukraine was another new nation with significant CFE Treaty rights and responsibilities. In defining its foreign policy and military department treaty responsibilities, the Ukrainian government set up a new, presidential-level national committee. Led by Konstantyn Gryshenko, a senior diplomat, this new National Committee for Disarmament reported directly to the president. Its staff and offices were located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it was responsible for representing Ukraine at the negotiating sessions of the CFE Treaty's JCG in Vienna, and in future negotiations on other international arms control treaties, such as the Open Skies and START treaties. This national committee also collected, processed, and prepared Ukraine's CFE Treaty data and reports.²²

The Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was located in Kiev, and was organized under the Ministry of Defense. According to General-Major N.T. Honcharenko, Director, the center had four departments: conventional armed forces, open skies, nuclear disarmament, and administration. When the center was established in May 1992, it had approximately 50 officers and civilians. Subordinate to the verification center were four treaty

implementation support centers. Located in Kiev (army and air force), Odessa, and Lvov, each center was manned with 25 to 45 military personnel.²³

Before the Ukrainian government established its Verification Center of the Armed Forces in May 1992, General Honcharenko said the government hosted several small, high-level delegations from other CFE Treaty states. These groups presented an informal briefing, explaining their assigned roles and missions, their organizational structure, and their experiences in implementing various treaties. In April 1992, a team arrived in Kiev from the Canadian Verification Agency. In June 1992, Dr. Edward M. Ifft, Deputy Director for External Affairs, OSIA, led a small, six-person American team to Kiev. He was accompanied by Colonel William R. Smith, the new Commander of OSIA's European Operations Command, two planning officers, and two linguists. They explained OSIA's charter, structure, and treaty experiences.

The visit to Kiev was part of an extended 21-day trip to seven CFE Treaty states of the Commonwealth of Independent States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine. Colonel Smith's impression of the preparations of Belarus and Ukraine was favorable. "In Minsk and Kiev we met with large groups of people who knew a lot about arms control." He found that "they had set up very professional organizations," and were well prepared to carry out their treaty responsibilities.²⁴ Smith learned that the Ukrainians had researched many of the national verification centers and agencies. General Honcharenko said they had studied reports from treaty verification centers in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.



Dr. Edward M. Ifft, Deputy Director for External Affairs, OSIA.



Dr. Ifft's team on its 14,000-mile Inissio11 to seven states in 21 days.



Belarussian seal.

In addition to reviewing the structure and mission of other nations' verification centers, General Honcharenko explained that "Our verification center was founded on the base of the implementation department of the Kiev Military District." That department had been established by the Soviet Union to carry out the INF Treaty. Honcharenko indicated that "most of the officers who had served in that department ... became the officers of the Ukrainian verification center." In May and June of 1992, the center organized special training for its escort teams. Personnel also went to every unit of the Ukrainian military forces and held classes on how to prepare OOVs for inspection. Then they conducted a full-scale mock inspection with the units, sending an inspection and escort team from the verification center. Finally, General Honcharenko said that they conducted a few joint mock training inspections with teams from the United States and Germany.²⁵

From these different national experiences in establishing CFE Treaty inspection organizations, certain generalizations emerge. To begin with, all NATO, Eastern European, and USSR successor states recruited, trained, and used their professional military as CFE Treaty inspectors and escorts. In the NATO nations, the selection, training, and leadership responsibilities of the inspection team leaders were quite similar in all of the inspectorates. The selection of inspectors varied, however. The larger verification agencies—those in the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain—used a concept of organic, fixed teams, while the smaller verification organizations—those in Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy—opted for composite teams with permanent leaders and linguists as the core team. Inspectors drawn from the military forces augmented the teams.

Among the Warsaw Pact nations, there was a similar conceptual distinction. Russia, with its INF Treaty experience, used the fixed team model for escort and inspection operations under the CFE Treaty. Belarus and Ukraine focused their operations on escorting, but here again, they used professional military officers dedicated to implementing the treaty. In both nations, the national CFE Treaty obligations were substantial in terms of the numbers of OOVs and TLE subject to inspection. The likelihood of these sites and units being inspected by the NATO nations was considerable; consequently, the greatest burden in both Belarus and Ukraine fell to the escorting mission. Further, the poor economic conditions in these nations after the collapse of the centralized Soviet Union limited their governments' capability to organize and send CFE inspection teams abroad. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, to a degree, Poland used composite inspection and escort teams.



Local escorts hosted INF inspections in the Soviet Union; later they brought their experience to the newly formed national verification agencies.

Other generalizations applied. Among CFE inspection team leaders, virtually all were colonels or lieutenant colonels. As commissioned officers, they had trained and served with their respective military forces during the Cold War. Within the NATO alliance, these senior and mid-level officers had served in NATO military commands or on combined staffs; thus they were familiar with the military structure of the national armies and air forces of the 16 NATO nations. By 1990, NATO was a mature, experienced, cohesive alliance, and this fact contributed directly to planning, training, and communicating operational concepts in implementing the CFE Treaty.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) experience was considerably different. There the Soviet Union—and by extension Russia—commanded the dominant role. Within its officer corps, there was a clear sense of professionalism and commitment to direction from Moscow. Compared to NATO nations, there was far less communication among the former nations of the Warsaw Pact. Among the states of the former Soviet Union, Belarus and Ukraine had team chiefs who had, with some exceptions, direct experience with escorting American inspection teams monitoring Soviet missile eliminations under the INF Treaty. Thus they shared a distinct set of experiences with Russian inspectors and escorts.



A U.S. site commander conducts a "windshield tour" of the declared site.

One final generalization applied: the directors, commanders, and commanders of the national CFE Treaty inspection agencies saw their organizations and inspection/escort teams as *implementers* of the treaty. Their mission was to monitor on-site the entitlements and obligations of the respective nations; they did not articulate policy or advocate future agreements. Theirs was a limited role.

PATTERNS OF TRAINING

A distinctive pattern of training emerged during the 20-month period from CFE Treaty signature in November 1990 to entry into force in July 1992. This pattern applied in both the larger, separate national verification agencies and in the smaller, cadre type of inspection organizations. The key concept was the use of mock inspections in which two teams of inspectors, an inspection and an escort team, conducted a full-scale on-site inspection at an active military installation using the CFE Treaty as "the law." All the treaty's provisions and protocols applied, from the team's arrival at a treaty-designated POE through the conduct of a detailed, thorough inspection, to the inspection and escort team

leaders' signatures on the final inspection report. A joint evaluation followed each mock inspection, with the participation of the two teams, the military installation commander, and invited observers. As Colonel Lawrence Kelley, the Director of Operations for OSIA's European Operations Command, declared, "Mock inspections are now and have always been the single most important training tool that we have at our disposal."²¹

In setting up the U.S. CFE inspection operations, Colonel Kelley established a three-pronged approach for these training inspections. One involved a series of mock inspections conducted with inspection teams from the NATO nations. Rigorous and thorough, these inspections developed a common understanding of the process, the CFE Treaty, and national obligations of the inspectorates. Another had American CFE inspection teams conduct rigorous mock inspections opposite other American teams on U.S. military sites and installations throughout Europe. These training inspections educated both the American inspection teams and the American military personnel at each of the installations, from the security police at the gate to the combat commander at the unit that was the object of verification. Participants tested all

aspects of the on-site inspection protocols, particularly the line between the treaty rights of the inspectors and the treaty obligations of the inspected state. The final aspect of the American approach had U.S. inspection teams participating in a series of mock inspections with Russia and the Eastern European nations. Through mock inspections with Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, OSIA built early and continuing liaisons. The mock inspections initiated these ties, and over the course of many discussions among inspectors and escorts, and directors and commanders, common approaches to many areas of treaty implementation developed.²⁷

Among the other NATO nations preparing to implement the CFE Treaty, a three-stage training pattern emerged: mock inspections with the national military forces, mock inspections with allied inspection teams and their organizations, and finally, mock inspections with the inspection agencies of the former Warsaw Pact nations and their military forces. These latter mock inspections usually were planned and organized on a reciprocal basis, with inspections in one nation followed by inspections in the other. Because nation-to-nation relationships varied considerably across the European continent, there was no set order or sequence to this pattern of inspections. In some nations, mock inspections with allied nations preceded training inspections with their own military forces. In others, mock training events with former Warsaw Pact nations were scheduled before similar events with NATO allies.

Group Captain D.A.G. Bremner, Commandant of the United Kingdom's Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG), explained that British inspector training began with an intensive four-week course on the CFE Treaty and other current arms control agreements. Then team training began with the agency's inspectors "simulating a foreign inspection group and a JACIG escort team conducting mock inspections at United Kingdom sites."²⁸ According to Group Captain Bremner, these inspections developed team skills and standard operating procedures for both the British military installation commanders and the British inspection group's escort and inspection teams. Next, the British group arranged and conducted bilateral mock training inspections with teams from the inspectorates of the NATO nations, and then they set up a series of mock training exercises with the nations of the Warsaw Pact from mid-1991 to mid-1992. The French experience, according to Colonel François Rozec, Commandant, L'Unité Française de Vérification, followed a pattern similar to that of the other NATO nations' inspection agencies. "All of the verification agencies," Colonel Rozec explained, "more or less, worked along the same lines. We first started doing mock inspections on a national level, then bilaterally with the NATO allies. Then, as a third





German escorts, representing the host state, took Eastern teams to inspection sites.

step, we started working on mock inspections with the Eastern bloc countries, especially with Russia, Belarus, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.¹²)

Germany developed one of the most extensive training programs of the NATO nations. To begin with, the unified German nation, because of its incorporation of East Germany's military forces and equipment, had more than 900 CFE Treaty OOVs, more than any other NATO nation. All of these sites had to be surveyed and their personnel trained and prepared for on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty. Since most, if not all, of the former GDR's military equipment was either Soviet-made or built to Soviet military specifications, it provided a training windfall for German CFE Treaty inspection teams. Germany was one of the principal NATO nations for implementing the CFE Treaty. German inspection teams would be leading and conducting 20 percent of the NATO alliance's inspection quota. Another important operational consideration driving Germany's training was the fact that many of NATO's military installations and CFE reduction sites were located on German territory. When the Eastern group of states' CFE teams conducted inspections on stationed forces' military units and equipment located on German territory, German escort officers had to meet them at the point of entry, transport them to the declared military installation, and, following the inspection, accompany them back to the exit point. Germany had to anticipate, over the 40-month reduction phase, dozens of inspection teams arriving at designated points of entry in the former

German Democratic Republic, traveling under escort to the reduction sites, and then, for a period of days, monitoring TLE destruction. Finally, because of Germany's strategic position in middle Europe, its national political leaders encouraged and supported joint training with all the Central European national verification agencies during preparations for implementing the CFE Treaty. For all these reasons, the German verification agency was extremely active during the 20-month treaty preparation phase.³⁰

By the time of the CFE Treaty's entry into force in July 1992, the Germans had conducted more than 200 mock inspections and escort missions. Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loqua, Director, ZVBW, recalled a particularly important series of mock inspections:

"We arranged with the Eastern European countries, the former Warsaw Pact countries, a series of test inspections or mock inspections in order to establish with them practical cooperation. I think one of the most crucial mock inspections was our inspection in the Soviet Union. It was agreed on at the ministerial level and took place in August 1991. Two guest inspectors participated in this inspection, a Dutch and a French inspector. Two weeks later, the Soviets came to Germany, conducting an inspection on a German site.... These were revolutionary times, with the attempted coup d'etat in Moscow, but I was convinced that if the coup had succeeded, the new government would have done everything to fulfill the obligations of the CFE Treaty."

The Russian experience in training paralleled in many respects the experiences of the other large state parties to the treaty. In explaining Russia's training concept, General-Major Tsygankov, Deputy Director of the Russian NRRC, was characteristically forthright: "The most important task was to prepare the training for our forces. Objects of verification must be prepared, beginning with diagrams of the declared sites. The correct stand on these issues must come from the NRRC." The Russian center handled virtually every aspect of treaty preparations, from drawing up site diagrams, to designating administrative zones, to defining the OOVs. Every Russian military district, according to General Tsygankov, had an arms control department, staffed with 10 to 16 persons. Officers from the Russian NRRC trained these district officers on the CFE Treaty. Every Russian army division had two or three CFE Treaty specialists assigned to the division's training brigade. The scope of the CFE Treaty and the size of the Russian Army meant that training had to be reinforced by regulations and regular training visits from NRRC officials. In July 1992, at the time of the CFE Treaty's entry into force, Russia declared 9,342 tanks, 8,346 artillery pieces, 19,399 armored personnel carriers, and 4,624 aircraft. This vast array of treaty equipment was maintained at 488 declared sites and 503 OOVs throughout Russia.³³

"The most important task was to prepare the training (or our forces) ...

Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Russian and Eastern European Affairs

From April to July 1991, General Tsygankov had the CFE Treaty section plan and organize mock inspections with several military commands and units of the army, air force, and air defense forces. Their objective was to train the inspection teams and Soviet forces on the practical aspects of treaty implementation. They conducted full-scale CFE inspections at several facilities of the army, air force, and air defense forces. "Our approach," General Tsygankov stated, "was that we call it a training inspection if we carried it out with our people on Russian territory, but we call it a mock inspection if an inspector from a foreign country participated." From August 1991 to April 1992, the Russian RRC conducted mock inspections on a mutual basis with eleven treaty states—the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Turkey, Holland, and France. Observers participated in the post-training inspection debriefing in all these mock inspections.;

It is important to remember that throughout this lengthy, 20-month CFE Treaty training phase, Eastern Europe was in turmoil. The Soviet Union was in revolution, and it ceased to exist as a nation in late 1991. After its collapse, eight new states became signatory parties to the CFE Treaty. Throughout these changes, CFE inspection teams from the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact nations, including the successor states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, conducted several hundred CFE Treaty mock inspections. They refined all aspects of treaty implementation, from communications, to inspection/escort procedures, to logistics. Slowly and deliberately, a consensus emerged over time among the national inspectorates on certain "understandings of the treaty," as did a general agreement on what constituted "standards of an inspec-



Logistics requirements increased for OS/A's European Operations Command under the CFE Treaty.

ri on." These by-products of extensive bilateral and multilateral mock training inspections would become even more significant when the treaty entered into force. Consensus, especially when based on actual experience, became a powerful instrument in implementing this multinational arms reduction treaty.

In negotiating the CFE Treaty, diplomats in Vienna had reached an understanding of the treaty's language, protocols, and requirements. Now, in preparing to implement the treaty, leaders of the national inspectorates were trying to reach a similar measure of understanding about the practical, operational aspects of conducting recurring on-site inspections. Given the turmoil across Central and Eastern Europe in 1991 to 1992, the significance of these national agency-to-agency, military-to-military mock training inspections can not be underestimated. They occurred, like the CFE Treaty itself, on the cusp of major political and economic changes across the European continent.

READINESS FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE

When the diplomats met at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on July 10, 1992, they signed documents that permitted the CFE Treaty to enter into force provisionally. Ten days later, CFE Treaty baseline inspections would begin. Were the respective national verification agencies ready? Were the military forces prepared? Had the site diagrams been drawn properly, were the POEs ready, were the nation-to-nation communications systems ready to go?

By and large, directors of verification agencies were confident. At the German verification center in Geilenkirchen, General Loquai stated unequivocally that they were ready. Only a few weeks before, the German center had organized a maximum-level mock inspection exercise involving inspection teams from the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, and, of course, Germany. Within one week, these national teams conducted 10 on-site inspections, exercising every element of the inspection process: notifications, communications, security, logistics, site preparations, escort procedures, inspection rights, photography, emergency procedures, and report sequencing. "The normal military logic," General Loquai observed, "is that you should perform training exercises under conditions more difficult than real life."³¹ After completing this training exercise without incident, General Loquai knew the German agency was ready. Germany had conducted more than 200 mock training inspections prior to entry into force.

Directors at other agencies also were ready. At the Belgian verification agency, Lt. Colonel Fred Janssen, Director of Operations, expressed his confidence, declaring, "Without any doubt we were ready, more than ready, I should say. We were eager to go in."¹⁷ The Belgians had conducted 56 mock inspections prior to



entry into force. At the French verification unit in Creil, Colonel Rozec acknowledged, "I think we were ready, considering that you can never be completely ready for this kind of job Some of our new inspectors were not on the list of inspectors, but we were as ready as we could possibly be."³⁸ In Warsaw, Colonel Malinowski noted that the period from treaty signature to entry into force was "a long time." He believed that Polish armed forces were well prepared and that the verification center was ready: "I wouldn't like to boast, but I think that Poland, the United States, Netherlands, Germany, and Britain were very well prepared at that time."³⁹ In Moscow, General-Major Tsygankov had reached a similar conclusion: "The center was ready. The center had a mission, and we were responsible for carrying it out. We knew that when the treaty entered into force, there would be no time for further preparations."⁴⁰ In Frankfurt, Colonel Kelley, speaking of the U.S. effort, concluded, "I think that although the butterflies were there, and although there were certain areas where we were not quite satisfied that we had the optimal solution, communications, liaison officers, transportation, operations center, we did feel at entry into force that operationally, we were ready."⁴¹

Colonel Kelley's next comment, provided with the perspective of thinking back over all the inspection and escort operations conducted during the CFE Treaty baseline phase, was both short and insightful: "And, that turned out to *be* the case."⁴²

NOTES

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Chapter 6

CFE TREATY BASELINE



American and Russian team chiefs sign the report completing the inspection of Russian forces in Gyandzha, Azerbaijan.

On July 17, 1992, the CFE Treaty entered into force, albeit provisionally. While Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan had not yet ratified the treaty by early July their representatives assured other nations in Vienna that they would soon ratify. Consequently, when the European and North American leaders arrived at the Helsinki Summit on July 10, 1992, they were prepared to sign the CFE IIA Agreement and to approve the CFE Treaty's provisional entry into force. As promised, Armenia deposited its instrument of ratification at The Hague on October 12, 1992, and Belarus and Kazakhstan followed on October 30, 1992. Two weeks later, the 29-nation Joint Consultative Group (JCG) assembled in Vienna and confirmed that the treaty had officially entered into force 10 days after the final instruments of ratification had been deposited. Consequently, the provisional entry into force status ended on November 9, 1992. Regardless, the formal date for the CFE Treaty's entry into force remained July 17, 1992.¹

ATO 's VCC allotted the United States a total of 45 baselille inspectioll s.

The start of the treaty's baseline phase was not a shotgun blast of national inspection teams racing across Europe. Instead, NATO nations dispatched their teams according to a coordinated, well-planned schedule. This was necessary to prevent inspection teams of different NATO nations from trying to inspect the same site simultaneously or sending too many teams into one country at once. The treaty's Protocol on Inspection limited the number of teams a nation was required to host at any given time within its national territory or at any given declared site. In addition, the protocol dictated the number of inspections any nation was liable to receive during any period of the treaty's life, and it limited a nation to conducting no more than 50 percent of the declared site and challenge inspections any nation was liable for during a calendar year. On the other hand, there were no provisions stipulating how many inspections any one nation could conduct or how the inspections were to be divided among the participating states. There was no central monitor. Consequently, planning inspection schedules and monitoring activity during any phase of the treaty was an option that fell to the two groups of state parties.

The NATO Verification Coordination Committee (VCC), with membership from all 16 allied nations, determined the number of inspections that each NATO nation would conduct annually. A starting point for determining each nation's quota of inspections in the East (active quota) was the number of inspections it was liable to receive (passive quota). A nation's passive quota compared to the total NATO passive quota produced a percentage that could be applied to the Eastern group of states' total passive quota. This calculation produced a potential active quota.

*U. . Inspection Quotas
Passive- 8%
Actiue-1 8%*

The U.S. passive quota was 8 percent of the passive quota for the NATO states. The VCC, however, agreed to allow the United States an active quota of approximately 18 percent of the NATO states' total share. This was the result of heated debate among VCC delegates. The U.S. had requested a greater share of the Eastern inspection quota because its contributions to NATO were not measured only in terms of its OOVs. Moreover, the United States had experience in arms control treaty implementation as well as the financial and logistical capability to conduct numerous inspections. On the other hand, the United States was only one of 16 nations in the alliance. European nations wanted their share of inspections as participants in the security affairs of Europe. Some nations did not set up verification agencies, only small sections with a handful of treaty experts, because they had few objects of verification (OOVs); Iceland had none. These nations were not interested in developing inspection teams and spending money to conduct inspections. A solution to their needs was relinquishing inspections to the United States with the proviso that their inspectors join U.S. teams on those missions. After much haggling and

bargaining, the VCC allotted the United States a total of 45 baseline inspections out of a total of 251 to be conducted by NATO allies.

The Verification and Implementation Coordination Section, which was the VCC's working staff, had the task of taking the inspections allocated by the VCC and guiding the NATO nations through a process in which each received a block of time (three days) and an Eastern nation to inspect. Selection of the specific OOV for inspection was left to the NATO state. The time blocks were critical because the NATO nations had to conduct 251 inspections in the Eastern states during baseline-only 120 days. This "deconfliction" schedule would enable the NATO allies to conduct all possible inspections during baseline. Every state could benefit from information gained and shared in those inspections.

Assigning states to be inspected was also important because of the greater demand among the NATO allies to inspect OOVs in Russia than those in any other Eastern state. The coordinated effort of all NATO states ensured each of at least some opportunity to inspect OOVs in nations that were important to them. This schedule also precluded NATO states from exceeding the inspection protocol limits of two simultaneous inspections in a country and one inspection team on a declared site.² The first NATO states to conduct inspections were Canada and the United States. The Canadians notified the Russians that they would arrive for a declared site inspection on July 17, 1992. On the day the Canadians were arriving to conduct the first NATO inspection, the U.S. government notified Russian authorities that on July 18, 1992, an American inspection team would arrive at the Russian point of entry (POE), Moscow, for a declared site inspection. The difference in dates of notification reflected a different interpretation of implementation; the Canadians viewed the arrival for the inspection on the 17th as the first step of implementation, whereas the United States considered the notification of intent to inspect the first step of implementation.³



European Operations Command's Operations Center, a focal point for CFE inspection communications.

1ST U.S. INSPECTION

The first U.S. CFE inspection team, led by Lt. Colonel Elmer G. (Guy) White, USA, arrived in Moscow at 1700 GMT on July 18, 1992. Before Team White deployed to Russia, a great deal of coordination and preparation had been completed. In Washington, the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee had selected

U.S. inspection equipment in metal cases known as "silver bullets."



Buy, Russia, to be the first FE inspection site and had notified Headquarters OSIA of the selection. Headquarters OSIA had then forwarded that information to OSIA European Operations. In Europe, Team White began its many checks to prepare for the mission. Lt. Colonel White prepared a "mission warning order" to notify his eight team members of the upcoming mission and the schedule of briefings required before departure. Through his warning order, he also assigned responsibilities for different elements of mission preparation to his team members." He later gave the Plans Section the information necessary to prepare the "Notification of Intent to Inspect" message, which would ultimately arrive in Moscow 36 hours before the American inspection team's arrival there.

The Plans Branch of OSIA's European Operations Command compiled the information Lt. Colonel White had provided for the intent-to-inspect message and forwarded it to Headquarters OSIA. There, Robert G. Green of the Treaty List Management Branch verified aircrew and team augmen tee data such as names, birth dates, and passport numbers. Any discrepancies between the Headquarters computer lists and the data transmitted from the European Operations Command were resolved at OSIA before the Headquarters Operations Center forwarded the message to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the U.S. State Department. Changes or discrepancies discovered in treaty inspector or flight crew lists would be corrected in a "Remarks" block of the notification. This action was critical to ensure that U.S. inspectors would be allowed entry without delay to conduct their inspections. Next, the NRRC sent the official U.S. government announcement of intent to inspect through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CS E) network, and the State Department sent the same message through diplomatic channels.⁵

While Headquarters OSIA, the NRRC, and the State Department processed the CFE Treaty notification, Team White continued its preparation for this first CFE on-site inspection. The American inspection team gathered information, equipment, and documents required for their mission. Current weather reports for the inspection area, and news of ongoing activities by NATO ally inspection teams, provided information that could improve the odds of a successful mission. The team checked that its equipment was operational and ready for deployment. Each team had its own set of equipment in metal suitcases nicknamed "silver bullets." In addition to their equipment, the team gathered passports, inspector badges, dog tags, bottled water, and mementos to be exchanged with their hosts. Team documents included maps of the area, photos of the treaty-limited equipment (TLE) submitted by the inspected nation at the exchange of treaty information, CFE inspection forms, inspection notification messages, copies of the treaty, and checklists to be used at various stages of the inspection trip. As the team assembled these items, Lt. Colonel White worked with the Inspection Support Staff (ISS) to develop a detailed mission briefing on the Russian site to be inspected.

Lt. Colonel White's briefing paralleled his mission operations order. In both, he outlined his basic game plan for the inspection mission, covering the type of inspection, the specific site, equipment subject to the treaty as well as any other equipment the team could anticipate encountering at the inspection site, and the composition of his inspection team. His briefing also addressed the site's terrain, the weather forecast for the mission, and how those conditions might affect the inspection. He also made certain that the team's time in country, from arrival at the POE to its return to a POE after the inspection, would be under 48 hours. The treaty



A British inspector drinks bottled water during an inspection mission.

allowed 48 hours in country to execute a single declared site inspection, and for any sequential inspections planned, the treaty allowed an additional 36 hours per inspection, up to a maximum of 10 days.

White also set up three subteams and planned the inspection to ensure redundant coverage of the entire declared site. At the same time, he assigned specific responsibilities to individual team members, such as video filming, timekeeping, passport checking, and monitoring the team equipment case throughout the inspection. The American team set up a subteam communications plan to use during the inspection, with code words for key events. Lt. Colonel White also announced the departure staging area and time, where final checks would be made on equipment and luggage.⁶

In addition to White's briefing, the ISS also provided team briefings before deployment. These included the latest information available about the inspection site, including imagery from national technical means (NTM), findings from inspections under the Vienna Document, and the CFE data exchanged. The ISS briefings provided an insight about the significance of the site selected and guidance on the kind of information required to satisfy U.S. government concerns.

In addition to these briefings, the Counterintelligence Section reminded inspectors of personal and team security requirements during CFE inspection missions. Topics included adherence to the two-person rule that prohibited U.S. inspectors from being alone outside their rooms or bathrooms during an inspection mission, the policy on alcohol consumption during a mission, and guidelines on what was appropriate for discussion with an Eastern escort, both in personal and business matters. The U.S. govern-



Team White preparing to depart on the first U.S. CFE mission to Buy, Russia.



U.S. policy allowed U.S. inspectors to engage in toasts at the completion of the inspection.

ment expected its CFE Treaty inspectors to be open with their Eastern bloc escorts, but to remain unimpeachable in their behavior while implementing the treaty.⁷

Having completed these final briefings, the team was prepared to deploy on their mission to Buy, Russia. Lt. Colonel White's team, including OSIA's Director, Major General Robert W. Parker, gathered on July 18th to perform their final predeparture checks for this historic mission. Final checks confirmed that everyone was on the flight manifest and had passports, inspector badges, and dog tags. Certain that both personnel and equipment were ready for departure, Lt. Colonel White led the nine-person team to the bus for the short ride across the ramp to the waiting military aircraft.

The U.S. Air Force C-141 aircraft departed Rhein-Main at 1545 Frankfurt time, flew for three hours, and landed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo I Airport at 2052 Moscow time. As the team prepared to depart the aircraft, General Parker and Lt. Colonel White met the senior Russian CFE Treaty escorts. The team chiefs agreed to 1700 Greenwich mean time (GMT) as the official arrival time, as had been announced in the message of intent to inspect. A representative of the U.S. Embassy's Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU) met *the* American inspection team to assist them and the aircrew if needed. Meanwhile Captain Jeremy Wintersteen, USAF the deputy team chief, gathered passports for

processing. While "in country," diplomatic privileges and immunities were extended to inspectors and aircrews as outlined in the treaty. Team members unloaded their gear and, as planned for all changes of transportation, one member of the team performed a final sweep for anything left behind. The team then proceeded through a routine Russian customs inspection of personal belongings. Russian CFE escorts also completed a treaty-specified check of American inspection equipment. In accordance with the CFE Treaty's inspection protocol, the U.S. notification of intent to inspect specified a seven-hour delay between arrival time at the POE in Moscow and Lt. Colonel White's declaration of the first inspection site.

Exactly seven hours after the team's arrival, Lt. Colonel White announced to the Russian escort team that Buy was the site for the first U.S. CFE inspection. It was now 0400 Moscow time, 0200 Frankfurt time.^x The American team had worn civilian clothes on the flight to Moscow, but changed into field military uniforms, called BDUs-battle dress uniforms-in preparation for the trip to Buy. During INF Treaty inspections, American inspectors wore civilian clothes throughout the missions, but CFE inspections were to be conducted in much more rugged conditions, so field uniforms were more practical. After declaring the site to be inspected, the American team notified the ACIU of its plan to depart for Buy and estimated the time of arrival at 0700 GMT on July 19th.

Nearly three hours after the American team chief had declared the site, the Russians escorted Team White to an IL-18 aircraft, and the two teams left for Tunoshna. After a two-and-one-half-hour delay in acquiring ground transportation in Tunoshna, the team and escorts continued on, switching vehicles once again before arriving at Buy at 0855 GMT. The arrival time at Buy was within five minutes of the maximum nine-hour transit time the treaty permitted from the POE to the declared site, in this case approximately a 250-mile trip. The treaty allowed the inspected nation six hours to prepare a site following the inspection team's site declaration. In this mission the six-hour allowance was easily satisfied. Despite the long transport time, the American team was ready and eager to begin their inspection.

Shortly after arriving at Buy, the team notified the U.S. Embassy of its arrival. The senior Russian escort then presented the site diagram to the Americans. Lt. Colonel White immediately declared the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Depot as the object of verification for the inspection. The Russian escorts and site representatives in turn commenced a 42-minute preinspection briefing. During this briefing, they announced the depot's equipment quantities; they were considerably higher than Russian data had previously indicated in November 1990. A correction to the 1990 infor-

duties, while Sergeant First Class Kenneth D. Periman, USA, a linguist, bridged the communications gap.

The teams inventoried the equipment twice and confirmed their figures with the Russian escorts when they completed a facility or group of equipment. This procedure avoided last-minute recounts to clear up discrepancies. It proved to be a timesaver because the U.S. inventory figures did not match those in the pre-inspection briefing. The U.S. team inventoried 254 T-54 tanks and 417 T-55 tanks, which varied from the briefed figures of 361 and 308, respectively. Russian escorts and U.S. inspectors agreed on a combined total of 671 T-54s and T-55s on-site. Both sides agreed that the difference of two in total tanks was an accounting mistake, while the difference in totals for the two types of tanks stemmed from the difficulty in identifying the many variants of these tanks. The ACY and ACY look-alike inventories were nearly error-free. The Russians briefed 301 ACYs on-site, more than

the teams found, and again the difference was attributed to a tabulating error. In all, the American inspection team counted and recorded 1,315 pieces of treaty equipment. The inspection ended 22 hours and 37 minutes after it began, with the signing and exchanging of inspection reports by the two team chiefs on July 20th, at 0720 GMT.

Team White notified the U.S. Embassy that the inspection was complete and that the Russian escorts had arranged for transportation to the POE within 20 minutes after completion of the inspection. Team White departed the site within 23 hours of its arrival on-site. That night the team toured Moscow, enjoying the hospitality arranged by its Russian hosts. The next morning, July 21st, the host escorts transported Team White to Sheremetyevo I Airport, where the team rendezvoused with the American C-141 aircrew and left Russia at 1115 GMT. Team White had completed the first U.S. CFE inspection and left Russia within the three-day timeline required by the NATO deconfliction schedule.¹⁰

While the inspection in Russia was over, the mission was far from finished. The C-141 flight back to Rhein-Main was a working trip as team members reviewed notes taken during the inspection. During the flight, Captain Wintersteen completed the CFE mission report for Lt. Colonel White's review. White would submit the report within an hour of the 1430 GMT touchdown at Rhein-Main. Over the next several days,



CFE inspectors participated in brief/cultural events or sight-seeing after completing their missions.

while memories were fresh, the team participated in mission debriefs. They labeled the inspection film and turned it in for development, checked and repaired equipment as needed, replaced expendables, and returned issued clothing. Team White would soon prepare for its next CFE inspection mission, scheduled for August 4th at Shuya, Russia.

The declared site inspection at Buy, Russia, was significant because it was a historical first—the first U.S. inspection under the CFE Treaty. However, the inspection's significance was not only historical. The Russian equipment declared at Buy in the initial equipment data exchange of February 1991 was outdated and differed significantly from what satellite reconnaissance indicated in July 1992. Questions raised by NTM could only be answered by a team on-site, a team that had the right to enter buildings and determine their contents; inspect all areas on the site that could hold conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST); and take a detailed, exact inventory of the equipment. The openness the Russian escorts and local site officers displayed during the inspection and during discussions explaining the increased equipment on-site were important benchmarks for the United States and the CFE Treaty. Team White had fulfilled its inspection mission. This first American CFE inspection—well-prepared, professional, and thorough—became the norm for the 120-day CFE Treaty baseline phase and beyond.

U.S. Escort Missions

U.S. inspectors had completed seven missions (nine inspections) before they escorted the first Eastern inspection team on a declared site inspection of U.S. facilities. On August 10, 1992, the Russian government sent notices of intent to inspect to the German, Canadian, and U.S. governments.¹¹ The Russians intended to inspect U.S. and Canadian forces stationed in Germany. Germany received notice because it was the host nation for the Russian inspection mission, and as such would be responsible for the POE procedures, transportation, and other support for the Russian team while it was in Germany. On August 13th, treaty representatives of the three nations were present when the Russian team arrived at Frankfurt.

When the Aeroflot AN-72 touched down at Frankfurt International Airport, the Russian inspection team disembarked and

U.S. CFE Treaty Team Leaders

Declared Site/Challenge Inspections

July 17-November 17, 1992

Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr.	U.S. Army
Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser	U.S. Army
Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II	U.S. Army
Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert	U.S. Air Force
Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz	U.S. Army
Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley	U.S. Marine Corps
Lt. Colonel Keith A. Oatman	U.S. Army
Major George P. Weller	U.S. Air Force
Lt. Colonel Elmer G. White	U.S. Army

Reduction Inspections

July 17-November 17, 1992

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II	U.S. Army
Lt. Colonel John D. Pesterfield	U.S. Air Force
Major Timothy C. Shea	U.S. Army
Lt. Colonel David F. Stack	U.S. Air Force
Major George P. Weller	U.S. Air Force

proceeded to the VIP lounge where the POE procedures were conducted. The Russian team chief, Colonel Lev Vladimirovich Patsiorin, and the German escort team chief, Lt. Colonel Klaus Urban, agreed on a 1000 GMT arrival time for the inspection report. The U.S. liaison team—Major Dee Dodson Morris, USA, and Staff Sergeant Kent O. Elliston, USA—along with a Canadian liaison team, participated in the German escort team's inspection of the Russians' treaty-authorized equipment. The treaty allowed each inspected nation to evaluate the inspection team's equipment at the POE or, if necessary, at the inspection site. This one-time group inspection of the Russian team's equipment facilitated the inspection process. The Russian inspection equipment was acceptable as outlined in the Protocol on Inspection.

The Russian team declared Canadian Forces Base Lahr as its first inspection site. Major Morris notified European Command (EUCOM) and OSIA of the selection and then proceeded to the site. Major Morris did not attend the preinspection briefing because it was a Canadian military facility, and the Canadians chose to protect their national sovereignty. However, she remained in the Lahr area as the Russians inspected, in case any U.S. facilities were encountered. The Canadians billeted all inspectors for the night at Lahr. The next morning the Russian team finished its inspection and announced the sequential inspection site before signing the inspection report.



Major Les Garrison, USMC, and a Canadian inspector on a reduction inspection.

The sequential inspection was to be at an American site, the U.S. Army Airfield at Giebelstadt, Germany. Colonel Patsiorin declared the first sequential inspection site at 1150 GMT; 10 minutes later, Lt. Colonel Urban, the German escort team chief, notified Major Morris of the next inspection. Immediately, she notified Headquarters EUCOM of the sequential declared site inspection and then alerted the operations center at OSIA European Operations. Within 30 minutes of the Russian team's declaration, Major George P. Weller, USAF, the American escort team chief for this mission, received word of the inspection site. Ten minutes later his 10-member American escort team departed Rhein-Main, arriving at Giebelstadt at 1500 GMT.

While Team Weller drove to Giebelstadt, Headquarters EUCOM held a conference call with USAREUR, USAFE, and Headquarters OSIA to pass on the status of the inspection and to alert Giebelstadt to prepare for the upcoming inspection. Meanwhile, the German team assumed escort responsibilities from the Canadians as the Russians left the Canadian facilities at Lahr.¹² The German escorts delivered the Russian inspectors to Giebelstadt Army Air Field at 1915 GMT, seven hours and 15 minutes after Colonel Patsiorin had announced the site for this sequential inspection. Travel time to Giebelstadt was well within the nine-hour maximum, but long enough to provide six hours of preparation time at the Army Air Field. Team Weller arrived four hours ahead of the inspection team. The U.S. team used that time for its own site familiarization and to help site personnel prepare for the CFE inspection.

Five minutes after Colonel Patsiorin's team arrived, site officials presented him a site diagram. Thirty minutes later, he declared the 2nd Squadron, 3d Aviation Regiment as the OOV for inspection. At this time, unit personnel presented the preinspection briefing, which ended 50 minutes later, 2040 GMT. One point of confusion arose. The data presented in the briefing were dated August 14, 1992. The Russian team had deployed before the most recent data exchange and consequently held data from the previous exchange. Colonel Patsiorin accepted the new information, and he and his team retired for the evening.

The next morning, August 15th, at 0715 GMT, the Russian inspectors began the inspection. Site officials had briefed them that there were 14 AH-64 "Apache" attack helicopters, 11 OH-58 "Kiowa" multipurpose attack helicopters, and 3 UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters on site. There were differences between the reported and briefed numbers, and the reasons for those differences were explained to Colonel Patsiorin's satisfaction. At 2100 GMT Colonel Patsiorin officially announced the sequential site, the U.S. Army's garrison at Schweinfurt, Germany. At 2130 GMT Patsiorin completed his inspection report and both he and Weller signed the report.¹³

The Demands of a CFE Mission





U.S. AH-64 "Apache" helicopters ready for inspection.

When the Russian inspection team left Giebelstadt Army Airfield at 2:145 GMT, the Germans again assumed escort responsibilities. The Russian and German team chiefs agreed to follow the spirit of the treaty, not the letter of the law, and exceed the nine-hour travel time limit to the next site, allowing the inspection team to take advantage of a comfortable hotel in the vicinity of Giebelsradt for the night. The following morning the inspection team arrived at Schweinfurt at 0720 GMT. There, the Germans relinquished responsibility for the Russian team to the U.S. escorts for the inspection of the U.S. Army's Conn Barracks facilities at Schweinfurt, home of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division.

Following the inspection of Conn Barracks, the Russian inspection team continued through three more CFE inspections: at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division; at Mainz, the Mainz Army Depot; and finally at Babenhäusen, the 41st Field Artillery Brigade. The Russians had not planned to conduct the Grafenwoehr inspection, but all the tanks and most of the ACVs normally in place at Conn Barracks in Schweinfurt were not on-site; the American units had deployed to the training areas at Grafenwoehr. As a result, the Russian inspection at Schweinfurt was brief, since there was little equipment there. Because the deployed equipment represented over 15 percent of the declared equipment for Conn Barracks, the Russians exercised their treaty right to declare a sequential inspection to the location where the equipment was in place: the Grafenwoehr Training Area. Team Weller, OSIA's escort team, stayed with the Russian inspection team through the first three inspections. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, OSIA European Operations Command's Chief of Operations, chose to have Major Keith A. Oatman, USA, and his team relieve Team Weller enroute to the Mainz Army Depot. Kelley did this to mitigate fatigue and to allow Weller's team time to prepare for an upcoming inspection mission. Colonel Kelley also wanted to spread the escort experience among all of the teams.¹⁴ Major Morris and Staff Sergeant Elliston remained as the liaison team throughout the nine-day inspection trip, assisting

Colonel Kelley changed escorts at the Mainz Army Depot during the Russian inspection mission to mitigate fatigue and spread escort experience among the teams.



the American escort teams and USAREUR site officials as necessary. Ar Gra fenwoehr, a very large Army training facility, Major Morris also assisted in escorting the Russian team. This concluded the first series of Russian CFE inspections at American facilities. Colonel Patsiori n's team departed Frankfurt for Moscow at 0914 GMT on August 22, 1992.

The Russian team did not declare ambiguities during the inspections of the five U.S. declared sites. There were instances in which the briefed and the observed equipment totals differed, but U.S. escorts and site representatives fully explained those differences to the inspectors, who annotated them in the inspection reports.¹⁵

FIRST U.S. LIAISON MISSION

The first U.S. liaison activity during baseline occurred in England on July 20, 1992, just three days after entry into force. Captain Ellen Merkle, USAF, and Petty Officer First Class (PO1) David E. Sparks, USN, were the liaison team that met the British escort team chief, RAF Wing Commander Griffiths and his nine-person team at the POE, RAF Scampton. The Russian inspection team arrived on July 20th at 1730 GMT and declared a challenge inspection near Catterick Garrison at Richmond; the team continued with sequential declared site inspections at Roman Barracks at Colchester, Meany Barracks at Colchester, and finally Carver Barracks at Wimbish. The Russians were in England for seven days during this four-site inspection trip. The inspection team did not come upon any U.S. facilities on these British Army installations, so it was a quiet mission for the American liaison team. Captain Merkle and PO1 Sparks stayed in contact with the British escort team from the time the Russian team arrived in country through its departure. They then returned to their staging area, the East Gate Hotel in Lincoln, to wait for the next mission.¹⁶

"BACKDOOR " Co. ti IU I ..AI IO S

Formal communications proved to be a problem during this first liaison mission and continued to be a source of concern throughout baseline. An informal communications system developed among the Allies that enabled them to complete their missions. As an example, Russia notified the United Kingdom that a Russian inspection team intended to arrive in the United Kingdom on the evening of July 20, 1992, to conduct one challenge and three declared site inspections during a CFE mission in England. Russia satisfied its treaty notification responsibilities with the single message to the United Kingdom because it intended to inspect only English sites. Diplomatic channels, however, failed to carry out the treaty requirement to notify allies within a group of states when a state received a notification of intent to inspect. The United States would have been unaware of the impending inspection had it not been for the informal, "backdoor," communications system.

This system operated as an informal network among the arms control verification organizations throughout Europe. It developed during the coordination of mock inspections, grew as entry into force approached, and matured during baseline when the various inspection organizations came to rely on it. For the United States, assigning personnel with linguistic skills to OSIA's European Operations was a key to the development of the communications network. Colonel Kelley looked not only for Russian-speaking inspectors but also for personnel conversant in the six CFE lan-



U.S. Master Sergeant William N. Chesney, Jr., parti ci/Jates in a French-led reduction inspection.

guages when filling assignments. For instance, Captain William C. Plumlee, USA, and Major John D. Monahan, USA, were combat arms officers and West European FAOs. Their language skills proved invaluable as they directed the Command's Operation Center in communicating with the European verification agencies. It was these skills that enabled OSIA personnel to establish professional and personal relationships with their counterparts throughout Europe.

The Plans Branch provided ample opportunity for U.S. personnel to exercise their language capabilities and to communicate effectively with U.S. allies. Master Sergeant William N. Chesney, Jr., USA, and Technical Sergeant Ronald S. Fox, USAF, of OSIA European Operations Command's Plans Branch, both spoke German; Chesney also spoke French and dabbled in several other languages. They frequently spoke with the Zentrum for Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) officials during preparations for mock inspections, and whenever possible, they spoke German. They coordinated with the ZVBW not only U.S./German mocks but also U.S. mocks with other nations at U.S. facilities in Germany. The United States respected German sovereignty when inviting other states to visit U.S. facilities, and Germany took every opportunity to exercise its role as host nation for these inspections. These planners helped OSIA develop a working relationship with the busiest of the NATO verification agencies in implementing the CFE Treaty. Whenever possible, OSIA's European Operations Command communicated with its counterparts in their language. As the number of mocks increased and baseline drew near, communications among the agencies increased; people working in the verification agencies grew increasingly confident in each other.¹⁷

When baseline began it soon became apparent that the formal treaty notification system would not be 100 percent reliable. Most verification agencies did not transmit the official notifications to other states—other agencies within their governments were responsible for these formal notifications. The verification agencies, however, relied on accurate and timely information to properly implement the treaty. The "Group of Four"—the French, English, German, and American verification agencies—called each other daily and faxed situation reports to each other. In the first U.S. liaison mission, discussed above, the United States received notification of the Russian inspection only because the joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG), the United Kingdom's verification agency, faxed a copy of the notification to OSIA's European Operations Command on August 18th, two days before Russian CFE inspectors would arrive in England. This gave the American inspectorate sufficient time to notify one of the two OSIA liaison teams prepositioned in England and to notify Headquarters EUCOM of the impending inspection.¹⁸

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, U.S. Army, was one of the original American CFE team chiefs during the baseline and reduction phases of treaty implementation. He holds a master's degree in Russian area studies. An armor officer (tanks) and a foreign area officer (Russian), Lt. Colonel Fiser served with the 1st Cavalry Division in the Gulf War prior to reporting to OSIA European Operations in Frankfurt, Germany.

On preparing the team for its inspection mission:

"The first thing I always do is give my operations order. This is pretty much a standard, five paragraph, U.S. Army operations order: situation, mission, execution, administration/logistics, and command, control, communication, coordination. I lay out all the deployment information so everybody knows where we're going, when we're going, what we're going to do when we get there, and how we're going to do it. They know who is on what subteam, when we break down into two- or three-person subteams, who carries what equipment, and any specific instructions covering a myriad of issues, like drinking water or specific team equipment. It also covers individual tasks like who does the voice format reports to the embassy or who's responsible for laying on transportation.

"Following the operations order, we have a period of training on all the inspection equipment. The *only* thing that presented a challenge for *anybody* was our photographic equipment, the video or 35mm cameras, and the dictaphone. Those are really the only pieces of equipment that required any training. We'd also have training, usually two or three hours, on the signature piece of equipment that we expected to see at that particular type of unit, so everyone was well versed in what we were going to be seeing, whether it be ground or air equipment."

On use of CFE Treaty's database: "The point of departure was always the submitted data: Charts one, three, and five data, and their submission photos. We'd usually expand on that quite a bit. I'd assign my weapons specialist the job of presenting classes on the declared TLE and other types of vehicles, equipment that we expected to see in the unit, be it a motorized rifle regiment or an air regiment. We studied both order of battle and equipment types and we'd expand our study from there."

On CFE team chiefs and inspectors serving as soldier-diplomats:

"That is a very important aspect of being a treaty inspector. It was something I wasn't really prepared for until I arrived here. First, I did some mock inspections, and then had one or two real CFE Treaty inspections under *my* belt. I found, especially in the Eastern bloc nations, that at meals, and often at the report-signing ceremony, you would be expected to make some sort of toast. You're expected to speak, to some extent, about the opening of relations between our countries, and on how the CFE Treaty was bringing us closer together. There were variations on that theme, but you are almost invariably expected to say something along those lines. That was a new experience in my career. There is definitely a diplomatic side to being an inspector."



On the differences between being an inspector and an escort:

"I have to be careful here. The main thing that makes being an escort more difficult is that you are defensive as opposed to being on the offense. You have to react to the inspector. The treaty requires that you aid him whenever necessary in carrying out his inspection. At the same time, obviously, we have U.S. interests that we are trying to protect. So there's a fine line you have to walk. There have been times when we have had disagreements concerning the interpretation of certain treaty points with representatives from different U.S. military headquarters here in Europe. We've also had confrontations or issues arise with the inspectors from various countries at U.S. sites. That makes escorting more difficult. Another aspect of escorting is the logistics. They are much more difficult during the escort mission because you're also dealing with the host nation escorts. You are trying to make lodging arrangements, many times off post, for 20 to 25 people, sometimes as many as 28 or 29 people. Going from site to site, there is an extreme amount of coordination that has to be done. It makes for a very difficult time, and some very, very long nights. I've had some escort missions where if you got a couple of hours sleep a night you were doing well."

U.S. BASELINE INSPECTION OPERATIONS

The U.S. inspection teams conducted 44 baseline inspections at Eastern sites. Because of civil unrest in Georgia, the U.S. government canceled one mission out of concern for the safety of its inspectors. Teams deployed to nine different countries, inspecting Russia most frequently. Of the 44 inspections, only one was a challenge inspection, conducted in Belarus; the other 43 U.S. inspections were declared site inspections. In total, the United States conducted 22 CFE single inspection missions and 11 missions during which teams inspected two sites. Unlike their Eastern counterparts, U.S. teams inspected only one or two sites per mission, never approaching the 10-day in-country allowance outlined in the treaty.

The U.S. pattern of inspection operations was influenced by the NATO deconfliction schedule. The schedule allocated each NATO state three-day inspection periods, or "slots," in which to conduct CFE inspections. The three-day slot restricted a team's ability to conduct sequential inspections. The treaty allowed 84 hours to conduct two declared site inspections, 48 hours for the first and 36 hours for each sequential inspection. The NATO slot allowed only 72 hours; the team lost 12 hours when squeezing two inspections into the same slot. In the later stages of baseline, the slots were sometimes consecutive, allowing a team six days in country to complete its mission. By contrast, the Russian CFE teams adopted a less costly approach by inspecting 10 U.S. sites during two inspection missions. The cost of supporting and transporting an inspection team was borne by the inspected state, while the inspecting state paid its way to and from the inspected state.



Inspectors discuss treaty provisions behind an A CV in Azerbaijan.



Escorts could deny access to aircraft shelters, but inspectors could require that TLE be brought out of the shelter.

Two trips instead of five or six produced a significant savings for the inspecting state.¹⁹

Inspections were extremely intrusive, and U.S. inspectors were trained to probe and push as deeply as possible when inspecting. An inspection team had significant rights when conducting an inspection; however, the treaty also stipulated limits that protected the inspected state. The treaty authorized an inspection team to inspect all areas within a declared site except those that belonged exclusively to another OOV. In addition, inspectors had the same rights at locations separated from the site where CAEST of the inspected unit were routinely present, such as a railhead. This meant, among other things, that the inspection team had the right to access, entry, and unobstructed inspection of any location, structure, or area within a structure in which CAEST were permanently or routinely present.

Escorts, however, could apply treaty restrictions on an inspection team to limit access to or within a structure in several ways. The first and most common way was by citing the two-meter rule. An escort could deny an inspector access through any entrance that was less than two meters wide because that was the threshold through which no CAEST could fit. Having passed through an entrance greater than two meters wide, the team could continue its inspection within the facility until it reached a point where escorts could successfully apply the two-meter rule. A second limitation was the right to shroud sensitive equipment and deny inspectors access to any shrouded item or container, so long as any one of its measurements fell under two meters. Third, escorts could also deny inspectors access to hardened aircraft shelters. While an escort team could normally prevent an inspection team from entering a hardened aircraft shelter, inspectors had the right to look in to determine if any CAEST were present. Further, if CAEST were

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positioned in an aircraft shelter and the inspectors were denied entry, they had the right to counterdemand that all treaty-limited equipment (TLE) be brought out for display to determine quantities, types, and models.

Finally, escorts could deny, limit, or delay access to those areas or shrouded equipment that the inspected state's government considered sensitive. Sensitive areas could hold equipment that the inspected state considered critical to national security, such as a communications center or a special weapons storage facility. But not all sensitive areas dealt with national security; prisons, for example, were frequently declared sensitive areas. If an escort team chief declared an area or object sensitive, he then needed to state whether there were any CAEST in the area. If CAEST were present, the escort team was required to report the amount, type, and model and to take steps to satisfy inspectors that no additional equipment was present.

As with access to facilities, the treaty allowed the inspected state to impose limits on inspectors' access to CAEST. The Protocol on Inspection limited inspectors' access to the extent they could confirm visually the number, type, and model or version of a piece of CAEST. If inspectors encountered recategorized helicopters, reclassified aircraft, armored vehicle look-alikes, or reduced equipment, specific inspection protocol procedures allowed inspection of the interior of these vehicles to confirm the status of the equipment. Inspectors could require that the doors of an armored vehicle look-a-like be opened to confirm that the vehicle could not transport a combat infantry squad. Equipment within or on such a vehicle could be shrouded, and the inspectors had no right to enter the vehicle.

DECLARED SITE ACCESS

During baseline, declared site access became the most contentious issue that U.S. inspectors faced during inspections of Eastern states. As baseline began, the U.S. understanding of access on a declared site had not changed since American Ambassador Lynn Hansen and the Soviet verification negotiator, Gennadiy Yeftaviyev, ironed out an agreement in November 1990. During a declared site inspection, a team could select and inspect only one OOV on a declared site—the OOV was the subject of the inspection. The team, however, could inspect the entire declared site, to its outermost natural or manmade borders, to include areas common to all OOVs located on the site. Inspectors were prohibited only from any area on the declared site that supported another OOV exclusively.

The first indication of a different understanding of inspector access during a declared site inspection arose during the U.S./



Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II (right), leading an inspection at Ovruch, Ukraine.

Russian mock inspection at Pushkin, Russia, on February 12, 1992. During the Russian preinspection briefing at Pushkin, escorts presented a site diagram that depicted only the two OOVs at Pushkin and a limited portion of the common areas. Lt. Colonel Edward Gallagher, the U.S. team chief, pointed out that U.S. satellite reconnaissance indicated that there were other inspectable areas within the outermost boundary of the garrison. The Russian escorts responded that the Pushkin site diagram was correct. This problem was noted in the mock inspection report; the Russians countered that U.S. inspectors had been given access to the entire declared site associated with the OOV.²⁰

When the treaty entered into force, it became obvious that some states were not using the declared site definition that had been negotiated. On August 5, 1992, during an early baseline inspection of the 228th High Power Artillery Brigade at Shuya, Russia, Lt. Colonel White received a site diagram that illustrated the OOV but not all of the common areas on the site. Escort officials subsequently denied the team access to the common areas not included on the diagram. Nine days later, when all states again exchanged treaty data, it became apparent that Lt. Colonel White's experience would not be an isolated one. The original Soviet site diagrams had displayed multiple OOVs and common areas on a single site. The new August 14th diagrams indicated one OOV on one declared site that was defined by the boundaries of that OOV.²¹ The sites were no different physically—the common areas remained—but some states had changed their concept of a declared site.

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Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., atop a tank while leading a declared site inspection.

On August 29, 1992, U.S. inspectors had their first opportunity to confirm, on-site, that the new diagrams reflected changes in the concept of a declared site. In addition, inspectors would determine how these changes affected inspector access during an inspection. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, led an inspection of the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade in Osipovich, Belarus. Drach received a site diagram from the Belarussian escorts that did not include all common areas within the manmade boundaries of the site. More important, the escort team denied the inspectors access to common areas that were on the installation but excluded from the site diagram. While Drach documented this fact as an ambiguity in his inspection report, another U.S. team was preparing to deploy to Russia.²²

Four days later, on September 4, 1992, Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, led his team to the 752nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at Novyy, Russia, to test the Russian definition of a declared site. His mission was to draw a "line in the sand" on the issue of the definition of a declared site and inspector access. In preparing his team to confront those issues, Karcz worked closely with Colonel Schuyler (Sky) Foerster, USAF, who had participated in the negotiation process in Vienna and was knowledgeable of the negotiators' intentions on the issue of declared sites and access. Karcz and Foerster worked with team linguist Sergeant Danny K. Boyd, USAF, and Alan J. French, Russian language professional, to prepare treaty-based responses to questions that might arise during the inspection. When the team deployed to Moscow, Russia's only POE, they brought along five to six pages of Russian text to con-

vey the U.S. position on declared sites and access in language that would be unambiguous to an escort team chief.

On arrival at Novyy, Lt. Colonel Karcz received a site diagram of the OOV that was limited specifically to the area taken up by the OOV. It did not include common areas outside the OOV on the installation. The Russians defined the site's boundary using roads that were well within the fenced area that was military property at Novyy. At that point Lt. Colonel Karcz cited Article XV of the treaty that allowed the use of NTM and produced a map developed from overhead photography. Karcz pointed out to Colonel V. Pavlenko, the Russian escort team chief, what the U.S. considered the outermost boundary of the site. After two to three hours of discussion, Colonel Pavlenko left the briefing area to notify Moscow of the U.S. position. He soon returned and would not stray from the Russian definition of a declared site. He reiterated that the Russian site diagram was accurate as drawn and that the U.S. team would have access only to the area depicted on the diagram. At this point Lt. Colonel Karcz recognized that Colonel Pavlenko was at his final position and would not budge. Karcz commenced the inspection.

As the inspection proceeded, Pavlenko adhered to the Russian definition of the declared site and did not allow the Americans access to all areas that the U.S. team considered common areas. This prompted Karcz to declare an ambiguity. Pavlenko protested that an ambiguity was not appropriate in this situation because the issue did not address TLE nor was it based on objective facts. Karcz countered that the declared site definition and access issues were indeed based on objective facts: the negotiating history provided a very specific definition of a declared site and the access to be granted to an inspection team at a declared site. The current Russian approach did not follow that specific definition and did not satisfy CFE Treaty requirements, thus the ambiguity. Karcz reminded Pavlenko that, ultimately, inspectors write the reports.



Lt. Colonel fan S. Karcz signing an inspection report in Ukraine.

The inspecting team chief had the right to determine if an ambiguity was to be written, just as the escort team chief determined what response, if any, would be made on the report.²

This new interpretation of a declared site spawned several other problems that surfaced repeatedly during baseline inspections. The first problem inspectors faced on-site was the site diagram. The new diagrams illustrated that the declared site was defined solely by the OOV—each OOV was a declared site. In addition, states depicted OOVs bounded by internal roads, buildings, and fences specific to the OOV, not by the outermost boundaries of an installation. These site diagrams omitted common areas located within an installation that were outside the narrowly defined OOV. Escort teams, armed with these site diagrams, allowed teams to inspect only the OOV, which had become synonymous with the declared site, thus limiting access to all common areas. The new declared site interpretation also affected the requirement under CFE IA to report organizations and personnel figures for activities subject to inspection at the inspection site. Escorts did not provide figures for units located in what had previously been common areas. Another difficulty arose at the POE, before the start of the inspection. Inspection teams were, de facto, required to announce the OOV to be inspected while at the POE, because OOVs were now located on their own individual declared sites. By declaring the site for inspection, inspectors were also revealing the OOV for inspection. This fact increased preparation time from one hour when inspectors selected the OOV at the site to more than six to nine hours when inspectors were forced to select the OOV at the point of entry.

The declared site issue arose repeatedly during baseline, causing U.S. inspectors to declare eight ambiguities. These ambiguities occurred when escorts denied inspectors access to all common areas. There were also occasions when states produced site diagrams that omitted all common areas, but escorts nonetheless allowed access to all common areas.²⁴ The repeated efforts of U.S. and allied inspection teams led to discussions at the joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna to resolve the situation.

U.S. Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen addressed the declared site issue at the opening meeting of the JCG on September 23, 1992. He discussed the site definition and access problems that Team Karcz had encountered at Novyy and that other American and NATO inspectors had encountered elsewhere. Citing the August 14, 1992, exchange of information, Ambassador Hansen stated that the Russian definition of a declared site was now radically different than that negotiated in New York in late October 1990. The new Russian data indicated that all multiple OOV sites had been converted to multiple declared sites within a single installation. He highlighted one example in which the left side of a dormitory was within the declared site of one OOV while the right side

was in a different declared site. Hansen expressed concern as to how this Russian approach might affect verification of treaty compliance.

Ambassador Hansen further pointed out that the new Russian approach in effect forced a CFE inspection team to declare the specific OOV at the POE. This gave the inspected party an opportunity to move equipment across a road and hide it in a different OOV during the inspection team's nine-hour transit from the POE. At a declared site with a single OOV there was nowhere to hide the equipment because all areas were subject to inspection. At the multiple OOV/declared site installations the inspection process could become a pea in the shell game. This Russian change, Hansen charged, directly threatened the openness that was a key component in the treaty. Inspection teams could no longer visit a site and be confident that they had seen all of the equipment there. Further negotiations in Vienna led the Russians to agree with the U.S. position and to provide assurances that they would change their site diagrams.²⁵ After receiving assurances of change, NATO allies tested the Russians again.

On October 3, 1992, 10 days after Ambassador Hansen's speech and on the heels of a German inspection team, Team Gessert deployed to the Russian 423rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at Naru-Fominsk. During that inspection, the issues of



American team chief Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert discussing site diagrams and access issues with Russian escorts at Naru-Fominsk.

site diagrams and multiple declared sites on an installation surfaced again because the changes had not penetrated through from the diplomatic to the operational level of the Russian army. Although he received the personal assurances of General-Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygankov that future access would be provided, Lt. Colonel Gessert declared an ambiguity. While the two officers were discussing the issue, a French team that included Lt. Colonel Karcz announced from the POE that it would inspect one of the declared sites/OOVs at Naro-Fominsk. General Tsygankov initially wanted to refuse the French permission to inspect Naro-Fominsk because Team Gessert was already in place, and the treaty prohibited more than one team on a site. He soon realized however, that Naro-Fominsk was a multiple OOV and a multiple declared site, and that the French were not requesting the same OOV that Gessert was inspecting. He acknowledged the French team's right to conduct its inspection. They did so. These multinational inspections caused new discussions at the JCG in Vienna. They produced new assurances from the Russian representatives that the site diagrams and multiple OOV problems would be corrected. Three days after Team Gessert departed Naro-Fominsk, another U.S. team returned.²⁶

On October 9th, Colonel Kelley led a team augmented by two foreign members-Lieutenant Ole T. Pedersen from Denmark, and Georges M. Virse from France. Their destination was the 12th Guards Tank Regiment at Naro-Fominsk. Again, a major goal of the mission was to test the assurances given by Russian delegates in Vienna that site diagrams would be changed and inspection teams granted full access to an installation. The presence of the two augmentees signaled to Russia that a community of nations, not only the United States, considered the issue of site diagrams and multiple OOVs to be very serious. Team Kelley arrived at Naro-Fominsk and, like previous teams, received a restrictive site



Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser (left) leading an inspection in Belarus.

diagram that did not include the entire installation. The Russians still depicted multiple OOVs as individual declared sites; the Russians claimed that the change would come with the next treaty data exchange. Colonel Kelley declared an ambiguity. After completing this inspection, the team conducted a sequential declared site inspection of the 589th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at Totskoye. Again site diagrams were an issue, and again Colonel Kelley declared an ambiguity.²⁷

These inspections revealed that the Russians had not yet changed their position on OOVs and declared sites, or that directives to implement change had not yet filtered down to operational levels of the Russian army. In Vienna, JCG discussions continued, and Russian delegates stated that Russia would soon revise the declared sites and site diagrams at issue to reflect multiple OOVs colocated on single declared sites. The Russians indicated that they would develop new site diagrams that would restrict access only to those areas specific to another OOV on the same declared site. Russian representatives assured JCG delegates that these changes would appear in the annual exchange of data on December 15, 1992. An encouraging sign that Russia was making headway in its changes came on November 8, 1992. During an inspection mission of Russian forces in Azerbaijan, the Russian site representatives presented Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, site diagrams that indicated multiple OOVs located on a single declared site. He conducted two inspections on that mission and had no difficulties in either location with site diagrams or inspector access.

On January 14, 1993, after an evaluation of Russia's December 15, 1992, exchange of treaty information, President George Bush presented his annual "Report to Congress on Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements." In the report he stated that "the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent, Ukraine and Belarus" had developed an overly restrictive definition of a declared site, consequently restricting access. But he noted that

"In its December 15, 1992, data exchange, the Russian Federation has, however, taken action to rectify its data depiction of what should be single declared sites with multiple OOVs, and discussions are continuing in the joint Consultative Group to resolve the rest of the access issue."²⁸

The December 1992, data exchange indicated a change in the Russian position on declared sites, OOVs, and inspection team access. Confirmation came during subsequent declared site inspections in the reduction phase of the treaty. The Russians had indeed conformed to treaty requirements, but Belarus and Ukraine did not follow Russia's example.

CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS

During baseline, U.S. inspectors conducted only one challenge inspection. On August 11, 1992, Major Keith A. Oatman, USA, led his team to Minsk, Belarus. Their mission was to inspect a large holding of TLE that had not been declared in the data exchange of Ø90. One hour after arrival at Minsk, Major Oatman specified the area for inspection, an apparent tank storage facility at Urechye. Two hours later Belarussian officials granted the inspection request, and within an hour Team Oatman was en route to Urechye. According to escort officials, these tanks and storage facilities were part of the 969th Central Tank Reserve Base that Belarus would declare in a matter of days in its August 1992 data exchange. Although none was required, Belarus officials gave Team Oatman a modified site briefing that highlighted the 969th's relationship to the other two OOVs that were on the declared site at Urechye. The issue of declared site inspection versus challenge inspection arose, because Urechye was a declared site for both the 30th Tank Regiment and the 20th Independent Reconnaissance Battalion, and the specified area requested for inspection was located on the installation. Ultimately, the Belarus escorts afforded Team Oatman access to the tank storage facilities to complete its mission, but denied the team access to areas that were part of the two declared OOVs.²⁹



Lt. Colonel Keith Oatman completes an inspection in Azerbaijan.

MULTI NATIONAL TEAMS

During the baseline period, NATO guest inspectors frequently joined U.S.-led inspection teams, and U.S. inspectors participated as members of allied teams. The increase in inspection opportunities provided allied governments, through their guest inspectors, a broader view of treaty implementation throughout Europe. The multinational teams represented a united front on treaty implementation issues at the JCG, as had been the case in resolving the declared site definition and access issue. Colonel Brenna Tesori of Italy was the first allied inspector to join a U.S. team on a U.S. CFE mission, Team Gessert's declared site inspection mission to Ukraine, on July 30, 1992. During the baseline period, OSIA teams conducted 22 inspections with the assistance of allied guest inspectors, usually one or two augmentees per mission. Inspectors from the Netherlands, France, Germany, Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy represented their countries on U.S. teams. The allied multinational inspection team foreshadowed the international mix of team members subsequent to baseline. However, while U.S. inspection teams became multinational, escort teams remained strictly American.

U.S. BASELINE ESCORT OPERATIONS

The OSIA escort teams stood ready to react at nearly a moment's notice. Teams initially maintained a 30-minute, one-hour, or three-hour stand by. The team on 30-minute stand by lived on base in the 21st Replacement Battalion dormitory or the Rhein-Main Hotel. Their three-day stand by rotation matched the time blocks of the NATO baseline deconfliction schedule, facilitating planning for inspection deployments. The short reaction time for escort teams was driven by the possibility that an Eastern team



OSIA escort team with local escorts during a declared site inspection.

would declare a sequential inspection of a U.S. site in northern Germany or in the flank areas: Turkey, Greece, or Norway. Because of the travel time to distant locations, an escort team might need all of the six-hour site preparation time allowed by the treaty to arrive at one of the outlying inspection sites before the inspection team. The U.S. escort teams had to arrive on-site ahead of the Eastern inspection teams to avoid delaying the inspection process and to make certain that the site was prepared to receive inspectors.

During baseline, OSIA teams met nine Eastern inspection teams and escorted them through inspections of 23 U.S. declared sites. Russian teams conducted 10 of those inspections during two missions. Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia each inspected three U.S. facilities, and Romania inspected one U.S. site. All Eastern inspections of U.S. declared sites occurred in Central Europe, the focal point of the treaty; none took place in the flanks. Specifically, Eastern teams conducted 21 inspections of U.S. forces stationed in Germany, 1 in Belgium, and 1 in Luxembourg. ii

Russian inspectors recorded the only ambiguities against U.S. forces during baseline. During the second Russian inspection mission of U.S. sites in September 1992, Lt. Colonel Oleg Borisovich Koptelov declared four ambiguities. On September 25, 1992, he declared an ambiguity at the General Support Center at Kaiserslautern, Germany, about the categorization of three M-728 combat engineer vehicles. The Russian team chief asserted that the vehicles should be considered M-60 tanks because of their short muzzle, 165 millimeter gun, and extra plating. The American team chief, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, countered that the M-728s were not M-60 tanks; the M-728s were designed for mine-clearing operations. Fiser cited Article I of the treaty, stating that they were not capable of "heavy firepower of a high muzzle veloc-



American ambulances were based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier.

ity direct fire gun." The Russian team chief did not agree and exercised his treaty right to declare an ambiguity.

Lt. Colonel Koptelov declared two more ambiguities on September 28th, during a sequential inspection at Rhine Ordnance Barracks. The first concerned ambulances based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier (APC). Lt. Colonel Koptelov stated that an M-113 ambulance should be considered TLE because, with the exception of quickly removable interior equipment, it was an APC. Major Guy White, who replaced Lt. Colonel Fiser at Rhine Ordnance Barracks, responded that because the vehicle carried the "red cross and was configured for litters, it was not an APC."

Lt. Colonel Koptelov's second ambiguity at the Rhine Ordnance Barracks dealt with the site diagram and access. The Russian inspection team chief stated that U.S. military facilities on territory west of the declared site should have been portrayed on the site diagram. He observed that only a small road and chainlink fence separated the depicted declared site and military facilities to the west. Lt. Colonel Koptelov added that two roads connected the two locations, making the facilities a single declared site, and therefore the western portion should be accessible to an inspection team. Major White replied that the facility to the west was not associated with Rhine Ordnance Barracks—it was the Weilerbach Ammunition Storage Area, an old INF site—a separate facility. Major White pointed to the eight-foot chainlink and barbed wire fences that surrounded both facilities, and to the German civilian road that bisected the facilities as evidence that they were, in fact, separate military installations. The two team chiefs discussed previous site diagram and access disputes that U.S. inspectors had documented during inspections of Russian sites. Major White maintained that the situations were not the same; however, Koptelov was not persuaded and declared an ambiguity.

The Russian inspector's fourth and final ambiguity arose during the last inspection of his mission, on September 30th, at the South Park Storage at Moenchgladbach. After Russian inspectors inventoried another 30 M-113 based ambulances there, Koptelov repeated the Russian assertion that these ambulances should be considered APCs, thus TLE, contrary to the U.S. position that as ambulances they were not subject to the treaty.³²



The M113 armored personnel carrier was a mainstay of American forces in Europe.



An INMARSAT provided reliable but bulky communications.

AMERICAN LIAISON OPERATIONS

As discussed previously, the role of a U.S. liaison officer (LNO) was to protect U.S. interests by representing the U.S. government whenever Eastern inspection teams conducted inspections in a NATO state. To ensure readiness, OSIA's liaison teams in Germany operated on a rotating standby schedule. Two primary standby teams could deploy within three hours of notification. Two other teams were on a six-hour alert and moved up to the three-hour alert when one of the primary teams deployed. The remaining two teams were on a one-day standby schedule. The forward-deployed teams in Italy, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom were prepared to respond at any time. Twice a day the forward-deployed teams checked with European Operations to monitor the status of treaty activities in their area. They also maintained ties with the host nation's treaty verification agency and with the American Embassy.

To communicate with European Operations and EUCOM when phones were not available, each team deployed with an INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite) communications station. The INMARSAT, an 80-pound self-contained satellite communications system, was reliable and effective, but very cumbersome. Cellular phones offered far greater flexibility. Cellular phones were not available to all LNOs at the onset of the CFE baseline, but were provided when they became available. The cellular phones were purchased in Germany; there were different national phone systems throughout Europe, and the new cellular phones did not work on all of the systems. England and Spain were two countries where LNOs experienced some difficulties. There were also places where the cellular communications systems had "dead spots." The LNOs ultimately relied on their resourcefulness to keep lines of communication open with the host escort team, European Operations, and EUCOM.

Procedures for American LNOs varied from nation to nation. Before the baseline period, a joint State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) team traveled throughout the NATO states to negotiate bilateral agreements that would outline specifically what actions the American teams could take to protect U.S. interests and rights. These agreements varied widely. The U.S.-German agreement mirrored years of close government cooperation and the interaction of significant U.S. and German military forces. This agreement permitted an American presence at the POE when Eastern inspection teams arrived. Frequently German escort teams invited the American LNOs to ride with them and the inspection team on the same bus. The German escorts kept U.S. LNOs well informed of the inspection team's status and intentions for sequential inspections. The timeliness of the German notifications allowed American LNOs, through OSIA's "Big Hog" data base, to



quickly determine which U.S. forces were known to be in the vicinity of the next inspection. Consequently, those forces had a better opportunity to prepare for a possible inspection.

As discussed previously, maintaining up-to-date databases was difficult because of the wide variety of activities of U.S. forces in Europe. On two occasions, neither OSIA nor EUCOM databases provided the American LNOs information of U.S. forces located on sites to be inspected. In Germany, 600 U.S. soldiers participating in an annual major NATO exercise, REFORGER, surprised a German escort team when they encountered them near Hamburg. The American LNO team standing by in the vicinity responded to the German discovery and the inspection proceeded smoothly. A similar situation arose in Florennes, Belgium. Neither EUCOM nor OSIA databases were updated to show the temporary deployment of two F-15 and four F-16 aircraft to a U.S. training program in Belgium. However, the chief liaison officer, Major Richard **J.** O'Shea, USAF, was aware that the training program existed and the U.S. liaison team was able to alert the U.S. forces and prepare them for the inspection. In both cases the U.S. liaison teams, with the cooperation of host escort teams, protected American interests.³³

Other NATO nations took a much more restrictive approach. Turkey and Portugal, for example, preferred to exercise their national sovereignty and insisted that U.S. LNOs not be present at



U.S. aircraft, like the F-16, could be found throughout Europe far from American sites.

the POE when Eastern teams arrived. In the opinion of these nations, the inspection process did not involve the United States until American forces became subject to inspection. In an October 1992 inspection, the Portuguese escort team chief told the American LNO, Major Charles R. Allison, USA, that the U.S. government would be notified through the American Embassy if the Russian team wanted to inspect U.S. facilities.³⁴

Major John M. Bilyeu, USA, had a similar experience when a Bulgarian team arrived in Turkey on July 27, 1992. The Turkish government had chosen to minimize U.S. visibility during CFE inspections. The American LNOs traveled to the vicinity of the POE and attempted to contact the escort team chief, but could not. The U.S. team received no information from the Turkish escort team until after the Bulgarian team had conducted two inspections and was preparing to depart the country. Lacking information, the American team deployed to the only known U.S. facilities that were in the area of the POE and stood by in case the Bulgarians opted to inspect that location.³⁵

In August 1992, it was clear that Eastern nations were not keeping pace with their allotted CFE baseline inspection quotas. It also became apparent that the Eastern inspection teams were inspecting several sites during each mission, thus minimizing travel expenses. For U.S. liaison teams this implied far fewer deployments to POEs, but it also meant longer missions when they did deploy.

In late August, Lt. Colonel Stephen A. Barneby, USA, Chief of the Plans Branch, evaluated the Eastern states' inspection pattern and recommended cutting the number of forward-deployed liaison teams. On September 3, 1992, Colonel William R. Smith, USAF, Commander, OSIA European Operations Command, agreed and proposed the cuts to Headquarters OSIA. In mid-September, the United States reduced its forward-deployed LNO presence to single teams in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. The single team in Spain was eliminated. Colonel Kelley decided that Lt. Colonel Barneby, a West European foreign area officer (FAO) who had come to European Operations Command in July 1992 from a three-year tour in Spain, would deploy from Frankfurt to Spain when required. Throughout the rest of the baseline period, the remaining LNO teams fulfilled the JCS requirement to provide an American presence to protect American rights and interests whenever an Eastern inspection team entered a NATO state.³⁶

U.S. BASELINE REDUCTION INSPECTIONS

Under the CFE Treaty, reduction inspections provided the primary means to determine that nations were meeting their obligations to reduce TLE. Western reduction inspection teams were

usually multinational, and team leadership varied from mission to mission. The NATO VCC designated which nation would lead reduction inspection teams for the group of 16 states. Rotating team leadership spread the burden of the expense and the difficulty of providing transportation, billeting, and meals associated with the inspection effort. Many nations, however, declined the opportunity to lead reduction teams during baseline, largely because of the cost.

Initially, the Eastern states reduced small sets of equipment over a 30-day period, causing Western inspection teams to deploy frequently. Colonel Smith suggested that the VCC consider decreasing the size of reduction inspection teams to reduce costs. While other nations declined leading reduction inspection teams, the U.S. government's policy dictated that at least one U.S. representative would participate on any reduction mission and that the United States would accept the lead on a mission whenever the VCC offered it. Colonel Smith also recommended that nations lengthen their reduction periods to the allowable 90 days and increase the amount of equipment for reduction, thereby decreasing the number of reduction inspections. During the baseline period, U.S. inspectors led 5 of the 23 NATO alliance reduction inspection teams and participated in 12 others.

The first U.S.-led mission was in Germany.³⁷ Lt. Colonel John D. Pesterfield, USAF, led the first U.S. reduction team to the Capital Repair Plant at Wuensdorf, Germany, on August 6, 1992. Team Pesterfield was composed of five Americans, an Italian, a Belgian, a Canadian, and an inspector from the United Kingdom. While conducting an opening inspection, the team checked and recorded the serial numbers of the 100 ACVs to be reduced over the next 30 days. The team also watched and confirmed the destruction of two ACVs—a BMP-1 and a BTR-60. Lt. Colonel Pesterfield signed the inspection report on August 8th, indicating that his team had confirmed the destruction of two ACVs and recorded the serial numbers of those yet to be destroyed. Team Pesterfield's data were available to the governments involved in the inspection and were submitted to NATO's VCC.

The VCC maintained the information for subsequent use by the closure inspection team that would return to Wuensdorf to confirm the reduction of the remaining 98 pieces of equipment. The Wuensdorf reduction period highlighted the VCC's critical role in scheduling and data collection for reduction missions. The United States did not lead the follow-up team, but that team prepared for the mission based on the information provided by the VCC. During

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Spanish and Danish inspectors on a multinational reduction inspection team.

the baseline period, OSIA inspectors led four other reduction inspections, two to Ukraine, one to Poland, and one to Bulgaria. All five reduction inspections were successful multinational efforts and provided evidence that nations were satisfying the treaty's central objective: reducing military hardware in Central Europe.

Operational Issues

American inspection teams encountered various difficulties during the CFE baseline. The major problems that arose concerned the definition of a declared site and the resulting difficulties with inspector access. As the baseline ended, however, Western states held a cautious optimism that Russia had resolved these problems. Ukraine and Belarus, however, offered no indication of changing their restrictive approach to the definition of a declared site. The issue of U.S. armored ambulances versus M-113 APCs also remained unresolved. Communications provided the most frequent operational problems that OSIA teams confronted.

During the early stages of baseline, OSIA European Operations occasionally had to modify notification messages because aircrew identification was inaccurate or because treaty-required data had to be changed. European Operations had no control over aircrew identification information, which was the responsibility of the aircrews' wing. In fact, EO could not confirm aircrew data until the crews arrived in Frankfurt. Colonel Smith recognized that late changes to inspection notification messages were an irritant to State Department communications specialists. Yet, he took excep-



Bulgarian escorts stand on a treaty-limited tank converted for static display.

tion to their insistence that no changes could be made after the initial message submission. On three occasions during July-August 1992, State Department representatives balked at transmitting late message changes. The problem was simple to state, but difficult to resolve. On the one hand, Colonel Smith had to provide mandatory treaty information about the inspections to the treaty states. On the other hand, the State Department had to transmit accurate, standardized message data to foreign nations through the American embassies. When operational pressures created requirements for changing the data, network standards resisted any changes. Friction resulted. The problem was resolved over time by closer coordination on the mandatory CFE Treaty data requirements and by better advance mission planning. By the end of the baseline period, communicating messages over the State Department network had improved considerably.

Another communications problem stemmed from host nations' providing late announcements that they had received intent-to-inspect messages, and sometimes that information came only through informal channels. This problem continued throughout the baseline period. As late as November 12, 1992, 118 days into baseline, Greece notified the United States of a Hungarian inspection that had started two days earlier. In this case, an American LNO was not in place to protect U.S. interests.³⁹ Late notifications frequently put U.S. liaison teams in the position of catching up with inspection teams. These notification problems, coupled with some nations' practice of keeping U.S. liaison teams at a distance, made it difficult for LNOs to gather information and be certain that all U.S. interests were protected during inspections.

The strict "letter of the law" approach to treaty implementation taken by OSIA teams periodically strained working relations, especially when U.S. methods were compared with the "spirit of the law" approach taken by other nations. As directed by the National Security Council, OSIA teams implemented the treaty without deviation. American army field commanders complained to Headquarters USA REUR that OSIA team chiefs were too rigid in their interpretation of treaty timeline requirements; that OSIA team chiefs would not allow time requirements to be relaxed so that inspection could begin in the morning instead of late at night. This would prevent calling civilians into work on overtime and keeping military personnel on duty for lengthy periods. Field commanders pointed out that other nations took a much more casual approach to treaty implementation.

Similarly, Eastern inspectors expressed displeasure that OSIA teams arrived late at night or on weekends, causing difficulties with their work force.⁴⁰ What was not known to Eastern escort teams was the VCC scheduling of inspections and the NATO-imposed three-day inspection time block. When U.S. teams de-

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ployed, they had little choice but to execute their plan. An Eastern escort team might have been willing to allow an American team to relax time requirements; however, by agreeing, the American team might have prevented another team, U.S. or allied, from conducting a planned inspection several hours later. The 120-day baseline was a relatively short period in which to complete numerous inspections, and there were bound to be inconveniences associated with any large-scale effort. Illustrative of many states' outlook was a Bulgarian inspector's comment during an inspection in Belgium: "The main goal of the treaty had been accomplished by signing the treaty, and the inspections were merely a formality."

Many inspectors from nations in both groups of states cited the "spirit of the treaty" as a guide for implementation. The U.S. experience during INF Treaty implementation, however, indicated that participants adhering strictly to treaty requirements had little doubt concerning their own or their counterparts' responsibilities and rights. OSIA's Director, Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, expressed that view in a letter to USAREUR's Major General Joseph T. Davies, USA, on the issue of inspection teams' late arrivals and briefings at U.S. facilities. Parker pointed out that host state escort teams, not OSIA liaison or escort teams, delivered inspection teams to a site following treaty guidelines. Once at the site, the U.S. government had specific treaty obligations to fulfill. General Parker stated categorically that he "would not apologize for OSIA standards of inspection." He said that OSIA inspectors followed the treaty strictly so that there would be no doubt as to what the requirements were and so that those requirements would be fulfilled. He asserted that in this way everyone's rights were being protected.

Despite communication and perception problems, OSIA inspectors, escorts, and LNOs succeeded in fulfilling their responsibilities and protecting the rights of the United States as outlined in the CFE Treaty. Problems that arose during inspections were discussed and handled in a professional manner by OSIA team members and their counterparts. Even in situations that resulted in declarations of ambiguities, inspection and escort teams maintained an "operational" atmosphere, leaving resolution of problems to their governments.

During baseline, OSIA inspection teams traveled 33 times into Eastern nations to conduct 44 inspections. On one other occasion a team traveled to Moscow only to reschedule the mission because of poor weather conditions at the inspection site. The U.S. completed 98 percent of the 45 missions available to it. Meanwhile, Eastern teams completed only 66 percent of the 34 inspections available to them at U.S. declared sites. OSIA escort teams responded to 9 Eastern inspection missions to 23 inspection sites.

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Chapter 7

REDUCTION YEARS



Severed Ukrainian fighters on display during a U.S. reduction inspection.

"Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large scale action in Europe, ... the States Parties have agreed as follows: ..."

These objectives are found in the CFE Treaty Preamble. To fulfill them, the treaty requires the elimination of specific quantities of conventional armaments located in the treaty's area of application within specific timelines. The elimination-or, in treaty terms, the reduction-of equipment had to be complete, irreversible, and verifiable. The Eastern group of states' agreement to asymmetrical reductions was instrumental in enabling the two groups of states to eliminate the disparities in force strength that were "prejudicial to stability." Collectively, the Eastern states, previously the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states, would reduce more equipment than the NATO alliance nations because they held a significant numerical superiority in conventional armaments in Europe.

REDUCTION LIABILITIES

When the 22 nations signed the treaty on November 19, 1990, they exchanged data declaring their national holdings. Based on these declarations, the two groups of states possessed the following:

Table 7-1. National Holdings by Alliance


Equipment	On hand ¹	Treaty limit	Reduction liability ²
Tanks			
NATO	25,091	20,000	5,949
WTO	33,191	20,000	13,191
Armored Combat Vehicles			
NATO	34,453	30,000	4,631
WTO	42,949	30,000	12,949
Artillery			
NATO	20,620	20,000	2,334
WTO	26,953	20,000	6,953
Aircraft			
NATO	5,939	6,800	0
WTO	8,372	6,800	1,572
Helicopters			
NATO	1,736	2,000	0
WTO	1,701	2,000	0

¹ NATO figures include weapons held by the former German Democratic Republic.

² NATO states allocated cuts below treaty limits.

Sources: *Arms Control Reporter 1990*, 407.E-0.7; Jane M.O. Sharp, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe," *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 423-426.

At treaty signature, the reduction liability of the NATO states stood at 12,914 pieces of equipment, the majority of which was equipment of the former German Democratic Republic. The NATO states placed greater reduction liabilities on themselves than the treaty required by setting their tank, armored combat vehicle (ACV), and artillery ceilings below those outlined in the treaty. In contrast, the Eastern group of states possessed 34,665 pieces of equipment for reduction. Regardless of quantity, the treaty required each group to complete its reductions within 40 months of the treaty's entry into force.¹



Soviets transferred more than 57,000 pieces of TLE east of the Urals.

As discussed in a previous chapter, the Eastern states' figures for treaty-limited equipment (TLE) from data exchanged shortly after treaty signature surprised the United States and the NATO allies. The Soviets had transferred more than 57,000 pieces of equipment out of the treaty's area of application before November 19, 1990. In addition to moving equipment east of the Urals, the Soviets had reassigned portions of its conventional armaments to coastal defense forces, naval infantry units, and the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Soviets claimed that these forces and their conventional equipment were not subject to the treaty. The NATO states countered that TLE within the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals) was TLE, regardless of the organization that possessed it. It was accountable. The Soviet movement of equipment east of the Urals raised concerns that the Soviets could quickly reintroduce those weapons into the ATTU. Some nations declared that shifting the TLE east of the Urals was a circumvention of the treaty. These Soviet actions brought on political and diplomatic debate that stalled ratification of the treaty. On June 14, 1991, after months of lengthy and heated Joint Consultative Group (JCG) negotiations, Soviet representatives submitted pledges addressing both the equipment east of the Urals and the reassigned TLE within the ATTU. These pledges allowed the ratification process to move forward.

One Soviet pledge provided a legally binding solution to the TLE held by the Strategic Rocket Forces, naval infantry, and coastal defense forces. The Soviets agreed to limit TLE assigned to the naval infantry and coastal defense forces not to exceed a total 933 tanks, 1,080 pieces of artillery, and 972 ACVs. In addition, the Soviets agreed to increase their total treaty reduction liability

by the same totals. They would accomplish 50 percent of those reductions within the ATTU and would reduce the other 50 percent in the east after transferring that amount of equipment out of the ATTU. Once the Soviets transferred the equipment, they would reduce that same equipment or an equal number of the same type of equipment. The Soviets would not incur any reduction liabilities associated with the 1,701 armored personnel carriers (APCs) assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Soviet limits on naval TLE:

933 tanks

1,080 artillery

972 ACVs

The other pledge, politically binding, dealt with the equipment the Soviets had transferred east of the Urals prior to treaty signature. The Soviets pledged to reduce at least 14,500 pieces of that equipment. This broke down to 6,000 tanks, 1,500 ACVs, and 7,000 pieces of artillery. These reductions were in addition to the obligations they had assumed concerning naval infantry and coastal defense forces. The combined reduction obligations for equipment the Soviets had moved or would move east of the Urals, as outlined in the two pledges, totaled 15,993 items, specifically: 6,467 tanks, 7,540 pieces of artillery, and 1,986 ACVs.² There was, however, one major difference between reductions on the two sides of the Urals. The NATO states could inspect all reductions within the ATTU—the Soviets had no right of refusal. East of the Urals, however, satellite reconnaissance was the only means the NATO states had for monitoring reductions. The Soviets stated in their pledge that all reductions in the East would be readily visible for satellite observation.

The collapse of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991 threw reduction liabilities for the Eastern group of states into a muddle. Out of the former Soviet Union arose eight new treaty states: Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia. The new nations of the former Soviet Union had no agreement on equipment ownership, much less who would be responsible for reductions. Individual signatory states, not the group, were responsible for treaty implementation, and the NATO nations could not ratify the treaty without the former Soviet states acknowledging their reduction liabilities. As the new states focused on forming new governments, resolving domestic issues, and dealing with armed hostilities, it appeared that they would not soon agree on TLE and reduction allocations. However, on May 15, 1992, at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the new republics came to a dramatic agreement on the national distribution of the former USSR's military hardware and established ceilings for holdings in the various categories of equipment. This agreement led directly to the Oslo Extraordinary Conference in June 1992, where all signatory nations had sufficient confidence to proceed with ratification based on the understanding that the combined reduction obligations of the newly emerged nations would equal those of the former Soviet Union.³

Months later, after the treaty entered into force, it was clear that the individual nations had not reached agreement on all of their reduction liabilities. The exchange of treaty data on December 15, 1992, indicated that the new nations' liabilities, when totaled, would not equal the original Soviet obligation. The original Soviet reduction liabilities, not including the reductions required under the agreement on coastal defense forces and naval infantry, included 7,575 tanks, 9,890 ACVs, 763 artillery, 1,461 combat aircraft, and no helicopters. The new data showed shortfalls in declared reduction liabilities of 1,789 tanks and 819 ACVs, while producing overages of 68 pieces of artillery, 401 combat aircraft, and 115 attack helicopters.

The disparities stemmed partly from confusion over inventories as new governments continued to be embroiled in domestic issues, and some even in armed conflict. None of the nations had the expertise that the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) had developed through implementation of previous arms control treaties. The armed hostilities in the Transcaucasus nations (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and in Moldova were a major reason for the shortfall in reduction liabilities for tanks and ACVs. Nongovernment forces controlled some of the hardware in the region, ongoing battles had destroyed or heavily damaged other pieces, and withdrawing Russian troops had left behind equipment



The new nations of the Caucasus were reluctant to declare broken-down equipment left behind by the Russian army.



U.S. inspectors at a Belarussian reduction site.

suitable only for scrap. Most important, no one claimed ownership or responsibility for the equipment. In addition, Armenia and Azerbaijan, involved in heavy fighting, wanted recognition for TLE destroyed in combat, but the treaty did not allow for battlefield losses. These new nations reported no reduction liabilities yet they reported possessing equipment in excess of the ceilings agreed to at Tashkent.⁴ During the two subsequent years, JCG discussions brought some clarification as the shortfall decreased to 539 tanks and 1,394 ACVs by November 1994. Azerbaijan's and Armenia's failure to declare a reduction liability contributed significantly to the 1994 shortfall.

Shortly after the third reduction year, Armenia announced its holdings, as did Azerbaijan; both still had more ACVs than the Tashkent agreement allowed, Armenia by 65 and Azerbaijan by 615. Azerbaijan also held 58 more pieces of artillery than the 285 agreed upon at Tashkent. Belarus faced economic problems that forced a postponement of its reductions during the third reduction year; it held 548 tanks, 446 ACVs, and 88 aircraft to be reduced. Although Belarus resumed reductions, it did not meet its goals before November 17, 1995.

Despite these problems, the former Soviet states reduced enough TLE as a group to be below their ceilings for all categories of TLE. These reductions, coupled with the success of the Eastern European states during the third reduction year, led to the former Warsaw Pact states' meeting their CFE treaty ceilings. As of November 1995, all NATO nations met their reduction goals and both groups of states were under the treaty ceiling for all categories of TLE.

The U.S. reduction liability at treaty signature and entry into force was 1,898 tanks, 375 ACVs, and 109 pieces of artillery. The United States quickly decreased its reduction liabilities, because the NATO group of states agreed to transfer equipment, along with the equivalent reduction liability, among themselves. A treaty-authorized transfer, colloquially called "cascading," allowed the United States, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy to transfer TLE to other NATO states. The NATO Equipment Transfer Plan allowed donor states to bring their TLE holdings down to treaty-declared levels to avoid reduction costs and to modernize and standardize armaments throughout the alliance. The initial planning for cascaded NATO equipment totaled 2,578 tanks, 1,114 ACVs, and

Table 7-2. NATO Equipment Transfers

Donor	Recipient	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery
U.S.	Greece	671	150	84
	Norway	0	136	0
	Portugal	80	0	0
	Spain	311	100	24
	Turkey	932	250	72
U.S. totals		1,994	636	180
Germany	Denmark	110	0	0
	Greece	0	200	0
	Turkey	85	187	131
	Norway	92	0	0
	Portugal	0	50	0
German totals		287	437	131
Netherlands	Greece	169	0	171
	Portugal	0	104	0
Netherlands totals		169	104	171
Italy	Turkey	0	97	0
NATO totals		2,450	1,274	482

Source: Report, Under Secretary of Defense Tactical Warfare Programs, "Report on Transfer of Certain CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment," August 30, 1994.

180 pieces of artillery. By the end of 1993 the final distribution differed only slightly from the initial plan.

The U.S. European Command, the United States' executive agent for the CFE Treaty, managed the cascading of U.S. TLE and contracted for the destruction of the 632 excess M-47 tanks in Buccino, Italy, and 7 M-47 tanks and 4 M-44 howitzers at the U.S. Army Depot at Germersheim, Germany. Italian contractors conducted the first U.S. reductions at Buccino on January 28, 1993. Buccino was also the site for the final U.S. TLE reductions on November 12, 1993. The combined cascading and destruction of TLE enabled the United States to reach its declared TLE ceilings of 4,006 tanks, 5,372 ACVs, and 2,492 pieces of artillery. The United States had no reduction liabilities for combat aircraft and

helicopters because it held 334 combat aircraft against a ceiling of 784 and 341 helicopters against a ceiling of 518. Thus there was no U.S. cascading or reduction for either category.⁵

REDUCTION METHODS

Reduction methods varied depending on the type of equipment, and several options were available to reduce any piece of equipment. Destruction was the primary means of reducing TLE, and technicians could employ several methods to accomplish it. As an option to destroying all equipment, the treaty authorized modifying a small portion of TLE for nonoffensive purposes. Tanks could be converted into bulldozers, or combat helicopters into support helicopters. States could also elect to modify equipment for use as trainers, static displays, or training targets.

The Protocol on Reduction allowed severing as a method of destroying all types of TLE, such as the American M-47 tanks. The protocol did not dictate a particular technology to sever TLE, but it detailed the cuts required for each category of equipment. Tanks, for example, required specific cuts for the gun breech ring, the gun tube, one gun trunnion and mount, and the hull. The



Reduction by conversion to static display.



Reduction by conversion to nonmilitary equipment.



Team Drach checking the length and location of a cut on a gun tube.

guidance on specific cuts included location, length, and number of cuts, as well as the extent of material to be removed in a cut. Severing with torches was the primary method used to reduce TLE.

While most states chose to sever equipment, Poland chose to smash much of its TLE. Smashing was cheap and efficient. Technicians positioned equipment on a pad below an eight-ton wrecking ball suspended on a crane and repeatedly dropped the ball on tanks, ACVs, and artillery until they achieved the desired results. The pad on which the technicians centered the TLE enabled them to smash their equipment successfully. According to Colonel Stanisław Malinowski, Director of the Polish Verification Center, "It has to be made of a special material that can be enduring. If not, it is easily smashed up with three or four droppings of the ball. So the composition, the material that is used...is patented by Poland." The surface withstood the pounding as the Poles successfully destroyed their TLE.⁶

The treaty provided for two other destruction methods, but states did not use them because they were expensive and less efficient. NATO allies conducted tests to develop an inexpensive and effective method for explosive demolition of TLE, but the tests produced poor results. The treaty also allowed for the deformation of tanks, helicopters, and combat aircraft. Superheating the equipment before pressing the weakened metal led to satisfactory results, but the expense and efficiency precluded that method.

THE REDUCTION PROCESS

Reduction of TLE under the CFE Treaty was a multinational effort. The process began with each nation working within its group of states to determine its reduction liability. Based on its reduction liability, a state determined the number of reduction

Poland's Reduction Method-A Smashing Success



Above and left: Magnetic force releases steel ball from gantry onto TLE in chamber. Below: Crushed relics, the results of smashing by the eight-ton ball.



Reduction Process at Buccino, Italy



*Left: A tank awaiting reduction.
Below: Treads removed, prepared for severing.*



Above: Technicians begin the cutting process. Above right: Czech team inspects severed components. Right: Severed tank ready for scrap.



sites required to reduce its TLE. The treaty did not limit the number of reduction sites a state could designate, but it did restrict the number of sites engaged in reductions at any given time to 20. This number proved to be far in excess of what any nation actually organized. Poland required only four sites during the first reduction year to begin reducing its sizable liability of nearly 1,200 tanks, 715 pieces of artillery, 300 ACVs, and 41 aircraft. By the end of the first year, Poland had reduced its 41 aircraft and closed its aircraft reduction site. Polish planners evaluated their progress and elected to close a second site because the two remaining sites would be sufficient for their needs.⁷

Reducing massive amounts of equipment, such as tanks and APCs, within treaty timelines required scheduling. The treaty mandated that states complete at least 25 percent of their reductions during the first reduction year, followed by 35 and 40 percent of the total in the final two years. In addition, the treaty required states to reduce equipment in blocks of time of not less than 30 and not more than 90 days, known as calendar reporting periods. Moreover, the capacity of reduction sites, in terms of space and work flow and the movement of equipment to and from the sites, dictated that the work be spread out over time. Cost, a major consideration for the Eastern states, slowed work flow because of the expense of labor and materials.

Once the reducing state had planned reductions for a specific calendar reporting period, it opened the process to the other signatory nations through an official notification. The treaty obligated the reducing state to provide at least 15 days' advance notice of reductions. The state announced the reduction site, the quantities and types of equipment, the OOVs that were releasing the equipment, the method of reduction, and the dates of the reporting period. The notification also indicated the final date and time



The reduction liabilities for some treaty states were significant, taxing facilities, manpower, and funds.

inspection teams could arrive at a specific point of entry (POE) to view the equipment before the reduction began. In addition to giving notice of the reduction, the reducing state had to display the equipment for inspectors. The requirements for display varied: A fuselage satisfied the requirement for an aircraft, whereas a proper tank display included the hull, turret, and integral main armament. In all cases, the displayed TLE had to be available for inspection before reduction, and they had to be complete assemblies, a requirement that would become an issue during U.S. inspections. The reducing state also established a register to document serial numbers and to record the start and completion dates of reduction for each piece of equipment.

Once an Eastern state sent a notification of reduction, the VCC sought a NATO state to lead the reduction inspection. The VCC polled member states to determine leadership and participation on the reduction inspection team. Some nations frequently declined; however, the U.S. government's policy to lead reduction inspections and participate whenever possible ensured that a NATO team would inspect each Eastern reduction. The nation leading the inspection team assumed responsibility to announce its intent to inspect, to assemble and prepare the team, and to transport the team to and from the POE.

The inspected state had no right of refusal to a reduction inspection, and the treaty allowed inspectors to be present throughout the calendar reporting period to view all reductions. In practice, however, one team normally conducted an opening inspection at the beginning of the calendar reporting period to record serial numbers of the equipment slated for reduction. The team then departed, and later another team conducted a closing inspection to confirm the proper reduction of TLE and to match serial numbers against those previously recorded. Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, recalled that during his first reduction inspection, an opening inspection at Tapioszesco, Hungary, he required only 20 minutes to record the serial numbers of the 4 DJ 152-millimeter howitzers to be reduced. His team needed just over 12 hours to conduct the inspection, confirm that the site reduction register was correct, and sign the inspection report with the escort team chief. Less than one day on-site was the norm for U.S. reduction inspections, but there were exceptions.

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, USA, Chief of the Inspection and Escort Branch at OSIA's European Operations Command, led a three-day reduction inspection of Dabrowa Gornicza, Poland. Team Gallagher arrived at the site on October 26, 1992, and remained there until October 29—from opening to closing of the reduction. Lt. Colonel Gallagher declared the first U.S. ambiguity of a reduction inspection because "the 43 T-55 main battle tanks were not presented as complete assemblies." Gallagher's

quantities and type of equipment.

LINE NO	ARMAMENT'S EQUIPMENT BEING REDUCED	IDENTIFICATION OR SERIAL NO	ORIGIN	REDUCTION PROCEDURE			REMARKS
				METHOD OF REDUCED	REFERENCE ID	PILOTAGE	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
9	D-1	...	0149	II (I)	SIN	V. PARA 2	...
	BRECH	...					
	GUN/TUBE	...					
	TRAIS	...					
10	D-1	...	0149	...	SEY	V. PARA 2	...
	BRECH	...					
	GUN/TUBE	...					
	TRAIS	...					
11	D-1	...	0149	...	SIN	V. PARA 2	...
	BRECH	...					
	GUN/TUBE	...					
	TRAIS	...					

comments reflected the U.S. position that "complete assembly" meant an assembled piece of TLE. Inspectors could not determine whether the disassembled parts on the site came from TLE or from a collection of spare parts. The Poles responded that disassembling some tank components and stacking them allowed for more efficient transportation. They added that separating components improved the results of the smashing destruction method. Despite the ambiguity, Gallagher's team recorded component serial numbers and observed the smashing of tanks for three days, confirming that the Poles had reduced all 43 tanks. Later in the reduction year, Poland changed its presentation practice and presented assembled TLE.

On two other reduction inspections Lt. Colonel Gallagher encountered circumstances that warranted notation on inspection reports—one was only a comment, the other an ambiguity. On March 17, 1993, Gallagher led an opening reduction inspection team at Szabadszallas, Hungary. During the inspection, the team recorded the serial numbers of 53 items of TLE scheduled for destruction by severing. The 18 T-34 tanks presented for reduction did not have breach blocks. The escort team, however, provided



Polish technicians presented disassembled, stacked TLE for opening a reduction inspection.

documentation indicating that technicians had destroyed 86 breech blocks at the Csepel Iron Works on July 19, 1989, prior to treaty signature. Gallagher accepted the explanation and ended the American inspection after recording a comment describing the situation in the inspection report.

Lt. Colonel Gallagher recorded an ambiguity during an opening inspection at the Military Repair Works in Trenčín, in the Slovak Republic, on November 24, 1993. In this case, technicians presented 38 OT-62 APCs for reduction by severing, but 10 did not have machine gun turrets. Gallagher cited the treaty's provisions for presenting a complete assembly. The Slovak escort team chief responded that the OT-62 was also produced in an "A" model and that only the A model had a turret. Gallagher countered that the exchanged data photos for the OT-62 showed a turret. The inspection concluded after Team Gallagher confirmed the destruction of three APCs to include two of the APCs that did not have turrets, leaving the rest for a future closing inspection. The JCG later approved a new piece of TLE, "OT-62, without turret."⁹

Major Marc C. Lieber, USMC, also encountered problems at Trenčín, a reduction site used jointly by the Czech and Slovak Republics, involving turrets on APCs during his team's opening inspection on September 1, 1993. In recording serial numbers for 50 OT-64 APCs, Major Lieber noted that six of the units were actually OT-64A models that had no turrets. The data exchange photos indicated that they should have turrets. Czech escorts responded that technicians had removed the turrets prior to treaty signature as part of a modification program for BMP-1 armored infantry fighting vehicles.¹⁰

Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, USAF, declared the last of four ambiguities. During his opening reduction inspection on March 30, 1994, at Plovdiv, in the Czech Republic, he cited the requirement for complete assembly when presenting TLE for destruction. Czech technicians had already disassembled 15 T-55 tanks and had begun disassembly on 14 other tanks. The required components were present and colocated, but not assembled. The Czechs, like the Poles, responded that all components were available in one place and that complete assemblies were on hand but not assembled.¹¹ All in all, during the 110 reduction missions, U.S. team chiefs declared only four ambiguities, all of which dealt with the standards of presentation.

EASTER INSPECTIONS

One U.S. mission highlighted a problem that other TATO reduction inspection teams had encountered earlier. Major Henry T. Storey, USA, led a multinational reduction inspection team to

Trencin, in the Slovak Republic. He intended to conduct a closing inspection of 50 OT-64s. However, upon arrival, he learned that a Hungarian team had already inspected and confirmed the reduction of 44 of the APCs nine days earlier, on September 28, 1993. The NATO team had no definite proof that the Slovaks had reduced the equipment. This situation had cropped up several times earlier in the reduction period. NATO state inspection teams were unable to confirm the reduction of TLE because Eastern teams had already inspected and confirmed the reductions. The inspected nations had scrapped the destroyed TLE.

This presented a problem because the treaty does not prohibit intra-group reduction inspections, nor does it place quotas or limits on reduction inspections. Some of the Eastern states in the post-Cold War era were just as interested in the military capabilities and holdings of neighboring states as they were of most of the NATO states. These inspections, however, ran counter to what the NATO states viewed as a basic tenet of the treaty, that each group of states would complete its reduction obligations within 40 months and that members of the opposite group of states could confirm all reductions. The NATO states, however, could not verify all reductions when Eastern states conducted reduction inspections within their group of states.

NATO allies were concerned about lost inspection opportunities because Eastern nations were conducting reduction and declared site inspections within their group of states. In an attempt to curtail these East-on-East inspections, the VCC sponsored a meeting of all CFE states in January 1993 to discuss the intra-group inspections and to propose a plan for Cooperation Partners. Under this plan, the VCC would continue to schedule CFE inspections for the NATO states but, based on requests from Cooperation Partners for specific inspections, the VCC would also coonii-



Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, USAF, confirms serial numbers read by Senior Master Sergeant David Schmitz during a reduction inspection.

nate the placement of Eastern inspectors on Western-led teams. NATO states would open slots on their inspection teams for Eastern inspectors in return for their cooperation in not leading inspections within their group of states. This would allow the NATO states to conduct as many inspections as possible, while providing the Eastern states with inspection opportunities without the expense of leading an inspection. The NATO states also agreed to share all reduction inspection data maintained in a database known as VERITY.

In addition to leading reduction inspection teams, individual U.S. inspectors, known as "singletons," participated in reduction inspections led by other NATO nations. This allowed U.S. inspectors to participate in approximately 70 percent of the reduction inspections. Their participation in these inspections provided the U.S. government a presence and firsthand view of the majority of the reduction inspections.

DECLARED | F | D | H | III | (-) | P | T | S CONTINUE

Declared site and challenge inspections continued through the reduction years, although the incidence of those inspections was not as frequent. The treaty obliged nations to receive declared site inspections based on 10 percent of their declared OOVs during each reduction year. By contrast, the baseline period inspection rate had been 20 percent over only 120 days.

OSIA inspectors conducted 16 declared site inspections and two challenge inspections during the first reduction year, November 1992 through November 1993. During that period, team chiefs declared four ambiguities, site access being the common thread in all four. The first ambiguity occurred in Belarus at Marina Gorka, where Team Fiser inspected the 30th Independent Mechanized Brigade. On April 1, 1993, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, received a site diagram excluding areas of the military facility. The Belarus escort team denied the American team access to areas that were within the military facility but not on the site map. Fiser declared an ambiguity and completed his inspection of 240 pieces of TLE and 96 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST).¹²


Former Major, now Lt. Colonel Keith A. Oatman, USA, also declared an ambiguity when he led an inspection team at Baranovichi, Belarus, on November 9, 1993. He received the site diagram for the 28th Weapon Combat Vehicle Storage Base, which excluded areas believed to belong to two colocated missile brigades. The Belarussians had not declared the colocated brigades a sensitive point, nor had they declared them OOVs. Lt. Colonel Oatman requested access to these areas but the Belarus escorts denied the

request. As was the case in Marina Gorka, Belarussian officials stated that it was the exclusive right of the inspected state to determine the boundaries of its OOVs and declared sites. Lt. Colonel Oatman disagreed, cited the treaty definition of a declared site, noted the ambiguity, and continued his inspection of 254 pieces of TLE and 57 pieces of other treaty-reportable equipment.

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, declared an ambiguity in Ukraine on May 4, 1993, while inspecting Ukrainian army forces at Khmel'nitskiy. Lt. Colonel Gessert announced the 15th Mechanized Brigade as the OOV for inspection. During the inspection, Ukrainian escorts denied Gessert's team access to three of the 15th's four subordinate battalions on the site. Lt. Colonel Gessert declared an ambiguity and completed the inspection.¹⁴

On July 14, 1993, Major Ronald M. Tait, USAF, and his team of CFE inspectors arrived at Praslavice, in the Czech Republic. Before inspecting the 33rd Tank Regiment he received a site diagram that depicted the OOV as being the entire declared site; it did not include any other area of the military facility. The Czech position was similar to the early Russian position during mock inspections and baseline. A fence around the OOV delineated the boundary of the declared site, and any other fences beyond that fence served a different purpose. The American team chief noted the ambiguity and finished the inspection.¹¹

The number of declared site and challenge inspections held steady during the second reduction year. OSIA teams conducted 17 inspections, 14 declared site inspections, and ..., challenge inspections. One of those inspections, led by Lt. Colonel Fiser, offered a unique opportunity for a U.S. CFE inspection team. On April 5,



A Belarussian site diagram is displayed during a German-led inspection.

1994, Fiser's team conducted a challenge inspection of a specified area at Arkhangelsk, Russia. What made the inspection unusual was the coastal defense and naval aviation forces stationed within the specified area: As naval forces they were not subject to declared site inspections because they were not OOVs; they were, however, open to a challenge inspection.

During the second reduction year, U.S. teams declared only two ambiguities. Team Tait declared the first on February 1, 1994, at Slutsk, Belarus, when Behrussian escorts once again cited a nation's exclusive right to determine the borders of an OOV. The other ambiguity arose on August 22, 1994, when Lt. Colonel Kirk E. Murray, USA, led his team to Odessa, Ukraine. Ukrainian escorts limited access, citing the same rationale that Belarussian escorts had espoused.¹⁶

American inspection teams conducted 15 declared site inspections and one challenge inspection during the third reduction year. Lt. Colonel James Jubilee, USAF, documented the only ambiguity during these inspections at Stryy, Ukraine. On March 22, 1995, Team Jubilee inspected the 10th Aviation Base and was denied access to a storage area that was within the outermost fenced area of the base. The Ukrainian site diagram, however, indicated that the declared site stopped at a wire fence that was short of the storage area. The escort team chief enforced the declared site as depicted in the site diagram.

During the reduction years, many OSIA inspectors left the European Operations Command for retirement, change of duty within the agency, or a change of assignment away from OSIA. To offset these losses, new personnel arrived and trained to meet the standards required of OSIA inspectors. Despite this turnover, U.S. inspection teams continued their operations successfully, inspecting 6 specified areas and conducting 45 declared site inspections through the third reduction year.

INTERNATIONAL

During the reduction years, the composition of U.S. inspection teams changed. Participation by allied inspectors on U.S.-led teams increased, and more U.S. inspectors joined allied teams. This reflected a U.S. government policy decision to seek more inspection opportunities. The U.S.-led inspections with allied inspectors required some additional preparations to familiarize guest inspectors with U.S. inspection techniques and to train them in specific tasks as members of the team. The net benefit of more inspection opportunities outweighed the additional preparation requirements.

A more significant change to team composition developed when Eastern inspectors joined NATO nation inspection teams on declared sites and challenge inspections. As discussed previously,

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 111 /JC /OJL

the NATO states extended the invitations in an attempt to stem an increasing number of East-on-East inspections. The first inspection to include Cooperative Partners took place on March 16, 1993, when inspectors from Poland, Hungary, and Azerbaijan joined an Italian-led team in an inspection of a Romanian declared site. The first Eastern inspector to join an American team, Lt. Colonel Oldrich Lacina of the Czech Republic, deployed with Team Fiser on April 28, 1993, on a successful mission to Taszar, Hungary, to inspect the 31st Fighter Regiment.¹⁷

Because the program to incorporate Eastern guest inspectors into NATO teams did not eliminate East-on-East inspections, the NATO nations chose to send Western inspectors to join Eastern inspection teams. The United States government was reluctant to participate, fearing that doing so would encourage more East-on-East inspections. In May 1994, U.S. policy changed; OSIA would send U.S. inspectors to join Eastern teams. This decision allowed the U.S. inspectors to take advantage of opportunities that otherwise would have been lost. The first U.S. inspector to participate on an Eastern inspection team, Major Ilarc Lieber, USMC, joined a Bulgarian-led inspection team on May 15, 1994, on a mission to inspect Romanian forces. A day later, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser participated in an inspection of Ukrainian forces as a member of a Polish-led inspection team.



Inspectors from the United Kingdom and Belgium were led by Lt. Colonel Ronald Tait, OSIA Team Chief, during an inspection of Czech forces.



Lt. Colonel Gabor Nagy of Hungary, a Cooperative Partner Inspector, served on a U.S. team at Trenčín, Slovakia, in November 1993.

One inspection that dramatically portrayed the changes that had occurred in Europe and in the implementation of the CFE Treaty took place in September 1994. Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, USAF, led an inspection team to Cazarma Centru Oradea, Romania, to inspect the 21st Mechanized Battalion. This American-led inspection team was a milestone of sorts because it included Russian guest inspectors Colonel Aleksandr Petrovich Kalinin and Colonel Gennadiy Mikha ylovich Savostyuk. The two dominant forces of the Cold War thus pooled their resources to conduct an arms control treaty inspection.¹⁸

The United States received only nine declared site inspections during the first reduction year. A Bulgarian team conducted the only inspection of U.S. facilities outside Germany during a mission to a POMCUS (prepositioning of material configured to unit sets) site at Grobbendonk, Belgium. The remaining eight inspections all took place in Germany. The second year brought nine more inspections of U.S. forces, eight in Germany and one in Italy. During the third year, OSIA teams escorted seven inspection teams: five in Germany and one each in Luxembourg and Italy. The issue of ambulances mounted on M-113 chassis arose several times during these inspections. Ukrainian inspectors wrote a comment on their report concerning this type of ambulance at the U.S. Tactical Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, on June 5, 1993. The U.S. escort team chief, Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, denied the Ukrainian inspectors access to the interior of the ambulances. Karcz told



Colonel Aleksandr Petrouich Kalilili, a Russian pilot, waves to an American team in Romania. He signals all's well after the plane landed off the runway.

them that the ambulances were neither armored combat vehicles nor look-alikes, and therefore were not subject to the Treaty. The inspection team chief did not declare an ambiguity, but commented that there was no way to confirm that the vehicles were ambulances instead of M-113s.

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, SMC, encountered a similar situation while escorting Hungarian inspectors during an inspection of the Leghorn Army Depot in Livorno, Italy, on June 21, 1994. Technicians accidentally had left the doors to the ambulances open, allowing the inspectors to observe the interior of ambulances that had not yet been modified. The site commander provided the Hungarian inspectors documentation to show that conversion kits had been ordered, but had not yet arrived. The inspectors ultimately made no comment on the inspection report.¹⁹

During the reduction period, U.S. inspection teams continued their policy of strict adherence to the provisions of the Treaty. They exercised their inspection right and protected U.S. interests to the fullest. Despite encountering problems, U.S. inspection teams maintained a professional relationship with their counterparts while attempting to resolve those problems. They incorporated new team members from different nations and participated on teams from other nations. They displayed flexibility in completing their mission, while maintaining high standards.



After the 40-month reduction period, how had the situation in Europe changed? What remained? Tables 7-3 and 7-4 list the holdings of TLE declared by each state at the end of the reduction period. They also show the net change in holdings from July 17, 1992, to November 17, 1995. The change was significant. The two groups of states' combined decrease was 64,854 pieces of TLE: the Eastern nations were down by 37,482 pieces while the NATO states dropped 27,372 items.

Both groups were below the treaty's ceilings in each TLE category. Several states, such as Turkey, showed increases in equipment because their national ceilings, agreed upon within

Table 7-3. Residual Levels-NATO States (November 17, 1995)

	Tanks		ACVs		Artillery		Aircraft		Helicopters		Total	
	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF
Belgium	334	28	704	679	316	62	169	33	46	+38	1,569	764
Canada	0	76	0	136	6	26	0	28	0	0	6	266
Denmark	343	156	303	13	552		75	31	12	0	1,285	201
France	1,289	46	3,556	831	1,251	185	667	28	317	49	7,080	1,139
Germany	3,061	4,109	2,679	6,420	2,056	2,679	578	462	225	31	8,599	13,701
Greece	1,735	236	2,324	+892	1,878	97	489	+34	6	+6	6,432	+599
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	1,162	70	2,986	788	1,939	74	524	18	137	39	6,748	989
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	734	179	1,002	443	580	257	182	+6	0	90	2,498	963
Norway	170	35	203	+79	246	298	75	14	0	0	694	268
Portugal	174	+28	367	+87	320	34	105	+13	0	0	966	+94
Spain	630	228	1,199	24	1,210	158	188	+10	28	0	3,255	400
Turkey	2,608	400	2,450	+391	3,125	+18	387	+27	20	+9	8,590	+45
United Kingdom	662	497	2,574	632	536	+2	640	117	342	47	4,754	1,291
United States	1,254	3,909	2,238	2,725	854	1,119	222	176	150	199	4,718	8,128
TOTAL	14,156	9,941	22,585	11,242	14,869	4,970	4,301	817	1,283	402	57,194	27,372
Bloc Authorized												
TLE Levels	20,000		30,000		20,000		6,800		2,000		78,800	

Source: "Fact file: Final Weapons Reductions Under the CFE Treaty," *Arms Control Today*, December 1995/January 1996.

Table 7-4. Residual Levels-Eastern States (November 17, 1995)

	Tanks		ACVs		Artillery		Aircraft		Helicopters		Total	
	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF	Declared Nov 95	Decrease From EIF
Armenia	102	NA	285	NA	225	NA	6	NA	7	NA	625	NA
Azerbaijan	285	+151	835	+722	343	+217	58	+43	18	+9	1,539	+1,142
Belarus	2,320	1,137	2,984	840	1,533	29	335	55	79	+3	7,251	2,058
Bulgaria	1,475	794	1,985	247	1,750	404	235	100	44	0	5,489	1,545
Czech Republic	953	850	1,363	1,152	767	956	187	41	36		3,306	3,000
Georgia	NIA	NA	NIA	NA	NIA	NIA	NA	NIA	NA	NA	NIA	NA
Hungary	835	510	1,540	191	840	207	144	+1	59	+20	3,418	887
Kazakstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	0	0	209	+111	155	+47	27	3	0	0	391	+155
Poland	1,720	1,130	1,516	880	1,581	734	400	109	92	+62	5,309	2,791
Romania	1,375	1,592	2,073	1,098	1,471	2,471	373	135	16	+1	5,308	5,295
Russia	5,492	3,846	10,372	9,027	5,680	2,646	2,986	1,638	826	179	25,356	17,336
Slovak Republic	478	423	683	575	383	478	114	0	19	0	1,677	1,476
Ukraine	4,026	2,102	4,919	1,784	3,727	+136	1,008	640	270		13,950	4,391
TOTAL	19,061	12,233	28,764	14,961	18,455	7,525	5,873	2,677	1,466	86	73,619	37,482
Bloc Authorized TLE Levels	20,000		30,000		20,000		6,800		2,000		78,800	

Source: "Fact file: Final Weapons Reductions Under the CFE Treaty," *Arms Control Today*, December 1995/January 1996.

their group of states, were higher than their holdings, allowing them to increase their forces through purchases or cascading.

The total decrease in TLE was not entirely the result of treaty reductions or a need to fulfill treaty-obligated reductions. While the United States fulfilled its reduction obligations, it also withdrew many of its forces from Europe for political and economic reasons. Some nations—Russia, Poland, Ukraine—reduced TLE beyond their required liabilities for economic reasons. Other nations exported small quantities of weapons.

Iceland and Luxembourg were signatories but held no TLE, so they reported none. Georgia and Armenia made no declaration at entry into force, and Georgia did not make a declaration in November 1995. Both were involved in fighting during the period and disputed total numbers of items attributed to them from the Tashkent agreement.

1. Randall Forsberg, Roh Leavitt, and Steve Lilly-Weber, "Conventional Forces Treaty Buries Cold War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 1991, pp. 32-37; Jim Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Russian Attitudes and Implications for U.S. Interests." CRS Report for Congress, updated September 15, 1995.
2. See Appendix B for the text of the pledges.
3. *Arms Control Reporter* 1992, pp. 407.B.463-474.
4. President George Bush, *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements and the President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 14, 1993.
5. *Arms Control Reporter* 1990, p. 407.E.08; Department of Defense, Acting Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, "Report on Transfer of Certain CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment," August 30, 1994; OSIA European Operations Command, Plans Section, "Summary of Activity at Buccino, Italy," November 1993; joint Consultative Group, "Revised Report on the Work of the JCG Informal Working Group," December 8, 1992.
6. Interview with Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Chief Inspector, Polish Verification Center, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Warsaw, Poland, February 3, 1994.
7. Ibid.
8. Interview with Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993.
9. Inspection Reports, C92-Blue-034-PL, October 29, 1992; C93-Blue-013-HU, March 17, 1993; C93-Blue-051-CZ, November 24, 1993.
10. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-038-CZ, September 1, 1993.
11. Inspection Report, C94-Blue-007-CZ, March 30, 1994.
12. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-014-BO, April 1, 1993.
13. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-047-BO, November 9, 1993.
14. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-021-UP, May 4, 1993.
15. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-034-CZ, July 14, 1993.
16. Inspection Reports, C94-Blue-003-BO, February 1, 1994; C94-Blue-028-UP, August 22, 1994.
17. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-OI8-HU, April 28, 1993.
18. Inspection Report, C94-Blue-033-RO, September 19, 1994.
19. Escort Mission Report Folders, 93-CFE-030-UP-GE; 94-CFE-021-HU-IT.

Chapter 8

THE CFE TREATY: DURABLE STRUCTURE FOR POST-COLD WAR EUROPE



Verification agency leaders gathered at RAF Scampton, England, for a post-baseline conference in December / 1992.

At the end of the CFE Treaty's third reduction year in November 1995, one could draw six conclusions. First, the treaty ratification process had been critical to achieving national and international consensus on the detailed treaty provisions and protocols that were so important throughout implementation. Second, three years into the process of providing data, reducing weapons, accepting inspection teams, and adjudicating disputes, the 30 signatory states remained committed to the CFE Treaty. With some exceptions, the states were meeting their national reduction quotas in the treaty's five categories of offensive weapons. The treaty specified that 100 percent of each nation's final reduction liability had to be achieved by the end of the third

reduction year. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia did not meet their treaty-mandated reduction quotas.¹ Of these states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia had informed the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna of the special circumstances that forced them to postpone the date for completing their treaty reductions. No nation indicated that it would withdraw from the treaty. Despite the fact that these six nations were not in compliance as of November 1995, collectively, the nations of the NATO and WTO alliances had met and even exceeded the CFE Treaty reduction quotas. By November 17, 1995, the end of the third reduction year, the signatory states had destroyed, converted, decommissioned, reclassified, or placed on static display more than 19,200 battle tanks, 9,800 artillery pieces, 18,600 armored personnel carriers, 2,200 combat aircraft, and 370 attack helicopters. The total-50,170-exceeded the reduction quotas established in the treaty.²

The third conclusion was that the CFE Treaty's principal verification measure—the use of on-site inspection teams to confirm force data and to monitor reductions, recategorizations, and suspect sites—was working well. National on-site inspection teams had conducted more than 2,500 inspections of declared sites, objects of verification (OOVs), specified areas, and reductions of treaty-limited equipment (TLE). Disputes arose in fewer than 50 inspections. Many potentially contentious issues had been resolved on-site by the inspectors and escorts acting within the treaty's articles and protocols.



The Hofburg Palace in Vienna, Austria, was the meeting place for the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group.

important informal forums for raising implementation issues, and they provided a setting in which the verification directors could discuss common issues and approaches. When the CFE Treaty was negotiated and signed in 1990, no one had anticipated the form or the extent of these joint East-West treaty implementation activities.

Finally, one could conclude that collectively the 30 CFE Treaty states had, in large measure, achieved the treaty's stated objectives of establishing a "secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels" and eliminating "as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack or for initiating a large-scale offensive action in Europe."³ Certainly, the demise of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as a viable military alliance were consequential events that contributed directly to these all-European treaty objectives. Yet, one should not discount the treaty states' concrete actions in carrying out their CFE Treaty commitments. In 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995; daily, weekly, yearly; in thousands of discrete actions, the signatory states had met their treaty obligations and exercised their treaty rights.

By the end of the reduction period in November 1995, the CFE Treaty was viewed widely across Europe as a valuable, legally binding agreement for reducing military armaments and for enhancing openness of military forces across national borders. Since it entered into force, a durable record had been achieved; that record established a context for evaluating the CFE Treaty's next major phase: the residual level validation period.

RESIDUAL LEVEL VALIDATION PERIOD: NOVEMBER 1995 TO MARCH 1996

Following the 40-month reduction period, the treaty provided for a brief 120-day phase during which every nation had the right, under the group of states quota system, to verify the treaty-limited weapons and forces possessed by the nations in the other group of states. Based on the number of OOVs in the Eastern group of states on November 17, 1995, the end of the reduction period, the NATO nations could conduct up to 247 on-site inspections over the next 120 days, while the Eastern group of states could conduct up to 254 inspections. Designated in the treaty as the residual level validation period (RLVP), this phase preceded the treaty's final stage: the residual period. That final period would be of unlimited duration, with compliance monitoring by on-site inspections continuing indefinitely, though always based on a percentage of a nation's OOVs. The RLVP was an important period, because it allowed states to verify the accuracy of the other treaty nations' postreduction numbers in order to establish a basis for monitoring the national TLE holdings in the residual period.⁴

RLVP:

November 17, 1995-
March 16, 1996

This RLVP phase resembled the treaty's baseline period in both intent and duration. Both were periods of intense inspection activities, with the treaty allowing inspections by the group of states of up to 20 percent of all declared OOVs. The major difference between the two periods lay in the length of time for planning and preparation. The CFE Treaty's final ratification developed quickly in June-July 1992 as the states decided to implement the treaty provisionally. Entry into force came immediately after the Helsinki Summit on July 17, 1992; it caught some nations, especially some of the newer Eastern European republics, by surprise. This element of surprise was not part of the treaty's RLVP phase. All treaty nations knew that RLVP would begin on November 17, 1995, and end on March 16, 1996.

These dates were known to Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, U.S. Army, who assumed command of OSIA's European Operations (EO) Command in January 1995. He took over an active, experienced, 145-person inspection command. The treaty's RLVP was 10 months away, but he initiated an intensive planning effort immediately. Guillory knew that the process of inspecting, escorting, and conducting liaison operations would be the same as during the baseline and reduction periods, but he recognized that the pace during RLVP would be much faster. The command would be called upon to conduct twice as many inspections in 120 days as it normally did in an entire year. On the escort side, U.S. vulnerability to being inspected would not be as great as during baseline.



Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, Commander of OSIA's European Operations Command, leads an OSCE inspection in Bosnia.

Since 1992, thousands of U.S. troops had been withdrawn from Europe and dozens of U.S. military bases closed. Consequently, Colonel Guillory expected that the 56 U.S. Army and 5 U.S. Air Force OOVs in Europe would be inspected 12 times during RLVP (20 percent of 61 OOVs). Further, Guillory assumed that American liaison officers would be extremely busy during the period, since the NATO nations' passive quota was 254 inspections. United States policy dictated that a U.S. liaison team travel to every site subject to inspection in order to protect U.S. facilities and units stationed or deployed there. As he added up numbers of inspections, escorts, and liaison missions for the RLVP phase, Guillory concluded that the command would be doing twice as much work in one-third the time. To ensure the command's readiness, he initiated an intensive planning effort to nail down every aspect of OSIA's RLVP mission.⁵

In mid-February 1995, Guillory brought the European Operations Command staff together and explained his initial planning guidance. All RLVP planning and preparations would be a joint staff effort involving operations, support, and logistics. Further, the effort would involve extensive coordination with Headquarters and with OSIA's operating commands and consultation with the staffs of the NATO nations' verification agencies, other foreign verification agencies, and NATO's VCC. Finally, he directed at this initial meeting that the effort would be coordinated by the operations division's planning cell. In November 1995, just as the RLVP operation was getting under way, Colonel Guillory recalled his objectives. "We went to work," he explained, "to develop an operational concept and four interlocking plans."⁶ This work, he said, produced the following⁷:

- An operational concept as part of the NATO plan. Since the beginning of the CFE Treaty, the United States had conducted its treaty responsibilities in concert with the NATO nations. This would continue during RLVP.
- An aggressive liaison plan to ensure an American presence at any U.S. facility in the NATO nations.
- An augmentation plan to ensure that OSIA's EO Command had the necessary manpower to conduct the escort and inspection missions.
- A logistics plan to support all EO inspectors, escorts, liaison officers, and augmentees.
- An aggressive training plan to prepare new EO members and augmentees for CFE Treaty operations.

As the planning got under way in the spring of 1995, Brigadier General Gregory G. Govan, Director of OSIA, decided that the agency would augment the EO Command with people from Headquarters and the other operational commands. By mid-

summer the plan called for 41 augmentees. All would be trained by September and would deploy to Europe in early November. These OSIA people would serve on liaison teams, inspection teams, and escort teams. They would also work in communications, planning, and administration. As the date grew closer, Colonel Guillory reevaluated the command's requirement for augmentees. He reduced the required number from 41 to 33, largely on the basis of new personnel arriving earlier than anticipated and a new estimate of the logistics division's operational capability. At Rhein-Main, three officers-Lt. Colonel Thomas Carraway, USA; Lt. Colonel William L. Lefevers, USAF; and Major Jon Rebholz, Jr., USMC-played key roles in shepherding every aspect of the RLVP planning effort. Just as Colonel Lawrence Kelley, USMC, had checked and rechecked every detail of the command's planning prior to baseline, these three officers forced every division, section, team, and individual to know and understand their role during RLVP.⁸ What were the results?


During the residual level validation period-from November 17, 1995, to March 16, 1996-NATO nations conducted 246 inspections of Eastern bloc nations. The United States led 38 inspections and provided guest inspectors on 56 other national teams. U.S. inspection teams hosted 65 guest inspectors. During RLVP, U.S. inspection teams exercised all their treaty rights; when appropriate, they wrote comments on the inspection reports. They declared 11 ambiguities, which were referred to the JCG in Vienna for resolution. As in every other period in the treaty, U.S. inspection teams and inspectors set high standards in their knowledge of the treaty, its protocols, TLE status, and national force data.⁹

From November to March, Eastern nations inspected NATO nations 183 times. This tempo was somewhat slower than expected, although it was at an inspection level of 72 percent of the maximum possibility of 254 inspections. Eastern nations used sequential inspections to cover as many sites as possible in a single




Brigadier General Gregory G. Govan, USA, Director OS/A.

NATO Quota: 247 Inspections



Eastern Group Quota: 255 Inspections





Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, U.S. Army

Colonel Ken Guillory, U.S. Army, commanded OSIA's European Operations Command during the RLVP period. A field artillery officer, he commanded a battalion at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma; fought in Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia; and served as a civil-military liaison officer to the German army under the US Army's Pershing II command. Capable in German and Russian, Guillory holds a master's degree in Soviet area studies from Georgetown University.

On the necessity for early planning for the CFE Treaty's RLVP operations: "We started the planning process in February 1995. We used the basic joint operations planning system, which is similar to the Army's system. We did it not because it was familiar to me, which it was, but because it tends to make you ask the right questions and do the kind of planning that you need to do. It's deliberately designed to expose things that may be weaknesses, so that you can address them and take care of them in your planning. The other thing that we did that was important was to coordinate all key issues with agencies here in Europe, with OSIA Headquarters in Washington, and with the Inspection Support Staff. We didn't plan it just as operators, we had logistics people, personnel folks, counterintelligence folks; everybody was involved. It was a total, coordinated effort. I think it made a big difference."

On the difference between normal operations and the tempo during RLVP: "The difference, of course, was the intensity of the operation. We were doing a greater number of inspections in a shorter period. What made the operation different was the coordination needed to get people briefed, transported to and from the inspection site, debriefed, and then having to coordinate everything with several other nations simultaneously. It was a major coordination problem."

"The one problem that you try to plan for, but there really is nothing you can do about, is the weather. RLVP, of course, happened from mid-November to mid-March, right in the middle of the Russian and East European winter. That made it hard. The difficulty was not as great in the East European countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. There ground transportation was al-

ways available. In Russia, however, the only entry point was Moscow. To get from Moscow to the majority of the CFE Treaty sites, the team had to fly. That presented us some problems. I expected that at least once, if not more, we were going to have trouble reaching a Russian site in time to conduct the inspection, simply because of the weather. And that, of course, was out of our hands. The other problem was that it was really very difficult to do a CFE inspection after dark. You needed daylight. In the winter the days are shorter, so you had to plan the inspection to cover all the areas you needed to cover and see within available daylight. Our inspectors know how to do it, and they're good at it, but it is just more difficult inspecting after August or September when the days are longer."

On the coordination process at NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee: "The process has several steps. First, we decide which NATO countries get what percentage of the available inspections in the East. Then, we decide which countries get what percentage of inspections in Russia, in Ukraine, in Poland, Belarus, and all the other countries. Then the total period for the inspections is divided into time blocks. A block is one week. Normally we do 52 blocks in a year. The RLVP was 18 blocks. Because of a high number of inspections we had to do for three countries—Russia, Romania, and Ukraine—we had to create subordinate blocks. There was not just Block 2, there was Block 2 Alpha, Block 2 Bravo, and Block 3 Alpha, Block 3 Bravo, and so on. For the other nations, each block remained one week, so that you could go to Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, or wherever. Once that got settled, there was a process at NATO for each of the countries to say, 'Okay, I want to inspect this country in this block.' That was negotiated and

visit to Western Europe. The United States was inspected 11 times, with 10 inspections occurring at U.S. facilities in Germany and 1 in Italy. OSIA's EO Command deployed full escort teams to each site to conduct the foreign inspection teams through the U.S. facilities. During RLVP operations, the U.S. liaison teams deployed on 163 Eastern nation inspections. They provided invaluable assistance to U.S. military units and personnel, particularly in Turkey, Italy, and Germany.¹⁰

In March 1996, when the RLVP ended, Colonel Guillory evaluated the American effort. He developed a method to compare the "expected" level of operations with the "actual" level. Using pluses and minuses, he evaluated the strengths and weaknesses in the command's planning, training, operations, logistics, and international coordination. In early May, Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, Director of OSIA, and the senior staff held an all-Agency operations conference at which Guillory briefed his analysis of U.S. operations during RLVP. The operation was a success, he thought, because the early, intensive planning effort had defined the requirements and had produced an operations plan that was comprehensive and realistic. The expected and actual levels of operations matched up across the board, except for a few minuses concerning forecasting efforts that had been unsuccessful in antici-

deconflicted as each country presented its schedule. Then the VCC put them all together and said, 'Okay, here is where there are conflicts,' and they worked them all out. So NATO came up with a deconflicted schedule. Once that was done, the NATO countries went back and decided who would be guest inspectors on their teams. In our case, for example, sometimes we had a German or a British officer; a Frenchman or a Dutchman; a Belgian, Italian, Portuguese, Danish, or Turkish officer. Those all got worked out in advance.

"Some inspections were 'paired.' That's the term we use for inspections when we take representatives from our Eastern European treaty partners. In some cases we will actually have Eastern officers on our teams. For example, we had some Hungarian officers with us on an inspection in Romania. There is no quota for how many times we do it. We don't have to do it at all, but it's good for us. It helps us a lot. Also, it gives them exposure and experience in working with Allied teams. The United States is not the only country that does this."

On incorporating an analysis of the CFE Treaty baseline experience into RLVP operations:
"When we did the original plan, we did the commander's estimate portion and one of the things we looked at was how we, at EO, had handled the baseline operations. What we found out was that we had actually handled the inspections pretty well. We had organized the teams properly, we had the right number, and we were able to conduct virtually all of the required inspections. Remember, the treaty's baseline period was in the summertime, so the weather was a lot better. On the escort side, we were well prepared, although the Eastern states did not inspect us as much as we thought they would. On the liaison officer side, where we went to the different NATO countries every time there was an inspection, there were problems. During baseline we had LNO teams standing by in several locations, and it was a waste of manpower. It wasn't the best way to do things. For the RLVP, because of the distance, we are keeping an LNO team in place in Turkey, with the rest based here in Germany. We have more flexibility that way."



Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., USAF, Director, OSIA.

paring other nations' inspection activity. On the plus side, Gu illory gave high ratings to NATO's VCC deconfliction work and its coordination of guest inspectors, the continuous dialogue among the NATO nations' verification agencies, the West-to-East dialogue between verification agencies planning cooperative missions, the work of the augmentees from OSIA Headquarters and operational commands, the determination of the U.S. liaison officer teams, the professionalism of the Inspection Support Staff and its coordination efforts with the interagency policy community in Washington, and the early planning and standardized packages developed by the command's logistics experts.¹¹

In the encl, the fact that there were many more pluses than minuses was less important than the presence in the command of a vigorous planning effort; rigorous training standards; extensive NATO nation coordination; thoroughness in inspections, escorts, and liaison teams; responsiveness in logistics; and a willingness to conduct an honest postoperation evaluation. Measured in this way, OSIA's European Operations Command demonstrated that the leadership and professional standards that had been present in the execution of the U.S. CFE Treaty on-site inspection mission during the baseline and reduction periods had continued during RLVP.

PROBLEMS DURING TRIAL IMPLEMENTATION

In the implementation of any multinational treaty, problems arise as a result of changes in the international situation, changes in one or more of the signatory nations' internal conditions, or, more commonly, differing national interpretations of treaty rights and obligations. A treaty may have unresolved or ambiguous issues embedded in the text or protocols that come to the fore only during implementation. Implementation of the CFE Treaty certainly proved these generalizations true. Five problems surfaced from July 1992, entry into force, to November 1995, the end of the reduction period:

- Inspector access at declared sites.
- Cost of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) reductions.
- Accounting for TLE among the Soviet Union's successor states.
- Destruction of Russian TLE located east of the Urals.
- Redefinition of the treaty's zonal restrictions for stationing weapons in the flank areas of Russia and Ukraine.

Some of these problems, such as the inspectors' right of access at declared sites, resulted from complex compromises in treaty definitions during the final weeks of negotiations. Others were the direct consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse and the creation

of eight successor states that subsequently became parties to the treaty. When the Soviet Union's massive holdings of TLE were divided among the new nations, some states had difficulty accounting for all the equipment transferred from the Russian army. Other states had problems financing the destruction of their excess weapons and equipment under the treaty's protocols. Finally, in the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union, some successor states faced severe internal unrest, such as ethnic violence in Chechnya and internal disruptions in Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia. These internal problems placed pressures on the governments, which deployed military forces to suppress the unrest. The movement of these forces and their weapons threatened compliance with the treaty's zone limits. Some nations, specifically Russia, argued that key provisions of the treaty should be altered to accommodate these problems.

C (E O O I ' C I A R F D S I f f

The first significant problem, inspector access to declared sites, arose shortly after the treaty entered into force in July 1992. During the initial inspections, Russian escorts routinely granted inspectors access to the designated OOVs but often denied them access to the entire declared site. These denials occurred also, to a lesser degree, in Belarus and Ukraine. In mid-August, Russia and all other treaty states presented, as required by the treaty, a revised set of data charts, listing their declared sites, OOVs, units, and TLE. For most of its CFE sites, Russia now stated that all its OOVs and declared sites had identical boundary lines. Previously, Russia had stated in its treaty data submissions that it had many declared sites (military bases, garrisons, or installations) containing five, six, or more OOVs (regiments or brigades). The new Russian treaty data charts signaled a major change, one that had the potential of limiting the CFE inspection team's access while on site. Also, the Russian data charts essentially nullified the treaty's carefully negotiated compromise on the inspection team's right of access to inspect both the designated OOV and the declared site.

Among the NATO nations, the United States was most insistent on challenging what it believed was Russia's unilateral reinterpretation of the treaty. It set out to force the issue. The United States sent several inspection teams to Russia to conduct Section VII Declared Site CFE Treaty inspections. These teams conducted



Unrest in the Soviet Union led to its breakup and the addition of eight new states to the CFE Treaty.

A U.S.-led multinational inspection in Romania.



inspections of the OOVs and declared sites and in the process, they insisted on their treaty right to inspect the entire site.¹² France, Germany, and Great Britain agreed with the United States. Their inspection teams raised the issue with Russian military escorts and site commanders. *Only* the United States, however, declared ambiguities.¹³

While inspectors argued and documented the issue of inspection rights and inspectable sites, diplomatic delegations discussed the problem in Moscow, Washington, and major European capitals. The JCG held a series of meetings seeking resolution. In late October, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator, flew to Moscow for discussions on the issue with senior Russian diplomatic and military officials. In those meetings, Russian officials declared categorically their intention to return to the original treaty interpretation and to comply with the CFE Treaty's definition of a declared site.¹⁴ Four weeks later, in its December 15, 1992, data update, Russia stated that it had 431 OOVs and 299 declared sites. Subsequent inspections of Russian CFE sites in 1993 and 1994 by NATO nation teams revealed that on this issue—the inspection team's right of access to the declared site and the common areas—Russia had, indeed, reverted to the complex treaty understanding that had been negotiated and ratified."

It is important to recognize that in the resolution of this treaty problem, the process worked. Inspectors raised and documented the issue on-site; they declared ambiguities, which were recorded in the legal process of verifying compliance with the CFE Treaty. Once documented, the problem was examined by the respective national verification agency directors and staffs. Then senior officials in Moscow, Washington, and other capitals evaluated the issue and prepared government positions. In Vienna, national representatives to the JCG presented their views and

worked in committees and joint sessions on a resolution acceptable to all treaty states. In this case, the treaty problem was caused by a change in Russia's designation of its national force data. It was resolved when Russia, challenged by the United States and other treaty states, decided to return to the data format used by all other signatory states, thus acknowledging the original intent of the treaty. Once the data were in the correct format, inspectors could confirm, through direct observation on-site, that the site, unit, and nation were in compliance with the treaty.

COST OF TLE REDUCTIONS

A persistent problem of a different nature arose shortly after the CFE Treaty entered into force. Several nations complained publicly and in treaty forums that the treaty's reduction protocols required destruction methodologies that were too specific and too expensive, given the thousands of weapons and pieces of equipment that had to be reduced within the treaty-mandated 40 months. They suggested less costly, alternative methods. Only one month after the treaty entered into force in July 1992, General-Lieutenant Ivan Oleynik, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments, stated publicly that destroying T-54 tanks was too expensive. To destroy one tank, according to General Oleynik, the Ukrainian government had to spend over 7,000 rubles. Destruction of just one armored personnel carrier, he maintained, would cost over 4,000 rubles. Under the CFE Treaty, Ukraine was responsible for the destruction of 2,450 tanks, 2,222 APCs, and 550



U.S. inspection team recording data on T-54 tank reductions in Ukraine.

aircraft. To accomplish this work, the Ukrainian government had to set up reduction sites at Zhitomer, Kiev, Lvov, Nikolaev, and Kharkov.¹⁶

Other states with substantial reduction liabilities agreed with Ukraine. In December 1992, Germany, Russia, and Belarus joined Ukraine in petitioning the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group to consider new, less costly procedures for reducing treaty-limited equipment.¹⁷ Russia had 10 reduction sites, Germany 6, and Belarus 4. From December through March, the JCG discussed Ukraine's petition. Then in April 1993, Russia invited observers from the other treaty nations to witness a demonstration reduction of tanks using the new procedures. At a military base outside Saint Petersburg, Russian army warrant officers demonstrated how disabling one side of a tank's drive system—rather than two, as prescribed in the treaty—would render it militarily ineffective. They also demonstrated that making partial rather than complete cuts would effectively disable the tank's major components: the turret rings and gun barrels. At this demonstration, representatives of the other treaty states observed the recommended modifications, and in Vienna, following discussions and comments, the JCG representatives accepted the Russian proposal. The new procedures became acceptable ways to reduce tanks under the treaty.¹⁸ Less than a month later, the JCG agreed to a German proposal for modifying the procedures for reducing lightly armored vehicles. The German delegates proposed that these weapons be destroyed by crushing them in a large compactor. Known as the "cheese slicer" or "cookie cutter," this compactor worked well in field demonstrations. After further negotiations in Vienna, the JCG approved its use in June 1993.¹⁹



Poland's eight-ton ball crushed TLE efficiently and economically.



Reduction costs caused Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Germany to petition the JCG to modify reduction procedures.

Poland had a large reduction liability under the CFE Treaty: 1,120 tanks, 246 armored combat vehicles, 705 artillery pieces, and 49 aircraft. In 1993, Poland recommended and the JCG approved a modification of the treaty protocol for destroying artillery pieces. According to Colonel Stanisław Malinowski, Director of the Polish Verification Center, the new method called for a very large, heavy steel wrecking ball to be lifted high in the air and dropped on the weapons, thereby "smashing the gun components until they were visibly cracked or bent." Colonel Malinowski added that this method was "not very costly" but was "very efficient."²⁰

Even with these procedural changes, the cost of reducing the excess TLE was a burden for some of the smaller successor states. Belarus is a small nation of 10 million people. At Tashkent it had received a large portion of the Soviet Union's CFE Treaty conventional weapons: 3,457 tanks, 3,824 ACVs, 1,562 artillery pieces, and 390 aircraft. Belarus's total reduction liability was more than 3,750 weapons. To destroy these treaty weapons within the 40-month reduction period, Belarus set up reduction centers at Borisov, Lesnaya, Baranovichi, and Stankovo. When its economy collapsed in 1992-93, Belarus said that the cost of carrying out CFE Treaty reductions was excessive. In December 1992, Belarus joined Russia, Ukraine, and Germany in petitioning the JCG to modify the treaty's reduction protocols. In June 1993, Belarussian senior officials stated that the government was under such financial pressure that it might not be able to meet its CFE Treaty reduction obligations. General-Major Viktor Vakar, Director of the Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspection, raised the issue with the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee in November 1993. Other Belarussian senior officials took the issue before the state parties at the Joint Consultative Group; still others raised it in diplomatic exchanges with the United States. In the latter instance, Belarus requested that Nunn-Lugar funds be obli-

Minister of Defense Pavel Kozlovskiy of Belarus and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin following the signing of a funding agreement under the Nunn-Lugar program.



gated to assist it in its CFE Treaty reductions. Here was a new problem. Belarus was not requesting further modifications to the treaty's reduction protocols; instead, it was asking for direct foreign aid to pay the cost of reducing the weapons. Belarus estimated that it would cost \$33 million to reduce its 3,758 pieces of CFE Treaty TLE.²¹

When the United States did not respond (to avoid setting a precedent of paying for TLE destruction for all the successor states), Belarus took another tack. It called for the treaty states to set up a voluntary CFE Treaty Support Fund. Among the treaty nations, only Russia and Ukraine actively supported establishing such a fund. Nevertheless, Belarus kept the concept alive. In March 1994, senior government officials said they would be forced to declare a force majeure in further treaty reductions if economic conditions did not improve. In late March, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Perry stated that the United States would commit \$5 million each to Belarus and Ukraine to support their CFE Treaty reduction efforts. At the same time, Perry pointed out that Belarus had already been granted \$70 million, and Ukraine \$270 million, under the United States' Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.²²

This action was sufficient for Belarus to continue its CFE reduction program through 1994. Then in February 1995, President Alexander R. Lukashenko suddenly announced that Belarus would suspend all reduction efforts. Declaring that the cost of destroying the CFE weapons was "economically unjust," Lukashenko said that he had made a unilateral decision to shut down the reduction operations. Here was a direct threat to treaty compliance. Lukashenko's announcement came a few weeks before Russian President Boris Yeltsin threatened to pull out of the treaty

if Russia did not receive some relief from the treaty's flank limit restrictions and if NATO expanded into Central Europe.²

Lukashenko's announcement and Yeltsin's threat had the effect of forcing this problem out of treaty forums and into the realm of international politics. Resolution of Russia's flank limit problem will be discussed later; resolving Belarus's financial problem took more than 15 months. Within a few days of Lukashenko's February 23, 1995, announcement, Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Tsepka lo explained that Belarus was prepared to resume destruction of weapons if sufficient funding was forthcoming immediately. When no other nation came forth with funds, Belarus continued its suspension throughout the spring, summer, and into the fall months. The CFE Treaty's November 17, 1995, reduction deadline approached; nations with excessive TLE would not be in compliance. In late August, German Defense Minister Klaus Kinkel flew to Minsk and discussed the issue with the Belarussian president and his ministers. As he left, the German defense minister made no commitments, but he conceded that the Cold War's termination had created great suffering for Belarus and the other successor nations.

In September 1995, Belarus announced that it would resume its reduction activities but indicated that for economic reasons it would not meet its treaty reduction obligations. The following month, James Collins, Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, flew to Minsk for consultations. No direct action followed until November, when the deadline came for all treaty states to meet their reduction liabilities. On November 17, 1995, all 30 nations issued a joint statement from Vienna identifying nations that were not in compliance with the treaty. Belarus was not in compliance. Apparently this statement and the promise of the United States and Germany to provide financial assistance were sufficient motivation for Belarus to commit to a definite plan for completing its TLE reductions. Ten days after Belarus was singled out for noncompliance, its representatives submitted a plan to the JCG for destroying all of the state's remaining TLE by April 26, 1996. The plan was quickly approved, and the pace of reductions proceeded to meet the schedule. Belarus, in fact, did not meet the April 1996 deadline, which meant that it was still not in full compliance with the CFE Treaty's reduction quotas.²⁴

ACCOUNTING FOR TLE AMONG THE SUCCESSOR STATES

Eight signatory states—Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakstan—did not exist as nations during CFE Treaty negotiations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states received portions of its vast arsenal

in the Tashkent Agreement of May 1992. During ratification, they committed to the CFE Treaty's provisions and protocols. However, when it came time for implementation, some of the successor states found it difficult to meet their treaty commitments. The situation in the Transcaucasian region was chaotic. Nations were ensnared in a web of civil wars, revolutions, ethnic conflicts, and internal governmental chaos. Implementing the CFE Treaty was not a pressing commitment for these states. To complicate matters, the Russian army, which had inherited the USSR's forces and equipment before Tashkent, was now withdrawing from some parts of the region. Under the Tashkent Agreement, the Russian army was responsible for turning over to the other successor states their "agreed-upon" portion of the former USSR's arsenal. Under the CFE Treaty, those nations would be responsible for the treaty-limited equipment and for destroying excess weapons. However, much of the Russian army's military equipment in the Transcaucasian region was old and unusable. When transferred, it was rejected. This rejection, which included several hundred tanks, ACVs, and artillery pieces, caused problems for the other signatory states monitoring compliance with the CFE Treaty.

In the Transcaucasian region, all three states-Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia-experienced major difficulties in complying with the CFE Treaty. When the treaty entered into force in July 1992, Armenia reported almost no data on its conventional equipment, despite having been authorized at Tashkent 258 tanks, 641 ACVs, 357 artillery pieces, and 7 helicopters. Furthermore, Armenia did not admit to the JCG that it had any reduction liabilities in the first or second treaty reduction years. In January 1993, Armenia did submit its TLE listings, but it stated that some of the



Abandoned TLE presented accountability problems in the Transcaucasus nations.



In November 1992, an American team conducted a declared site inspection in Azerbaijan.

CFE equipment left by the departing Russian army lacked parts, critical elements, and functioning units. Armenia implied that it would not account for or reduce this unacceptable CFE equipment. Russia, in its CFE Treaty charts, had reported the equipment as transferred to Armenia. However, Armenia, on its treaty charts, did not report the same numbers. This caused a discrepancy, which the JCG discussed but could not resolve.

Azerbaijan, when the treaty entered into force, submitted its TLE data, but they were incomplete and inaccurate. The problem with the Azerbaijani data stemmed from the same cause: the departing Russian army had left tanks, ACVs, and artillery that were in such poor shape or so stripped down that Azerbaijan refused to accept and account for them. In addition, the Azerbaijanis were involved in a lengthy ethnic war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and they asserted that losses of conventional equipment in that conflict could not be accounted for or reported. Azerbaijan did accept one U.S. CFE inspection team in November 1992, thus indicating a certain willingness to participate in the treaty. But Azerbaijan did not report any CFE equipment or weapons reduction liabilities to the JCG as required at the end of either the first or the second treaty reduction year. Georgia, as a new nation, had major problems. An intense civil war threatened the existence of the government. Under these circumstances, Georgia's compliance with the CFE Treaty was problematical. At the end of the third reduction year, the JCG issued a statement declaring that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were not in compliance with the treaty.²⁵

Ukraine and Russia were also not in compliance with the CFE Treaty. They did not *meet* their quotas for reducing excess treaty-limited equipment assigned to the Black Sea Fleet's naval infantry and coastal defense units. This treaty problem was part of

a much larger issue: the Black Sea Fleet's partition by Russia and Ukraine. At Tashkent, Russia agreed to cede to Ukraine a certain portion of the former Soviet Union's weapons, units, and sites. Since these weapons fell under the numerical and zone restrictions of the CFE Treaty, Ukraine agreed in its articles of ratification to reduce any excess TLE within 40 months of entry into force. As of November 17, 1995, Ukraine was in compliance with all its treaty reduction quotas, except for the weapons and units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet. In 1995, the fleet had approximately 48,000 naval and marine personnel, 14 submarines, 31 surface ships, 43 patrol and coastal ships, 125 combat aircraft, and 85 helicopters. Equipment covered by the CFE Treaty included one coastal defense division with 175 tanks, 450 armored infantry fighting vehicles, and 72 artillery pieces. The fleet also contained a naval infantry brigade with 50 tanks, 218 ACVs, and 45 artillery pieces. Based in the Odessa Military District in the Crimea, this fleet was manned predominantly by Russian sailors and officers. The fleet's Russian commander and its senior officers resisted any partition and transfer to Ukraine.²⁶

Partitioning the fleet proved to be difficult at Tashkent; consequently, the issue was left to bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. In June 1993, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement that essentially split the fleet in half, beginning in September 1993 and reaching completion in July 1996. No sooner had this agreement been announced than it fell apart. Russian naval officers objected to any transfer, and Ukrainian military leaders objected to any loss of territory from the naval bases slated for transfer. The Black Sea Fleet agreement was renegotiated in September 1993, again in April 1994, and once again in February 1996. Two months later it fell apart again. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stopped the division because of controversy over where the Russian fleet would be based. Through-



U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Perry, NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev at NATO Headquarters, March 29, 1993.

out these indecisive negotiations and inconclusive agreements, neither Ukraine nor Russia destroyed any of the weapons or equipment assigned to the naval infantry and coastal defense units of the Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, the two nations were not in compliance with the CFE Treaty, and until the fleet had been divided successfully, they would remain in that status.²⁷

DESTRUCTION COMMITMENTS EAST OF THE URALS

In 1990, during the final months of CFE Treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union transferred more than 50,000 pieces of TLE to military bases and depots east of the Ural Mountains. This was a legal movement of military equipment, since neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation had signed the unfinished treaty. Nevertheless, once the treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990, the Soviet Union's initial TLE figures disturbed the other treaty states. They were concerned with the sheer size of the transfers, and some observers concluded that the Soviet military might be trying to circumvent the treaty, since no other nation had transferred any conventional weapons or equipment outside its borders. At the time of the treaty's signature in Paris, the Soviet Union's data revealed a transfer of 6,289 CFE Treaty TLE items to units of the naval infantry, coastal defense, civil defense, and Strategic Rocket Forces. This transfer was considered a serious breach of the treaty—so serious that many nations, including the United States, suspended ratification actions until the Soviet Union pledged to account for and destroy a large portion of the transferred equipment.

As explained in Chapter 3, "Ratification Delayed," intense diplomatic negotiations led the Soviet Union to pledge in a legal declaration to the Joint Consultative Group in June 1991 that it would destroy or convert 6,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and 15,500 ACVs (14,500 total) located east of the Urals by December 31, 1995. At the same time, the Soviet Union obligated itself to remove from the treaty's territorial zones 1,492 pieces of naval-related equipment. This equipment would also be destroyed by the end of 1995. None of the reductions would be subject to inspection; however, Moscow pledged to provide sufficient visible evidence to indicate that the equipment had been destroyed or converted.²⁸

During the CFE Treaty's 40-month reduction period, the treaty states individually monitored Russia's progress in keeping its pledge to reduce its TLE east of the Urals. There was little reduction activity in 1992-93; only a slight increase in 1993-94; and a steady low state in 1994-95. In January 1995, the U.S. Congress was informed in a published Arms Control and Disarma-

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ment Agency (ACDA) report that "serious concern persists over the pace and validation of the [Russian] reductions." In July 1995, the agency raised the issue before Congress again, criticizing Russia's slow pace of destruction or conversion.²⁹ Then, just six weeks before the December 31, 1995, deadline, Russian General Dmitri Kha rchen ko announced to the JCG that Russia would be unable to meet its commitments, citing the expense of reducing such a large number of conventional weapons. He asked for an extension to December 1998. General Kha rchen ko discounted any military threat from the massed equipment, stating that weather exposure and lack of maintenance had rendered it effectively useless.³⁰

Russia's request was discussed in the JCG in Vienna, but there was no agreement. However, in May 1996, at the CFE Treaty Review Conference, all the signatory states accepted a new Russian declaration on the issue. In that conference's Final Document (see Appendix D), Russia declared that it would proceed with reductions of all the committed weapons and equipment and would provide documentary evidence of its destruction and conversion. All battle tanks and armored combat vehicles that had been exposed to the weather would be displayed with the "hatches and covers of engines" opened. A group of experts, at their own expense, would be invited to the reduction sites to examine the equipment prior to its final disposal through scrapping. Finally, Russia established the year 2000 as the new deadline for completing all reductions east of the Urals.³¹

REDI: <TINI (, THE TIU ATY' . FLANK LIMITS

The problem of the treaty's flank limits was both consequential and controversial.¹² During negotiations the treaty states accepted a two-part flank zone that contained limits on the number of active and stored conventional weapons. In the diplomatic end game leading to treaty signature, President Gorbachev and the Soviet Union accepted these zone limits and restrictions. The CFE Treaty's Article V stipulated that each group of states could possess no more than 4,700 tanks, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 5,900 ACVs in the flank zones. Originally, the flank zones included the following national territories: Iceland, Norway, Greece, and parts of Turkey (NATO flanks) and Romania, Bulgaria, and four military districts in the Soviet Union (WTO flanks). For the Warsaw Treaty Organization, these military districts were located on the northern and southern flanks of the alliance (see table 8-1). The intent of treaty negotiators was to limit, through absolute numerical ceilings and storage and active sublimits, the number of offensive weapons in these military districts.

Table 8-1. CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment in the WTO Flank Zones

	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Total
Russia (2 military districts) ¹	700	1,280	580	2,560 active
	600	400	800	1,800 storage
Ukraine (1 military district) ²	280	390	350	1,020 active
	400	500		900 storage
Moldova (1 military district) ³	210	250	210	670 active
				0 storage
Georgia ³	220	285	220	725 active
				0 storage
Azerbaijan ³	220	285	220	725 active
				0 storage
Armenia ³	220	285	220	725 active
				0 storage
Total former USSR	2,850	3,675	2,600	9,125 active and storage
Total former USSR	1,850	2,775	1,800	6,425 active only
Bulgaria ⁴	1,475	1,750	2,000	5,225 active
				0 storage
Romania ⁴	1,375	1,475	2,100	4,950 active
				0 storage
WTO flank total ⁵	4,700	6,000	5,900	16,600 active only

¹The flank zone included the Soviet military districts of Leningrad and Northern Caucasus, part of Russia.

²Ukraine contained the Soviet military districts of Kiev, Carpathia, and Odessa, but only Odessa was included in the flank zone. The Odessa Military District also contained Moldova.

³Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan made up the Soviet Transcaucasus Military District.


⁴Bulgaria and Romania belonged entirely within the WTO Flank Zone.

⁵As determined by Article V of the CFE Treaty.

Source: Dorn Crawford, "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)," ACDA, 1993.

In 1990, when the Soviet Union accepted these flank zone limitations, no one anticipated the nation's collapse in 1991 and the emergence of 15 new states so quickly. During the first six months of 1992, Russia agreed to partition the former Soviet Union's military forces and to ratify the CFE Treaty, including its flank zone restrictions. The treaty entered into force on July 17, 1992; on-site inspections began immediately, and all the treaty's provisions were in effect. Under Article V, Russia was allowed to have approximately 10 percent of its total treaty entitlements in the northern and southern flank zones in active units; more than 85 percent had to be placed in storage. These treaty restrictions on

CFE TREATY FLANK REGIONS



Russia's conventional force deployments irritated senior military leaders. Only Ukraine had similar restrictions. In June 1993, Russian Minister of Defense Grachev declared categorically that the CFE Treaty's flank limits had to be revised. Grachev said the Russian general staff needed to remove 400 tanks, 2,420 ACVs, and 820 artillery pieces from the flank limits in order to field an additional mechanized division.³³

In September 1993, President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the heads of state of the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain requesting that they recognize the CFE Treaty's flank limits as a serious problem. Yeltsin asked for assistance in Russia's efforts to modify the treaty. Ten days later, Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kulebyakin presented a diplomatic demarche to all CFE Treaty states. Specifically, Kulebyakin asked that the joint Consultative Group consider raising Russia's flank sublimits in the Leningrad Military District and in the Northern Caucasus Military District. In Vienna, Ukraine supported Russia on this issue, since the CFE flank rule required the Ukrainian army to base 60 percent of its forces on 40 percent of its territory. Ambassador Kulebyakin explained that "generally recognized common norms of international law provide for a possibility of suspending the effects of treaty obligations due to a radical change of circumstances" He argued that the internal situation in the Northern Caucasus region warranted altering the CFE Treaty's flank limits.³⁴

The other CFE states did not respond formally to the Russian and Ukrainian requests. NATO nations, in the main, preferred the status quo. They indicated that while the treaty was being implemented, they would not support any changes in the negotiated and

ratified treaty. Two NATO nations, Turkey and Norway, objected more strongly. Both nations bordered the Russian military districts in question. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin publicly stated that modifying the CFE Treaty would both interrupt its implementation and open up the possibility of an arms race in the Caucasus. Leaders of other NATO nations expressed their concerns about reopening the treaty, suggesting that some Eastern European nations—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic—did not like the current treaty-mandated restrictions on stored weapons. Given this opposition, no other CFE Treaty state stepped forward in the fall and winter of 1993-94 to support the Russian and Ukrainian request to reconsider the CFE Treaty's flank limits.³⁵

Russia, however, did not let the issue die. In February 1994, two Russian general staff officers, General Dmitri Kharchenko and General Leonid Shevstov, briefed the JCG delegates in Vienna on precisely which TLE the Russian army intended to deploy in the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts and how that equipment would be used. Then, in March 1994, the Russian CFE Treaty delegate asked the JCG to consider modifying the CFE Treaty provisions on weapons and equipment stored in the two military districts. The Russian representative argued that the treaty restrictions on the number of CFE weapons a state could remove from storage were out of date and militarily cumbersome. The JCG took no action on these Russian requests. Throughout the remainder of 1994, Russia continued to raise these flank issues in Vienna, and Ukraine continued its support. The other CFE Treaty states, however, maintained their opposition to considering any changes. At the end of the second treaty reduction year, the CFE Treaty's flank limit problem remained unresolved.¹⁶

On December 10, 1994, Russia launched a military assault on rebel forces in Chechnya, in the Northern Caucasus region. The Russian military sent personnel, tanks, ACVs, artillery, and other conventional equipment into the region to quell the rebellion. Within a month, more than 40,000 Russian military and police troops had deployed into Chechnya. Under the CFE Treaty, Russia was limited to a total of 700 tanks, 580 ACVs, and 1,200 artillery pieces in active units in the southern flank zone. By the spring of 1995, Russian deployments far exceeded these limits. If Russia did not reduce its deployments by November 17, 1995, the end of the third reduction year, it faced being designated as out of compliance with the CFE Treaty.

Here was a serious, consequential treaty problem. Quickly, the issue was elevated above the diplomatic realm into international politics. In May 1995, President Clinton discussed the flanks issue with President Yeltsin at the Moscow Summit. In late May, Turkey threatened to send its military to its northeastern border if Russia continued to station excess forces in the southern



President William J. Clinton.

flank zone. Then, on June 1, the Russian High Command announced that the 58th Army would be organized and stationed in the Northern Caucasus Military District. During the summer months the rebellion abated as Chechen and Russian leaders signed a series of declarations that established cease-fire dates and set timetables for limited troop withdrawals. But these declarations proved short-lived, as one side or the other resumed fighting. In the fall of 1995, with the approach of the date for ending the treaty's reduction period (November 17), there was a flurry of diplomatic activity on the flanks issue.¹⁷

NATO nations presented a plan in mid-September for revising the treaty's flank zones. They proposed reducing the areas designated as flanks by excluding two military oblasts (districts) from Russia's southern flank and three from its northern flank. These exclusions would give the Russian High Command greater flexibility in deploying its conventional forces and equipment internally. In return for this treaty modification, Russia had to agree to remain in the treaty, accept a few additional inspections, and provide some additional information, especially on any TLE deployed in areas that were formerly located in the flank zones. The Russians rejected this proposal categorically. In fact, they rejected all offers of compromise in the fall of 1995. In those months, President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, and ACDA Director John Holum discussed various plans with their Russian counterparts. No common ground emerged. In Vienna, JGC representatives tried to work out an acceptable compromise that all nations could agree to. None worked. Consequently, when the November 17, 1995, deadline arrived, the 30 CFE states issued a joint statement identifying the states that had not met their treaty obligations. Russia, because of the excess TLE stationed in the southern flank zone and its failure to resolve the Black Sea Fleet issue, was not in compliance.³⁸



Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.

The next demarcation point for possible resolution was May 1996. The CFE Treaty contained a provision for a mandatory all-signatory states conference to be held 46 months after entry into force. The CFE First Review Conference was held in Vienna May 15-31, 1996. The flanks issue dominated the conference. The Russian representative, Ambassador Kulebyakin, stated and restated Russia's rationale for seeking relief from Article V and the flank limits. The U.S. delegation, led by Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, and Gregory G. Govan, U.S. Chief Delegate to the JCG, tried repeatedly to shape a compromise redefinition of the flanks that was acceptable to all 30 nations. Netherlands Ambassador Frank Majoor chaired the conference and intervened at key times to facilitate a solution. Negotiations on the flanks issue were very, very difficult, but in the final hours Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov signaled



*Verification agency leaders
General-Major Yevgeniy Ivanovich
Nikulin of Belarus, General-Major
Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich
Romanov of Russia, and Genera-
l-Major Nikolai Tikhonovich
Honcharenko of Ukraine visit
OS/A on July 31, 1995.*

Moscow's acceptance of conference language and the agreement went forward. Russia and the other signatory states agreed in the Final Document that (1) Russia's flank zone areas would be redrawn, excluding certain military oblasts; (2) the total number of CFE equipment allowed in the Russian military districts—battle tanks, ACVs, and artillery—would be revised upward; (3) Russia would provide the other treaty states with force data more often; and (4) Russia would be liable for up to 10 additional declared site inspections annually in the flank zones.³⁹

During the difficult negotiations, four nations—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—expressed major concerns about Russia's future security intentions. In one way these nations were articulating new regional concerns; in another way they were expressing their fears about the possibility of large states' influencing small states and the significance of international law. In the conference's Final Document, each of these four nations submitted a separate annex statement explaining its concerns (see Appendix D). During the conference, some of the NATO nations, particularly France and Great Britain, supported these nations. France took the position that every state had to respect the national sovereignty of every other state, especially states that were parties to the CFE Treaty, the most important, modern, all-European multinational arms control treaty. With the positions of these four nations incorporated into the final statement, the delegates moved forward with language redefining the treaty's flank limits. Not all the details were ironed out. Subsequent diplomatic negotiations on the exact territorial demarcations and specific timetables for movement of the forces remained to be worked out in the Joint Consultative Group.

CHANGES IN EUROPE INFLUENCE CFE TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

Throughout the first CFE Treaty year, 1992-93, considerable pressures had developed within the NATO alliance for a program

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of cooperation with the treaty verification agencies of the Eastern European nations-Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the other successor states. These pressures had originated as a political and diplomatic consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall; the revolutions in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; the unification of Germany; and, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the new republics. These continental upheavals influenced how the NATO nations approached implementation of the CFE Treaty. Within NATO, Belgium, Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany were the strongest advocates of establishing joint inspector training, authorizing joint inspection teams, and sharing treaty data among all signatory nations.

In January 1993, seven months into the CFE Treaty's implementation, NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee invited the directors of the national verification agencies, east and west, to attend an important meeting at NATO Headquarters. At this meeting, the 16 NATO nations, acting through the VCC, formally invited the 14 Eastern CFE Treaty nations to have their inspectors participate on NATO nations' joint multinational inspection teams. They would be identified as NATO nation teams, but individual inspectors from one, two, or more of the Eastern bloc nations, as well as from the other NATO nations, could participate. The NATO nation conducting the inspection would lead the team.



Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signs the Partnership for Peace Framework Document for Russia at NATO Headquarters.

After hearing the concept, the directors of the Eastern states' verification agencies accepted the invitation. Within a matter of months, it became routine for inspectors from "cooperating partner" nations to serve on NATO-led multinational CFE inspection teams conducting reduction inspections in Eastern Europe.⁴⁰ Brigadier General Heinz Loquai, Director of the German Federal Armed Forces Verification Center, observed, "At first it was not so easy for the inspected countries, especially the former Warsaw Pact countries, to understand why guest inspectors were coming along with the [NATO nation] inspection teams. But, in my opinion, the participation of the guest inspectors is a good development. Germany has opened more than 50 percent of all its inspections for the guest inspectors."⁴¹

In 1993 and up to June 1994, 83 NATO-led multinational inspection teams conducted CFE Treaty inspections in Eastern Europe. According to Necil Nedimoglu, Director of NATO's Verification and Implementation Coordination Section (VICS), the cooperative program for guest inspectors worked so well that it stimulated other cooperative initiatives. Late in 1993, a few Eastern European treaty nations invited the NATO nations to send guest inspectors to serve on their inspection teams. After considerable discussion within the alliance, in June 1994 the VCC issued a statement to NATO state verification agencies and staffs. It stated that Western inspectors could join Eastern-led CFE inspection teams that were conducting East-on-East inspections. During 1994 and 1995, the United States, France, Holland, and Belgium participated in many of these joint inspections.⁴²

Along with these changes, the VCC also invited the Eastern nation treaty agencies to send individual inspectors to participate in NATO-conducted CFE Treaty courses. They accepted; and in 1993 and 1994, 80 inspectors from Eastern nations' verification agencies attended courses for CFE Treaty inspectors and escorts at the NATO school at Oberarnmergau, Germany. Other Eastern bloc inspectors participated in a NATO course on monitoring CFE reductions held at the Belgian Military Camp at Leopoldville. The guest inspectors at this Belgian reduction course even taught a portion of the course. They discussed the reduction methods being used in their nations, and, in turn, the NATO national inspectors explained how they would monitor those reductions. The VCC also sponsored seminars for all verification agency directors at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. These two-day seminars focused on treaty implementation issues and on strengthening director-to-director communications, but they should not be construed as a substitute for the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group meeting



in Vienna. The JCG was the official forum for resolving treaty issues and for authorizing any modifications to the treaty.

Other cooperative initiatives demonstrated the new era of West-East European relations associated with implementing the CFE Treaty. In November 1993 the NATO nations offered all Eastern nations access to the alliance's computerized CFE Treaty database, VERITY. The database contained the NATO nations' annual military force data, information from their treaty inspection reports, and data extracted from the inspections that monitored TLE reductions. VERITY had an electronic mail feature and was on-line 24 hours a day, every day at NATO Headquarters. While VERITY had no legal status, most of the NATO nation verification agencies found the system useful in preparing for inspection missions and monitoring overall reductions. Of the 14 Eastern verification agencies, all except Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted the November 13 invitation to participate in the computerized data system. After a few months to schedule and conduct training courses at NATO Headquarters for the verification agencies' automated data managers, the expanded VERITY system went into effect in March 1994. Among the participating nations (28 of 30), the system helped verification agency staffs track the annual data exchange of national military force holdings; notifications of reduction events; results of reductions; and inspection information regarding the time, place, and type of inspection. By mid-1994, the VERITY database included inspection reports from all NATO nations, the Eastern European nations, and all but two of the new republics.⁴³

EVALUATING THE CFE TREATY: THE FIRST REVIEW CONFERENCE

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Incorporated into the treaty was a provision for a review conference of all the signatory states to be held 46 months after entry into force. Since the CFE Treaty entered into force in mid-July 1992, the treaty's First Review Conference was held in mid-May 1996. Representatives from all states parties met in Vienna from May 15-31. In 46 months, much had changed. The Warsaw Treaty Organization had collapsed, prompting some states, principally Russia, to advocate "modernizing" the treaty by removing the group of states concept from the treaty's text. This recommendation was opposed by other states, principally the United States, citing the conference's short duration and the opportunity to resolve more pressing treaty implementation issues. Specifically, those issues were Russia's commitment to reducing its TLE east of the Urals, the demands of Russia and Ukraine for adjusting the flank zone limits, the problem of accounting for the TLE transfers among the treaty states of the former Soviet Union, and the issue of authorizing a review and update of the treaty's Protocol on

Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET). The two major recommendations for the conference agenda-treaty modernization and treaty compliance/implementation issues-were not incompatible. Both were part of the conference's final statement; however, implementation issues dominated the conference agenda.⁴⁴

Because of the meeting's short two-week duration, the conference delegates formed working groups to develop recommendations and textual language for debate and decision. Negotiations were conducted by representatives of individual states (or at times by groups of states), while decisions were made by consensus of all 30 state parties. The U.S. delegation was led by Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. The U.S. representative to the Joint Consultative Group, Gregory G. Govan, formerly a Director of OSIA, worked closely with the large U.S. delegation. Russia's representative to the JCG, Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, worked with Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov. Germany was represented by Ambassador Rudiger Hartmann; France by Ambassador Bernard Miget, and Ukraine by Deputy Foreign Minister Konstyantin Gryshchenko. Ambassador Frank Majoor of the Netherlands chaired the conference. All discussions and negotiations were conducted in confidence.



At Criel, France, officials observe a ceremony recognizing Brigadier General Francois Rozec, Director, L'Unite Francaise de Verification. (Front row left) Brigadier General Colae Corduneanu, Romania; Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the VICS; Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuening, OS/A; Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, OS/A; Brigadier General Peter Von Geysso, Germany; Colonel Colin A. Heron and Lt. Colonel Michael Morgan, United Kingdom.

When the conference concluded on May 31, the 30 states issued a Final Document (see Appendix D). The states resolved the thorny issue of redefining the treaty's flank zones. Russia made a specific commitment to reduce its TLE holdings east of the Urals. All the treaty states agreed that the JCG should update the POET each year. The conference representatives also addressed the future of the treaty. In the Final Document, the 30 state parties instructed the delegates to the Joint Consultative Group to "expand upon their work" in accordance with the treaty's Article XVI. Since this article had established and empowered the JCG, the Review Conference representatives were essentially increasing and redirecting the JCG's responsibilities. They charged the Vienna treaty group with creating a process to modernize the treaty and to improve its operations. On the subject of treaty modernization, the state representatives agreed on 12 topics for the JCG's consideration (see Appendix D, Annex D). These topics included such fundamental treaty terms as "groups of states parties," "area of application," and "designated permanent storage site." For improving treaty operations, the conference representatives developed 15 specific recommendations for "further consideration and resolution" by the JCG (see Appendix D, Annex E). Finally, the states instructed the JCG to develop a progress report and present it at the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 1996.

One of the most interesting aspect of the First Review Conference's Final Document was the section reviewing the CFE Treaty's operations. In the 46 months that had elapsed since entry into force, much had changed in Europe, and much had been accomplished under the provisions of the treaty. The document summarized some of these accomplishments⁴⁵:

The states parties note with satisfaction that more than 58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment have been reduced, and that the overall holdings of conventional armaments and equipment within the area of application are substantially lower than the limits set in the treaty.

More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A permanent system for regular and routine exchange of treaty notifications and other information has been developed. The joint Consultative Group has been firmly established and has demonstrated its utility and importance as the ongoing treaty forum.

With regard to the concluding act, the states parties note with satisfaction that the personnel strength of conventional armed forces in the area of application was reduced by 1.2 million persons.

The states parties note that the treaty established a high degree of transparency in military relations through its compre-

hensive system for exchange of information and for verification. Together with the extensive reductions of conventional armaments and equipment, this has led to greater predictability and confidence in security relations. The treaty has also nurtured the development of new patterns of cooperation in Europe and provides a basis for stability and enhanced security in Europe at substantially Lower levels of conventional armaments and equipment than heretofore. Although risks and challenges still exist in some parts of Europe, the capability for launching surprise attack and the danger of large-scale offensive action in Europe as a whole have been diminished substantially. Nevertheless, the achievement of the goals of the treaty in the whole area of its application requires continuous efforts by the states parties.

hV LUATING THF TREATY: COMPARING TH U IBER

Following the end of the CFE Treaty's 40-month reduction period, all treaty states declared their force levels in the five categories of offensive weapons. This declaration allowed nations to compare the "anticipated" number of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and attack helicopters with the "actual" figure at the end of the reduction phase. The data were declared by each nation; when aggregated for the group of state parties (Western Group and Eastern Group), the figures indicated that the actual reductions were well below the CFE Treaty's anticipated ceilings (table 8-2).

Table 8-2. Comparison of CFE Treaty Reductions by Group of States

	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Aircraft	Helicopters	Total
Western Group						
July 1992*	24,097	19,839	33,827	5,118	1,685	84,566
CFE ceiling	19,142	18,286	29,822	6,662	2,000	75,912
Nov 1995**	14,156	14,869	22,585	4,301	1,283	57,194
Eastern Group						
July 1992	31,269	25,755	43,468	8,544	1,545	110,581
CFE ceiling	20,000	20,000	30,000	6,800	2,000	78,800
Nov 1995	19,061	18,455	28,764	5,873	1,466	73,619

*CFE Treaty entry into force.

**CFE Treaty end of 40-month reduction period.

Sources: Arms Control Reporter, 407.A.11 (1993); Arms Control Reporter, 407.B.533 (1996).



Many U.S. tanks deployed from U.S. Army units in Western Europe to the Gulf War.

For a variety of reasons, national reductions of these weapons continued after the mid-November 1995 treaty deadline. A few nations—such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia—had not reduced all their TLE as required under the treaty. Other nations—Poland, Romania, and others—continued to reduce CFE weapons because they were excess to their national force structure. By the time of the CFE Treaty's First Review Conference in May 1996, the state parties announced that the total number of reductions had exceeded 58,000 items. At that conference, Russia pledged to destroy by the year 2000 the weapons and equipment located beyond the Ural Mountains and in certain naval units.

A comparison of selected states' CFE holdings at the beginning of the baseline period (July 1992) and at the end of the reduction period (November 1995) indicates that the larger nations had significantly reduced their conventional weapons in the treaty's territorial zones (table 8-3).

Not all of these reductions were driven by the CFE Treaty. The massive withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Western Europe, for example, were caused by the need to deploy combat troops to the Middle East for the Gulf War and by reductions in the American military services following the Cold War. Russia's large-scale reductions were also caused by historic forces, largely economic and political, that were external to the requirements of the CFE Treaty. Consequently, one must be cautious in drawing conclusions from these numbers alone. Nations did not make excess reductions in their military forces and weapons to comply

Table 8-3. Comparison of Selected National Holdings of CFE Treaty TLE

	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Aircraft	Helicopters	Total
United States						
July 1992*	5,163	1,973	4,963	398	349	12,846
Nov 1995**	1,254	854	2,238	222	150	4,718
Germany						
July 92	7,170	4,735	9,099	1,040	256	22,300
Nov 95	3,061	2,056	2,679	578	225	8,599
France						
July 92	1,335	1,436	4,387	695	366	8,219
Nov 95	1,289	1,251	3,556	667	317	7,080
Russia						
July 92	9,338	8,326	19,399	4,624	1,005	42,692
Nov 95	5,492	5,680	10,372	2,986	826	25,356
Ukraine						
July 92	6,128	3,591	6,703	1,648	271	18,341
Nov 95	4,026	3,727	4,919	1,008	270	13,950
Romania						
July 92	2,967	3,942	3,171	508	15	10,603
Nov 95	1,375	1,471	2,073	373	16	5,308

*CFE Treaty entry into force.

**CFE Treaty 40-month reduction period.

Source: *Arms Control Today*, December 1995, pp. 29-30.

with the treaty; rather, they were compelled by economic, strategic, and military reasons to reduce their military forces.

The numbers, however, do confirm that there have been major reductions in national military forces on the European continent. The United States, for instance, reduced or withdrew 8,128 CFE TLE items from its forces stationed in Western Europe. This was a 63 percent reduction in its offensive forces on the European continent. Collectively, the states of the former Soviet Union possessed 71,080 weapons in July 1992; three years later they had reduced these weapons to 39,581 or 55 percent. For Russia, the largest of the new republics, the figures indicate that its November 1995 holdings of tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft, and helicopters west of the Ural Mountains was 25,261. In July 1992, Russia had declared 42,692 CFE weapons; three years later it had reduced 17,431 items or 41 percent. Germany reduced more CFE weapons-13,701-than any other NATO nation. Certainly

Table 8-4. Comparison of CFE 1A Military Manpower Figures for Selected Nations- July 1992 to November 1995

	CFE 1A Ceiling July 1992	Declared Holding November 1995
United States	250,000	107,166
Germany	345,000	293,889
Turkey	530,000	527,670
Russia	1,450,000	818,471
Poland	234,000	233,870
Ukraine	450,000	400,686

Source: *Arms Control Reporter*, 407.A.11, (1993); *Arms Control Reporter*, 407.B.533 (1996).

German unification in 1990 had skewed these figures, with the addition of the former German Democratic Republic's ground and air forces. In July 1992, Germany declared 22,300 CFE items; in November 1995, it stated it held 8,599 TLE, a reduction of 13,701 or 61 percent.

Reductions of full-time military personnel occurred in virtually every CFE Treaty state. The CFE 1A Agreement dealt with limits on full-time military personnel. When the states parties agreed to implement the treaty provisionally in July 1992, they declared that 40 months later their military manpower would be at or below a specific numerical ceiling. The states, themselves, set the ceilings; consequently, they were quite high. When the 40-month reduction period ended in November 1995, all nations reporting military personnel force data were in compliance with the CFE 1A Agreement. Three nations-Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus-reported no data. Table 8-4 contains military manpower figures for selected nations at the starting and ending periods, July 1992 and November 1995.

One should approach these figures with caution. As in other comparisons associated with the CFE Treaty, larger forces must be considered. Most of the reasons for these manpower reductions lie outside the CFE Treaty; the treaty was not the single causal factor that forced these manpower reductions.

There is no comprehensive set of figures listing all on-site inspections conducted by every nation under the CFE Treaty. The NATO nations recorded on their VERITY database system only the inspections for the Group of Western States. Inspections conducted by the Eastern nations, especially inspections on each other,

were not systematically recorded in any central database or repository. It was not until June 1994 that most of the CFE Treaty states agreed to record their on-site inspections in the VERITY system; thus, no comprehensive list exists of inspections by all states before June 1994. The United States, through the On-Site Inspection Agency, did record the number and type of its own CFE Treaty inspections. Compiled annually, these figures indicated an intense involvement by the United States in monitoring every aspect of the CFE Treaty (table 8-5).

Table 8-5. U.S. On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty

Treaty Period	Baseline ¹	1993 ²	1994 ²	1995 ²	1996 ³
Declared site	43	16	12	14	31
Challenge		2	5		7
Reduction	5	49	47	41	
Singletons*	9	86	89	50	56
Totals	58	153	153	106	94

¹ July 18, 1992-November 13, 1992.

² Annual figures, mid-November-mid-November.

³ Residual level validation period (RLVP): November 18, 1995-March 16, 1996.

* U.S. inspectors on teams led by other state parties.

Source: On-Site Inspection Agency, May 1996.

EVALUATING THE TREATY: FINAL THOUGHTS

If one asked in May 1996 why the CFE Treaty had succeeded as a continental European arms control treaty, there were many answers. On the geopolitical level, Europe had experienced historic changes from 1989 through 1992 that ended the Cold War, unified Germany, dissolved the Soviet Union, and created new European states. On the military level, Europe had witnessed in just five years (1989-1994) the Soviet Union's and Russia's withdrawal of more than 700,000 military personnel from Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states. The United States had withdrawn 220,000 troops from Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, and other Western European nations. On the economic level, Central and Eastern European nations had shifted from socialist economies to capitalist market economies, creating a broad political consensus for consumer goods over military equipment. In nation after nation, this economic transition proved extraordinarily difficult, creating societies racked by inflation and unemployment. Arms reduction treaties held a strong appeal for the citizens of most European nations, east and west.

Trust and verify.

On the institutional level, some Eastern European nations sought entry into the European Union and the established NATO alliance. Adherence to the CFE Treaty, one of the NATO alliance's fundamental post-Cold War objectives, furthered the foreign policy objectives of these nations. Finally, on the level of international law, the 30-nation CFE Treaty represented a fundamental legal commitment to a single continental arms control treaty permanently limiting five categories of conventional military offensive weapons. The treaty contained important provisions for sharing force data and for verification by on-site inspection, thus creating a legal basis for transparency across national borders on a heavily armed continent. All things considered, national compliance with the CFE Treaty was the result of a broad European consensus constructed on significant changes in geopolitics, military strategy, economics, institutional desires, and a determination to establish international law across the vast continent.

These factors were widely known; what was not so well known were the contributions of the 30 nations' verification agencies, the on-site inspectors monitoring the treaty's provisions and protocols, the military forces reducing the weapons, and the Verification Coordinating Committee and the Joint Consultative Group facilitating implementation. Collectively, these elements had implemented the complex, continent-wide treaty clay by day, month by month, year by year.

The people of these organizations were predominantly, but not exclusively, military officers and noncommissioned officers. They were the closest to treaty operations; they knew whether the treaty was meeting its objectives or not. Most believed that the CFE Treaty had achieved its objectives: reducing the level of offensive conventional arms on the continent, marking out territorial zones for the permanent reduction of forces and weapons, and establishing a rule of law for the future of Europe, west and east.

These achievements were important. The CFE Treaty states were constructing the foundations of post-Cold War Europe.

Trust and verify.

NOTES

1. Statement of the Joint Consultative Group, Vienna, Austria, November 17, 1995, cited in *Arms Control Reporter 1995*, pp. 407.B.527-528.
2. *Arms Control Reporter 1995*, p. 407.B.528.
3. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," Preamble, paragraph 7.
4. Ibid., Article XIV; Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, Commander, European Operations Command, OSIA, Briefing, "RLVP Summary," May 9, 1996.
5. Interview with Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, Commander, European Operations Command, OSIA, by Technical Sergeant David Willford, USAF, History Office, OSIA, November 13, 1995, and December 1, 1995.
6. Colonel Kenneth Guillory, "We're Ready for the Newest Treaty Challenge," *On-Site Insights*, November/December 1995, p. 3.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Interview, Guillory; Col. Kenneth Guillory, "We're Ready for the Newest Treaty Challenge," p. 3; Technical Sergeant David Willford, "Treaty Validation Period Begins in Europe: Agency Inspectors Check Destruction of Weapons," *On-Site Insights*, November/December 1995, pp. 1, 4.
9. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, "RLVP Summary," May 9, 1996.
10. Ibid.; Interview, Guillory.
11. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, "RLVP Summary," May 9, 1996.
12. See this history, Chapter 6, CFE Treaty Baseline. See also Interview with Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations Division, European Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1994; Interview, Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, December 13, 1993.
13. Interview, Kelley; Interview with Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; Interview, Karcz.
14. Interview, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Treaty Negotiator, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, December 14, 1993.
15. For a more detailed examination of the issue, see Chapter 6.
16. *Arms Control Reporter 1992*, p. 407.B.479.
17. Ibid., p. 407.B.481.
18. *Arms Control Reporter 1993*, pp. 407.B.487, 488-489.
19. Ibid., p. 407.B.489.
20. *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, p. 407.B.503; Interview with Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Chief Inspector, Polish Verification Center, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Warsaw, Poland, February 3, 1994.
21. *Arms Control Reporter 1992*, p. 407.B.481; *Arms Control Reporter 1993*, p. 407.B.499; *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, pp. 407.B.506, 508.
22. *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, pp. 407.B.505-507.

23. "Complying with CFE Suspended for Financial Reasons," INTERFAX (Moscow), February 23, 1995, in *FBIS-Soviet Union*, February 24, 1995.
24. *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, pp. 407.B.516, 519, 525, 527-528, 530; *Arms Control Reporter 1996*, p. 407.B.537.
25. Jim Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Russian Attitudes and Implications for U.S. Interests," Congressional Research Service Report, September 15, 1995; Jack Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review," *Arms Control Today*, April 1996, pp. 7-11.
26. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: Brassey's Inc., 1995), pp. 71, 100, 105, 118.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 100; *Arms Control Reporter 1996*, pp. 407.B.534-536.
28. See this history, Chapter 3, Ratification Delayed.
29. Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty."
30. *Arms Control Reporter 1995*, p. 407.B.529.
31. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D.
32. For an incisive analysis of this flank's issue, see Richard A. Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings"; *International Security*, Spring 1995, pp. 118-144; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Resolving the CFE 'Flank' Dispute," *Arms Control Today*, May 1995, pp. 15-20.
33. Falkenrath, "CFE Flank Dispute," pp. 129-130.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-133.
35. Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty."
36. *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, pp. 407.B.502-503, 507, 509, 512, 513.
37. Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty"; *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, pp. 407.B.522-523, 526; Falkenrath, "Resolving the CFE 'Flank' Dispute," pp. 15-17.
38. *Arms Control Reporter 1995*, pp. 407.B.518, 522-523, 525-526; Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review," pp. 7-11.
39. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D.
40. Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the Verification and Implementation Coordination Section, NATO Verification Coordinating Committee, "NATO's Role in Verification and Compliance Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document," speech presented to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All Its Aspects, New York, July 19, 1994. See also Interview, Kelley.
41. Interview with Brigadier General Dr. Heinz Loquai, Director, Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994.
42. Nedimoglu, "NATO's Role in Verification and Compliance Monitoring"; *Arms Control Reporter 1993*, p. 407.B.508.
43. *Arms Control Reporter 1994*, p. 407.B.502.
44. Interview with Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, by editors of *Arms Control Today*, April 25, 1996, published in "The CFE Treaty Review Conference: Strengthening the 'Cornerstone' of European Security," *Arms Control Today*, April 1996, pp. 3-6.
45. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D.

Appendix A

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having conducted this negotiation in Vienna beginning on March 9, 1989,

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted,

Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Conscious of the need to prevent any military conflict in Europe,

Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe,

Striving to replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to overcoming the division of Europe,

Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe,

Recalling that they signed or acceded to the Treaty of Brussels of 1948, the Treaty of Washington of 1949 or the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 and that they have the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance,

Committed to the objective of ensuring that the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application of this Treaty do not exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armoured combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters,

Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect adversely the security interests of any State,

Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional arms control process including negotiations, taking into account future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, including those obligations relating to the following five categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters.

2. Each State Party also shall carry out the other measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure security and stability both during the period of reduction of conventional armed forces and after the completion of reductions.

3. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing Types, with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft Into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Information Exchange, with an Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Format; the Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and the Protocol on the

Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Provisional Application. Each of these documents constitutes an integral part of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty:

- (A) The term "group of States Parties" means the group of States Parties that signed the Treaty of Warsaw' of 1955 consisting of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the group of States Parties that signed or acceded to the Treaty of Brussels" of 1948 or the Treaty of Washington" of 1949 consisting of the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
- (B) The term "area of application" means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of the Republic of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line extending from the point of intersection of the Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gozne and thence to the sea.
- (C) The term "battle tank" means a self-propelled armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a high level of self-protection, and which is not

designed and equipped primarily to transport combat troops. Such armoured vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of ground-force tank and other armoured formations.

Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting vehicles which weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight and which are armed with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre. In addition, any wheeled armoured fighting vehicles entering into service which meet all the other criteria stated above shall also be deemed battle tanks.

- (D) The term "armoured combat vehicle" means a self-propelled vehicle with armoured protection and cross-country capability. Armoured combat vehicles include armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles.

The term "armoured personnel carrier" means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped to transport a combat infantry squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an integral or organic weapon of less than 20 millimetres calibre.

The term "armoured infantry fighting vehicle" means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or motorised infantry formations and units of ground forces.

The term "heavy armament combat vehicle" means an armoured combat vehicle with an integral or organic direct fire gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre, weighing at least 6.0 metric tonnes unladen weight, which does not fall within the definitions of an armoured personnel carrier, or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle or a battle tank.

- (E) The term "unladen weight" means the weight of a vehicle excluding the weight of ammunition; fuel and lubricants; removable reactive armour; spare parts, tools and accessories; removable snorkelling equipment; and crew and their personal kit.
- (F) The term "artillery" means large calibre systems capable of engaging ground targets by delivering primarily indirect fire. Such artillery systems provide the essential indirect fire support to combined arms formations.

Large calibre artillery systems are guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars

·The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Warsaw, 14 May 1955

·The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed in Brussels, 17 March 1948

...The North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, 4 April 1949

- and multiple launch rocket systems with a calibre of 100 millimetres and above. In addition, any future large calibre direct fire system which has a secondary effective indirect fire capability shall be counted against the artillery ceilings.
- (G) The term "stationed conventional armed forces" means conventional armed forces of a State Party that are stationed within the area of application on the territory of another State Party.
- (H) The term "designated permanent storage site" means a place with a clearly defined physical boundary containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, which are counted within overall ceilings but which are not subject to limitations on conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.
- (I) The term "armoured vehicle launched bridge" means a self-propelled armoured transporter-launcher vehicle capable of carrying and, through built-in mechanisms, of emplacing and retrieving a bridge structure. Such a vehicle with a bridge structure operates as an integrated system.
- (J) The term "conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty" means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI.
- (K) The term "combat aircraft" means a fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model or version of such an aircraft which performs other military functions such as reconnaissance or electronic warfare. The term "combat aircraft" does not include primary trainer aircraft.
- (L) The term "combat helicopter" means a rotary wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets or equipped to perform other military functions. The term "combat helicopter" comprises attack helicopters and combat support helicopters. The term "combat helicopter" does not include unarmed transport helicopters.
- (M) The term "attack helicopter" means a combat helicopter equipped to employ anti-armour, air-to-ground, or air-to-air guided weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons. The term "attack helicopter" comprises specialised attack helicopters and multi-purpose attack helicopters.
- (N) The term "specialised attack helicopter" means an attack helicopter that is designed primarily to employ guided weapons.
- (O) The term "multi-purpose attack helicopter" means an attack helicopter designed to perform multiple military functions and equipped to employ guided weapons.
- (P) The term "combat support helicopter" means a combat helicopter which does not fulfill the requirements to qualify as an attack helicopter and which may be equipped with a variety of self-defence and area suppression weapons, such as guns, cannons and unguided rockets, bombs or cluster bombs, or which may be equipped to perform other military functions.
- (Q) The term "conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty" means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes subject to information exchange in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.
- (R) The term "in service," as it applies to conventional armed forces and conventional armaments and equipment, means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes that are within the area of application, except for those that are held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions or that meet any of the exceptions set forth in Article III.
- (S) The terms "armoured personnel carrier look-alike" and "armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike" mean an armoured vehicle based on the same chassis as, and externally similar to, an armoured personnel carrier or armoured infantry fighting vehicle, respectively, which does not have a cannon or gun of 20 millimetres calibre or greater and which has been constructed or modified in such a way as not to permit the transportation of a combat infantry squad. Taking into account the provisions of the Geneva Convention "For the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field" of 12 August 1949 that confer a special status on ambulances, armoured personnel carrier ambulances shall not be deemed armoured combat vehicles or armoured personnel carrier look-alikes.
- (T) The term "reduction site" means a clearly designated location where the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII takes place.
- (U) The term "reduction liability" means the number in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that a State Party commits itself to reduce during the period of 40 months following the entry into force of this Treaty in order to ensure compliance with Article VII.
2. Existing types of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty are listed in the Protocol on

Existing Types. The lists of existing types shall be periodically updated in accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2, subparagraph (D) and Section IV of the Protocol on Existing Types. Such updates to the existing types lists shall not be deemed amendments to this Treaty.

3. The existing types of combat helicopters listed in the Protocol on Existing Types shall be categorised in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation.

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties shall apply the following counting rules:

All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article 11, within the area of application shall be subject to the numerical limitations and other provisions set forth in Articles IV, V and VI, with the exception of those which in a manner consistent with a State Party's normal practices:

- (A) are in the process of manufacture, including manufacturing-related testing;
- (B) are used exclusively for the purposes of research and development;
- (C) belong to historical collections;
- (D) are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned from service in accordance with the provisions of Article IX;
- (E) are awaiting, or are being refurbished for, export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be located elsewhere than at sites declared under the terms of Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange or at no more than 10 such declared sites which shall have been notified in the previous year's annual information exchange. In the latter case, they shall be separately distinguishable from conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
- (F) are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles or multi-purpose attack helicopters, held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; or
- (G) are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application, and are in the area of application for no longer than a total of seven days.

2. If, in respect of any such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters, the notification of which is required under Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a State Party notifies an unusually high number in more than two successive annual information exchanges, it shall explain the reasons in the Joint Consultative Group, if so requested.

Article IV

1. Within the area of application, as defined in Article II, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs, as defined in Article 11, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- (A) 20,000 battle tanks, of which no more than 16,500 shall be in active units;
- (B) 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 27,300 shall be in active units. Of the 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, no more than 18,000 shall be armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles; of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles, no more than 1,500 shall be heavy armament combat vehicles;
- (C) 20,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than 17,000 shall be in active units;
- (D) 6,800 combat aircraft; and
- (E) 2,000 attack helicopters.

Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery not in active units shall be placed in designated permanent storage sites, as defined in Article 11, and shall be located only in the area described in paragraph 2 of this Article. Such designated permanent storage sites may also be located in that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Odessa Military District and the southern part of the Leningrad Military District. In the Odessa Military District, no more than 400 battle tanks and no more than 500 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. In the southern part of the Leningrad Military District, no more than 600 battle tanks, no more than 800 armoured combat vehicles, including no more than 300 armoured combat vehicles of any type with the remaining number consisting of armoured personnel carriers, and no more than 400 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. The southern part of the Leningrad Military District is understood to mean the territory within that military district south of the line East-West 60 degrees 15 minutes northern latitude.

2. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics west of the Ural Mountains comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow and Volga-Ural Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- (A) 15,300 battle tanks, of which no more than 11,800 shall be in active units;
- (B) 24,100 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 21,400 shall be in active units; and
- (C) 14,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than 11,000 shall be in active units.

3. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian and Kiev Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:

- (A) 10,300 battle tanks;
- (B) 19,260 armoured combat vehicles; and
- (C) 9,100 pieces of artillery; and
- (D) in the Kiev Military District, the aggregate numbers in active units and designated permanent storage sites together shall not exceed:
 - (1) 2,250 battle tanks;
 - (2) 2,500 armoured combat vehicles; and
 - (3) 1,500 pieces of artillery.

4. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:

- (A) 7,500 battle tanks; •
- (B) 11,250 armoured combat vehicles; and
- (C) 5,000 pieces of artillery.

5. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties may locate battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in active units in each of the areas described in this Article and Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) up to the numerical limitations applying in that area, consistent with the maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII and provided that no State Party

stations conventional armed forces on the territory of another State Party without the agreement of that State Party.

6. If a group of States Parties' aggregate numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in active units within the area described in paragraph 4 of this Article are less than the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 4 of this Article, and provided that no State Party is thereby prevented from reaching its maximum levels for holdings notified in accordance with Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, then amounts equal to the difference between the aggregate numbers in each of the categories of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery and the specified numerical limitations for that area may be located by States Parties belonging to that group of States Parties in the area described in paragraph 3 of this Article, consistent with the numerical limitations specified in paragraph 3 of this Article.

Article V

1. To ensure that the security of each State Party is not affected adversely at any stage:

- (A) within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed the difference between the overall numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is:
 - (1) 4,700 battle tanks;
 - (2) 5,900 armoured combat vehicles; and
 - (3) 6,000 pieces of artillery;
- (B) notwithstanding the numerical limitations set forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a State Party or States Parties may on a temporary basis deploy into the territory belonging to the members of the same group of States Parties within the area described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph additional aggregate numbers in active units for each group of States Parties not to exceed:
 - (1) 459 battle tanks;
 - (2) 723 armoured combat vehicles; and
 - (3) 420 pieces of artillery; and

(C) provided that for each group of States Parties no more than one-third of each of these additional aggregate numbers shall be deployed to any State Party with territory within the area described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, that is:

- (1) 153 battle tanks;
- (2) 241 armoured combat vehicles; and
- (3) 140 pieces of artillery.

2. Notification shall be provided to all other States Parties no later than at the start of the deployment by the State Party or States Parties conducting the deployment and by the recipient State Party or States Parties, specifying the total number in each category of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery deployed. Notification also shall be provided to all other States Parties by the State Party or States Parties conducting the deployment and by the recipient State Party or States Parties within 30 days of the withdrawal of those battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery that were temporarily deployed.

Article VI

With the objective of ensuring that no single State Party possesses more than approximately one-third of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the numbers within the area of application for that State Party do not exceed:

- (A) 13,300 battle tanks;
- (B) 20,000 armoured combat vehicles;
- (C) 13,700 pieces of artillery;
- (D) 5,150 combat aircraft; and
- (E) 1,500 attack helicopters.

Article VII

1. In order that the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI are not exceeded, no State Party shall exceed, from 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, the maximum levels which it has previously agreed upon within its group of States Parties, in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article, for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and of which it has provided notification pursuant to the provisions of this Article.

2. Each State Party shall provide at the signature of this Treaty notification to all other States Parties of the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. The notification of the maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty provided by each State Party at the signature of this Treaty shall remain valid until the date specified in a subsequent notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. In accordance with the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI, each State Party shall have the right to change the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Any change in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party shall be notified by that State Party to all other States Parties at least 90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification,

on which such a change takes effect. In order not to exceed any of the limitations set forth in Articles IV and V, any increase in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party that would otherwise cause those limitations to be exceeded shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the previously notified maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of one or more States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties. The notification of a change in the maximum levels for holdings shall remain valid from the date specified in the notification until the date specified in a subsequent notification of change pursuant to this paragraph.

4. Each notification required pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article for armoured combat vehicles shall also include maximum levels for the holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles of the State Party providing the notification.

5. Ninety days before expiration of the 40-month period of reductions set forth in Article VIII and subsequently at the time of any notification of a change pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, each State Party shall provide notification of the maximum levels for its holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery with respect to each of the areas described in Article IV, paragraphs 2 to 4 and Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A).

6. A decrease in the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held by a State Party and subject to notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase the maximum levels for its holdings subject to notification pursuant to this Article.

7. It shall be the responsibility solely of each individual State Party to ensure that the maximum levels for its holdings notified pursuant to the provisions of this Article are not exceeded. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall consult in order to ensure that the maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to the provisions of this Article, taken together as appropriate, do not exceed the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI.

Article VIII

1. The numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI shall be achieved only by means of reduction in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, the Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types and the Protocol on Inspection.

2. The categories of conventional armaments and equipment subject to reductions are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The specific types are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types.

- (A) Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be reduced by destruction, conversion for non-military purposes, placement on static display, use as ground targets, or, in the case of armoured personnel

carriers, modification in accordance with the Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types.

- (B) Artillery shall be reduced by destruction or placement on static display, or, in the case of self-propelled artillery, by use as ground targets.
- (C) Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or, in the case of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer aircraft.
- (D) Specialised attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, or use for ground instructional purposes.
- (E) Multi-purpose attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or recategorisation.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be deemed to be reduced upon execution of the procedures set forth in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article and upon notification as required by these Protocols. Armaments and equipment so reduced shall no longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI.

4. Reductions shall be effected in three phases and completed no later than 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, so that:

- (A) by the end of the first reduction phase, that is, no later than 16 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at least 25 percent of its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced;
- (B) by the end of the second reduction phase, that is, no later than 28 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at least 60 percent of its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced;
- (C) by the end of the third reduction phase, that is, no later than 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall have reduced its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. States Parties carrying out conversion for non-military purposes shall have ensured that the conversion of all battle tanks in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction shall have been completed by the end of the third reduction phase; and
- (D) armoured combat vehicles deemed reduced by reason of having been partially destroyed in accordance with Section VIII, paragraph 6 of the Protocol on Reduction shall have been fully converted for non-military purposes, or destroyed in accordance with Section IV of the Protocol on Reduction, no later than 64 months after entry into force of this Treaty.

5. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty to be reduced shall have been declared present within the area of application in the exchange of information at signature of this Treaty.

6. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of its reduction liability.

7. Except as provided for in paragraph 8 of this Article, a State Party's reduction liability in each category shall be no less than the difference between its holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, at signature or effective upon entry into force of this Treaty, whichever is the greater, and the maximum levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII.

8. Any subsequent revision of a State Party's holdings notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange or of its maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII shall be reflected by a notified adjustment to its reduction liability. Any notification of a decrease in a State Party's reduction liability shall be preceded or accompanied by either a notification of a corresponding increase in holdings not exceeding the maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII by one or more States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties, or a notification of a corresponding increase in the reduction liability of one or more such States Parties.

9. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, of the locations of its reduction sites, including those where the final conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles for non-military purposes will be carried out.

10. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as many reduction sites as it wishes, to revise without restriction its designation of such sites and to carry out reduction and final conversion simultaneously at a maximum of 20 sites. States Parties shall have the right to share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement.

11. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of this Article, during the baseline validation period, that is, the interval between entry into force of this Treaty and 120 days after entry into force of this Treaty, reduction shall be carried out simultaneously at no more than two reduction sites for each State Party.

12. Reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be carried out at reduction sites, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, within the area of application.

13. The reduction process, including the results of the conversion of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for non-military purposes both during the reduction period and in the 24 months following the reduction period, shall be subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

Article IX

1. Other than removal from service in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application shall be removed from service only by decommissioning, provided that:

- (A) such conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are decommissioned and awaiting disposal at no more than eight sites which shall be notified as declared sites in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and shall be identified in such notifications as holding areas for decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned from service also contain any other conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, the decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be separately distinguishable; and
- (B) the numbers of such decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty do not exceed, in the case of any individual State Party, one percent of its notified holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or a total of 250, whichever is greater, of which no more than 200 shall be battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery, and no more than 50 shall be attack helicopters and combat aircraft.

2. Notification of decommissioning shall include the number and type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned and the location of decommissioning and shall be provided to all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Protocol on Information Exchange.

Article X

1. Designated permanent storage sites shall be notified in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange to all other States Parties by the State Party to which the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty contained at designated permanent storage sites belong. The notification shall include the designation and location, including geographic coordinates, of designated permanent storage sites and the numbers by type of each category of its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty at each such storage site.

2. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain only facilities appropriate for the storage and maintenance of armaments and equipment (e.g., warehouses, garages, workshops and associated stores as well as other support accommodation). Designated permanent storage sites shall not contain firing ranges or training areas associated with conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain only armaments and equipment belonging to the conventional armed forces of a State Party.

3. Each designated permanent storage site shall have a clearly defined physical boundary that shall consist of a continuous perimeter fence at least 1.5 metres in height. The

perimeter fence shall have no more than three gates providing the sole means of entrance and exit for armaments and equipment.

4. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not in active units, including when they are temporarily removed in accordance with paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of this Article. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in storage other than in designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.

5. Active units or formations shall not be located within designated permanent storage sites, except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article.

6. Only personnel associated with the security or operation of designated permanent storage sites, or the maintenance of the armaments and equipment stored therein, shall be located within the designated permanent storage sites.

7. For the purpose of maintenance, repair or modification of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites, each State Party shall have the right, without prior notification, to remove from and retain outside designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10 percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of the notified holdings of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in each designated permanent storage site, or 10 items of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in each category in each designated permanent storage site, whichever is less.

8. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article, no State Party shall remove conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty from designated permanent storage sites unless notification has been provided to all other States Parties at least 42 days in advance of such removal. Notification shall be given by the State Party to which the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty belong. Such notification shall specify:

- (A) the location of the designated permanent storage site from which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are to be removed and the numbers by type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of each category to be removed;
- (B) the dates of removal and return of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and
- (C) the intended location and use of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty while outside the designated permanent storage site.

9. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed from and retained outside designated permanent storage sites by States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall at no time exceed the following levels:

- (A) 550 battle tanks;
- (B) 1,000 armoured combat vehicles; and
- (C) 300 pieces of artillery.

10. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed from designated permanent storage sites pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Article shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites no later than 42 days after their removal, except for those items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed for industrial rebuild. Such items shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites immediately on completion of the rebuild.

11. Each State Party shall have the right to replace conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located in designated permanent storage sites. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, at the beginning of replacement, of the number, location, type and disposition of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty being replaced.

Article XI

1. Each State Party shall limit its armoured vehicle launched bridges so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched bridges in active units within the area of application does not exceed 740.

2. All armoured vehicle launched bridges within the area of application in excess of the aggregate number specified in paragraph 1 of this Article for each group of States Parties shall be placed in designated permanent storage sites, as defined in Article II. When armoured vehicle launched bridges are placed in a designated permanent storage site, either on their own or together with conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, Article X, paragraphs 1 to 6 shall apply to armoured vehicle launched bridges as well as to conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Armoured vehicle launched bridges placed in designated permanent storage sites shall not be considered as being in active units.

3. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, armoured vehicle launched bridges may be removed, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, from designated permanent storage sites only after notification has been provided to all other States Parties at least 42 days prior to such removal. This notification shall specify:

- (A) the locations of the designated permanent storage sites from which armoured vehicle launched bridges are to be removed and the numbers of armoured vehicle launched bridges to be removed from each such site;
- (B) the dates of removal of armoured vehicle launched bridges from and return to designated permanent storage sites; and
- (C) the intended use of armoured vehicle launched bridges during the period of their removal from designated permanent storage sites.

4. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, armoured vehicle launched bridges removed from designated permanent storage sites shall be returned to them no later than 42 days after the actual date of removal.

5. The aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched bridges removed from and retained outside of designated permanent storage sites by each group of States Parties shall not exceed 50 at any one time.

6. States Parties shall have the right, for the purpose of maintenance or modification, to remove and have outside of designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10 percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of their notified holdings of armoured vehicle launched bridges in each designated permanent storage site, or 10 armoured vehicle launched bridges from each designated permanent storage site, whichever is less.

7. In the event of natural disasters involving flooding or damage to permanent bridges, States Parties shall have the right to withdraw armoured vehicle launched bridges from designated permanent storage sites. Notification to all other States Parties of such withdrawals shall be given at the time of withdrawal.

Article XII

1. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations of a State Party designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, which are not structured and organised for ground combat against an external enemy, are not limited by this Treaty. The foregoing notwithstanding, in order to enhance the implementation of this Treaty and to provide assurance that the number of such armaments held by such organisations shall not be used to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, any such armaments in excess of 1,000 armoured infantry fighting vehicles assigned by a State Party to organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions shall constitute a portion of the permitted levels specified in Articles IV, V and VI. No more than 600 such armoured infantry fighting vehicles of a State Party, assigned to such organisations, may be located in that part of the area of application described in Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A). Each State Party shall further ensure that such organisations refrain from the acquisition of combat capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal security requirements.

2. A State Party that intends to reassign battle tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched bridges in service with its conventional armed forces to any organisation of that State Party not a part of its conventional armed forces shall notify all other States Parties no later than the date such reassignment takes effect. Such notification shall specify the effective date of the reassignment, the date such equipment is physically transferred, as well as the numbers, by type, of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty being reassigned.

Article XIII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State

Party shall provide notifications and exchange information pertaining to its conventional armaments and equipment in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.

2. Such notifications and exchange of information shall be provided in accordance with Article XVII.

3. Each State Party shall be responsible for its own information; receipt of such information and of notifications shall not imply validation or acceptance of the information provided.

Article XIV

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, within the area of application, inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection.

2. The purpose of such inspections shall be:

- (A) to verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI;
- (B) to monitor the process of reduction of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters carried out at reduction sites in accordance with Article VIII and the Protocol on Reduction; and
- (C) to monitor the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, respectively.

3. No State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in respect of States Parties which belong to the group of States Parties to which it belongs in order to elude the objectives of the verification regime.

4. In the case of an inspection conducted jointly by more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsible for the execution of the provisions of this Treaty.

5. The number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection which each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to accept during each specified time period shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that Protocol.

6. Upon completion of the 120-day residual level validation period, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall have the obligation to accept, an agreed number of aerial inspections within the area of application. Such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions shall be developed during negotiations referred to in Article XVIII.

Article XV

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, a State Party shall have the right to use, in addition to the procedures referred to in Article XIV, national or multinational technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law.

2. A State Party shall not interfere with national or multinational technical means of verification of another State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. A State Party shall not use concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national or multinational technical means of verification of another State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices associated with normal personnel training, maintenance or operations involving conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

Article XVI

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties hereby establish a Joint Consultative Group.

2. Within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, the States Parties shall:

- (A) address questions relating to compliance with or possible circumvention of the provisions of this Treaty;
- (B) seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may become apparent in the way this Treaty is implemented;
- (C) consider and, if possible, agree on measures to enhance the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty;
- (D) update the lists contained in the Protocol on Existing Types, as required by Article II, paragraph 2;
- (E) resolve technical questions in order to seek common practices among the States Parties in the way this Treaty is implemented;
- (F) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, working methods, the scale of distribution of expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of conferences convened under this Treaty and the distribution of costs of inspections between or among States Parties;
- (G) consider and work out appropriate measures to ensure that information obtained through exchanges of information among the States Parties or as a result of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely for the purposes of this Treaty, taking into account the particular requirements of each State Party in respect of safeguarding information which that State Party specifies as being sensitive;

- (H) consider, upon the request of any State Party, any matter that a State Party wishes to propose for examination by any conference to be convened in accordance with Article XXI; such consideration shall not prejudice the right of any State Party to resort to the procedures set forth in Article XXI; and
- (I) consider matters of dispute arising out of the implementation of this Treaty.
3. Each State Party shall have the right to raise before the Joint Consultative Group, and have placed on its agenda, any issue relating to this Treaty.
4. The Joint Consultative Group shall take decisions or make recommendations by consensus. Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection by any representative of a State Party to the taking of a decision or the making of a recommendation.
5. The Joint Consultative Group may propose amendments to this Treaty for consideration and confirmation in accordance with Article XX. The Joint Consultative Group may also agree on improvements to the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, consistent with its provisions. Unless such improvements relate only to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature, they shall be subject to consideration and confirmation in accordance with Article XX before they can take effect.
6. Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prohibit or restrict any State Party from requesting information from or undertaking consultations with other States Parties on matters relating to this Treaty and its implementation in channels or fora other than the Joint Consultative Group.
7. The Joint Consultative Group shall follow the procedures set forth in the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group.

Article XVII

The States Parties shall transmit information and notifications required by this Treaty in written form. They shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, including in particular a communications network to be established by a separate arrangement.

Article XVIII

1. The States Parties, after signature of this Treaty, shall continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same Mandate and with the goal of building on this Treaty.
2. The objective for these negotiations shall be to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe, and pursuant to the Mandate, including measures to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application.
3. The States Parties shall seek to conclude these negotiations no later than the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Helsinki in 1992.

Article XIX

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It may be supplemented by a further treaty.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. A State Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the Depositary and to all other States Parties. Such notice shall be given at least 150 days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. It shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.
3. Each State Party shall, in particular, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if another State Party increases its holdings in battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, which are outside the scope of the limitations of this Treaty, in such proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application.

Article XX

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, which shall circulate it to all the States Parties.
2. If an amendment is approved by all the States Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XXII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XXI

1. Forty-six months after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a review of the operation of this Treaty.
2. The Depositary shall convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties, if requested to do so by any State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this Treaty have arisen, in particular, in the event that a State Party has announced its intention to leave its group of States Parties or to join the other group of States Parties, as defined in Article II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A). In order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for this conference, the request shall include the reason why that State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be necessary. The conference shall consider the circumstances set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of this Treaty. The conference shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, shall last no longer than three weeks.
3. The Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to consider an amendment proposed pursuant to Article XX, if requested to do so by three or more States Parties. Such a conference shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the necessary requests.

4. In the event that a State Party gives notice of its decision to withdraw from this Treaty pursuant to Article XIX, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the notice of withdrawal in order to consider questions relating to the withdrawal from this Treaty.

Article XXII

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, hereby designated the Depositary.

2. This Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble.

3. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Parties of:

- (A) the deposit of each instrument of ratification;
- (B) the entry into force of this Treaty;
- (C) any withdrawal in accordance with Article XIX and its effective date;
- (D) the text of any amendment proposed in accordance with Article XX;
- (E) the entry into force of any amendment to this Treaty;
- (F) any request to convene a conference in accordance with Article XXI;
- (G) the convening of a conference pursuant to Article XXI; and
- (H) any other matter of which the Depositary is required by this Treaty to inform the States Parties.

4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XXIII

The original of this Treaty, of which the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary to all the States Parties.

PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and provisions regarding notification and exchange of information pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF EACH STATE PARTY'S LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information about the structure of its land forces and air and air defence aviation forces within the area of application:

- (A) the command organization of its land forces, specifying the designation and subordination of all combat, combat support and combat service support formations and units at each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent level, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the brigade/regiment level (i.e., independent battalions) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated; and
- (B) the command organisation of its air and air defence aviation forces, specifying the designation and subordination of formations and units at each level of command down to wing/air regiment or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the wing/air regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the wing/air regiment level (i.e., independent squadrons) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated.

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on:

- (A) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and
- (B) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery limited by the Treaty in each of the areas described in Articles IV and V of the Treaty.

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES

1. For each of its formations and units notified pursuant to Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Protocol, as well as separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalents subordinate to those formations and units, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information:

- (A) the designation and peacetime location of its formations and units at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including

headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates:

- (1) battle tanks;
 - (2) armoured combat vehicles;
 - (3) artillery;
 - (4) combat aircraft; and
 - (5) attack helicopters;
- (B) the holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of the conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of:
- (1) combat support helicopters;
 - (2) unarmed transport helicopters;
 - (3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying those in active units;
 - (4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;
 - (6) primary trainer aircraft;
 - (7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and
 - (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty¹;
- (C) the designation and peacetime location of its formations and units, other than those notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, at which the following categories of conventional armaments and equipment, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, specified in the Protocol on Existing Types, or enumerated in the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates:
- (1) combat support helicopters;
 - (2) unarmed transport helicopters;
 - (3) armoured vehicle launched bridges;
 - (4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;
 - (6) primary trainer aircraft;
 - (7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and
 - (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty²; and

- (D) the holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) in each category specified above; and, in the case of armoured vehicle launched bridges, those which are in active units.

2. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces but not held by its land forces or air or air defence aviation forces, specifying:

- (A) the designation and peacetime location of its formations and units down to the level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or are independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent) at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates:
- (1) battle tanks;
 - (2) armoured combat vehicles;
 - (3) artillery;
 - (4) combat aircraft; and
 - (5) attack helicopters; and
- (B) the holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of:
- (1) combat support helicopters;
 - (2) unarmed transport helicopters;
 - (3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying those in active units;
 - (4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
 - (5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;
 - (6) primary trainer aircraft;
 - (7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and
 - (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty³

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information:

² Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation.

³ Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation.

¹ Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation.

- (A) the location of its designated permanent storage sites, specifying geographic name and coordinates, and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Section held at such sites;
- (B) the location of its military storage sites not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification, independent repair and maintenance units, military training establishments and military airfields, specifying geographic name and coordinates, at which conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Section are held or routinely present, giving the holdings by type in each category at such locations; and
- (C) the location of its sites at which the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty will be undertaken pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction, specifying the location by geographic name and coordinates, the holdings by type in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting reduction at such locations, and indicating that it is a reduction site.

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND NUMBERS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION BUT NOT IN SERVICE WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

1. Each State Party shall provide information to all other States Parties on the location and numbers of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application not in service with its conventional armed forces but of potential military significance.

- (A) Accordingly, each State Party shall provide the following information:
 - (1) in respect of its battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and specialised attack helicopters, as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the Treaty, held by organisations down to the independent or separately located battalion or equivalent level designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in these categories held by each such organisation;
 - (2) in respect of its armoured personnel carriers, heavy armament combat vehicles and multi-purpose attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the aggregate numbers in each category of such armaments

and equipment in each administrative region or division;

- (3) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site;
- (4) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, an identifiable location of each site at which there are normally more than a total of 15 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery or more than five combat aircraft or more than 10 attack helicopters which are, pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (E) of the Treaty, awaiting or are being refurbished for export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, the numbers of such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The States Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, agree as to the form in which the information on the numbers shall be provided pursuant to this provision;
- (5) in respect of its battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles which have been reduced and are awaiting conversion pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of each site at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site; and
- (6) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters used exclusively for the purpose of research and development pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol the aggregate numbers in each category of such conventional armaments and equipment.

SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information specifying its objects of verification, including the total number and the designation of each object of verification, and enumerating its declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection, providing the following information on each site:

- (A) the site's designation and location, including geographic name and coordinates;
- (B) the designation of all objects of verification, as specified in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (J) of the Protocol on Inspection, at that site, it being understood that subordinate elements at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment or wing/air regiment level located in the vicinity of each other or of the headquarters immediately superior to such elements may be deemed as not separately located, if the distance between such separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalent or to their headquarters does not exceed 15 kilometres;
- (C) the overall numbers by type of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of this Protocol held at that site and by each object of verification, as well as those belonging to any object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation of each such object of verification;
- (D) in addition, for each such declared site, the number of conventional armaments and equipment not in service with its conventional armed forces, indicating those that are:
 - (1) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty or reduced and awaiting conversion pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction; and
 - (2) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions;
- (E) declared sites that hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export and temporarily retained within the area of application or used exclusively for research and development shall be identified as such, and the aggregate numbers in each category at that site shall be provided; and
- (F) point(s) of entry/exit associated with each declared site, including geographic name and coordinates.

SECTION VI. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF SITES FROM WHICH CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties, coincident with the annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, information about the locations of sites which have been notified previously as declared sites from which all conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol have been withdrawn since the signature of the Treaty if such sites continue to be used by the conventional armed forces of that State Party. The locations of these sites shall be notified for three years following such withdrawal.

SECTION VII. TIMETABLE FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION IN SECTIONS I TO V OF THIS PROTOCOL

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information pursuant to Sections I to V of this Protocol as follows:

- (A) upon signature of the Treaty, with information effective as of that date; and, no later than 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group any necessary corrections to its information reported pursuant to Sections III, IV and V of this Protocol. Such corrected information shall be deemed information provided at Treaty signature and valid as of that date;
- (B) 30 days following entry into force of the Treaty, with information effective as of the date of entry into force;
- (C) on the 15th day of December of the year in which the Treaty comes into force (unless entry into force occurs within 60 days of the 15th day of December), and on the 15th day of December of every year thereafter, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year; and
- (D) following completion of the 40-month reduction period specified in Article VIII of the Treaty, with information effective as of that date.

SECTION VIII. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OR FORCE LEVELS

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of:

- (A) any permanent change in the organisational structure of its conventional armed forces within the area of application as notified pursuant to Section I of this Protocol at least 42 days in advance of that change; and
- (B) any change of 10 percent or more in any one of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of its combat, combat support or combat service

support formations and units down to the brigade/ regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) and paragraph 2, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Protocol since the last annual exchange of information. Such notification shall be given no later than five days after such change occurs, indicating actual holdings after the notified change.

SECTION IX. INFORMATION ON THE ENTRY INTO AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF A STATE PARTY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol:

- (A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which entered into service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months; and
- (B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which have been removed from service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months.

SECTION X. INFORMATION ON ENTRY INTO AND EXIT FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol:

- (A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have entered the area of application within the last 12 months and whether any of these armaments and equipment were organised in a formation or unit;
- (B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have been removed from, and remain outside of, the area of application within the last 12 months and the last reported locations within the area of application of such conventional armaments and equipment; and

- (C) conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application which exit and re-enter the area of application, including for purposes such as training or military activities, within a seven-day period shall not be subject to the reporting provisions in this Section.

SECTION XI. CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT THROUGH THE AREA OF APPLICATION

1. The provisions of this Protocol shall not apply to conventional armaments and equipment that are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application. Conventional armaments and equipment in the categories specified in Section III of this Protocol which entered the area of application in transit shall be reported pursuant to this Protocol if they remain within the area of application for a period longer than seven days.

SECTION XII. FORMAT FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information specified in this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII of the Treaty and the Annex on Format. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to the Annex on Format shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

SECTION XIII. OTHER NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE TREATY

1. After signature of the Treaty and prior to its entry into force, the Joint Consultative Group shall develop a document relating to notifications required by the Treaty. Such document shall list all such notifications, specifying those that shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, and shall include appropriate formats, as necessary, for such notifications. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to this document, including any formats, shall be deemed to be improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

ANNEX ON THE FORMAT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, in accordance with the formats specified in this Annex. The information in each data listing shall be provided in mechanically or electronically printed form and in one of the six official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In each table (column a), each data entry shall be assigned a sequential line number.

2. Each set of listings shall begin with a cover page showing the name of the State Party providing the listings,

the language in which the listings are being provided, the date on which the listings are to be exchanged and the effective date of the information set forth in the listings.

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION

1. Pursuant to Section I of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the command organisation of its land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, and air and air defence aviation forces in the form of two separate hierarchical data listings as set forth in Chart I.

2. The data listings shall be provided beginning at the highest level and proceeding through each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment, independent battalion, and wing/air regiment, independent squadron or their equivalent. For example, a military district/army/corps would be followed by any subordinate independent regiments, independent battalions, depots, training establishments, then each subordinate division with its regiments/independent battalions. After all the subordinate organisations are listed, entries shall begin for the next military district/army/corps. An identical procedure shall be followed for air and air defence aviation forces.

- (A) Each organisation shall be identified (column b) by a unique designator (i.e., formation or unit record number) which shall be used on subsequent listings with that organisation and for all subsequent information exchanges; its national designation (i.e., name) (column c); and, in the case of divisions, brigades/regiments, independent battalions, and wings/air regiments, independent squadrons or equivalent organisations, where appropriate, the formation or unit type (e.g., infantry, tank, artillery, fighter, bomber, supply); and
- (B) for each organisation, the two levels of command within the area of application immediately superior to that organization shall be designated (columns d and e).

Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLES IV AND V OF THE TREATY

1. Pursuant to Section II of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide data on its overall holdings by type of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery (Chart IIA) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV and V of the Treaty (column b), and on its overall holdings by type of combat aircraft and attack helicopters (Chart IIB) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV of the Treaty (column b).

2. Data on armoured combat vehicles shall include the total numbers of heavy armament combat vehicles, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, and their number (column f/e) and type (column e/d) in each of these subcategories (column d/c).

3. In the case of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery and armoured vehicle launched bridges, stored in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, the total of such equipment in designated permanent storage sites shall be specified (column g).

Chart IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Chart IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS, AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

1. Each State Party shall provide a hierarchical data listing of all its land forces' and air and air defence aviation forces' organisations reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1 of the Protocol, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and installations at which conventional armaments and equipment are held as specified in Section III, paragraph 3 of the Protocol.

2. For each organisation and installation, the information shall reflect:

- (A) the formation or unit record number (column b) and designation of the organisation (column c) reported in Chart I. Separately located battalions/squadrons specified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and installations listed in accordance with Section III, paragraph 3 of the Protocol shall also be given a unique formation or unit record number (column b), and their national designation (i.e., name), (column c) shall be provided. Their position on the listing shall reflect their subordination with the exception of formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol, which shall be specified together at the conclusion of the listing:
 - (1) designated permanent storage sites shall be identified with the notation "DPSS" following the national designation; and
 - (2) reduction sites shall be identified with the notation "reduction" following the national designation;
- (B) location (column d), including the geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds.

For locations containing stationed forces, the host State Party shall also be included;

- (C) for each level of command from the highest down to the division/air division level, the overall total of conventional armaments and equipment in each category (columns f to m/l). For example, the overall total held by a division would be the sum of the holdings of all its subordinate organisations; and
- (D) for each level of command at the division level and below as specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the number of conventional armaments and equipment by type under the headings specified in Charts IIIA and IIIB (columns f to m/l). In the armoured combat vehicle column in Chart IIIA (column g), the subcategories (i.e., armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles) shall be presented separately. In the attack helicopter column (column k/i), the subcategories (i.e., specialised attack, multi-purpose attack) shall be presented separately. The column (l) labelled "other" in Chart IIIB shall include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, and armoured vehicle launched bridges, if any, in service with the air and air defence aviation forces.

Chart IIIA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Chart IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

1. Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the location, number and type of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application but not in service with its conventional armed forces.

2. For each location, the information shall reflect:
- (A) the provision of Section IV of the Protocol pursuant to which the information is being provided (column b);
- (B) the location (column c):
- (1) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV,

paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1), (3) and (5) of the Protocol, the geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds of sites containing such equipment; and

- (2) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2) of the Protocol, the national designation of the administrative region or division containing such equipment;
- (C) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the Protocol, the national-level designation of organisations holding the equipment specified (column c); and
- (D) for each location, the number by type under the headings specified in Chart IV (columns d to h), except as follows:
- in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2) of the Protocol, only the numbers in each category shall be provided solely for the administrative region or division specified (column c).

Chart IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES

1. Pursuant to Section V of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide a listing of its objects of verification and declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection. Declared sites (Chart V) shall be listed in alphabetical order.

2. Information about each declared site shall include:
- (A) a unique designator (i.e., declared site record number) (column b) which shall be used with that site for all subsequent information exchanges;
- (B) the site's name and location using geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column c). For locations containing objects of verification of stationed forces, the host State Party shall also be included;
- (C) the point(s) of entry/exit associated with the declared site (column d);
- (D) a unique sequential number and the designation and formation or unit record number of all objects of verification stationed at the declared site as specified in Section III of this Annex (column e). Unique sequential numbers shall be assigned such that the

number assigned to the last object of verification appearing in the listing shall equal the State Party's total number of objects of verification; and

(E) the overall number of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of the Protocol held at the declared site and by each object of verification (columns f to p) and specifying, in addition:

(1) conventional armaments and equipment held in each category on the declared site belonging to an object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation and formation or unit record number of each such object of verification (column e); and

(2) conventional armaments and equipment not belonging to an object of verification shall be identified with the following notations immediately following/below each such entry in columns f to p:

(a) equipment held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, with the notation "security";

(b) decommissioned equipment, with the notation "decommissioned";

(c) equipment awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export, with the notation "export";

(d) reduced equipment awaiting conversion, with the notation "reduced"; and

(e) equipment used exclusively for research and development, with the notation "research."

Chart V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

3. Each State Party shall provide a listing of points of entry/exit (Chart VI). The listing shall assign a unique sequential numerical designator (column b) which shall be used to indicate the point(s) of entry/exit for each site provided pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (C) of this Section. The location shall include the geographic name (column c) and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column d). The type(s) of transportation acceptable-"air," "sea," "ground"-for each point of entry/exit also shall be specified (column e).

Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number	Formation or Unit Record Number	Designation of Formation of Unit	Subordination	
			1st Higher Echelon	2nd Higher Echelon
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)

Chart IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number	Area	Category	Sub-Category	Type(s)	Overall Number (including in DPSSs)	Number in DPSSs
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)

Chart IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number	Category	Sub-Category	Type	Overall Number
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)

Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number	POE Record Number	Name of POE	Location	Type(s)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)

PROTOCOL ON EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

The States Parties hereby agree upon: (a) lists, valid as of the date of Treaty signature, of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the measures of limitation, reduction, information exchange and verification; (b) procedures for the provision of technical data and photographs relevant to such existing types of conventional armaments and equipment; and (c) procedures for updating the lists of such existing types of conventional armaments and equipment, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Existing types of battle tanks are:

M-1	T-34
M-60	T-54
M-48	T-55
M-47	T-62
Leopard 1	T-64
Leopard 2	T-72
AMX-30	T-80
Challenger	TR-85
Chieftain	TR-580
Centurion	
M-41	
NM-116	
T-54	
T-55	
T-72	

All models and versions of an existing type of battle tank listed above shall be deemed to be battle tanks of that type.

2. Existing types of armoured combat vehicles are:

(A) Armoured Personnel Carriers:

YPR-765	BTR-40
AMX-13 VTT	BTR-152
M113	BTR-50
M75	BTR-60
Spartan	OT-62 (TOPAS)
Grizzly	OT-64 (SKOT)
TPz-1 Fuchs	OT-90
VAB	FUG D-442
M59	BTR-70
Leonidas	BTR-80
VCC1	BTR-D
VCC2	TAB-77
Saxon	OT-810
AFV 432	PSZH D-944
Saracen	TABC-79
Hum ber	TAB-71
BDX	MLVM
BMR-600	MT-LB'
Chaimite V200	
V150S	

EBR-ETT
M3A1
YP 408
BLR
VIB
LVTP-7
6614/G
BTR-152
BTR-50
BTR-60
BTR-70
MT-LB'

All models and versions of an existing type of armoured personnel carrier listed above shall be deemed to be armoured personnel carriers of that type, unless such models and versions are included in the armoured personnel carrier look-alike list in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

... This multi-purpose lightly armoured vehicle may be exceptionally modified within 40 months of entry into force of the Treaty into an armoured personnel carrier look-alike listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol as MT-LB-AT by alteration of the interior of the vehicle through the removal of the left-hand combat infantry squad seating and the welding of the ammunition racking to the side and the floor at a minimum of six points so that the vehicle is not capable of transporting a combat infantry squad. Such modifications may be accomplished at locations other than reduction sites. MT-LB armoured personnel carriers that have not been modified shall be reported in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange as armoured personnel carriers.

(B) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles:

YPR-765 (25mm)	BMP-1/BRM-1
Marder	BMP-2
AMX-IOP	BMP-23
Warrior	MLI-84
M2/M3 Bradley	BMD-1
AFV 432 Rarden	BMD-2
NM-135	BMP-3
BMP-1/BRM-1	
BMP-2	

All models and versions of an existing type of an armoured infantry fighting vehicle listed above shall be deemed to be armoured infantry fighting vehicles of that type, unless such models and versions are included in the armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike list in Section II, paragraph 2 of this Protocol.

(C) Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles:

AMX-IORC	PT-76
ERC 90 Sagaye	SU-76
BMR-625-90	SU-100
Commando V150	ISU-152
Scorpion	
Saladin	
JPK-90	
M-24	
AMX-13	
EBR-75 Panhard	
PT-76	

All models and versions of an existing type of heavy armament combat vehicle listed above shall be deemed to be heavy armament combat vehicles of that type.

3. Existing types of artillery are:

(A) Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers:

105mm:	105 Light Gun M18 105 Krupp Gun 105 R Metal Gun 105 Pack How M 56 Pack How M 101 Towed How M102 Towed How Abbot SP Gun M108 SP How M52 SP How 105 HM-2 How M-38 Gun (Skoda) 105 AU 50 How R58/M26 Towed How	100mm:	BS-3 Field Gun Model 53 Field Gun Skoda How (Model 1914/1934, 1930, 1934) Skoda How (Model 1939)
	M 101 Towed How M102 Towed How Abbot SP Gun M108 SP How M52 SP How 105 HM-2 How M-38 Gun (Skoda) 105 AU 50 How R58/M26 Towed How	105mm:	Schneider Field Gun (Model 1936)
	M 101 Towed How M102 Towed How Abbot SP Gun M108 SP How M52 SP How 105 HM-2 How M-38 Gun (Skoda) 105 AU 50 How R58/M26 Towed How	120mm:	2B16 How 2S9 SP How
	M 101 Towed How M102 Towed How Abbot SP Gun M108 SP How M52 SP How 105 HM-2 How M-38 Gun (Skoda) 105 AU 50 How R58/M26 Towed How	122mm:	030 How M-30 How 074 How 2S1 SP How A19 Gun (Model 31/37) Model 89 SP How
122mm:	122/46 Field Gun 030 How M 30 How 2S1 SP How	130mm:	Gun 82 M-46 Gun
130mm:	M 46 Gun	150mm:	Skoda How (Model 1934) Ceh How (Model 1937)
140mm:	5.5" (139.7mm) Towed How	152mm:	D1 How 2S3 SP How 2A65 How
150mm:	150 Skoda Gun		ML20 How-Gun 020 Gun-How Gun 81 2A36 Gun Dana SP Gun-How M77
152mm:	020 Gun-How 2S3 SP How		2S5 SP Gun 2S19 SP How Gun-How 85 How Model 1938 How 81
155mm:	M114 Towed How M114/39 (M-139) Towed How FH-70 Towed How M109 SP How M198 Towed How 155 TRF1 Gun 155 AUFI Gun 155 AMF3 Gun 155 BF50 Gun M44 SP How M59 Towed Gun SP70 SP How M107 SP Gun	203mm:	B4 How 2S7 SP Gun
175mm:	M115 Towed How		
203mm:	M110 SP How M55 SP How		

(B) Mortars:

107mm:	4.2" (ground mounted or on M 106 armoured vehicle)	107mm:	Mortar M-1938
120mm:	Brandt (M60, M-120-60, SLM-120-AM-50) M120 RTF 1 M120 M51 Soltam/Tampella (ground mounted)	120mm:	2B11 (2S12) M 120 Model 38/43 Tundzha/Tundzha Sani SP Mortar (mounted on MT-LB) Mortar Model 1982 B-24

or on MI 13 armored vehicle) 160mm: MI60
Ecia Mod L (ground mounted M-L or mounted on either the BMR-600 or MI 13 armoured vehicle) 240mm: M240
2S4 SP Mortar
HY12 (Tosam)
2B11 (2S12)

(C) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems:

110mm:	LARS BM-21	122mm:	BM-21 (BM-21-1, BM-21V) RM-70
122mm:	RM-70		APR-21 APR-40
140mm:	Teruel MLAS		
227mm:	MLRS	130mm:	M-51 RM-130 BM-13 R.2 BM-14
		140mm:	BM-22/27
		220mm:	BM-24
		240mm:	Uragan 9P140
		280mm:	Smerch
		300mm:	

All models and versions of an existing type of artillery listed above shall be deemed to be artillery of that type.

4. Existing types of combat aircraft are:

A-7	IAR-93
A-10	IL-28
Alpha Jet A	MiG-15
AM-X	MiG-17
Buccaneer	MiG-21
Canberra	MiG-23
Draken	MiG-25
F-4	MiG-27
F-5	MiG-29
F-15	MiG-31
F-16	SU-7
F-18	SU-15
F-84	SU-17
F-102	SU-20
F-104	SU-22
F-111	SU-24
G-91	SU-25
Harrier	SU-27
Hunter	TU-16
Jaguar	TU-22
Lightning	TU-22M
MiG-21	TU-128
MiG-23	Yak-28
MiG-29	
MB-339	
Mirage F1	
Mirage III	
Mirage IV	
Mirage V	
Mirage 2000	
SU-22	
Tornado	

All models or versions of an existing type of combat aircraft listed above shall be deemed to be combat aircraft of that type.

5. Existing types of attack helicopters are:

(A) Specialised Attack Helicopters:

A-129 Mangusta Mi-24
 AH-1 Cobra
 AH-64 Apache
 Mi-24

Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or versions of an existing type of specialised attack helicopter listed above shall be deemed to be specialised attack helicopters of that type.

(B) Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters:

A-109 Hirundo IAR-316
 Alouette III Mi-8/Mi-17
 B0-105/PAH-1
 Fennec AS 550 C-2
 Gazelle
 Lynx
 Mi-8
 OH-58 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136
 Scout
 Wessex

Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or versions of an existing type of multi-purpose attack helicopter listed above shall be deemed to be multi-purpose attack helicopters of that type.

SECTION II. EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Existing types of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes are:

YPR-765	MILAN CP PRCOCt PRCOC2 PRCOC4 PRCOC5 PRMR	BTR-40 BTR-50	CP PU PUM p PUR 82 PK (MRF) UR-67
AMX-13	VTT MILAN PC	PK (B) BTR-152	MTP-1 CP
M113	MILAN AI/A2 (ATGW) FJW TOW ARTFC ARTOBS FACONT MORTFC AIE Mortar Carrier SIG HFTRSM CP	BTR-60	PU PU-12/PA PU-12 PAU BBS ABS R-137 B R-140 BM R-145 R-156 R-409 BM P-238BT

CPSVC AICP AIECP 4.2"/M106 A1 4.2" M106 81mm M-125 81mm M125 A1 81mm M125 A2 81mm NM-125 81mm		P-240BT P-241BT E-351BR R-975 MTP-2 1V18, 1V19 1V118 B
TPz-1 FUCHS HFTRSM AD CP CP ENGRCP ELOKA NBC RASIT CP	BTR-70	KShM SPR-2 BREM ZS-88 Kh
M59	BTR-80	1V119 RCHM-4
LEONIDAS	BTR-D	ZD RD
VAB PC	OT-62 (TOPAS)	CP WPT/DPT-62 BREM R-2M R-3M R-3MT R-4MT
BMR-600 SIG PC 81mm	OT-64 (SKOT)	CP R-3Z R-2M R-3MT R-4 R-4MT R-2AM PROPAGANDA R-4M R-6 WPT/DR-64 BREM S-260 inz. S-260 art.
SPARTAN STRIKER SAMSON CP JAVELIN MILAN		
SAXON AD CP MAINT		
AFV 432 CP/RA 81mm CYMB AFV 435 AFV 436 AFV 439	OT-810	OT-810/R-112
HUMBER SQUIRT	OT 90	VP 90
SARACEN SQUIRT CP ADR	FUG D-442	VS MRP OT-65/R-112 OT-65 DP OT-65 CH
YP 408 PWMR PWCO PWAT PWRDR PWV	PSZH D-944	CP
BTR-50 PU PK(MRF) PK(B)	MT-LB	AT KShM-R-81 R-80 9S743 PI tW-13-16 IW-21-25 IW-12 MP-21-25 AFMS R-381T R-330P Beta 3M SPR-1
BTR-60 PU-12/PA PU-12 BBS ABS R-137B R-140BM R-145 R-156 R-409 BM P-238 BT		

	P-240 BT		WPT/DTP
	P-241 BT		BREM
	B		TRI
MT-LB	PI		MTP-LB
	MP-21-25		BRM <i>Sova</i> /
	1 W-13-16		BRM 30
	AFMS	TAB-71	A
	R-381 T		TERA-71-L
	R-330 P		AR
	Beta 3M		
MTP-LB-		TAB-77	A
			TERA-77-L
			RCH-84
			PCOMA
			AR
		TABC-79	A-POMA
		TAB	TCG-80
		MLVM	AR

2. Existing types of armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes are:

WARRIORRA		BMP-1	KSh
REP			95743
REC			PRP-3, -4
			MP-31
BMP-1	MTP		B
	MP-31		SVO
			DTB-80
			VPV
			RM
			MTP
			BREM-4, -2, -D
		BMD-1	KSh
		BRM-1	KSh

3. Existing types of primary trainer aircraft which are designed and constructed for primary flying training and which may possess only limited armament capability necessary for basic training in weapon delivery techniques are:

Alpha Jet E	1-22
C-101 Aviojet	IAR-99
Fouga	L-29
Hawk	L-39
Jet Provost	TS-11
L-39	
MB-326	
PD-808	
T-2	
T-33/CT-133	
T-37	
T-38	

4. Existing types of combat support helicopters are:

A-109 Hirundo	IAR-316
AB-412	IAR-330
Alouette II	Mi-2
Alouette III	Mi-6
Blackhawk	Mi-8/Mi-17
Bell 47/AB 47/Sioux	
BO-10S	
CHS3	
Chinook	
Fennec AS SSS A	
Hughes 300	
Hughes SOO/OH-6	

Mi-8
OH-S8 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136
Puma
Sea King
UH-1 NIB/AB-204
UH-1D/1H/AB-20S
UH-1N/AB-212
Wessex

5. Existing types of unarmed transport helicopters which are not equipped for the employment of weapons are:

AB 47	Mi-2
AB-412	Mi-26
Alouette II	SA-36 SN Dauphin
CHS3	W-3 Sokol
Chinook	
Cougar AS S 32 U	
Dauphin AS 36S NI	
Hughes 300	
NH SOO	
Puma	
Sea King/H-3F/HAR 3	
SH-3D	
UH-1D/1H/AB-20S	
UH-1N/AB-212	

6. Existing types of armoured vehicle launched bridges are:

M47 AVLB	MTU
M48 AVLB	MT-20
M60 AVLB	MT-S SA
Centurion AVLB	MTU-72
Chieftain AVLB	BLG-60
Brueckenlegepanzer Biber/	BLG-67M
Leopard 1 AVLB	BLG-67M2

SECTION III. TECHNICAL DATA AND PHOTOGRAPHS

1. Technical data, in accordance with the agreed categories in the Annex to this Protocol, together with photographs presenting the right or left side, top and front views for each of its existing types of conventional armaments and equipment listed in Sections I and II of this Protocol shall be provided by each State Party to all other States Parties at the signature of the Treaty. In addition, photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes shall include a view of such vehicles so as to show clearly their internal configuration illustrating the specific characteristic which distinguishes this particular vehicle as a look-alike. Photographs in addition to those required by this paragraph may be provided at the discretion of each State Party.

2. Each existing type of conventional armaments and equipment listed in Sections I and II of this Protocol shall have a model or version of that type designated as an exemplar. Photographs shall be provided for each such designated exemplar pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section. Photographs shall not be required of models and versions of a type that have no significant externally observable differences from the exemplar of that type. The photographs of each exemplar of a type shall contain an annotation of the existing type designation and national nomenclature for all models and versions of the type that the photographs of the

exemplar represent. The photographs of each exemplar of a type shall contain an annotation of the technical data for that type in accordance with the agreed categories in the Annex to this Protocol. In addition, the annotation shall indicate all models and versions of the type that the photographs of the exemplar represent. Such technical data shall be annotated on the side view photograph.

SECTION IV. UPDATES OF EXISTING TYPES LISTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES

1. This Protocol constitutes agreement by the States Parties only with respect to existing types of conventional armaments and equipment as well as with respect to the categories of technical data set forth in Sections I and II of the Annex to this Protocol.
2. Each State Party shall be responsible for the accuracy of technical data for only its own conventional armaments and equipment provided in accordance with Section III of this Protocol.
3. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, upon the entry into service with the armed forces of that State Party within the area of application, of: (a) any new type of conventional armaments and equipment which meets one of the definitions in Article II of the Treaty or which falls under a category listed in this Protocol, and (b) any new model or version of a type listed in this Protocol. At the same time, each State Party shall provide all other States Parties with the technical data and photographs required by Section III of this Protocol.
4. As soon as possible, and in any case no later than 60 days following a notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the States Parties shall initiate update actions, in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article XVI of the Treaty and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, for the lists of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment in Sections I and II of this Protocol.

ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL ON EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

SECTION I. AGREED CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL DATA

The following are agreed categories of technical data for each model and version of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment:

1. Battle Tanks

Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Main Gun Calibre
Unladen Weight

2. Armoured Combat Vehicles

Armoured Personnel Carriers
Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Type and Calibre of Armaments

Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles
Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Main Gun Calibre
Unladen Weight

3. Artillery

Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers
Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Calibre

Mortars
Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Calibre

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Calibre

4. Combat Aircraft

Existing Type
National Nomenclature

5. Attack Helicopters

Existing Type
National Nomenclature

6. Armoured Personnel Carrier Look-Alikes

Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

7. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look-Alikes

Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

8. Primary Trainer Aircraft

Existing Type
National Nomenclature
Type of Armaments, if any

9. Combat Support Helicopters

Existing Type
National Nomenclature

10. Unarmed Transport Helicopters

Existing Type
National Nomenclature

11. Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges

Existing Type
National Nomenclature

obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located.

SECTION II. SPECIFICATIONS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs provided pursuant to Section III of this Protocol shall be in black and white. The use of flash and lighting equipment shall be allowed. The object being photographed shall contrast with the background of the photograph. All photographs shall be of high definition, with continuous tone and in sharp focus. Photographs measuring 13 centimetres by 18 centimetres, not including a border, shall be provided. For aspects other than overhead, all photographs shall be taken from the same level as the equipment being photographed, with the camera placed along or perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object being photographed; for the top view, photographs shall show the top and may show the rear aspects of the equipment. The object being photographed shall fill at least 80 percent of the photograph in either horizontal or vertical aspect. A reference gauge shall be included in each photograph together with the object. The gauge shall have alternating half-metre sections in black and white. It shall be long enough to provide accurate scaling and shall be placed on or against the object or in close proximity to it. Each photograph shall be labelled to provide the information required by Section III, paragraph 2 of this Protocol as well as the date when the photograph was taken.

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and other provisions governing the conduct of inspections as provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. DEFINITIONS

1. For the purposes of the Treaty:

- (A) The term "inspected State Party" means a State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out in compliance with Article XIV of the Treaty:
 - (1) in the case of inspection sites where only a stationing State Party's conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are present, such a stationing State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and
 - (2) in the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of more than one State Party, each such State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, each in respect of its own conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, the rights and

- (B) The term "stationing State Party" means a State Party stationing conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces outside its own territory and within the area of application.
- (C) The term "host State Party" means a State Party receiving on its territory within the area of application conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of another State Party stationed by that State Party.
- (D) The term "inspecting State Party" means a State Party which requests and is therefore responsible for carrying out an inspection.
- (E) The term "inspector" means an individual designated by one of the States Parties to carry out an inspection and who is included on that State Party's accepted list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.
- (F) The term "transport crew member" means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of a transportation means and who is included on a State Party's accepted list of transport crew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.
- (G) The term "inspection team" means a group of inspectors designated by an inspecting State Party to conduct a particular inspection.
- (H) The term "escort team" means a group of individuals assigned by an inspected State Party to accompany and to assist inspectors conducting a particular inspection, as well as to assume other responsibilities as set forth in this Protocol. In the case of inspection of a stationing State Party's conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, an escort team shall include individuals assigned by both the host and stationing States Parties, unless otherwise agreed between them.
- (I) The term "inspection site" means an area, location or facility where an inspection is carried out.
- (J) The term "object of verification" means:
 - (1) any formation or unit at the organizational level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion, independent squadron or equivalent as well as any separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent unit at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty at a location notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Information Exchange;

- (2) any designated permanent storage site, military storage site not organic to formations and units referred to in sub-subparagraph (1) of this subparagraph, independent repair or maintenance unit, military training establishment or military airfield at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being permanently or routinely present;
- (3) a reduction site for conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraph (C) of the Protocol on Information Exchange;
- (4) in the case of units below the level of battalion holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that are directly subordinate to a unit or formation above the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent, that unit or formation to which the units below the level of battalion are subordinated shall be considered an object of verification, if it has no subordinate unit or formation at the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent; and
- (5) a formation or unit holding conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, but not in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party shall not be considered an object of verification.
- (K) The term "military airfield" means a permanent military complex, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which the frequent operation, i.e., launch and recovery, of at least six combat aircraft or combat helicopters limited by the Treaty or subject to internal inspection is routinely performed.
- (L) The term "military training establishment" means a facility, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which a military unit or subunit using at least 30 conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty is organised to train military personnel.
- (M) The term "military storage site" not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification means any storage site, other than designated permanent storage sites or sites subordinate to organisations designed and structured for internal security purposes, holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty without respect to organisational or operational status. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty contained in such sites shall constitute a portion of the permitted holdings counted in active units pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty.
- (N) The term "declared site" means a facility or precisely delineated geographic location which contains one or more objects of verification. A declared site shall consist of all territory within its man-made or natural outer boundary or boundaries as well as associated territory comprising firing ranges, training areas, maintenance and storage areas, helicopter airfields and railroad loading facilities at which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present.
- (O) The term "specified area" means an area anywhere on the territory of a State Party within the area of application other than a site inspected pursuant to Section VII, IX or X of this Protocol within which a challenge inspection is conducted pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol. A specified area shall not exceed 65 square kilometres. No straight line between any two points in that area shall exceed 16 kilometres.
- (P) The term "sensitive point" means any equipment, structure or location which has been designated to be sensitive by the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party through the escort team and to which access or overflight may be delayed, limited or refused.
- (Q) The term "point of entry/exit" means a point designated by a State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out, through which inspection teams and transport crews arrive on the territory of that State Party and through which they depart from the territory of that State Party.
- (R) The term "in-country period" means the total time spent continuously on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out by an inspection team for inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol from arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit until the return of the inspection team to a point of entry/exit after completion of that inspection team's last inspection.
- (S) The term "baseline validation period" means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period consisting of the first 120 days following entry into force of the Treaty.
- (T) The term "reduction period" means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period consisting of the three years following the 120-day baseline validation period.
- (U) The term "residual level validation period" means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period consisting of the 120 days following the three-year reduction period.
- (V) The term "residual period" means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period following the 120-day residual level validation period for the duration of the Treaty.

- (W) The term "passive declared site inspection quota" means the total number of inspections of objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be obliged to receive within a specified time period at inspection sites where its objects of verification are located.
- (X) The term "passive challenge inspection quota" means the maximum number of challenge inspections within specified areas pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol that each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to receive within a specified time period.
- (Y) The term "active inspection quota" means the total number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be entitled to conduct within a specified time period.
- (Z)) The term "certification site" means a clearly designated location where the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification takes place.
- (AA) The term "calendar reporting period" means a period of time defined in days during which the intended reduction of the planned number of items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty is to be carried out.

SECTION II. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State Party shall facilitate inspections pursuant to this Protocol.
2. In the case of conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party stationed in the area of application outside national territory, the host State Party and the stationing State Party shall, in fulfillment of their respective responsibilities, cooperatively ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this Protocol. The stationing State Party shall be fully responsible for compliance with the Treaty obligations in respect of its conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces stationed on the territory of the host State Party.
3. The escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of the inspected State Party:
 - (A) in the case of inspection sites at which only a stationing State Party's conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are present and are under this State Party's command, the escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of a representative of the stationing State Party for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where the stationing State Party's conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and
 - (B) in the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty of both the host State Party and the stationing State Party, the escort team shall be composed of representatives from both States Parties when conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the stationing State Party are actually inspected. During the inspection within that inspection site, the host State Party shall exercise the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party with the exception of those rights and obligations related to the inspection of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the stationing State Party, which shall be exercised by this stationing State Party.

4. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party, such other State Party shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises.

5. Structures or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party shall be subject to inspection only when that other State Party's representative is on the escort team.

6. Inspection teams and sub-teams shall be under the control and responsibility of the inspecting State Party.

7. No more than one inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol may be present at the same time at any one inspection site.

8. Subject to the other provisions of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall decide for how long each inspection team will stay on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, and at how many and at which inspection sites it will conduct inspections during the in-country period.

9. Travel expenses of an inspection team to the point of entry/exit prior to conducting an inspection and from the point of entry/exit after completion of the last inspection shall be borne by the inspecting State Party.

10. Each State Party shall be obliged to receive a number of inspections pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol not to exceed its passive declared site inspection quota for each specified time period: a 120-day baseline validation period, a three-year reduction period, a 120-day residual level validation period and a residual period for the duration of the Treaty. The passive declared site inspection quota shall be determined for each specified time period as a percentage of that State Party's objects of verification, excluding reduction sites and certification sites, located within the area of application of the Treaty:

- (A) during the first 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent of a State Party's objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange;
- (B) during each year of the reduction period, after completion of the initial 120-day period, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 10

ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY

percent of a State Party's objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange;

- (C) during the first 120 days after completion of the three-year reduction period, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent of a State Party's objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; and
- (D) each year, commencing after completion of the 120-day residual level validation period, for the duration of the Treaty, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 15 percent of a State Party's objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange.

11. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept challenge inspections as follows:

- (A) during the baseline validation period, during each year of the reduction period and during the residual level validation period, up to 15 percent of the number of inspections of declared sites which that State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its own objects of verification as well as of objects of verification belonging to stationing States Parties; and
- (B) during each year of the residual period, up to 23 percent of the number of inspections of declared sites which that State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its own objects of verification and of objects of verification belonging to stationing States Parties.

12. Notwithstanding any other limitations in this Section, each State Party shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each year of its objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each year within a specified area pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol.

13. Inspection pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of one object of verification at an inspection site shall count as one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of that State Party whose object of verification is inspected.

14. The proportion of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol on the territory of a host State Party within a specified time period used to inspect objects of verification belonging to a stationing State Party shall be no greater than the proportion which that stationing State Party's objects of verification constitute of the total number of objects of verification located on the territory of that host State Party.

15. The number of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of objects of verification within a specified time period on any State Party's territory shall be calculated as a percentage of the total number of objects of verification present on that State Party's territory.

16. Inspection pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol within one specified area shall count as one inspection against the passive challenge inspection quota and one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is conducted.

17. Unless otherwise agreed between the escort team and the inspection team, an inspection team's in-country period shall, up to a total of 10 days, not exceed the total number of hours calculated according to the following formula:

- (A) 48 hours for the first inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area; plus
- (B) 36 hours for each sequential inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area.

18. Subject to the limitations in paragraph 17 of this Section, an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol shall spend no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than 24 hours in inspection within a specified area.

19. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to a sequential inspection site by the most expeditious means available. If the time between completion of one inspection and arrival of the inspection team at a sequential inspection site exceeds nine hours, or if the time between completion of the last inspection conducted by an inspection team on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out and the arrival of that inspection team at the point of entry/exit exceeds nine hours, such excess time shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period.

20. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept on its territory within the area of application simultaneously no more than either two inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol or a number of inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol equal to two percent of the total number of objects of verification that are to be inspected during a specified time period on the territory of that State Party, whichever number is greater.

21. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept simultaneously no more than either two inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol or a number of inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol equal to two percent of the total number of its objects of verification that are to be inspected during a specified time period, whichever number is greater.

22. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 20 and 21 of this Section, each State Party with military districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty shall be obliged to accept on its territory within the area of application simultaneously no more than two inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol within any one of those military districts.

23. No State Party shall be obliged to accept inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol

representing more than 50 percent of its passive declared site inspection quota in a calendar year from the same State Party.

24. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections within the area of application on the territory of other States Parties. However, no State Party shall conduct more than five inspections annually pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol of another State Party belonging to the same group of States Parties. Any such inspections shall count against the passive declared site inspection quota of the State Party being inspected. It shall otherwise be the responsibility solely of each group of States Parties to determine the allocation of inspections for each State Party within its group of States Parties. Each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties its active inspection quota:

- (A) for the baseline validation period, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty;
- (B) for the first year of the reduction period, no later than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and
- (C) for each subsequent year of the reduction period, for the residual level validation period and for each year of the residual period, no later than the 15th day of January preceding each such specified time period.

SECTION III. PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Section.

2. Inspectors shall be nationals of the inspecting State Party or other States Parties.

3. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties a list of its proposed inspectors and a list of its proposed transport crew members, containing the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number. No list of proposed inspectors provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 400 individuals, and no list of proposed transport crew members provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 600 individuals.

4. Each State Party shall review the lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided to it by other States Parties and, within 30 days after receipt of each list, shall provide notification to the State Party providing that list of any individual whose name it wishes to be deleted from that list.

5. Subject to paragraph 7 of this Section, inspectors and transport crew members for whom deletion has not been requested within the time interval specified in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be considered as accepted for the purposes of issuing visas and any other documents in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section.

6. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its lists within one month after entry into force of the Treaty. Thereafter, each State Party may once every six months propose additions to or deletions from its lists of inspectors and transport crew members, provided that such amended

lists do not exceed the numbers specified in paragraph 3 of this Section. Proposed additions shall be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section.

7. A State Party may request, without right of refusal, deletion of any individual it wishes from lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided by any other State Party.

8. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is conducted shall provide to the inspectors and transport crew members accepted in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section visas and any other documents as required to ensure that these inspectors and transport crew members may enter and remain in the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and any other necessary documents shall be provided either:

- (A) within 30 days after the acceptance of the lists or subsequent changes in such lists, in which case the visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 months; or
- (B) within one hour after the arrival of the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit, in which case the visa shall be valid for the duration of their inspection activities.

9. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the transportation means of that State Party transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for an inspection into and out of the territory of the State Party in which such an inspection is conducted. Routings to and from the designated point(s) of entry/exit shall be along established international airways or other routes that are agreed upon by the States Parties concerned as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. Inspectors may use commercial flights for travel to those points of entry/exit that are served by airlines. The provisions of this paragraph relating to diplomatic clearance numbers shall not apply to such flights.

10. Each State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange a point or points of entry/exit in respect of each declared site with its objects of verification. Such points of entry/exit may be ground border crossing points, airports or seaports which must have the capacity to receive the transportation means of the inspecting State Party. At least one airport shall be notified as a point of entry/exit associated with each declared site. The location of any point of entry/exit notified as associated with a declared site shall be such as to allow access to that declared site within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8 of this Protocol.

11. Each State Party shall have the right to change the point or points of entry/exit to its territory by notifying all other States Parties no less than 90 days before such a change becomes effective.

12. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the official language or languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be

used by inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces.

SECTION IV. NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO INSPECT

1. The inspecting State Party shall notify the inspected State Party of its intention to carry out an inspection provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty. In the case of inspection of stationed conventional armed forces, the inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host and stationing States Parties. In the case of inspection of certification or reduction procedures carried out by a stationing State Party, the inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host and stationing States Parties.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include:

- (A) the point of entry/exit to be used;
- (B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (D) a statement of whether the first inspection shall be conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol and whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these;
- (E) the time interval between the arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection site;
- (F) the language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol;
- (G) the language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XII of this Protocol;
- (H) the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number; and
- (I) the likely number of sequential inspections.

3. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections IX and X of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 96 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the designated point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include:

- (A) the point of entry/exit to be used;
- (B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit;
- (C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;

(D) for each inspection at a reduction or certification site, reference to the notification provided pursuant to Section IX, paragraph 3 or Section X, paragraph 5 of this Protocol;

(E) the language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol;

(F) the language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XII of this Protocol; and

(G) the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number.

4. The States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section shall acknowledge in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty receipt of notification within three hours. Subject to the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall be permitted to arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival notified pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (B) or paragraph 3, subparagraph (B) of this Section.

5. An inspected State Party receiving a notification of intent to inspect shall immediately upon its receipt send copies of such notification to all other States Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty.

6. If the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out is unable to allow the entry of the inspection team at the estimated time of arrival, the inspection team shall be permitted to enter the territory of that State Party within two hours before or after the notified estimated time of arrival. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall notify the inspecting State Party of the new time of arrival no later than 24 hours following the issuance of the original notification.

7. If the inspection team finds itself delayed more than two hours beyond the notified estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall inform the States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section of:

- (A) a new estimated time of arrival, which in no case shall be more than six hours beyond the initial estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section; and
- (B) if the inspecting State Party desires, a new time interval between arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection site.

8. In the event non-commercial flights are used to transport the inspection team to the point of entry/exit, no less than 10 hours before the planned time of entry into the air space of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, the inspecting State Party shall provide that State Party with a flight plan in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. The flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil

Aviation Organisation applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting State Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "CFE inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required."

9. No more than three hours following the receipt of a flight plan that has been filed in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that the flight plan is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival.

SECTION V. PROCEDURES UPON ARRIVAL AT POINT OF ENTRY/EXIT

1. The escort team shall meet the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit upon their arrival.

2. A State Party which utilises structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party will designate a liaison officer to the escort team who will be available as needed at the point of entry/exit to accompany the inspection team at any time as agreed with the escort team.

3. Times of arrival at and return to a point of entry/exit shall be agreed and recorded by both the inspection team and the escort team.

4. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that luggage, equipment and supplies of the inspection team are exempt from all customs duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry/exit.

5. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting State Party brings into the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that territory. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry/exit to the inspection site. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the escort team in the presence of the inspection team members.

6. If the escort team determines upon examination that an item of equipment or supplies brought by inspectors is capable of performing functions inconsistent with the inspection requirements of this Protocol or does not meet the requirements set forth in Section VI, paragraph 15 of this Protocol, then the escort team shall have the right to deny permission to use that item and to impound it at the point of entry/exit. The inspecting State Party shall remove such impounded equipment or supplies from the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out at the earliest opportunity at its own discretion, but no later than the time when the inspection team which brought that impounded equipment or supplies leaves the country.

7. If a State Party has not participated during examination of equipment of an inspection team at the point of entry/exit, that State Party shall be entitled to exercise the rights of the escort team pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section prior to inspection at a declared site at which its conventional armed forces are present or of a

structure or premises it utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party.

8. Throughout the period in which the inspection team and transport crew remain on the territory of the State Party where the inspection site is located, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care or any other emergency assistance.

9. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out shall provide accommodation, security protection, servicing and fuel for the transportation means of the inspecting State Party at the point of entry/exit.

SECTION VI. GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS

1. An inspection team may include inspectors from States Parties other than the inspecting State Party.

2. For inspections conducted in accordance with Sections VII, VIII, IX and X of this Protocol, an inspection team shall consist of up to nine inspectors and may divide itself into up to three sub-teams. In the case of simultaneous inspections on the territory of States Parties that do not have military districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty or within a single military district of a State Party with such military districts, only one inspection team may divide itself at the inspection site into three sub-teams, the others into two sub-teams.

3. Inspectors and escort team members shall wear some clear identification of their respective roles.

4. An inspector shall be deemed to have assumed his or her duties upon arrival at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall be deemed to have ceased performing those duties after leaving the territory of that State Party through the point of entry/exit.

5. The number of transport crew members shall not exceed 10.

6. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and transport crew members shall respect the laws and regulations of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of that State Party. Inspectors and transport crew members shall also respect regulations at an inspection site, including safety and administrative procedures. In the event that the inspected State Party determines that an inspector or transport crew member has violated such laws and regulations or other conditions governing the inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, it shall so notify the inspecting State Party, which upon the request of the inspected State Party shall immediately delete the name of the individual from the list of inspectors or transport crew members. If the individual is on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspecting State Party shall promptly remove that individual from that territory.

7. The inspected State Party shall be responsible for ensuring the safety of the inspection team and transport crew members from the time they arrive at the point of

entry/exit until the time they leave the point of entry/exit to depart the territory of that State Party.

8. The escort team shall assist the inspection team in carrying out its functions. At its discretion, the escort team may exercise its right to accompany the inspection team from the time it enters the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out until the time it departs that territory.

9. The inspecting State Party shall ensure that the inspection team and each sub-team have the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely with the escort team in the language notified in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (F) and paragraph 3, subparagraph (E) of this Protocol. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the escort team has the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely in this language with the inspection team and each sub-team. Inspectors and members of the escort team may also communicate in other languages.

10. No information obtained during inspections shall be publicly disclosed without the express consent of the inspecting State Party.

11. Throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, inspectors shall have the right to communicate with the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party located on that territory, using appropriate telecommunications means provided by the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall also provide means of communication between the sub-teams of an inspection team.

12. The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to, from and between inspection sites by a means and route selected by the inspected State Party. The inspecting State Party may request a variation in the selected route. The inspected State Party shall if possible grant such a request. Whenever mutually agreed, the inspecting State Party will be permitted to use its own land vehicles.

13. If an emergency arises that necessitates travel of inspectors from an inspection site to a point of entry/exit or to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspection team shall so notify the escort team, which shall promptly arrange such travel, and if necessary, shall provide appropriate means of transportation.

14. The inspected State Party shall provide for use by the inspection team at the inspection site an administrative area for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest breaks and meals.

15. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, in particular its own maps and charts. Inspectors shall be permitted to bring and use portable passive night vision devices, binoculars, video and still cameras, dictaphones, tape measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses and lap-top computers. The inspectors shall be permitted to use other equipment, subject to the approval of the inspected State Party. Throughout the in-country period, the escort team shall have the right to observe the equipment brought by inspectors, but shall not interfere with the use of equipment

that has been approved by the escort team in accordance with Section V, paragraphs 5 to 7 of this Protocol.

16. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, the inspection team shall specify on each occasion it designates the inspection site to be inspected whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspected State Party shall provide and operate the appropriate cross-country vehicles at the inspection site.

17. Whenever possible, subject to the safety requirements and flight regulations of the inspected State Party and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 to 21 of this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct helicopter overflights of the inspection site, using a helicopter provided and operated by the inspected State Party, during inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol.

18. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to provide a helicopter at any inspection site that is less than 20 square kilometres in area.

19. The inspected State Party shall have the right to delay, limit or refuse helicopter overflights above sensitive points, but the presence of sensitive points shall not prevent helicopter overflight of the remaining areas of the inspection site. Photography of or above sensitive points during helicopter overflights shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

20. The duration of such helicopter overflights at an inspection site shall not exceed a cumulative total of one hour, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team.

21. Any helicopter provided by the inspected State Party shall be large enough to carry at least two members of the inspection team and at least one member of the escort team. Inspectors shall be allowed to take and use on overflights of the inspection site any of the equipment specified in paragraph 15 of this Section. The inspection team shall advise the escort team during inspection flights whenever it intends to take photographs. A helicopter shall afford the inspectors a constant and unobstructed view of the ground.

22. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying operations at the inspection site or taking actions affecting safe operation.

23. Except as provided for in paragraphs 24 to 29 of this Section, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area, inspectors shall be permitted access, entry and unobstructed inspection:

- (A) in the case of a specified area, within the entire specified area; or
- (B) in the case of an object of verification, within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection.

24. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol and subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right, within the areas cited in paragraph 23 of this Section, to enter any location, structure or area within a structure in which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present. Inspectors shall not have the right to enter other structures or areas within structures the entry points to which are physically accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two metres in width and to which access is denied by the escort team.

25. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to look into a hardened aircraft shelter to confirm visually whether any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present and, if so, their number and type, model or version. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 24 of this Section, inspectors shall enter the interior of such hardened aircraft shelters only with the approval of the escort team. If such approval is denied and if the inspectors so request, any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges in such hardened aircraft shelters shall be displayed outside.

26. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, except as provided in paragraphs 27 to 33 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to have access to conventional armaments and equipment only in so far as is necessary to confirm visually their number and type, model or version.

27. The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud individual sensitive items of equipment.

28. The escort team shall have the right to deny access to sensitive points, the number and extent of which should be as limited as possible, to shrouded objects and to containers any dimension (width, height, length or diameter) of which is less than two metres. Whenever a sensitive point is designated, or shrouded objects or containers are present, the escort team shall declare whether the sensitive point, shrouded object or container holds any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges and, if so, their number and type, model or version.

29. If the escort team declares that a sensitive point, shrouded object or container does contain any of the conventional armaments and equipment specified in paragraph 28 of this Section, then the escort team shall

display or declare such conventional armaments and equipment to the inspection team and shall take steps to satisfy the inspection team that no more than the declared number of such conventional armaments and equipment are present.

30. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, a helicopter of a type that is or has been on the multi-purpose attack helicopter list in the Protocol on Existing Types is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be a combat support helicopter, or if an Mi-24R or Mi-24K helicopter is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be limited pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, such a helicopter shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX, paragraphs 4 to 6 of this Protocol.

31. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, an aircraft of a specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to have been certified as unarmed in accordance with the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, such an aircraft shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX, paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Protocol.

32. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, an armoured vehicle declared by the escort team to be an armoured personnel carrier look-alike or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike is present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to determine that such vehicle cannot permit the transport of a combat infantry squad. Inspectors shall have the right to require the doors and/or hatches of the vehicle to be opened so that the interior can be visually inspected from outside the vehicle. Sensitive equipment in or on the vehicle may be shrouded.

33. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, items of equipment declared by the escort team to have been reduced in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such items of equipment to confirm that they have been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction.

34. Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs, including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, including within designated permanent storage sites, or other storage sites containing more than 50 such conventional armaments and equipment. Still cameras shall be limited to 35mm cameras and to cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. The inspection team shall advise the escort team in advance whether it plans to take photographs. The escort team shall cooperate with the inspection team's taking of photographs.

35. Photography of sensitive points shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

36. Except as provided for in paragraph 38 of this Section, photography of interiors of structures other than storage sites specified in paragraph 34 of this Section shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

37. Inspectors shall have the right to take measurements to resolve ambiguities that might arise during inspections. Such measurements recorded during inspections shall be confirmed by a member of the inspection team and a member of the escort team immediately after they are taken. Such confirmed data shall be included in the inspection report.

38. States Parties shall, whenever possible, resolve during an inspection any ambiguities that arise regarding factual information. Whenever inspectors request the escort team to clarify such an ambiguity, the escort team shall promptly provide the inspection team with clarifications. If inspectors decide to document an unresolved ambiguity with photographs, the escort team shall, subject to the provision in paragraph 35 of this Section, cooperate with the inspection team's taking of appropriate photographs using a camera capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. If an ambiguity cannot be resolved during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and any pertinent photographs shall be included in the inspection report in accordance with Section XII of this Protocol.

39. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, the inspection shall be deemed to have been completed once the inspection report has been signed and countersigned.

40. No later than completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, the inspection team shall inform the escort team whether the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall designate at that time the next inspection site. In such cases, subject to the provisions in Section VII, paragraphs 6 and 17 and Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team arrives at the sequential inspection site as soon as possible after completion of the previous inspection. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct a sequential inspection, then the provisions in paragraphs 42 and 43 of this Section shall apply.

41. An inspection team shall have the right to conduct a sequential inspection, subject to the provisions of Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, on the territory of the State Party on which that inspection team has conducted the preceding inspection:

- (A) at any declared site associated with the same point of entry/exit as the preceding inspection site or the same point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived; or
- (B) within any specified area for which the point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived is the nearest point of entry/exit notified pursuant to

Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; or

- (C) at any location within 200 kilometres of the preceding inspection site within the same military district; or
- (D) at the location which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11, subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, is the temporary location of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft or armoured vehicle launched bridges which were absent during inspection of an object of verification at the preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment constitute more than 15 percent of the number of such conventional armaments and equipment notified in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange; or
- (E) at the declared site which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11, subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, is the site of origin for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft or armoured vehicle launched bridges at the preceding inspection site which are in excess of the number provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange as being present at that preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment exceed by 15 percent the number of such conventional armaments and equipment so notified.

42. After completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, if no sequential inspection has been declared, then the inspection team shall be transported to the appropriate point of entry/exit as soon as possible and shall depart the territory of the State Party where the inspection was carried out within 24 hours.

43. The inspection team shall leave the territory of the State Party where it has been conducting inspections from the same point of entry/exit at which it entered, unless otherwise agreed. If an inspection team chooses to proceed to a point of entry/exit on the territory of another State Party for the purpose of conducting inspections, it shall have the right to do so provided that the inspecting State Party has provided the necessary notification in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

SECTION VII. DECLARED SITE INSPECTION

1. Inspection of a declared site pursuant to this Protocol shall not be refused. Such inspections may be delayed only in cases of force majeure or in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 7 and 20 to 22 of this Protocol.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, an inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit associated under Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange with the declared site it plans to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section.

3. If an inspecting State Party desires to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit and the inspected State Party has not previously notified a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as associated with the declared site the inspecting State Party desires to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2 of this Protocol the desired ground border crossing point or seaport as point of entry/exit. The inspected State Party shall indicate in its acknowledgement of receipt of notification, as provided for in Section IV, paragraph 4 of this Protocol, whether this point of entry/exit is acceptable or not. In the latter case, the inspected State Party shall notify the inspecting State Party of another point of entry/exit which shall be as near as possible to the desired point of entry/exit and which may be an airport notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a seaport or a ground border crossing point through which the inspection team and transport crew members may arrive on its territory.

4. If an inspecting State Party notifies its desire to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, it shall determine prior to such notification that there is reasonable certainty that its inspection team can reach the first declared site where that State Party desires to carry out an inspection within the time specified in paragraph 8 of this Section using ground transportation means.

5. If an inspection team and transport crew arrive pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section on the territory of the State Party on which an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit other than a point of entry/exit that was notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being associated with the declared site it desires to designate as the first inspection site, the inspected State Party shall facilitate access to this declared site as expeditiously as possible, but shall be permitted to exceed, if necessary, the time limit specified in paragraph 8 of this Section.

6. The inspected State Party shall have the right to utilise up to six hours after designation of a declared site to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at that site.

7. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E) of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first declared site to be inspected.

8. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first declared site by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible but no later than nine hours after the designation of the site to be inspected, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after designation of that inspection site. Travel time in excess

of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period.

9. Immediately upon arrival at the declared site, the inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility where it shall be provided with a diagram of the declared site, unless such a diagram has been provided in a previous exchange of site diagrams. The declared site diagram, provided upon arrival at the declared site, shall contain an accurate depiction of the:

- (A) geographic coordinates of a point within the inspection site, to the nearest 10 seconds, with indication of that point and of true north;
- (B) scale used in the site diagram;
- (C) perimeter of the declared site;
- (D) precisely delineated boundaries of those areas belonging exclusively to each object of verification, indicating the formation or unit record number of each object of verification to which each such area belongs and including those separately located areas where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges belonging to each object of verification are permanently assigned;
- (E) major buildings and roads on the declared site;
- (F) entrances to the declared site; and
- (G) location of an administrative area for the inspection team provided in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 14 of this Protocol.

10. Within one-half hour after receiving the diagram of the declared site, the inspection team shall designate the object of verification to be inspected. The inspection team shall then be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last no more than one hour and shall include the following elements:

- (A) safety and administrative procedures at the inspection site;
- (B) modalities of transportation and communication for inspectors at the inspection site; and
- (C) holdings and locations at the inspection site, including within the common areas of the declared site, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured vehicle launched bridges, including those belonging to separately located subordinate elements belonging to the same object of verification to be inspected.

11. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters or armoured vehicle launched bridges present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers

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provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, in accordance with the following provisions:

- (A) if the numbers of such conventional armaments and equipment present at the inspection site are less than the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include the temporary location of such conventional armaments and equipment; and
- (B) if the numbers of such armaments and equipment present at the inspection site exceed the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include specific information on the origin, departure times from origin, time of arrival and projected stay at the inspection site of such additional conventional armaments and equipment.

12. When an inspection team designates an object of verification to be inspected, the inspection team shall have the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of verification, to inspect all territory delineated on the site diagram as belonging to that object of verification, including those separately located areas on the territory of the same State Party where conventional armaments and equipment belonging to that object of verification are permanently assigned.

13. The inspection of one object of verification at a declared site shall permit the inspection team access, entry and unobstructed inspection within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection. During such inspections, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply.

14. If the escort team informs the inspection team that battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that have been notified as being held by one object of verification at a declared site are present within an area delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification, then the escort team shall ensure that the inspection team, as part of the same inspection, has access to such conventional armaments and equipment.

15. If conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present within areas of a declared site not delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to one object of verification, the escort team shall inform the inspection team to which object of verification such conventional armaments and equipment belong.

16. Each State Party shall be obliged to account for the aggregate total of any category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, at the organisational level above brigade/regiment or equivalent, if such an accounting is requested by another State Party.

17. If, during an inspection at a declared site, the inspection team decides to conduct at the same declared site an inspection of an object of verification that had not been previously designated, the inspection team shall have the right to commence such inspection within three hours of that designation. In such case, the inspection team shall be given a briefing on the object of verification designated for the next inspection in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section.

SECTION VIII. CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHIN SPECIFIED AREAS

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct challenge inspections within specified areas in accordance with this Protocol.

2. If the inspecting State Party intends to conduct a challenge inspection within a specified area as the first inspection after arrival at a point of entry/exit:

(A) it shall include in its notification pursuant to Section IV of this Protocol the designated point of entry/exit nearest to or within that specified area capable of receiving the inspecting State Party's chosen means of transportation; and

(B) at the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E) of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first specified area it wishes to inspect. Whenever a specified area is designated, the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection request, provide to the escort team a geographic description delineating the outer boundaries of that area. The inspection team shall have the right, as part of that request, to identify any structure or facility it wishes to inspect.

3. The State Party on whose territory a challenge inspection is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a designation of a specified area, inform other States Parties which utilise structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party of that specified area, including its geographic description delineating the outer boundaries.

4. The inspected State Party shall have the right to refuse challenge inspections within specified areas.

5. The inspected State Party shall inform the inspection team within two hours after the designation of a specified area whether the inspection request will be granted.

6. If access to a specified area is granted:

(A) the inspected State Party shall have the right to use up to six hours after it accepts the inspection to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area;

(B) the inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first specified area by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible after the designation of the site to be inspected, but no later than nine hours from the time

such an inspection is accepted, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after such an inspection is accepted. Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team's in-country period; and

- (C) the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply. Within such specified area the escort team may delay access to or overflight of particular parts of that specified area. If the delay exceeds more than four hours the inspection team shall have the right to cancel the inspection. The period of delay shall not count against the in-country period or the maximum time allowed within a specified area.

7. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises which another State Party utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall immediately inform that State Party of such a request. The escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party, shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises.

8. If the inspected State Party so wishes, the inspection team may be briefed on arrival at the specified area. This briefing is to last no more than one hour. Safety procedures and administrative arrangements may also be covered in this briefing.

- 9. If access to a specified area is denied:
 - (A) the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall provide all reasonable assurance that the specified area does not contain conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If such armaments and equipment are present and assigned to organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions in the area defined in Article V of the Treaty, the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall allow visual confirmation of their presence, unless precluded from so doing by force majeure, in which case visual confirmation shall be allowed as soon as practicable; and
 - (B) no inspection quota shall be counted, and the time between the designation of the specified area and its subsequent refusal shall not count against the in-country period. The inspection team shall have the right to designate another specified area or declared site for inspection or to declare the inspection concluded.

SECTION IX. INSPECTION OF CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect, without right of refusal, the certification of recategorised

multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each certification site.

2. In conducting an inspection of certification in accordance with this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to spend up to two days at a certification site, unless otherwise agreed.

3. No less than 15 days before the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters or reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide to all other States Parties notification of:

- (A) the site at which the certification is to take place, including geographic coordinates;
- (B) the scheduled dates of the certification process;
- (C) the estimated number and type, model or version of helicopters or aircraft to be certified;
- (D) the manufacturer's serial number for each helicopter or aircraft;
- (E) the unit or location to which the helicopters or aircraft were previously assigned;
- (F) the unit or location to which the certified helicopters or aircraft will be assigned in the future;
- (G) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team; and
- (H) the date and time by which an inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the certification.

4. Inspectors shall have the right to enter and inspect visually the helicopter or aircraft cockpit and interior to include checking the manufacturer's serial number, without right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification.

5. If requested by the inspection team, the escort team shall remove, without right of refusal, any access panels covering the position from which components and wiring were removed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation or the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification.

6. Inspectors shall have the right to request and observe, with the right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification, the activation of any weapon system component in multi-purpose attack helicopters being certified or declared to have been recategorised.

7. At the conclusion of each inspection of certification, the inspection team shall complete an inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XII of this Protocol.

8. Upon completion of an inspection at a certification site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another certification site or at a reduction site if the appropriate notification has been provided by the inspection team in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3 of this Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the certification site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another certification site or to a reduction site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time.

9. Within seven days after completion of the certification, the State Party responsible for the certification shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of the certification. Such notification shall specify the number, types, models or versions and manufacturer's serial numbers of certified helicopters or aircraft, the certification site involved, the actual dates of the certification, and the units or locations to which the recategorised helicopters or reclassified aircraft will be assigned.

SECTION X. INSPECTION OF REDUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections, without the right of refusal by the inspected State Party, of the process of reduction carried out pursuant to Sections I to VIII and X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each reduction site.

2. The inspected State Party shall have the right to organise and implement the process of reduction subject only to the provisions set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty and in the Protocol on Reduction. Inspections of the process of reduction shall be conducted in a manner that does not interfere with the ongoing activities at the reduction site or unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the implementation of the process of reduction.

3. If a reduction site notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange is used by more than one State Party, inspections of the reduction process shall be conducted in accordance with schedules of such use provided by each State Party using the reduction site.

4. Each State Party that intends to reduce conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall notify all other States Parties which conventional armaments and equipment are to be reduced at each reduction site during a calendar reporting period. Each such calendar reporting period shall have a duration of no more than 90 days and no less than 30 days. This provision shall apply whenever reduction is carried out at a reduction site, without regard to whether the reduction process is to be carried out on a continuous or intermittent basis.

5. No less than 15 days before the initiation of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party intending to implement reduction procedures shall provide to all other States Parties the calendar reporting period

notification. Such notification shall include the designation of the reduction site with geographic coordinates, the scheduled date for initiation of reduction and the scheduled date for completion of the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment identified for reduction during the calendar reporting period. In addition, the notification shall identify:

- (A) the estimated number and type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced;
- (B) the object or objects of verification from which the items to be reduced have been withdrawn;
- (C) the reduction procedures to be used, pursuant to Sections III to VIII and Sections X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction, for each type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced;
- (D) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection of reduction notified for that calendar reporting period; and
- (E) the date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the conventional armaments and equipment before the initiation of their reduction.

6. Except as specified in paragraph 11 of this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from a reduction site at any time during the calendar reporting period, including three days beyond the end of a notified calendar reporting period. In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to remain at the reduction site throughout one or more calendar reporting periods provided that these periods are not separated by more than three days. Throughout the period that the inspection team remains at the reduction site, it shall have the right to observe all the reduction procedures carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction.

7. In accordance with the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to freely record factory serial numbers from the conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced or to place special marks on such equipment before reduction and to record subsequently such numbers or marks at the completion of the reduction process. Parts and elements of reduced conventional armaments and equipment as specified in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Reduction or, in the case of conversion, the vehicles converted for non-military purposes shall be available for inspection for at least three days after the end of the notified calendar reporting period, unless inspection of those reduced elements has been completed earlier.

8. The State Party engaged in the process of reducing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall establish at each reduction site a working register in which it shall record the factory serial numbers of each item undergoing reduction as well as the dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed. This register shall also include aggregate data for each calendar reporting period. The register shall be made available to the inspection team for the period of inspection.

9. At the conclusion of each inspection of the reduction process, the inspection team shall complete a standardised report which shall be signed by the inspection team leader and a representative of the inspected State Party. The provisions of Section XII of this Protocol shall apply.

10. Upon completion of an inspection at a reduction site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another reduction site or at a certification site if the appropriate notification has been provided in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3 of this Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the reduction site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another reduction site or to a certification site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time.

11. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept up to 10 inspections each year to validate the completion of conversion of conventional armaments and equipment into vehicles for non-military purposes pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction. Such inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section with the following exceptions:

- (A) the notification pursuant to paragraph 5, subparagraph (E) of this Section shall identify only the date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the items of equipment at the completion of their conversion into vehicles for non-military purposes; and
- (B) the inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from the reduction site only during the three days beyond the end of the notified completion date of conversion.

12. Within seven days after the completion of the process of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party responsible for reductions shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of reduction for that period. Such notification shall specify the number and types of conventional armaments and equipment reduced, the reduction site involved, the reduction procedures employed and the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the reduction process for that calendar reporting period. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Sections X, XI and XII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall also specify the location at which such conventional armaments and equipment will be permanently located. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall specify the reduction site at which final conversion will be carried out or the storage site to which each item designated for conversion will be transferred.

SECTION XI. CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

1. If an inspection team finds itself unable to arrive at the point of entry/exit within six hours after the initial estimated time of arrival or after the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 6 of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall so inform the States Parties notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of this

Protocol. In such a case, the notification of intent to inspect shall lapse and the inspection shall be cancelled.

2. In the case of delay, due to circumstances beyond the control of the inspecting State Party, occurring after the inspection team has arrived at the point of entry/exit and which has prevented the inspection team from arriving at the first designated inspection site within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8 or Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall have the right to cancel the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled under such circumstances, it shall not be counted against any quotas provided for in the Treaty.

SECTION XII. INSPECTION REPORTS

1. In order to complete an inspection carried out in accordance with Section VII, VIII, IX or X of this Protocol, and before leaving the inspection site:

- (A) the inspection team shall provide the escort team with a written report; and
- (B) the escort team shall have the right to include its written comments in the inspection report and shall countersign the report within one hour after having received the report from the inspection team, unless an extension has been agreed between the inspection team and the escort team.

2. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and receipt acknowledged in writing by the leader of the escort team.

3. The report shall be factual and standardised. Formats for each type of inspection shall be agreed by the Joint Consultative Group prior to entry into force of the Treaty, taking into account paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section.

4. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall include:

- (A) the inspection site;
- (B) the date and time of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site;
- (C) the date and time of departure of the inspection team from the inspection site; and
- (D) the number and type, model or version of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that were observed during the inspection, including, if appropriate, an indication of the object of verification to which they belonged.

5. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections IX and X of this Protocol shall include:

- (A) the reduction or certification site at which the reduction or certification procedures were carried out;
- (B) the dates the inspection team was present at the site;

- (C) the number and type, model or version of conventional armaments and equipment for which the reduction or certification procedures were observed;
- (D) a list of any serial numbers recorded during the inspections;
- (E) in the case of reductions, the particular reduction procedures applied or observed; and
- (F) in the case of reductions, if an inspection team was present at the reduction site throughout the calendar reporting period, the actual dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed.

6. The inspection report shall be written in the official language of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe designated by the inspecting State Party in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (G) or paragraph 3, subparagraph (F) of this Protocol.

7. The inspecting State Party and the inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of the report. At the discretion of either State Party, the inspection report may be forwarded to other States Parties and, as a rule, made available to the Joint Consultative Group.

- 8. The stationing State Party shall in particular:
 - (A) have the right to include written comments related to the inspection of its stationed conventional armed forces; and
 - (B) retain one copy of the inspection report in the case of inspection of its stationed conventional armed forces.

SECTION XIII. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND TRANSPORT CREW MEMBERS

1. To exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29; Article 30, paragraph 2; Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. In addition, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. They shall not be permitted to bring into the territory of the State Party where the inspection is to be carried out articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations of that State Party.

3. The transportation means of the inspection team shall be inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

4. The inspecting State Party may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of any of its inspectors or transport crew members in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the

provisions of the Treaty. The immunity of inspectors and transport crew members who are not nationals of the inspecting State Party may be waived only by the States Parties of which those inspectors are nationals. Waiver must always be express.

5. The privileges and immunities provided for in this Section shall be accorded to inspectors and transport crew members:

- (A) while transiting through the territory of any State Party for the purpose of conducting an inspection on the territory of another State Party;
- (B) throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where the inspection is carried out; and
- (C) thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or transport crew member.

6. If the inspected State Party considers that an inspector or transport crew member has abused his or her privileges and immunities, then the provisions set forth in Section VI, paragraph 6 of this Protocol shall apply. At the request of any of the States Parties concerned, consultations shall be held between them in order to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REDUCTION

1. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be reduced in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Protocol and the other protocols listed in Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. Any one of such procedures shall be deemed sufficient, when conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the Treaty or this Protocol, to carry out reduction.

2. Each State Party shall have the right to use any technological means it deems appropriate to implement the procedures for reducing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to remove, retain and use those components and parts of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which are not themselves subject to reduction in accordance with the provisions of Section II of this Protocol, and to dispose of debris.

APPENDIX A: TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

4. Unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol, conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be reduced so as to preclude their further use or restoration for military purposes.

5. After entry into force of the Treaty, additional procedures for reduction may be proposed by any State Party. Such proposals shall be communicated to all other States Parties and shall provide the details of such procedures in the same format as the procedures set forth in this Protocol. Any such procedures shall be deemed sufficient to carry out the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty upon a decision to that effect by the Joint Consultative Group.

SECTION II. STANDARDS FOR PRESENTATION AT REDUCTION SITES

1. Each item of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which is to be reduced shall be presented at a reduction site. Each such item shall consist, at a minimum, of the following parts and elements:

- (A) for battle tanks: the hull, turret and integral main armament. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament of a battle tank shall be deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion mounts;
- (B) for armoured combat vehicles: the hull, turret and integral main armament, if any. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament of an armoured combat vehicle shall be deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion mounts. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament shall be deemed not to include machine guns of less than 20 millimetre calibre, all of which may be salvaged;
- (C) for artillery: the tube, breech system, cradle including trunnions and trunnion mounts, trails, if any; or launcher tubes or launcher rails and their bases; or mortar tubes and their base plates. In the case of self-propelled pieces of artillery, the vehicle hull and turret, if any, shall also be presented;
- (D) for combat aircraft: the fuselage; and
- (E) for attack helicopters: the fuselage, including the transmission mounting area.

2. In each case, the item presented at the reduction site in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section shall consist of a complete assembly.

3. Parts and elements of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, as well as parts and elements which are not affected by reduction under the procedures of this Protocol, including the turrets of armoured personnel carriers equipped only with machine guns, may be disposed of as the State Party undertaking the reduction decides.

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR REDUCTION OF BATTLE TANKS BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of battle tanks at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

- (A) removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems;
- (B) removal of the turret, if any;
- (C) for the gun breech system, either:
 - (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
 - (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
- (D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
- (E) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
- (F) severing of two sections from the perimeter of the hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a sector with an angle of no less than 60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; and
- (G) severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that, the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:

- (A) hull, hatches and cornerplates shall be open to maximise venting;
- (B) an explosive charge shall be placed inside the gun tube where the trunnions connect to the gun mount or cradle;
- (C) an explosive charge shall be placed on the outside of the hull between the second and third road wheels, or between the third and fourth road wheels in a six road wheel configuration, avoiding natural weaknesses such as welds or escape hatches. The charge must be located within the radius of the turret casting. A second charge shall be placed on the inside of the hull on the same side of the tank, offset and opposite to the external charge;
- (D) an explosive charge shall be placed on the inside of the turret casting in the area of the main armament mounting; and
- (E) all charges shall be fired simultaneously so that the main hull and turret are cracked and distorted; the breech block is stripped from the gun tube, fused or

deformed; the gun tube is split or longitudinally cut; the gun mount or cradle is ruptured so as to be unable to mount a gun tube; and damage is caused to the running gear so that at least one of the road wheel stations is destroyed.

4. Procedure for destruction by deformation:

- (A) removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems;
- (B) removal of the turret, if any;
- (C) for the gun breech system, either:
 - (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
 - (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
- (D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
- (E) severing of either of the gun trunnions; and
- (F) the hull and turret shall be deformed so that their widths are each reduced by at least 20 percent.

5. Procedure for destruction by smashing:

- (A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret until the hull is cracked in at least three separate places and the turret in at least one place;
- (B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and deform visibly the breech ring; and
- (C) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent.

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMoured COMBAT VEHICLES BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

- (A) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems;
- (B) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions;
- (C) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the front wheel final gearbox mounting areas by vertical, horizontal and irregular cuts in the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the front wheel final gearbox

mounting areas are included in the severed portions at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts; and

- (D) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles:
 - (1) removal of the turret;
 - (2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
 - (3) for the gun breech system:
 - (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places;
 - (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or
 - (c) severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts;
 - (4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; and
 - (5) severing of two sections from the perimeter of the hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a sector with an angle of no less than 60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:

- (A) an explosive charge shall be placed on the interior floor at the mid-point of the vehicle;
- (B) a second explosive charge shall be placed as follows:
 - (1) for heavy armament combat vehicles, inside the gun where the trunnions connect to the gun mount or cradle;
 - (2) for armoured infantry fighting vehicles, on the exterior of the receiver/breech area and lower barrel group;

(C) all hatches shall be secured; and

(D) the charges shall be detonated simultaneously so as to split the sides and top of the hull. For heavy armament combat vehicles and armoured infantry fighting vehicles, damage to the gun system shall be equivalent to that specified in paragraph 2, subparagraph (D) of this Section.

4. Procedure for destruction by smashing:

- (A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and the turret, if any, until the hull is cracked in at least three separate places and the turret, if any, in one place;
- (B) in addition, for heavy armament combat vehicles:
 - (1) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and shall deform visibly the breech ring; and

- (2) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent.

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARTILLERY BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems or mortars at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, or mortars, that are not self-propelled:

- (A) removal of special equipment, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar;
- (B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar, either:
 - (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
 - (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
- (C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
- (D) severing of the left trunnion of the cradle and the mounting area of that trunnion in the upper carriage; and
- (E) severing of the trails, or the base plate of the mortar, into two approximately equal parts.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers that are not self-propelled:

- (A) explosive charges shall be placed in the tube, on one cradle mount in the upper carriage and on the trails, and detonated so that:
 - (1) the tube is split or longitudinally torn within 1.5 metres of the breech;
 - (2) the breech block is torn off, deformed or partially melted;
 - (3) the attachments between the tube and the breech ring and between one of the trunnions of the cradle and the upper carriage are destroyed or sufficiently damaged to make them further inoperative; and
 - (4) the trails are separated into two approximately equal parts or sufficiently damaged to make them further inoperative.

4. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of mortars that are not self-propelled:

explosive charges shall be placed in the mortar tube and on the base plate so that, when the charges are

detonated, the mortar tube is ruptured in its lower half and the base plate is severed into two approximately equal parts.

5. Procedure for destruction by deformation of mortars that are not self-propelled:

- (A) the mortar tube shall be visibly bent approximately at its mid-point; and
- (B) the base plate shall be bent approximately on the centerline at an angle of at least 45 degrees.

6. Procedure for destruction by severing of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars:

- (A) removal of special equipment, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar;
- (B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar, either:
 - (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
 - (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
- (C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
- (D) severing of the left trunnion and trunnion mount; and
- (E) severing of sections of both sides from the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions.

7. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars:

- (A) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars with a turret: the method specified for battle tanks in Section III, paragraph 3 of this Protocol shall be applied in order to achieve results equivalent to those specified in that provision; and
- (B) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars without a turret: an explosive charge shall be placed in the hull under the forward edge of the traversing deck that supports the tube, and detonated so as to separate the deck plate from the hull. For the destruction of the weapon system, the method specified for guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers in paragraph 3 of this Section shall be applied in order to achieve results equivalent to those specified in that provision.

8. Procedure for destruction by smashing of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars:

- (A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret, if any, until the hull is cracked in at least three separate places and the turret in at least one place;
- (B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and deform visibly the breech ring; and
- (C) the tube shall be visibly cracked or bent at approximately its mid-point.

9. Procedure for destruction by severing of multiple launch rocket systems:

- (A) removal of special equipment from the multiple launch rocket system, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of its combat systems; and
- (B) removal of tubes or launch rails, screws (gears) of elevation mechanism sectors, tube bases or launch rail bases and their rotatable parts and severing them into two approximately equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints.

10. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of multiple launch rocket systems:

a linear shaped charge shall be placed across the tubes or launcher rails, and tube or launcher rail bases. When detonated, the charge shall sever the tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases and their rotatable parts, into two approximately equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints.

11. Procedure for destruction by deformation of multiple launch rocket systems:

all tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases and the sighting system shall be visibly bent at approximately the mid-point.

SECTION VI. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of combat aircraft at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

the fuselage of the aircraft shall be divided into three parts not on assembly joints by severing its nose immediately forward of the cockpit and its tail in the central wing section area so that assembly joints, if there are any in the areas to be severed, shall be contained in the severed portions.

3. Procedure for destruction by deformation:

the fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression, so that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 percent.

4. Procedure for destruction by use as target drones:

(A) each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as target drones no more than 200 combat aircraft during the 40-month reduction period;

(B) the target drone shall be destroyed in flight by munitions fired by the armed forces of the State Party owning the target drone;

(C) if the attempt to shoot down the target drone fails and it is subsequently destroyed by a self-destruct mechanism, the procedures of this paragraph shall continue to apply. Otherwise the target drone may be recovered or may be claimed destroyed by accident in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, depending on the circumstances; and

(D) notification of destruction shall be made to all other States Parties. Such notification shall include the type of the destroyed target drone and the location where it was destroyed. Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party claiming such reduction shall send documentary evidence, such as a report of the investigation, to all other States Parties. In the event of ambiguities relating to the destruction of a particular target drone, reduction shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the matter.

SECTION VII. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of attack helicopters at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

(A) the tail boom or tail part shall be severed from the fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the severed portion; and

(B) at least two transmission mounts on the fuselage shall be severed, fused or deformed.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: any type and number of explosives may be used so that, at a minimum, after detonation the fuselage is cut into two pieces through that section of the fuselage that contains the transmission mounting area.

4. Procedure for destruction by deformation: the fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression so that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 percent.

SECTION VIII. RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY BY CONVERSION FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce a certain number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles by conversion. The types of vehicles that may be converted are listed in paragraph 3 of this Section and the specific non-military purposes for which they may be converted are listed in paragraph 4 of this Section. Converted vehicles shall not be placed in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party.

2. Each State Party shall determine the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert. This number shall not exceed:

- (A) for battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750 battle tanks) of the maximum level for holdings of battle tanks it notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items whichever is the greater; and
- (B) for armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the maximum level for holdings of armoured combat vehicles it notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items whichever is the greater.

3. The following vehicles may be converted for non-military purposes: T-54, T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72, Leopard 1, BMP-1, BTR-60, OT-64. The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of vehicles which may be converted to non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

4. Such vehicles shall be converted for the following specific non- military purposes:

- (A) general purpose prime movers;
- (B) bulldozers;
- (C) fire fighting vehicles;
- (D) cranes;
- (E) power unit vehicles;
- (F) mineral fine crushing vehicles;
- (G) quarry vehicles;
- (H) rescue vehicles;
- (I) casualty evacuation vehicles;
- (J) transportation vehicles;
- (K) oil rig vehicles;
- (L) oil and chemical product spill cleaning vehicles;
- (M) tracked ice breaking prime movers;
- (N) environmental vehicles.

The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of specific non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

5. On entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles that it plans to convert in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Notification of a State Party's intention to carry out conversion in accordance with this Section shall be given to all other States

Parties at least 15 days in advance in accordance with Section X, paragraph 5 of the Protocol on Inspection. It shall specify the number and types of vehicles to be converted, the starting date and completion date of conversion, as well as the specific non-military purpose vehicles to emerge after conversion.

6. The following procedures shall be carried out before conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites:

(A) for battle tanks:

- (1) removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems;
- (2) removal of the turret, if any;
- (3) for the gun breech system, either:
 - (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
 - (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
- (4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
- (5) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; and
- (6) cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour beginning from the front glacis to the middle of the hull turret aperture, together with the associated portions of the side armour at a height of no less than 200 millimetres (for the T-64 and T-72, no less than 100 millimetres) below the level of the hull top armour, as well as the associated portion of the front glacis plate severed at the same height. The severed portion of this front glacis plate shall consist of no less than the upper third; and

(B) for armoured combat vehicles:

- (1) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on- board armament systems;
- (2) for rear-engined vehicles, cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour from the front glacis to the bulkhead of the engine-transmission compartment, together with the associated portions of the side and front armour at a height of no less than 300 millimetres below the level of the top of the assault crew compartment;
- (3) for front-engined vehicles, cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour plate from the bulkhead of the engine-transmission compartment to the rear of the vehicle, together with the associated portions of the side armour at a height of no less than 300

millimetres below the level of the top of the assault crew compartment ; and

- (4) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles:
 - (a) removal of the turret;
 - (b) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
 - (c) for the gun breech system:
 - (i) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places;
 - (ii) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or
 - (iii) severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts; and
 - (d) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring.

7. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles being reduced pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section shall be subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be deemed reduced upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section and notification in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection.

8. Vehicles reduced pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section shall remain subject to notification pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange until final conversion for non-military purposes has been completed and notification has been made in accordance with Section X, paragraph 12 of the Protocol on Inspection.

9. Vehicles undergoing final conversion for non-military purposes shall also be subject to inspection in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, with the following changes:

- (A) the process of final conversion at a reduction site shall not be subject to inspection; and
- (B) all other States Parties shall have the right to inspect fully converted vehicles, without right of refusal, upon receipt of a notification from the State Party conducting final conversion specifying when final conversion procedures will be completed.

10. If, having completed the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided not to proceed with final conversion, then the vehicle shall be destroyed within the time limits for conversion set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol.

SECTION IX. PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF DESTRUCTION BY ACCIDENT

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce its reduction liability for each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the event of destruction by accident by an amount no greater than 1.5 percent of the maximum levels for holdings it notified at the signature of the Treaty for that category.

2. An item of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be deemed reduced, in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty, if the accident in which it was destroyed is notified to all other States Parties within seven days of its occurrence. Notification shall include the type of the destroyed item, the date of the accident, the approximate location of the accident and the circumstances related to the accident.

3. Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party claiming such reduction shall provide documentary evidence, such as a report of the investigation, to all other States Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. In the event of ambiguities relating to the accident, such reduction shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the matter.

SECTION X. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY MEANS OF STATIC DISPLAY

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by means of static display a certain number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

2. No State Party shall use static display to reduce more than one percent or eight items, whichever is the greater number, of its maximum levels for holdings it declared at the signature of the Treaty for each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, each State Party also shall have the right to retain in working order two items of each existing type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for the purpose of static display. Such conventional armaments and equipment shall be displayed at museums or other similar sites.

4. Conventional armaments and equipment placed on static display or in museums prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including the numerical limitations set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section.

5. Such items to be reduced by means of static display shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites:

- (A) all items to be displayed that are powered by self-contained engines shall have their fuel tanks rendered incapable of holding fuel and:
 - (1) have their engine(s) and transmission removed and their mounts damaged so that these pieces cannot be refitted; or
 - (2) have their engine compartment filled with concrete or a polymer resin;

- (B) all items to be displayed equipped with 75 millimetre or larger guns with permanently fixed elevation and traversing mechanisms shall have their elevation and traversing mechanisms welded so that the tube can be neither traversed nor elevated. In addition, those items to be displayed which use pinion and rack or pinion and ring mechanisms for traversing or elevating shall have three consecutive gear teeth cut off from the rack or ring on each side of the pinion of the gun tube;
- (C) all items to be displayed which are equipped with weapon systems that do not meet the criteria set forth in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall have their barrel and receiver group filled with either concrete or a polymer resin, beginning at the face of the bolt/breech and ending within 100 millimetres of the muzzle.

- (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places;
- (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or
- (c) severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts;
- (2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
- (3) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions; and
- (4) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the front wheel final gearbox mounting areas by vertical, horizontal and irregular cuts in the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the front wheel final gear box mounting areas are included in the severed portions at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts.

SECTION XI. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY USE AS GROUND TARGETS

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground targets a certain number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and self-propelled pieces of artillery.

2. No State Party shall reduce by use as ground targets numbers of battle tanks or armoured combat vehicles greater than 2.5 percent of its maximum level for holdings in each of those two categories as notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. In addition, no State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground targets more than 50 self-propelled pieces of artillery.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment in use as ground targets prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V or VI of the Treaty, or to the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 2 of this Section.

4. Such items to be reduced by use as ground targets shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites:

- (A) for battle tanks and self-propelled pieces of artillery:
 - (1) for the breech system, either:
 - (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
 - (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
 - (2) severing of either of the trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; and
 - (3) severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, such that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions; and
- (B) for armoured combat vehicles:
 - (1) for the gun breech system:

SECTION XII. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY USE FOR GROUND INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use for ground instructional purposes a certain number of combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

2. No State Party shall reduce by use for ground instructional purposes numbers of combat aircraft or attack helicopters greater than five percent of its maximum level for holdings in each of those two categories as notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in use for ground instructional purposes prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, V or VI of the Treaty, or the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 2 of this Section.

4. Such items to be reduced by use for ground instructional purposes shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites:

- (A) for combat aircraft:
 - (1) severing of the fuselage into two parts in the central wing area;
 - (2) removal of engines, mutilation of engine mounting points and either filling of all fuel tanks with concrete, polymer or resin setting compounds or removal of the fuel tanks and mutilation of the fuel tank mounting points; or
 - (3) removal of all internal, external and removable armament and armament systems equipment, removal of the tail fin and mutilation of the tail

fin mounting points, and filling of all but one fuel tank with concrete, polymer or resin setting compounds; and

(B) for attack helicopters:

severing of the tail boom or tail part from the fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the severed portion.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE RECLASSIFICATION OF SPECIFIC MODELS OR VERSIONS OF COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINER AIRCRAFT INTO UNARMED TRAINER AIRCRAFT

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and provisions governing total disarming and certification of the unarmed status of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty only those specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Protocol.

(A) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol that have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol only by total disarming and certification.

(B) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol that do not have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol by certification alone.

2. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol may be disarmed and certified, or certified alone, within 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. Such aircraft shall count against the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty until such aircraft have been certified as unarmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section IV of this Protocol. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty no more than 550 such aircraft, of which no more than 130 shall be of the MiG-25U model or version.

3. No later than entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of:

(A) the total number of each specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party intends to disarm and certify in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), Section III and Section IV of this Protocol; and

(B) the total number of each specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party intends to certify alone, in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) and Section IV of this Protocol.

4. Each State Party shall use whatever technological means it deems necessary to implement the total disarming procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol.

SECTION II. MODELS OR VERSIONS OF COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINER AIRCRAFT ELIGIBLE FOR TOTAL DISARMING AND CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol only the following specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft:

SU-15U

SU-17U

MiG-15U

MiG-21U

MiG-23U

MiG-25U

UIL-28

2. The foregoing list of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft is final and not subject to revision.

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR TOTAL DISARMING

1. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft being totally disarmed shall be rendered incapable of further employment of any type of weapon system as well as further operation of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems by the removal of the following components:

(A) provisions specifically for the attachment of weapon systems, such as special hardpoints, launching devices, or weapon mounting areas;

(B) units and panels of weapon control systems including weapon selection, arming and firing or launching systems;

(C) units of aiming equipment and weapon guidance systems not integral to navigation and flight control systems; and

(D) units and panels of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems including associated antennae.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Section, any special hardpoints which are integral to the aircraft, as well as any special elements of general purpose hardpoints which

are designed for use only with the components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, shall be rendered incapable of further employment with such systems. Electrical circuits of the weapon, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance systems described in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be rendered incapable of further employment by removal of the wiring or, if that is not technically practicable, by cutting out sections of the wiring in accessible areas.

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information, no less than 42 days in advance of the total disarming of the first aircraft of each model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol:

- (A) a basic block diagram portraying all major components of weapon systems including aiming equipment and weapon guidance systems, provisions designed for the attachment of weapons as well as components of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems, the basic function of the components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, and the functional connections of such components to each other;
- (B) a general description of the disarming process including a list of components to be removed; and
- (C) a photograph of each component to be removed illustrating its position in the aircraft prior to its removal, and a photograph of the same position after the corresponding component has been removed.

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party that intends to disarm and certify, or certify alone, models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft shall comply with the following certification procedures in order to ensure that such aircraft do not possess any of the components listed in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Inspection of each certification. In the event of the first certification of an aircraft that does not require total disarming, the State Party that intends to conduct the certification shall provide to all other States Parties the information required in Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of this Protocol for an armed model or version of the same aircraft type.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

4. The process of total disarming and certification, or certification alone, shall be deemed completed when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and reclassification provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is

an ambiguity relating to the certification and reclassification process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such reclassification shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved.

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification.

6. Certification shall be conducted in the area of application. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification.

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION

All models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft certified as unarmed shall be subject to information exchange, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and verification, including inspection, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CATEGORISATION OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS AND THE RECATEGORISATION OF MULTI-PURPOSE ATTACK HELICOPTERS

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and provisions governing the categorisation of combat helicopters and recategorisation of multi-purpose attack helicopters as provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CATEGORISATION OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS

1. Combat helicopters shall be categorised as specialised attack, multi-purpose attack or combat support helicopters and shall be listed as such in the Protocol on Existing Types.

2. All models or versions of a specialised attack helicopter type shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of information in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of this limit shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty.

4. Each State Party that holds both combat support and multi-purpose attack models or versions of a helicopter type shall categorise as attack helicopters all helicopters which have any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol and shall have the right to categorise as combat support helicopters any helicopters that have none of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

5. Each State Party that holds only combat support models or versions of a helicopter type included on both the Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopter and the Combat Support Helicopter lists in the Protocol on Existing Types shall have the right to categorise such helicopters as combat support helicopters.

SECTION II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RECATEGORISATION

1. Only combat helicopters that are categorised as multi-purpose attack helicopters in accordance with the categorisation requirements set forth in this Protocol shall be eligible for recategorisation as combat support helicopters.

2. Each State Party shall have the right to recategorise individual multi-purpose attack helicopters that have any of the features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol only by conversion and certification. Each State Party shall have the right to recategorise individual multi-purpose attack helicopters that do not have any of the features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol by certification alone.

3. Each State Party shall use whatever technological means it deems necessary to implement the conversion procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol.

4. Each combat helicopter subject to the recategorisation procedure shall bear the original manufacturer's serial number permanently stamped in a main airframe structural member.

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION

1. Multi-purpose attack helicopters being converted shall be rendered incapable of further employment of guided weapons by the removal of the following components:

- (A) provisions specifically for the attachment of guided weapons, such as special hardpoints or launching devices. Any such special hardpoints which are integral to the helicopter, as well as any special elements of general purpose hardpoints which are designed for use only by guided weapons, shall be rendered incapable of further employment with guided weapons; and
- (B) all integrated fire control and aiming systems for guided weapons, including wiring.

2. A State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information, either at least 42 days in advance of the conversion of the first helicopter of a type or at entry into force of the Treaty in the event that a State Party declares both multi-purpose attack helicopters and combat support helicopters of the same type:

- (A) a basic block diagram portraying all major components of guided weapon integrated fire control and aiming systems as well as components of equipment designed for the attachment of guided weapons, the basic function of the components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, and the functional connections of such components to each other;
- (B) a general description of the conversion process, including a list of components to be removed; and
- (C) a photograph of each component to be removed, illustrating its position in the helicopter prior to its removal, and a photograph of the same position after the corresponding component has been removed.

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party that is recategorising multi-purpose attack helicopters shall comply with the following certification procedures, in order to ensure that such helicopters do not possess any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of each certification in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Inspection.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of helicopters in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

4. The process of recategorisation shall be deemed complete when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and recategorisation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and recategorisation process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such recategorisation shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved.

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification and recategorisation.

6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of application. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification.

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION

All combat helicopters within the area of application shall be subject to information exchange in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange and verification, including inspection, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and other provisions relating to the Joint Consultative Group established by Article XVI of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

1. The Joint Consultative Group shall be composed of representatives designated by each State Party. Alternates, advisers and experts of a State Party may take part in the proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group as deemed necessary by that State Party.

2. The first session of the Joint Consultative Group shall open no later than 60 days after the signing of the Treaty. The Chairman of the opening meeting shall be the representative of the Kingdom of Norway.

3. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet for regular sessions to be held two times per year.

4. Additional sessions shall be convened at the request of one or more States Parties by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group, who shall promptly inform all other States Parties of the request. Such sessions shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of such a request by the Chairman.

5. Sessions of the Joint Consultative Group shall last no longer than four weeks, unless it decides otherwise.

6. States Parties shall assume in rotation, determined by alphabetical order in the French language, the Chairmanship of the Joint Consultative Group.

7. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet in Vienna, unless it decides otherwise.

8. Representatives at meetings shall be seated in alphabetical order of the States Parties in the French language.

9. The official languages of the Joint Consultative Group shall be English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish.

10. The proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group shall be confidential, unless it decides otherwise.

11. The scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative Group shall be applied, unless otherwise decided by the Joint Consultative Group, as follows:

10.35% for the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

6.50% for Canada;

5.20% for the Kingdom of Spain;

4.00% for the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland;

2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Hungary and the Kingdom of Norway;

0.88% for the Hellenic Republic, Romania and the Republic of Turkey;

0.68% for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Portuguese Republic; and

0.16% for the Republic of Iceland.

12. During the period that this Protocol is applied provisionally in accordance with the Protocol on Provisional Application, the Joint Consultative Group shall:

- (A) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, working methods, the scale of distribution of expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of conferences, and the distribution of the costs of inspections between or among States Parties, in accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2, subparagraph (F) of the Treaty; and
- (B) consider, upon the request of any State Party, issues relating to the provisions of the Treaty that are applied provisionally.

PROTOCOL ON THE PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

To promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the States Parties hereby agree to the provisional application of certain provisions of the Treaty.

1. Without detriment to the provisions of Article XXII of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply provisionally the following provisions of the Treaty:

- (A) Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4;
- (B) Article VIII, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8;
- (C) Article IX;
- (D) Article XIII;
- (E) Article XVI, paragraphs 1, 2(F), 2(G), 4, 6 and 7;
- (F) Article XVII;
- (G) Article XVIII;
- (H) Article XXI, paragraph 2;
- (I) Protocol on Existing Types, Sections III and IV;
- (J) Protocol on Information Exchange, Sections VII, XII and XIII;
- (K) Protocol on Inspection, Section II paragraph 24, subparagraph (A) and Section III, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12;
- (L) Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and

(M) Protocol on Reduction, Section IX.

2. The States Parties shall apply provisionally the provisions listed in paragraph 1 of this Protocol in the light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

3. This Protocol shall enter into force at the signature of the Treaty. It shall remain in force for 12 months, but shall terminate earlier if:

- (A) the Treaty enters into force before the period of 12 months expires; or
- (B) a State Party notifies all other States Parties that it does not intend to become a party to the Treaty.

The period of application of this Protocol may be extended if all the States Parties so decide.

DECLARATION OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT

To promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the States Parties to the Treaty undertake the following political commitments outside the framework of the Treaty.

1. No one State will have in the area of application of the Treaty more than 400 permanently land-based combat naval aircraft. It is understood that this commitment applies to combat aircraft armed and equipped to engage surface or air targets and excludes types designed as maritime patrol aircraft.

2. The aggregate number of such permanently land-based combat naval aircraft held by either of the two groups of States defined under the terms of the Treaty will not exceed 430.

3. No one State will hold in its naval forces within the area of application any permanently land-based attack helicopters.

4. The limitations provided for in this Declaration will apply beginning 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

5. This Declaration will become effective as of entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

DECLARATION OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL STRENGTH

In connection with the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, and with a view to the follow-on negotiations referred to in Article XVIII of that Treaty, the States Parties to that Treaty declare that, for the period of these negotiations, they will not increase the total peacetime authorized personnel strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the Mandate in the area of application.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF GERMAN ARMED FORCES

In connection with the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany confirms the declaration made by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30 August 1990 in the plenary session of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which reads as follows:

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval forces) within three to four years. This reduction will commence on the entry into force of the first CFE agreement.

Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than 345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces which, pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are the subject of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Federal Government regards its commitment to reduce ground and air forces as a significant German contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. It assumes that in follow-on negotiations the other participants in the negotiations, too, will render their contribution to enhancing security and stability in Europe, including measures to limit personnel strengths."

Appendix B

CFE STATEMENTS

Statement by the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty), the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that it assumes the following obligations outside the framework of the Treaty.

I

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hold within the area of application of the Treaty conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories not to exceed: in Coastal Defence forces - 813 battle tanks, 972 armoured combat vehicles and 846 pieces of artillery; in Naval Infantry - 120 battle tanks, 753 armoured combat vehicles and 234 pieces of artillery; in the Strategic Rocket Forces - 1,701 armoured combat vehicles, each being an armoured personnel carrier as that term is defined in the Treaty.

II

Forty months after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, within the levels and sublevels that ensue from the obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty, the holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery shall be less than its maximum level for holdings, as notified in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, by the number it will have in Coastal Defence forces and Naval Infantry within the area of application of the Treaty. For example, with regard to battle tanks, unless the maximum levels for holdings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are revised in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, the numbers for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the area of application of the Treaty, including battle tanks in Coastal Defence forces and Naval Infantry, will not exceed: 13,150 overall; 10,500 in active units overall; 7,150 in active units within the region described in Article IV, paragraph 3 of the Treaty; and 1,850 in active units within the area described in Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) of the Treaty.

III

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall reduce, in addition to the reduction liability established for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty on the basis of information it supplied, its holding of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories within the area of application of the Treaty by the number which it had as of the date of signature of the Treaty in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry, that is, by 933 battle tanks, 1,725 armoured combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery.

2. Such additional reduction shall be carried out by means of destruction or conversion into civilian equipment of 933 battle tanks and destruction of 1,080 pieces of artillery. Of the 1,725 armoured combat vehicles to be additionally reduced, 972 armoured combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted into civilian equipment and 753 armoured combat vehicles of the MT-LB type, included in the armoured combat vehicle category and belonging to the number declared as of the date of signature of the Treaty, shall be modified, in accordance with the Protocol on Existing Types, into armoured personnel carrier look-alikes of the MT-LB-AT type, which are not limited by the Treaty.

3. Fifty percent of the 933 battle tanks and 972 armoured combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted within the area of application of the Treaty and 50 percent of the 1,080 pieces of artillery shall be destroyed within the area of application of the Treaty, within the time limits and in accordance with the procedures established by the Treaty. The remainder of these conventional armaments and equipment shall be withdrawn from the area of application of the Treaty; an equivalent number of conventional armaments and equipment shall be destroyed or converted outside of the area of application of the Treaty within the time limits established by the Treaty and in accordance with procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that the conventional armaments and equipment have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. The States Parties to the Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the location, number and types of conventional armaments and equipment to be destroyed or converted.

IV

The holdings of armoured combat vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not be subject to the numerical limitations of the Treaty, in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (F) of the Treaty. These forces shall not be equipped with conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories, other than armoured personnel carriers.

V

The conventional armaments and equipment of Coastal Defence forces and Naval Infantry in the categories subject to the Treaty within the area of application of the Treaty shall be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. Effective verification of such armaments and equipment shall be ensured. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide separate information to all States Parties on such armaments and equipment of the same scope and with the same degree of detail as provided for in Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and under the same timetable for the provision of information as provided for in Section VII of that Protocol.

VI

Unless otherwise specified (a) in this Statement, (b) in the Treaty, or (c) in the Declaration on Land-Based Naval Aircraft, all conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories, based on land within the area of application of the Treaty, irrespective of assignment, shall be subject to all numerical limitations of the Treaty.

VII

This Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the aforementioned obligations assumed outside the framework of the Treaty shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, shall be legally binding and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

June 14, 1991.

Statement of the Government of the United States of America and Statements Identical in Content of the Other 20 Signatory States

Statement of the Government of the United States of America

The Government of the United States of America hereby agrees that the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of today's date provides a satisfactory basis for proceeding toward ratification and implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty).

The aforementioned Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and this Statement of the Government of the United States of America shall be equally legally binding; they shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

June 14, 1991.

Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, (the Treaty) I have been instructed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to state the following:

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, during 1991-1995, destroy or convert into civilian equipment no less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armoured combat vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories beyond the Urals, in addition to the numbers of armaments subject to destruction and conversion specified in the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 14, 1991 concerning obligations outside the framework of the Treaty.

The armaments will be destroyed or converted under the procedures that will provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. Advance notification and information will be provided to the States Parties to the Treaty regarding

the locations and numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery undergoing destruction or conversion.

Elimination of armaments in the Treaty-limited categories will also be carried out subsequently as their operational and service life is expended.

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the period between January 1989 and signature of the Treaty on November 19, 1990, in connection with activities related to unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries of Eastern Europe and adaption of the armed forces to the new defensive doctrine, withdrew beyond the Urals the following numbers of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories: 16,400 battle tanks, 15,900 armoured combat vehicles and 25,000 pieces of artillery.

Of these numbers of armaments and equipment, 8,000 battle tanks, 11,200 armoured combat vehicles and 1600 pieces of artillery have been turned over to military units and subunits in the eastern Soviet Union for the purpose of reequipping them and supplementing their armaments.

Another part of the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories which have been transferred beyond the Urals (8,400 battle tanks, 4,700 armoured combat vehicles and 16,400 pieces of artillery), has been placed in storage. In addition, 7,000 pieces of artillery are being used for replacement and repair.

These stored conventional armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will be used up in the process of replacing obsolete armaments and equipment that have expended their established operational and service life and, in the eastern Soviet Union, also in supplementing units.

With respect to the armaments and equipment transferred beyond the Urals before signature of the Treaty that have been placed in storage or are used for replacement and repair beyond the Urals, upon entry into force of the Treaty, information will be provided to all States Parties about the location and numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery at such locations as of July 1, 1991. Armaments in each of these categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery) will be stored separately.

3. The conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories withdrawn beyond the Urals prior to signature of the Treaty will not be used to create a strategic reserve or operational groupings, and will not be stored in any way permitting their rapid return to the area of application of the Treaty, that is, such armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will not be stored in sets for military formations.

Military formations and units deployed within the area of application of the Treaty will be organized in line with the Soviet defensive doctrine and taking into account the sufficiency levels of armaments established by the Treaty for a single state.

June 14, 1991.

Appendix C

CONCLUDING Act OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE 1A)

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Participating States.

Recalling the obligations undertaken in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the CFE Treaty, and the important achievements attained in that treaty,

In accordance with the obligation in Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty to continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same mandate and with the goal of building on the CFE Treaty and with the objective of concluding an agreement, no later than the 1992 follow-up of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe,

Guided by the mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having conducted negotiations in Vienna,

Having decided to limit and, if applicable, reduce, on a national basis, the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application,¹

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the CSCE, within the framework of which these negotiations were conducted,

Looking forward to a more structured cooperation among all CSCE Participating States on security matters and to new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and

security building in accordance with their commitment in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and, accordingly, to the possibility, within the context of those new negotiations, for all CSCE Participating States to subscribe to a common regime based upon the measures adopted in this Concluding Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act,

Taking into account the principle of sufficiency, and recalling the undertaking of the Participating States to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence, bearing in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines,

Recognising the freedom of each Participating State to choose its own security arrangements,

Have adopted the following:

SECTION 1. SCOPE OF LIMITATION

1. Each Participating State will limit, as specified in Section II of this Act, its personnel based on land within the area of application in the following categories of conventional armed forces:

- (A) All full-time military personnel serving with land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, as specified in Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty;
- (B) All full-time military personnel serving with air and air defence aviation forces, including long-range aviation forces reported pursuant to Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, as well as military transport aviation forces;
- (C) All full-time military personnel serving with air and air defence forces other than those specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph;
- (D) All full-time military personnel, excluding naval personnel, serving with all central headquarters, command and staff elements
- (E) All full-time military personnel, excluding naval personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled formations, units and other organisations, including those of rear services;
- (F) All full-time military personnel serving with all land-based naval formations and units which hold battle

¹ The area of application of the measures adopted in this Act is the area of application of the CFE Treaty as defined in Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (B) of Article II of the CFE Treaty, taking into account the understanding specified in Paragraph 5 of Annex A of the final document of the extraordinary conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of June 5, 1992.

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, or armoured personnel carrier look-alikes as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty or which hold land-based naval combat aircraft referred to in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with respect to land-based naval aircraft of November 19, 1990;

- (G) All full-time military personnel serving with all other formations, units and other organisations which hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters in service with its conventional armed forces, as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty; and
- (H) All reserve personnel who have completed their initial military service or training and who are called up or report voluntarily for full-time military service or training in conventional armed forces for a continuous period of more than 90 days.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this section, the following categories of personnel are not included within the scope of limitation specified in this Act:

- (A) Personnel serving with organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions;
- (B) Personnel in transit from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application who are in the area of application for no longer than seven days; and
- (C) Personnel serving under the command of the United Nations.

3. If, after the date on which this Act comes into effect, any land-based formations or units are formed within the area of application which, according to their structure and armaments, have a capability for ground combat outside national borders against an external enemy, a Participating State may raise in the Joint Consultative Group any issue regarding personnel serving with such formations and units. The Joint Consultative Group will consider any such issue on the basis of all available information, including information provided by the Participating States concerned, with a view to deciding whether the above-mentioned criteria are applicable to such formations and units; if such criteria are deemed to apply, the personnel serving with such formations and units will be included within the scope of limitation specified in this Act.

SECTION II. NATIONAL PERSONNEL LIMITS

1. Each Participating State will limit its military personnel based on land within the area of application in the categories of conventional armed forces specified in Section I, Paragraph 1 of this Act so that, 40 months after entry into force of the CFE Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number of such personnel will not exceed the number representing its national personnel limitation as specified in this paragraph:

The Republic of Armenia	
The Republic of Azerbaijan	
The Republic of Belarus	100,000
The Kingdom of Belgium	70,000
The Republic of Bulgaria	104,000
Canada	10,660
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	140,000
The Kingdom of Denmark	39,000
The French Republic	325,000
The Republic of Georgia	
The Federal Republic of Germany	345,000
The Hellenic Republic	158,621
The Republic of Hungary	100,000
The Republic of Iceland	0
The Italian Republic	315,000
The Republic of Kazakhstan.....	0
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.....	900
The Republic of Moldova	
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	80,000
The Kingdom of Norway	32,000
The Republic of Poland	234,000
The Portuguese Republic	75,000
Romania	230,248
The Russian Federation	1,450,000
The Kingdom of Spain	300,000
The Republic of Turkey	530,000
Ukraine	450,000
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	260,000
The United States of America	250,000

2. For the purpose of recording changes to the information specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will distribute to all the Participating States a revised version of the information in that paragraph.

3. Each Participating State may revise its national personnel limit in accordance with Section IV of this Act.

SECTION III. REVISION PROCEDURES

1. A Participating State may revise downward its national personnel limit by providing a notification of its revised limit to all other Participating States. Such notification will specify the date on which the revised limit will become effective.

2. A Participating State intending to revise upward its national personnel limit will provide notification of such intended revision to all other Participating States. Such notification will include an explanation of the reasons for such a revision. Any Participating State may raise any question concerning the intended revision. A revised national personnel limit will become effective 42 days after notification has been provided, unless a Participating State raises an objection to such revision by providing notification of its objection to all other Participating States.

3. If an objection is raised, any Participating State may request the convening of an extraordinary conference which will examine the intended revision in the light of the explanations provided and seek to decide on a future national personnel limit. The extraordinary conference will open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, will last no longer than three weeks.

SECTION IV. INFORMATION EXCHANGE

1. Each Participating State will provide to all other Participating States, in accordance with the provisions of this section, the following information in respect of its personnel based on land within the area of application:

- (A) In respect of all personnel specified in Section I, Paragraph I of this Act, the aggregate number;
- (B) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, as specified in Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, the aggregate number and the number in each formation, unit and other organisation down to the brigade/regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation;
- (C) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with air and air defence aviation forces, including long-range aviation forces reported pursuant to Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, as well as military transport aviation forces, the aggregate number and the number in each formation, unit and other organisation of conventional armed forces down to the wing/air regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation;
- (D) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with air defence forces other than those specified in Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph, the aggregate number and the number in each formation and other organisation down to the next level of command above division or equivalent level (i.e., air defence army or equivalent), specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name

and coordinates, for each such formation and organisation;

- (E) In respect of all full-time military personnel of conventional armed forces, excluding naval personnel, serving with all central headquarters, command and staff elements, the aggregate number;
- (F) In respect of all full-time military personnel of conventional armed forces, excluding naval personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled formations, units and other organisations, including those of rear services, the aggregate number and the number in each formation, unit and other organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation;
- (G) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with all land-based naval formations and units which hold conventional armaments and equipment in the categories specified in Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty or which hold land-based naval combat aircraft referred to in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with respect to land-based naval aircraft of November 19, 1990, the aggregate number and the number in each formation and unit down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent), specifying the designation and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation and unit;
- (H) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with all formations, units and other organisations of conventional armed forces specified in Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, the number in each such formation, unit and organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent), specifying the designation and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation;
- (I) In respect of all personnel serving with all formations and units down to the independent or separately located battalion or equivalent level which hold battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft or specialised attack helicopters as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the CFE Treaty, in organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the number in each such formation and unit at each site at which such armaments and equipment are held, specifying the national-level designation of each

such organisation and the location, including the geographic name and coordinates, of each site at which such armaments and equipment are held;

- (J) In respect of all personnel serving with all formations and units in organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police forces and protective services, the aggregate number and the aggregate number in each administrative region or equivalent;
- (K) In respect of all reserve personnel who have completed their military service or training and who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service or training in conventional armed forces since the most recent exchange of information provided in accordance with this section, the aggregate number, specifying the number, if any, of those who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for full-time military service or training in conventional armed forces for a continuous period of more than 90 days;
- (L) In respect of all military personnel serving under the command of the United Nations, the aggregate number; and
- (M) In respect of all military personnel serving with all other formations, units and other organisations of conventional armed forces, the aggregate number, specifying the designation of such formations, units and organisations.

2. In providing information on personnel strengths in accordance with this section, each Participating State will provide the peacetime authorized personnel strength, which will approximate the number of personnel serving within the area of application with each of the formations, units and other organisations specified in Paragraph 1 of this section.

3. The provisions of this section will not apply to personnel who are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application. Personnel in the categories specified in Paragraph 1 of this section who entered the area of application in transit will be subject to the provisions of this section if they remain within the area of application for a period longer than seven days.

4. Each Participating State will be responsible for its own information; receipt of such information will not imply validation or acceptance of the information provided.

5. The Participating States will provide the information specified in this section in accordance with the formats and procedures to be agreed in the Joint Consultative Group.

6. Prior to the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act, each Participating State will provide to all other Participating States the information specified in Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs (A), (D), (E) and (G) to (K) of this section, as well as the information on aggregate numbers of personnel in the categories specified in Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F) of that paragraph, in written form, in one of the official CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other official

channels designated by them in accordance with the following timetable:

- (A) No later than 30 days following entry into force of the CFE Treaty, with the information effective as of the date of entry into force of that Treaty; and
- (B) On the 15th day of December of the year in which the CFE Treaty comes into force (unless entry into force of that Treaty occurs within 60 days of the 1st day of December), and on the 15th day of December of every year thereafter, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year.

7. Beginning with the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act, each Participating State will provide to all other Participating States all the information specified in Paragraph 1 of this section in written form, in one of the official CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, in accordance with the following timetable:

- (A) On the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act, with the information effective as of that date; and
- (B) On the 15th day of December of the year in which the national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act, and on the 15th day of December of every year thereafter, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year

8. The Participating States will, at the first review of the operation of this Act in accordance with Paragraph 3 of Section VII of this Act, consider issues relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of the disaggregation of the information specified in Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F) of this section.

SECTION V. STABILISING MEASURES

Notification Of Increases In Unit Strengths

1. Each Participating State will notify all other Participating States at least 42 days in advance of any permanent increase in the personnel strength of any formation, unit or other organisation which was reported in the most recent exchange of information at the brigade/ regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level in accordance with Section IV of this Act when such increase equals 1,000 or more at the brigade/regiment level, or 500 or more at the wing/air regiment level, or equivalent levels.

Notification Of Call-Up Of Reserve Personnel

2. Any Participating State intending to call up reserve personnel of its conventional armed forces based on land within the area of application will notify all other Participating States whenever the cumulative total of the personnel called up and retained on full-time military service will exceed a threshold of 35,000.

3. Such notification will be provided at least 42 days in advance of such threshold being exceeded. As an exception, in the case of emergency situations where advance notification is not practical, notification will be provided as soon as possible and, in any event, no later than the date such threshold is exceeded.

4. Such notification will include the following information:

- (A) The total number of reserve personnel to be called up, specifying the number to be called up for more than 90 days;
- (B) A general description of the purpose of the call-up;
- (C) The planned start and end dates of the period during which such threshold will be exceeded; and
- (D) The designation and location of any formation in which more than 7,000 at the division or equivalent level or more than 9,000 at the army/army corps or equivalent level of the personnel so called up will serve.

Resubordination Of Units

5. After the first exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this Act, a Participating State intending to resubordinate formations, units or other organisations whose personnel are subject to limitation in accordance with Section I of this Act to a formation, unit or other organisation whose personnel would not otherwise be subject to limitation will notify all other Participating States of the planned resubordination no later than the date on which such resubordination will become effective.

6. Such notification will include the following information:

- (A) The date on which such resubordination will become effective;
- (B) The subordination, designation and peacetime location of each formation, unit and organisation to be resubordinated, both before and after such resubordination will become effective;
- (C) The peacetime authorized personnel strength for each formation, unit and organisation to be resubordinated, both before and after such resubordination will become effective; and
- (D) The number, if any, of battle tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched bridges as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty held by each formation, unit and organisation to be resubordinated, both before and after such resubordination will become effective.

7. Personnel serving with formations, units or other organisations resubordinated after the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act will remain subject to limitation in accordance with Section I of this Act until the date of the exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this Act one year subsequent to the year in which such

resubordination becomes effective, after which time the procedure specified in Paragraph 8 of this section will apply.

8. Forty-two days prior to the end of the one-year period specified in Paragraph 7 of this section, the Participating State resubordinating such formations, units or other organisations will provide to all other Participating States notification of the planned exclusion. Upon the request of any other Participating State, the Participating State resubordinating such formations, units or other organisations will provide all relevant information supporting such exclusion.

SECTION VI. VERIFICATION/EVALUATION

1. For the purpose of evaluating observance of national personnel limits and the other provisions of this Act, Participating States will apply Section VII and Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty and other relevant provisions of that Treaty, together with the provisions set out in this section.

2. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the preinspection briefing will include information on the number of personnel serving with any formation, unit or other organisation which was notified in the most recent exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this Act and which is located at that inspection site. If the number of such personnel differs from the number of personnel noted in that most recent exchange of information, the inspection team will be provided with an explanation of such difference. The preinspection briefing will also include information on the number of personnel serving with any other formation or unit down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as independent units at the battalion/squadron or equivalent level, in the categories specified in Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F) of Section IV of this Act, which is located at that inspection site.

3. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the escort team will provide, if requested by the inspection team, information on the number of personnel serving with any formation, unit or other organisation which was notified in the most recent exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this Act, which is located at that inspection site and whose facilities are being inspected. If the number of such personnel differs from the number of personnel notified in that most recent exchange of information, the inspection team will be provided with an explanation of such difference.

4. During an inspection pursuant to Section VII or Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, inspectors may have access, consistent with the provisions of that Protocol, to all facilities subject to inspection at the inspection site, including those used by all formations, units and other organisations located at that inspection site. During such an inspection, the escort team will specify, if requested by the inspection team, whether a particular building on the inspection site is a personnel barracks or messing facility.

SELF INSPECTION AGENCY

5. Inspectors will include in the inspection report prepared pursuant to Section XII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty information provided to the inspection team in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this section in a format to be agreed in the Joint Consultative Group. Inspectors may also include in that report written comments pertaining to the evaluation of personnel strengths.

6. Evaluation of observance of the provisions of this Act will be further facilitated through confidence and security building measures that have been developed and that may be developed in the context of the new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building following the Helsinki follow-up meeting. In this context, Participating States are prepared to join in considering ways and means to refine the evaluation provisions specified in the Vienna Document 1992.

SECTION VII. REVIEW MECHANISMS

1. The Participating States will review the implementation of this Act in accordance with the procedures set out in this section, using the relevant bodies and channels within the framework of the CSCE process.

2. In particular, any Participating State may at any time raise and clarify questions relating to the implementation of this Act within the framework, as appropriate, of the Joint Consultative Group. The Participating States will consider in the context of the new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building which will be conducted following the Helsinki follow-up meeting, the role of the conflict prevention centre in this regard, as appropriate.

3. Six months after the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Participating States will conduct a review of the operation of this Act.

4. The Participating States will meet in an extraordinary conference if requested to do so by any Participating State which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this Act have arisen. Such a request will be transmitted to all other Participating States and will include an explanation of exceptional circumstances relating to this Act, e.g., an increase in the number of military personnel in categories listed in Section I of this Act in a manner or proportion which the Participating State requesting such an extraordinary conference deems to be prejudicial to security and stability within the area of application. The conference will open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, will last no longer than three weeks.

SECTION VIII. CLOSING PROVISIONS

1. The measures adopted in this Act are politically binding. Accordingly, this Act is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Act will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty.

2. This Act will have the same duration as the CFE Treaty and may be supplemented, modified or superseded.

3. The government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will transmit true copies of this Act, the original of which is in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to all Participating States, and bring this Act to the attention of the Secretariat of the CSCE and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

4. Wherefore, we have subscribed our signatures below:

Done at Helsinki on 10 July 1992, at the meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Participating States.

Appendix D

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH

VIENNA, 15-31 MAY 1996

The Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Fulfilling the obligation set forth in Article XXI, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, to conduct a review of the operation of the Treaty, and thereby taking into account the Final Documents of the Extraordinary Conferences of the States Parties of 10 July 1992 in Helsinki and 13 November 1992 in Vienna,

Acting in accordance with the provision of Section VII, paragraph 3, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation of Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 10 July 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding Act,

Recalling the results of the Extraordinary Conferences held thus far,

Reaffirming all the decisions of the Joint Consultative Group made thus far,

Having met at the First Review Conference, chaired by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, from 15 to 31 May 1996 in Vienna,

Have adopted the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The States Parties reaffirm the fundamental role of the Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and their adherence to its goals and objectives. It is their common interest to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and the Concluding Act as well as the predictability and transparency they have created. The States Parties reaffirm their determination to fulfill in good faith all obligations and commitments arising from the Treaty and its associated documents. Bearing that in mind, they commit themselves to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

2. The negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the Treaty and the Concluding Act, as well as the ratification of the Treaty, took place in times of change during which the European security environment evolved significantly. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has ceased to exist. New states have emerged and became States Parties to the Treaty. At the same time, new risks and challenges to security have come to the fore. As a result of common efforts of the States Parties, the Treaty and the Concluding Act have remained vital stabilizing factors in this period of transition and contributed to its peaceful unfolding.

3. The States Parties stress that security and stability in Europe are vitally underpinned by the continuation and enhancement of robust arms control measures. Recognizing the evolution of the European political and security environment, the States Parties are resolved to continue the conventional arms control process, including through the enhancement of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. They see this as a common responsibility.

4. The States Parties recognize that the Treaty and the Concluding Act are essential contributions to the achievement of the goals and purposes of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in particular the promotion of confidence, stability and security in an undivided Europe. In that context, they stress the

importance of the development of a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century, of the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies and of the ongoing security dialogue and negotiations in the Forum for Security Co-operation.

II. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AND THE CONCLUDING ACT

5. The States Parties note with satisfaction that more than 58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment have been reduced, and that the overall holdings of conventional armaments and equipment within the area of application are substantially lower than the limits set in the Treaty.

More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A permanent system for regular and routine exchange of Treaty notifications and other information has been developed. The Joint Consultative Group has been firmly established and has demonstrated its utility and importance as the ongoing Treaty forum.

With regard to the Concluding Act, the States Parties note with satisfaction that the personnel strength of conventional armed forces in the area of application was reduced by 1.2 million persons.

6. The States Parties note that the Treaty established a high degree of transparency in military relations through its comprehensive system for exchange of information and for verification. Together with the extensive reductions of conventional armaments and equipment, this has led to greater predictability and confidence in security relations. The Treaty has also nurtured the development of new patterns of co-operation in Europe and provides a basis for stability and enhanced security in Europe at substantially lower levels of conventional armaments and equipment than heretofore. Although risks and challenges still exist in some parts of Europe, the capability for launching surprise attack and the danger of large-scale offensive action in Europe as a whole have been diminished substantially. Nevertheless, the achievement of the goals of the Treaty in the whole area of its application requires continuous efforts by the States Parties.

7. The States Parties reaffirm the continued relevance of the basic structures of the Treaty including the principle of zonal limitations, as embodied in Articles IV and V of the Treaty. In this respect, and in line with the decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 17 November 1995, the States Parties have agreed on a document, which is contained in Annex A, reflecting a combination of measures agreed in cooperative fashion and acceptable to all parties to the Treaty.

8. States Parties regret that not all reduction obligations pursuant to the Treaty have been met. They stress the necessity to complete as soon as possible reductions of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (TLE) in accordance with obligations under the Treaty. They note with satisfaction the reiterated commitment of those States Parties which still have to complete reductions to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and associated documents. All States Parties express

their readiness to follow this process to its completion in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In this context, being aware of difficulties which have delayed the completion of reductions, they take positive note of efforts undertaken in order to meet fully obligations under the Treaty.

9. States Parties express their concern with serious difficulties of some States Parties to comply fully within their territory with the provisions of the Treaty and its related documents due to TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled within the Treaty. This situation adversely affects the operation of the Treaty and complicates its implementation.

They stress the need to reach as soon as possible relevant political solutions and to elaborate necessary measures to enable the implementation of the Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

They express their readiness to address the issue of this TLE in the Joint Consultative Group, including the ways and means to facilitate the resolution of this issue.

10. The States Parties have adopted the understandings and agreed interpretations with regard to implementation and ways and means to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty as specified in Annex B of this Final Document.

11. The States Parties have agreed that the implementation issues contained in Annex C of this Final Document require further consideration and resolution in the Joint Consultative Group.

12. The States Parties reaffirm the arrangements of Article XII reached at the Extraordinary Conferences in Oslo in 1992.

They understand that for successor states that had become States Parties by 1992, paragraph 2 of the Article XII part of the Oslo arrangement should be read as: "In particular, no State Party will increase within the area of application its holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions above that aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of signature of the Treaty, as notified on their territory pursuant to the information exchange as of November 19, 1990."

They agree to work further on this issue of Article XII in the Joint Consultative Group, taking into account the proposals made at the Review Conference.

13. States Parties stressed the importance of full and continuous respect for the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5, in the context of maintaining the viability of the Treaty, as well as for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved.

States Parties noted that, in certain instances, bilateral agreements are under negotiation-or in the process of ratification or implementation -which relate to the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5. States Parties-expressed their support for early and positive results of the ongoing processes.

States Parties consider that the importance of the Article IV provisions on stationing forces should be recognised in the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final Document.

14. In the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final Document, States Parties will examine different interpretations of temporary deployments so as to ensure that these temporary deployments do not become indefinite.

15. The States Parties recall that according to Article II, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the lists of existing types contained in Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) shall be updated periodically by the Joint Consultative Group in accordance with Section IV of the POET. However, it has not been updated since the Treaty's conclusion.

The States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint Consultative Group to update the POET. They further agreed that:

- any inaccuracies should be corrected; including by removal of types, models and versions of conventional armaments and equipment that do not meet Treaty criteria;
- the Joint Consultative Group should consider if a yearly update of the lists would be appropriate;
- the Joint Consultative Group should consider an electronic version of the lists in all official languages.

16. The States Parties also discussed the topics contained in Annex D of this Final Document.

17. The States Parties welcome the statement of the representative of the Russian Federation to promote the implementation of the statement of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group on 14 June 1991 in Vienna. The text of the Russian statement is laid down in Annex E of this Final Document.

18. The States Parties recommend that in view of the issues that have been referred to the Joint Consultative Group, most effective use is made of the provisions of Article XVI and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, in order to allow the Joint Consultative Group to address all those issues in a proper manner.

III. FUTURE WORK ON THE TREATY

19. In view of Sections I and II of this Final Document, the States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint Consultative Group to expand upon their work in accordance with Article XVI of the Treaty. Taking fresh impetus from this Review Conference, they will immediately start a thorough process aimed at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politico-military alliance. As part of this process, the States Parties will consider measures and adaptations with the aim of promoting the objectives of the Treaty and of enhancing its viability and effectiveness, including but not limited to the consideration of proposals already made to that effect. The character of this process should be such as to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role

in the European security architecture. Its scope and parameters should be defined as a matter of priority.

20. Until the entry into force of such measures and adaptations, the States Parties will observe all provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents.

21. The States Parties will consider a progress report on the intermediate results of this process at the time of the OSCE Lisbon Summit. This report will inter alia include recommendations on the way ahead.

In accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, the States Parties look forward to gathering again in five years time to conduct the second review of the operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

This Final Document, together with its Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, which are integral to it, having been drawn up in all the official languages of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, shall be deposited with the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the designated depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Document to all the States Parties.

ANNEX A:

Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990.

The 30 States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, have agreed as follows:

1. Each State Party shall, taking into account the clarification set forth in this Document relating to the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty and taking into account the understandings on flexibility set forth in this Document, comply fully with the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including Article V thereof, no later than 31 May 1999.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Section shall be understood as not giving any State Party, which was in compliance with the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including Article V thereof, as of 1 January 1996, the right to exceed any of the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty.

3. Pursuant to the decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 17 November 1995, the States Parties shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of this Document.

II

1. Within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, the Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that, no later than 31 May 1999 and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- (A) 1,800 battle tanks;

- (B) 3,700 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 552 shall be located within the Astrakhan Oblast; no more than 552 shall be located within the Volgograd Oblast; no more than 310 shall be located within the eastern part of the Rostov Oblast described in Section III, paragraph I, of this Document; and no more than 600 shall be located within the Pskov Oblast; and
- (C) 2,400 pieces of artillery.

2. Within the Odessa Oblast, Ukraine shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that, upon provisional application of this Document and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- (A) 400 battle tanks;
- (B) 400 armoured combat vehicles; and
- (C) 350 pieces of artillery.

3. Upon provisional application of this document and until 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery, within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, so that the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- (A) 1,897 battle tanks;
- (B) 4,397 armoured combat vehicles; and
- (C) 2,422 pieces of artillery.

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1. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty, the following territory, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of the Russian Federation shall be deemed to be located in the area described in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty: the Pskov Oblast; the Volgograd Oblast; the Astrakhan Oblast; that part of the Rostov Oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgogradsk to the Volgograd Oblast border, including Volgogradsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray leading to Kushchevskaya.

2. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty, the territory of the Odessa Oblast, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of Ukraine shall be deemed to be located in the area described in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty.

IV

1. The States Parties shall, during the period before 31 May 1999, examine the Treaty provisions on designated permanent storage sites so as to allow all battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery in designated permanent storage sites, including those subject to regional numerical limitations, to be located with active units.

2. The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize to the maximum extent possible the provisions of the Treaty

on temporary deployment of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery within its territory and outside its territory. Such temporary deployments on the territory of other States Parties shall be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved.

3. The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize to the maximum extent possible reallocation, in accordance with existing agreements, of the current quotas for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery established by the Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Tashkent, on 15 May 1992. Such reallocations shall be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved.

4. The Russian Federation shall count against the numerical limitations established in the Treaty and paragraph 1 of Section II of this Document any armoured combat vehicles listed as "to be removed" in its information exchange of 1 January 1996 that are not so removed by 31 May 1999.

V

1. In addition to the annual information exchange provided pursuant to Section VII, subparagraph 1(C), of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, the Russian Federation shall provide information equal to that reported in the annual information exchange on the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, upon provisional application of this Document and every six months after the annual information exchange. In the case of Kushchevskaya, the Russian Federation shall provide such additional information every three months after the annual information exchange.

2. Upon provisional application of this Document, Ukraine shall provide "F21" notifications for its holdings within the Odessa Oblast on the basis of changes of five, rather than ten, percent or more in assigned holdings.

3. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, the Russian Federation shall, upon provisional application of this Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota established pursuant to Section II, subparagraph 10(D), of the Protocol on Inspection, up to a total of 10 supplementary declared site inspections, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection, at objects of verification:

- (A) Located within the Pskov Oblast; the Volgograd Oblast; the Astrakhan Oblast; that part of the Rostov Oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgogradsk to the Volgograd Oblast border, including Volgogradsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray leading to Kushchevskaya;
- (B) Containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty designated by the Russian Federation in its annual information exchange of 1

January 1996 as "to be removed," until such time that a declared site inspection confirms that such equipment has been removed.

4. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, Ukraine shall, upon provisional application of this Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota established pursuant to Section II, subparagraph IO(D), of the Protocol on Inspection, up to a total of one supplementary declared site inspection, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection, at objects of verification located within the Odessa Oblast.

5. The number of supplementary declared site inspections conducted at objects of verification pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section shall not exceed the number of declared site passive quota inspections, established in accordance with Section II, subparagraph IO(D) of the Protocol on Inspection, conducted at those objects of verification in the course of the same year.

6. All supplementary declared site inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section:

- (A) Shall be carried out at the cost of the inspecting State Party, consistent with prevailing commercial rates; and
- (B) At the discretion of the inspecting State Party, shall be conducted either as a sequential inspection or as a separate inspection.

VI

1. This document shall enter into force upon receipt by the Depository of notification of confirmation of approval by all States Parties. Section II, paragraphs 2 and 3, Section IV, and Section V of this Document are hereby provisionally applied as of 31 May 1996 through 15 December 1996. If this Document does not enter into force by 15 December 1996, then it shall be reviewed by the States Parties.

2. This Document, in all six official languages of the Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depository for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this document to all States Parties.

ANNEX B: UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREED INTERPRETATIONS WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION AND WAYS AND MEANS TO IMPROVE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY

1. The States Parties stress the need to ensure that relevant Government authorities charged with Treaty implementation fulfill all the obligations of the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on the cost of inspection dated 23 May 1995.

2. The States Parties agree that pursuant to the Protocol on Inspection, Section VII, paragraph 1,

- (A) In case an inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party delays an inspection on grounds of force majeure, it shall, in written form, explain the reasons for this delay in detail;

This should take place as follows:

- If force majeure is declared prior to the arrival of the inspection team, through the answer to the relevant notifications;
 - If force majeure is declared after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, the explanation should be presented as soon as possible, through diplomatic channels or other official channels.
- (B) In case of such a delay due to force majeure, the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 2 of the Protocol on Inspection shall apply.

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties annually, but not later than 15 December, the complete updated list of inspectors and transport crew members. In case of additions to the list of inspectors and transport crew members, the State Party shall provide the complete updated list highlighting the additions.

4. Each State Party with territory in the area of application shall provide to all other States Parties during the annual exchange of information the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for their aviation transportation means for the subsequent calendar year.

5. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties during the annual exchange of information the list of its officially recognized holidays for the subsequent calendar year.

6. The State Party whose inspection team intends to transit the territory of another State Party prior to conducting the inspection should inform the transited State(s) Party (Parties) about the estimated time of transit, cross-border points and transportation means to be used by the inspection team, as well as a list of inspectors and drivers with passport numbers.

7. States Parties agree that a specified area may contain declared sites of their own and stationed forces; but all declared sites within a specified area are excluded from an inspection of the specified area (inspections in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection) as they can be inspected only in accordance with Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

8. States Parties agree to send the notification of the intent to inspect simultaneously to the host and the stationing States Parties, if the inspecting State intends to conduct a sequential inspection which involves stationed forces.

9. Where appropriate and with the agreement of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out in respect of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of a stationing State Party, the stationing State Party shall assist the host nation in the provision of security protection to both the inspection team and the escort team for the duration of the inspection.

10. Notifications of changes of 10 per cent of holdings:

- The States Parties agree that, pursuant to Section VIII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, the most recent update of information on holdings will always constitute the basis for any subsequent change to be notified under this paragraph.
- The notification of any change of 10 per cent or more shall be given no later than five days after such change occurs. The time period of five days is understood as being five working days.

11. States Parties agree to notify:

- Any changes in the designation of formations or units pursuant to Section I, III, and V of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information at least 42 days in advance;
- Any closures of objects of verification within the last month pursuant to Section V, on the fifteenth of each month;
- Any creation or move to another location of an object of verification at least 42 days in advance.

12. The States Parties agree that, in addition to the requirements for the submission of information and notifications as prescribed in Article XVII of the Treaty and in paragraph 1 of the Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, they will endeavour to supplement the annual exchange of information pursuant to the aforementioned Protocol in written form by an electronic data version on diskette in the agreed format; the written form remaining the official version.

13. Each State Party should notify to all other States Parties its passive declared site inspection quota coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section VII, paragraph 1(C).

ANNEX C: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND RESOLUTION IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP

1. Introducing common procedures concerning flights of the aviation transportation means with the inspection team.
2. Point of entry/exit.
3. Immunity of the transportation means of an inspection team.
4. Formulation of principles for the elaboration of declared site diagrams including the possibility of a more precise formulation/interpretation of the term "routinely."
5. Equipment to be used during inspections.
6. Rules on photography.

7. Calendar year/possibility of synchronization with implementation year.

8. Financing of the inspections.

9. Common understanding of the obligation pursuant to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section VIII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B).

10. Review and updating of the Treaty Notification Formats to ensure their continued viability.

11. The issue of TLE which has left, on a temporary basis, without re-assignment, the normal peacetime location, for commitments under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

12. A question whether, with reference to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section I, paragraph 1, all units and formations holding equipment subject to the Treaty, including depots, bases, and Designated Permanent Storage Sites, should be notified in both Charts I and III.

13. Disposal of TLE in excess of reduction liabilities and disposal of decommissioned TLE.

14. Rounding of passive inspection quotas.

15. Enhanced transparency measures on ambulances built on the chassis of ACVs or APC look-alikes as listed in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment.

ANNEX D: TOPICS THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED DURING THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

1. Article II: definitions of;

"group of States Parties";

"area of application";

"accession of other OSCE States Parties";

"designated permanent storage site";

"armoured vehicle launched bridge";

"combat aircraft";

And the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment

2. Article III:

Export of equipment;

Transparency concerning TLE assigned to Internal Security Forces;

United peacekeeping force proposal.

3. Article IV:
 - Approach to limitations and maximum levels of holdings;
 - Stationing forces on the territory of another State Party.
4. Article V:
 - Implementation;
 - Temporary deployment;
 - Stationed forces.
5. Article VI:
 - Sufficiency rule.
6. Article X:
 - Removal from DPSS.
7. Article XI:
 - Implementation;
 - Limits;
 - Removal from storage.
8. Article XII:
 - Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by internal security forces (pursuant to Oslo Final Document, 5 June 1992);
 - Transparency;
 - Need of those states which joined the Treaty in 1992;
 - Criteria concerning internal security force levels.
9. Article XIV:
 - Aerial inspections.
10. Article XVI:
 - Future role of the Joint Consultative Group;
 - Duration of sessions of the Joint Consultative Group.
11. Article XVIII:
 - Follow-up negotiations;
 - Modalities;
 - Proposal for a Supplementary Agreement.
12. Miscellaneous
 - United peacekeeping force proposal;
 - Exceptional circumstances;
 - Joint Consultative Group dialogue on Treaty support fund.

ANNEX E: STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

To promote the implementation of the Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Joint Consultative Group of 14 June 1991 (the Statement of the Soviet Representative), I have been instructed by the Government of the Russian Federation to state the following.

1. It is understood that conventional armaments and equipment in the three Treaty limited categories referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery) will be deemed destroyed or rendered militarily unusable, in accordance with that statement, upon the application of any of the following methods:

- (A) Destruction or conversion of conventional armaments and equipment under procedures that provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable;
- (B) Provision of satisfactory documentary evidence as meeting requirements of sufficient visible evidence, only in case of such armaments and equipment destroyed prior to the promulgation of this statement. The Russian Federation intends to provide such documentary evidence with regard to armaments and equipment destroyed in the area of application of the Treaty after 17 November 1995;
- (C) Segregation of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles exposed to the influence of atmospheric factors, with hatches and covers of engine compartments opened, with the invitation of a group of experts to conduct-at its own expense-an examination of a random sample representative of those conventional armaments and equipment, prior to their removal from a display site for final disposal (scrapping), and notification of such removal;
- (D) Visit of group of experts, at its own expense and upon invitation, to count already derelict conventional armaments and equipment;
- (E) Notification preceding or accompanying each transfer of conventional armaments and equipment to other States Parties within the area of application of the Treaty, with equivalent relevant notification from the recipient State Party. Such transfers will be done in line with Treaty provisions and will be compatible with the objectives and terms of the Statement of the Soviet Representative.

2. Continuing its efforts aimed at the implementation of the statement of the Soviet representative, the Russian Federation will apply methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this statement to conventional armaments and equipment located on its territory. It will co-operate with the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in applying those methods to conventional armaments and equipment located on their territories. The Russian Federation will negotiate the necessary arrangements with those states for

the purpose of completing by joint efforts the process referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative by the year 2000.

3. If, despite good faith efforts, the quota of 6000 battle tanks subject to elimination is not fully met, the shortfall of not more than 2300 battle tanks will be covered by applying methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this statement to an equal number of armoured combat vehicles in excess of the quota of 1500 pieces; and thus the overall process referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative will be in general deemed completed. Notwithstanding that, a number of battle tanks equal to the above-mentioned shortfall will be subsequently eliminated. The envisaged date for the completion of the process of their elimination will depend on the duration of their operational and service life and on the availability of financial resources. That elimination will be carried out in line with paragraph 1 of this statement.

4. Upon completion of initial visits referred to in paragraph 1 of this statement, the Russian Federation will be ready to discuss in the JCG their results and in the light of these to make arrangements, as necessary, for further visits, as well as to discuss possible modalities for further visits. In general, relevant practices established in the process of Treaty implementation will be followed as much as applicable in the organization and conduct of the visits.

STATEMENTS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH:

- Notwithstanding the rights of each state as stated in Article XIV of the Treaty, each State Party should attempt to avoid conducting inspections during the officially recognized holidays of the other State Party.
- With regard to the phrase "on the availability of financial resources" in the Statement of the Representative of the Russian Federation as contained in Annex E of the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, it is understood that this phrase is without prejudice to other arms control obligations.
- Temporary deployment and reallocation of quotas referred to in Section IV, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Document will not be used in the context of the Azerbaijan Republic.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AT THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE

31 MAY 1996

Unless flexibilities listed in the agreement on the flank issue are realized by 31 May 1999 the Russian Federation retains the right to use other Treaty flexibilities discussed but not mentioned in the above agreement.

STATEMENT OF UKRAINE AT THE CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

31 MAY 1996

In connection with the decision of the CFE Review Conference of 31 May 1996 to adopt the "Document Agreed by the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990," Ukraine gives consent to such a decision, with the understanding that, in implementing its provisions, the States Parties will proceed from the following:

1. The rights and obligations of the Russian Federation set forth in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section V, paragraph 1, of the Document, in relation to "the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed," do not cover the territory of Ukraine, namely the autonomous Republic of the Crimea, Nikolayev Oblast, Zaporozhskaya Oblast and Kherson Oblast.

2. Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section IV, paragraph 2, of the Document, do not cover that portion of the TLE of the naval infantry and coastal defence forces which, as a result of the Black Sea Fleet division between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, will be assigned to the Russian Federation and subject to their withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine with the agreed timeframes.

3. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 2, of the Document, shall in no way restrict the right and possibilities of Ukraine to deploy on a temporary basis, under Article V, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, combat tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery within the "new" flank area.

4. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 3, of the Document, shall in no way bear upon the rights and obligations of Ukraine under the Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 15 May 1992.

The delegation of Ukraine requests to distribute this Statement as an Annex to the Final Document of the Conference.

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF MOLDOVA TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE CFE TREATY ON 31 MAY 1996

In relation to paragraph 7 Section 2 of the Final Document, the Republic of Moldova would like to make the following statement:

The early entry into force of the bilateral agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops, signed between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on 21 October 1994 shall contribute to full implementation of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

In relation to Section IV, paragraph 2 of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contained in the Annex A of the Final Document, the Republic of Moldova would like to make the following interpretative statement:

The constitution of the Republic of Moldova has proclaimed the permanent neutrality of the country, prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of the Republic. In view of these constitutional provisions, the Republic of Moldova cannot allow even temporary deployment of conventional armaments belonging to other countries on its territory.

I would like to ask you Mr. Chairman to annex this statement to the Final Document with the translation into all official languages.

THE STATEMENT OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION ON THE "DOCUMENT AGREED AMONG THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CFE TREATY OF NOVEMBER 19, 1990."

On the occasion of the adoption of the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Turkish delegation registers the following understanding:

1. The Document in question does not change in any way the legally binding character of the CFE Treaty and its associated documents, nor the obligations of individual States Parties to the Treaty.
2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section IV of the Document cannot be interpreted in a manner which may prejudice the provision contained in Article IV, paragraph 5 of the CFE Treaty, nor the principle of free consent enshrined in the OSCE documents in the use of such rights.
3. The "flexibilities" contained in the Treaty consist of those mentioned in the above paragraphs and can only be used in full respect of the relevant Treaty provisions and on the basis of agreements concluded and implemented with free consent of the States Parties involved.
4. While the Turkish delegation accepts an examination of the DPSS provisions, it makes it clear that it can accept eventual modifications only if they do not result in force concentrations prejudicial to regional balances and provided

that a similar examination is carried out for the clarification of the question of "temporary deployments," in particular with regard to their duration.

5. In view of the continued relevance of the regional sublimits even under changing conditions, the Turkish government will not enter into any negotiation prejudicial to the principle of regional sub-limits, nor accept any force limits which would not take due consideration of the size of its territory, population and the security environment in adjacent regions not subject to Treaty limitations.

I request that this statement be attached to the Final Document.

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF GEORGIA

The Georgian delegation has considered paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section IV of the Document Amongst the States Parties on the flank issue very carefully. We still have some very serious concerns about the future implementation of their content. In this context we would like to make the following statement:

Any agreement on temporary deployment of conventional armed forces on the territory of Georgia or for the reallocation of equipment quotas established by the Tashkent Agreement must be the result of free negotiation and must be taken with full respect for the sovereignty of Georgia and for its constitution. All parties must implement all the provisions of any such agreements in good faith and in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

STATEMENT BY THE NETHERLANDS

THE NETHERLANDS

31MAY 1996

It is the view of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance that any future flexibility must be consistent with the legal framework of the Treaty, as agreed by all 30 States Parties.

I request that this statement will be attached to the Final Document.

Appendix E

CFE TREATY: NATIONAL VERIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

BELGIUM

AGENCY: Ministere de la Defense Nationale, Verification Unit (JSO-D/WV)

LOCATION: Brussels, Belgium

CFE TREATY TLE: 2,333»

'''Note: All CFE Treaty TLE figures were drawn from the August 1992, data exchange

CANADA

AGENCY: J3 Arms Control Verification Directorate, National Defense Headquarters

LOCATION: Ottawa, Canada

CFE TREATY TLE: 272

DENMARK

AGENCY: Headquarters, Chief of Defense Arms Control Section

LOCATION: Copenhagen, Denmark

CFE TREATY TLE: 1,486

FRANCE

AGENCY: L'Unite Francaise de Verification

LOCATION: Creil Cedex, France

CFE TREATY TLE: 8,219

GERMANY

AGENCY: Federal Armed Forces Verification Center

LOCATION: Geilenkirchen, Germany

CFE TREATY TLE: 22,300

GREECE

AGENCY: Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Arms Control Directorate

LOCATION: Athens, Greece

CFE TREATY TLE: 5,833

ICELAND

AGENCY: Defense Department Ministry for Foreign Affairs

LOCATION: Reykjavik, Iceland

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment

ITALY

AGENCY: Joint Armaments Verification Center

LOCATION: Rome, Italy

CFE TREATY TLE: 7,737

LUXEMBOURG

AGENCY: Inspection, Verification and Observation Group

LOCATION: Luxembourg

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment

NETHERLANDS

AGENCY: Defence Staff, Arms Control Branch

LOCATION: The Hague, Netherlands

CFE TREATY TLE: 3,461

NORWAY

AGENCY: Headquarters Defense Command Norway

LOCATION: Oslo, Norway

CFE TREATY TLE: 962

PORTUGAL

AGENCY: Unidade Nacional De Verificacoes

LOCATION: Lisbon, Portugal

CFE TREATY TLE: 872

SPAIN

AGENCY: Unidad De Verificacion Espanola

LOCATION: Madrid, Spain

CFE TREATY TLE: 3, 655

TURKEY

AGENCY: International Security Affairs Division Verification and Implementation Branch

LOCATION: Ankara, Turkey

CFE TREATY TLE: 8,545

UNITED KINGDOM

AGENCY: Joint Arms Control Implementation Group

LOCATION: RAF Henlow, United Kingdom (moved in May 1996 from RAF Scampton)

CFE TREATY TLE: 6,025

UNITED STATES

AGENCY: On-Site Inspection Agency, European Operations
LOCATION: Frankfurt, Germany
CFE TREATY TLE: 12,846

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

Note: In November 1990, the Budapest Group (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic) superseded the WTO and accepted all CFE Treaty responsibilities.

BULGARIA

AGENCY: Director of Disarmament
LOCATION: Sofia, Bulgaria
CFE TREATY TLE: 7,034

CZECH REPUBLIC

AGENCY: Disarmament Control Office
LOCATION: Prague, Czech Republic
CFE TREATY TLE: 6,306

HUNGARY

AGENCY: Arms Control and Verification Center
LOCATION: Budapest, Hungary
CFE TREATY TLE: 4,305

POLAND

AGENCY: Polish Verification Center
LOCATION: Warsaw, Poland
CFE TREATY TLE: 8,100

ROMANIA

AGENCY: Directorate for International Relations and Treaties
LOCATION: Bucharest, Romania
CFE TREATY TLE: 10,603

SLOVAK REPUBLIC (SLOVAKIA)

AGENCY: Verification Centre, Ministry of Defense
LOCATION: Bratislava, Slovak Republic
CFE TREATY TLE: 3,153

FORMER SOVIET UNION

Note: In May 1992, at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the successor states to the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) formally accepted all CFE Treaty responsibilities. The Tashkent Group divided the former Soviet Union's treaty limited equipment.

ARMENIA

AGENCY: Unit of International Treaties Realization
LOCATION: Yerevan, Republic of Armenia
CFE TREATY TLE: Data Not Available

AZERBAIJAN

AGENCY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
LOCATION: Baku, Azerbaijan
CFE TREATY TLE: 397

BELARUS

AGENCY: National Agency for Verification and Inspections
LOCATION: Minsk, Belarus
CFE TREATY TLE: 9,254

GEORGIA

AGENCY: Department of Foreign Affairs and Disarmament
LOCATION: Tbilisi, Georgia
CFE TREATY TLE: 105

KAZAKHSTAN

AGENCY: Treaty Implementation Section, International Department, Ministry of Defense
LOCATION: Almaty, Kazakhstan
CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment

MOLDOVA

AGENCY: Department for International Treaty Compliance
LOCATION: Chisinau (Kishinev), Moldova
CFE TREATY TLE: 236

RUSSIA

AGENCY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
LOCATION: Moscow, Russian Federation
CFE TREATY TLE: 42,692



UKRAINE


AGENCY: Verification Center Armed Forces of Ukraine
LOCATION: Kiev, Ukraine
CFE TREATY TLE: 18,341

Appendix F

U.S. AIR FORCE EUROPEAN OPERATIONS COMMAND: PERSONNEL STRENGTH 1990-1992

OSIA European Operations Personnel Assigned by Service





Appendix G

CHRONOLOGY: CFE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION, 1972-1996

- 1972 May 24. President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev reached a compromise agreement to hold separate political and military negotiations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would deal with political issues, and Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe with actual force reductions. Derente in Europe began.
- November 22. The CSCE process formally began in Helsinki, Finland. These preliminary negotiations of the 35 CSCE member nations involved setting up a framework to negotiate confidence and security building measures.
- 1973 July 3. CSCE negotiations began after six months of preparatory meetings. The 35 nations of the CSCE met to begin the process of negotiating confidence and security building measures in Europe.
- October 30. Negotiations on MBFR began. The object of negotiations was to reduce conventional forces in the zone of Central Europe surrounding East and West Germany and to provide a stable military balance in Central Europe.
- 1975 August 1. The CSCE resulted in 35 nations signing the concluding document. The Helsinki Final Act was primarily designed to build confidence within Europe. Confidence-building measures included notification of major military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops.
- 1977 October 4. A first CSCE review conference on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act began in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
- 1978 March 9. The Belgrade CSCE review conference closed, with no conclusions reached.
- May 25. French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing proposed a two-stage security conference during a UN meeting.
- 1979 December. Negotiations for MBFR stalled because of the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
- December. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
- 1980 November 11. The second CSCE review conference began in Madrid, Spain. These negotiations would continue for almost three years, leading to the adoption of the Madrid Mandate.
- 1983 September 6-9. The Madrid CSCE conference ended after almost three years of negotiations. The 35 CSCE states signed the Madrid Concluding Document, or Madrid Mandate, which established the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures. The mandate called for member nations to negotiate treaties reducing the size of their armed forces in Europe, in addition to continuing work to develop confidence and security building measures.
- 1984 January 17. The CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) began.
- 1985 March 10. Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- March 13. President Ronald Reagan reversed his position on holding high-level talks with leaders of the Soviet Union.
- November 19-20. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held their first summit meeting.
- 1986 April 18. General Secretary Gorbachev proposed in MBFR negotiations to reduce ground and air forces, and to include conventional and nuclear weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. Gorbachev recognized the presence of significant asymmetries of conventional forces and proposed large-scale force reductions to be verified by on-site inspection.

- June 11. Gorbachev's proposals were formalized during a Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) meeting in Budapest, with the proposals later known as the Budapest Appeal or Budapest Communiqué.
- September 22. In Stockholm, 35 CSCE nations, meeting as the Conference on Confidence and Security Building and Disarmament in Europe, adopted an accord, the Stockholm Document, designed to increase transparency of military activities and to reduce the risk of war in Europe. The agreement required notification of military exercises of 13,000 troops or more, and allowed on-site inspections of field activities of more than 17,000 ground troops or 5,000 airborne troops.
- October 11-12. A summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was held at Reykjavik, Iceland. It created a positive context for further negotiations.
- November 4. The third CSCE review conference began in Vienna.
- December 12. NATO's North Atlantic Council of foreign ministers issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. The declaration called for two distinct sets of negotiations: one to build on the CSBM results of the Stockholm Conference and the other to establish conventional stability in Europe through negotiations on conventional arms control from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).
- 1987 January 7. The Stockholm Document entered into force. The agreement for the first time provided for a negotiated right to conduct on-site inspections of military forces in the field.
- February 17. Informal talks between the 16 NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact nations began in Vienna on a mandate for conventional negotiations in Europe, which would set out treaty negotiating guidelines.
- July 27. NATO presented a draft mandate during the 23-nation conference in Vienna. The mandate called for elimination of force disparities, capability for surprise attack, and large-scale offensive operations, and the establishment of an effective verification system.
- December 8. The INF treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- 1988 January 26. The Secretary of Defense established the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) as a Department of Defense agency responsible for conducting on-site inspection, monitoring, and escort operations under the INF Treaty.
- May 29-June 2. At the Moscow Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev emphasized the importance of stability and security in Europe, specifically calling for data exchange, verification of these data, and then reductions.
- December 7. General Secretary Gorbachev announced at the United Nations a unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, and demobilization of 500,000 Soviet troops.
- 1989 January 14. Twenty-three member nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact produced the Mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The mandate set out objectives for the CFE Treaty and established negotiating principles.
- January 15. The Vienna CSCE review conference ended after more than two years, resulting in the Vienna Concluding Document, which set a mandate for CSBM talks, specifying that the talks would work toward "elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence and security building measures designed to reduce the risk of confrontation in Europe."
- February 2. After 15 years of negotiations, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks ended in Vienna.
- March 9. The Vienna Confidence and Security Building Measures negotiations mandated by the Vienna Concluding Document began, with 35 states participating.
- March 9. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty negotiations commenced in Vienna with 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- May 20-25. President George Bush and France's President François Mitterrand met at Kennebunkport, Maine. President Bush announced the acceptance of combat aircraft and helicopters in the reductions as proposed by the WTO. He also proposed a ceiling of 275,000 personnel stationed in Europe by the U.S. and Soviet Union.
- May 29-30. During a NATO summit in Brussels, President Bush's proposal was adopted and subsequently presented in Vienna.
- November 9. The Berlin Wall fell. Revolutions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria followed within four weeks.
- December 2-3. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met at sea off Malta and agreed to speed up arms control and economic negotiations.
- 1990 January 15-February 22. Non-Soviet WTO states negotiated for deeper Soviet cuts and earlier withdrawals.
- January 16-February 5. The 35 CSCE states held a seminar on military doctrine in Vienna.

January 31. In his State of the Union address, President Bush proposed lower levels of Soviet and U.S. forces in Europe. The proposal called for 195,000 personnel for each nation and 30,000 for the U.S. in the periphery.

February 26. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on withdrawal of Soviet forces. The agreement called for the withdrawal by July 1991 of all 73,500 Soviet troops, along with more than 1,200 tanks, 2,500 armored combat vehicles, 1,200 pieces of artillery, and 80 aircraft.

March 9. Hungary and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on withdrawal of Soviet forces. The Soviet Union agreed that by the end of June 1991, it would withdraw all its forces, consisting of 50,000 troops, 860 tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles, and other equipment from Hungary.

May 5. The first Two plus Four (foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic plus France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) Meeting on German Unification was held in Bonn.

May 29. President Bush signed National Security Directive 41, which made the Secretary of Defense responsible for CFE compliance and directed the On-Site Inspection Agency to prepare for CFE Treaty implementation. It also directed OSIA to prepare for inspection duties under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

June 26. The Hungarian National Assembly voted to begin negotiations to withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

July 6. NATO announced the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, which called for decreased size of NATO forces as the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Eastern Europe, among other measures to draw down from the confrontational attitudes of the Cold War.

July 16. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Gorbachev agreed to a complete Soviet withdrawal from Germany by 1994 and a ceiling of 370,000 active German military personnel.

September 11. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker formally agreed to rescind their earlier agreement to limit their own personnel in the region, and to resolve the personnel issue during CFE IA negotiations.

September 12. In Moscow, the Two plus Four countries signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. The World War II "Big

Four" gave up their occupation rights in Germany on October 3, paving the way for German unification.

October 1. With German unification drawing near, the Soviet Union had 17 divisions stationed in East Germany, totaling more than 363,700 troops, which had to be withdrawn by 1994.

October 3. The German Democratic Republic ceased to exist, as Germany was unified.

October 3. President Bush requested that the U.S. and Soviet negotiators move from Vienna to New York to facilitate completion of the negotiations in time for the 19-21 November CSCE Paris Summit.

October-November. U.S. Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resolved most major outstanding CFE issues. CFE negotiators in Vienna resolved most of the remaining smaller, technical disputes. Major disagreements over verification were resolved, and the "sufficiency rule" was established.

October 13. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze sent a letter to Secretary of State Baker listing the CFE Treaty-limited equipment that the USSR had relocated to east of the Urals.

November 3. Warsaw Pact countries signed an agreement in Budapest that divided Warsaw Pact allocations of forces by country as allowed under the CFE Treaty.

November 14. Poland and Germany signed an agreement confirming the existing Polish-German border.

November 17. CSBM Vienna Document 1990 was completed and signed by the 34 members of the CSCE. (German unification had lowered the number of CSCE states by one, as the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist.) The Vienna Document 1990 expanded on the CSBM provisions of the 1986 Stockholm Document.

November 18. The Soviet Union submitted official treaty data. Data submitted were significantly out of line with data submitted two years earlier-as the Soviets' number of objects of verification was reduced from 1,500 to 1,000.

November 19. At the Paris Summit, the CFE Treaty was signed by leaders of 22 states.

November 21. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe was adopted by all 34 members of the CSCE. The charter's goal was to recognize the end of the Cold War and to reflect a new spirit of cooperation.

November 26. CFE IA negotiations formally commenced in Vienna.

- November 29. The first meeting of the Joint Consultative Group (*JCG*) convened in Vienna.
- December 6. The United States dispatched a team of experts to Moscow in an effort to resolve discrepancies in Soviet treaty data.
- 1991 February 4-14. The first U.S. CFE course was conducted at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, D.C.
- February 14. The Soviet Union submitted updated treaty data. The Soviets interpreted equipment transferred to coastal defense, naval infantry, Strategic Rocket Forces, and civil defense units as being not countable as treaty-limited equipment.
- February 15. The United States and other NATO nations suspended treaty ratification because of the Soviet Union's unilateral reinterpretation of the treaty.
- March 31. The Warsaw Treaty Organization's military organs and structures were dissolved.
- May 14. The U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency conducted its first CFE mock inspection, working with France's verification agency, L'Unite Francaise de Verification. OSIA's Team Gessert inspected the French 3rd Fighter Wing at Nancy-Ochey Airfield and, the next day, the French 3rd Tank Battalion.
- June 1. Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker met in Lisbon to discuss the final details of the CFE Treaty statement concerning Soviet naval infantry and coastal defense units.
- June 14. The Soviet government presented to other signatory states a "legally binding" statement on how it would comply with the terms of the CFE Treaty, covering issues such as reassignment of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) to coastal defense, naval infantry and Strategic Rocket Forces, and elimination of TLE east of the Urals.
- June 14. The Secretary of Defense assigned the U.S. Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) as the executive agent for CFE, with responsibility for U.S. CFE compliance in Europe.
- June 18. The Joint Consultative Group held its first Extraordinary Conference at the Hague. During the session, the Soviet statements on coastal defense and naval infantry and on reductions east of the Urals were read and accepted as treaty documents.
- July 1. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved.
- July 9. President Bush submitted the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification.
- August 19. An abortive military coup d'etat was launched in the Soviet Union. After the coup, the Soviet government continued, but very weakly, while nationalism grew rapidly in the Soviet republics.
- October 18. At the second Extraordinary Conference of the *JCG*, held in Vienna, the Soviet Union issued a political declaration stating its intention to rapidly withdraw weapons based in the Baltics. The *JCG* no longer considered Baltic states to be within the CFE area of application.
- December 8. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Within a week, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also joined the CIS.
- December 25. The Soviet Union dissolved into 15 independent states, 8 of which had former Soviet forces stationed in their territories and fell within the CFE Treaty's area of application.
- December 26. The United States ratified the CFE Treaty.
- 1992 January 10. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)-which consisted of the 16 NATO nations and the 15 newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, along with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia-assembled a High Level Working Group in Brussels. Of the member states, only Kazakstan did not attend. The meeting agreed that CFE Treaty obligations assumed by the former USSR should be fully accepted by all newly created CIS states within the ATTU.
- January 13. The Joint Consultative Group met to discuss how to incorporate CIS republics into the CFE Treaty.
- January 30-31. CSCE foreign ministers in Prague admitted several new CIS states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
- February 10-14. The On-Site Inspection Agency conducted its first CFE mock inspections inside the territory of the Eastern Group of States. The first inspection was held at Siverskiy Air Base and the second at Pushkin, both in Russia's Leningrad Military District.
- February 21. The High Level Working Group meeting in Brussels agreed on methods for bringing the CFE Treaty into force.
- March 4. CSCE participants adopted the Vienna Document 1992. The agreement subsumed and added to the Vienna Document 1990 and provided for expanded membership in the CSCE process and greater exchange of information in numerous areas

of CSBM. With the admission of most of the former Soviet states, the CSCE included 48 member nations.

March 24. The CSCE nations signed the Vienna Document 1992.

April 3. The High Level Working Group of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council met to discuss division of the former Soviet Union's TLE among independent CIS states.

May 8. The High Level Working Group met again to discuss division of the former Soviet Union's TLE.

May 15. The CIS states met at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and agreed on division of former Soviet forces among CIS states.

June 5. The JCG held its third Extraordinary Conference in Oslo, Norway. Twenty-nine countries signed the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty. The document removed all obstacles to ratification of the treaty and modified language of the treaty to include all CIS states which were in the ATTU, legalizing the entry of the new states into the treaty and their acceptance of the obligations of the USSR.

July 1. Ukraine ratified the CFE Treaty.

July 5. The United States completed its 44th and last CFE mock inspection mission before entry into force of the treaty. During these 44 missions, OSIA inspected 100 separate sites. About half-27 missions and 50 inspections-involved cooperative mock inspections with NATO partners. Six missions involved participation with Eastern bloc nations: Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. The remainder took place at U.S. sites in Europe, giving the host site personnel as well as OSIA teams training in the CFE inspection process.

July 8. Russia ratified the CFE Treaty.

July 10. By the time of the Helsinki CSCE Summit, three nations-Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakstan-had not yet ratified the CFE Treaty. At the fourth JCG Extraordinary Conference, held concurrently with the CSCE Summit, the CFE Treaty nations agreed on provisional entry into force of the treaty, which would allow implementation to begin while they waited for the remaining three countries to ratify the treaty.

July 10. CFE IA was signed by 29 states during the Helsinki CSCE summit. The agreement limited personnel to specific national thresholds and put into place an extensive information exchange regime.

July 17. The CFE Treaty provisionally entered into force, limiting five major categories of weapons, with 29 signatory states. When the remaining countries deposited their instruments of ratification in October, it was agreed to make full entry into force retroactive to July 17.

July 17. The CFE baseline period began. Canada conducted the first NATO inspection in the former Soviet Union.

July 18-20. OSIA's Team White, led by Lt. Colonel Elmer G. "Guy" White, conducted the first U.S. CFE baseline inspection at Buy, Russia.

July 20. The first U.S. liaison officer (LNO) activity occurred in England during baseline.

August 6-8. OSIA conducted the first U.S. reduction inspection at the Capital Repair Plant at Woensdorf, Germany. Russian forces still in the former East Germany reduced the equipment.

August 13-15. In the first Eastern Group of States inspection, a Russian team inspected a Canadian site in Germany, followed by a sequential inspection of U.S. stationed forces at Geibelstadt, Germany, for the first U.S. CFE escort mission.

August 14. The first post-baseline information on national equipment holdings was exchanged.

September 4. U.S. inspection teams were denied access to Russian declared sites. A four-month dispute ensued.

September 22. Fifty-four member states of the CSCE follow-on conference created the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) mandate for new security negotiations. CFE was replaced as the primary tool for conventional arms control confidence and security building measures. Unlike the CFE Treaty, all states would participate individually and not as alliances or military blocs.

October 12. Armenia deposited its CFE instruments of ratification in The Hague, leaving only two nations to ratify before the treaty could fully enter into force.

October 3-9. Following a German inspection of Naro-Fominsk, Russia, in late September, two U.S. teams and one French team conducted inspections in rapid succession at Naro-Fominsk to test Russian assurances that site diagrams would be corrected and that inspectors would have full access at declared objects of verification (OOVs).

October 30. The final two CFE ratification instruments, those of Belarus and Kazakstan, were deposited at The Hague.

- November 9. The Joint Consultative Group formalized the CFE Treaty's entry into force with 29 states, and made entry into force retroactive to the July 17 date of provisional entry into force.
- November 14. The CFE baseline period ended. During baseline the United States hosted nine inspection teams that inspected 23 U.S. declared sites, and conducted 33 missions into former WTO nations, inspecting 44 Eastern bloc sites. In addition to the baseline inspections, the United States also conducted five reduction inspections.
- November 15. With the baseline period ended, the CFE treaty moved into a three-year reduction period.
- 1993 January. NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) invited the participation of former Warsaw Pact guest inspectors on its teams. Hosting guest inspectors from NATO nations had been a common practice since the beginning of baseline, but this marked the first time NATO had invited inspectors from former Eastern bloc nations onto their teams.
- April 28. The United States hosted the first guest inspector from a former Warsaw Pact nation on one of its CFE inspection teams when a Czech inspector participated in a U.S. inspection in Tazar, Hungary.
- September. Russia's President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom asking that they recognize the flanks as a serious problem.
- November 17. The first CFE reduction year ended. All signatories met their 25 percent reduction liabilities for the first year, with the exceptions of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- 1994 March 21. Russia asked the JCG to consider modifying the CFE Treaty to increase the amount of TLE that could be taken out of storage and the length of time it could be out of storage.
- March 23. Belarus threatened to cease its CFE reductions because of high costs, unless it received assistance from other nations.
- March 31. The United States gave \$10 million to be divided between Belarus and Ukraine to help finance their CFE reductions.
- May 15. A U.S. guest inspector took part for the first time in an inspection conducted by a former Warsaw Pact nation. Major Mark Lieber, USMC, served on a Bulgarian inspection in Romania.
- September 19. For the first time, a U.S. CFE inspection team included a Russian guest inspector. OSIA's Lt. Col. Fred E. Busing led this team on a declared site inspection in Oradea, Romania.
- November 13. The CFE Treaty's second reduction year ended. All but two nations had met their 60 percent reduction goals.
- December 4. At the CSCE Summit in Budapest, the 52 nations of the CSCE signed the Vienna Document 1994, which replaced the Vienna Document 1992 and expanded on its confidence and security building measures. At the same time, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
- 1995 January 10. The United States agreed that Russian forces in Chechnya did not constitute a CFE Treaty violation, since flank limits did not come into effect until the end of the reduction period in November. After that, they would still not be a violation, since the treaty allowed temporary deployments.
- February 23. President Alexander Lukashenka announced that Belarus would suspend all CFE reduction activities because of the cost, which he called "economically unjust," since Belarus did not produce the weapons left behind when the Soviet Union dissolved but still had responsibility for destroying them. Belarus did state, however, that reductions could begin again if financing was made available.
- May 10. At a Clinton/Yeltsin summit meeting in Moscow, the United States told Russia that it would not support modification to the CFE Treaty until the review conference in May 1996.
- September 12. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan announced that they would not be able to meet their reduction liabilities by the end of the reduction period. Ukraine said it could meet its commitments with the exception of TLE assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, which it could not reduce until the equipment in the fleet was divided between Ukraine and Russia. The other three nations blamed economic difficulties.
- October 15. Belarus resumed its reduction of treaty-limited equipment, but stated it would not be able to meet its remaining reduction liability by the end of the reduction period in November.
- November 17. The CFE reduction period ended. The treaty nations issued a joint statement identifying the countries that were not in compliance with their treaty obligations: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Despite some countries' failing to fully meet their reduction liabilities, the amount of equipment reduced by the CFE Treaty constituted the largest negotiated arms reduction in history, with over 50,000 pieces of equipment destroyed. This equipment included 19,200 battle tanks, 18,600 armed combat vehicles, 9,800 pieces of artillery, 2,200 combat aircraft, and 370 attack helicopters.

- November 17. The residual level validation period (RLVP) began. This 120-day "second baseline" confirmed the accuracy of national reductions, recategorizations, and relocations of equipment declared after the reduction period.
- November 25. Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on division of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine would receive 150 naval installations of the fleet in the agreement.
- November 28. The Joint Consultative Group gave Belarus an extension until April 26, 1996, to complete its reductions of treaty-limited equipment. The United States and Germany agreed to assist Belarus in its reduction effort.
- December 31. Russia failed to meet its deadline for reducing TLE it had moved east of the Urals prior to treaty signature. Russia cited economic difficulties and requested that the JCG extend the deadline until 1998.
- 1996 March 16. The residual level validation period ended. During the 120-day RLVP, NATO nations conducted 246 inspections of Eastern bloc nations. Of these, the United States led 38 inspections and provided guest inspectors to 56 teams led by other nations. The Eastern bloc nations inspected NATO nations 183 times, with U.S. sites in Europe receiving 11 inspections.
- April 26. Belarus did not complete its reductions in time for the deadline proposed in its November 1995 plan.
- May 15-31. The 30 treaty nations held the CFE Review Conference in Vienna. The Final Document of the conference included compromises on the flank issue, east of the Urals reductions, and other issues.

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GLOSSARY

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACIU	Arms Control Implementation Unit
ACV	armored combat vehicle
AIFV	armored infantry fighting vehicle
AMC	Air Mobility Command
APC	armored personnel carrier
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
BOU	battle dress uniform
CAEST	conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty
CBMs	confidence-building measures
CFE Treaty	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVA	Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi
CSBMs	confidence and security building measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ewe	Chemical Weapons Convention
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DoD	Department of Defense
DPSS	designated permanent storage sites
EIF	entry into force
EO	European Operations
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
FAO	foreign area officer
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GMT	Greenwich mean time
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
HLTF	High Level Task Force
INF Treaty	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite
ISS	Inspection Support Staff
JACIG	Joint Arms Control Implementation Group
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LNO	liaison officer
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MD	Military District
mm	millimeter
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAKI	National Agency for Control and Inspections
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
NSC	National Security Council

NSD 41	National Security Directive 41
NTM	national technical means
NTT	Nuclear Testing Treaties
OOV	object of verification
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PNET	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
POC	point of contact
POE	point of entry
POET	Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment
RAF	Royal Air Force
RLVP	residual level validation period
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRF	Strategic Rocket Forces
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TAMC	Theater Army Materiel Command
TLE	treaty-limited equipment
TTBT	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UFV	L'Unite Franc;aise de Verification
USA	U.S. Army
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAFA	U.S. Air Force Academy
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	U.S. Army Europe
USARI	U.S. Army Russian Institute
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USLANTCOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USMLM	U.S. Military Liaison Mission
USN	U.S. Navy
USNAVEUR	U.S. Navy Europe
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UVB	L'Unite Beige de Verification
VCC	Verification Coordinating Committee
VICS	Verification and Implementation Coordination Section
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
ZVBW	Zentrum fiir Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr

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