Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...

MSSION: Prepare 3eport end Reoomenilotions Covering 

the Q.uastermaBter Supply Operations in the 

European Theator of Operations. 

The General Foord wca established by General Orders 128, 

f’eadquarters European Theater of Operatlona, 113 Army, dated 

17 .Time 1945, aa amended by mnsral Orders 182, dated 

7 .~u,.uisu~Cl9/+5and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1545, 

Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to 

prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, taotics ant: 

ailministration employ4 by the Thtted Statas forces Jn the 

Ruropean Theater.

n.L.,a.L.r%.A.L,. A .h -" 

TABU? OF COtTEETTS 

S"CT FAGE 

.- Pnrt One: Introduction . ............ 6 ................... 1 

Part Twcr General Quartermaster Supply. Transportation. 

Labor and Supply of Other Than Us Army Fcrcae 4 

Chapter 1: Classes of SupDlg........................ 4 

Section 1 .''Jar qepartment Definitions ............ 4 

Section 2 .Definitions Developed in the Euro- 

pean Theater of' OperationEl ............ 5 

Section 3 .European Theater of Operations 

lkperience with Definitlons ........... 5 

Secticn l+ .Conclusions and Secomnendations., ..... 9 

RiblloRraphy ...................................... 10 

Chapter 2: Levels of Supply......................... 11 

Section 1.Existing Definitions., ................ 11 

Section 2 .Determinetion of Levels ............... 12 

Section 3 .3xperience in the European Theater .... 15 

Section 

!+ 

.Conclusions and Recommendations ....... 16 

fliblioAraphy ...................................... 1U 

Chapter 3:- Daily Telegram........................... 19 

Section 1.Preocribed Use ........................ 19 

Section 2 .Use in the European Thecte-r of 

Operetions ............................ 19 

Section 3 .Conolusions and Recommenfintionu....... 23 

Bibliography...................................... 24 

Chapter 4 : quartermaater Depot 3perations in Coinmunioatigns 

Tone ......................... 25 

Section 1.rlepot Systev ......................... 25 

Section 2 .Requisiticning and Replenishient 

Procedure within the Theator., ........ 29 

Section 3 .Inventorying and Stock Accounting ..+ .. 31 

Seotion 4 .Conclusions md Recomment ations ....... 32 

Ribllo$raphy...................................... 33 

Chapter 5: Quartormaster Transportation., ........... 31. 

Section 1.quartermaster Wuok Company........... 34 

Soobion 2 .Other Units........................... 36 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) 

SUSJYCT PAGE 

Section 3 .Discussion..........................38 

saction 4 . Conolusions and Recommenaations .....40 

Biblio$raDhy .................................... 41 

Chapter 6: Quarternaster Labor Service............ 42 

wction 1 - nuartcrmaster Service Company .......42 

Section 2 .Other Labor ......................... 4-1 

"ection 3 .Conclusions snC Recommendations ..... 47 

RjbltopraDL.. ....................................49 

Choptor 7: 'upply end Service for US MYToroes 

and 'iupg!y of Othtir Thnu ITS &my Forces 50 

Section 1 .Sunply and scrvlces for Vnited Stat= 

Air JrorcBs, European Theater of 

Operntions..........................50 

Section 2 .TJnnltcd States Navy., ................ 54 

Section- j .Axmerican Rcd Cross.................. 55 

Section 4 .Civil AffairB ....................... 57 

saction 5 .suppl8 of hllisd Military Units..... 64 

Taction 6 .Conclwions and Rcoo;.v.iandations ..... 63 

PJ bliograpliy ....................................70 

pax* mee: Class 1 sumlg...........................71 

.--- Cliaptcr 8: sntlons................................71 

4ectjan 1 .Types of Pations....................71 

Section 2 .Operational Rations .................72 

Clection 3 .Eulk nations ........................74 

Scction /+ .Conclusions and Recommendations .....77 

Qibliographir .................................... 77 

Chrrpter 9 : Operating Frooedure . Proourenent 

and ISSU...............................7~ 

owtion 1 .Gomunicutions Zone .................78 

neation 2 .Field Forces ........................ 83 

section 3 .Bakers and Cooks Sahool, Catering 

Semioe ana Yess Teams., ............84 

Section l+ .Conclusions ana Recommsndations.. ...86

-- 

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.TABTX OY CONmlTs (Conttd) 

SWECT PAGE 

Bibliography .................................... 88 

Cheptsr 10: Operating Facilities. ................. 8Y 

Section 1 - Refrigeration Units ................. 89 

Section 2 - Raking and Ooffcc Roasting .......... 91 

section 3 - nuartemaster Railhead Company. 

(T/O & 9 10-197).................... 92 

Suction 4 - Conclusions and Rscommondations ..... 94 

Rlblioaraphy .................................... $7 

?art TOW: Class 11 p-. supply ...................... 99 

Chapter 11; q.uartermaster Class I T p: IV Operatiom. 

Communications Zone............ 99 

Faction 1 - Kission. Or#canizations en& Functions 99 

Soction 2 - Determination of Requirencnts....... 100 

Section 3 - Requisitioning Procedures........... 102 

Section h - Control an8 Distribution............104 

Section 5 - Conclusions and Recommendations.. ... 104 

Riblionraphy....................................105 

Ci-mpter 12: Class I T & IV Operatione, Tiold 

903.088................................106 

Section 1 - fl.partermastor. .%?.my Group........... 106 

Section 2 - Class IJ. b IV Section. Quartermaster 

Supply. Army ................. 106 

Sectlon 3 - Operation of Army Class I1 & IV 

Depots ..............................109 

Section 4 - Conoluelons and Recozmendations.....111 

Rib1io.raph.J .................................... 113 

Chapter 13: quartermaster Depot COmpWY. .%j>ply. 

(T/O L 110-227)......................114 

Seation 1 - 1”lssion and Organization............ 114 

Tection 2 - Employment in the European 

Theater of Operations.. .............114 

Bectlon 3 - Conclusion8 and Recommendations..... 116 

BiblioRraphy ....................................118 

iif. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d) 

SUBJECT PAGE 

Chapter 14: Beech Maintenance Sets 2nd Beach 

Follow-up Sets........................119 

Section 1 .Chnractarlstics and Usa............. 119 

Section 2 - Oneration...........................121 

Section 3 .Conclusions and Recommendations ..... 1.22 

Bibliography.................................... 123 

Chapter 15: Clothing ond EqUiDiIlfXlt ................ 124 

Section 1 - Allowmce and Yalntenance ...........124 

Section 2 - Winter Clcthing ..................... 1-27 

section 3 - ~oriclusionsand Recoruendetions ..... 129 

Bibliography....................................170 

Chapter 16: ‘7, uu^rtarrastor Bales Operations........131 

Section 1.nuortermaster Selus Conpnny. 

(T/O & E 10-157).................... 131 

section 2 .~ llctsStore Operatious .............. 132 

section 3 .~onclusionsana BeCOnJ?lt?UdCtfGns..... 173 

Bibliography....................................134 

Five: Class 111 Supply..........................1.35 

Chcpter 17: Putroleurn, Oil nnd Lubricnnt 

0per.i:iona ............................135 

section 1 .Introduction ........................135 

section 2 - Ekchwtics of Supply.................136 

Section 3 - prinripol Functions of Or retiag 

end Planning Agonci..a ...............143 

section 4 - ~onclusionsand Recoamendntions., ... 146 

Ribliography....................................148 

chapter 18: Logistical Fcictcrs .................... 150 

Conalusions nnd nrcoi ;lF..sndationa................. 155 

Ribliogra.)hy ....................................1% 

Cha?ter 19: Pasoline Supply Cofcpiny...............157 

section 1 .Misflion. Organization :ind Function. . 157 

ssotion 2 - Europmn Theoter of OperaLions 

mpcrfence .......................... 158 

section 3 - Conclusions and Hecomond.$tions. .... 160 

Riblioeraph. ....................................151 

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TABU OF COSTEVTS (Cont'd) 

SUBJXT PAfZ 

Ctapter 20: class TII (So1j.d Fuels) Operations.. i i; 162 

Section 1- ~eneral..r.r.....................rl.. 

162 

5ection 2 - Ogerations.. ......................... 163 

9ection 3 - IConolusionE and Recomendationz.. .... 165 

Bibliography ...................................... 167 

mETDLcm : 

1. 0,uartermaster Levels of Supi>ly, Zurogean Theater I 

29 Vovember 1942 to 3 March 29b5 

2. Letter, Eq 12th D,rol.,l Froup, file 400.312 (e-4 

"U?) Bub : Requisitioning and !:ovencnt Of Supplzee, 

2$ October 1gb/, 

3, Form for 'lailg Telegrm 

4. Letter, Iin, Seventh v9 ?my, fi1e.M lt00.213 OXJ 

sub3 : nuarteraaster Ren,uiremnts, 7 Cctober 194.4 

5. I"ettor, To, Seventh US !myJ file AG 400.213 nL7, . 

subj: nuarternester Clem 111 Eequireiaents, 

7 October 1944+ 

6. Letter, ZTq Cown"cntiol8 Zone RT0Us3A, Office 

of the Chief ~uartermster,subj: lllssion of 

Tho Charleroi Lle?ot; 4rea, '-)-lc3,2 kurch 19q.T. 

7. Letter, Supreme qoadcunrtom, -41liod Xxped itionary 

Porc8~1, subj: Allocation of Credits - 

Civil Affaire Supnlies/Eltores - Operation 

OIZRLORD - 7 plus 91 to D plus 120, doted 

9 July l9/+4 

a. Letter Suprovc I-Tcadquartcrs, Nlicd Zxpsditionasg 

Forcm, subj: Ulocetion or Credits - 

civil ?ffoirs Supplies/Rtoros - Oporetion 

OERLORD, dRtod 19 Oc1,obur 191Jt 

9. Lottor, xq scrpicos or T'iupvly, :TO .Office of 

tho Chiof ?uart~r.r\astor, filo &,SOa? Fub, subj: 

Coinposito Rattion for E.T.0,U.S.I. I 27 April 

1943 

10. Contants and P-llmranoos of Ration 4ccossory 

Convoiileice Dackots I 

11. Ovxissuo of Rations to 7.T3 trmy Forces 

12I htloil Issue 'kporionoe on hropean Coiitinont 

13 

OraRnrzation of the British Irmy CatcPine; Corps 

Published by the "rar Offios (S.T.) Octobor 19b2 

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T.IBLX OF COTBTTS (Cont'd) 

lk. List of I tsms to be Carrted in %del Stock 

for Mvanoe Denots 

15. ovorlay of' Major Pipslino Systams in tho 

European Theater 62 Ogor=tions 

16. Chaptor 3, ?uartermnstcr Servicc Referencc 

Data, Volume I1 (Revised), Operationa-Plan- 

ning 1January lql+l+,'publishad by Hq Soxvices 

ol SQpDly, 3'110, 0-Vice of the Chief 

0,uartcrmaater 

17. Chaptcr 6, fiuarTerinaster 3ervioe liefcrcnce 

Data, Volume I1 (Revised) Operatdons-Planning 

1 January i944.,'pu'>lishad by He Services 

of Supp1y, ETO, OffiCc of the Chief 

n,uartermastQr- 

18. Report of Class I11 Consmption Rates of 

FoIV3g in Final Ldvanse to tho Rhine, prepared 

by Suljrcme'Hoadq~~srters , illlied Expoditionary 

Forces. 25 Ap3l 1945 

vi 

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Prepared by: 

R-E-S-T-R-I-0-T-E-D 

THE GENERAL BOARD 

UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATEI 

APO 408 

REPORT ON 

QUARTEFMABTER SUPPLY OPERATIONS 

Col Thad A. Broom, 016246, Chief, Quartermaster Section 

Lt Col Raymond H. Tiffany, 020348, Quartermaster Section 

Lt Col Dan L. Hiller, 0189278, Quartermaster Section 

Lt Col Felix J. Gerace, 023954, Quartermaster Section 

Lt Col Wilmer C, Landry, 020238, Quartermaster Section 

Major Walter S. Kiebach, 0406256, Quartermaster Section 

Najor Thomas D. Blackwell, 0405117, Quartermaster Section 

Najor Arthur B. Johnston, 015773E8, Quartermaster Section 

Captain Ernest C. Vincent, OlStM456, Quartermaster Section 

PrZncipal Consultants : 

Brig Gen ;mines W. Younger, 08335, USA, 12th Army Oroup 

Quart erma ster 

Brig Gen John B. FranBS, 021063, USA, Office of the 

Theater Chlef Quar termaater 

Brig Gen Robert M. Lee, 018483, USA, Deputy Commanding 

General in Charge of Operations, 9th Air Force 

col Charles N. Howze, 018506, @4C, Quartermaster, 9th 

Air Force Service Command 

col Albert 0. Duncan, 0120888, QMC, Office of the 

Thester Chief Quar terms tar 

Col Robert P. Ilollis, 015079, QIC, Office of the Theater 

Chief Quartermaster 

Col John M. Kenderdine, 0316467, QMC, Office, or tha 

Theater Chief Quartermasbr 

Lt Col Morris M. Bryan, 0410965, QMC, Office of the 

Theater Chief Quar tormaster 

Lt Go1 Ralph Y. Hower, 0920754, QlrlC, Office of the 

Theater Chief Quartermaster 

Lt Col William F, Schultz, 0265729, TC, Office of the 

Chiof of Transportation 

Lt Col Benjamin H. Evans, Jr., 0315369, WC, Quartermaster 

Section, Fifteenth US Army 

Major Jmee T. Catlin, 0366031, WC, Office of thc 

Theater Chief Quartermaster 

vii 

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1. Gcncrol. 

PAQT ONE 

INTRODUCTION 

a. Tho purposc of this study is to yroscnt in concis0 

but dotnilod form thc brocd phnsos oi? tho probloms 

lacod by tho n,UQI%On"tor Scrvicc ill tho Buropccn Thcator 

of Oporntions in tho porfommco of its suDply nission, End 

tho orgmizntions, motlicds and proooduros tho ~,unrtmi"tor 

Somrico ovolvod tc moot thoso probloms. 

b. El tho prcpnratlon Of tkiS Study ClOSG coordinnticn 

wc.s effcotca bctwocn the Quartcrunstc?r Boctf@n ol The 

Gonornl Boer8 rnd tho Thentor Chiof n,u?.rtornclstar, 'Riontcr 

Sorvico Forces, Europor?n Thw..tcr. In ordcr to aasiat Tho 

Gcnorcl Bonrd, the Chiof Qu"crm*?stor projxrod a group 01 

study melysos of vnrious phnscs of Qunrtomnstor supply 

activitioa in tho Curopoon Thcatcr of Op-rations. The 

StudiQS hnvo boon Cnro%lly fOllOWOd; CXgOt quOtcltiOnS VLPO 

mdo where n7pmprlnto and propcr rnnotatisas mdo to thb 

indiviAun1 studics in thc bibliogrrLphy. Tho following io n 

list of dccumcnts mado nvailcblo by thc ChiLf nunrtomnstor 

to tbo ounrtcmtstor Sooticn of Tho Goncrnl Board in tho 

propnmtlan of this ropcrt: 

(1) Critique of oucrtowsttr Fkwning for 

Continontol Operations, 

(2) ogorntionnl Study t?mbor 1 - Ddinitions 

of n,u-rtcrmc.stor SUppliGS, 

(3) Oporntional tltudy Nuribor 3 - Lovols of 

SUPPlY * 

(4.) Oporntioncl Study ITumbcr i- Qu?.rtrimastur 

Logistical Datfl. 

(5) Oporrtioncl Study Nunbor 5 - Quortwucstor 

Supply Oporatioos in tho Comunicntions 

Zono During Coribe.t. 

(6) Oporntional Study nmbcr 8 - Manpowor in 

Rclation bo Supply. 

(7) Oporntionnl Study Numbor 9 - Roquisitioning 

Procodurcs for 8upply of m. OvcrsGaa 

Thontor fYom tho Zono OP the Intorlor. 

(8) Oporc.tlono1 Study Nunbar 11 - USB cf Fbrsonncl 

othor thin Unitod Statcs TIilitnry 

in tho Eurogorn Thoator of Oporntions. 

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(9) Oporotionnl Btudy Numbor 13 - Broad Phcscs 

of Orgazizntion cnd Oaercticn for Supply. 

2. Quartomastor OrRdnizntion for Supply in tho Europonn 

Thontor of Operations. 

n. Tho nission of tho qumtonastcr Scrvicr; in tho 

Xuropom Thentor of Oporations was slmilhr to th-t of thc 

?unrtcrr?stcr Corps.in tho Uiiitod Mxtos, ' Tho Chiof ?uortornastcr 

wns chzrgod with tha procurment, storago cad issuc 

of nll ~.u~.rtomastcr supplia

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3. gy"one. Tho planning of tho invasion of tlic 

continont , ?ad the opcrations thet occuTrOa nftor D-Day, roquirGd 

close coordinntion by tho Chiof qunrtemastcr with 

othor stcffs md. scmiccs to ovorconc tho problem thnt ,?ram. 

The prnblm of shipping the initial rcquironcnts 37 

low priority Clrlss 11 supplics to thG continent cftclr D-D,?y 

w.S P,VCFC"rG by tho devclopncnt of becch rlaintonnnco and 

bcwh follow-u:? sots. Thorc waa c, cmtinucus problcii of 

ri-.intn.iiinR stock lcvois in tho dCl3GtS. Xmy chmgos in 

stock lovcls wcrc m.clc noccsszry by chrnging situr.tions, 

'-"her:! w?.S P. constcnt sl1.oi-taGo ?f transportation which , p

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-PART TWO 

---- 

GEENBRAL QtJARTE;XFIIASTEB SUPPLY, TRA.NEPORTILTION, LABOR 

AND SUPPLY OF VPHER TI”US ARMY FORCES 

- 

B&4Pl?ER 1 

OLASms OF SUPPLY 

SECTION 1 

WAR DEPARWNT IIEFINITIONS 

5. Definitions in har Department Field Manuals. 

a. The War Department has established five classes 

of supply which apply to all Servicos. T ey are defined in 

Field Manual 100-10 and are quoted below: P 

‘Class I Supplies. Those articles whiich are 

consumed at an approximately uniform daily rate 

irrespective of combat operations or terrain 

and which do not necessitate spcial adapta- 

tion to meet individual requirements, such a8 

rations and forace. 

Clays I1 Supplies, Those authorized articles 

not included in Class IV, for which allowances 

are established by Tables of Basic Allcwanced, 

Tables of Allo~vanceB, and Tables of Equipment. 

Class 111 Supplies. Puels end lubrlonnts for 

ell pur1,oses except aviation, inoludlng g:o$oline 

for all vehicles, diQ8el oil and aoal. 

Glass 111 (A) Supglies. kviation fuels and 

lubricunts. 

Class IV Supplies. Supplies and equipment 

for which allowances are not prescrihed, or 

which require speoial measures of control 

and are hoc otherwioe classified, Normally 

such supplies include fortifioation materiols, 

construotion materials, aircraft and article8 

of a Similar nntura. 

chss IV (b) Supplies. Complete airplanes, 

airplane aguigment and all spare pnrta and 

supplies required to maintain the oomplete 

airplane in oommrlssion. 

Claas V Supplies. Amunition, pyrotechnics, 

antitank minee and chemicals, It 

b. The following Jarinitions for olassee of supply 

are listea In Field Manuals 10-5 and 10-10:?13 

Class 1 - No change from definition in Field 

Manual 100-10, 

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Class I - No change from definition in Field 

Manuel 100-10. 

Class I1 - Those authorized articles for whick: 

allowances are established by Tables of Basio 

Allowances and Tables of Allowncea, such as 

clothing, gas masks, arms, trucks, radio sets, 

tools, and instruments. 

Class I11 - Engine fuels and lubricants, inoluding 

gasoline for all vehicles and aircraft, 

diesel oil, fuel oil, and coal. 

Class IV - Those articles of supply which are 

not covered in Tables of Basic Allowances and 

demands for which are directly related to 

operations contemplated or in progress (except 

for articles in Classes Inand V), such 

as fortification materials, construotioo 

materials, and machinery. 

class V - No change from definition in Field 

Manual 100-10. 

SECTION 2 

DEFINITIONS IJEVELOPED IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OB OPERATIONS. 

6. Definiticns prescribed by the Chief Qua-temaster, 

European "heater of Operations. The Quartermsstsr Service 

Reference Data. Volume 11. Office of the Chief Quartermaster. 

European Theat& of' Operations, dat8d 1 January-1944, gives 

the following definitions for classes of supply.4 

a. Class I - As stated in Field Manual 100-10, War 

Deprtment, 15 November 1943. 

b. Class I1 - Those supplies and equipment for 

which allowances are established by Tables or Allowances, 

Tables of Equipmeut and Ow Circular 1-18; namely, clothing 

and equipage used by the individual and also organiza- 

tional equipment such as heavy tentage, axes, field ranges, 

and any other items to be used for the whole of the organization; 

also items of an expendable natura such as soap, 

stationery and brooms. 

c. Class I11 - Petrol (Gasoline, oil and lubricants 

ana solid fuels (coal, coke and wood). 

d. Class IV - Miscellaneous articles of supply 

such as post exchange items, special sales store supplies, 

repair supplies and equipment, depot equipment or other 

such supplies whichae not covered in documents establish- 

ing Class I1 allowances and the demands for which are di- 

rectly related to the operations contemplated or in progress. 

e. Class V - Ammunition, pyrotechnics, antitank 

mines and chemicals. These are not supplied by the Quarter- 

master Service. 

SECFON ,a 

FROE" THEAmR OF OPERA'I?ONS Em,R"CE WITH IIEFIKITIONS 

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7, Class I Suppl&. 


a. The First US "rmy carried and i sued solidi- 

fied alcohol heat units as Class I supplies,? in contradhtion 

to Circuler 23, tieadquarters European Theater of 

Operations, listed tbs as an item of expendable 

Class I1 su;? In the Third US Amy the Class I section 

waa responsible for the issue of gratuitous post exchange 

supplies, whersas the Class I1 and IV section was responsible 

for the distribution of post exchange sales items.7 

In the report for September 1944, the Third US Kcmy C'uarter- 

master stated that h'e was iszuing gratuitous post exchange 

items through Class I channels but that the stocks of those 

item were stored in a Glass I1 and IV depot, 

b. Due to inccr.sistenoies and misconceptions such 

as these that &rose throuehout his experience in the European 

'i'lieuter, the Chief buartermaster recommended the following 

definition of Glass I supplies:9 

Vlass I - subsistence rations, subsistence 

ration accessories, &nu those items which 

me distinctively necessary and exclusively 

used in the hmdling and preparation of the 

above products, such 8s bread sacks, solidi- 

fled alcohol hQat units, ooifee bags, etc." 

8. Class I1 and IV Suppllez. 

a. Research failea to reveal any definition of 

these two Classes of supply publjshed by any of the field 

forces. However, the field forces were not always clearly 

decided as to what exsctly was tbe difference betereen Class 

I1 and IV items. One ,.my Luartermaster, on being 

ashed to separate Class I1 end IV itoms an the daily tele- 

gram, stated that ne can determine which are to be 

Oluss I1 or IV itez:.8 This confusion results from the 

existing deficltions of Class I1 and IV supply. Keavy 

tentage is listed under Class I1 because its issue is provided 

i'or ip Tables of Equipment. Tentnjie for housing 

purposes, $oweyer, wa3 cmsidered by sme agencies as Class 

JV supply. 

b. Class I1 and IV Supplies were colc.bined and 

made the responsibility of one sub-section both in the 

Offices of the Army CLuartermasters and also in the Dffioe 

of the Chief Guartcrmaster, European Theater of Operations. 

Maximum levels of supply for these two classes wra prescribed 

for the combined group in terms of days of supply.7 

Reports of levels of sup1,lg on hand were made for %hecombined 

group arid wera also given in days of sup@y.lO I;OWever, 

sinao Class I1 supplies were procurd prirnariig orr 

the basis of allOwdnC6S, and Class Iv sup-lies were procured 

on the basis of speaific needs for planncd Operations, the 

procurement of these two c.lasses required that each class 

bs separated on requisitior-s to the Zone of the interior. 

The lack of a clear distinction between the two clnsses made 

such separation difficult, nut only at the higher levels buij 

also among the conbot trcop, and caused further confusion 

when opimons differed. 

c. On the basis of tkee yoarstexperVence th~ 

CClef &,,,uartermster, European Theater of Operations, re- 

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comended be following definitions of these two classes 

of supply: B (1) "Class 11 8UPDlie3 

''4, Th Esuipmant: 

Individual or organizational clothiq 

and equipment, allowances of which axe 

covered by T/IC1s and T/A1s. 

Exatemplea: 

Clothing - shocs, overcoats, socks, 

underwear. 

EQIlipri"t - individunl equipment a8 

authorized by T/E 21 - blankets, 

web equipment, shelter halves; 

organizational eguipaent as 

authorized by T/O's and l'/E's - 

field ranees, heavy tentage, 

cots, G.I. cans, eto. 

Q. Exmndablez: 

Expandable supplies covered by allowances 

coritained ir, official War Department 

or Theuter publioations . 

@x.aIzplw: 

Oleaniug and preserving materials - 

soap, broome, mops and brushes, 

Orrice supplies - stationery, pencils, 

paper clips, etc. 

~~~, Spare P~ta: 

Haintenunoe and repair parts, and 

component parts for the sbove Class 11 

item. 

Exampies: 

Field rawu p6rts; ham" and saws 

which are oompoueuts of' oarpenter's 

tool kit, QXC. 

qmue of any Glass I1 Items in excess 

of tho allowencea prescribed in T/Els 

nnd T/A.'s or aocwnts coveriM expendable 

supplies does aot change its 

supply claasific~~tion.Such issues arc 

known as Claso I1 issues in eXCI3BS of 

authorized allownoes. 

VChose items which are contclned in Th's 

or other documnts menzioned in (I)A, 2 

aud J above, but which ere used exolusively 

iE the retail handling of basic products 

of othcr olasses will not be considered 

es Clasa 11, but will be oonsiderad 

as ao item of the class iIl which its 

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related item falls, 

Example : 

Gasoline cans 826 T/E equipment yet 

they are used exclusively i n the 

handling of' gasoline and are 

therefore to be considered as a 

Class I11 item. 

(2) rrclass 'fv Supplies, 

Phose articlcs of supply which are 

not contafiiud in dccumsnts which establisl; 

Class LI allownoes: 

A. Officers, nurses and WAC offioi-rs 

'Ci:stinctive items of olothing, oad 

acccssories. 

E. Iteirs procured spceif'ioally for 

such &rsonr&l as merloan Red Cross, War 

Correspondents, &ne sold t o such parsonnel, 

C. Supplies firocured for spxific 

projcFts for a nonrecurrirg operation; 

exaples, ,merican fls~arm bands, nausba 

bags, etc. 

-G. Medal9 and ducoratjons. 

L, Material handling e uipment items 

which-we ~iotcantainud in l'h and, T/A 

ellowttnces. '1 

9. Class 111 Yu lies. The field forces in the iiuropean 

T h e e ~ & ~ m & ~ ? ofollowed n s gonorally tho concepts 

of higher headquarters in the definition or Class 111 supijliee; 

The Shiof kuartermastcr, howevar, took excoption to 

the existine; definition of 2lass I1 supply and statcd:q 

TtGasclinu cans undor the iiar Department deflnitiori 

arc. Class 31 itas; yet the yrocuruxent, 

storage u d issue of gasolinz oh116 is dircctly relcted 

to tho proouramcnt, Storago and issue of 

gasolino. Gaaolino cans =E out 01 glaou in a 

Class I1 depot, c a a Class TI dtrily train, or a 

Class I1 ruGulsiticn. They am required nt ClasG 

I11 dump and should bo included 810n.g with othor 

items us00 in the rutail distribution of FOL uder 

the olussificztion of Class III supplies, Examples: 

Gcisoliae CL~R,.gasolinedl.aponsers, gasoline hose, 

uto. 1' 

He timrc ore recomanded that the Pollowine: dfifinition be 

adopt a;pt 

n3lnss III - Gasoilnf!, oil, lubricant8 and 

solid fuels (ooal, ooke 8Pd VfoOd), Uld Suoh i tem 

as arb distinutivoly necessary and exclusively 

use4 in thu rotail handling o f tho above products. 

Gxaqilcs: Gasoline cam, gaseline ciispensars, gesoiine 

hose, at6.71 

- 8 - 

R-E-9 -T-R-I-G-T-R-D

10, Post Exchango Items. Regardingtho issue of post 

exchange new and the establishment of ar, aaditional class 

of supply for those items, the Chief Uuartcrmster stated: 

I'One other difficulty has beeo the lack of a 

clear cut golicy on the classification of articles 

which are sold anC distributed through Army Exchange 

facilities. This group of items could be 

termed. as follows: Those items necessary to promote 

morale and personal hygiene, which are pro- 

cured by the Cuartermzster Service but which are 

turned over in wholesale lots to the Army Exchange 

Serviae, or to agencies such as the Kavy, Red 

Cross, etc., for distribution and sales purposes. 

These items have beensclassified both in this 

Theeter and by the Zone of Interior in Glass I, 

I1 and IV. There is no clear-cut official classi- 

fication of these items. They presenG a special 

probleln in that under sae circmtnnces they my 

be issued as a daily or weekly ration, wPJle in 

the majority of cases the items are distributed 

througli sales facilities. They are procured, 

stored and sold in buUc by the Luartermaster Service 

to the Army Exchuiige. tinlike all other items 

hwdled by this Service it is nut the responsibility 

of the Luarterraster Service to insure their 

delivery to the individual ccznsumer. For this 

reason it is advistble to establish an additional 

class of supply Isnorm as VX Itenis". 

"The additional class of supplies should be 

referred to simply as TX Items" aiid should be 

defined as follows: 

nnhose items , necessary to yromote moral e 

and prsonal hygiene, whlch are proaured by 

the Cuartermaster Service, but whioh are turnea 

over in wholesale lots to the Army Exchange 

Service or to other ageiicies slioh as the IL'avy, 

Red dross, etc,, for distribution and scles 

purposes. The sum items 1:" distributed gratuitously 

b) the C,uarternas*uer Service retain 

classification as a 'PX Iten'. 11 

11. Concluslo-- Various inconslsteiicies and problems 

arose throughovt-Ekii 1:uropean Theater of Operations, due to the 

many interpretations of definitions of the olassea of supply. 

12. Recomhiend~~Lc)q~. That appropriate aeencies of the 

\/alar Department ennead pertinent kvar Department Field Uanuals 

to standardize definitions far classes of supply in CoMormity 

with the reaomndations submitted by the Chief (Luarterrcaster, 

European Theater of Oprations. (Tar 7b, 80, 9 and 10). 

- 9 - 

R-E43 -T-R -1-C-'P- E-D

1. m 100-10 (Fa). 

2. Fld 10-5, 29 April 191;3. 

R-E-S -%R-I-C-T-E -D 

Bibliography 

Chapter 1 

3. l?M 10-10,2 Xarch 1942, Chaiige. i, 8 October 1942. 

4. Qhf Service Reference Data, Vol 11, OCC#~TOUSA, 1 Jan 44. 

5. SOP for Operation of Glass I Truckheads, First US 

20 EOV 44. 

6. LTOUSA Cir 23, 4. Ihr 44. 

7. Kfter Action Report, Third 'is amy [QX Section). 

6. 1st Ind. h00.312 (G-Li Sup) Hq 12th Army Group to CG, 

Communicutiona Zone, 25 Deo 44 and '%emo for Hecord" 

attached theretv by 12th Army Gsoup. 

9. @: OprhtioiLal malysis Study ti, Subject: nDeflniCions 

of Classes of Supply;' ~q BF,ETO, OIV~ (Rear) APO 687, 

undate d1 

10. Ltr Hq 12th &my Group, rile 400 (C-4 Sup) 13 Peb 45, 

subjoot: "Levels of Supplyn, to CG. Communications Zone. 

- 10 - 

R-E-4-T-R-I-C-T-E3

cwm 2 

-XTKLS OF SUPPLY 

SECTION 1 

EjCISTLlTG ~3FImTIOm 

13. Day of Supply. A day of sua2ly is thL ostimatcd 

avorage oxgenaiturc of various itoms of supply per day in a 

campaign, exprossod in quantitios of spocific itms, in 

rcrunds per weapon, or in punas pcr man par day.1 In doaliw 

with 0,uartLmastcr su>p,plias, the following dGtailcd dofinitions 

wora amployod in tho EwoDoan Thoator of Oporationa: 

a. Class I. A ration is thG food roquircd to subsist 

oni man for onc day, A flay of sunply for on3 m n of 

Clam I therefore was Sot at one ration.2 

b. Class I1 & N. h dag of supply of Cle.38 XI 

could not bo oomputd accurately, and was theroforc only 

regarded as a unit of muasuro. Actual cxporionco shwod tho 

cxponditures of various itorus to bo variable under campaign 

coneitions. Class N itoms aro those roquircd fa' special 

or .\articular typos of oporations, and roquirements variod 

considerably as tho combat conditions changed. A day of 

supply or Class I1 or N bannot be exprosso3 in ?ounds, but 

must bo exyxased by itom. Days of sup>ly Wcro,computod 

basod on tho '7ar nopartmcnt roplacomont factors, which avo 

tho cxpootud avorago mor-all exponditwe of oach itom.&, 5 

The allowances as authorizcd by those rsplaoomont factors, 

convortod int pounas, providod a figuro of .85 pounds Dcr 

man per day.17 

c. Class 111. A day of supply of Class 111 was 

bascd on cxpcrionco and consumption data coqilod throughout 

tho*campaign, Tho figurc, oxyroased in pounds pGr man 

por day, variod frbm 15.47 gounds por mar, por day to the 

final flguro of 11.38 gounds por man >cr day, This figuro, 

hO-NOVGI, was also rOgardGd as a unit of mcasuro. It was 

not to bo considorad as on0 day's rcquironenh of any givon 

command, but as an avorago d&y of Sup31 which woulG m ot requirements 

ovor a eiven period of timo,T 

14. Lcvols of S U I . A lovul of supply is tho luan- 

tity CT suppliea hcmat a givm point; bnso, dofonso command, 

8qartmont , thoatw of o,ioraticns, or similar aotivity, 

measiirod in days of supply or in spccific guantitios of an 

it0n.l Iovols aro proscribod by tho ldar DcDartnent for tho 

thcatcr of opcratlnns, and by tlic thoatcr for the various 

dopots, sections and amios. Lcvols a8 prescribad by tho 

War Departmnt woro of throo pincipal typos: Minimum, Oporating 

and Maximum ~OVclS. 

15. lfinimum LOVO~B. 

a. The minimum levo1 is tho quantity of su7plios 

(in daya) nocdcd to maintain an everseas command priding re- 

- 11 - 

R-E -3-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S4-R-I-C-T-E-D 

prescribe3 by the Var Departnent as being the stookage 

necessary to provide for the replacement of the nomal supaly 

rontine due to interruptions in transportation, enemy 

aotJoc, and other unforeseen demds. The stookage of this 

reserve in echelon provides for distribution and envisages 

the asse-bly of adenuate supplies Lmediately behind coinbat 

operetions to insure a aonstant flow in the event of an lnterrnption 

In the nomal operatinR level. 

b. The iinimum level is therefore governed by the 

need to have levels spread frun the rear to forwar? areas, 

and by the Quantities needed to iiaintain the supply pipe 

line P'ratl ports md base depots to Pozward supTly install- 

ations. The quantity In the suyply pipe line itself is 

.governed by the length of the lines or commuttication and by 

the transport an& handline fhcilities available. r'Jb.en the 

pipe line is short, the field forces are supplied direct 

frora base depots and levels are relatively easy to mintain. 

ks the line lengthens, ana the time fnotor for dellvory increams, 

Advance and Intwrmomte depots beoome neosssary. Kin. 

&num* levels lnust be established and mintaimed at alldepts tin 

order t9 mintaln a sufficient flow oT supplies to the field 

foroes .O 

16. Oparatinp Level. An ogerat!.ng level of supply~is 

the quant~ty of supplies (in days) necessary to aintain an 

overseas command duriQg the interval between recaipt of 

shiprsents from the zone of interior.5 The operat ng level, 

therefor%,is based on the frequency of sailings,lQ and on 

the tirie reouired to wrfom the following:5 

a. Initiate and forward a requisition to the Zone 

of Interior, 

b. Load and ship the supplies from the zone of 

interior. 

0. Unload Lhe supplies in the theater of operations. 

(The number of days lnvolved from the initie.tlox of 

the i:onuisitton to the receipt of the supplies in the thes- 

ter is called the "order and ahippinp time1?$ 

17. lraximum Ieval. A maxi" level of supply is tne 

maximum quantity of supply aermitted on 3and at my given 

time in au overseas command, an& is th6 sum of the ninimum 

and operating levels, expressed in terms of days of supply.5 

18. Although naxhum, operating, and 

minimum levels of supply were presoribea for the lhropean 

5%-atar of Operations, all stocW of Qwrtermnstor supplies, 

from the tlme of their arrival, were Considered to foru 

part of a Siu@.Q leml. There was no physical segraplntion 

of stock betiweex operating and ninimum love1 stocks. Depots 

Woro not concerned with oporsting and milvrnun levels, but 

were interested only in the total fiqurs, in assuring themselves 

that requireQents For so nany days wcre availablo, 

RGquisltions to the BOnQ of interior were based on so many 

day6 of supply, and not on operating or minimum levels. ~ll 

incoaiw %"crrnaster suplies formed one European Theater 

stock pile, oontrolled and aistributed by the Chief Q,uartermastar, 

Zlthoufih tho factors considered ir, the detQ2hIinotiOn 

of tho rininwn and operating levels are essent5al to tho 

final detomination of' the maxinzum level, tho suropem meater 

of Operatione avoided confnsion and excessiv6 records by 

confinin itself insofar as Quartermaster supplies were con- 

cerned, &o only the one level. 

- 12 - 

R-E-El-T-R-I -C-T-E-D

n-w-0- &-n-~ -U-I -a-u 

SECTION 2 

DETERFUNATION OF LZVEX.8 

lg, Necessity for Establishing a Level. 

a. A level of supply Is essential to provide protection 

against interruption in*tha flow of supplioa. Convoys 

are s w , delayed 02 lost, daily trains fail t o arrive 

and truckg break down, Stoclc levels must be Inaintain- 

ed in all echelons to provide continuous supply in spite of 

suoh interruptions. 

b. A level of supply is essential to provide proper 

distribution. Every soldier, regardless of hi&position, 

requires q,uartermastcr supplies every day, and in 

order t o meet these dQm-dt3 thore must bG concentrntions of 

stock at various ventage points throughout the area in 

whlch'troops era located, Each item of olot:iing, in all 

sizes, though not issued to every soldier every day, aust be 

available in stock to meet the damands. Supplies flow 

through many channals. Troops are widely disporsed, and the 

problem in distribution throughout all ochelona soquiros 

stock levels to met the deJminds when placed. 

6. A level of supply is essential to meet unerpooted 

dmands. Supplies aro repuisitionod fromtho zone of 

interior basod on speoific plans n?d on astimates of noeds 

end oonsumption YatQ8. Actual consimption of sup?lics in excess 

of tho anticipated rate results in a foiluro to moet 

damanas of tho anticipated roto results in a failure to nimt 

domnds solely from tho supply stocks ordorod for oonsurflptioi 

purposes. In April and Yay 194.5, the number of prisoncrs 

of war taken by the United States forces was doublo the anti 

oipated rate, Thore wore sevcral instanoes of largo soale 

dostruction or supplies, necessitating imadiato roplaoe- . 

"lt. Several factors cause unoxpectod dowds to be mde, 

and stock lovols munt be sufficient at all tines to meot 

such ron_uiremants. 

20, SiZo Of the LOVOl.16 

' a, In dotomining tho size of the bvol to be 

carried, the froquency of'convoy arrivals must bo considored 

Xach ship, or oaoh convoy, cannot oarry u balanced load of 

a number of days supply of oach itm, and tho intorvnl Potwoen 

oonvoy arrivals therefore cannot bo mathcjmatically 

calculotod into thc dotormination of %?a l ~velto bo carried 

Ilowcvcr,it is a factor for oonSideratSon duo to probablo intorruption 

of convoy arrivals by suharino nnd bombing aotivitics 

of tho onemy. 

b. During tho eerly days of tho Europoan Theator 

of Ogorations a poriod of 180 to 210 days wag roquircd from 

the time of plaoing a roquisition on the zone OP fntorior 

until supplios wcro rocoivcd. Tho ordor and shipping timo 

was oonsiaorably roduooa to a poriod of 120 days in tho lattar 

phases of the ce?ipaign, and spmially hndlod roqulsltions 

roqIdircd even leas timu. Tho Sizo of tho IsvoL, thoro 

fore, io reduced in proportJon to reduction in the order aqd 

ehippine the, 

c. nistribution problams also offoat thc Si20 of

R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-3 -D 

lovcls, and spcoial problcms pcculiar to oooh class of Bupply 

must be considered ssparately. In general;however, supplies 

were distributed by means of the depot system. The larcat. the 

flraa and tho proator tho dispcrsion of troops, the prrcatcr 

tho numbor or dopots rcquirod. Tho cstablishment of additional 

dogots to satiefy this distribution roquircmont waa 

n 00118idCrF.tiCn in tho rucmcnded estebl3.shnont of my Snorcamd 

thcatcr lcvcl. Tho lovol in each clopot is also depcndcnt 

u3on the transportation facilitios aveilab1.e for 

brinuing in stock, making intor-depot sizipmmcnts, end for 

maintaining a propor stock lovol. 

d. Tho principal problcms in tho distribution of 

Class 7: supp1.i~~ involvod tho xrcontap.o of moh type ration 

to bc cotismod, the ncoossity for maintaining ~3. balanced 

diot, and tho supply of pc!rishablos. Tho nlllnCI'OU8 BiZQS 

of clothfnpl itemxi ronuiruc? thc distribution anC maintailanoo 

of balancod stocks of all sizes in aocordwco with 

tariff tablcs, anc! othcr itcnis in Class I1 onc! IV, such RS 

spnrc parte, prosoxtcd siniinr poculiar Froblcrts of stockago 

and distribution. 

o. Unexpootod demands on sup2lics affcct tho sizc 

of tho lcvcl to bo oarricd. As mor6 axporionco was Gain& 

In tho Suropoan Thoatcr of Operations roquirencnts nru mor0 

noouratoly ostimatcd and. uncxpoctud dcman?.s docreased . 

21. Levols as Proscribed. 

a. Yerious lovols wcre proscribod for tlic Zuropom 

Thoator of Oprations from thG tho of its inccption. 

aosoriboa.levols for Clam I variod from 75 days on 29 Fovmbor 

1942, to 50 days*on 3 ?larch 1945. Othor clacsos VRriod 

botwoon 45 rind 90 days, with a 60 day 1r:vol a8 avcrago. Tho 

Chiof ?uartorrmstor voluntarily cleotod to maintain n 60 day 

1svol.of all classcs, and Q 45 day luvt11. of ?ost Rxclianffc 

itom, until Naroh 1945, whon conformod to thcso prascribcd 

by the "'ar ~,oi~,artLncnt. 

1% 

b. Tho."rar ncpertucnt proscribod tho thoator levols 

to bo maintalncd, direotcd thnt thoy not ba axcooded, and 

indicctod tho point at which inco n u plioc would bo included 

fimt in the thoater Ic.vols?;f~~~BTho proscribod 

lovols wcro subjoat to tho review and rooommcndations of tho 

XuroDoon 7!hZ€itC Y Commander. ( AppGCdiX 1) 

0; Tho Goinding Ccnernl, .&ropean Theater of 

O~oratlena,nroscribed t he lovols to bc. rncilntainorl within 

tho thoator. €IC recomixondad, In T'cbruary 1945, tho follow- 

.nR lcvols In days to bo luaintainod within the thoatur; 10 

-Class 

Armp Rorvico 

Area 

Mvanco 

Section 

IntGmOdinto 

Section 

Base 

Sootion 

T 7 10 18 15 

IT 15 15 20 10 

SI1 (MT-90) 7 10 10 3 

III (Nliod Products) 7 10 18 10 

Iv 15 15 20 10 

-u- 

R-E-3-T-it-I-C-T-b-D

H-r: +"lL&l--mfi-u 

The balance of theator stocks not included in tho Army Sorvioe 

Jcea and Advance Section worc to bc divided betwocn the 

Intomodiate and naso Sec%ions, but the lovols in those SOCtiona 

were to be brought dcvm ns soon as prccticablo to the 

levels preSCribGd. 

a. The ronction to tho Thontcr Commder's recommondations 

varied in tho field forces. Tlie Third US Iu?ny 

desired to reduce tho Class I levo1 of thc Army Sorvlco 

kre~from seven to five dnys in order to retain mobllity, 

and at the eamc timo to inc ose the lavvL1 in thc Rdv-nco 

Scotion from 10 to 15 dnys.ff Tho Pirst US kmy, howcvm, 

desired to incronso tho Flmy Tervloe Aroa levo to 15 days 

since thoro woru 15 days in tho ration cgclc,lh mc %id 

US lrmy dcsirod thnt sxpondnblc in tho krmy Servicc :?roc 

bo increased to a 30 day lovolJf(l wliilo tho First US .'.ray 

dosirod ci 30 day love1 for a ll Clnss I1 and 1V supplies. 

Each desired a hiqhor stock lcvcl in tho combat zono, OithGr 

in tho tray Rcrvico 4rea or in tho Advnnoo Scctioii. 

e. Tlic 12 h Army Group roComndm3,od a-sliqhtly 

highor stoclc l ~ v ~ but l , the ~ Thonter Comnder, cn 12 March 

1945 proscribod thnt the following lovsls be cstablisbod 

nnd naintainod at the oarlicst practicnblc dnte:l? 

Army 

-ClOSS sorvico 

-kea Section 

AdViXlCQ 

I: 7 10 

I1 15 15 

JII 7 10 

Iv 15 15 

He stated thet thoro was on obvious advmtage In hnvlng 

uniform stoolc levels authorizod and maintninod in 4rmy Garvice 

Areas and h tho Pdvanoe "oction, and thnt tho levols 

presoribod werc set; to afford mnxinum suliyort to tho ardea 

whilo still mnintnining their mobility. Xxooptioas to theso 

lcvele wero authorlzod only on spscjfic Clam I1 .and N 

itams noooesnry for opcrationnl roquircncnts, -md subjoot 

to agreement botwoon the 12th Axmy Croup and the Comnuni- 

cntlona Zone. 

22. dncfinition. Basod upon oxporioncc throughout the 

cmpaign, tho Chibf Quhrtamnstor rocomionded thnt-thc cxlst- 

ing dofinitions of lcvols of supply be disrogcrdud, c.n that 

only one lcvol b@ cstnblishsd rad defincd as follovm:l% 

LOVCl Of SUPPLY - that DLlOUnt Of SUp?liOS IIOCOSs~ryto 

bo stocked undcr.contrc1 of thc using agon- 

cy (Thcnter, .-, Corps, oto. ,) to provide for rill 

requiromonts for a given period of tjr.0 in tho 

futuro. Its purposo is t o provido protection 

agalnst intorrruption in the rogul-r flow of supplfos; 

to provide for M own bnlmoad dlstrlbution; 

and to provido n resGrvc t o ineet unoxpootod dcmnndd. 

- 15 - 

R-E-8-T-R-I-C -T-E-D


23. Ekproasion of LCVG~, of Supply. A level expressed 

in days of supply should be R realistic forocnst of ?upply 

roquirmnts, end should not bo basod on such factors as proaont 

mpowor or rcplacomont factors olcno. A day of su-pqly 

of Clnss I1 cannot bo oxpresnod as a wholo as cach itom 

mst bo nnalyzad aepcratcly, pad tho us0 of c purcly roplacenant 

factor levcl is inaccurnto duG to tho groat nuqbur OP 

initial'issuos whichwere made. Tho uso of pmsont manpowor 

fipwes, in coinputing days of auoply Tor all classcs, was 

a150 inaccurntc ma .mapower wn$ subjoct to constcnt change,. 

Othcr Tsctors, such as nn incorrect tariff of sizos on hind, 

thc diffcront :ionus to bo scrvod to difforont cfitu&orii;-s of 

parsonni.1, nnd fUbWG p1,nnncd ogorctions suoh ns thosc cclling 

for tho omploy" of lnrgo nrmorcd forcos, must bo connidmcd 

in co?:iputing dnvs of supply. Thc lcvcls of supply 

woro thoreforc nnc.lyzod in E ronlistic fcroccst of require-. 

mdnts which took 011 influoncing fr.ctors into considoration, 

nnd th.0 lcvols w;ro exprossod, not.in tams of replacomant 

factor cnd monpowor dnys of supply, but in n foro r.st of the 

nmbor of dngs tho supplics vould probably inst. 18 

24. @vels on Fand. 

. a, The lcvcls down to nrmiea woro genorrilly maintoinod, 

insof::r as priorities rad trensportation would pormit, 

tovols v;ithj.n tho nimics, hOWCVGr, vzriod considornbly. 

In Auguat i9&; thc Thirc! US .mny had on hnnd two dc.ys supply 

of Clnss I, onc day of Class 111, and four days of Class 

I1 nnd TV, while tho lovols of tba Firs6 ,"my woro rolntivo- 

Ly high, In ncptemtcr 19&, thc Ninth ?my bocama oporcitlon- 

nl with hiEh lovols, vhila thoso of the First and Third 

Irmics wrc crtromoiy low. Thc disproportion bf3tWGGn the 

lcvols .of tho various amios (Sradunlly dscrcc.scd a d im- , 

proved until by tho cnii of tho cm aign 6xccl.lcnt propcr- 

tioucito dlstributlon w7.s cffeotcd.~~ 

b. Lovela throughout tho opcrntions in Southurn 

Frrmce ware goncrnlly higher, P1:ins. cnllod for tho landing 

of fivo d.nys su~plyevory thrco days, building up a two dny 

ntook cnch ttw. Tho plcns wcro cnrricd out, but tho ex9sn- 

dituro of 31csB I11 was honvior thnn :inticipatod. In Octobor 

194L stock lovols in tho .Firray Borvicc .&Tor. woro cstnblishoa 

at fivo d?.y.yc for Class I 2nd I11 r!nd 15 days for 

Clnas I1 end IV. A l5-dcy ?.Lvcl or a11 cl.ossce was cetnblishod 

for %?lo nLdvr.nce Roction, Thc shortncc of transportntion 

lncilitics provontod tho octunl build-up of thoso 

lcvcls in thc Eonvctrd c.rc?.s until January 1945, whon tho foriwrd 

rilovomont of tho Seventh US Army and tflc First Fronch 

.Rmy he.d slorvoa dovm.15 

25. Conclusions. 

0. Thnt tho Turopcnn The-tcr or Oporntions wns 

only conccrnod with on6 lcvol oP supply. Thnt tho LWSQof 

throe typos of levcls ceuses oonfusion cnd prcscn'ts m incorrect 

pioturo of $hi. situation. 

b. Thnt the computntion of days of mp"ly, bnsod 

pwaly on rcplncomcnt factors and proncnt manpowor, is nooossarily 

c.n incorroct figure. 

- 16 - 

R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E-D


c: nrt lcvols must bo established to moot 211 raquirmonts, 

stocked through -11 ochelone, and nL?int,dnod in 

such bnlnncc and sizo r.s to moot requiremonts without impding 

mobility. 

26. Recommendations, 

n,' That oxisting dofinitions of lwcla oP supply bo 

diarogardod, ond thct only Onc lovcl be catahlishecl in ccnforrlity 

with the definition as rocomcndod bjr the Chicf 

fiunrtom.stor, Ruroncin Thontcr of OporcCions. 

b. Thnt the conputction of day8 of supply, bzsul 

on roplnconont fact,ors and prosont monpowcr, bz mended to 

Include constecsz.tion of all roqulromonts, . 

- 17 

R-E-S-T-R-1-0 -T-E-D

R-E-S-'P-R-1-C-T-E-D 

Bibliography 

Chaptcr 2 

1. Chaptcr 1, FM 100-10, Ficld Sorvico Regulations - Ab. 

2. Adm Inst No. 9, 21 August 1944, 12th Army Group. 

3. PVX QX 23281, Ogl905A Nov l+J+ from 12th Army Group. 

4. A h Inst No 13j 27 August 19k4, 12th Army Group, 

5. Part 111, ?M 38-205, lfArmy Supply Proccduroll, 15 May 1944. 

6. Ltr, Hq ASF,'Wsh, D.C. , SPX 400 (16 ,Tun 44) OB-S-SPDDL-14, 

19 June 1944, subj: "Adhorenac to Authorizod LoVOl6" . 

7. LtP, WD Wsh, D.C., AG 400 (15 Nov 44.)OB-S-B3rI, 23 Nov 

44, sad: qqLcvclsof Supply for Ovorsilae Aroa9, Dcportments, 

Thoators, Bases". 

8. Ltr, WD, Wash, D. C., AG 400 (21 Doc 44) B-S-E4, 29 Duo 

44, subj: qbvols of Supply for Oversons Arons, %partmcnts, 

Thoators and B860S". 

9. TWX, EX-99501, G-4, C O ~Z, 02DQ30A Fob 45. 

10. Ltr, Hq Third U3 Army, f41o AG 400 (Gon) GNMCD-3, 8 Fob 

45, subj: 'rLovola of Supplyql. 

11 

'Dm CX e28, First ES &my, 08104OA Fob &5. 

12. Ltr, Hq 12th Army Group to CG, Com 2, filo 400 (G-4 Sup) 

13 Feb 44, subj: "Levels of Supplyfl. 

13. WJg EX 19609, Hq BTOGSA, 121600A March 19C5. 

1L. Periodic (WocXly) Q-4 Reports, 12th Army Group (Aug 44 - 

May 1945). 

History of Oontincntal Advanoo Section, Comunicntiona 

15 Zona, ETQUSA, August 1944 - May 1945. 

16. Oporational,Analysis Study No 3, undatoa, ItLovols of 

SUPPlY", TSFET, TCC& 

3.7 QM Oporational Analysis'Btudy no 4, undated, V'Quartormaator 

Logistical Datal!, TSFET, TCQM. 

- 18 - 

R-E-8-T-R-I 4 -T-E-0

R-E&-T-R-I-C-T-3-D 

CHAPTER 2 

DAILY TELEGRAM 

SECTION 1 

PRESCRIBED USE 

27. Definition. A Dally Telegram ie a messap dis- 

patched da y p d visions, air force service command 

and larger'hitbs reiquesting Class I and 111 supplies.f'It 

Is the basis for the supply of these lasses from the Communications 

Zone to the using unlta.16 

28, Procedure. 

a. Individual units submit dally ration requests 

to their next hlgher headquarters. Divisions (for divisional 

and attached troops] and corps (for corps troops only) con- 

solidate unit requests and estimate their total ration requirements. 

They then prepare the daily telegram, giving 

the strength of the conmand, total rations required, and a 

report on the status and requirements of Class I11 suppliee.1° 

b. Corps and division daily telegrams are submitted 

direct to army. Army prepares a consolidated army 

telegram, based on the requirements of all subordinate units 

including army troops, on stock levels on hand In army supply 

points, and on estimated requirements for intended 

operatlons. Army submits its telegram to the regulating 

station, stating the mount of supplies deeired at each 

auoply point, The regulating station notifles the appro- 

priate Communications Zom depots whioh prepare an8 deliver 

the ehlpents to tie designated arm supply pointe.10 

c. In the event that there is no regulating sta- 

tlon, divjsion and corps may submit their telegrams direct 

to the army supply point, which in turn consolidates 

and forwards st" to the army. The army may either submit 

it8 telegram direct to the Communications Zone depot, or 

'GO the depot through the Advance Section, Communications 

Zone. 11 

SECTION 2 

USE IN THE EUROPEAN THEAm OF OPERATIONS 

29. Procedure. 

a. The preparation, routing, and use of the daily 

telegram in the European Theater of Operations followed 

generally the procedure prescribed by the War Department. 

Class I and 1x1 supplles were procured by means of daily 

tebgrams which included the strength of the command and 

an outline of the Class 111 situation.2 The field armies 

prescribed that divisions, for divlslon and attached troops; 

oorps, for corps and attached trcope; and each unit of 

army troops would submit daily telegram,? Telegrams were, 

- 19 - 

TI-E-3-T-R-1-0 -'I-3-D

howevor, norlully subrlittec' to tho supgly points instoud 

of dircct to urIqr. 

h. r.ftur rcgulatinp stctionn wore establisho2, thc 

Quartormoster subtaitted his d~ilytclcgrdm diroct to 

tho reculotinp station. ':ith roforenoo to tho Turtiicr routiq 

beyond tho ro[,ulotinG station snc? tho nhnncr in vhioh 

s~~pplics mro nclturally ship2ed from tho domunicotions 

Zona forrrurd to tho m~e8,thoro vas o [rddu~~l ovolution 

to tho syf,tam whereby the rey,uletinf stution rcocived the 

ddlg tolcrron fro51 tho eruios biid routod scme to jhc clo ot 

ifhioh actudly mado shim" to thc fiold forcos. The 

evolution of the crpcoss cms dlrooted to thr lassaniw of 

thc interval bctnocn the tino tho amy subriittod the daily 

telcgru dnd tho tfno su>,plios wcrc ectunllg dolivmWl, 12 

Duriwe the only gbrt of tho coiri:) icn, cvm for Class 1 

supplies, this intcrvd rrmgod fro i oipht to 15 iuys far 

thc ariiios of the 12th xfliy Froup.7,c,$ 

0. Outlinocl balor, l o tho history of thc cvolution 

of the iwoccdurt lor wopgrini rinE routinc, thc A,,Fly tclo- 

Frem in Conuunicotioco Zono, Zui+opo;ln ThoutcjP of Oar~,itions: 

(I) Durine July-Octobor 19&, tho daily telo- 

[ran frori tho arrlios wna aubdttud diroct 

to I:undquntcrs, :omnuniciitlone Sone. Tht: 

crltical ougply situation pcvuiliny ut 

tho tine woe thc bt.sin for adoptinp this 

hithly controllod orocodurc. ClL>8sII 

mqfplioo, in u0.clition to Clues I and 

Class I11 su;i?lios, wcrc ordorcd c71soby 

the trruios in tho ddly tologrun.li T:ourevcr, 

instoed of cdllinG for such suo~~l~os 

by iten, tho cull, in dcoordunco qiith 

thc Ygsteri OP tonuipc ullocutionn arcscribotl 

e t t tho tlim, wu5 w,dc lor J ccrtuin 

nuibcr of tom dT Class I1 itcims. 

Such 2 polioy prov~a incffootive. Tho 

Chicf C$uarl.onulstor stntcA: ':my do,u,nrl 

for Pun?ly must bi, liy itc 11 .nd not liy 

ton. Pc,r::on.icl in thc Coruiunicutims 

;hi ii must bc ~1~ncr: llg f'di1i.r xith tho 

rcquironcnts in for\, r(i uroa::, yot novcr 

tL thr, s?cclfio iiacds 

(2) Durinr d?tUiltjGT 194.4, L duvico for f,cilitho 

calla of tlit, tirciios for Clnss 

Jlios vC.s doptcc? in Coniunic~tione 

Zoni., Surolwun Tlw~torof 0:)orationb. 

Class I1 Quortormstcr nanic lhintandncc 

Sot tvus dram uti, listiny tho vc8rious 

Class 11 itom dnd lctturinp them rdth An 

olphuboSio&l system. Tho claily tclq raia 

thcn roguostod a numbor of bs,sio moiltonmc.? 

sct~, rilnuo cart .in itilma not nol>dcb, 

plus o~rt~iii itom not listod In ddoounto 

ousntitios. This TxrocLduro eliminutcd tho 

dieudvuntofo of ordcrirq Cluas IJ FJA 7Am.os 

by tons, but oinoc thi. duiLy toloprarl ifas 

still routod direct frori thu ropul~tinl 

stution to Xeadounrtezc, Coritiunicqtions 2 OWJ, 

tho Systoiu WGD as hichlg controlled LIS 

before. I.? 

- 20 - 

R-E-3 -T-R-T -0-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-I7 -I-C -T-IC -D 

The system outlined above was predicated 

on the Idea that the records in the OPfice 

of the Chief Qusrtermaster, Comrounj cations 

Zone, were sufficiently complete and upto-date 

to enable the Quartermaster Supply 

end Distribution Division to rscaive the 

daily telegram from the armies and to 

parcel out to the various Quartermaster 

supply Installations the demands of the 

armies. Such provea not to be the case 

in frequent instances. Directions for 

shipnent were sometines made by the Chief 

Quartermaster on depots whose stock condl- 

tions were insufficient for the shipAents 

required. This was partioularly true in 

Class I1 and IV sup~lies.l3,15 Adding 

to the difficulties of the situation, shor- 

tage of transportation did not permit 

adequate stocking of forward depots from 

port ar8as and, for the same reason, it 

was also lmoossible to make inter-depot 

shipment beeween forward depota .I3 Backorders 

for Class I1 and IT items increased 

to serious oroportions. The armies, in 

order to be certain of suppl -requisitioned 

back-ordered itms.Y3,3f By 

December 194b the situation was so serious 

that the 12th Army Croup caused an investigation 

tc be made by Its own personnel 

(See Appendix 2). Representatives from 

the Army Service Forces in 'Vashington 

visited the Comunications 'Cone Headquarters 

to examine tho procedure.l4,15 

In December 1944, the Class 11 section 

wqs eliminated from the dally telegram on 

the basis that a daily call was a too Prequent 

requisition for Class I1 supplies, 

back-orders being too numerous. The prpcedure 

was also adopted whereby daily talsgrams 

wore routed direct Prom the rogulating 

station to depots previously desig- 

nated by the Chief nuartarmaster 30 supply 

each army. In addition, the Class I11 

solid fuel section was eliminated from the 

daily telegram, and it we8 also prescribed 

that Cl8,ss IV end Post =change tens would 

not be included on the telcgmm.:3 

Throughout the remainder of the campaiqn, 

the prooedure adopted in December 19l+,4for 

the preparation and routinpl of the dailv 

telegrai wagyetained anti isad in supplying 

the armies. 

d. Commmting on the procedure finally evolved 

whereby the regulating station reoeivsd the daily telegram 

and directed shipment from spec3.f ic depots oreviously deslgnated 

by the Chief Quartermaster, the ideal ooncept of the 

regulating station which would facilitate this procedure was 

outlined b>v the Chief "unrternsster in a memorar?dum to The 

Penrsal i3oerd Ssrvice Section, 17 November 1945!1p Rroa& 

Phases of Organization and Cperation for Supply. 

- 21 - 

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R-3-6-T-R-J -G -T-E-D 

"The teaching& of the US Army that the impetus 

of supply shall be from the rear are sound. The connecting 

link betweea the Cammunicatlons Zone and the Army or the Army 

Group should be an improved regulating ste,tion. The mission 

of the improved regulating station should be carefully rede- 

fined and broadened. It should be the contact agenoy with 

the b.rdes and the Army Groups. They need Pew troops. A 

small staff having a knowledge cf all depots - knowing on 

which depot to place requisitions and being intimately associated 

with all phases of military transport, can, in my 

opinion, best accomplish the mission. The improved rep- 

lating station referred to by me herein must know at all 

times the status of requiaitibns placed - the status of supplies 

shipped, tht is, their location enroute, thsir time 

Of delivery to the Armias and other troops forward, etc. 

l'hs vqq&iting ststfon as outlined by me should serve direct- 

ly under, and receive its command orders frob the Commanding 

neneral, Communications ?one. Its technical fnformatlon 

should come from the Deputy Chiefs of Service located at 

the Headquarters, Communications 7Z~ne.9' 

30. m. 

a. There was no form presaribad for the daily telegram 

by the War Department. Eaoh army devissd its own form 

for the use of its suborahate units (Appendix 3 ). This 

procedure wm generally satisfactory from the standpoint of 

both the armies end the subordinete units, with the exccp- 

ticn that the forme were changed from time to timt and varied 

mong the ardes, thus causing oonfusion emong the units. 

Some forms were clonr and simple, while others gave break- 

downs by types of retions and listed reserve and maintenance 

stocks. Others, Lcter in the campaign, listed by oatcgory 

the personnel for whom rhtlons were roquired. 

b. In calling for supplies from the Comunlcations 

Zone, the Army Qmxtermaster utilized no standard form. The 

Sevbnth IJR Arq vuortermastbr submitted his requests by 

letter (Appendlaas I+ & 5). Since the Army quartermastor, 

unlike the nuartsrmaster or supply of'ficer of his subordinace 

units, is concerned with stocking a number of instnllatiohs 

rather than a single unit aupply dunp, and alnce he muat 

maintain a oertain level of' supplies in order to furnish 

day to day requirements for immediate consumption, his daily 

call for supplioa can not h6 reduced to R standard, simpli- 

fied form suitable under all conditions. 

31. Fditin The question of the authority or advisability 

ofe&un$ications "one to edit the daily telegram 

submitted by the field forces arose when the Communi- 

cations Zonc requested thnt Class I1 and Tv SUpplieB be 

separated on the dally telegram. The guartermaster, Third 

Us Army, stated "It.would be difficult to explain the tao- 

tical reason for which much of this equipment is required, 

,, and the Commandiq General, 12th Army Group, 

in a le ter to the Commanding General, Communications Zone, 

stated: s 

"Thls headquarters recognizes the fact that 

you, 8s the supply agency for this theater, 

must odopt measures which will insure an equi- 

table distribution of the aveilable supplies 

to all wmmands of the theater. This is accomplished, 

insofar 8s the elements of this com- 

- 22 - 

R-ES-2-R-I-C-T-3-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D 

nand me concerned, if requisltlons for sup- 

plies are kept within authorized allowances, 

Under existing instruct ions of this heedquarters, 

elements of the 12th Arm Group are not 

permitted to requisition items in excess of 

authorized allowances without priot approval 

of this headquarters. Therefore, the editing 

of requisitions by you is considered to be not 

only unnecessary, but could VEW well develop 

into procedure which would seriously limit the 

prompt shipment of supplies. '1 

It was decided that the Communications Zone did not hEve 

authority to edit, and that the Army Quartermaster would 

be limited, in his call for supplies only by his own judg- 

ment, his estimate of the situation, and by any limitations 

imposed by higher h6adquarters, based mainly on shortages 

in supply stocks and transportation. 

SECTION 3 

GOhTLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 


a. That in a supply system featuring a oentral, 

highly controlled supply procedure, the success of the daily 

telegram in aupply operations from the Communications Zone 

to the field forces demands an up-to-deite, aoourate stock 

control system in the headquarters exercising central control. 

b. When the situation permits of decentralization, 

the greatest succe8s in scpply operations based on daily 

telegrams is achieved whsn the supply organization provides 

for a regulating station whose variqus sections are sufficiently 

lnfbrmed on the looal eupply and transportation 

situation to permit routing the dally telegram direct to 

the supply lnstallation capable of shipping the supplies 

raqbeatcd.. 

a. It is not practicable to ordctr nuertermastsr 

Class I1 and TV supplies by means of thc daily telegram. 

33. Recommendat ions. 

a. That in future operations similar to the condi- 

tions that existed in the European Theater of Operations, the 

supply organization be so constituted as to provide for 

routing the daily telegram direat from the regulating station 

to the supply installation designated to make shipment. 

b. That Class 11 and IV supplies not be included 

in the daily telegram.

R-l2-S-T-R-I-G-T-I-D 

Bibllogrnphy 

Chap'ter 3 

1, Paragraph 16, FM 10-10 (Quarteraester Field Manual). 

2. Cynrtermastsr Service RefGrenCQ Dsta, Volume 11, OW, 

ETOUSA, 1 January 1944. 

3. AdministrQtive Stsnding Operating Procedure, Third US 

Army. 

4. Letter, Eq Ninth US Amx, 400 GNMW-3, 1 Bczmber 1944, 

Rubjoct: Non-Shipment of Items Requested on Daily Tolegram. 

5. 1st Indorsement, Hq 12th Army Group, file 400.312 (G-4 

Sup), 25 Decambor 1944, to CG, Con 2, and "Memo for 

9eoord" nttachsd thoreto, 

6. After Actjon Report, QE" Section, Thiid US Army. 

7. P-fter Action RCpoTt, n,N Section. 12th Army Group. 

5. TW, CU-828, 081040A February 45, First US Army to 12th 

Army Group. 

9. Inclosure 110. 7, to Ltr Hq 12th Army Group, file 400,312 

(a-4. Sup), 28 October,, 1944, Sub jact: *lRequlsitloningand 

Movement of Supplies. 

10. FII 100-10. 

11. w 101-10. 

12. Operational Study Number 13 V3road Phase of Organization 

Rnd Operation for Supplyf1,Hq MFET, OTCQM, December lc5. 

13. 

Quartermaster Operational Analysis Study Number 5, l'Quuartermaster 

Supply Operstions in the Communications Zone 

during Gombat", Rq TSF':T, OTCQM, December 45. 

14. After Action Report, Quartrrmaster Section, 12th Army 

Croup, August 1944-Xay 1945. 

15. Study Nmber 27, Mechonica of Supply in Fast Moving 

>Siturtions, file 401/4, General Board, USm, APO 408. 

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SECTIIlr 1 

DEFGT LYSE71 

34. Ceneral Ilission of the De?ot Swtem. In the Comunioationv 

Zodi?,Tui?j&n Theater ; m o n s , the do lot 

systcm was the leans by which e8ch soldier iras supplied 

svery dag with ruartermster sii:>plies, regardless of his 

position in the Thejter of Opcr-tions and his assigned 

mission. 

35. Classifioation of Depots. 

a. Severe1 different interpr_ettltions of’ depot 

olbRfiffioetions viere publinhed ia tho ,,urogJ;.i: The:..taP Of 

@:)crctions by v:,risus epncie5. ?..oh charge in tominology 

c:!uaed confusion and neoessit::ted a reeducztion of all 

field. and staff personnel. Claesific.,tion uf depots and 

degot teminol.o$y must be standadfzed cnd chfinees therein 

kept to rn absolute ninimun. 

b. The Y x i)egnrt.ment Piald Tbnunl 100-10 states: 

“Cormunications Zono depots ore a180 designated as Aclvmoe, , 

Intermediate or Ease, dcpendonb upon tho Section in which. 

l0c:ltod.” 

0. Standing Operating Procedure Ilunber 7, Buropean 

Theoter of pwation-J, 19 ::arch 1945 rive0 the follmtine: 

dufiniticns: 

“(1 Issue Depot. I, &pat norrmlly in un 

aiivunoo section, assigned rcsponalhility 

for storing suiplias within prescribed 

levels and for iosuinr,- supalj?.s .. reqilirod 

to neet the nods of: 

(a) Arden and other troop and orpanlzations 

in li dwignated SroG of tho 

Combat Zone. 

(b) Trocps rind organizations in e dasignatod 

moa of tho Comiunioatlons 

zone. 

d- 

(2) Fillor De ot. A depot, norrally in 8n 

ntcrricd a e section, ac~signsd rosponsibility 

for atorin6 tho principal portion 

of theater sugp1:os within prescrlhcd 

lcvols and for: 

(a) Replsnishing supplios upon roguost 

frcn Imue Dopots. 

(b) Iosuiq- supplies to troops end organizations 

in (I dcsigmtod ama of 

the Comunic!itions Zone. 

(a) Recaiving and. storing so??lics 

- 25 -

R-E-S -T-R-I -C-T-Z-D 

reccived from local procurer" in 

the area. 

(3) BsseiDepot. A depot, nor:laIly in a base 

sect on, ansignod rosponsibilitp for: 

(a) Receiving, olascifyine, and storinc 

supplios shippod frori porta or frori 

local manufacturers , 

(b) Serving as a warohousc. to clctir ports 

and for storage of excess thcatcr 

atooks. 

(0) Roplofiishing supplies of Pillcr Dcpota 

upon direction of thc Chief of 

Servico conezrned. 

(d) Issuing supplios to troops and organizations 

in a desippatod are@of 

the Corununioations Zone. 

* 

(4.) Ice ,De ot. A dopot assigned rosponsibi- 

(a) Centrally storing tho entiro Cormuuni- 

cations Zono stock of selected items 

and/or their components. 

(b) Issulna suplioz1 upori request from 

isistolletions and orgenizations .'I 

d. Tho Thatlter terminology as prescribed above is 

misleading from a Fuartormastcr standpoint, end tands to 

falsoily imply thc mission of the v rious doppts. All 

9,uutormster depot8 hem an issuo rospomibilitg. Bone 

aapots nust ioauo in retail to troops in tlioir locality. 

Furthernore, a base dcpot has tho aemo typo of niobion ac 

a ftller dopot inasmuali as uuppliss in filltr dopots or0 

roplonishod by shipments fro3 baso depoto. The '!sr Eepertmnt 

tominology mora correctly dosignatas thri dopots. 

Uov+over, the dcfinitiona as oontainnc in Fiola Iianual 100-10 

should be mdo more spooiflo and a t thc 8x10 tirae rotain 

tho neccsoary flosibility. 

Q. Classifying LL dopot as a Keydopot ~EIScaused 

oonfusien from a Cuarterimstor standpoint. Tb-e def inltion 

states that a Key (tepot is rQRpOnSiblQt or storing the entire 

stools of sslootod items - thb purposc boing to oonoentrato 

thovo item whioh are required in ana11 quantities 

such as flags, officers' inaiynio, etc. and those itsms which 

might be oonsidorcd of o. sonsitivo nature and ousily pilfes- 

able, such as ~ 0 " ~ olothing, s atc. The 0,uartonastcr 

Scrvice doos not huvo H Sufficient number of itom requiring 

this centralized atmago to nocoeuitato a depot with ehe 

oxolusive niusloii of recovering, storing, a d isouint: onZy 

thoso items. This boing tho cam, it was uacesa ry to give 

a doublo olssslflcation - A goy depot and a fillor dopot, 

etc. Furthernore, the classification of a f!cpot as a koy 

depot mons nothing uiiless tho solected itom ?vhich ire to 

bo oontrally stored there arc dcfinod. This points to tho 

fact thst It is tho item which reauiros dofinition sild not 

tho depot. Tho rnisoion Of OBCh dopot StlOUld Stotc the item3 

- 26 - 

ReE-9-T-R-1- C-T-E-D

!vihic!i 610 to bo cxclusivcly rQcOiVOd, storcd and issued by 

that insttllution. 

f. Dept classifications for a Thcater of Dpcracions 

which would bcot fulfill the roouiromcnts os" tho martcrmr;tor 

Scrvioc aru: 

Base Dopot. A Qopot nornallg at ar in tho 

vicinity of (I port having tho res2onsibi- 

litg for: 

[a] Recoiviq, classifying and storin[: of 

su?glics shipLxd froE ports. 

(b) Roalonishine auEplicb of Intcrnediato 

and Xdvnnce Dopotu. 

(c) ~ssuingsupllics to troops and organizations 

in a docienpted moa of thc 

ComunicGtions Zone. 

Intcrmodistc Dcpot. 1 depot fiOri,mlly in 

an Intaruediatc SectIan assigned the 

rosponsibility Tor storing thl: principal 

portion of '?hater supplies within proscribed 

levolG and for: 

(a) Rcplcnishing slrpplica upon request 

from IidVbnCO Depots. 

(b) Issuing supplies to troops und organi- 

zetions in a designated ure8 of the 

Golltumications Zone, 

Mvanco Ijcyot. A dapot nor!lelly in on 

Mvance Sr,ction, aasi@od thc rosponsibi- 

licv for storinr: sumlios within nrascribod 

levels ?or ivbuin8 su~pl.ios 

rcguirod to wet tho noods or: 

(a) Psnios end othcr traops md orgeinizations 

in a dasignatod arc3 of Chc 

Conibot Zcno. 

(b) Trco~so:ic? organizations in a dcslgnatod 

ci~aof Lhc Coruuiiceticine 

Zonc. 

36. Nood for Port Dopots. :Ihonovr.r the trsnsportution 

fricilitics for novin~, off locdcd siipplios frsii thc? port to 

supijlg instullntions outside the port area aro ineufflciont 

to Iccitp tk ports cloar, thcra is a noed for n port dopat. 

P!ithout a port depot to invontorp off loac?cd stocks ut ~orts, 

them 3tooIc3 cannot bc oonsidurcd svailoblc for wyglyina, 

t!ic traops until thoy arc shl.ppcd to inland dopots, warchoused, 

2nd invont oricd. Prior to this, them uninvontorica 

stocks wem just so uany tons, and not' item w required 

bv troops. In thc lurop3aii Thaetor of Opcrntions trdnopor- 

&tion facilities WCrO searoe and tho ,?,unrtei?naster service, 

to&:othcr wltli otlior sc-rvicos, wos givau R daily allocation 

of so tons for rorward riovoncnt from port arcus to 

inlalft dopots. At the lar&o port of Antworp (J-65951 thorc 

\vas no port 0.apot to sogreento 3nd invcntory stooko that woro 

- 27 - 

R 4-43-T-R-I -C -!S 4-D

off loudcd and awaiting shipwnt iniond. 'iith no knowlocigc 

of tho compoaition of thcse oPf lo,ded stocks, tho lixited 

tr-.naportation ?acSlitics woru often used to transport inlala 

fron ports itor.rs thnt wcrc not ncoded at thc tine by the 

ficld forem, while other itom for which n critical nocd 

cxiotod wro left unideiitifiod ot tho port. In addition, 

bulk shipriata of uninvontoriod tons of oup~lic~ from ports 

to ialund depots ortcii i-esul:ed in undesirable dic tribution 

of otoc1:a. 'Ihcn tr~nsport~tion is sliort, inter-ciopot ahipmilts 

cannot be mide for tha purpose of rrdintributing stocks. 

37. Ths %pot System in Dogth. As thc lino of comunications 

longthenod, cnd it beccmc ncccvsury to suyply tho 

ficld forcoo by formrd depots, thL sdootivo stocking of 

forvard ciiid iriterrlediatc dcpots w3s begun. Fact noving 

itons wrc sclLcted out of the msa of toncagc at thc baoa 

dcpoG md worc .tockod in forirard clnd ir.tcrmc2isto depots. 

Tho slow-moviny. bulk item romining; fit tho Lase depot aore 

moved forvrard only as reguircd. Generally, interniedintu 

dopots rsplonishod tho oclvanoc dopots and stockod certain 

itcls thot tldvalicc depots did not stock. Howcvcr, it llrils not 

until about Novcmher 191& that depot opcretions coescd to be 

tlod. down to tho boachcn and thc intcrmodiato dqot systm 

UBS set up. 

38. 

fl. In the European Theator of Oportitions tho gcncrftl 

adxiinistrntion of depots waa govowed by the P,uortcr- 

milter Depot Opcrationa Manuril. dated 1 Dcccnbcr 1943, and 

by othcr storage puaphlc tz tlnrl uppopriato texts. €lowovo~, 

oncli dcgot had 3 spocific and detailad I@iSSloi1 thnt oould 

not bo set forth in publicfitions in gonerel tcrms. Coriscquontly, 

a letter mission wuu propcrred for each dopot 

explaining in sufriciciit dctoil crectly tho specific miskion 

in each cuco. Thcsc lsttcr lnissions worc proparod by the 

Chiuf Qm9ii;r:instor, so thdt the opcrflt!.oii of tha depot 

could bo intcpetcd in ,tho antiro dopot ogntcni. Thosu lottcrs 

YKWC simplc md briof and. provideti for Plcxibility in 

tho opcrrtion of -the dopot, diid furnishcd esocntiel inTomtion 

to thc depot corumndcr. (Appendix tlwibcr 6) 

b. Exporicncc in thcr Curogenn Thcotcr of Oporationn 

h:ie brought out ccrtain Essentials ro,rardinp dcpot misslons. 

X'hc ndssion must bo pr3percd und pub,lished o:i tho thoatar 

headquartcru LcvoI. It must bo Tloxiblc, siiqh, and. brief. 

T ~ Qdorot eormmdcr must iae!! thc folloviii& Tawts: 

TonnogcB to bo rccoivcA d,:ily by SOCLTCO. 

Tomages by Class thot munt bc stored. 

Troops to bu sc~cdon D rotuil basis and 

those to bc 8orwB hy wholcsalo bulk 

shipmmonts. 

"hetiler tile dopot will. storo tho entire 

2hoater stocks of n cc,rtain item. 

He must be given the mans (basic nodcl 

stock) by rvhich ha cdn oalnulutc, by item 

the quantity of stock vhich is to bo 

atorad. 

- 28 -

SECTION 2 

39. Contrzlizction or Docontmlizotion. In sulplying 

ii-ld forwori tho Coi>?~~ona Zone the '3road policies 

rcl::tin6: to prscuduros to bo uscd in roquisitionirq und ropiishing 

oper-itions nrc dotmninod by ttc dograo of ocndxliced 

oontrol exorcised by tho hichsr hcrrdquor'tcra . Vhcrc 

thc suiply sittiation is critic31, centrsbizcd control is csssntirl. 

::h2ro SU!.>ply conditions are nor" fnvorcblc, o 

cnrtcin mount of dcocntrdizction is pornittod. In thr! Suro- 

?can Thostrr of Oporotiors ci poiicy of proerosnivo deccntrnllzotion 

of supply control was followed. 

40. ProKrcso or Dccontmlizction. 

n. PTior to 5 Dccenbor 1944, vvhcn Circular Lattor 

.Xs. 97 vms pubiiohca ky thc Offioo JP tho Chiof Qu:~rtcrilc,s'l;cr, 

hiEhly contrulizod oontrol of su?gly operiitions rms e fecturo 

of tho 8?ufluortcrm:;tzr supply nystoii in tho Europoon Thonter of 

Opcrstions. Thc Offico of th3 CLisf ::u: rtcrfiustcr rccoivod 

through chomcls thc daily fe1cpu.l from the fiold forcoo nnd 

collod on apccific dopots to mko dhipiwncnts. Owing thit: 

timo nu??ly vias prgctioolly tiod to tho dopots near boaches 

?.nd ports, 2nd tho field forcno '11cx-c sup2licd lrirgoly by 

diroot ehipmont frca bum dopots through thc ,:idvouo.o Section 

of the Cofiuiiunicotions Zailc. This ocntralizcd control in the 

Offico of' tho Chicf C,usrtcrmater node it ncoossary to muintui:i 

in that offico tho centrd stock rzcord filo of ~ 11 

dopoto undcr thc Thc,ator C.u;.rtnrm;atcr's aontral so thut 

only t;hJsc depots copoblit of m::klne shipmnte to tho advance 

dapots ;.nd the field forocs ~foulclbo dirootod to m-kc suoh 

shipracinta. 

b. Aftcr 5 Docamtor 1944, L supply control co:isid- 

crctbly dccontralizod frm th )t proviously 511 ol'fcct ivos proscribed. 

The iriprovin( ouaply situation, lurgclly tho rosult 

of tho:o?oning uf thc htiiorp (2-6595) port, meo tliis poseiblc. 

Irl IjUDplginF the crdcs, tho d.iilJ tcloeran PIU~ 

routcd dirGOt fron tho rdgL\ln';;iiiy st;.tion to doiyts :vo- 

viausly dusign;;tcd by tho Chiof QiirJrtermotcr to sii.>plg 

s;>ccific ur .ian. The o&v:.nco depnto \:ern sup?liod C1::os T. 

by irAtor:icliJtu &'lot8 aT. tho b.;Citl of C.3tinK;.iXIE aubr!ittoC 

?miodic Ily by thc ..dva~:cc aoctloii. Chss 11 raouirc;lr,aits 

for aGv.mcc dogsta wro obtoi-:cZ on roouinitlsn to she O Wicc 

of tho Chicf 3,ucrtcr:ioster. Gil tho hzis of ostinrtas 

whriittd to the Chisf ?unrtcrm.stcr, i.:it,cr!iadlntc dnpots 

su:>ilicd Clnss 111 (ictrolou , oil, nd lubricants) to ua- 

~31100dc:)ats. Thc flow of eUn7,?liJi? to intcrfilcdlato clowto 

ims co;tzollcd by thu Chicf Qu;rtcri.ustcr :I iccordnnoc 

vith c' 5mur 1 p l~nGra.,!.n. up 1 Dccoiihor 1944. 

c. 01: 9 itobruory l9b5, Cusrtorrtcster Circulrir 

Lo'ctcr 3,l4., YES gublialrcd ;?roscribinc Purthcr docont- 

r.llzatiw cf supply conCro1. Iristcad of the Chiof cuortwriastcr 

daslgnLting 3l;CCifiC dogats to sur;ply tho fiold 

forocs, thc. 3dvc!lOo SOCtii!n \J:lS GhnrF,Cd vlth tho function 

of nllocztine ::dvanco dsqots to tho supply of each psrticu1;r 

:riiy. Evcn tk su]>);Ly of coritrollod itclas WE docc:itrslizud 

to the v' riaus soctio:ls of thc Co!u,iL~nic,:tions 

Z3ila. Thle dogrce of doceiitr3Limtic,n roprosontod thc 

- 29 - 

R-X-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-ES-T-R- I-ET-X-D 

fiiici systm of oontrol In tho Coixiunicotions Zotlc .,nd it 

fuctioned satisfactorily. 

4.1. Lovonont Allowtion of Torui..gc. 

ti. xtor tho roquisitionlcg proccduro end dopot roplonishont 

system h3d bow estoblishod, tho prob1er.i involved 

the i!lovi;mcnt of fIu?plios in order to fill thc roquisicions 

,ad rcplocishncrit dee: nds , ".'ith -Lr:dwportntion critical, 

'thCrQ shonld >e strict coxtrol of tonncgo ollscatians. 

Durine the period June to October 191,4 cll toim:gc moveIicnts 

were coi~trolled by ormies. Tho trmsportctim for tho nwo- 

mont of rescrvos that accurmlutcd on thz bcnchcs wyns not zv- 

:;iloblc. Evcntuolly transportation did bcccrb :ivailablc for 

tLo gradu :1 novomcnt of r;upplios ti, ir.tamcdir,tc. ilopota. 

';hen no st amy roquircments wuro baing mat frori intormodiotc 

donots, il change VI.^ !'~(tc in the tonr,;gc o1locr:tion procodurc. 

Thc 2roblon thcr. bocwe one of Lllocoticg. tonncge for tlio 

luovonont frill ports forward, nd frorr ii:torradictrt depots 

f 0rrrGl-d. 

b. :Lllocations frou hrts to Inturiicdiete lhpatz. 

Until 10 January 194.5 allocctions were made ctaily at rieetings 

coiducted by the Assistant Chief of Stoff, G-4, Headqusrters 

Comuriicatioiis Zone. The priiiclpdi f'ullacy In t,he method 

cf allocating this toimc:ge was that G-4 allocitod the Qutrt- 

eniaster Ysrvice so many trains for eech class of su:)ply. 

The Quarterraster vas not allocated the trains far shipiients 

of OlaSSeS a8 required. Cn 10 January 1945, 

letter, subject: "Procedure fm Planr?int, Reception 

Xovanent of 3u>ply, Equip! :ent arid Per8anne11' :>ublished by 

Headquarters Comunications Zone .zlrovided a nore satisfactory 

basus far the allocatiori of tonmpe. The followin& 

is quotea on overall moverlent plans: 

"(1) On or before the 23d of each month, the 

Chief of Transportation vi11 subr,iit to 

the loting Chief of Staff, G-4, Atterrtion; 

Ports, 2oads dnd Bailronds 

Branch, recomendatisns for.: 

Allocatioa of' shiL7pin(2 t o pai*ts 

showinp the number of & hip ,,rid nvorsfe 

daily Loiinclge to be discharged, 

by Olasv ar supply. 

Vltn for Port clearonce and movement 

sf euqlies to de,mt.s showing 

ori;in, aver ge daily tormlge, 

deEtinatiX and ty7e of transportdtlor! 

for eoch class of supply. 

Pler, for noverient of BU >plies from 

de7ots to forward destinationn shsaing 

origin, averace daily tonnage, 

Cestinstion und type or trans2ort- 

8tio:i for each class (if supply. 

In the developmnt of plans for 

Zovemnt, the Chiel of Transyxtatior. 

will ciriifer directly vlth 

supply services in deterninntion of 

-. 30 - 

R-Ea-T-R-I-C -%E- D

allocation of ships by name and nuiber 

to ports and in the determination of 

special requirements for movement of 

supplies from ports to dspot~.~* 

(illocatjons frm InternGdiate Depcts to Consum- 

;..i$,~o!i;4;s. Class 1 alia supplies iiere handlcd on a 

ci-y te eiram basis. The CoialerGlinf+ General. Ldvonce Sac- . 

tiou, arranged for t!ie transportatis; of Clash I an; III-re-. 

qr;ircnents from the advance depots in his area. Class I1 and 

IV oiid Post Gxchango requirments we,-e h~iidled011 a oeriodic 

requisitioning basis. The Coxunder of the Base Section in 

whish the shipment originated was responsible for providirg 

noaessdry trarisportotion in accorda:ice xith the provisions of 

Circular Letter Bunber 1L, Office of tho Chief Qartomustcr, 

9 February 1945. 

42. Docunontation of Ship:~enta. Documentotion is the 

process of mbr':ine ond recording shipntuts on various paper 

docwnts for tile purposo or identifieition end control. 

Since it is i,4~psssiblcto su2ply tcns of supplics to fill 

specific denanda of the field, it is nocessary thit the tuna 

be cor.vertc8 int? items. The spacific tons of cach item 

should be hiO!qa. By inventoryirg, supplies are convertod 

lron a tmragc to an itori basis. Proper documeatation provides 

a nwns of rotainin& this identity while the aupplios 

are in trmisit betwen tho depots or from Gho depots to the 

con.siulii*g uyenciss. 

43. Gcr.ora1. The hcnrt of 011 supgljr cporetions in a 

Thcntor o m t i u n s is thc principle af Laowirlg Ivbt supplies 

cro un ha~dand whoro thcy LTG located. Inventorying 

is a periodic nctivity; stock accounting is i cocticuous 

sctivity. The corMnc,tion f urnishod tho Chief Quartermistar 

with itifarmation that ves csscntiol to hili i!i porfoming tho 

following functions : 

a. ;dvjsinG the I'hootur of Oporotions CollrnnCcr in 

formulatiiz tagtical plans. 

b. Distributiug stocks i:l tho Curopo-n Thoctsr of 

O?crhtioas. 

c. Advising pcrsonncl suoh as hrily ani1 Brny Group 

Co:unandorn on comlitions acd locations. 

44. ;lit;? Depoy. The mctiiods of imontorying and 

stook cccouli ng efip oyed by Bcpots in the Xuropan Thoator 

of Oporations fsllowod tho basic principles proscribod in 

!.:a- Dap:irtrlont publications. 

45. Reports to Ce.rtru1 Thootcr Rocords. 

a. T'ho office of the CIdef Quartornostor mintairled 

tho Ceutrol Thentcr record of Qmrternastor stocks. Stock 

status reports wore siibmlttod p6riodlctrlly by Quortermstor 

ciopots in thc Thoator of Opcro-ciono ucoardiug to the follow- 

- 31 -

ing schedule: 

R-ES-T-R-I-C-T-Z-D 

Class 1 Cupplies - Weekly 

Class I1 and ZV - 1st and 15th of the month 

Class If1 - 1st and 15th or the month 

More frequent reporting was found to place too great a burden 

on the depot. Invento;ries tere normally reported by the 

depots by item and quantity. 

d. Reports to Other hqencies. 

a* %lie the depot reported direct to the central 

records of the Office Of the Clzief n,uartermaster, copies of 

the stocks Status reports were also sent to the ?unrtemaster 

of the interested section of the Gomunications Zone. It 

was essential that the sectiOn 7uartermaster be kept informed 

on the stock status in his own section. 

b. In addition, there were certain item oi which 

the stock position for the whole theater ahould be known 

from time to time by all seotions of the Comunications Zone 

and the armies. Lccordingly, special stock status reports 

were from time to time disseminated by the OfPice of the Chief 

Quartermaster to interested agencies. 

SECTION 4 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMnaDnzlI~s 


a* The olassifioation of depots set forth in European 

Theater of Operations Standing Operating Procedure No, 

7, L9 March 19L+5aisnot suitable for nxartemster ma. 

b. The port depot in the European Theater of Operations 

was essontial'to efficient sup~ly operations in the 

Communications Zone, and where it wa8 not established ef'ficioncy 

of tho supply system suffered. 

0, During combat cperetions, the field forccs reooive 

increasingly efficient supply support when supply 

stocks arc largo and control of supply is decentralized. 

DocontralizaCion of control of supply cmn brj acoomplishad 

~nlyvhon tho lines of oommunication and channols of supply 

aro sufficiently well organized to warrant woh decentralization, 

d, Regardless of the degree of daoentralized control 

of supply operations, an up-to-date central stook 

accounting systeni Is easential in the Offioe of the Chief 

Quartormastar of the Theater of Operations. 

48. Rooommendations. 

a. That the classification of dcpots In tho Oommunications 

'lone be redefined to lndicate thoir goncral fluzction 

a8 base, intomediate, and advasoe depots, and that pertinont 

War Department publications be amonded accordingly. 

b, mat in oporations similar to those in the Euro- 

- 32 -

!I-E-B-T-R- I-C-T-E-D 

Theater, provision bo mde for tho establishment of 

bmo dopots R t porta. 

Bibliapaphy 

Chapcor 4 

1. Quortcrmstor Operbtianol fimly8i5 Sturiy liumbor Fivo, 

dotod 1 !:o-mmbcr 1945, Mq OTCQJ:, TSETT. 

- 33 - 

R-E-S-1-R-I-C-T-3-D

49. Mission and Orfanization. The mission of the Quartermaster 

Eruck oom>any, or trooptransport dompany, is tu 

provide transportation for the haulin6 of carbo and for the 

m0Ve"t of personnel by motor transport. It is a mobile, 

flexible unit, and is orLanlzed into a company headquarters 

and three operating ulatoons. Each platoon operates 16 

trucks, two and one-hlf ton 6 x 6 oargo, with 16 trailers, 

1-ton, 2 wheel, and each platoon has suffioient equipment to 

perform liolited claintenanoe. The maintenance section, equip- 

ped with complete second yhelon equipment, operates under 

the company headquarters. 

50. Allocation and Con-. 

a. In the Communications Zone the TPanBpOrt€itiOn 

Corps assumed camruand and operational control of the truck 

oompanies.2 In the Combat Zone companies were allocated by 

army pup to armies, and Brrcdes to subordinate QOrpB and 

divisions, In some instances allocation or oorapanies was 

made direct from Lamy group to division. The Army, Corps 

and Division Quartermasters norually retained oyerational 

oontrol over the companies, subject to the allocation and 

dispatch control exercised by the G-4.3 

b. Of the 464 Quarterblaster truck oomA,anies in 

the European Theater of O;rerations, 170 were allocated to 

the 12th Army Group. The troop basis for this allooation 

was as follows:3 

Type Unit Basis of Allocation Total Type Total 

Number Cwi;*anies Units in 12th Companies 

Army Group Allocated 

Army Group Hqs 1 1 1 

Army Hgs 1 4 4 

Corps Hq6 2 11 22 

Divisions 3 44 132 

Additional for 

new Armored 

Division 1 11 11 

Total 170 

cy The 12th Army Group recommended an increase of 

11 truck oompanies in the allocation based bn the fact that 

each Armorsd division required, and had attached to it, two 

truck companies throuehout the operation. These truok ampanies 

were organic in the old-type Armored divisions, 

During actual operations on the continent, however, the 

total allocation of 170 companies was never assigned to the 

group and serious motor t asportation shortaEes existed 

throuoout the operati0n.t This sane shorta,e of truck com- 

panies, compared with proposed allocation, was experienced 

throughout the European Theater, Twelve oom:.anies were on 

the continent by 18 June 1944 ana by the end of operations 

May 19L5, there was a total o 164 companies assiqned to 

unite in the 12th Army Group. 5 

- 34 - 

R-E-S-T-R-14 -T-E-D

R-E-8 -T-R -I-C -Td-D 

auarterriaster 36 5- 

Ordnance 2: F 

-hiineor 11 4; 

Lienal 3 

Other 0 :d 

5, 

TermnimI 

hll bervlces 19 

Total lo@5 

52. Cor Lrol .in8 Dis,mtch. 

a. *ha quhrtermclster, 12th .".YJ.I:T Croup, coord1nn:od 

rymrtornsstor transjortetion nettar:> botwen tho urddes cf 

thp Proup, furniohad fldvicc on the distribution of traneportotion 

units dnd furnished the b~flisuhan necessary for 

soourinp bflditiondl transnortution unit:: fro i tho Coclnunlcations 

LOSQ irhen nesded.14 

h. The method of coiitrol . /.11 requeets for tmnsoo~.tationlmrc p.t'ooosaed 

throwl. the C-4 for wovcl mc' to the "ruortercL-st-r

R-E-S-T-R-1-0-T-E-D 

for dispatch.15 In addition to the d:,ily G.is?atch, can?aniea 

were at t1rir;s dispatched ta Staff Sections or aubordlnbte 

units on a wrianent hasis. 

c; :i dally motor transqortstion uvitilabilitg re :,art 

vias subnitteG by the Array Quarterrwster to tho G-L,, shouin:. 

the status of 011 Quarternaster truckc of tho arfiw. 1~ 

weekly tOiUlr.ge-,2lilQ re+" was subrllittea edCh I:cnduy for 

transmittal to the 12th ..my Group civin! t$e totdl tollu.,ye 

hauled and rfilos trsvoled dUriu6 the F.reck.lo 

d. In the First dnd Fifteenth US .miies tho r-& 

Tranagortatioii Seotion exercised au:w~isory conti-ol crrly 

over D,uartarmuter t'ransportition o.xir&tions.2,17 In the 

Third US ..my, the G-4 Trans lortation Section, which vaa 

staffed by B Eieadouartcra dd headnuartern dituchmnt, 

P.uarterm8tor group, exercised o?oration coatrol over tho 

Quartermaster truns:isrtation, wbilo tho :Lrr.vquartsrmatcr 

maintained cuutml only over those units assigned to @.la%ermster 

liork.9 In the Levanth US .,,imyall transportation 

onerated directly undcr the Trtirts:~ortetinn Caotion, a sc2arate 

speci 11staff soctisn ort,iir?ieod for that purposo.5 

53. o=ti?n?. 

a. Thoro ~YBSa o~umt~nt .!id coptinuoua silortuga 

of trucks throuphout tho owr.;tions. l!ai,itunanco m y penorally 

poor, tind qure ports at ti.mort h.d bo obtain.2 

5. Duo to the shoi%uc,c of trhnstiortation, dnd 

hasud u-pon road conditions, tho overloadinr of tho curgo 

truoks ua to 100 :.ercont WRS authorizod. The condition of 

thc roads one. terrain, and rostriotions due to operntions 

limitad the USG of trailors, and uhen unod, loading HBS 

rostriatctl ho rated capcity. 6,7 Driver treinlnr \JUS oftr:n 

found lackiw , und nutllified driver rcglocmcnts wCT6 of tan 

dlffioult to obtaig,( Those Cirivcrs actually ,~ssip~od wr'o 

too ofton of a typo laclciw. in intolligcnce Fina 8onso OP 

ros,ionsihiiity. Trainin[ co: .sistca of on-tho-job o:?crations.9,lO 

e. In tho ogeration in Youthorn Fratice, Itallan 

sorvicc unit geraorlnol waa oxtonslvcly usoc! to ibn tho 

Quarternaoter truck corA2auios. 5 

?any tnblo of organization and e0,di nC WQS a teluT,orsry 

cxxdlent vcndinp ex>srImntation dnci d6vclopirnt+ AR a 

ftnal orgaifLzetim it was a Trans ,ortutian C O ~ Scrmmny 

('P/O E 3 55-37), vith seven offioora c.n? 1'73 onllut;t2d rid, 

cc3sistinr oi tlfo !>l.toons tiith thruo soctlons crach, ..rid 

rdth eipht trxks, 2$ ton, 6 x 6 em-ihibibn (coLionly cailoa 

DU::''s), ?or soction. It wag ea entlellp u f- rbor C rLft 

oomany ind o7Lr- tad grinoi*J-lly Jbh port battblioiis, Its 

function lids tc transfer cargo fro91 shiyicie to shore 

dui:m or boactas, Tihero pier fncilitios wro not tlvuiloblo. 

Each cbrquny, ovcr D pcrioa of 24. hours, vas cagubla of 

- 36 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

- 37 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D


1 cur do tolu~cnt CA 10 t trucks ,l/l+-ton 

1 truck d~tocluaent CD Y 1 truck, 1/4-ton 

2 trucks, 

3/4-tOn, ' C 

4 truoks, 

2,'*-ton, 6 x 6 

cilrfo 

57. Dincumion.


parts r:.SUltc!d in tho OpcrstloU of trucks :,ithoat j!ropGr 

ropairij, thus ceusinc o::ccs!,ivc ::oar on otl,nr ?arts. 

d. Tho Buartornastor 3battnlion, hobiic, h3edTuari;or3 

(T/O t.C 10-5h),was lockin( in ~i uotor officx to gr.02crly 

sup-rviso and coordinoto rlclinfonancs activitiocl in 

truck companiw. Iicvfcvcr, d notor officw was ridded aftor 

htmtilitics CebSod, (chaiigc; 2, T/O P 7 .l0-56, i-atud 2 :.uf'ust 

1945). 

0. Kiicrally, officar por:ionni;l in truck coli-1 riios 

wrc! not sufficicntly troixd in riotor trans>ort;-:tion slid 

ririiicipal ii:>?liad pxurnl1.y to cor& ian$~ pointfl within roeoh of tho using 

units * 

c, Truck com?anics em cjqi:ipod with thrcu tool 

SC~S,sooond ocholon, nubor ona (.OOi*iOII) on tho hasis of 

ono pcr plbtc7on, cind one Cool stt, wcond ec!iol.on, nwibzr 

two (conuior!) for thc maiiitouonoi soction. ::c;ch oonyny is 

also oquipDcC; rri,iih onc tmck, 3/4 ton, 4 : l+ llij3:)ons cilrriur, 

and ono Cruak, ?$-ton, 6 x 6 cargo, rilth :finch, for uountiw 

supx-str:mturc, hoi.et dnd tovir?;: Lor, for thc mintontlnoc 

ecction. Tho rroc~ridochclon sot nunbur ono is dosimoc3 

to bc usod by V.10 ruch$nicn onC 5~ tr8tlS.?"08 in a 

3/4-ton k x IC uoaponu oarrior irith tho nocossary oils and 

Brousos t o tdlx ourc of 15 trucks, "ith platoons trooel- 

ing in diffaront diroctions, it is in:Jractioablc to p;ivo 

iiro?cr maintznoncc to oech platoon. Zach pLtoon nhould 

thoroforc bo onui!>pcd with B 3/l+-ton, 4 ;; 4 r'ioajmis carriol', 

to adcquatoly :?crf orn mintononcc of vchiolas lihcn ollortltine 

individually in convoy and to proporly :x~intaiii tho tools 

assignod. 

- 39 -

R-E-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D 

il. That Quuartcrrtcstcr octlvitics throughout tho 

op:rction in the Zuroydn TJioatur wcro handica?>ad duc ta 

CIU s1iorttq.t OT trann:mttttion both in ths Comunicc;tiolls 

Zono and in th ~rnyareas. 

b. That, in C::ncri:1, offiwrs, drivcrs und riochanics 

wrl! inzd,f,flustcly trsixd, and th..t quallricd TGplaoacnt 

ilarsoniiol wxo soldom uviiileblo. 

0. Thrii; division Quortcrrnestors raquirs sufficicnt 

organic traiisportatian under tlloir dircct control to ticconplish 

thcir mission, one that oor;?s Quuortcrrastcrs roouiro 

sufficiunt tranaportLtion to p"o closc supgort to corps 

troops attt~clicd divis. ons. ,:.riy quartcrmgtcrs riust ILVO 

snffioiont trnnoZortatlon at tbair disposal to irerq) do;~ots 

ana siin:]l., point8 stockod und .Jrithin rcaoh of tho using mitt 

59. ;:ocoiuiundations 

8. TJiilt, boginnine )with tha activation of t?uclc 

units, a imru ctiroful selection of both offioors, drivers 

and mcohan3.cn bo raadz. 

13. Thiit mor6 timo he pj,vcn to thc proper trainin(: 

of offioors in motor maintcnonco and convoy opcrations; 

drivure in :?rcvijntativc r.iuintcn$noc an6 clrivinp;; ,ncl nochonFc5 

in notor +:n8 vchlclu rapoir. 

0. That ro~ilaccimmt dopots contain miile drivers 

and mrlhanics Froperly trainrtd in maintonanca and oprhtion 

for rcplaccaant 3r euflmntklion purposcs. 

(1. That oach truck corJ?nny hG oc.ui,la;ld itit11 t1;O 

r.dd.iticr!al. trucks, 3/4-toP., 4 : I+ -.rc;apons ciirriors nith 

vincti, to :JroviBL o. niintmoiicc truck for mch ?lotcon. 

, Thjt Chs oopratc Quortorr~-.stcrcar platoon bo 

nd OrgQlliZCd undcr (1 so?sr:rtc tcblc of wgarization 

and evui?:icnt. 

- 40 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I-0-I-E-IJ

1. T/O L C 10-57 

Eih1iopru:ihZ 

Gllaptcr 5 

2. Praliininary kJft Truck Comlisny (Trool) or 7' Fro03 

Transport Company 10-57", 0%': -, Octobor 1945. 

3. f'otcs on bcrvics Troops, Oraa Brmch, ('-4., 12th f,rrJy 

Group, 1C July 1945. 

0. ':cckly 0-4 Poriodio hpcrts, 

1944-IW 1945. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

c. 

9. 

12th 

,! rlw 

Croup, 

..uyuet

R-2-S-T-R- I-3-T-F D 

CWG?’ECR 6 

@. RidXd &Z. UEOR S.Il+VICES 

S2CTZCII 1 

$UARTJAASTuR Su2VVXLr- COtJ&E 

60. Kission and 0rtanLzation.l The miseion of the auartermastar 

garvice Com,bany {TjO & %, 10-67) is to provide milltary 

personnel for ,enera1 labor and Tor the su,,ervision of 

labor-when civilian-or ,gisonsr of war labor is-utilized. The 

coapn? is orjanixed into a company heaaquarters and two oner- 

Rth: platoons \tith n total atreu4th of four officers and 2.06 

enlisted Icen. &oh plbtoon, with 80 laborers in acldltion to 

platoon overhead, is capible of oleratin& indegendently and 

~ 

has a rated capaoitg of handling 400 tons of su*>;liea eacu day.‘ 

61, Xciulament. Ortanixational ekuipnmant of the service 

company is confinedL to the equi$nent necessary for the ahinistration 

of the company and for the use an6 protection of the 

individual soldieys. The major items of eiui:)ment are the 

fallowing: 1 

a. Trailer, 1-ton, two wheel, car60 1 

b. Truak, 2-1/2 ton car-o 1 

c. Truck, 3/4 ton weapons carrier 1 

d. Truck, 1/4 tOA 1 

The con:,an:- is cor,+letelj1 lockin& in mobilit: a and translortation 

mat be furnished by hiaer head-unrters or by T;he unit 

Lo diich the company is attached. Basnuoh as transidortation 

IILS critical thuu,hout the campuLLns in the Xuroyean Theater 

of Operations additicnel trucks Por the tiiovemnt oi the comptny 

weie often difficult 60 obta5n.b It is believed that the oompanj. 

would heve been able to ogerate mole efficiently if sufficient 

trucks had been assigneh or-nnically to tho cm:any to 

pernit tlie siiuttlirit of’ work details iron the cmp” bivouac 

area to place of employment. A total of Pour tiyoks, P-1/2 

ton caxLo, woulcl pravide one truck for trms.ortinL labor detailo 

for each o-eratin& platoon end two for canpctnp headquarteis. 

It Is also believed thet the ompany should be nuthorized 

cue additional tl’uck, 1/4. ton. Jith f ~ orficerv ~ r assipe6 

to the conp”, this auditional vehicle would be available 

to the two platoon leaders for su-mvising and ohecking on labor 

details, 

62. Allocution. 

a. The troop basio in the Zuro,san Theater of Operahions 

povided Tor a total of 276 seivioe cokpanies, with lo3 

allotted to the 12th Arm: Group. The basis for this aliotment 

P~RBas follows:~~b 

For eaoh crm:,, two companies - or a total of 

ei@t conpaaios in the lour amles of the 

12th Army Group. 

For each corps, one corgany - or a total of 11 

ompanies for the oorps in 12th &my Group 

- 42 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I-0-T-3-D

R-C-S-T-R-1-0 T-E-U 

For each armored division, 1.5 cordiany - or a to- 

tal of 17.5 companies for the I3 armored 

divisions in tho 12th h y Group. 

For each irsantry division, tvuo oonpnies - or 

n totaZ of 64 companies lor the 32 inidintry 

divisions in th6 12th Arlr;. Group. 

b. At no time, howev~r, were 103 COinEbniea sssiknea 

to the group. In Se,tember 1944, the 12th Amy Grcug hfla h total 

of 30 service oampcnios, of which i9 were assiLaed to tno 

First US Army, 14 to the Third US Army and five to the ldnth 

US Army. It was COIlSiderQd that a mininun of 19 cor&pnibs for 

each arniy was reguired for operations in libexted territory 

and 25 for o$eratiana in Oefllany.4 Towards &he lbttav 3hRsas 

of the Camkaim each of the three armies wllich croavcd thc; 

Rhino River had ap-jroxioiataly 25 companies assi~nud.3 

c. AllOaQtion of Quartermastar Service car~p”ms 

within the 6th Amy Group was liriited. In the initial lending 

in Southern France in &Lust 1944, the Seventh US Arw,r vJGs hondicappcd 

in labor operations on the bencha due to the small nunber 

of sorvioe companies available. Throuehout. this campaijn 

tho Continental Advance Section and The Dolta Base Section of 

the Southern Lines of Cammudoation dependea heairiiy on Italian 

service units, prisoqer of w&r labor unittl, and, to e 1hiteU 

degree, on civilian labor.12,14 

63. Method of -mploynenti. 

a. The Quarte,mastsr Service Corn$" was normallj 

employed in thu guropean heater of Operations t o perfortu &Qnera1 

labor and kuard duty, sopervise prisoners cnd prisoner of 

war labor, and to suppLement or replace uopot suyply and railhead 

cohlpanies in suppl;. oyerations.2 

b. typical cxanple of the asoianment of service 

companies was that of the First US Army on 7 liarch 194.5 with 

a total of 21 companies available:6 

(I) ~uartermsterdeDot oderations - 7 

(2) One to each of threc corp~ - 3 

(3 ) Cometery work - 2 

(h) Solid fuel labor -1. 

15) class I11 ogerations - 1 

(6) Si,pal supply operations - c 

(7) Ordnance depot operations - 4 

(8) &&inoer depot ojerations - 2 

At other t‘mes connanies were assimned to auUUcnt labor at 

hospitals,+ operat; or supplement railheads ana trookheads,lO 

and supplement personnel De Lravea registration companies for 

field operatsons. 

c. In the ComunLoations Zone serviou Collpanifis 

were utalized primarily to buard and 6.tpperviue workin& prison- 

ers of war. As oporationa ppocxessed dee&eP inside NrrJanY, 

- 43 - 

R-334-T-R-I 4-T-J!LD

R-Ea-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

the field forms found it im~ractlcablo to sdcure the area in 

the rear of the army service areas. This additions1 security 

nission was assianed to service coinpaniee. The company was 

enyloysd to juard both tho supp1:- and semico installations 

and the prisoners of war who wero lwploged therein. Prperience 

indicated that under normal conditions the service company 

could ade Uately kuard and supervise 1,500 working pisoners 

of war.yl 

d. In addition to beink attached for labor at yuartormastbr 

depots, railheads or other ins8allations. (1 limited 

number of companies WBM sttached to Ordnanca and lhgineer 

SerViCQS for ceneral labor at ammunition and snhinoer depots. 

Some oampanies wuro also attached tc prceido labor for hand- 

ling sensitive items which for security reasons could not be 

handlea by prisoners of wm or civilian labcr.2 In other 

cases spooially qualified servioo companies mro used to supplement 

or replaod depot and railhand companies in supply operations 

8. Normlly within thb urmies, acrvice companies 

werg controlled by the &my 2uarturmaster and assi~nod to Quartermastor 

Battalions for administration and operations,839 

Army sgecial staff sections in need cf labor placod their rcque$ts 

with the &my Quartormastm. The Army Quartermastor 

allocated servicu companies to tho staff sections Either dircotly 

or through tho battalion to which the ConlpanLeS wertl 

attached, The Quartermaster also as8i;ned sorvioe COmp4niea 

to depots, railheads, and other army installations as requlred. 

In each case, whether horkink for a "taff soction or an 

installation, the service conpany okerated direocly under the 

staff section or installation concerned. In one army whom 

the service company commander was senior to the railhead officer, 

OP to the officer comndinl: the &aa supply company to 

which it was assienw3, the service company comnder norolally 

assumLd ccntrol.5 

SECTION 2 

oTmx WBOR 

a. Civilian and other indiLenous types of labor 

were utilizad by tho Quartcrmasttr Corps to auuJnont military 

labor in the European Theater of Oporations for tho following 

principal rLasons:ll 

(1) A shortaeo of' &uartsrmasfer Service units. 

(2) Thu neoesaity fo? furnishinC supplius to 

purscniiel othbr 'than United Status Ulftary, 

such as: civiliaz: omployoes, prisoners of 

war, and liborated manpower. 

(3) The necessity for utillzinC incra8sin&ly 

lar e numbors of Quartormastor sorvico campanics 

to guard prisoncrs of war and survioe 

installations. 

b. The various categorioa of parsonncl used by tho 

Quartormastor Uorps in thu Communioationa Zone and tho extant 

- 44 -

R-X-7-T-X-I-C-T-E -D 

tu wiiich each was mnloyad at Quartermstcr Installations at 

tlrc ocssotion of hos%ilitios vrerti as foiiows:11 

65. Civilian Labor. 

CatOFor,v PLrodnt of Total 

United Statos Uilitory 21 $ 

Ennomy Prisonas of Wnr k6 4‘. 

Civilian Labor 26 $ 

Itnlian Sorvlco Units 6 $ 

Liborated Wnpowcr 1% 

TOtd 100 6 

a. On 26 1@1y19k4, iiaadqmrturs &ropeon fheatcr of 

Oprations publiahcrd Stnndink Opdratlq Procoduru Numbor 29, 

entitled ftProourwr”t, Utilizntion, cnd ACirdnistrction of Civllien 

Labor in Libcrated or Ocouciod Countrlonw. Undur these 

re~ulatiun8 tho Corps of En,inoors was Chm-Qd with procuring 

oivilina lnbor for tho usiaC swvloos, cnd ostcblished rugiona1 

labor offloas end local unploymunt officus throughout the 

arca under control of tho United Status Forcos. k a usiny, 

survlco, tho (lunrtdmaster Corps was ohorjcd with: 82 

(1) UtiliainL civilian lcbor as much as praotiOQbl@undcr 

conditions that provailud. 

(2) DesiLnp.tInC Labor Adiuiniatratlve Officers 

for closi&natad projuots or arm. 

(3) Submlttln~ esthatcrs far civilian labor 

roquirenonts. 

(4) Requisitioning and ndministerine civilian 

labat prsonnd. 

b. Each laborir WLS initially clesslfiod ne unslcllldd, 

oxcupt In unusual oiroumsi;anccm, with a tcntntive clessi- 

ficatinn indicotad by the mgloymont offloe. Clnsaificntion 

was $a& by tho usinL sorvlco aftor dmonstaatod skill on the 

job. 

c. Statio labor was that labor which renidod within 

the area where tho work was parformcd and for which tho United 

States FOrcQS assumed llmitcd responsibilitg for fetdlny, 

clothing. and 6hdtGrinL. Liobile labor was that labor which 

was or,anlzud Into mobile units undor military control, aubjoot 

to bblng moved from placo to glacu, and fcm which tho 

U11it6d Status Forces assumod responsibility for olothing , foodinL 

rind sholtorinc.ll The bnsio mobile unit was tho mobile 

hbor oompcny, whlob 0rlLinall;- conslated of fivd officurs and 

23 onlistoa men with 300 laboiwrs. Later, urder cho EIilitary 

Labor Sbrvico Administration the campan:- strenLth iffls changed 

to four oifiours and four oniistod mtn with 250 laborors. The 

company w e divided into threo platoons of four soctlons eaoh. 

Esoh swation was capahle of operating lndcrpohdontlg, As the 

qwrations protrussed lnt o armany, thl: oompanlos wcro largely

R-T-CT-R-1-GT-li!-D 

conpostd of displaced persons of soveral naticnalities.6 

66. Employment of Civilian Labor. 

a, Thc Quartoranstw Corps, or othor usin, sdruioe, 

prciarod roquisiticns for civilian labor end procosscrd tho individual 

laborers. The usinc scrviou completed the individual 

contracts, employment idzntificction cards, snd othor records, 

and nssumLd coxtrol until thc work was oompletad.12 

bl Civi3i:ns were CUD loyod by thc: Quuartumastcr 

Corps in administrative caprcitfes such Clbrks, interpreters, 

key tochnioluns cnd yrds. They wore nlsc emaloyed 

ns laborers in depots, ropl r mstcllations, hotols, ieesses 

and other installations. At the peak, agproximatoly 58,000 

civilinns, incluaing British clurical pcrsonnol hired on a contract 

basis, were om loyed by thG yuartdrmastcr Survica in the 

Communications zone .P1 

c. In the Southern France operation, civilian labor 

was difficult to obtain. !Che Base Purchosin& Mont, a sugarat0 

staff officvr, wcs charLad with the procuramtnt of oivilian 

lcbor, and thc G,uart,rmnstcr Corps was again murely a usiq 

c&ency. Although ralinnoc was plsccd mainly on Italian 

sbrvice units and prisoners of war, tho Quartvrmastcr, Base 

Soction, at one time cm_nloyed 15,000 civiliuns in the sklllcd, 

unskilled and olLricol oatu&ories.l4 

d. Civilian labor was normally not fls u~fioientas 

prisonw of wnr labor, and the use of civilians usually moant 

e. hi& rnto of pilforcge. They could be usod, howsvor, on projocta 

wllare tho USG of pisonars of war wna either impractioal 

or restricted by thu GQnEV& ConvLntiOn, and, in audition, they 

roquirrtd no Luuords ,11 

67. Military Labor Service. The ILilltary Labor Sorvioe 

wns ustablishod latu in 1 44 ne a sgccial stcff section of 

Hcadquartws, European Th:ater of Operations, for tho ovor-all 

stnfl" coordination nnd suporvision of labor oryflnisations, exclusivu 

or UnltGd 8tatus Yvrvico units and static civiliun labor. 

It rucomrkindod ollocation, aWiuistration and prooodures 

for the umploymcnt of Italian sorvioe units, .prisoner of war 

work units, and for all othor formlly orLanized labor ulemcnts 

utilizud by thf United Status Forces in the &r'opeM Theater 

of Opclrotions. 1 

68 Gonevu Conv~ntion.~*a~~ The Goneva Convontion of 

1939 e0;or-e use of prisonor pf wnr labor, r.nd practically 

rustrioted tho uac of prisoncors of wv to the Comiunicntions 

Zoncr. Some of tho rostrictions fls prcvidod in tho convuntion 

arc as follows: 

p. They can not be uscd st inutnllflt2ons within 12 

ruilus of' tht. nvarost orgnnizcd unurjy fCrOe. 

b. They cfin not be usud forward of tho Communico- 

tiona Zone at any establishmat which constitutod log-* objective 

for hostilc cviation. 

C. They can not be used to trnnsport matorial intendud 

for cmbat units. This was normnlly interprcrtod to pornit 

locding and unloading of nll mturiill excupt arms and ammunition,

69. Prisonorb of .Jar, 

?-2-S -T-R-T -C -T-Z-D 

a. ThL Provost Idmshal Was chorOLd with th,, gcncral 

nbinistrztion of prisoxrs of war nnd with sup2lyinr prisonor 

Of war labor to the uain; sorviccs as rquiriid. Prisoners wore 

assiknod cithtr on a tmporary or permanent basis. If tsmpor- 

nry, the Provost ldnrshal rotained cdninistrativa control while 

tile usink scrvicc assumcd the rusponsitility of ~uardingand 

aupcrvising thit prisonLrs durin' tht perioa of tmporcry assignuunt. 

If ernanant, tht using service nssumd oonplcte rospon- 

Sibilitg.lf 

b. Early in 1945 prieonw of war labor survioe 

units wtrd orgenizcd to repicoe losss6 of United Stetos units 

caused by rtdeployment to the Pacific Thoctor of Opuratians. 

Th6 units were dbsignctcd nocordin, to nationality and func- 

tion such as: "Prisoner of :?akbor Compan (Ccrman) Qucrtern;sttr 

Lnundry". In Ap-11 1945, 26 cmganfcs were cssiencd 

to thd Qu$unrt~rmc:stcr Sfzviw in the Advance section of the 

Scuthdrn Linos of Comunicntion.11 

c. Thd first prisoners of wnr employed werd usud 

3s labortrs in ciIitltori*s in STormmdy nnd as lnborers in baoh 

supply dumps in Southern Brnnoe , Shortly thortr?fttr, they 

wme used in salvaCe and 1f.undry pctivitios, wood cutting, and 

in do ots. Later, prisoners of war were classifiod accordin& 

to skflls. Tailors, cobblus, tinsmiths, :a&othvr skilled 

ptrsonnel wcr@ crpnized into SGlVftge repair oampcmics. Porfcrmnncs 

of' prisontr of warilabor was rwdioore when employed 

in lerku groups, hut in general, prisoners of Mnr were suparior 

to indigonous civilien labor in tlie quality of work produced. 

Approxhately ll5,OOO prisonor of war were usod by the 

Quartormastor Servioe nt tht peak of Operations in tho Commun- 

ications Zona ,11 

70. Italian Sorvice units.11 

a. Italias pursomol wurc OPcanf26d into ten different 

kinds or QuartormstLr Service units under stnndard Quartermaster 

Tables of 0rLnnizP.tion. At the peak there were 50 

oomgnni6s on duty in thu Euro oan Thuoter of Operitioaa and 

they su plied ap roxirmtoly sfx >arcant of thb labor survioe 

u1 the Bo"unics!ions zone for Qunrtcrwster operations. 

b. Originally, some Italian Sorvlcu Units operated 

under the supervision of Lhginter Ti!ohnicnl Suparvisory Hsgiwnts. 

Othurs wore allocated diroct to the serviow. hcn the 

Military Labor Survice was or,anized, thct abuncy suporvised 

the Ittrlion Survicu Units. 

0. In cenornl, Itnlian Sorvioe Units wiire found to 

bo lass satisfactory than other type8 of labor in tho European 

Theater of Operations. Their grentost efficlmcy was echiuved 

in thtt receigt, storage, and issutt of gasoline nncl in laundry 

nnd srtlvago oporations. Thdy were ratod et npproximately hdf 

tho cnpucity of thu comparable United Stntca Military unit.

Q-%-S-T-R-f-C-T-3-D 

at the cessation of hostilities mre than 75 percent of the 

labor sorvice of the Quartermaster Corps in the Gomunica- 

tiono Zone was performed by other than United States military 

pasonnel. b. Thct thc rulativo efficiency of th, vmiou6: 

[rou>s of labor _eorsorm.lvms na follosg: 

(1) UnitLd Str.tcs military wits. 

(2) EnenJ~prisonurs of wur. 

(3) Civilion labor. 

(4) Italian 3urvic.t. Units. 

C. That thc ndvantnfos of tho uao of labor other ’han 

U.S. military units outwoighed the disadvantages of its use. 

8. Thr.t the &nrterrmstm Scrvico Corqcny is a Tlcxiblu 

unit capablu of vnrioue operations, but completely lacking 

uobility. 

72. Rcoomendations. 

n. That cdditiom-,l trnnsportatim bb assibnnud to 

tho Qum%rmaatcr Survico Coupmy (T/O & E 10-67) to provide 

at List ono truck, 2-1/2 ton ci.reo, for mch plctoon for 

trnnsporting lobor dutails, at least on2 addiZ;Lond truok, 

2-1/2 ton cargo, for company bcadquarters, on8 at hest onc 

truck, 1/& ton, for the uae of the platoon lmders in chuokinL 

and supervisink labor dotc.ils. 

b. That pertinent doctrinca, techniquoa and Tables 

of OrLaniaation nrid Equipment be amended by uppropriotecies 

of th6 Wr Depurtmont. 

- 48 - 

R-E-8-T-R-I -0-T-E-D

L. 

2, 

R-ES-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

BiblioLrnphg 

Chapter 6 

3. Notos on Sorvico Troops, Oreanisation Branch, G-4, 12th 

Army Group, 18 July 3.945. 

4. War Dcipwtricxt Obsurvers RGport Nuubor 981, 22 May 1945. 

5. VCJ Ddprtwcint Observers Rqort Hubx 773, 9 April 1945. 

6. 'Vcr Utpnrtrient Observers Report Nuriber 975, 22 May 1945. 

7. ;mr Dupcrtnont ObsGrvurs Rbport Number 7.58, 24 ?$arch 1945. 

8. War Departriont Obsomwrs Rdport Xubur 934, 10 W.y 1945. 

9. Jar Dajartiwnt Obssrvors Report I?um.ber 756, 27 March 1945. 

10. :(firDsportnunt Observurs Rolort hiber 967, 10 Uap 1945. 

11. QM OporetioAml Study iu'o. 11, Wst) of Pcr60nnul Otuer than 

US llilitary in thu Eurojoan Theator". 

12 * ETO, SOY Kuber 29, 

md changes. 

13 

26 Eny 1944: Hondguartors, STOUSA, 

Lytter, Hbadquarters, PTOUSA, f ilo AG 383.6 OpGA, 

joct: "Prisoncr of War Labor", 21 SvL)twmbor1944. sub- 

Hiat or? of Contincntal Advanoo Sootion, Gomumicat ions 

Ronu. ATIIUSA. Aui_ust 1944 - May 1945, 

- 49 - 

R-l$CEI-T-F!- I-O-T-E-D

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T -E-D 

ti. Wnrtarimster su,pply to the Uriitcd Dtotcs Air 

Psrcos fol1waG thc sane gcncml prccofiuro QS suply t3 

,',my Grouid ohd Service Forcos. Csmkndcrs sf Base 8cctiws 

af Cornuiicatiann Gonc on the cwitincnt :and in the 

TJoitod liinGdani v!erc rospor:slblc for thc auiply of all tho 

3nitcd Stntcs forces assignuci ar within tho p?Eruphicol 

moil, irrcspoctivo of whotha: sucb units wrc nir, jirmnd 

or sorvico fnrcos. NL,rrally, tdr Fiirce units werc assicnod 

specific depots far supply, CithGr in tho carviunicatims 

Z:no i)r amy arqas. ?Tnrml roquisitirming ma supply proccdurcs 

vorc followd in aocordanco with Instructlms issuod 

by tho Corxmding Conorzl; BJudquclrtcrs , Europun Thc.1tcr 

aP Oporutions. 

b. Pri:r to D-Day it was docidod that no Air 

F.rca urdts vsuld stoa!: ar carry any lovol ,df gucrtcriustcr 

aupplics 3thcr thi.n ormrgoncy stacks of PatiiJnS, rril ..nd 

lulriconts. Tho Cawxindinp GLnorcls df tho army mons :.nil 

s af Cosc, IntcrLicC.icte and .wTJnCo sections 

icatinns Zimo ncrc rcs:!onsiblo for thc supply 

cf .%irBcrcc units locotea iiithin tlioir rcspcotivo nroas. 

Diroctivcs i~suaGby ITondqucrtcrs, Euriipcan Thcator i1P 

Ggarstians, proscribed th-t ths su:ply oeancios ooncornud 

plnco su:iplios vithin 1~0rlilos tho nlr Borcc iwtnllntions 

within thoir rcsgcctiva zi,lics. Thc serviac bcri 

!$artormator uf tho Air FU~CL Scrvico Coruxnd wcs rzspm- 

siblc fdr picking up the sujpliils 3t tho pc)ints dcsip3tca 

by tha Supply cQncy. 

7h. supply 0pcratisns.l 

CI. pI',wliolLy, r:iti.cin issums wrc mido as dircctcd 

by udp-clgri:,to Zuropcm ThesLcr nf Gyorctinns circulars 

.nd oniondriunts, 1Znti;rns WOXT c,intrallc;d by tho opplic3tion 

of tho dully mnu ;ttcndance figurcs. @porc!ti::nol ratij sns 

~'{oruusod by tho Air FijrCo princi.plly c.8 n travol rctiw 

by tho f,viutlrn truck coripnias ;.nd cir ooribct crows ::n 

tho iiovo. Bpocial ullotr~imts of sholl ocgs, orangus, 

povrdorcd riilk :ad ougur verc furnishcd ccribat crow during 

.;ir oTcroticns an a nacossnry Liugrxcntntia., bath fro?i a 

:iodic.:l :,n& ti mr.:lc stcndpoint. Spocir,l issuos i>f omdy 

,..nd cui wcro uddo ;vail;!blc for use by cor.ibat crows on 

10% niissians. A spocial box cf rich ollnaics w3s imufncturod 

in Jtnglnnd for this purp..sc, but invcstig3tik.n rcvcalod 

thrit oo;rb:.t croim pruforrod rcgulnr condy bzrs 

ovnil:lblo tit post uxohmgos . 

b, In roguisiticminc nutharisod su!?plioo the air 

n 50 .. 

R-E-9-T-R-I-0-T-E-n

R-E-S-T-R-I4 -T-E-D 

bese Quarteri-ster dealt directly with assigned denots. Controlled 

Itens, ar item In short sug?lg such as certein 

itena i.f eeneral purpose equipnent, and itans in excess 

nf outhorized alldwances, were requislticmsd thrswh the 

~$mrter,?aster,Air Farce Service CO inad. The Milith Air 

Vorce Service Calmand Quarterilaster appoved the recuisitis$n 

where aDprapriate and fonm-de6 it tu the Quarter- 

:mster, Otniriunicatims ZL.ne, f x final approval nnd weessarg 

actiirn. 

c. Cluss XI1 requirerients f )r each Air Pmce 

statiam were 0.nt;;rlldated a d subriltted tk thr? nearest 

depdt IJr amy suiply p int. Claso if1 (aviati n) requirerrcnts 

tiere cnof reti.,n factt;rs during the 

r.A crnservatlivi progran vas w Irked :Jut by the linth jLir 

F;!rco with C~-~ImiderRble diffiouJ.ty because personnel 

effected by different reducti,.n factms, a8 ne11 66 OKeiiptod 

prsmnel, were eating in tho 6ar.e ~~,u~cliil~tod 

.;om, m.ktne, It phynicel.ly I:zp.\ssibln tn differentiato bctwccn 

sedciitsry and hard r:srlcern, 

b. The Quartermetor parsr~ilnalin tho petorial 

Wuaarfin (T/O 1-456Ri..of the a1k- servioe group .were 

cinsfderod nwiorically suffioidnt, Earever, under the 

idd tabla of organizatlnn for tho air .dOj)ot eroug, cnly 

23 enlisted non and tw;, sfficors wero outhLirisod far the 

quertermestor dopdt pl8tr.m. T!ila nurkber praved Insurfioiont 

tc provido Ear pcak l?ado and to caro fm distrfhutitla 

points vhlch harl t.) bo ostnblishcd et air depot 

p:cups t,:j c,?pe with critical auggly situations. 

c. BW-J~CQ tuan Querteraastcrc; at tirtoa 13%porianccd 

uxtrenc di!’fioultioo dno to the fact that thay 

end tho r.ir Pkrcu !hito vrhich they suppliod ~ G V Q in ~ rapid 

succossl~%back and fmth through arqy 8108s and AaVanCu 

;:ne intcrnodiato Soctims ;’fCzuuniehti us Z-m.:. In smo 

ORSOD, tho sorvlco tusn Quortornastcr vkuld bo in ono ar.ly 

arcs vrhflc the cicbat units ho served $;ab .j.?uruting In 

c m the arca. This, tagother xjith the mvonont8 ixf tho 

smios and 6i30ti .ns s~f Ca%aunicotiibne Zmc, resulted in 

tho scrvico tear3 Quarto~-%e~otors riakin$; mny onntacts with 

do.!c?ts and ,,thor Buartcrmstors. In this c,-,nnectL?n, they 

lcarncid whcro supplics wore XJcatod ijn the ct.ntinont, and, 

if sui>plicsv ~ronot ovaileblc! at mo placo they wiuld e3 

t;i Flll;.thChcr dco. t. This rosuiltud in cmsidorablo c;?nfii8i;m 

which c

a. Difficulties were enbountered, in socle army 

areas, by mobile sales store pemonnal refusin to sell to 

Air Force officers. Usually, this was straighfened out 

when it was brought to the attention of the sales officer 

by either the Air Foroe Service Command Quartermaster or 

the Army Quartermaster. In some cases, Army Ground Force 

peraonnel were favored over Air Force personnel. Notices 

of the itinerary of army sales stores smethes were not 

received by A ir Force unlts anti1 the store had left the 

locality and, on other occasions, were not received at all. 

This was primarily,due to low channels of communications. 

Forceg. 9 

76. Quartermaster Servioes for the United States Air 

a. The methods and procedures for handling sal- 

vage collection and salvage repair in the Arey Air Forces 

were essentially the same aa that for other United States 

Army forces. Air Force units were not normally responsible 

fer the collection and segregation of Air Force salvage. 

scrap which accumulated at Air Force stations was disposed 

of as directed by the Communications Zone Section Commander 

in whose area the Air Force unit was located. Preliminary 

segregation and classif'ication was effeoted by the station 

salvage officer who moved the salvage material to the 

appropriate Quartermaster dump or salvage collecting point 

as directed. Air Force installations maintainea a Salvage 

and Conservatian officer who supervised salvage activities 

with a view of conserving material as well as disposing of 

it. Unserviceable Quartermaster individual and organiza- 

tional clothing and equipment at Air Force installations 

Was processed through assigned depots in the base section. 

If replacement was required, the salvage items were turned 

in to a depot and a requisition for replacement in kind 

and quantity was Submitted. 

b. The evacuation of Quartermaster salvage was 

not normally a function of Air Force units. The Air Force 

wae only responsible for forwarding salvage to base section 

depotg or salvage oolleoting units, which in turn segregated 

and classified the items for evacuation as directed 

by that unit. 

c. Salvage repair service for Army Air Force 

units was furnished by salvage depots and Quartermaster 

salvage repair units allocated by the Chief Quartermaster 

to units near Air Force installations, The Salvage 

officer at Air Force installations maintained facilities 

within the station for minor repairs such as tent patch- 

ing, but, in general, he secured replacements for unserviceable 

items of Quartermaster equipment while the 

salvage depots performed the necessary reclamation or 

disposal. Clothing repair facilities were allocated by 

base section headquarters and normally consisted of 

quartermaster repair units or civilian agencies in 

Allied countries. 

.d. Quartermaster laundry service for A ir Force 

units was normally secured through the Communications 

Zone Section Quartermasters or, in the United 

Kingdom, through base section Quartermasters. 

- 52 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

Air Psrcc units WQro nssigncd to Quartorpustor nsbilc 

Lundrp installations in arny urec,s ;rr t,; civilian ~~gcncic3 

lii Allied c(1untrics whore nwg rnoilitios \$or0 lirdted. 

Tho Station C,uartarnasters at Nr Force bases were ro8pon- 

siblr: for the osllection ;.IT laundry for all wits at 

their stetions and for dolivery to the assignad laundry 

installotian. 811 specification0 as t:, the method of 

budline, quantity nf itOru3, etc., were followed, and the 

wper wrk involved, asgeoially where civilian agsncias 

wurc concernod, was processed throwh tho Btatisn Quart- 

errmstor, Under rcciprocal bid agrcenont in Allied 

ciuntrics, the civilian eguncy subnittod a bill f;;r scrvi003 

ti tho l;tatiOn Quartcmsstur u:ir;n ci;mIglotiirn nf the 

wrk. Tho f3tatI.m r?uartcrrmel;cr authenticated the vnuchcr 

dnd forwarded it tcJ tho bas0 scctiia f:sr f ind auditing 

and psyricnt. 

e. Dath fslcilitioa were al1:cated ti) boac ROCtlclns 

by tho CliFcl" Quartorrustor. Air Firrcc units wore 

assi&ned to instullatl~~ns vithin thcir rosgirctivc 1p3aso 

ae 0tions. 

77. Discussi- a n . 

a. Shm ropair and lcundry scrvicca often were. 

nj;'c a-milablo trJ Air Porco units in army arcaa bccauso 

thcsa eorvicos wre nurally placcd fur the cavenicnoc 

i,f amios, prticularly to scrvo fratlinc divisiuns. 

During the advancc into bemany, sorvico t~sriand air 

dOpCt Quartorraastcrs arrarqcd lacally with civilian c.:ntractma 

fsr laundry und sh;x ropsir, t-mk mer nd w?oratod 

1:ocal loundrios d d shoo ropair shopa with civilian 

labor ai, whore this ccjuld a:,t bti dmc, thoy sent the 

shoos to be ropairod and lui&clry Co Belgim cr France, 

s,xioti;los for distencsa sf somrul hundred niles. 

b. Air Fcrm c~~~bot units nccuylod either 

newly crnstructed. landing strips or airficlds taker ovcr 

fram tho Gcmna which Yycro, in m-ist cases, dostmgcd 

and wit,h(:Ut bethinp fucilitics, end in such CQSC~Sbathing 

iecilities wore inpravisod. 

78. Gravos Hoc'istration Sorvico.l0 

a. Tlia nothoas, policies and procedures far 

Gravos Rucistration Sorvice for the Unitod Status Lir 

Fnrccs in Europc wore ossentislly tha sam as that pravidod 

lor bmny Ground Bilrcos. 

b. The Graves Rc-gistroticin Scrvicc in thc Unitod 

Statss Air 7cJrcas in Euroio iporatod uneor tho Caixmnding 

Gonorel, Noadquartors I: Air Paroe Gervico C3.a" This 

sorvicc owsistod ,?f a Unltod Stetos Air Fnrcas in Europe 

Grevos Cogistratiun L?fficc.r wiii: was liicatod in tho '&artcrnaatcr 

Saction, IIcadquartors 1;: kir Borco Sorvico 0ar~r.1and. 

Thoro was ulsa grcvidod a corimnd gavna 'z'oEistration 

iifficcr far oach Quartcrmat3tor socti'm of all 

rJaJrr subnrdinato csmnnas af Hcadp.iertors United States 

?,ir Fnrcos in Curspc. qravos zogistraticn nffioers wre 

also prijvidcd far scrvico p;roups, Etir dopt &?.;ups, scparata 

grLrtips,end any unit nat scrvicoa by D Quar:ormster 

aorvlcc toan. Numally, $uartormstcr officars 

ytcrc) appoiJntod 6s grams rogistratirm CJfficcrS and aaswiGd 

- 53 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

K-E-S-T-Hcl-lj-y-g-D 

this responsibility in addition to their other duties. 

C. "'hen teeth occurred in the Vnited Xinpdom, 

the deceased' 8 inadiate oomaendinr: offLcar pro4q2tlg 

evacuated t5.e relains to the nearest siiit ..r;r ceinetery or 

to an awroved c!.vilian unasrteker. If the remains were 

.rtthin 50 niles of a hited Vxtes wilitery cei,letery they 

vere nomally dispatched to that cemetery. 1.ooal Ixuials 

were authorized in emerRencies when it was L3possible to 

transport the remins to any one of the desipnated military 

cemeteries. For euercencies, s.-laLl plots vere re- 

served in various civilian cemeteries tb.rou,?::out the Viiittcd 

LYn$.oii. In case of enermnoy burial In fi local cealutery, 

tb.6 'merlcan crives Registration Tervioe wm '.?ro:ptly n.oti 

fied in order that necessary action coulC be takeii, 

d. "Wen death occurred on the continent in tlie 

Zumpean Theater of C!?era.tions, the noma1 ncthod of evacuation 

to estsblishsd id1itr.V ceizeteries was follovred iT 

at all possible. The rsnains '''ere normlly transnorted to 

the oenetery by unit transportetion. 

e. The nethods, policies ancl. 7rooeCures followed 

by Army Cround Forces on tha continent were nonmlly uaed 

by the llnited States .?.ir,Forces in ZUTO?E in thu iflentirication 

of deceassd ?ersonnal and the handlinm of personal 

effccts. 

f. k?erience indicated thAt all .ini"or:imtion of 

my asslstnme in iaent3.f iaction of unlrnoam deceased shouid 

be colleated in one ?lace by a saecicl researoh section 

unaer th,e fi.d.jUtxnt noneral Gaflualty Seotion. Tho section 

should. ~RVGaoaem to ;?rlssinc, Air Crew ?.c?orts*', 4djutant 

Eeneral Casv.alty ':crninR rie.,ort locator car& , teeth charts, 

finaernrints, clnd any other identifyinr mter5.al available. 

79. AuJ&rJ>po-Sy>1..2 On 6 TTovc.iber 1S13, the 

Joint LocTatioal teff' on ttee, "ropean Eiceter of 

Operations, nuhlidied R su.)plg plan to novorn U9 Irmy 

responsibility to U' ?'ami Borces in %rope, which str ted 

"The Commanding General, Servloes of qupply, is responsible 

for sumlyinfl to the US Maval forces In Europe 

those itens which are COiLWn to the 4rqy mc' KaVy, and 

which er6 aQproved for suoh 6u3 'ly in the tray cnd Naval 

Porce8 in Turo?e'7. Under t'le ?inn the Chief quarternaster 

was charged with supplyin0 Ltem of a ?"eraaster nature 

as called for or tirected. 

a. The ?Tavy prepared estimtes of its requirements 

and sublttcd these from tine to tiine to the General 

Purchasinf! Agent, The Peneral Purohasinr, .%en t furnished 

the Chief Pluartermster with A lirt of t'-e Fava1 requiremente 

pertainin- to tbe ?uar%er?aster seWJ.ce. The Chief 

nuartemster ini'icated thereon which itenS would be .n-ooured 

fpom the Inoy in the %ropean Thecter of QperatJons

R-E-S-?!-B-IC-T-E-D 

bg' Cavy 3)moh. sing 8&noieS, and tho reminifie, itom \.rhich 

vwuld be reyuisiticmed by the Navy froa thc Unitcd Statos 

by nproval of the G-4 Socti;.n cf the 

hosdnuartors af the am8 in which tho navy unit 1va6 a yrating, 

and all raquisitions far o. ntrollcd iCms roquirod 

tho a!iqraval iif thc Chiof Quartsrnastor. Class 111 requircrionts 

in large quontitics nlea roquirod tha approval 

For USQ in -&"can Xed Cross clubs) 

theso itons wro c;.nfincc! tu 1;hc iq.redicllts, 

oxccpt rdlng.ti, the currant ricmu LJr purchcsod 

cxccsn itens ;.fsubsistunoc. Tho 

c11ngewas 75 ocrnts per mti;n. 

b. The Q2uai%CrmStCl' 1106 OUth?JriZOd t

84. Accruntinc Pracadurd. C;lLect~.cn frcn thc Red 

CroSs far itens sirld ims the res?snsihil.ity i.f tIic hccnmtin&Divisian, 

Offico sf thc Chior cpucrtcrrzstor. Druphnut 

flour and bamk mtches and othor sirrilrr iteris of Rcd 

Crdss prsperty Btcrca by the Quzrtowntcr wire ng t cntorc-d 

,mtollios vith itcL-s sold. Gratuit\us issues t3 the Rod 

Cross wro also placed tn separnto tollics. All tollion 

fJr iteris issuod n o rcinbUrsf3ilcnt basis were fawsrdcd t a l 

tho Acciunts Diviaix for c.)llecticn, All prapcrty hold 

by thc Rod Crms in mmrandu receipt was records& in the Bnpply 

Divisiun, Office df tho Chief &uertor mstcr, tct wh,u 

all pertinent dobit ond crcdit tallics ware for. ordd. 

85. Idisoia~nclnd Authvity 

a. In a lottor to tho Sccrct?ry -3 "YIP, dstit 10 

H,mnbcr 19k3, tho Prcsident )f tho Unitad St~tos fv-mlly 

chargod the Anw with tho rGSj1 nsibility, until such ti m 

9s oppr7priLto civilizn deuncios woro propcrod ttJasswo 

it, If shi.pin@ and distributing aupplics far thr! rolicf 

(2nd rohnbllitoticm f libbr,tcd o utrioe. Until that 

ti-10, tho orrj had roccgnizcd its pctcnti, 1 rcsiv nsibiliti-a 

frr o. certain a:i unt -f civil raliof tc: 

(1) Prcvont civil unroat which \i. &le bndancor 

lines cf c-xmuniootiims and ohnnncls f 

supply, and 

(2) Frevont dinoose which ieipht ondungcr 

tr,ops. 

Hcwwor, full rasponaibility hod mver bcun cloorly definocl. 

In his lettor to tho Sooretary of 'hr, Lho Irosident stutitd: 

".llthsugh athor bgonolos sf tho 0 wcm lent uro 

preparing tbilselvos far thc wdrk th-t ikust he d no iu cmnoctiqm 

with tho reliof und rohabilitoti in C llberatod 

mms, it I8 mite apprrent if Pr3:Ipt rcsults [ire ti bo obtained 

the Amy will hnvc tcJ usaurie tho ivitidl burdcn .>f 

shipping rind di stributine raliJf supplios. This will m i t 

mly bo tho cos0 in thL ovont thirt notivi. riilit,ry 3pcrctions 

arc under way, but alss in tho ovcnt d t CIerilan 

ool1,pso. I ciivisngo chat in the cvcnt nf' c Gcrum cullapso, 

tho nocd Tor tho mny LAunclortckc thin w rk will 

bo all tht rime appnrcnt. 

T~wQ~.-I~c, I direct thrit y~u hovo tho hruy undortalro 

the planning ncccssury to onoblct it t L 8 carry nut this 

task to tho ana thit it shall he prcporud tc garforri this 

functiin, pending such timo 2s civilion agcnclios iiust be 

propored to carry .ut tbo lnngcr rungo progroii if roliof. 

You m y t.iko this lottcr 08 riy uuthdty ta y-u ta 

0011 upon 011 othor nguncios 3f the G vorinriont for such 

plans and assfstmcu as you n.~y noad. F m a11 mttcrs ai' 

policy that hcvc t-1be dctorninod in connocti n with this 

work, mu will consult vvith the State Department 

for anp politioal advice, and upon the Treasury 

- 57 - 

R-E-9 -T -R-I-C-T-E -1

R-E-q-T-?-I-C-T-&D 

for such oconomic and fisoel direction as you m y nood." 

b, This lottcr brought up the prcblom of roliof 

RUpplios for thi Pcoplc of 3uropc and onvisagod prinarily 

rilictf of thcso pboplo raiding in 1-iberated countrios. 

%E thc militcry opcrutions progrossod, tho additional 

oroblom arosb of furnishing, roliof to thosc .pcoplo of Allid 

Netions who had bccn tmnsportcd into GG"~ for 

B'.QVC labor cnd othcr purpo8os. Tho bnsio eupply mission 

of Civil Affairs m y thoroforc b+ statcd as follmm: 

(1) To provide suy;plius noccssarg for imcdiato 

rcliof to the people of liborotod 

comtrios. 

(2) To provide thc cseuntinl supplics ncce- 

ssary for tho hcalth and maintonanca of 

dis?laccd'pcraons founa inside ammy 

oomtrios, and also thosc supolics neccssary 

for tho rcpotriation of thcse 

pooplc bock to thcir native lands. 

86. Rcsnonsibility. 

a. To acoomplish the nruy's res~onsibility in tho 

?urop=an Thcntcr, R Civil Mfaira section was orgmizod 011dor 

tho (7-1, Hcsdquart:rs Turoponn ThC&tLrof Operations, 

nnP onorntLd undcr and in77acccrdancc with tho oolicios an& 

1-iroctivos Zssuod by thc ,>uropcanThcntor Caandor an6 by 

the Sivi1 hffairs nivision in tho ''ar Wportmont. Civil 

lffg.lre ims lcter givon penern1 stcff status by inclusion 

on thc goncral stcff BS G-5. It oTGrutcd through fill echclons 

down to and including divisions and through local 

clctaclmcnts sot up in vnrious pats oh libcratd and OCCU- 

?i&icountric,?, These Cictachmonta wcrc known as Civil 4ffairs 

dctac)lrzLn6s rvhcn oporctina in libcrat6d countries and 

as ?Tilitarj GovCrnmont dctocl"cints whcn oporeting in occuoivd 

tcrritory. The 0-5 was chcrgtd with tho res7onsibility 

fer planning and ostimnting roquircmonts ; ccordinktion 

with thL sorvicos for procuroncnt, storago md issuu of tho 

sunp1.i~~; coordinntion with nipopriatc. agcncias of tho 

govormcnts of libcratud and occlipicd countries for*storaga 

spaco and othor matters portnining to Civil .Vftlira, nnd 

with tho local safoguurding and retril isms OP tho suyplios 

to civillan rocinionts. 

b, Tho mothods, policios QRd wocduros for 

Civil Affairs surmly wom publishca by the Comn;ing Conornl, 

Xuroponn Thcntur of Opcretions, as Sto-lding Opirating 

l'rooodure ?hubor 28, dctcd 2 Juno 1944. In this, thc RUPply 

objcctivo was statu3 ns fol-lows: 

?'The priln'ry >bjcctivc of Civil 'dfnirs opcr. tiom 

is tho cffoctivo oontrol of tho civilian gopulntion to prcvont 

i t B intorfcrcnco with military o?Lr?tions and to aakc 

thc naximufi iiao of local rosnurcos for tho bcnofit of thGS0 

opcraticns. A corollary of this objoctivc is thL furnishing 

of cortcin niniinun~suoplios to tho oivllinn -mpulotion to 

GatabliSh ndcouqto stsnflnrds of vubl ic hbnlth end to DrLvCnt 

thc civL1 ?onulntion from b arming a bur on upn thc A l l j l i t a v 4 

Of thoscr mincmm suvplios tho ranximum mounts nrG to bc obt-inod 

from inddgunous rosourcca, rnd nnly thG 

- 58 - 

R-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E 4-T-R-I 4-T-E -D 

deficiency, if any, is t o be provided from stocks under 

military control." 

Under this procedure, and in accordance with instructions 

iesued from time to time by Headquarters, European Theater 

of Operations, the Quartermaster responsib ilities for Civil 

Affairs were as follows: 

87. Prior Planning. 

Deterininaticn of Re uirements. No responsibility. 

Reequiremh--~corr@uted by 

higher authority and passed to the Chief 

Quartermaster for procurement. 

Proowement. A meohanlcal responsibility. 

m - s were placed on the souroe as 

designated by higher autliorities for the 

quantities and items as designated by 

those authorities. 

Stora e Complete responsibility for all 

d k f a i r s items of a Quartermaster 

nature. 

Distribution. Full' responsibility fcr dLstribution 

to depots from ports and between 

depots. 

Issue. Bulk issue to Civil Affairs detach 

merizs only. NO responsibility for retail 

issue or distribution to the civil population. 

a, Early In 1943 the Unlted States ana Great 

Britain began a study of the problem for civilian supply in 

liberated and occupied countries. The work W88 carried on 

under an Inter-Allied Codttee known as the "Administration 

of Territories of Europe" (A.T.E.). Ita object was to 

study the problem of providing food, medical supplies, and 

clothing for civilians in countries under Axis oooupation. 

The a odttee agreed thht stock piles created for Civil Affairs 

or relief purposes would be available for joint British 

and American use, with no division between United States and 

British responsibility, In their planning, the noamittee 

members Used largely the American proposed basic ration for 

Class I requirements, while for Class I1 and IVsequirements 

they utilized the Erritish experience gtrined in handling relief 

in bombed areas of the United Kingdom. krcm this they 

determined the clothing, footwear, sanitary equipment and 

emergenay feeding equipment that would probably be required. 

No reference was made to factual information available In 

the Office of the Chief Quartermster, and the requirements 

a8 determined from British cxperlenoe alone were publishefi 

by Supreme Headquartera in a catal0gue entitled "Catalogue 

Civil Mfairs Stores and Suppliestt. 

b, The roquiremente as estimated for food, 010thfng, 

blankets and emergency feeding sets wore generally 

satisfactQry. The requirements as estimated for sanltary 

and expendable supplies, tents and cots were not satiufaotorg, 

and in some cases the figures were lacking entirely, 

As a result, the Quartermastar service was often called


upon ts furnish mny zf those itons frnn rcgular arrly stock 

to Cnl;qs for displcc-d pcrs. ;is. If sulipllcs vore nvr.ilc;ble, 

this was ncit ~~hjoctioniblc, but it woa frequcntl’y ncccsscry 

to nbteir? a osmmd decision W.n IkQdouartcrs, Zuroponn 

Thoater ;if Opcfntisn, prim tcr thc issue :If ccrtnin 1tor.u 

required for wlitory o:ierotiims. In a fow cssos civil 

.UfairS stcck had to be issusd to met US i*r:iy raquiretienta, 

and D. grwt clonl ?f ndninistrativc work HCS invnlvcd 

in accmnting fI)r tho tronsncticns t,) cnnblc suhscqucnt 

rctsanslor frm amy to Civil E,fI’airs std?k. 

88. Raticns. 

e. Tho principal ommdity suyplicd by tho Chicf 

QUdrtCriluBtBr thr.q:h Civil Aff.?irS chnnncls 8US f .id. 

Fliiur, fats L;nd ?nrbahydratcs fsirricd thu x i ji:r oc.rgoiicnCs. 

Far tho rmst part, thc itom nerc ic?cnl;ici;l with thi.fia 

fmnd in the nunus fcr pris:,ncrs {if war, civilian .Eab:,r, 

mcl othwr sirdlar cntcgmlos iif pcrsi:.nnol au qlic:d by the 

Quunrterrmstor. It was thorcr,.ro nocosscry t:) ostnbllsh 

ad naintAn sopar:.ta mcdds, sogcrctc str-ck pile0 4’ 

supplies in dopsts, 2nd sepnrntc ou:>ply pr;lcoduros rijr 

1acntici:l itms. 

h. Initlolly, it wns noccaocry ta dovelnp n basic 

rjticn ss o br.Sis Inr tho procurmicnt sf SUpplio6. The Civilian 

flugply Bronoh, Intarn:..tL:);hl kid Divisi;n, !Ioadqunrtors, 

Aniy Sorvloc Farom, LnshinEtcn, D.C., bcsod tho 

rcquircaonts n thc follL.uingfnct.ws: 

(1) Tho ration hod n nutrit1;n:l vzluo .?f at 

lunst 2,000 c3L)ries. 

(2) kll item :in tho Unitoil States sohodulc 

were 3lrcadg in use by thz United Stntos 

Arriy, in units :i.nS. c::ntaincrs ri~hiohGho 

amy wrls nccust ,moB to hondlin(l. 

(3) Initiul shi:nont vcs t::, IIG rixlo frsxi 

rcguhr amy Stocks, a d incraaaod priduotim 

ijf thCSB itons IJ .uld ni,t 22srupt 

the rogulLrr flw amg ,.rdors. 

(4) Quantities .!iitam wcro :Iv^iiloblc in the 

United Stntos without l.ny scri,)us drain 

in civi1i:;n supply in tho wuntry. 

b. Tho 8tucliuS crf tfic j?int o

R-E-S-T-R-I-C -P-E-D 

'-oisht Calvrics 

_c_ 

PL ur 35.00 nunccs 1,515 

);est 6: Vogctablo Stcw 2.45 65 

Salt .50 -- 

L;; up, c?ohyclratcd 2.00 178 

Pulsos 1'00 100 

Cbocso .50 55 

BAt3 - e 5 0 - 127 

Toto1 21.75 rluriCcS 2,G40 

Burploncntol Itm ::tight Calmi3s 

1_1 

$;ilk, avnpiratod 2.00 f75 ?orcent :-fthc t,.jt:.l. 

d. This basic rctid was usotl inly 05 0 guide, 

:,ne issue tvcs ii::t?c ..nly iif tt;m itcis ncoossnry In osrtain 

acns tc supploiicnt civllicn stilclrs til briny tho roti;,n up 

t:) tho prosoribac: st-;ndnrC. Substitution wss froquont, 

p-;r%icuhrlyiu tho iiout c:r?ipon::nt of thc ri.tion. Thc 

'Unitoil Kini;don substitutod mny itcins in :TdEir t? use up 

thc l:;r50 Dtocks ,-.fccnnod no3t tk.t h.8. bcon Bt 

In thc Unitcd 1;icgd':il in tho f Ira .if "Blockogo" 

vnsi.,n 2:Cscrvc~'. All thoso canno6 m~ts,hi:wcver, hod bcon 

packaged fn r oonrlf.rcSol uac al.:r, with rosult;int, tr$Iuhlo 

nd difficulty in hmclling, ship>lng ..ml star .ei:in can- 

tincntnl dc?i.ts, Tho corroroi:.l tygc gickxinc did nnt 

st .nd. up which rcsultcf. in o~nsidornblc lC-ss. Tho Issue 

dia, htwovor, carry ,'vcr the civil .;ff:.iru pdprxi until 

shipcnts fr-n tho Unitod Stctc8, !iach~oi: tho sane ns 

rcgulx nm~ysuylios, begun to nrrivo on tho o;,ntincnt in 

sufficient quxitity. 

89. Roquiroriwts. 

cl. Roq,uirononts fi,r 011 sui!plics 1'Jcro cirnputocl 

::nc! L-?pr:wo?L by thG G-5 Bcctic n, Sup" I:cadquurters, 

Allioc? Expcditl .n:.ry F~!rocs, innsnuch cs rcpuircnonts wor'o 

ci;:tl:I1 t . 2 bilth Ariorici,n ::nB British Ziince of Actbn. Tho 

initk.1 roqulrcimnts for tho perird D-Dby to D plus 90 vore 

ostinr.teC I nd fsninrc?od trr tho C,,nbinod Civil .':ffL~il-sCam.1ittco 

in *.:::shirigtiin, D.C., for :,jlprovzl and nacasaory acti$m. 

Rcquirorionts for lotor pericds ucro nct conputod until ,opcrc,tims 

hxl c8?rlriencoflan tho .o. ntincnt, nnc! wcrc thon bosod 

upirn rowrts na roc,utnonAati~as of tho fiold farcos. 

b. Each 5r3y thrxqh miy '@,;up a d Caununicotions 

z;.nc rop:rtcd tltcir rcspcctivc foroc sts df rcquiromnts for 

tho f..urth, fifth :,nd sixth n nthe subsqquont t.?tho ai'nth 

in rrhioh tho rt?i.rt was iir,~Is, TliU5, tho roquircr.icnts for ' 

the sixth ni'nth..vxrc tvico rcviscc? before finel dotorrlina- 

ti

R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E -D 

saruencc?, estirtted snd subnittea by Suprene Headqwrtors 

tn thr; C8-mbinoC Civil Affcirs Crdiittce for apprav,il znr; ol- 

L-1c~ticn . 

91 Pr,curo:?cnt, 

a. ''.'hen thc G-5, He2CqLVJrtor8, Euri gam Thoctcr 3f 

Opcrr;tic.ns, rccciveil cqics fif thu clloc!ition lettcrs , copies 

vroro fozwrdod td tlio Chicf Qu.,rk"mtor thrt.ugh tho G-L,, 

Koidquartcrs, Emi poan Thector ;9 Opircitisns. The O-uzrtor- 

ncstcr :liiinot icitiato procurmient on thesa lcttors, hswcver, 

until instructod tc. dit 8:) by thc C-4. 

b. F'i>r thcsc itcrls tu be pri:curac? in thc Vnitod 

SCntos tho Cbiar '$xnrti.rmstcr pruporcd roquisiticns In the 

nxxal mnnor .:ne folwarecc!. thorl t.1 th 1 ~ Ymk s ~ Port or 

n dlhi,rkc,fi .. 

u, ,which in turn forwcrclod than tc tho Tnbomot 

I m L 1 Divisiijn, hrrq Serviac F rcas. The Internatiinnl 

Divisi;.,n prnccsscd tho rcoulsitims and returnac! ciipics ti 

the IJcw Y~rkPort .,f E!xbm-htii;n, which c&lleclthe supplios 

f inwiird mi; .rmr?c shipxnt. 

c. F.:r th:m itails trj bo prxurcd in tho United 

I:hnCdsri, tho Chi.cE 9?xrtanas hr preporor? n roquisiticn an 

:.: spocial. fl:rii;ad subnltted it to tho British 1'hr Office 

f;.r zction. Tho special f(,mVLS sc propsrod JS tc cnnbla 

thc !lcr Ot'fico rad thc Chicf O,uc..rtcrrastc:r t:) c( nsnlidate 

oll tho hfc.rintim niicessnry an onc Ellnet. The Chiaf Quuortoriwatcr 

listcd tho ulloontisn nuthority, on?. tho itons and 

Sumtities ijf anch rcquiro2. Tho British War OfYiCu can- 

plc'c~c!tho f . ~ i 

by shi-wing the Gopat, pL~i30, itcn, typo of 

packnee rind wci&hi;, on6 roturncd tho Torn tc tho Chief 

r.unrtorrustor. Dnsot c,n tlic inf;?rrhti?n, coctoincd in the 

ram, tho Chiif O,uortcrrnstor praporod &pi,t supply o.hipping 

ZLota [DSSD)onC subriittcd It to the Offico of tho Chief if 

Trmspmtntion. for action. 

92. Shipnent of ,Supplfcs. 

a. 

All supplies shippoi! Trori thc UniteC States 

wcro in p~clc3gosspccia1I.y mrked fdir Civil .Wfairs to rliffomntiatc 

thCii frm ,ithor supplios. Tho rrtw Ywl: Ptat of 

- 62 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

EmbarkatIan shipPcd the supplics bascd on pric;ritics ostob- 

lishod by tho G--4, IIcndguartors, CQrLUUIIiCcitiCnB Zona, whvhi. 

ales desi6notod, in cnnjunctim with tho Chiof Qu::rtcrmstor, 

the ports of cntry :.nc:. tlzo n,uartcrrq.aetor .?en>ts ts be utilizer? 

for stornge. The shcrtago oi’ shipping-space ant! the 

oongosted ports of off loac‘hg prcvontcd the civil hffclirs 

Supplle8 frou bciw ploceil In priority’!&” 36 the nee?. for 

nilitary supplios was considorccl to bo nore urecnt. Consoquently, 

but few Civil Afffdm ~u_n?lioswcrc rcaeivcc! ?.urin[t 

tho first sir months of thc operation. Tic ;?ocuxntation 

of supplies fron the United States wi?s thc rosponsibility 

of tha depot of shipping origin. 

b. Supplies shippc?. frori tho Uidto?. ??in(;clon vmru 

31co spLcislly rizrkeCt, TJLCG-4, Ilndquartcrs, Cc.mnicr;tiona 

EO;^ ellocatofi shipping ap~cofor Civil !:ffairs suip;bliaa, 

m G the Supgly S..2tion of tho Civil Lffnirs Br ;,ch, 1k.Lquarters, 

Co . uniotitions Zone, cstablishoc; pricritics af cor- 

toln su~i~lics within tho allocution. ‘L’hhLse priorities wra 

given to tho Chisf of h.?nsnortntion, an& us the supplies 

were cclllcd forwart on dcpot Bup_nly s;,: ,pine da$: , wro 

locded nnd stipao?. ooccrdingly. On about 15 Octobar 1944., 

tho systnri wc.s chongei. in thnt sug;;lics rvhiob cEp,rogatod 

lese than a trainioca lot weFo shippet: frori thc British depots 

conccrncc; in tho United KingBon to UAtcC Si;.tas al‘ by 

clcpots for consoliCation into ono lmgo ship.nent. 

93. Discrlbutlon. 

a. iw supplics urrived at Q,d..rtonmster depots 

norrial proooduro wcIs followc! in cccounting unC ro2orting 

for Civil Axfairs sup$ios. Comonly wed ilcxs ivorc not 

stored soparote fron Amy stocks. Itons pcpuliar t o Civil 

Arfnlrs, or food itans bolow army stunLards, Were storcc‘, 

scpnratoly. Scpurata recorile wru kept of tha reccipt, 

starago and issua of all Civil 11.4; irs itons. 

b. ISSUcS O f Civil AffoirS SUlIpliOS WePU mBo to 

Civil Affairs dotaohnonts, basc motion, .ari:dos r:nd IJationol 

Authorities (bweous or agcnoios cstoblishoZ by tbc cxiatin 

f.lliod or libwatccl Govornlonts to nclniniatcr Civil AffcirS?. 

All issuos wmo rmde on requisitions npprovai: by tho Chicf 

Quiirtormstcr or on distribution r!.ir~tivis ionucr! by hin, 

All lssuos wro mCo frori the c7apots unc!cr tbc RW~Coystcri 

ns for rsculcr nrrly sugplios, with the cxooption thct two 

axtro coplcs of tha tally-outs woro forwirc:.cd to the Chicf 

q,ucrtorrigstor for trnnsnittal to tho 0-5,k‘i,Cquortcrs, COIInunications 

Zono, for the rnintonanca of his rocords. 

C. Rcquisitions wort! norrwlly subrdttuC. by tho 

vcrious acancics to the 0-5, Eanclquarters, Corxmicstiona 

Z,one, who sc~ccnod,oCitoO ona trCnsiiittaL? tho a:~provod 

requisition to tho Uhief r?,uc:rformstitr through G-4, &adqunrtors, 

Cotmunic::tions %one, The Chiof Quartarnmter actocl 

only on rcauieitions cpprovocl by tho C-5 nnC Q-4. Upon a?provd, 

thc CMcf Cu.Jrtorrastcr checkec! ovnilabillty of 

Civil Affairs stocks, Lotcrr.inoc’. if the shipiont woulc~ be 

within the approved tonnaga allocation, snc! elthor iSQUed ii 

distribution directive to tho dopot conoerncd fcr shiprmnt 

or opprovod tho requisition if pick-up wns to bo nor?.c 4t 

tho dopot. 

94. Discussion. Tho Chiof “,ucrtcrciastm had tho 

R-E-6-T-R-I 4-T-E-D

osaonslbiilty of ostlxating font, clothing, tentaee, insccticidcs 

ond othor shdlar type iten requirements for United 

at,ites nilitary fOP2CS, Itclim servioc units, libcratcd 

ilrnpwar units, civilian Lbor, cmry prisoners of war, 

libcrntad AlioA prisonsrs of m.r, r:n2 other sinilcr cnte- 

Corics or gorsorml. For thosc, Civil Affairs hod no rosgon- 

sibility. Civil Affairs Zid hovmor, hnc the rosponsihi- 

lity of ostimting rcqulrcnonts of the 8E:rio itons for 

prJcticully tho Sam ty2o of porsonncl. The division of 

responsibility vrns very ?.ifficult to :'raw, and tho rosulting 

prooo[lurcs rmd circunstcncco cruntcd D spsten which ltokecl 

flcxibilitjr both frOn n staff stundpoint and froi? fiold 

opamtions. ':hiLC in a fuw msas it was nccossery to atilizi? 

civil hffnirs stocks to wet U!iitocI St,:tcs I,rriy coixiitm- 

ents cons-derable quantities of Ar.g sugplics wore issuoi: 

to m G t Civil Affcirs ras?onsibilltics. This ma pnrtioul- 

:nip truo In Xi0 su:xily of rliaplacofl. psrsons in Gorminy. 

This pas clue$ not Only to unilorestilwtlon of rcquirononta 

-an? to thc lotr priority of that class of sulyly, but to thc 

inibility or difficulty In ostablishing thc ihontity of on 

indlviaunl as D fiiSp1,locod porson or as on0 of the categories 

for whlah the :mny was rospor.sIb1o. 

95. CloOScs of Allitm'. I:illt3rp Units. 

c.. W thc on?, of h-ostilitiss I.n I'zy 194.5, :.llioc: 

ri:iU::a:uer LIS in?ici.tcc: bolow vi39 bc,iny suylioC by ths Ur.iteC 

Status Forcos: 

Fronoh I:ilitery (incluCinE.Iloslu~~a) 355,551 

Continontt.1 hllioZ (libsrotecl mnpovwr) 79,617 

Italicri oni; Salvogo Sorvico Wits 41,967 

cI_ 

Tnt:1.l 477,155 

b. On 3 Docncbcr 1944, Suprcmc H6ncl.quarters, A'+loil 

3qcc:itionary Porcr;o, prosaribo?. cl.;oses of ~ lliut?ililitsrg 

orpnizstiona bused upon thair formtion nnc? aquipriznt. 

lIilitary and pnrn-rdlitary forccs woro Civifle(1 into 

tilo Pollortin;, tyccs : 

(1) Typo "A" f'orcos wcro tho80 refplcrly constitutoc? 

tlrmd @-ounl! lorcov cctivatiid, 

aquigpch, cnt; w?plic.L?in zooorclnnce vith 

appvvcri rommxnt prograis nnc? 01)Gl'oti.ilg 

un6.c~ thc Suyrciio ComanC;, idlid. SxzoCitionary.Forcos. 

(2) Typo IW forcco woro thoso nilitciry units 

roiscc! froi.1 libcratcc! mngotror snt'. oqui;)ncd, 

in :iooordnnco with Coeibinoc? Chiofs 

of Staff

R-E-S -T-R-I4 &%E -D 

orrifjd forccs of liborated nation8 nnd not 

eroupud unecr Typc trhrtand W' forces. 

(4) Typo W1forccs includd 511 militury .In6 

pra-nilitn-37 forces enrl. Lgoncies of libcrntod 

nations not incluc'cd iR other cst- 

cgorios. 

c. On 15 Lpril 1945, tho Colxlonr?ing: G,\noro1, Xuro- 

11s3nTheater of Operations, further clefinci; thcsc clasccs 

as follows; 

(1) Ty~uiiA:l rorccs wcrc rogularlg oonsti- 

tutcc'. ar:iy ficlrl ;nC air forccs orconizd 

ani. oquippod in nccorGanc: with 

ap;>rovo? Coabincll Chiefs of Stsff re- m'inmnt 

j7ropn:i aril! su1;3lic(? on .

R-E-S -T-R-I-c-T-E-D 

established by the Chief Quartermaster with the exception 

of those units operating in r;he 6th Army Group area which 

fed the French-Moslem ration. Type rIBrI units operating 

inside Germany were given a modified Post Exchange issue. 

Those operating outside Germany were authorized no issue 

of Post Exchange items. 

C. Type "C" forces were supplied rations insofar 

as availability permitted, from Cormunications Zone or =my 

dumps when operating under direot United States command. 

Type forces were supplied when specifically agreed up- 

on between the government concerned and Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditionary Forbes. Type nD*t forces when supplied 

were fed under the same procedure as for Type llEfI units in 

training. During later stages of operations, types '*DtI and 

fIC" units, operating under United States control, exoept 

those of the 6th Army Group, were issued a special Conti- 

nental Manu for nllied Forces operating with the United 

States, Units in 6th amy Group were furnished the French- 

Moslem ration. Eo Post Exohange items were authorized for 

these units. 

97. Class I11 Su lies. Supply of Glass I11 roducts was 

furnished in the same'ianner a8 for United States gorces ta 

Type SA1' units, operational type ftBII units, and type llC" 

forces under direct command of a Udted States comander. 

Type ltBrf units in training and type 'IDtv units were supplied 

when specifically agreed upon between Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditioqary X'oroes, and the government concerned, 

If supplied, the procedure and priority system established 

for the supply of rations to type rrBtrunits i n training 

were followed. 

98. Class I1 and IV Supplies. 

a. Initial issue of clothing and equlpment to 

type "A" forces was as prescribed by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. The War Department established the polioies 

with regard to replacement and maintenance of Type 

forces operating with United States Forces. Units in the 

approved French rearmament program established by the War 

Department received combat maintenance on the sane basis 

as United States Forces. 

b. Initial issue of clothing and equipment; to 

type tfBll forces was made by the Chief (.Luartermaster after 

approval by Sujreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Poroes. Clothing and equipment required for maintenance 

by type llBI1 forces were supplied by the British Far Offioe. 

The supplies were held in the United Kingdom until called 

forward by the Communications Zone. Responsibility for 

Clasa I1 and IV supply of' these units was later placed 

entirely on the British War Office. Type V" and riY 

forces were given initial issuss of clothing and equipment 

only when approved by Supreme Headquarters in accordance 

with agreements between the governments concerned and the 

Communications Zone, No replacement issues were authorized. 

99. Owerations. 

a. The definitions of the various types of units 

- 66 - 

R-E-8 -T-R-I-G-T-E-D

R-E 4-T-R-I 4-T-E-D 

mro odoruato, as wcro thc doscz-ipticns of tho aoalcs on 

vhich each gr,nor*jl t yw i:aa to bo su plicd. The grcatcst 

difficulty meountcrod by tho Chidf Guartcrmestir in tho 

sunply of those units, iiovwmr, was in obtaining thc: propcr 

018: sifioation and 6tronp.th fieUroS of thc units involvcc?. 

Thc Chicf Qumtcmastcr ststod that tho burden of mnpwcr 

&tin. tos fcll ahost cntiroly on his officr., and that tho 

i-portancc of thiE function was ncvcr fully re,ilizod by tho 

staff of Ibadouartcra, ZuropLan Thcctor of Opirotions. 

Prior to furxishine, suoglies tc LI unit, the Chiof QuartLrmstcr 

mst know its oatugory cind its strcwth. Prior to 

thc sul>ply of a numbor of units it was ossantiil thbt tho 

Chiof Quartcrnastor roocivc information os to numbor, oat& 

qorp and strcn@Ae far onouph in dvanco of issuo to 1wrmit 

addcuate stockaeo of dogets to mcct the requiromonb. 

as they arosr). Yct throughout most of tho opLrations in 

the Cur0 wvn Theator thL Chicf Quartcmastcr 1189 furniskcd 

noithcr tho strength of tho unit, the classification, nor 

tha scalc of issuo until dircctivcs wrc roccivcd from 

highor hoad?uartcro to mku thc issuus. 

3. The ’lrCopartm-nt, lata in 19k.4, turmd 

down a renuisition cubnittcd by thc Chicf Quartermustor 

oovoring supplios noadod tc roploniah stocks issuod to 

rion IJd pOr80lmC1, and directcd thtit tho rcquircments bo 

resubmitted in project form, Thc Chief Quartctrmastor vJa8 

unablc to comply as ho did not hevc tho nooesnary troop 

strbngths and classifications on ?rhich to basc roquirrjncnts. 

In tin cfrcrt to obtain thc information ma cstabllsh 

a system for thc flw! O f that information in tho 

fuwro, th Chief Qunrtcrmastor, in J&nuG ry 1945, notified 

thc P-l+ Ecsdqusrtcrs, Comuniestions Zonc, of his dccd for 

information, and submittod to him tho followinf chart 

which includrd all tho information 0vsiJ.ablo to tho Chiof 

Qunrtcrmastor on tho units to bo suyliad: 

Closs of Supply StrenE*th known 

Authorized Tor to tho 2uarter- 

Cntcigorg Issue I’RStCr 

(1) Liboratad !;anpowor 

Type A All Clanacs, p.S Unknown 

Typo R 

( 090ratiGnRl) 

?yp I3 

(In-trainin&) 

l’ypo c 

I and III 

Unl-Jlown 

T and 111 

Ihilcnocdn 

Unknown 

Unknown 

Typo n unknown ITnknown 

(2) bench Pw~onnel 

Fioncor Com- 

panios Unknown 22,030 

Li&t Isfantry 

Dattalions Unknown 5 3 200 

Gnrdo E!obile 

Gondarneiro Un.hown 3,000

Gondarniora Unknown 

French Forces 

of the Int- 

crior. Un.knoim 

(31 Dol.~iun7crsonncl. 

Bclqi dl LIC,t 

infantry units Unknown 

Bclgiun Pusil- 

ier Bottulions Unknoirn 

c. On 16 E'cbruary 1945, tho informetion c7,esirod 

illss still ihcking in the office of thc Chicf Quartormstor. 

!IC thoref or0 vrotc to thc Corhnandiny Gmcrill, Connunications 

Zone und rcquest,d thc follot,inf;: 

Conploto clarification cf tht. Quartor- 

master res?onsibility for the supply of 

non US units. 

Confirrmtlon that thc 2uartLrmstcr was 

to takr: no dction in the prograii for rocquippinp 

the Brcnch i.rmy. 

IIonthly pcriodic troop projection six 

iJonths in adv,nco. 

That no cormitncnts of 2uartornoster supplioa 

Bc nada dthout oonsultiny, thc Chiof 

c\,uwtormaster to dctcrrrlnc if the supplius 

rcquirod 6ro actuailg 011 hund 2nd chn bo 

.,llocntod for a spocific purposo. 

d. In u lcttcr on 5 Karch l%5, thc G-4, IIoadquartcrs, 

Cormunications Zonc, notificd thu Ch-iof '\,uartor- 

rwntcr thst thc ::ontrol Division, Comunicotioils Conc, w38 

conductinp: t? Study to dctdrrninu which stGff scotion i*ould 

bu rcszonsiblc for the ruonthly prcpnutlon of maripo~rcrsstirmtos. 

Tho proviouo duy, hovdcver, thc G-4 ha& roquestcd 

informtion by 6 IPrah 1945, as to the amount or clothiny. 

tho Chicf \uortirrrmstar could furnis:~to alliaa IailitLry 

units, indicdtlve of c. still inoduqustc coIioa'it of tho 

woblm. Thc Chicf qunrtcnmstor rcpliad that hc could 

suyply nothinc, :nd agsin roviotrcd his difficulties in obtoiniiq 

a pr0pr.r basis for the supply of thesc units. Thc 

situation WLS clurlficd to sono cxtcnt, but not coni>lztcly, 

by thb turninntion of hostilitios in Europo. 

c. aupplios uud cguipmont furnished to militbrg 

'md gaa-nilit Jry forccs of libmcctcd countries woru tronaf'crrsd 

in oocordunco vij th lond-loasc oocountlly procedures. 

In sp'tc of l~ck of lnfomtion as to strone;ths and types 

oi' units, militmy oncrstions worc not hindbrad throufrli 

look of su3pliaa :is sufficiont stooks wrc on hand to fiU bdsic mods. T ~ Lissuc of tho Unitcd States uniforn, howovor, 

to ather wilitary units, without boinc dyed or othorwiso 

altcrod, had c distinctly dcteriorating cffcct on tho 

morolo of thc: United States Soldier and lassaned his prido 

in tho vrunrin8 of his own uniforn. Such IsSuOS would not 

hovo boen nude hnd fncilitioa and tPm bocn aviilablo to 

nrko tho ncccflsory oltcrotions. 

- 68 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D


a. Class I1 and IV supplies for the Air Forces 

would.have been better controlled from an Air Force stand- 

point, had issue been made through the air depot groups. 

It would have been impractical for the Air Force to have 

handled other classes, due to the wide dispereion and regularly 

scheduled issue. 

b. quartermaster sales store service to the Air 

Forces would have been improved had the Air Force had at its 

disposal mobile sales stores on the same basis as the armles 

had them. 

e. The lack of a sufficiently hitrh priority for 

the movement of' Civil Affairs su?plies from the Zone of 

Interior to the Xuropean Theater of Operations considerably 

reduced the flow of such supplies from the Quartermaster 

Corps to Civil Affairs aEencies in the European Theater of 

Operations. 

d. The outstandina difficulty of' supplying Allied 

military units by the Qumtermaster Corps in the European 

Theater OP Operations was the lack of timely irf0matiOn on 

the dlanpower basis and the scales of issue for such groups Of 

personnel. The actual supply operations involvLnq these units 

were performed throueh Quartemster Corps channels and were 

SatiSfaotory to the extent that overall ,nilitary operations 

were not seriously pffected. 

e. The division of responsibility between the 

Quartermaster Corps and Civil Affairs for Civil Affairs 

supply was sonetlmas difficult to draw, and resulted at times 

in confusion and lack of officienoy. 

101. Recommendations. 

a. That in future operations the collection and 

dissemination of information and the formulation of broad 

plans for supply of Oth6F than Unitod States Amy Ground 

Forces be made tho responsibility of one single oentral staff 

wenoy 

b. That consideration and study be given to the 

feasibility of the Rir Forces drawing Class I1 &, D supplies 

from the Cmunications Zone In bulk,' and storing and issuing 

such supplies at Air Force depot groups, 

c. That consideration be given to the oontrol of mobile 

snlm stores by the fir lrorce for Air Force units, particularly 

those at sone distance from the armies. 

d. That in future operations, similrar,to those experlenced 

in the European Theater of Operations, the Quartermaster 

Corps be charged with responsibility for the supply, 

includinR planning and estimating requirements, of all Quartermaster 

items for all categories of personnel beinF supplied 

by the 0.9. Army. 

That the retail issue of auch supplies 

for the relief' of civilians end displaced persons be made the 

responsibility of Civil Affairs or similar agencies. 

- 69 - 

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R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-E-D 

Bibliography 

Chapter 7 

1. Ltr, Hq United States Air Forces in Europe, subject: 

ttQuartemaster Supply Operations in the Air Forcestl, 

undated. *(4) 

2. Supply Plan to Govern US Army Responsibility to US Maval 

Forces in Europe, Joint Lpgistioal Staff Coimnittee, 

European Theater of Operations, 6 Nov 43. *(5) 

3. Vechuical Manual Number 3", Headquartere, Theater 

Servioe Forces, European %eater, Office of the Theater 

Chief quartermaster, 15 Ssp 45. 

I+. "Continental Operating InstructionsTt, Office of the 

Chief Quartormaster, European Theater of Operations, 

19 Feb 45. *(6) 

5. quartermaster Operational Analysis Study ITumber 12, 

subject: Wivil Affairs Operations71,Office of the 

Theater Chief Quartermaster, Theater Service Forces, 

European Theater, Wovenbe? 1945. * (7) 

6, ft0,wrtermaster Operational Analyais study Number 8" 

subject: WMenpower in Relation to Supplyrt, Office o$ the 

Chief Quartermaster, Theater SerViCQ Forces, European 

Fhnater. 

7. Administrative Memorandum Number 40, Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditionary Force,. 3 Dec 44. 

. - 

8. Lfr, WD, AG office, datcd 7 Jun 44, 

9, Ltr, Rq US Air Forces in Europe, subject, "Service Operations 

of the OJ~ Corps", undated, *(si 

LO. Report on Graves Registration Services within the US 

Air Forces in Europe, €Iq UWE, dated 25 Nov 45. '(9) 

*NTumber in parentheses.is Catalog Nwnbcr.uSed in 

Inventory of ?kiterial, QM Study No. logt (General 

Supply), f ilo R LOl/ll. 

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R-E -8-T-R-I-C -T-E -U

R-2-S-T-R-I-C-T-E- 

PART THREf!l 

_1__ 

--- 

olsss I E l s e 

-= CHAPTER 8 

BATIONS ___I 

SECTION 1 - 

TYPES OF WTIONS 

102. 0 erational RationsB1 Oporational rations wuxe 

issued un-dss whore the issue or use of a 

bulk ration was impractical. There wore three principzl 

typos of oporational rations : 

a* Field Ration "0" was a cooked balanced ration 

in cans. Each ration consisted of thrco cans of,prtparrd 

mer.ts and vcgctablos, and three ~ ansof crackers, sugar and 

solublo ocffee. As this ration was not porishablo, it was 

suitable for use as a unit OX individual reservo ration, 

b. Field Ration W1Consisto&of throe unito, each 

containing on0 meal, packod iia a rectangular oortainer. Tkis 

ration could be used to replace the C ration for special 

purposes, 

o, The 10-in-1 Ration was a composite ration. 

Subsistence for 10 men for one day or for five man for two 

days was included in tho packago. There were four separate 

inner pnCkEgQS. Each package contained ccmponents of fivo 

rations and oach sct of two djffercnt packages combinod to 

make fivo comnlete rations. The LO-in-1 ration provided a 

wido varioty of food in fivo diffcrcnt menus. 

d. Other rations included.the*5-in-lJ which ma 

similnr to tho 10-in-1, md tho 25-in-1, which conaistod 

principnlly'of fruit juics, soup, and othQr Similar ration 

supplomonts. Both rations wore mainly usud to supplmcnt 

tho hospital rntion. 

103. Bulk Ratioml Bulk rations were iasuod whonovor 

possiblo in tho %jrcoan Thoatcr of Opcjrntions, and w0r0 of 

tvm prbcipal typos : 

a. Field Ration lfAfp, which correspondcd in goneral 

to the ~QELCOFime garrison ration and was generally porish- 

ablo. Boing perishable, it ms not auitable as a unit reservo 

melon. 

b. Field Rrticn "Bll, which was tho same ns fiald 

rution A e2copt that nonpcri shnblo itm roplaccd tho pcrlshnblu 

€toms, This ration was suitable for unit reserve purposes$ 

164. Supplemental Field Ration "DII. The D ration conrsisted 

of- g melting point choc- 

olata fortified with vitamin B-1. Originally, thls ration 

was intended as n complete reserve ration, but was used 

principolly in the Suropean 'Pheater as a supplement* to the 

operctionol rttions. Thore were occasions, bowever when the 

D ration was used and oonsumed 48 a reserve ration.2 

- 71 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

SZCTION 2 

105. Develoment .2 The developnient of tlie operational 

ration wasii=aTly on a lokistical basis, Gild was intended 

to povide sufficient food for a lkited iierioci. 

It VJRS 1ii~hl.y iri2ortant that the ration be: 

a, Zasy to ,"transpox%, 

b. SimiAe to issue, 

c. Coqact to carry. 

These 1oListical considerations were hazflrdous, for the 

character of the ration whs based on the size of the box 

it had to fit, ani not on the needs of the soldier. 

lQ6. p-?,C-->i;A-la>f.o~~.~ Tho nee& for a composite 

packed ra ion becane eviuent i;!hen B considerable portion of 

the Horth African Invasion Task Force vas suyplied fron the 

Uaited i;inkdm (See ALi5endix 9). Several miLlioii 14-in-1 

coilgosite rations wi?m procui-ed frai tile &ritish r,rry, but 

were never populcr witl; the Unite

R-E-9 -T-R-I-C -T-E-D 

at me sitting.& In the fall of 1944 however an ir~~iroved 

type C ration becue ov~iLable Set.c&nl excelient iter,,. of 

ffiatlt poducts mere substttuterd'for the stew type ~DQ&,S cf the 

oriqinal ration. !L variety of OrclCker6 rsplaced the original 

type C creckers. In nadition, uddltionol sclublb coffee and 

inprtwd confecticns were provided.:! 

3 09. Operational usc, 

Q. Tho 10-in-1, K and C rations wcro widely u8ed 

end woro aupplcrncnted whencvcr poseiblo by tba issue of 

fresh bread, mcnt end coffeo. Tho D ration, though-never 

popular, was at timcs uscd as a supplom~ntalration, as a 

substitute for coffee or cocoa, or as an ewr&6ncy rcserva. 

Tho 25-in-3 and 5-in-1 SUpplCUGntd rations wore uscd GXolusivoly 

for hospitals during the oarly stcgos of oporations 

on tho continent. Rosoarch and do-rolopmmt on all 

typos of operational rations was contjnuous. Hoat Wit8 

vmro prcvidod, spcclol bulletins on food preparRtlon and 

USG woro issued, P%dtho tJ"PYP0D bar Was AWdifiCd, The 

nutritional value nnii sccoptability of each tape ration 

was improved considorably. Thti followlnq ohart shows tht, 

changc in caloric oontent:Z 

Ration -194.3 x!& 

ories 

10-in-1 3408 4644. 

I I p 2756 2830 

"C" 2685 3709 

Average requirements pcr lnan per day: 4,000 cal- 

b. Comments by tho various Civision and Corps 

0,uartormastcre indicated their likes end dialikiis in type 

operational rations, as follows: 

Soventh Amrod Division. 

sOporational rations wore used during the 

cntire period (8August 1944 - 8 Reptombor 

1944) Pad consistcd Of C'S, K'8 and 10-in 

1's. Units et tintea would rofuao to acgoyt 

C rntioiis, a8 t op statoa tho mcn rcfuSod 

to cat thQll17.k 

Gth Infantry nivision. 

;1T$rpeS K and 10-in-lrations woro not in 

many instancos issuod es rO~.UQStQdand type 

C rations WClG substitutod tbcrcior. Thc 

typo C rntion is not oonaidorod sntisfao- 

tory for thG Infantry soldiorrf.7 

th Infantry Division. 

n tho fnst noving wP.riaro ncross Wranco, 

thc 10-in-1 ration wit3 DIUCT~ prootical tylc 

of ration duo to beinfl cornpact and mro 

opeily prepared in Q short tino. The I( 

ration ha6 been poforrcd by line aonpanics 

of Infantry whcn in oontact with the 

enemy and aspocLally during river croeflings 

or on D jump-off. Tho pe.akagoe woro 

oasily stuffod into n gcckot and this type 

- 73 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D

ation could bo oonsumod with little or no 

properation. The C ration has not bcen 

gonorally desirod by troops of this divi- 

sion and has been used only as a substituto 

for X ration when they wOre hord to 

obtain. Front line troops do hot liko tho 

C rabion due to its packaging and troops 

further in thc roar who can build a firc 

to hoot the C ration generally can be fed 

tho B ration.".a 

(4) %-*or o.rorationa1 rations oonsist- 

inE of C. D. IC and 10-in-1 vmro used oxclusiky 

&tii 13 July 194.4 whon tho B typo was 

brought to the oontinont, .horican troops 

did n3t thrivo on operational rations 

alone,. but on tho 10-in-1 ration no woight 

was lost. It yms dotominod that thc C 

ration wcs more praoticol for Armorcd clcmonts, 

and tho K for Infantryytt.9 

c. In addition to thu studios made in tho Zuropuan 

Theator of Oporations, a War Dopartmont Equipment Reviow 

Board whioh CbnVOnQd at Hoadqunrtors; !.my Ground Foroes, 

%shington, D. C., on 19 August 19!+/+, mode a ccnplcte study 

of all typos of rations. It recommondod that tho numbcr of 

typos be dooreasod, and that tho conditions undcr which cnoh 

was to be usoa definod mor0 olearly. It also rooonmondod 

that the C and R rations bo combined, that tho weight and 

volumo of packagod rations be roduood, end thnt accoptabil- 

ity be primarily charaotoristio of all rntians.5 Tho rocom- 

mcndations wero generally in accordance with ideas gathered 

from experience in the European Theater. 

SECTION 3 

110. pield Ration "B"2 

BTjLK RATIONS 

a. The first 2merioan troops arrived in Northern 

Ireland on 26 January 1942, and wera subeisted entirely on 

British rations. These rations were later modified into 

a British-Amcrican ration, and finally eliminated entirely. 

Plans for tho invasion of the continent called for the in- 

itial use of ogerational rations to be followod later by 

the B ration and finally by the A ration when practicable. 

The B ration was to equal the n ration in all respeots, with 

the excootion that non-pbrishablo componentB'wore to be sub- 

stituted for perishables. The B ration menu, which formed 

tho basis for procnrement in the United States, had thrae 

imnortant defeats : 

(1) Stow'type meat made up @. perccnt of the 

meat, poultzy and fish components. 

fZ) Milk products wore insufficient. 

(3j Thoro was froquent repotition of unpopular 

components of tho then current 

operational ration. 

b. Efforts were made to corrcct tho defects or 

to minimize their offeck, On-Dplus 32 the first B rations 

Brrivea on the continent. on- B 'plu 39 eMpments 

- 74 - 

R-E -6 -T-R-I-C-T-E-D


of frosh moat and buttor bLgan to arrim and a partial 

convorsion to fiold ration A was nadG at that tinc. 

111. Fiold Ration A. 

a. Thc A ration was planncd to mu%thu smo 

standards of tl-e garrison ration issucd in tho Unitd 

Rtatos. Circular,Pumbor 13, Tr~adquartcr~, EurosLan Thontcr 

of Oporations, gave tho following characturistios:2 

(1) bcsh moats, dairv prducts, vogctabl&, 

fruits and othm porishablus to bd usd 

as much ae possihlo. 

(2) To contain approximately 4,000 caloriw. 

(3) 

oquol or cxcood thc. rcconmcndcd diotary 

allO~anO66. 

(10 To succcssfully maintain thc health and 

moralo of tho troops. 

b. In ordcr to insuro propcr 'sroparetion and consorvation, 

menus wcrc przparod and distributsd through Glass 

I supply points as a guide to mass sorrzomnts. Eohools wLrc 

ostablishod and inonu teams went into the fiild to instruct 

in proper proparation. A coadiment kit was iSSUQd t o pro- 

vido all messes with a basic stook of oofidimcnts, but it 

was not until latc in tho oporations that propcr ana conploto 

distribution was mde.2 

c. Ration issue oxporionco in tho Europoan Tlicatcr 

of Operations boginning with J~ly1944 indicatos that a high 

proportion of typo A or 9 rntion was,consumod. Thc following 

chart shows tho porccnta 81) of G,K, 10-in-1 and tiTe A or 

B ration that *ere issuod:Z PAppondix 1.2) 

-Date Typo A/B Typo C Typo I Type 10-in-1 

June 1944 14 15 71 

Soptembor 194L 58 18 10 1L, 

Doccmbor 194.4 87 03 05 05 

March 1945 88 04 05 03 

Juno 1945 94 01 03 02 

Boptcmbcr 1945 92 02 04 02 

Considorinq thqoondition of the highways and thc railroads, 

tho oftan inadoquato port facilitios, and tho difficulty in 

maintaining a balancod ra$ion, tho consistont isauo of a 

high poroontago of typo A or:B ration throughout thu war 

was a i;romcrndous undertaking, Somo of tho suocoas nay be 

attributod to tho V%&"od Coa-oodit Loading,r of rations 

at tho Pow Yorlc Fort of Embarkation.~o 

112. Ration Accosso Conveniencc.~ackots.2 Tho RAC 

kite (Appendix TO) as thg w~rocallod, xadu Eobaooo, oanUy 

and toilot artiolos availablo for issuo as Part of tho fidd 

ration. This gratia issue was to continuo Until Post EKohongos 

oould bo oponed. A composite pack of 200 balanoc-d 

- 75 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T -E-D

R-E-S-T-R-X -C-T-E-D 

rations Of tobacco, Candy and toilot articles was vory casy 

to hnndlo and issuc. Sqmntc packs of thrco typcs: 200 

tobaoco'rations, 100 oandg rations, and 800 tOilGt nrticlo 

rations, caused coziplicntions in supply. 'Ilx initial allow- 

EICG of om razor bladc pof man per wook was insufficient 

subscqucntl.~ chengod to three blades per man per week. 

113. Perishables.:! %be success of the A ration dependad 

largely~e~cureqbnt of perishable item. The 

3,unrtemaster Corps prOourr?d , received, stored. and issued 

fresh neats and dairy products at cold storage plants, and 

distributed fresh meats pnd dairy products in mobile reefer, 

vans front btiee depot cold stores to su?'-~l-~ points, Local 

proourenent of vegetables and fresh fruits wss aa8.e wherever 

poasible, and shipments of all types of :>erishnbles 

were mde from the Uiil.tm3. States. Transportation difficulties 

and ths lack of proper refrigeratton facilities for 

transport made it impoasible at times to issue perisheble 

items to front line troops. %en proper facilities wen? 

nv;vaj.lable, such issue was made. 

1Ih. Dehydrated Ipooas,2 !"he use of dehydrated foods to 

conserve shfppinfl space and to faoilitate distribution be- 

came alr,ost es-:eiitial. Dehydrated foods wcre issued with . 

both the field ration .A and the field ration B. In General, 

dehydrated foods vere nQt popular, and ness sergeants and 

coolcs wre not properly instructed in their use and proparation. 

Dehydrated pctatoes e.sd vegetsbles reconstituted 

feirly well, and t8he preparation of dehydrated egss improved 

considerably. Dried whole milk yowder was fairly wul'. 

accented, find 50 percent of the European Theater milk requireinents 

ware renuisitLonad in that form. 

1x5. Raticiis for othor than US Forces.2 AS the oporations 

progressed tho ~.uartermast,erCorps.became more and 

more'invclvod in feeding vrifioners of war, displaced psrsons, 

civilian labor and otlier nationals. Originally, in 

the interest of food conservation, the followinp: menus wcre 

devised: 

a. Allied Ilationals. 

(1) Civilian embloyees 

(2) Liberatad manpower 

(3 1 French Expeditionary Force 

(4) Italian Service units 

(5) RussZan ?rationals 

b. Enmy Frationale. 

{ 1) ''lorking prisoners of war 

(2 ] lJon-worldn$ prisoners of war 

(j) Hospitallzcd prisoners of war 

Each menu prescribed a d.lPferent, calorfc coritent. Thc sevoral 

uenus, howover, Were nGwr issue&, as tho nunbor and 

variety proved too difficult to handle, .A cnntinental allicd 

mwu replaced the five menus for Allied Nationals, 

while the other monus rQmainod in offoct. 

- 76 - 

R-E-s -T-R-I -c -T-E-D

116. Conclusions 


SECTION 4 

a. Of tho opcrotlonal rations, the 10-in-1 ration 

VTQS tho most popular with tho soldior. It hztr n hipher caloric 

content thnn any of thc othLr typo opcrationnl rations 

and was used princinnlly as a modifiod R ration. 

b. Tho% ration, though containing fcwcr calories 

than the C ration, Wa8 mOrG acceptable to thc SolditiT. The 

K ration ia pacltngod to ffiCili%QtD ccirrylng, distribution 

and consumption. 

c. The C ration is bulky and awkward to oarry and 

normc.lly required hoating. ,Under oonditions it is 

possible to hoat a C ration, tha 10-in-1 ration om normally 

bo prepawd. 

d. Wile thc oporational rations wcro Lsscntial 

undor many circumstnnccs, ovory effort to issue thu A or B 

ration me. IIL7de. 

117, Recmcndations, 

8. !?hat studies and rosearch into dohydrated 

foods and oporational rations continue. 

b. That tho recommendations of.tfio %r Dcpartment 

?quipmont Review Ronrd , Fcadquartertr, lrmy Ground 

POPOCS,be gonerally accepted, an3 thet a suitablo 0701ational 

ration bo devcloped whioh will he nutritionally 

aocoptablo and contain a Suf'fioient variety in meals, 

whilo still combining the ni.2itary characteristics of n 

flat, mini"weip,ht and nfinimum volume packag6. 

BiblioRraphy 

Chaptor 8 

1. FM 100-10 

2. US Amuy Subsistonce Exporienco in Xuropaan Th69t8r 

dntpd 1 Novombar 1945. (Furnished for ffenoral Board use) 

3* Ltr,.Fq Sever&$ US Army, 21 Apr 45, subj: "Operational 

Rations". . (1). 

4. AM Report No. 751, 23 Mar 45. 

5. War Department Report of Board of Of'ricersrCdhvened to 

Btudy theEquipment of the Pbet War Army, dtd 20 Jan 45. 

6. Summary of qM Activltles, 7th m r o d Div for poriod 8 

A X b4 - 8 flop 44. *(2) , 

7. After 4ction Report of @I, 30th Inf Div dtd 4 Oct 44. *(3) 

8. Report of Opcrctions OT the 35th nJf Company during the 

poriod 7 Jul 44 to 1Feb 45. *(4) 

9, Opnwtion of XIX Corps - Normpdy Cmpaign (undated) 

10. nTT Operational aslalysls No, 5 , ddted 1Nov 45, OrPCQ)d,TSFEP. 

* Kumber in parentheses is Clatalog ?&."ex used in Inven- 

tory 0" Material, Stcciy No. log, (Class I Supply), 

rile ~~401/11 

- 77 - 

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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-n 

SECTION 1 

G O I ~ I O I ~ T SZONE O ~ 

118, Oranization and Ws8ion.l The Chiof quartormaster, 

Zuropcan Theater of Operatione, vas responsible 

for the procuremant, storage and issuo of all goods to the 

Unitad Cltates Forces and, when so diroctod by the Commanding 

Conoral, Turopoan Theatcr of Opcrations, to acrsome1 

OthGr than Unit& 4tates militan. In thc ?&??for- 

mancc of this mission the following divisions of tho Office 

of %he Chiof qmrtcrmastor wore principally cooccrnod: 

a. Subsintonco Division. 

b. Frocurcmont Division. 

c, Storage and Distribution DivJsion. 

Tho rrocuremant and storam and Distribution Division8 

were concerned with all classcs of suivlios. Tho rosponsibilitics 

of thc Subsistence Division were confined to 

Class I Supplizs. 

119. Mctions.1 

a. The Subsietqnce Division was charped with the 

following primary funotions: 

(1) To secure by roquisltion all Cl4SS I 

SUppliOS frm the United qtatos, from 

the British, and fron othsr souroos 

through tho Trocuremcint Division. 

(2) To maintain balanoed stocks of Class I 

supplios in dopots in accordmob with 

proscribed levels, and to rocommcnd to 

tho Storago and Distribution nivi9ion 

tho distribution of Glass I sup?liCs to 

aooomplish this purpose, 

(3) To suprvise and assist in the efficient 

uso of Class I supplios, including pro- 

paration of monus and tho formulation of 

m098 policies. 

(fk) 

To aovolop spooificationn for items procurd 

in tho Unit& Kingdom. 

b. Tha Trocurcmcnt Division waa charEod with 

making all local purchases as rqucatod by thL Subsistemu 

Division, and with chzclcine; al.1 requisitions on tho United 

fitates to dotcmino whiah itoms wuo ~~OOWRblC from local 

eourcos. 

c. Tho Rtorapo and Distribution nivision was 

charRoa in qcncrnl with furnishing toclinical nuidanoo for 

thG opcration of tho dopote, ooordinating tho distfibution 

- 76 - 

R-E-$ 4-R-I -C-T-E-D

of the supplies to the depots, and formulating plans for 

the receipt, storage and issue of the supplies. 

120.. Rrocurment. 

a, Class I supplies were obtdined from the Zone 

of Interior by requisftion and presrranged schedules of 

shipments. These were nugzented by exploitation of local 

re8ources in Allied and neutral countries, as well as 

frac; cnptured supplios. The nnxinu procurement in the 

United Kingdm, from late 19$2 until D-Day, amounted to 

npproxiiwtely 30 pewent of requirenonts for the United 

Stetes Foroes. This proourelrent wns based principally 

on the ni?,l ration for consmption in England and mounted 

to 38 staple items and 24 perishable Items. Procurelcent 

in the United vingdom fcr Shipm6nt to the continent after 

the invask was based on 10 staple items and fiV6 perishnble 

item.4 

b. Procurmnt in France and Belgiwl WES limited 

prinoipally to fresh potatoes, VegetQbl6s and fruits. 

Food processing and mnufacturing servioes were also ob- 

tained in these countries for the production of items such 

as yef.st and Spaghettj pcm raw mteriels furnished by 

the United fitotes hrw. Other noutral or occupi d oountries 

furnished oertnln items cf food as follows: 3 

(1) Spain and Canary Islands - tomatoes, 

onions, banenes, dried fruits, and fresh 

citrus fruits. 

(2) Denmark - butter, eggs, and carcass pork, 

(3) Portugal - sardinos in brine, green 

coffee, cocoa beans, and dried figs. 

(4) Holland - potatoetl and onions, 

(51 Norway - frozen cod fillets. 

c. Lend-Lease waa employed in all the transactions 

in tho UnitEd Kingdom, France, Belgiucl, and Luxumbourg 

until the termination of Lend-Lesse, September 1945. The 

United Stetca Commerciol Corporation, operating from the 

Rtcte Department, dispatched special purchasing niseions 

to the neutral countries of Spain, P6rtxt$cil and'tho Canary 

Islands, cnd tho liberated countries of Eollgd, Denmark 

and PTorway, to buy subsistence ond Oth6r commodities with 

C ~ Qdirect purpose of keeping those supplios from lalling 

into enow hsnds, end at the same time to supplsmcnt the 

fTA" rations of the Unitsd States troops. Liai3on was maintained 

by the Procurement Division Offjce of the Chief 

Quertermastm, Rmop(~nn Theater, with the General Purchas- 

ing Agents of the United States Gommwcicl Corporatlon, 

in tho various countries.3 

d. Proourement of subsistence itoms from the 

United Kingdoffi wns effcoted on an allocation basis of all 

ave.ilfible supplies in the Unitcd Kingdom, whereas in Franc6 

cnd other liberetdd countries subsistence items were drawn 

froa civil economg . sqppliaswhich were declared surplus 

to oivilinn needs by the foodl ministries of the respective 

countries.3 

- 73 . 

R-E -S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D

121. Storage. 


a. The storage of' perishnbles in the United 

Kingdom wes handled almost entirely by the British Minietry 

of Food and by commercial agedcies under its control. On 

the continent there-was an extreme shortage of cold storage 

facilities, particularly auring the early stages of 

the invaslcn. This was due chiefly to the destructkn of 

cold storage plants by enemy and Allied action, and tc 

the inability to quickly rehabilitate the plants. Construction 

and rehabilitatiGn was undertfiken as smn as 

practicable but, until satisfactory facilities were obtain- 

able, reefer vans hauled perishables direct from the ships 

to the supply points. The use of reefer vans, however, due 

to the long haul, was not satisfacto y for the proper care 

and maintenance of perishable items. 5 

b. As the operations progressed, more and great- 

er facilities fcr cold storage became available. With 

the liberation of Paris (S-0040) cold.stcrage capacity 

became adequate for the first time.2 

c. Since fresh fruits and vegetables obtained 

from local sources were not normally received until ready 

for issue, little or no storage was required. Fresh fruit 

and vegetables rrom other sources were stored in clcsed 

warehouses, when available and if made necessary by weatner 

conditions. When closed storage was not available,the 'Yem 

atyle stacks 14 feet by 20 feet, wlth tarpaulin covers, 

were used.4,5 These stacks were generally the shape of 

a storage tent and easily put together. In some instances 

two or more of these stacks were joined together for better 

storage or for heating when neoessary. After the invasion 

was well under way, 90 percent of all perishables, other 

than refrigerated perishables, were stored inside. The 

Vrem stacks were used for the renaining ten percentV5 

d. There wa6 a limited amount of spcilage aong 

nonperishable items which were packed prior to late 1943. 

hnoisture, in gome cases, detariorated the shipping carton 

and caused cans to rust. Citrus juices Bometimes developed 

pin holing from the inaide due to the aoticn of the oftrio 

acid on the metal. There was also some lcos due to the 

deterioration and loss cf paper labels from the cans. The 

majority of thbse difficulties were corrected by the devel- 

opment and use of a moisture proof carton. Also, a new 

laminated asphalt craft bag was used for coffee, flour, 

sugar, salt, and driofl vegetables. This type of bag practically 

eliminated loss from stcrage and moisture. An 

inside lacquered can for citrus juices cllminated loss from 

pin holing, and the label defect was eliminate6 by pai ting 

or stenciling the contents on the outside of the cans. 9 

e. Approximately ten porcent of' the A or B 

ration compononts such as coffoc, flour, sugar and dried 

VGgEtableB were stored inside. All ogeraticnal rations, 

and the reEainlng compononts of the bulk rations, were 

stored outside in staoks and covered with tarpaulins. 5 

122. Distributicn. 

a, The inltial Class I supplies for the lnvasicn 

of mope were brought in by ferry craft such as landing 

craft. tank. and nmphiblous DUG'Ivs. After a sufficient 

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R-E -S 4'-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-I2 -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

number of trucks were ashoke they assisted the DUIPJ's in 

establishing the first operational dumps. Five mobile 

rbfrigcratiun companies, fully loaded with perishables 

arrived on the continent In the middle of July 1944 and 

wtre used frr direct delivery to the army supply pcints. 

Th6 first railroad train fcr Class I supplies was used on 

12 Awust 1944, and as operations progressed addlti nal 

railroad ~tcck was utilized as it became flvailablea8 

b. Class T supplies were distributed tc the 

several armies, based upon requirements contained in the 

daily telegram. The Chief Quartertwister desig"d the 

dspct or Ctepots responsible for the supply of each artqt. 

Tha daily telegrams were sent through the regulating stat!ons, 

after their establishment, to the depots concernec. 

The dopots procured the supplies and shipped thorn to the 

armies, throyh tho regulating station, by means of the 

daily train, These trains were BO loaded that they could 

be broken down into six to ten sections, each section 

cerrying a fully balanced number of rations to be diverted 

to the various army supply points. Thjs system was not 

always satisfactory as cars were loaded from several difrarent 

points and asseabled into 8 single train when load- 

ing was conplete. Cars sometimes ecame mixed anC caused 

tho receipt of unbalanced rations. k 

123. Control of Issue. 

a. Effort6 were conttnuously mde to maintain 

the ration issue within authorized allowances and $0 avoid 

waste whenever possible. Army Quartermasters were required 

to include in the daily telegram the number of rations 

by type required, my augmentations uuthorizea, and the 

amount of any excess stocks on hand. Inasmuch as it was 

impracticable to make a head count during combat, the 

morning repert strength was shown in lieu of the head 

oount, and hrmy Pus-tormasters wePe required to jus ifg 

requests for requirements in excess of that figure.k The 

Chief C,mrternaster devised a ration return for Communications 

Zone troops which inaluded the s m requirements. 

~ 

This form was rcvised from time to time in accordance with 

tlie situation, and was requlred of all units after cessa- 

Lion of hostllitlea. 2 ~ 7 

b. As a further precuation against the building 

up by armies of stocks In excess of maintenanoe and re- 

serve requirements, the Chloi ".srtermaster established 

credits in the supplying depots againot whioh the armies 

were authorized to draw. The credits were flexible and 

could be increased at the discretion of the depot oomnder 

upon request of the Army Quartermaster. This plan 

was effective and rtduced the amount of supplies the armies 

received against the doily telegram, while at the S ~ Q 

time It allovded the depot stocks to build up.6 

a. Operational rations were the only dveilable 

ratiomfrom D-Day until 2 July 1946 when the first issue 

of bread wfls made. During the first week in July fresh 

meat and butter were added and by tho middle of July local 

purohasine, added fresh potatoes Oarruta, turnips and 

cabbage. on 10 July (D plus 321 191+/+the first ~~PII 

ration 

was issued and by D ylus 90 most of tho troops were subststed 

on n rapidly improving "A" ration.* Diffioultios 

were encountered during the latter part of July in main- 

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R-E-S -T-R-I -C-T-E -D 

taining a balanced nB" ration in each supply point and 

dump, The situation was relieved when the armies broke 

out of Normandy and by necessity were required to use the 

operational rations. Again, during the r3erman breakthrouqb 

in the winter of 1944-1945, supplies and dally trains were 

disrupted. The Third US Army arm "A" rations to meet 9C 

peroent of its requirements at that time, but ths First 

and Ninth W Armies, due to the disruption of the daily 

train, were required to draw dweply into their reserve 

stooks. These two armies subsisted, during the early stages, 

exclusively on operational ratione. The large number of 

prisoners captured aftm the armies crossed the Rhine cawed 

another CritiCal shortage to exist. Operatlonnl rations were 

lssued for initial use since oooklng equip" was not 

available. After oookhg equipment was provided, the prisoaers 

were rea according to tne prescri ed prisoner of 

war menust This relieved the situation. B 

dh Tine adoption of "balanced commodity loading" 

ol ships et the New York port contributad more to feeding 

of balanced rations than any other single faotor. This 

eyetea of loading all components of the r*Artor IW ration, 

in the oorrect proportion, in e. single ship ermitted the 

entire load being assigned to any one depot,$ 

e. Due to the large numbee of unreported or inproperly 

reported shortages or substitatlons ib 6ha rations 

which ocmrrred at supply points and depots, the Chief 

Quartermaster required a d'aily comprehensive report in 

order that he bo kept informed and could Cake such cor- 

reotive action as necessary.* 

124. Over Issue?. 

* a. Although the Quartermaster service made con- 

tlnuous effort t o keep ratlon issues within authorized 

allowances, there were several factors whioh contributed 

to over issue:2 

Division commanders wa-6 authrizod to 

augment the rations for thoir troops 

when in contact with the enemy. 

Doops often consumed four operational 

maals n day In lieu of three. 

several categories of porsonnel, such 

as prisoners of war, guides, interpreters, 

drivers and hungy oivilians were often 

fed by oombat troops. In many such 

oases no rsports of the numbem fed were 

made. 

FooQ waste normally inoreased whon organ- 

izations were on the move. 

b. The number of rations 1ssuc.d divided by the 

actual strength gives an index of over issue (Sac Appendix 

11). The index of over issue by month in tho EL&opean 

theater shows that the highest rate of over issue 

ooourrea during periods of maximum operetj onal activity: 2

R-E-S-T-R-I-C 4-E-D 

-rnaox Situat idn 

June 1944 1.02 The greatest portion of the 

troops were still in the United 

Kingdom, and therefore subject 

to control. 

September 1944 1.32 The transfer of c great den1 of 

Unlted Kingdom strength to the 

continent plus the great opern- 

fional activity of these months 

raise% the over issue index to 

its all time hi&. 

February 1445 1.04 The comparatlve stability of the 

fall and winter arc refleoted in 

rapid drop in overissues from 

its September peak. 

April 194.5 1.20 The intense Botivity of the drive 

into Germany is reflected by high 

over issues. 

SECTION 2 

FIELD FORCES 

L25. rnanization and Functions. The Arm Class T sections 

norially operated 8s port of the Supsly DiVi8iOn, 

Office of the .!amy Wartermaster. It was charged with the 

technical supervision and coordination of Class I actiybties 

within the army as directed by the Army Quartermastar. ,11 

In the performance of its mission, the Class 1 section was 

charged with the rollowing principal functiona: 

a. Determine Class I requirements, and coordinate 

tho proourmsnt, storage and distribution of Class I supplies 

based upon the availability of transportation, levels 

prescribed, and on the current milltery operational situa- 

tian .l2 

b. Recommend the distrlbution of Class I: supslies 

within the 6rmy 08 to type and percentage of eroh type, thfl 

source, the dally trsin shipments, and the resbrve stocks. 

c Reoomond the location of railheeds, truckheads 

and dumps.io 

d. 9uperviss bakery production and cold storage 

activit ie 8.12' 

e, E!aintcln accurate reoords on consumption and 

Class I supp1ies.10 

f, Receive and consolidate unft ily telegrams 

npd prepme and aubmlt the Army telegram. 1P 

1-26. Operations. 

a. Rations ware requested bV means or the daily 

telegram sndljere shlppsd to nrmy supply points by the 

dally train. The subordinate units normally submitted 

- 53 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I -C -%E -D


their telegram to the issuing supply point b8 nowe in 

ndVtInCe of drawin$.lOilb The supply point oonsolidnted 

requests and Bubmittbd the total requirements to the .&my 

Class I Section for tho preperotion of the army telsgran,.ll 

b. Armlks normolly opernted ne main dump and e 

iuinimum of one supply point per 00rpS.~3 mis was based 

on the lwinOipl0 that a base rnilheed should be Sbt up to 

handle 011 rations nnd to be responsible for providing 

bolnnced rrtions in the forwcrd supply points. The ~OCEtion 

of supply ooints was dictated by the tncttcnl ?&tun.tton 

,nd availnbility of‘ trunsportation fnc€lities. 

The primcry conaideration for the location of the roil- 

herd or supply pofnt wos the neceesity for hLrd atLnding, 

~t s6parPte entrance and exit, end a good roud net. The 

selection and 1oc:tion of the army railhead was no& by 

thc Army :ucrtermster. The selc=ctioi and recommendation 

of thc locntion of tho edvence supply points wss normolly 

loft to he Corps ?uartrrlrslstc7r nnd railhend officer con- 

ctrnad 

c, It w m found thst supply points could opcrr.te 

nearer to the front lln s than was gznerolly Eilieved 

possible or ndviscble.lz There %orenony times, howevcr, 

when the tCCtiCRl situetion progreseed so rnpidly or the 

transportation wn8 80 critiocil that the round-trip distance 

between combat troops and army slipply points equalled 8s 

muob RS 300 ailes. In such cnsus, odvunce aistributing 

points, stocked with onerational rations only, were estoblishod 

by Corps Quartermsters a8 ar a& 100 miles fopword 

of the closest nrmy supply point.15 

d, SupDly points we e normally oDfirated by -p.virtormaster 

Railhead Comwnies.fl Quarterma&ter Bakery 

companies supdied the- supply oints daily with the fresh 

breed md coffee requireixeents.f3t1& 

127. Issuss. Railhead oompanies were responsible for 

making c o m and proper losuea, and for mintenonce of 

accurate records pertaining therdto. Rations were issued 

on tally-out forms, and codes or tally-outs, together with 

corresponding ration rGturns, were submitted to the Army 

nmrterlraster 6aoh day for record and comparison.l3 Rread 

was noreally Issued with bulk rations on the basis of IC5 

pounds pm 100 am, or as a aupplement to the operational 

ration oti tha bosis of 30 pounds per 100 mea. Fresh OOffbe 

w3s iss cd when ovoilable in lieu of canned or soluble 

c0ffee,~4 The normal issue wGS baS6d upon eight pounds 

pcr 100 ma. During cold wehther, end when there was a 

short8ga of toe nnd cocoa, the isauo was raisod to 12 

pound8 per 100 men.2 The regular oondiment issue was modo 

in bulk at ten-day intervole. Ths issua vas ofton deluyed, 

or missod entirely, duo to the rapid movemont of 

troops, the opening nnd closing of supply goints, and the 

ljmitcd tronsportntion rvoilnble to move the aupplies 

foz”nGrd*l8 

128. GrRanizatlon_,2 ~n attempt was made on the oon- 

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R-E-9-I-R-I-C-T-Z-D

R-E-$-T-R-I-c-T-E-D 

tinent to develop a catering servioe which would train 

oookke, bakers, mess sergeants and mess officere, pmtic- 

ularlg in the preparation of new types of foods. This 

plan did not progress very fa, though a need for such u 

servico existed. In lieu of a catering service, K bakers 

and cooks school and mess teems were csthbllshed. Each mess 

team, compoaed of one officer, one dieticisn and eight enlisted 

men (cocks, bakers and mess sergeants),went into the 

field and rendered service to mang units desiring their 

assistance in establishing messes. The mess teams were 

avaiLab16 to hrmies, corps, divislcns and section commundere 

on recuest, with priority t3 field forces. Frior 

to D-Day, and whiie troops were in the Dnited Kingdom, model 

messes were established by thc kugrtsrmristor Corps. Nuw 

units were encouraged to visit trkse model establishonts 

prior to opening mosses of their Own. 

129. Functions and Operations of atlkers wd Cooks 

Sohools &nd ?LESS Le=. 

a. The Bakars and Jooks School, which originally 

opened in Laland in Septlmber 1442, moved to Yranoe in 

April 1945 whero it was mada a %uartermaster responsibi- 

lity, and in September 1945 it rooved to a central location 

in the erican ZoIie in Germany. The schools trained a 

total of 6,163 stuaents in cooking and mess management, 

who were drawn from all types of organizations and units 

on the continent and In ingland. 

b. In October 1944 six mess taws were set up 

end trained, taking to the field after a 30-day course 

of instruction in OOOking and mess mnagemcnt. The number 

of teams wem doubled in JanuLry lgh5 and after VE-Day 

increased to 23 mess t ms. These teams had, in general, 

the following duties:l? 

To assist an orgenleation comandcr in 

supervision and operation of his mess. 

To instruct and work with the mc1ss personnel 

of an organization in their unit 

kitchcns. 

To cwsult with the mess officer on vha 

glanning, superivision and inspection of 

his ness. 

'Po advise all mesa pcrsonnol rcgarding 

the function of the several types of 

ratione and most effective ways of utilizing 

the typ IfAII and 'lBrt rations. 

To assist all mess personnel on yroblams 

of substitution and r;he necessity 

for adherence to the nonthiy menu. 

To instruct in the proper poparaclon 

of dehydrated foods. 

To acqcaint all mss peraorael with 

recommendcd procedure for the efficient 

care tlnd ojeraticn af standard field mQSS 

equip". 

130. DiBousSion. * 

a. The moss team operation in the Luropcan

R -E-S-T -R-I -e -T-E-D 

Theater was distinctly a success. In addition to their 

normal function of instruction, mess teams took hold of 

several major messing Jobs and carried them through to 

success. Sone exonples are: 

men supplying hot food to refnforceuonts 

enroute by train became a problez, the 

pilot models of the kitchen care were 

designea and built by the ceasing organi- 

zation, The troop train ffienu wes dcnonstrnted 

in actual use by G ness team 

which mde several troop train trips. 

Mess tsoms did much of the pioneer work 

in opening messas in the huge staging 

ore23 in late Dscenber 1944, Januaryand 

February 1945. 

Xess tenns were called upon to solve 

the almost inconceivable messing problems 

encountered in receiving German 

prisoners of war in temporary enclosures 

with no equipment whutsoever. 

After VE-Day eight teams were sent to 

Germany to work with occupational force 

organizatlons which hod heavy losees of 

experienced Peas personnel as a result 

of redeployment. 

- suoaessful operation could have been improved 

with more attontion devoted to straightening out 

supply point operation as a part of the mess team function. 

Ry the time they had worked a woak or ten days in en ares 

R mess team commander should be able to form a sound 

opinion as to the adouracy a4d completeness of the issues 

of its supply point. The moss team commander's mission 

could have been OXpmkd with benefit to inolude a bey 

with the personnel of the supDly point. in oacharea covered, 

amphesizing the importance of accurate issues and eapsc- 

ielly instructing in the3ter issue polioy. 

c. The establishment of a Catering Service along 

the lines of. the Pritish Army system (See A.pDendix 15 ), 

would certainly insure that n higher percentage of profossional 

alvilian cooks entering the army would be directed 

into messing work. Further, it would guarantee 

thnt training effort would bc expended only on personnel 

which would remnin in messing work. From the standpoint 

gf COm"d, its implications would be that instead of 

transfcrbing an unsatisfactory cook to guard duty, a 

comndinig officer would request n replacsmant from the 

Cntering Service pool and, upon his arrival, return the 

unsatisfactory cook to the pool for retraining and renssignnont, 

SECTION 

CONCLUSIONS AND BECOIWNDA%IOWS 

131. Conolusions. 

a. The operoticg proaedure, procurecent and 

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R-E-9-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-P-D 

issue of Class I supplies by tho Comunlcetlons Zona, 

Xuropoan Theater, proved to be bnslcally sound end hi@y 

practical in principle and in opsmtion. 

b. Purchase of Silbsistancs Item in the 

Unittd Kingdon, on the continent and from Indigenous sour- 

CES relieved greater shipping facilities for other nssds 

and gsve troops foods they otherwise could not hme hnd. 

C. 'Yith the developat of the new typ packrglng 

sod conning, many ran-days of labor ware saved end 

loosca frol.i spoilage War6 reduced to B niniluum. 

d. lless teams proved to be a help in organizatlons 

fortunate enough to hove their services. 

132. Poco~-mcndations. 

n. Thnt packaging and conning rsthods be further 

devolopsd. 

b. That a Cctering Service be estcblished in 

the subststenae Brflnch of the Offica of tho p:unrtarmnstsr 

"anera1 and that it be developed along thc lines of tho 

rritish systom. 

- 87 " 

R-3-S-T-R-I-G-T-E-D


Bibliognaphy 

Chepter 9 

1. €,uartcrmaster Service Reference Datn Vol 11, Hecdquorters 

Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, 

1 Jan 44. 

2. US Arny Wubsistence Exppriences in the European 

Thcatcr”, ‘Norld ’Nay TI, 1 Nov 45. 

3. Ltr fr Hq TEFET, OTCQ!, dated 13 Deo 45, subj: WorL.ants 

on quarternaster Supply Study, Chegter I1 - Opcrnting 

Prooedurs, Procureaent and Issue”. *(7) 

4. Technical Mahuol 43, Depot Operation Yanunl, Eq, 

ETOUSA, O CW, Feb 45. 

5. Interview with Col J. Eh Kenderdine, @IC, Chief of 

Rtomge and Distribution Division, Office of Chiof 

Quartermaster, Unitad ?totes Forces, Eurupean Theeter, 

dated 3 NO 45. *(5) 

6. Advance section Conmunicctions Zone Opernttonal History 

of ?uartemaster (28 De0 43 to 28 Jun 45). 

7. nuartermsater Operation Analysis (Study #3 Level of 

Rupply), Hq Theater Service Forces, Iharopean Thiater, 

Office of the Theeter Chief Quartermaster. 

8. Annex **E@’ to European Theater of Operations, Standard 

Operating Procedure No. 7, undated. 

9. Quart~n”ater Operational Analysis, OCcl6 Study .P5, 

1 NOV 45. 

10. war Department Observers Report ,:‘930, 10 Ihy 45. 

11. fitanding Operating Procedure, Qartarmaster Section, 

Firtoenth US Army, dated 1 Sep 44. 

12. war Department Cbsorvers Report f834, 15 Apr 45. 

13. war Departnunt Observers Report 9773, 9 Apr 45. 

14. War Department Observer6 Report ’058, 24 lbr 45. 

15 Report of‘ 560th QJ’ Sdlhead Company, 17 @ct45. 

16. V Arny Corps, After Actlon Report, 6 Jun 4L to 31 Dec 4k. 

*(23) 

17 * Quartermaster History within XIX Corps, 5 )fey 45. 

18. Seventh Arlpi Quartermaster Information for G-4 Periodic 

%port, for 7 Jan 45 and 7 Apr 45. *(6) 

19 Continenta1,OperatFng Instruotlons, European Theater 

of Operations, Office of tho Chief Quartermster, 

19 Feb 45. 

* Number in parentheses is Catalo Number used in Inventory 

or Material, Study NO. 109, $Class I supply), file 

R/401/11. 

- 88 - 

A-E-6 -T-R-I-C -T-E-D

SECTION 1 

HEFRIGEWMON UNITS 

L33. &artcrmastor Refrigeration Company (Bixod) T/O & E 

10-217, 

a. Organization and Mission, The company with an 

aggregate of 142 enlisted men and five officers operated and 

maintained Corps of Jhgineer refrigeration equipment and 

civilian refrigerated storage p1ants.l It was organized into 

three platoons: (1 headquarters platoon, a butchery pintoon 

and a cold storage platoon with attached personnel Prom the 

Veterinary Corps for mat inspection purposes.2 Under many 

cordi ions it w;i8 not necessary to activate the butchery pln- 

toon. P 

b. Use. The capacity of the company was determined 

by the particux situation, since the aveilable storage 

ftlcilities governed the amount that it could handle. When 

Engineer collapsible refrigeratton box s were used the comljany 

served as mmy as 120,000 troops.! Under coilditions 

dherein the company personnel acted in a supervieory capacity 

and employed civilians end pri onera of war, approximtely 

650,000 troops were oupgorted.3 This company wa~inot used 

in the Combat Zone, but it did meet all expectations in 

connection with the use of collaysible refrigeration boxes.3 

c. lidointenanoe.' The Quartermaster responsi bilitg 

in maintning refrigeration facilities was limited to the 

repair of the refrigeration units coolim the mobile vans. 

A11 oi' the reaainlng maintenance responsibilities were 

divided among the other servicea. The responsibilities of 

the Corps of Engiiaers, for example, inoluded: 

(1) Repnir to existing cold storage nnd ice 

facilities. 

(2) Operation and mnfntenance of all statio 

refrigeration plants. 

In the European Theater of Operations Engineer personiel 

were preoccupied with other activities which were basic in 

advancing the war effort, hence their responsibilities were 

aesumed by the using unit or other u,uartermc?ster agencies. 

134. Quarteraaster Refrigeration Company (Mobile) T/O 

& E 10-24.7, 

n, Orgnhixntion and Mission. The Quurtekmster 

1-frigeration Company (Uobile) was organized into three plntoons 

of three sections eaoh. Each section and platoon was 

capable of operating independently.5 The mission of the 

company was to transport fresh meats and other perishables 

from the advance depot or other point where fixed refrigeration 

was provided to the division or army supply points. 

When the turn around time between the loading point and the 

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R-E 43-T-X-I-C -T-E-D 

supply point was not longer than one day, one oompany was 

considered oapa le of providing perishables to ah army of 

nine divisione.9 To aocomplish this the oompany was equippd 

xith 30 trucks, 4 to 5-t0n, tractors and 30 scmi-trailers, 10tw, 

i: wncel, van-type, rbfrigeratfnR, on the bnsis of threa 

per secticn end tne per pletoon ~~adquart~rs.5 

b. 0 eration. The use of the Luartermaster Refrig- 

eration hJUpani’efle) fell into three categories: 

transportation of perishables, statio storage or a oonbination 

of the two. rrhile the use as both static storage and 

transportation of perishables was oonsidered the normal 

employment, there were not always sufficient refrigerated 

vans assigned to an army to permit this type of operations. 

As a result, it was often necessary to transpurt the perish- 

ables to a supply point and deposit the loads into any 

available static storage or on the grouad, In such cases 

the arrival of the refrigerated vans was tired for the late 

afternoon of the day prior to isaue.8 dhen no cold storage 

wa6 available at the supply point, the Fifteenth bS hrmy 

adopted the system of hauling perishabies by cargo vehicles 

from the fixed cold storage point to t e mobile rePrigera- 

tion unit located at the supply point. 8 

C. iide uac . The adequacy of this type company 

Bepended i n v a r a the distance the vans were required to 

move, rfhen fresh meat was dellvored to the area by Comnications 

Zone facilities, the mobile company was generally 

able to deliver the rations to the supply points. rghen the 

companies went beyond tho army area to obtain the perishables, 

it was frequently necessary to transfer supplies to ca go 

trucks in the army mea for delivery to supply points.? 

Additional vans oould have been utilized by each army.lo 

d. Civilian Refrigeration Equf went, Wherever 

possible, civilian eqapment was used to augment military 

faoilities. The type operating wit available and the type 

of personnel employed varied. In som lnstanoes operations 

were conducted entirely by civilian personnel. Where facilities 

were Bo located that a Quartermaster railhead or 

truckhead could advantageously use them, huartermastor peraonnel 

oparatej. then and employed prisoner of waz or civilian 

Labor, if available, for augmentation. On other ocoaaions 

personnel of tho i,uartermaster Refrlgeratfon Compang (Fixed) 

were utilized, either for the co%plete operation of a civic - 

lian installation or for the supervision of operations. Wintenan 

e and repair became the responsibility of the using 

unit.% 

e, Discussion. Refrigeration facilities on the con- 

tinent were not entirely satisractory. The lliobile refrig- 

eration companies did an admirable job, but tho use of the 

vane for static storage cannot be justified. The mohility 

of the oompany must be utilized to the fullest extont by 

hauling from static supply points to army supply points 

delaying only for the maintenanoe of Yam. The orgsniza- 

tion of the campany under Tables of Organization ahd Equipment 

10-217 is entirely satisfactory. Such is not the case, 

however, with the Refrigeration Company (Fixed), The bdtch- 

ery platoon was dropped from the oom any. This left 45 

mn in the company headquarters and men in a cold storage 

platoon for the operation of a oold Storage plant. Suoh a 

large plant failed ta materializa in northebn Lurope, but 

many small plants wore locetod and utliized. It was necess-


ary to break the fixed company into three or Pour detachments. 

k more useful orgarxization in the Eiuropean Theater of OEerations 

woula heve been 8. company of four officers with a head- 

quarters of 15 to 20 men an8 three 32-man operating ~latoons.4 

SECTION 2 

BAKING AND COFFEE ROASTIPX 

135. uartermster Bakery Company, Mobile (Spacial) Ti0 

E io-ui'y. 

a, Organization and The oonpany hus an 

authorized strength of two officers and 82 enlisted mn and 

consists of a company headquarters and one operating platoon. 

The company headquarters supervised the operation and was 

responsible for all administritive duties pertaining to the 

company. Phe platoon, the basio oporating unit, was ooaposed 

of a platoon headquarters and three sections. Its function 

was to supply fresh bread and ooffda to troops in the Combat 

Zone. The ocWee roasting section, tbe fourth section of 

the oompany, consisted of six onlisted men with ooffoe roasting 

equiwnt. This section was improvised aa part of 

the Bakery Comgany in the European Theater of Operations 

and the men taken from the headqUartErS seation. 

b. 0 erations The speclal wartermaster Bakery 

Company o p e r a t b i t i s h equipment, dl operating 

equipment was trailer mounted. Wlth tko four prim movers, 

four-ton cargo, to haul heavy equipment, and the eigh$ 

truoks, 24-tcn, oargo, to motorize the remaining equipment 

and personnel, the company was completely mobile. ,hen in 

operation the cargo veh.icles haule ingredients and the 

finished product to supply points. f Having teohnioal equip- 

ment which required the one platoon to operate QB 8 unit, 

the oonpany lacked flexibility. It had to cea8e operations 

completely when required to move, but when an army had 

sufficient bakery oompanies to leap-frog one over the other, 

this was not an objectional oharacteristic.1° Zorward 

bakorias during the forward movement of an army augmented 

the rear area bakeries, while the bakeries in tho mar moved 

forward. This sytem required a min'rmun Of moving and reduced 

the hours af production lost,iZ Normally, one bakery 

compang WQS assigned to each supply point or two bakury 

campanise to uachrailhead company in support of a corys.12 

In one army, however, tho bakery oompanius were organized 

into a bakery battalion una furnished b eed-and corfeo to 

the supply points from a ocntral 1;oint.f3 ihis was th type 

of operation mvisaged by lrarLopartment publications, 14 

The coffee roasting and grinding equipment, trailer mounted, 

Udlikb the bakery equipmnt, was of Umarioan manufacture, 

When sufficient green ooFfeu. beans were availeblc fresh 

cOfYee was furnished to t a SWB number of troops to whom 

fresh bread was s~pyliad.~5 

Ca acit me capacity of the oonpany dependod 

on %hen w k *"each day it operatcd. The raoommended 

production we8 based on two eight-hour shifts each 

day, while the maxim production was based an three Light- 

hour shifts each Say. The produotion per day was as 

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A-3-S-T-R-I -C-T-E -D


3mad C ompap 21,000 lbs. 30,000 lbs 

Coffoe Company 3,200 lbs. 4,800 lbs 

d. Kaintenanco. S_onre parts for three months maintciiancc 

were furnished with the British oquipmcnt. In sddftion, 

the companies wero bccked up with a tw6lve-months 

were outhcrikod to perform first and second echelon mainten- 

aace. Higher echelon maintenance repair was accomplished 

by the Central Sclvege De ot or by field service tecms from 

thr? Comunications. Zone.17 

e. Liscussion, A lpurtermster Bnkery Gmpany 

(T/O & E 10-1kmimericnn ovens and machinery, was originclly 

intendcd for use in the European Thenter of Operations; 

It was flexiblo but not mobile.18 It had twice the 

nuniber of personnel as the special ooxpany and used 16 ovens 

a8 corcpnrod with three ovens used by the special conpany. 

The production capacity of tho two companies, however, dua 

to the difference of equipmuat, was the 8ae. Upon arrival in 

the buropLan Thsater of Op6rations eaoh Hmerican oquipped 

company vms reorganized into two Bakery hmpanies (Mobile) 

Spacial. None of the herican equipsea companies were used 

wikh any of the Lirinies in the European Theeter of Opcrctions.’ 

Ong was usod in the Delta Base Section to furnish broad for 

the redeployment center. The most valuable charaoteristic of 

the special cGunrtermaster Bakery Company is its self-sufficiency 

for transport. Possibly the most impressive fuatura of the 

bakary Companies’ record on the coutinent wa8 an almost total 

absence of major Froblens. The planning was evidently sound. 

The imuu rate of roasted and ground coffae, however, wns 

higher than planned. The normal lssus rate for two meals 

daily is eight pounds par 100 ration^.^ During colt weather 

it tvus necossnry to issue on the bcsis of 12 pounds per hundred 

rbtions. This. load could not bo cnrrieil by the coffos 

roasting equipnent , and oivilian roasting instullatioiis were 

necessary to aaEist in meeting the demand. 

SECTION 3 

CJNRLRTERMASTER RAILHEAD COMPANY (T/O dc E 10-197) 

136,Lisslon, The mlasion of the Quarteraaster Rflilhcad 

Coinoony wumovi.de personnel to operat railheads, 

truokheuds and navigation or beaohhea8s.4g Jt WELScharged 

by thc War Department with the gjcoipt, issue and evccuation 

or all quortermatcr suppliss. In the iuropean i’heater of 

Operations, however, this unit W E normally confined to the 

recoipt and distribution of Class 1 supplies.zO 

137. Or anizatioo ‘The company is organiaed into a comlmny 

heanqiA~~~~-;wo plRtOOnS, an aggregate .. b.* 

of 173 enlisted men and Sour The platoon was 

thb baeio operating unit and was nomnally divided into three 

- 92 -

sections for convenience in staggering working hows and for 

the purpo$$ of handling specific comodity classes of 

supplies. Copananded by a lieutenant, tLe platoon has 74 

enlisted men including one platoon sergeant, three seotion 

leadsrs, three checkers and one storekeeper.21 

138. Flexibilit , The organization of a railhead company 

into platoons and se5tions gave the unit sufficient flexibility 

tQestablish and Eaintain more than one distributing 

point. .*hen movement was necessary one platoon continued 

operation of the old supply point while the other platoon 

opened a new supply point. This allowed tlie issue of the 

reaaining supplies at the ola supply point while supplies WB~C 

received and issued at the new location. The ttleap-frogfl 

method of movement of Supply points was necessary in a fast 

moving situation. 23 

oui Sment. In addition to the normal organizational 

egui;i%t f++~ he rai sad company was authorized sufficient 

technical equipment to efficiently carry out its mission. 

The pump, gasoline, dispensing, and the gasoline drums were 

not used by the railhead company 88 the oombany did not 

normally handle Class 111 s~p~lies.~ Material handling 

equipment inoluded two hard trucks and two steel plates. 

The steel plates were to be used as ramps between box cars 

and warehouses. In the type of operateons encountered. in 

the buropean Theater of OparationB the steel plates 

not needed. Roller-type conveyors were a necessity.121&TeThe 

office aachines consisted of tw3 typewriters and two coffiputing 

machines, non-listing. It has been recommended that 

the company be aUthOriZ6d two comguting machines, listing. 

The listing typo machine is nee d in order to cheok the 

accuracy of reports maintained. %& 

140. Capacity. The railhead company, handling all 

olassea of &arternaster supply, had a rated capacity of 

70,000 men. The troop basis of the 12th Army oup was 

one coqsny per 50,000 men for Class I supplies.y$ Normal 

issues of a company were from 100,000 to 145,000 rations 

daily, and under exoeptionai circumstances over one-quarter 

of' a million rations a day were issued for short periods of 

the, In the amy area it was found that one railhead 

oompany handling Class I s pplies could support a f%yperl 

corps of thrae divisions.28 

141. Eb;;ity. The organic transportation of a Luarter- 

master Hai lee bom2any is illsufficient evon for administrative 

purposes, It was contemplated that addition 1 

transportation wolrld. be mde availablo as required. 26) The 

amount of transEortation necessary depended upon the type 

of operations involvsq. For tho internal administration of 

nt only a few additional trucks per platoon 

~~~e"%%dfst However, in a fast moving situation whore the 

supply point6 were located at great distances from the 

army depots, additional transportation to the extent of et 

least one Luarternaster Truck Company was normally made 

available to ha railhead company before it could operate 

si"ficicntly.~8 The lack of nobility is olearly indicated by 

the fallowing coments from unit 4.uartcrnasters: 

unite.. .,,Our ration trucks- took two days to mako- the trip 

- 93 - 

R-E-3-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E -5-T-3-14-T-E -D 

to aim$ truckheads and return to Class 1 breakdown aroatt.28 

b. 4th &more8 Division: ,,Class I supply I.oints 

during the dash to the Rhine werc at times newly 150 miles 

behind our control point and approximately 200 dies behind 

our forward elementslf.29 

c. 83d Infantry Livision: ftnuring the drive to 

the hlbe, Division wartermaster trucks oofitinue@ to haul 

“Att rations from ”hen-Gladbach (P-0909) This involvcd 

a distance of 20 milos extending to 1 0 mllcs, as the , 

division moved further into Germany”.% 

142. O&arations, The railheaa coqmy normally issuud 

rations to Lain$ unfts at tho suglly point. Oprations 

were generally efficient and the organlzation adequate. 

The platoon sergeant, or railheocl forem, su1;ervisad the 

receipt, unloadiiig, issm and loading of tiiu su&pliea. The 

chlof storokeeper in tlach rlatatn calculated the ,“roper 

breakdown end was charged with the aocuraoy cf all reports 

and inventories. Efficient checkers were essential as they 

formed the contact between the comijany and the drflwing units 

and were charged with making conplete and Lrober issues. 

The laborers were utilizsdmin the loadiw, unloading and 

wayehousing of supkllce. rhe tables of organizfltion and 

equipment, however, do not krovide sufficient laborers for 

all types of operations, and augmentation by cuartermaeter 

Service Companies or prisoner of war labor was often neccessary. 

It was at tises recomaended that the ratinga 

of various olasscs of personnel, particularly storekeepers 

and oheokere e made more commensurate with their reeponsi- 

bilities .l9, ’22: 

143. Liscussion. The function of the 6,uartermaster Railhead 

Company in the-Iuroyean Theator of operations we8 the 

rocoipt, storage and issue of Glass I supplies. It WRS wcll 

suited for this funotionexcapt for tha laok of vehicles, 

Thosv companies assigned to armios were ofton operating two 

or moro supply points. Transportation avuilablc to this 

company ima often insufficient for ir.ternal compenj adain- 

istrotion. It is highly dosirable that tho officers selected 

for warternaster Railhead Companies bt of superior ability. 

Tho propr breakdown of rations, tho intelligaat substitution 

of itoms, and a thorough broad-mindod knowlodRu of ourront 

menu instructions rcquiro an ospocially wall-qunlifiud 

offioer, The onlistud assistants in n roilhead coupmy must 

also be well trainud. In the Luropeun Theater of Operations 

thoy become speciallets as StGrekeeper.9, aheckors or clcrks. 

144. COpClUSiDIlS. 

a. artermster Refrigeration Units. The tech- 

nical aquipmen?and personnel were sufficient to accoeplish 

the designated mission. The transportation and distribution 

of perishable item wes oarrled on with slight delays dependent 

mostly upon the tactical situation. 

- 94 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I 4-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T -E-D 

b. QuarFmst;r BekeFy Cka&panies. The equipment 

and personnel of t e kuar ermastsr erg-&@", Mobile 

(T/O I E 10-147 S) aid not entirely prove adequate to accomplish 

the deeignated mission. 

(1) The Quarteraaster Xallhecd Corqany (T/O 

and E of 10-597) in the European Theecter 

of Operation8 did not handle all classes of 

supbly, and it6 actual ca;racity for Class I 

supbly escoeaed ita rated cazaclty. 

(2) The prsonnei eniployed during oprations 

developed into specialists in many instan- 

OeS, and the responsibility and grado 0s 

personnel wag not always comonsurate. 

145. Reco"ondetionsI 

a. Quarternaates Refri~eratiodUnits. That an 

additional Quartermastdr Refrigeration Comyany, Mobile 

(T/O & E 10-2lt7) be provided per army to allow for necosamy 

statio storage and ppoper mobility. 

b, ,Quartermaster Bakery CompanieB. 

(1) That the bakery company be Organized into 

two platoons in order to provide greater 

flexibility, and that it be provided with 

the British type equipmnt utilized by the 

uartermster Bakery Oompang, Mobile, 

9Spacial). 

(2) That additional equipment be provided so 

that the rated cascity of each platoon 

will be raised to 20,000 pounds of bread 

operatine on two eight-hour shifts. 

(3) That one coffee grindirg and roasting section 

be authorized per plhtoon with sufficient 

mobile equipment tc furnish fresh ooffee 

for the number of trtOp4 to whom fresh 

bread is furnished. 

0. Roilhead Compaqy (T/O & E 10-1971 

(1) That the mission of the unit be limited to 

the raosipt, storage and Issue of Glass 1 

supplies with a rated oapacfty of handling 

75,000 to 100,000 rations. 

(2) That tho oompany be mde more mobile by the 

authorization of sufficient PehiOlQS t o motorize 

personnel and equipment. 

(3) That tho equipment used to handle Class 111 

supply be delsted from the Table OI Organization 

and Equipment, end that labor-saving 

and office machinery bs authoriacd, 

(4) That one railhead forenan per platoon bo Buth- 

- 95 -

R-E-3-1'-R-I-C -T-E-D 

orized to .supervise railhead opbrationo, and 

that tho grade the checkers and atmekeepers 

bo increased aorxensiwate with the responsibilities 

or their jobs, 

d, That pertinent dbatrines, techniques and Tables 

of Orghrdzition and Bquiprdnt be amended by apFroGrihte agencies 

(if the irar Department.

1. T/O & F: 10-217. 

R-E-S-T-B-I-C-T-E-D 

Bibliography 

Chapter 10 

2. I a temaster hervice Reference Data V01w.e 111 dtd 15 Dec 4: 

l?d 

3. Report, Office Chief Tlioater C,uarterr;lastor, subject: IV@artorraster 

Refrigoration Cbrcpany (Fixed) T/O & E lO-2l7I1. 

(Undat ea) 

4. US Subsitence Exprience in burcgenn Theater of Operatids, 

dtd 1 NOV 45. 

5. 12th Army Grsup Study quartcrnlaste? Rafrigeratlon Ccmpany 

(Mobile) T/O & E lO-ik7. 

6, Tw 10-615, t~arternflster Ihndbook, Hefrigeratitn Company 

(Mobile) T/O aC E 10-247. 

7. T/O & E 10-247 dtd 25 Fob &. 

8. Army Ground Ewces Regort Number 834. ‘(9) 

9, hfter Aation,pE;yrt, headquarters Fifteenth US hrmy, Btd 

31 Jul 45. 

19. Ltr, Third US Army dtd 22 Sep 45, subject: tqIdeca cn Quartar 

master Or~anizstionlt.. “(11) 

11. T/O & E lO-l.47 S, Quartermaster Bakery Company, Mobile 

(Special), dtd 2 Oct 43. 

12. Amy Ground Forcos Xcgort Number 773 (First US ArmtF) dtd 

9 Kpr 45, “(12) 

13. 

Arny Ground Forms Report Number 933 (Ninth US Army) dtd 

10 m y ~ 5 . “(13) 

14. FbI 10-10, paragraph 64, dtd 2 bkr 42. “(14) 

15. 12th Army Grouy,, ‘He3crt m the kuarterinastcr Uakary 5ompany, 

Mobile (Speoial) T/O &, E 10-147 3. 

16. Ltr, lst US Arm Group, 1 Mar 44,.1st Ilia. garagraph a, file 

AG 413 OPGD. ‘(15) 

17. Office crr Chief ~$~artermtzster, T~oknio~l tilanual Numbor 1, 

paragraph 21, dtd December 1944. 

18. 12th Army Group, Pioel &ter*hction Report, paragraph 11, 

Srrctiou In,paragraph il. (16) 

19. Pwugraph 1, TM 10-379, raaxtcrLastor Handbook, Rnilhcad 

Oomnyany, T/O & E: 10-197, dtd 4 N c ~439 ‘(17) 

20. 

i;; 

Puragraph 8, Sectitn 111, paragraph II, 12th xrmg GrLup, 

Final After Action Rqort, period 19 OOt 4j to 30 Apr 4&. 

0 &E 10-197, ~uartermstcir Railhead Company, dial 17 Feb 45 

21+ 

22 I gral,h 54, FM 10-10, (partermstcr Service in Theater 

of Operations, dtd 1942. 

- 97 - 

R-E -S -T-R-T -C -‘P J3-n

23. 

24 

25. 

26, 

27 

28 

29. 

30 * 


12th xrmy Group, Field Sarvice and OprLtlons Report, 

July 1945. 

Report oP 560th b,uartermasser Railhead Cwnpny, dtd 

17 Oot !+5. *(22) 

Paragraph 17, TM 10-379, lLuartermaster hndbcok, Raill1et;e.d 

Company, T/O & E 10497, dtd 4 Nov 63. 

Bistory, 79th Infancry Lividon, dtd 7 Jun 45. 

Operations of 4th Armored Division, dtd 12 Jua 45. 

Quartermaster History, 8yd Infantry Division, priod 

5 Apr to If; Oot 44, 

* Number in parentheses is Gatalog Number used in Inventory 

of Material, Q.4 Study No. 109, (Class I 

Supply), file R 401/ll. 

- 98 - 

R-E-S-T-R-T -C-T-E-D

148. Ifission cnd 0r~nnniar..tbion.1 Tho chiof qumtcr- 

mnetcr, Puropocn Thcctxr of Opcrctioiis, actod in n d.lc1 

cnpncity n.8 tho Chief qunrtomnstor, EUropoc.n T!iclntor 01 

Cporctions nnd r.3 n,u~.rtnrinc..stor, Communications Zono. If0 

w?.a ch?rgod with tho ovorcll roaponslbility lo? the proouromont, 

storr.go, distribution md issue of quutemc.stor 

supplios to all troops in the Europonn Thw.'cor of OpoTatiOnS. 

Tho rosponslbillty for Clnss.11 :ad nr suDnly we.s ploccd 

with tho Supply, Proourorfiort , :md Storcac cnd Distribution 

Divisions of tho Offico of the Chiof PLuauartonnnetcr. Th.e 

Procurotxnt an& Storsgo Nsd Distribution Mvislons wrc 

cojzcc"d vith c.11 cl::ssos of supply. ~ h oSupply Division 

W'B concernod only with Glass TI and IV ana Post &cohang:Et 

aupplies. It whs organized into the following fivd branches: 

n, Salos Storo Branch. 

b, Clothing cnd Equipment Rrcnoh. 

c, Regnlnr Supplies Brmch, 

a. Distribution Bmnoh. 

0. Yost FLchnngo Eranch, 

147, Functions. 

7.. Tlic Supply Division, as a control cnd oncrating 

c@ncy over Class I1 and TV md Post Exchmge sup$.ios, h.:d 

tho follovhg funotione: 

(1) lkde cstim.tos of roquirments. 

(2) Propnrcd roquisitions uiL1ior on tbc United 

3tP.tos or frorn'Brifisb SaurcuB. 

(3) Studiod and rocom"od roplnoemcnt 

foctors 03 Closs I1 ,md IT eupplios. 

(4) l4r.lntninoa [i bnladeed stook of Clnss 

I1 ma N suppli0dI 

(5) R0Co"Gndcd to tho Storqp ane Dlstribu- 

tion Division tho distribution of inconing 

Clnss IT cn3. IV supljllos. 

(6) Ryquisitionod salcs storu itms rrom tho 

- 93 ..

n-&+'y-i(-I- C-T-3j-D 

Unitcd States or by loccl procurmcnt. 

(7) Arrmged for tho publicr.tion of Thoatsr 

allownncos of Class I1 and IT sun llcs, 

principclly for zxpendcblo items. E . 

(8) Inmgurnted : systy of rationing for 

3clos Rtoro itons. 

d. Tho Procurement Division choc!tcd nl1 rcquisitions 

on tho United States to determine which item could 

bo procured locally, It orranged for t 3G local procuroiwnt 

of' supplics nnd followed requisitions to insuuro production 

r.nd dolivwy. It propnrcd cll~raports on atntns oT 8upplicr;s 

procured in tho ?Jni!od ISngdon, and dctorminod vhat itvcI.5 

of supply worc obtainnbla frcm 1oc~,1sources. 

c. The storr.go ::nd Distribution Division furnishod 

tcchniccl guiBrsca for the ogcratioii of depots,. 

coorclinc-.tod tbc distribution of su2nlics to thc dqots, 

l-lctcrmincd tho modo1 Btocks to be cnrriod, formul?.tad. plmS 

for thc rccofpt, storngc i:nd issue of siiI)pliOs, and catcblishod 

procedures for nll movanonts of suyplios pcrtc-ining 

to tcsk forcc oporationu. 

SXTION 2 

DYTERIUNATTION OF EQ,UIXEMiNTS 

143, Initic.1 ISSUC~ Troops nomlly crrivod in tho 

ltwogonn ?hootor of Oporctions complctaly cquipped with prcsoribod 

:?llc"os of clothing and oquipmcnt, wlth tho BXcoption 

of cortnin items of ore;-!niz?.tioncl oquipmont . !:%en 

now itoms ?.rrivcd on thi; continent rnd when units or roinlorcoments 

?.rrl.vvod without prescribod itor!.is of clothing nI?d 

oqulpfiant, it ms ncccssr.ry to stock items for initin1 

issuo. Tho initinl issue factor wns oalculotcc! from tho 

Rctu::l troo].l hnsis for tho firoponn Tlicatcr of OporotLonS 

cad ma cxprcssed in r,u

R-E-S-T-B-T-C-T-I!-D 

Thus il opt; mrckiccw, 7.vhich hpd on r.vcr::gc lcngth of lifo 

of ono yorr, or nn cnnu4 roplaoomcnt of 100 !mooizt vhcn 

dividcd by 12 montho givas ? foplpcomcjnt f7ctor of GI3 

porccnt por month. Tho basic formula for tho dovolopmont 

of tho roplnccmcnt foctor of ,-.n item wns r.s follows: 

?umtitios issucd for rcgl-oumont 

purposes durinR ono month - hlonthly pcrn,urntitios 

in tho hinaa of troops - cuntzgc lnotor 

c. The computation of tho formila prosantad ".-ip 

difficulfios. 8bico it wcs imposgiblo to obt::in m ?.coilr- 

?.to count of thc cxzct nwnbcr of an itun in tho b-adis of 

troopB, tho number wns dorivod by multialying thc initi::l 

issue fnctor by tho Europonn Thoctor of Oparations :lr-npcvror 

figures. These mnnpowor figums wore not ?ccur?.to but tlic 

mothod proved pcncr.-.lly sctisfcatory. In tho dotLrn:min?.tion 

of tho nmber o l rcplccomunt issues mc.dci, tha .i;otal monthly 

issuo or cn item hi:d to bo modifiod by catciu apglioublo 

fF..ctors, suoh cs initicl issuos *inado, issuos to r.gL.nci;Y 

othor thm Uiiitcd Rtctas Foims, and pur.ntitios raturnccl to 

atook through snlvngc chnnnols. atill othor fcctors hild to 

bc considorod in tho final derivation of tho ropl~ccomont 

factor, r.nd tho fnctors ,?s mcthemntionlly dorivod wro 

frequently nlterad, bascd on tho short supply of ?.n item 

whioh failod to mct requiromcuts of tht: troops in tho flcld 

and on the soceoncl. vnri?.tions which cnusod c. ch,m.jlAo in 

roquiromdnts for itcms euch ns woolon unCGrwoar :ad wintcir 

clothing. 

d. Roplnccmcnt fnctors wcro ncvor oonsidLred 

cmplotoly nccurnto p.nd. vrciro subJect to Coilstc.1it sti:dy end 

chr.ne;c. They did, howovcr, rcprcscnt thz marago cnticipntod 

roquirmnts over P. long puriod of tj.w c.nd scrmd 

thoir purpose in the detcl-aj.nation of ovGr.-Cl raipc rc;cjui.romonts, 

150. Tn.rifPs.lO A size tariff in n. ~chocluloor tr.blo 

shoving thoavor?gc a,umtity 02 fllzes of m item rcc!uirod to 

proporly lit P. givon numbor of men. ?ioim?.lly, %?.rifftr,bloa 

oovm only thr, pcnulnr sizo8, or thoso nizos whichwill fit 

tho myjority of individ.unls in tho nrmy. ,? supplcmLntnl 

size tariff is ?. siinilnr tnb3.o but is coqfinod *to thc odd 

nnd unpopular sizcls roqirirod for tflos~ ruon who omnot bo 

fittod by the norrw.1 B~ZGtariff, Europoai "ho.?tcr of 

Oporntions cxpcrienco indicntod that 93 F-rcsnt of thc tokT.1 

roquiromonts worc) mot by thc; noiw.1 tnriff tnbls. Both 

tsblos nro cordpntod and basod on records covciring lo.tlg 

poriods of tinc, cnd wcro uoad in dotorlainin@; o;ao rquiromcnts 

of clothing. Ccrtcin othw consiCcmtions, howw", 

EuOh ct.8 tho sup-13-y diffioultium inVOlVCd in on oxccsaivo 

numborpcf sizos .md tho possibility or f'cnsitility of coilbiniilg, 

substituting, ond rcaucing tho numbor of sikos, 

wero takon.intc nocount boforo tho siao rcqtilraacnts woro 

dotormincd. 

151. Stoolc L~velS. 

a. Tho "hr Dopnrtmont proSCribOd i'rs thc initic.1 

lovols of Class I1 and Tv supply in ljho Eurovonn Thc,-tcr 

85 any minimum lmrol and 75 d::T mximum lovol of-,sui~l~,& 

Tho 45-day dmiNuol love1 WtlS f,>Uldto bo iIi?,clBQLl?:~dU~to tho 

difft(hilt1es and the factors involved in the di8tribktiw

(1. Tho ''r.-.r Dcg?rtn?c t cstnblishcd thrw yh7s-s of 

SUrply POY. owraons thOP.%CTE:8 

(1) .%utom?.ttFcoupply phcso, which coutinuod 

uatil tnvontory oontrol ;?roco&vruswora 

ostr.blisho2. 

(2) Somi-nutom?tic su7nl.y pMeo, in nU.ch 

cortcin sup?lics worG cutowtioally furnishod 

bosd upon tho mrtoricl stntus 

rcports, whilc othor suppliea were furnished 

by thc ro6pomibJ.o ports of ewbnpkkction 

br.sad tpon thar;tcr roquiromonts. 

(3) The thjrd phr.66 pl?.coo thc overso~.o"amcnd 

on r. full requisitioning bnsls, and 

w.s ::uthorizdd only When lovole OP s?ipply 

j.n tho thazter had boon StZbiliZGd cmd 

control proceduros oatcblishud. 

b. ?nu rutowtic supply phxw bo in thG Euro- 

F'jm Ecrtcr of dLxxctlono .tn Jnnur,Zy lt)h2,Ecs unsctia- 

T-otory to both t)lG MLW York port Of hbrrkction Ckld to the 

chior q.mtcrmnstor. ~ u l luorrponsibility tor supply dit! not 

lig xvitr tho 2uronitm 'Phoitor of Opxtions Co"ndor; 110 

dii? lict h?vc CCnnplGtO hnowlodgo at all tims ns to the 

stotua of incoming, supplios; rmi tho spoolnl roquirmonto 

- 102 - 

R-E-3 -T-R-I-C-T-X -D

R-E-S-T-9-I-C-T-E-D 

dotorminod nnd directed by him, in addition to the nofor 

bringing SuPPlies to tho propor lcvcls, forccd 

syst m of roquisitldnlng rcgcrdlcss of uxistlng j.nstruo- 

ti0ns.Z Tho cutmatic Supply phcsa wcs diacontinuGa in 

OotobCr 1942 when the Chiof %mrtzmnstcr submittud. c qunrttcrly 

.rcqii.LsitiOn bas& on tho somi-automatic phcso, which 

oontinucd until P-Prfl 1945 when tho hroponn Thoc.tur of 

Ogerntions entered the lust phnso of supply. 

153, Rcnuisitlonin&: Puriodsaa Tho Chief Quortomasfmcxporimded 

with monthly, aur-rtcrly , and semi-annual rqulsitions, 

The nionthly system or rwuisitioning rcauirod 

that n aomplctc reviow of the atoclc 1wel.a bc ma0 2.5 icr.st 

once ovcry thirty dciys, nnd Insured r, Tositivo nsthod for 

dGtooting orrorc tmd stock dcficicncicjs. It clso :lj.minc,ted 

the necessity for a lcrge numbcr of intoritn roouisitions. 

T ~ Camrtorly requisitlonlna proccduro , utilizinK ou.td.?tcd 

inventories, forc-d thL ?uartcsmrstcr to suljxit numbroue 

LntiorW rcquisitions to COTrCot doficioacies. Howcvor, the 

stntic oonditlons that Gxlstcd prior to Ihfoh 1944 showcd 

n quartarlg rovicw of itcms w.s sntisfnctmy.2 A rcquisition 

Par n poriod longcr thnn a ouartcr of n :'car could 

bo utilizcd only for supplios consued nt Q specific rate 

roRnrdloss of tho situation nnd wm thorcfore not Iccsibltt 

for the grcatcr portion of ~,ucrtc.rsk?.stcr Suplios nn9. equipmant. 

Tho pl'inoipal aclvmtagi; gainod frou thc. @.uarierly 

and scni-annual period mya,4 that it furnished the nauartor- 

mcstor Canornl with a projocted foroonst of roquircmnts that 

wm incorporr,tad into tho loiip, rmge procurmont ?lc\nning 

program. The montiily period of requisitioning was found to 

be tho nost sntisfnotory an6 feesibla when sunplics wore consued 

at an unovon rate nncl tho stoclc position was not sccure? 

- so3 -

R-E-S-T-R-I -C-T-E-D 

porta of entry for tho smpplios, xid tho mp.smcmJnt 

long tons to bo dollvuroa to orloh port, woro oom;?utcd End 

notGd on ocoh rcquisition. 

SECTION 4 

CONTROL -i!TD DISTRIBUTION 

155. Dlstrlbutlm Dirooti~ca.~ 

a. Distribution dirootivoci wcro prcpcred in thc 

OffLco of tho Chiof qu?.rtommjtor, directing si-dzmcnt of 

supplies cs indiontcd, cnii wcro bosod On stock lcvcls in the 

vnrioua dopots and on tho roquirmonts sf the fiald forces 

ns indlcatod in dnily toleerma, roquisitions, or in cjstimntes 

of tho nituxtion. Tho diroctivcs wcro forw:.xdcd 

directly to thc sbipplng depot8 through 'thc r.i>yopric?to 

sootion"l,u~.r;rtcmr,stora, Copics wro fumishod to thd cor-eignoee, 

nnd to thu c.pppmgribtc seotion ~,ur.rtGm.st~~s. 

b. Tho iSsuiw3 dapot, b?so dopot cmpmy, or 0th-r 

fi,u?rtcrm?etor i dt 0onoornc;d took thc nnccssnry acticr. to 

prcpnre cnd. shi!, tho supplius 2s ccllcd for, m B cxtrcctod 

unnw.llnblo itcms to tho Office of the Thcxtur Chiuf Wzrtormator 

for dotormiuntion of nvailcbillty fmmot:lor s3uro~s. 

Distribution Alroctivos wero roturnod d?.Sl?r by the issuing 

depots to tho Chiof ?unqtcrmstor giving n ompkte roport 

ne to tho nction tnkon fiurinR tho procodininr. 24 hours. rubsoquent 

shipments wro roportua on other ooploe of tho 

dlroctivoa furnlshcd for thct pwjmso. 

156. Controlled ItmmsQ Itcma mre 6.csign:natod ns controlled 

dthar hoc-uso tTq wor& in short rmn~ly,suit.ible 

only for rastrlotod uso, non-st"Ird, or in cxporhicntnl 

stagos OP aovolopwnt. Supply of oontrollcd itcas vms 

dologcted to bnsc motion nunrtom?stora ir; 'Gho forn of 

orodits, basod on csth-tos of' oontrollod iton roqui.rmcnts. 

subittad by tho scction ~unrtum.atcr9. 

. 104 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-F-E-D

159. Rcoocrlcnd:.ti~~ns, 

R-24-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

?,.Th?t is lutwo oporntions, t:io cutmtic . 

su?;ply ?hr.so qf supply opcrr,tions, if cnd :vhen utiliEcd, 

bo nodiiiod to Rivo the Thc.?tcr Co=.slr!ndcr p,m.rti?.l ocntrol 

?.nil cmploto informtion .?.s to tho str.tus of inilmdng 

supplics. .In ovorse?6 thwtcr nust bo supplicd by ncns of 

?raquuisition; cmplotc -.ntcm..tic supply shsuld not bo uOi1imd. 

b. m.?.t during opcrctinns -. nonthly roquisition- 

ing pcrlod bo used, but nftcr ccssctim of hositilitios c 

gucrtcrly ronuisltioning poriod bo uuod. 

c. Th-t ?, cantrnl cponcy bo dosign.?tc;d to conpllo 

~.rai!mr.:ntcin r.ccur-.to .-ad curront mniowor figuros in r. 

Thcr,tor of Opcr~.tionsin ordor to nolo cfficiunt1.y dotamlno 

rcguircricnt a . 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

LO. 

- 105 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I -C -P-I-D

-CBAPTER 12 

CLAM I1 ANC fV OPERATIONS. FIELD FORCES 

SECTION 1 

GUARTERNIASTER, ARMY GROUT 

160,Misslon. The mission of the &my Group was prlnarily 

t a m The Quartermaster was mainly ooncernsd 

with the overall planning and establl.shment of gclloies relating 

to Quartermaster supply and with the neoeasory super- 

vision to insure t at the plane and policies were followed 

and carried There was nc Class I1 and IV section 

as such in either army graup. The Supply Division, Quarter- 

master Seqtion, in the 12th Army Grou , and the Quuartermas- 

ter Sub-section, G-4. Section, in the 8th Army Group, performed 

suoh Class I1 and IV functions as were ne~esssry.~,3 

161. Tunctions.3 The Army Group Quartermaster kept hlmself 

lnformea at all times on the status of Class XI and IV 

supply. Pis principal functions wore: 

a. To maintain olose contact with the Army Quar- 

termasters and with the Quwtermastars of Comunlchtions 

Zone and Advance Seotion, Communications Zone. 

b. To prescribe or make reoommondotiona for thc 

levels of supply to be maintained by the verious armies. 

c. To insurs the proper maintenance of these pre- 

soribed levels. 

d. To make recommendations on the establishment 

of priorities for issue of critical items and on the allaoation 

of tonnage to the various armies. 

e, To allocate c'yartermaster units to the Army 

Quartermaster as required in the performance of his supply 

mlssione. 

f. To plan and estimate Quartarmests~ Glass I1 

and 3 7 operational requirements. 

g. To supervise the distribution of Quartermaster 

suppliss, 

The Quartermaster of the 12th Army Group exeroised control 

over a wider scope of activities and responsibilities than 

did the Quartermaster of the 6th Army Group, due mainly to 

the difference between their organizations and to the wider 

scope of the 12th Army Group itself. Their principal miadone 

and functions were, however, relatively tha same. In 

Class I1 end IV supply they were not eperational, but acted 

in a OQOrdinating and .supervisory capacity only. 

SECTION 2 

CUSS If AND TV SECTION, QUARTERwL4STER SUPPLY, ARMY

B-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-E -D 

162. Mission ad. Ornanization.4 The Quartermaster 

Class X I cnd IV Sootion operated as B part of the APNY 

Q.uuorter5aster Supply Division under the direct suparvision 

of the Arffiy Quartermaatcr. It was charged with the overall 

supply of ClriSs I1 and IV itcans to all troops under Amy 

control. It had no Trcscribed tF.blG of orgclnization but 

nornnlly consisted of two officers and eight enlisted r,en. 

In the performnce of its supply functions, the section was 

cherged with the following responsibilities: 

a. Preparation of‘ 011Clcss 11 rJnd IV plans, repons 

end corresgonhmca, 

b. Maintenmce of authorized stook levels. 

c. Preparation of estimtes for Closs If and IV 

requircrentv. 

d. Requisitioning of ars y requireffi6nts. 

e. Qesponsible for the efficient operation of 

t6c mry Class I1 and IV Depots. 

f. Control snd nllocation of itens in oritioal 

short supply. 

g. Liaison with the Cormunioctions Ione, Advanoe 

’;cotion, Communications Zono, Ar~vGroup, and subordinate 

units of tho army on all Class I1 and IVmttcrs. 

h. Control of Qunrtermstcr sales store operntions. 

163, Methods of Operation. 

o. In generul., it was the reEp0ndbility of the 

Cormonding General, Comaitmicotions Zone, to push supplies 

forward to the army by whntuvcr means of transportation vms 

c,vailnbfe, based upon requirements DB estimated Dr raquisitiorGd 

by the armies. Suppliea were stooked in srw depots, 

maintained et proscribed levels and issued to using units 

upan requisition. The Cless IT and IV Section wis responsible 

Por mointsining P currant Class I1 and IV plnn to 

ineot chrnging sltustions and for eoourately ostiL!fiting roquirsmuts 

to fill the needs of using units. 

b. During the initial stagw of the continentnl 

operotion, all supplies were brought to the benches under 

cofitrol of the pirat US Amy, Class I1 and IV supplios 

were ahipned to the continant in beaoh mlntennnce Ond 

bench follow-up sets, the composition snd planning of which 

had been coordinotad by the Chid Q,uuartsrsastbr, Eur0pW.n 

Theater of Oocrations, ond the ‘prtermcster, Firet US Army. 

mhc suapliss were controlled Pnd issued by the Writernester, 

First trr~Amy, until tho latter pert of July 19b4 

whcn the Advance 9ectlon, Com,unicrtions Zone, arrived 

tinct assumed control,-l T ~ EThird TIS Arriy prepared pre-scheduled 

requisitions for supplies to be shipped to the continent, 

broken down by days in t2CCOrdQnCe with t O m X E 

allocat~ons.5 In Southern bonae, the Seventh US Arrq mintnined 

control of beach supply operations until D plus 24, 

when the Continentea Base Section of ComrwnioatJ.oas Zona 

assumed control.6 

164. Feauisitionina Prooadure. 7- 

~ i . During bho early stnges of the continontnl


campaign, the ardGS JWq,UeSted ClQSS I1 and IV Supplies by 

requisition. In September 19b4 the policy was chaoged, 

Requlraments were included on the dally telegram, with no 

formal requisition required. Some confusion resulted due 

to the arrival of supplies in the army area without edvsnco 

notice and in quantities which could not be checked against 

the dally requests. Also some shipments were duplloated 

due to failure of units to remove items from &€ly telegrcns 

after the intiRl request. 7 

b. In December 1944, due to the unsatisfaotory 

results obtained, Class I1 and IV supplies were deieted from 

the daily telegram. Requlsitions were submitted instead to 

the Quartermaster, Advance Section, Communications Zorlo, for 

roquireme nt s coverinE a t en-day period. 

o, Early in 19C5 other changes were instltuted. 

The nalntenance of the backlog record of items not available 

was discontinued. Requisitions were submitted every 20 day8 

ror requirements computed on a jo-aay basis. This assured 

the .?rmy Quartermaster of et least a 10-day etook level Rt 

all times. To sFn,plify and coordinate supply, a conference 

was kald eaoh requisitioning period. Those attending inoluaeil 

the 4rmy Class If and IV officer, supply offioers of 

Csnmunications Zone depots and representatives of the Chief 

Quartermster, European Theater ot Operations. 

165. Stock Levels and Allocations, 

a. The 12th ArmxvGroup authorized a 30-day level 

of 01 8s I1 and IV suppliss for tho armies under ita control.8 

The 6th Array Group authorized a 15-day level.9 

Those levels were never constant due to the short supply 

of m y items and to the necessity for increasing or deoroasing 

the mount of stock on hand as the tactioal situation 

progressed from statio to mobile and baok to statio. 

b. Class I1 and IV supplies received a low pri- 

ority on shippinp and Zronsportetion. This caused many items 

to fell short of requiredlents, and the lack of supply dtaoipline 

ariong all troops resulted in further shortages. 

The Army Groupe, therefore, instituted the orocedure of’ 

allocating criticfll and controlled Items to the armies, based 

on the missions and needs of en0h.l The srn5es in turn 

aoptrblled issues to the u s i ~troops, 

c. When transportation was short a system of control 

by ~llocattngtonncge was introduced. This restriction 

requirsd the .2p4 :uarternaster to submit his requirements 

by tonnage, listinq the ftems bv class requJ.red, Due to 

the low priority gtten to Claas’II and IV rqply and its 

resultant low toonage allocation, n further shortage of’ this 

class of supply developed. 

8. In Cictober 19L4 the Seventh US Pxmy foresaw 

the need for winter clothing and raised tho priority of Class 

I1 and TV supply to e level equal to that of Class I and 111.11 

In December 1944 the heavy combat losses s1.istained by the 

Uni$ed States forcea, w3th the resultoh% urgent need to reequip 

the units, caused a first priority to be given to 

Class I1 and IV supp y. The neaessary shipmsnts were acoomplished 

in ten days. 3

SECTION 3 

WXRATIOM OF AFW CUSS I1 AND ZV DE-3 

166. Mission. The &my Class I1 and IV depot, operated 

by the Quartermaster depot oonipany, supply, under the direc- 

tion and teohnical supervision of the army Class I1 and IV 

Zfioer,L2 wns ohsrged with the responsibility of carrying 

model stocks of supplies for a oertain nmber of troops for 

a eiven period of tine; to supply, Either directly or through 

distributing points, all troops assigned to tke depot for 

supply; and to receive, store and iesue additional BUppliW 

over and above model stock levels in order to fully utilize 

all storage foclllties.l3 The normal delivery of Class I1 

and IV supplies to the using units was elads at the Army 

Class II and IV depot. Under unusual cjrcumstances, delivery 

was ma e to units if transportation faoilities were 

a~nllable.~4 During one phase of th6 Third US Army‘s operations, 

sub-depots were cstsblished for the pmpose of receiving, 

consolidating and forwarding to the main depot 

unit requisitions for supplies. The supplieo were trucked 

to the sub-dopots and issucd to the units at those points. 

167. Location of the Depot. 

a. The looation of Class II and IV depots p e 

oented Q problem throughout the continental cmpaign. 5- 

Factors considered in selecting a proper sitc included:l3 

(1) Type of terrain, drainage and accassi- 

bility. 

(2) Sufficient amount of open find closed 

storage, 

(3) TransportRtion f’acilities, rail Rnd road. 

(4) Security (dispersion and camouflage). 

(5) Layout plans, to include aisles ond roudways. 

b. Even should a Rite be found to meet a ll theae 

conditions, it was still unsatisfactory IS tt was not withln 

easy reach of the using units. The denot oompmy is not 

mobile without the attmhnent of addit?onal trucks, and tho 

low priority given to Class JI and IV eupplles Eade the move- 

ment of the depot difficult under the best of ciroumstances. 

During August and 98pteRber 19k.4, the round-trip distance 

between the combat troogs and the %raydepots amounted to FIS 

mucb as 360 uiles, and even then 50 perocnt of tbe unit trucks 

dispatc d to the depots were wasted beoause of lnodeciuate 

stockB,p3 In April 19C5, many arm depots were completely 

out of reach of the units that hed crossed the Bine. The 

units were utilizing their own avalluble transportation for 

Class I, IT1 and B supplies and round trips to the depots 

were as much as 500 miles.lb Bridge faoilities were also 

lnedequste at this time. On 31 March 1945 the Quartermaster, 

Beventh US Army, decided to move the army depot, starting 

with the immediate novement by truck of certain critical 

items. Transportation shortago, however, necessitated the 

use of slower rcil facilltles and the move was not completed 

until May, by which the the troops had mcved so far abeag 

thnt even at Its new location the depot was out of reach. 

- log - 

R-E-5-T-R-I- C-T-E -D

168. Depot Procedure. 


a. A strict systei? of stock control within the 

aopot was essential in order to insure that Etocks were kept 

r;t the propr levels to met the unit requirenents.17 

sunplies received w~rc?ronptly tallied in, inoluding the 

co:gl,etc description and quantity of QrCh iten receivctd. 

~lisywere storod and ssgregoted by class. Particuloi. ntten- 

tion wos given t o critical itom to arevent cny loss through 

negligence cy inprows storcge.13 S!>ot-ohsck team wira used 

in soix c:?ses to insure ci'rb nnd ncotness In tallying cutgoing 

end inco.ning suppligs, and to rectify errors made in 

notm~cloturonnd figures. 'f' .4 syste.1: of records, which reflcjcted 

mounts on hmd, mounts due $n,nnd mounts ue out, 

were ktpt ct nost deqots and included the fo1lowing:lq 

Stock record cords. 

Eaok-order cuds for sneciol iterrs only. 

Faxima lad minimn levels to be naintained. 

Daily renort of chAnge on master chart 

for forwarding to the headquarters supply 

ssction. 

Credit register of contrclled item which 

had been released to the units. 

Reports of shortages subaitted to headquarters 

supply section. 

Stock recard adjustment chart. 

b, Stock record cards were normally mnintained 

in c mnner as explsinrd by Q Fifteenth Amur Depot Commanaer:le 

"Stock record oards are filed by class nlphsbeti- 

cally within each clajs. All crndlt vouchers are ooneolldated 

on D daily mster voucher, which is a printed for& 

listj~iqall items in the snmc order as they pre filed in 

tho stock record cabintts. The business dcy runs from 0700 

to 0700, Wunntitlea urs posted to the master voucher 8s 

raquis'itiona 8rc3 fillcd. At the end of the business dag 

totals ere txtended for eech iten and only the total is 

postGd to tk stock rscord oord. This oDeratior. reduces 

the nur;ber of 7crsonnal posting stock records, as the cards 

ark posted only OnOe B day and the OOSthg to tho cards is 

dc4a in a consocutlve manner. Stcck record cards never 

fall behind issues by mre than twenty-four (24) hours. 

The mmtcr vouchar is Given the voucher number of the last 

credit voucher posted to it for reference purpose. This 

sa.m fora is used to pr6pi.m the ten (10)day stock status 

rcyorts and physic01 inventory reportsi1. 

0. Physical inventories varied within each army, 

but at laast one inventory per nonth was Mndatory, The 

Qxwlx"ster of the Ninth ?EArmy prescribed that a permnent 

inventory Section be established acpot aotivitios 

roquired and thnt each tteu be physically Inventoried every 

two wesks.13 

169. Processing of Requisitions. 

a. Each army required tlmt raquisitions be pro- 

?brly propcred and oertifie?, and consolidated by the high- 

- 110 - 

B-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-Z-D 

er headquarters of the rec,uisitioning unit. Requisitions 

were edited at the aepot for the purpose of asoertaining 

their correotness and that the items requested were authorize&. 

The quantities of items were not questioned w-less 

they appeared excessive, but they were reduced as depot 

stocks required. The procedure fop submitting requisitions 

and drawing supplies varied among the armies, No depot 

schedules were established during the early mosths of operations 

in the European Theater of Operations with the result 

that when a stalemate was reached the depots were flooded 

with requisitions.l6 In January 1945 the Third TTB Army 

established 8 drawing schedule for its units, and other 

armies adopted similar neaswes.5 Tho Ninth U3 Army required 

thet requisitions be submitted 211 hours in advsnce 

of drawing.19 Requisitions for controlled items were submitted 

to the Army Quartermaster for approval, and requewts 

for equipment in excess of authorized allowance and for 

Class IV supplies were submitted through oommand channeln. 

In the First US Army all requisitions of divisions required 

the approval of the Army cuartermester, whereas smaller 

units were allowed to draw direct. Normally, however, depots 

were authorized to approve and process all rcquisitions 

for equipment within authorized allowanoes. All otliar 

requisitions required tho Dpproval of the Arm 9,uartermaster 

or his representativee. 

b. The variations in depot prooedures among the 

armies often proved a handicap to the combat units. The 

neoesstty for obtaininp the approval of the Army Quartermaster, 

who was normally located at some distahce from the 

depot caused n considerable delay. The Quartermaster of 

the 35th Infantry Division stated:2* Yfn one Army, supplies 

could be drawn daily, or as needed; in another, one 

day each week was designated, In one arw the requisition 

was submitted to the issuing depot and honored at that 

point, while in another army it was.necessary to submit 

the requisition to the Army Quartermaster for approval 48 

hours prior to drawing time. This plan caused a delay in 

replaoemant --It. 


STCTION lt 

CONGLUSIONt3 AND FSCOMNBXDATIONS 

a. That throughout operations in the European 

Theater of Operations the taatl.ca1 situation normally dlo- 

tatad a low priority for Class I1 and IV supply. This 

priority, combined with the shortage of transportation, 

was normally too low to permit efficlezt operation and to 

insure ad6,qUato supply to the units when required. On those 

oooasione when the taotical situation permitted or required 

B higher Class XI and IV priority, the efficiency and speed 

of supnly increased in propartion, 

b. That different methods, procedures and sohedulas 

rogarding requisitiuning and drawing of supplies 

adopted by tho various srmies caused additiohal delay and 

oonf'usion among the combat troops. 

0. That the inclusson by axmy of Class TI and IV 

. 111 - 

9-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-1 -c -T-E+D 

supplies on the daily telegraIn wae unsatisfactory, aRd 

that the 20-day requisitioning period system, as finally 

developed, proved effective. 

d. That depot procedure, including recorcls and 

stock control measures, WBS as efficient as could be expected 

under the existing olroumstanoes. 

171. Reoommendations. 

a. That appropriate agencies of the !Per Department 

give further study to the fsasibllity of prescribing 

a standard procedure of army depot operatlona in regard to 

methods, policies end ,scheduling of units. That the procedure 

be so devised as to keep transportntlon, Qersonnel, 

movement, delay, and confusion to a minimum, and that it 

be published as a guide to mniy Cuartermstors. 

b. That the mathod prescribed by the War Deportment 

of calling forward Class I1 and IV supplies by the 

armies by means of requisition be further developed to indude 

the 20-day requisitioning period as outlined herain. 

- 112 - 

R-LWl'-R-I-C-T-B-D

R-X-5-T-R-I- C-T-E-D 

Bibliography 

Chaoter 12 

1. 12th hay Group Quartermaster "Final After Action Report". 

2. 6th krw Group G-4, trOffice Menorandm No. 13, -Standing 

Operating Procedure", dated 1 brch 1945. 

3. First DS Arw Group huartermaster, "Standing Operating 

?rocedurel~, 6 June lY45. 

4. Seventh US Army kuartermastor section Wperations". 

5. 

Third US &my, tLBi?ter Action Report1'. 

6. Severith US himy Qmrtermustzr ftRocord of Events". 

7. 12th Army Group b&artermaxter "Memorandum for Recorcl", 

dated lY September 1944. 

8. Chcnge 2, 24 IWVeLnbCr 1944 to Eioadquartera 12th Army Group 

rlBtailding Operatine l'rooedurei', 18 October 1944. 

9. Headquarters 6th wmy Group, "hdministrntive Instructions 

x'o 519, dated 20 Kovember 1944. 

10. Letter, Seventh Army ,u&rteraastor to Bsech Group Quartermaster, 

subject: "Report of Inspeotio!Ilr, 26 nugust 1914. 

11. Seventh I3 amy 0,uartermaater YPoimqe Bid for reriod 

8-15 October 191+411. 

12. Piftuenth US wmy Quarternaster Wlass II and IV After 

Action Report", 31 July 1945. 

13 

Xinth US ~cqyuLi.artermster tistandard Operation procedures 

KO. 7, Glass I1 and IV Suppiyft, 7 December 1944. 

First US umy %tanding Operating Procedure for the 

Quirtermas ter Depot w. 

15- 30th Infantry DiviRion ''Kfter hetioil Report". 

16. XZX Corps, I1,9ter Hction Reportfr. 

3.7. %ai- Uepai-trrinl; Obsarvers tmwy Ground Forces Report No, 

323, W-4 Yopic List", 9 January 1945. 

18. War Degartnent Cbeervors Arnty Ground Forcos Report No. 

923, *vQuUnrteruastzr Depot Company, Supply", 10 May 1945. 

19. Ninth US Army, "Administrative lnstruotions No. 2", 

4 January 1945. 

20. 35th Infantry Civision, flute2 kction Reportit.

172. Mission. The Quartermaster depot oompany, 'supply, 

is the amnative and teohnlcal udt for operating a 

Quartermaster supply depot other than motor transport and 

remount. It handles any partioular class of kuarter- 

meter supply 68 required ty the oiroumstanoes. Is aperate8 

as a unit in either the Cmunicaticns Zone or in the 

combat zone. It is designed to operate as an indapondent 

unit in oharge of H 3mtlll branoh dmot OP uncle: the control 

of a headquarters tind headquarters hcm_naby, -uLuortermaster 

base depot, fcr sub-depot operations at a .mjor huartermasmr 

brhnch depct. It can operate as separate plat0 ns, 

eaoh ElatOCn operating n soptlrhte kwt'tcmaster depot. P 

173 a Organization. 

a. The company is composed of E: company head- 

quarters which perPcrm the noma1 administrative, aess, 

and supply funotions for the company, and three operating 

platoons. Each of the three platoons is orgenized into 

two Sections: a depot headquarters section, coralsting of' 

one offioer and 17 erJ1sted mea; and a storage section, 

consisting of one officer and 33 enlisted men. The dopot 

hoodquarters scotion furnishes the personnel required to 

handle the clerioai work of the depot and mailitain the 

depot utilities. ,he Storage seotion f~imish6speraonnel 

for the receipt, storage, warehousing and issue of supplies. 

Normally, the oolrpany is orgunized alont oonmoditp lines, 

with eaoh platoon essigned to e partioular olaos or grouping 

of eupp~ies.2 

b. The tsblo of orgwization and equipment 

out;horized orly tko niniu.m 6mo.ut of personnel, trarsportation, 

and major i'cox3 of QgUigmc!lt, Thb o;cjOr itEll!S Of 

office equipsent, including 7cnyting and duplicating 

mchines, tyFWriCEr3, En? a 3CU yiind cepacity platform 

scale, are nor,r=:ljr nv!:'icienk for dapot opere.tions, lke 

company is no: r~;M.;e: c1.Q rid58 3ot have sufficient labor 

0rganios.llg tc hanc.ir ~1.1thc de3ot sup lies. With its 

normal caga-ity 'io sii?;,ly en2 mairitain f;10,000 moa under combet 

cocdS:iona, t!.b atfschment of one t uck oompany and two 

service companies is ncrmal1.v rc;uired. T 

SECTION 2 

EMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN Q W R OF OPERA5?IONs 

174.Communications Zone. 

a, The advanae planning for the troop basis Of 

depot supply companies in %uartermssteroperations on the 

The need 

continent raised several divergencies of opinion. 

- 111, -

R-E-S-T-R-I 4-T-E-D 

for dispersion and the looations of the troops had to be 

Considered a5 well 88 the rtted capacity of the company. 

The actual requirments Were estimated higher than the the- 

oretical r&te Tor the si26 O f the forces involved end it 

was decided that 37 companies would be recuired t; reoeive 

atore, and issue BartermaBter supplies for all general ani 

guartarmster branch depots. 

b. The company was normally utilized either by 

assignment to u headqrlurters and headquarters ccmpeny, Luartermster 

base depot, for sub-depot operations at a major 

~uextermaster branch depot, or by placing the compmy in 

ohfirge of an independent Uuartermastor depot, Cortrul m s 

exercised by the Wartermaster, Communications Zone, either 

direct, or through the advance, intermediate, or base sections 

to which the companies were cssigncd. In operating Communionticns 

Zone depots tho compunies ha dled Class 1, I1 and IO 

eupplius for as many cs ~OO,OOOmen.E 

175. Combat Zone. 

a. Bn allocation of depot supplg ooixpenies to the 

several amies, based on the rcted capacity of the om@ny, 

would huvo given each army nn average of fivo companies. Instead, 

6CCh army wa8 assigned two compcnles. That number 

proved sufficient. 

b. Employment of the comyaies varied to some extent 

within the ardes, although in generel the methods of 

employment missions, and functions were the some throughout. 

The company was the bnse fur supply operetiom of the r.rrj 

kuartcrmestc!r Service. It was used for the operation of the 

oimy Class 11 and IV depots, and in some ca8es for the cperction 

of Class 1 depots or dump$. Normclly, the aompany 

operated as a unit, but there were ocoasions when it was 

ntrcessnry to util.Lze individual platoons es separate operating 

units. hlthough Lhe dopat supply conpay was lloFmelly 

nssigncd to a &uai-tcrmustsr croup under army cofitrcl, th8 

standing oporstrng procedures of the various crmies placed 

the responsibility lor the efficient oparation of Glass I1 

an8 TV depots on the &my Qunrtttrmcster Class I1 and IB 

offioer. The kutk,-t.tclrra?ster goup cr bhttalion to which tbe 

COI, cony WLS ossigrwd creroised ndm'nistrative control cnly. 

Army rutaineci opori,tional control. 3 The company, operating 

as e unit and handling only Lllcss 11 and Iv supplies, supplied 

betweon 1.50,W0and 200,000 men. The kuartermaater 

of the 12th lsmy Group rclcommendad that tho Capacity of tho 

oompany for 0loc.s II and IV sup-dy be standerdized at 

150,000 troGps.b 

c. Th,: Firat CS m y normally operated one 

Cluss 11 and 1~depot., utilizing o m depof, snpply CGmpUy 

with ono or two sorvlco compnnics for labor. The second 

dopot company opcrr ted Cluss I &I ots with two to four 

scrvioo oompunida cttuohed for labor.? mira US &my 

employed ir;s two ccmFonios for 31cLss11 and IV supply, each 

operating n depot with one or two sorvlce companies attached. 

During cns phose of tho operetions, however, the two oompanics 

combincd to operate one d rct, but established subdepots 

Et Cl~ssI suppiy points.[. The Seventh US Army 

opsrcted only one Ulass I1 and. IV depot, with one service 

company attnched.9 The Ninth US Army operated one Cless 

11 mind IT depot, utilizing one ooffipny rrfth .me or t7m 

service companies attucheci. When a second dopot oompany 

- 115 -

R-E-S-T-3-14 -T-E-D 

was assigned, it w ~ semployed in operating n Class I atorngc 

supply point, normally with three service cilmpanies ottnched.1° 

The Nfteenth US Army employed OCE coqcny in the nporction 

of twc Class I1 and IV ciepots,. with one servico ocmpnny ottachtld 

to onch depot for lnbvr. 

d. The toble of crgcinizetion pr;vidcs for the 

attachment of one truck conipmiy to th6 uopot supply cnmp::ny 

for operht1uns;but due to the low priority givon to Clnss I1 

end IV supplies, the ormies were inclinsd ta allccstc all 

cvailcble transpcrtution fcr tho mctvcment of troop cnd 

other more vital chases of supply. Nbrmally, truck companics 

were nct attached to depots, and difficulty waa experieiiced 

by EL lack of transpoPtation when it became necessary to move 

the depct. The b,uartermaster, Third US amy, statea: f t O ~ 

Class I1 situaticn would have been solved during the drive 

across France and into Germany if the depot su2ply coaywnies 

had been provided with trucks as a part of their regular 

equipment, The inclusion c;f l+8 trucks in each nf the 

above units will ffect a great improven!ent in Guarter- 

master supply." 

176 Me uac of Personnel and E ui ent. The organization 

AFC&* c~mpaiiiwas ade~hat~Cti enable it - 

to perform its mission.. DUQ to large scale supply 

operations in Comxmications Zone, the activities of the 

company when employed in the Communioaticns Zcnc were frequently 

limited. In the ac.mbat zone its functlcjns were 

diversified and many, The internal organization of the . 

oompany was freqliently changed to meet existing cunditions, 

but the most frequent and lasting ohange ms the assign- 

ment of paokers as checkers, due to the heavy demand in 

that line of work. A transportation section waa OlSO 

organized in a Fifteenth kr depot t G mintain all records 

on mail and truck shipments% l'hroughout the European 

Theater of Operations it was found that depot personnel arrived 

on the coritinent with insufficient trainin$ and there 

was llttle time for training after arrival, Outstanding 

deefioienoies inoluded lack of trained personnel to handle 

the txansporbation problems and the problem of handling 

peraonal affeots and baggee.13 The company had no organic 

materials handlick equipment, but the Comflunications Zone 

maintained a sufi'ioient stock in a certral bass depot from 

which the armies ilrew their requiremeots.lb 

SECTION 2. 

COWCLUSIONS AND RfXCD!&EIQATIONS 

177. COnClUSiOnB. 

a. That the organization of the depot oompany, 

supply, 'is adequate end flexible. 

b, That the company was normally employed in 

the Buropaan Theater or Operations tc handle Class I and 

Class I1 and IV supplies. 

c. That the cmpany has insufficient transportation 

crganicaUy for normal routine recuiremnts in conneo- 

- 116 - 

R-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

tion with depot operationa. 

178. Reoommendatlona, 

R-E-8-T-R-I-C -3-E-D- 

a. That the Quartermaster Bepot Company, mgp>y, 

be rodeeignated w."noster depot supply cuapany. 

b. That the rated capacity for handling Class I1 

an& IV supplies be placed at l50,OOO troops. 

c. That aciditional transportation be assigned 

the company orgaLicaL2.y to eneble it to do normal dally 

routine haullng in connection with depot operations. 

a, That pertinent dootrines, techniques and Tables 

of Organization and Erruipment be amende6 by appiropriatr 

agencles'of the War Department. 

- A17 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S-2-R-I-C-T-E-D 

Bibliography 

Ch&pter 13 

1. lield l&inual 10-10, Quartermaster Service in Theater of 

Oparatioss, 2 Xar 42. 

2. Technical hCanutl1 10-230, Depot Company, Supply, 24 July 43. 

3. Table of Orgerdzation and Equipment 10-227, 6 Sap 43. *(5) 

4. 

5. 

Comnioatione Zone kuartermaster Report on 'lQuarterm3ster 

Depot Sompany, Supj?lg". 

Fifteenth US unw Quartermaster Wlass I1 and IV -4ftor 

Action Report", 31 July 1945. 

6. 12th army Group 4$mrtermaster 93"nul After Action Rcportll. 

7. First Army ,ieekly &uartermoster Operntiona Report to 12th 

Army Group. 

6. Third Army Wpieklg &uarterm.stfx! Operatione Report to 12th 

Army Group. (8) 

9. War Department Observers Eoard Report 1 No. 834, 14 April 

1945. 

10. Ninth US Ariry kuartcrnaster Operations ReEcirt to 12th 

Aru;y Oroul,, (undated). *(9) 

11. Letter, Third US &PI Quartermster to the Theatsr Quartermaster, 

22 Sspt 1945, subject:%ome Ideas on Quartermaster 

orgsnizctione." *(IO) 

12. War Dejwtizbnt Observers Arrry Ground Forces Report No. 

923, "Qunrtornaater Dept Cci?pl;ny, Surply", 10 ~ @y1945)s(6) 

13 M~coto PlYccenth US krroy Class II RC IV Officers, dated 

15 August 19L5, subject: VuIzmnts on Training of DcGot 

SuisLly Company.lf *(7) 

14 - Letter, Ikadquartors Corurunichtions Zone, 16 March 1945, 

subject:,tAllocntions end Requisition Procedure for 

Materials Hcndling Equipent . 

* Ktmblber in parentheses Ls Cotclog limber wed in 

Inventory of Material, Study No. 103, (Class I1 

& ly supply), file R 4o$E. 

- 118 - 

R-E-8-T-R-I-0-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-8-I-C -T-E-D 

CHAPTER 14 

BEACH MAIFTENANCE SEFS AND BEACH FOLLOW-UP SETS 

SECTION 1 

CHARACTJ5?ISTT.CS AND USE 

179. Bas1s.l In February 194k the Chief ~uartermest6r, 

Eurogeon TTZXer of Operations, in planning for D-D~Y, 

made arrangements with the Quartermaster, First iJnited 

States Army, for the shipment to the continent of Class 

I1 and IV supplies In sets which were to be amphibiously 

paoked. The plan called for the shipment of the initial 

supplies in sets that were to be skid-loaded, while the 

follow-up supplies would be shipped in composite sets. 

The inaintenmce during the early stages of tEo operation 

was to consist of Quartermaster items essential to combet 

and were to be gradually increassd in variety and quan- 

tity as the operation progressed and the requirenents for 

additional items arose. The plan was approved end placed 

into operation. 

180. Rescription and Composition.1 

e. Skid-loading may be defined as a method of 

loading in which the supplies are cratsd and mountad on 

skids or runners, similar to thQse of e. sled, which enables 

the load to be dragged or pulled over sandy terrain 

with conrporative eese. The skids keep the supplies off 

the ground, thereby ellmlnntin~ the possibility of dwge 

from ground water. 

b. Beaoh maintenance sets were composed of 

selected quantities of sPsentiel Class II and IV supplies 

loaded on akids, each set normally containing 23 skids, 

These supplies were sesembled, loaded and shipped as a 

cmposlta unit. Each set contalnad 75,000 man-days of 

supply which we8 sogregstod, insofar a8 possible, like 

oommodltles by skids. The londs were inaintalned on the 

skids by tle utilization of open cratss built onto the 

sklds. The supplies were safeguarded aqainst the elements 

by tarpaulins over tho crates for additional protection. 

?he beach mintenanoe set was therefore n composlte grouping 

or essential supplies, loaded for fast movement and 

segregated by commodities to fficilitote issue or Storage. 

c. Foll.ow-up maintenance sets were similar to 

ths beach maintenance sets, but were composed of a muoh 

wlder selection of items. They were not skid-loaded, but 

eaoh set contalned 450,000 man-days of supply. 

181. Preparetion of Sets, 

8, Approximately 61 beaoh maintenance sets were 

assembled et five different depots in the United Kingdom 

for delivery to the continent. The follow-up maintenance 

sets were also asseinbled in the sbme depots. Supplies 

were packed and shipped in oase lots if the difference 

between the case lots and the amounts require&were less 

than 10 percent either way. 

- 119 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T -E-D 

b. A typical skid contained the following items: 

W.Pkgs. WEIGHT (lbs) 

Trousers,wool,OD 420 7 850 

Undorshirts,wool 400 4 325 

Wspenders,bslt 140 2 160 

Bag,canva$,field 50 1 103 

Batter ies ,hand, 

electric 180 2 3 50 

Candles 450 1 75 

special and _parfichutist clothing was included in every 

fifth set. Pturses clothing was pecked on every 20th set, 

and blank forms were on a single skid included in every 

fifth set. 

e. Skids were preFared for ond constructed under 

the following specifications: 

Average net wai.&t of skids 1,838.0 pounds 

Cubags per skid 

146.1 cubic feet 

Wet weight per set 31,943.0 poun& 

ship tons per set 84.0 ship tons 

These skids were top-hcevy cnd were difficult to handle; 

they should be designed so as to give o more balanced lo%d.2 

d. Several problems were encountered in the assembling 

and shipping of them sets, ana in view of the ahor- 

toga of time, immediate steps had to be taken to insure 

that the deadlines were met. The major problems inoluded: 

The design, construction, loading Cnd 

marking of the skids and crates; snd 

assembly of the required sets. 

Sagregstion of skids by set in the dspots. 

Inspection of all ohases of the program. 

Short supply of certain items. 

Late arrival in the Unitsd Kingdom of 

a few key itens from the United States. 

Establishment of Driorities between the 

skid loading program end the normal requirements 

of supplies for other purposes. 

Last minute rsquests from the Quartor- 

master, Plrst US Army, for the inclusion 

of naw or additional itoms in the sfits, 

Throe depots were deslgnctsd to complete the construotiun 

of all skid crates and tc deliver them to the loading 

depots. qualified officcrs from the office of the Chid 

Quartermaster were dispatched to the depots to aid, sup- 

ervise an& coordinate the manufacturing, landing and assenbling 

of the sets in the order of their out-loading sched- 

ule. Oritiaal item were trucked fro& ports to depots 

and from depot to depot to complete the sets in the order 

of thoir calling up for shipment. Coordination WEB cffeotea 

bstwesn divi ~On8 the Office of th6 Chief Qyartermaster 

to establfsh pr or ties among the supplies. 

- 120 - 



SECTION 2 

OPEPATJON 

182. Amphibious Packin . In addition to and simultaneouely 

with the constru%lon of skid loads, preparations 

were made for the amphibious pocking of Classes I, 11 and 

Lv euppli6s for the period D plus 1b thmugh D plua 60. 

Inspection of the facilities for off-loading and the storage 

conditions on the continent immediately subsequent 

to D-Day reeulted in the dealsion to amphibiously pack fll1 

nuartermster supplies for t h e w through D plus 60, 

placing a heavy additional burden on the Quartermaster personnel 

and iacilities. Peaking and crating eohools had, 

however, already been established, pnckiw and crating 

supplies ware svailable, and 8 method of repsiri&q damaged 

or unserviceable containers agreed upon and plflced in 

effect. The containers were so constructed that they would 

be able to withstand over-the-beooh-handling, momentary 

Immersion, and at least 90 days of expoaed open storage 

without breakage or damage to the contents. 

183. Phasing of Maintenance Sets. The planned phasing 

of the sets a8 desired by the Quartermaster, First US 

Army, and the shipments e.s actually made coincided very 

closely. Extremely rough weather in the early stages 

of the operation resulted fn a delay in the shipping of 

some of the seta as originally scheduled. Subsequent 

shipments, however, rectlfiea this lag and the sets were 

completely shipped by tha end of eaob period as plamed 

for particular type of sets. The planned shipping sched- 

ule for the beach maintenance ae s and the follow-up 

maintenance sets was as follows..P 

Beach Eainteance Sets. 

E% No. of Sets I& No. of Sets 

D plus 4 

0 plus 5 

D plus b 

D plus 7 

D plus 8 

D plus 9 

2 

3 

5 

5 

6 

D plus 10 

D plus 11 

D plus 12 

D plus 13 

D plus 14 

6 

! 7 

8 

Follow-up Maintenanoe Seta. 

Ex Na. of Sets m yo. of Sets 

n plus 15 

D plus 16 

D plua 17 

D QlU9 18 

D plus 19 

D plus 20 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

n plus 21 

D plus 22 

D plus 23 

through D 

plus 4.1 

2 

0 

1 each day 

184. Qesults, 

a. The utilization of the maintenance sets for 

shipping supplies across the beaohes was a oomplete succesa. 

The contents were carefully selected by the Quartermaster, 

First US Army, and the Chief Quartermester. The sets were 

brought to the beaohes under the control of the Firat US 

Arny lramedlately following the assaults. Issues wzre made 

- 121 -


to the troops without fo$vial requisition or depot procedures, 

Remining atooks eventually collected and proces6ed 

into depots where they were augmented by the bulk shipments 

that followed.3 

b. In a report on the operation, the Commanding 

General, First TJS Army, stated:& 

"It has been previously stated, for the first 

ten days the 9,uarteraaster Class I1 & IV sup- I 

plies which arrived on the continent were in 

the form of Beeoh Maintenance Bets. The possession 

of these sets WRB quite adequate to 

this end. No requisitions for any item contained 

in these sets were turned away; on the 

other hand, 00 lsr e surpluses accumulated 

at any time, The ftems which they oontsined 

were esRential rother than ornaments1 and the 

factors were accurate. Considering the conservdtion 

of aupnlies and tonnage which was 

ePfeotaa by the use of these ssts, it is 

considered that the& design was one of the 

fhighllxhtsf of the entire operation". 

c. The difficulties encountered through the declsion 

to amphibiously pack all supplies for the period 

through plus 90 were overcame by htilizing the faoilitiea 

of all aepots in the C'nlted Kingdom on this work. Supplies 

were aistributed among de-pots as required. Personnel of 

depots not familiar with mphibioue packing were given 

speoiel instruotions in wp.torproofing supplles. Close 

liaison was maintainea throughout. The mission we5 acoomplishad, 

with only s am11 amount of tonnage shipped to 

tho oontinect without being amDhibioiisly paoked. 

SECTION 3 

COPTCUJSIONS AM) RECOMfENDATIONS 

185, Conclusions . 

a, That the use of beach maintennnae sets nn4 

follow-uD maintenance sets in the aly stages of lending 

operations on the continent and the amnhibious paolting of 

all sunplies proved of definite value. 

b. That no aaprecioble qunntities of supplies 

hed to be shipped over to mqplement the sets. 

186, Feoammendntions, 

a. That beach mainteaohco and besoh folloW-up 

sets be utilize& in tho early stages 2f Suture amphibious 

operqtions.


Bibliography 

Chapter 12c 

1. Topic No. 37, Headquarters, Theater Service Forcea, 

European Theater, Office of the Chief ?uartermaster, 

subjeot: "Supply Planning for Continental Operntionsn. 

(Inrormal Study for General Board Use.) *(20) 

2, Fq TsFET, OTCQf, Ltr, subject: tfCommentsof Q!4 8Upply 

studyvt, dsted 13 December 1945. *(27) 

3. 12th Army Group Quartermeeter "Final After Actiou 

neport", *( 21) 

4. ?eport on Operations, First US Army, Annex 12-14, 

Section 111, l,The Operations", 

*Nunher in pcreptheses is Catalog Number used in 

Inventory Of Matbl'ial, 91 Study NG. 109, (UlaSS 

I1 & N Supply), file R &OI./ll. 

- 123 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

187. Allmances. The iqltial allowances of individual 

and OrganiZational alothlng and equipent, as presoribed by 

the War Department, are contained In appopkate tables of 

organization and equipment, tables of basic allowanaes, and 

table of equipment number 21.l The Canananding General, aro 

ean Theater or OperatLons, authorized and published from 

tine to time speoial aliowances, in addition to those presorib- 

ed by the Uar Departmept, for troops in the European Theater 

of Operations. Requests for additional Items, or for items 

in excees of authorized allowanoes, were eubmitted through 

oommand oharmeLs to the Colrmaa&inLGeneral, Communications 

zone, for approval prior to issue.2 

quacy of Allowanoes, The allowances a6 pesorib- 

Department and as modiried in the i3uropean Theater 

of 0 erations were generally adequate, .There was a need 

for specfa1 it- required by speoial types of personnel suoh 

as armored, airborne, and tank destroyer, and in addition, a 

definite need for winter clothing. mny items of olothing and 

equipment were in critical‘short supply at various thes due 

to low priority. enemy aotion or to Laok of supply disaipline, 

Some item were ooneietently in short supply, whioh indloated 

either that the initial tqllowanoe wa8 too low or that produo- 

tion or rei?eh facilities were inadequete. The most outstan& 

ing oi these items were:3 

Outfits, aookiq, one burner 

Outfits, oookim& two burner 

Outfits, aooking, 20-man 

Field “34 

Heater, water, immersion tyye 

lkieess equipment, all tirpes 

Tentage 

Certaic items of combat aZothinG 

“anter QlOthiq 

Medessinc: equigment was often in short supply beaause bring 

oambat operatione ults Were frequently split up into smaller 

detaohments OP oombat groups. Organimtional allowances were 

not adequate to permit the iesuanoe of this tne of equipment 

to them detachments, Thia wa8 esgeoially notable among Mllitary 

Polioe an8 similar unite whioh operated in small groups.4 

Speoial and non-tariff sizes of olothing ~nbfootwear were ot’ten 

dirrlault to cbtain in army areaa, althou there were eufi&- 

oient stoaks oa the oontlnent. Units were u l t ~ t d author- l ~ ~ 

ized t o draw sgeoial and non-tarfif size olothisg ahd footwear 

for storage in unit supply for issue as required. 

- 124 - 

A-E-8-T-R-I4 -T-E-D


189. Classes of Clothing and Equipment.5 Clothi- and 

equipment W88 classified in the European Theater of Operations 

in tie order of serviceability into four categories as fallws: 

a. Class A olothink and ec,uipment included all Iiew 

items and thos- were sliEhtly used but not substantially 

aistinguishable frm new. 

b. Class B Included that which, althoueh not new or 

Glass A, still-ed combat serviceabiiity. 

0. Class C incluaed tb.& which could be made combat 

servioeable by-ation and repair. 

d. Class X included that which was usable but did 

not kVe combamceability for extended field use, Clcthin& 

aud equipment was segregated and issued by classes in 

order t o Obtain the maximum use of supplies on hand. 

190. Maintenanoe.3 

a. It was the responsibility of each soldier to 

maintain, bg normal care, the clothin& antl ekuipment issued to 

him. Susply discipline extended through all echelons and 

proper oare and miatenanoe was a command responsibility. 

QUartenn"aQr laundry and repair units while not always easily 

accessible to ombat troops, were avaiiable and provided 

aleaningj and repair service. 

b. Three salvage repair oompanies were normally 

provided for eaoh army. They proved adequate for the repair 

of shoes, although they did not meet expectations in the repair 

of other types of Quartermaster ecpiptlent, Shoes were 

tagged with the individual's name, rank, serial number and 

organization to insure return to the original mer. Repair 

of tentage and webbinE was abeguate, but laok of spare parts 

and proper facilities seriously hlndered the proper mintenanoe 

of items suoh as Inmereion type heaters, tYpwriters, 

mea8 equipment, and on6 and two burner StOVeS. 

191. Substitution and Elimination. 

a. In order to increase production and ausply of 

Quuflrtemstar item which proved more satlsfaatory ana essential 

than the othcrs, a study was madu to eliminate as many 

of tho lees satisfactory and non-cssantial items as gosslble. 

Items considered for elinination wera those whioh, although 

eliminated, would produce the least detriment to the success 

of future opera ions. They were divided into the following 

two categories: t 

(1) !Phose itens wliioh would be non-essential 

from a tochnical viewpoint. 

(2) oarmanly used items which recorda revealed 

to be in slight or decreased demandr 

b. The matter of eliminating non-essential items 

was of extreme importance to the owbat foross, It was appareat 

to Suprome Headquarters, European Theatsr of Operations, 

that oqntinued production and supply from the United States 

of all items being used in the European Theater was bpractioablo, 

and that in order to provide suffioient quantities of 

__ . . 

- 125 - 

R-IF-9-I-R-1-0-T-E-D


the moat needed itdms the eliminatiou of non-essential itas 

waa necessary. The British Arm, for example, adopted tho basic 

fundamental prlnci3ltrs of qimplicity and uniformity at 

the beginning of thtr war. Consccuontly the British uniform 

for all components of tho mmy, which consistd basioally of 

only 11 itoms, remained unohanged throughout five and onchali 

yeors of combat. 

C. As a result of a study diructed by Supreme Huadquarters, 

Eurogean Theater of Operatione, thu 6th and 12th 

Army Groups mado tht; followinL recommbndations: 

-Item 6th Arms Groug _I_ 12th Army Groq 

Clothing, Bakera & Cooks Elhlnato Zliainato 

Casa, Canvas Dispatch Eliminate Eliminate 

Chinawaro Procurable locally No oolnment 

Enamulwarer Procurablo looally No c mnt 

Stove, cookini 2 burner Eliminate Retain 

Dubbing, 4 oz c@n Is~ue2 oa can only Issuc 2 oz 

oan only 

Tent, Pyramidal Subatituto, Tent Retain 

squad 

Tent, Wall, mall Substitute, Tent Retaip 

squad 

Tent, Kitohen, Flyproof Substitute, Tent Retain 

Squad 

d. Surve;s were conducted throqhout the field 

forces to furthor determine bossiblc sources of blinlnation 

or substitution. The survey6 indicated the following: 

(1) Poncho was desirable a8 6n issw item.7 

(2) Lekgings were uneatisfflctorj. and disliked. 

(3) Overcoat was often 

(4) Combat boot with tk revarst! leathar aoaked 

up water and was 00113.7 

(5) Rainaoats were unaatiafeotory duo to lack 

of uniformity in sizes and maturiale.9 

(6) The cushion sola sock was in ereat denam3 

since it was warm and conlfortablc and the 

new type did not shrink vfhhun vrciehed.7 

(7) Leather palmed glove did not last. Thc 

glove shell, leethor with insert was fer 

more satisfactory and recommbnded as a mb-- 

StitUtQ-7 

(8) Pile jackat waa popular, 

outer garments were not 

resistant and water repellent. 

- 126 - 

R-E-8-T-R-14-T-E-D

R-E -5-T-€3-I-C-T-E-D 

e. A board of officers convened at Headquarters 

Army Ground Forces, ',cshington, D.C., in August 1941, t o Stiicly 

the equipmnt of the post war army. T is board considered 

the fumy rsquirements in all theatera.50 Its Tindings were 

benerhlljr similar t o those in th8 European Theater. The 

bosrd reconiiended that outer clothing he developed which 

would provide an adequate uniforn; for dres8, combat and rat- 

igce, This uniform wt1s to conslst of a meximum of general 

purpose farulents for issue to the greatest number af troops 

possible. The board racomended further that researoh con- 

tinue to iil.prove the type, quality snd characteristics of 

clothing anu equipment, 

,mCTION 2 

WINTER CLOTHING~~ 

192.Problem Involved. During the three yeor period in 

Europzan Theater of Operations efforts were cansjstently made 

to dovelop a winter combat uniforrr, suitable for 6ll troops under 

the clFmaLio conditions prevailing. Different types of uniforms, 

incluaing 70 different basic items, vvere issued. The 

suggly and aistribution problem was almost insurmountable. 

dul,b3.y W ~ Ynot adequfite, and conbat troops were not aaequately 

clothed for winter. The Jarmanding kneral, European Theater 

of Operations, therefore called a conference on 29 Jsnuary 1945, 

for the purpose of eliminating unsatisfactory items and de- 

tarminine, upon a single winter combat uniforo. suitable for ell 

oomponents. Representatives of the Jhief kuarterirmter, the 

12th Army Group, the 6th amy Group, the ;uarterniaster Air 

oerviae Gomano, the War Produotion Board, end other trgenoies 

were preser.t at both Lhe initial conference and at the final 

conference Iield in March 1945. The vErious items of uniforru 

were discussed snd studied in detail, and ths final recomen- 

dations adopted by the conferenoe are a3 followe: 

a. Jaokets. Of the six different tyies of jackets 

issued durin;s c hater of 19b!+-l+5, only two vwre reclomenbed 

to be retained: 

(1) Jacket, field wool - 1 per individual. 

(2) Jacket, combst winter, with hood - 1 per 

individual. 

It was reccn.n*ended that the combat jaoket be modified to include 

breast pockets, and that the outer fabric be Kade of' 

tough, wind resistant an8 water repellent material. 

b. Yrousers. Of the seven types OT trousers issued, 

only two were reco;LLen8ed to be retained: 

(1) Trousers, vool 18 oz - 2 par individual. 

(2) Trousers, oonbat winter - 1 per individual. 

It whs rocom;endea that the combat trouser be made tougher, 

more kin6 resistnnt an6 water repellent, and thht it be ~r,od.ified 

to include oargo pookets. 

c. Underwear and Shirts- That woolen underwear 

Elsd flannel sdrts were considered generally satisfactory. 

It wan recouienaed, however, that all $bee garments be 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-'T-9-T-R-I -C -T-X-D 

treated for shrinkage rssistanoe and that the wool content OT 

the underwear be increased to a ininimm of 50 yercent. In 

order to reduoe the problem of Suuply it was also i-ecm"mnded 

Cat underwear be sized only as small, medium and laree. 

d. Boad ear. That the cap, field, cotton, with 

visor, be i'eta& all others be eliminated. 

e. Gloves. That the alove, wool, leather palm, 

%meunsatisfacFyTor use in the European Theater of OperatLons, 

md that the mitten, trigcer finpar with insert, was 

suitable far o~lya smll percentage of troops. It was therefore 

recomended to eliminate all but t'ne rollowing three items: 

owing: 

(1) Glove, shell, leather - 1 per individual 

(2) Glove, insert, wool - 2 per individual 

(3) Glove, leather, henvy - 2 per truck driver 

or individual performini; 

'manual labor. 

f. Footwear. Tht Footwear be limited to the foll- 

(1) Roots, service combat 

(ivoaified) 

- 1 per individual 

(2) Shoapaos or overshoes - 1 per individual 

( 3) soclrs, wool, C~~.S~~.Oll - 3 per individual 

sole. 

(4) 

Socks, wool, heavy or - 3 per individual 

Y~001,Ski. 

x, Overcoats aild-Raincoats. That a soldier in COR- 

bat, clothad arrecucKiende3, woi.ilC! nit require an overcoat, 

but would require Iro'cectinn from rain. Troops on furlougi, 

and those eiiEaged on sentry duty or in sedentary activities, 

rrould require adklitioual warmth. It was therefore recomendod 

that, such issues be iwstricted to one nylon poncho an2 one 

trcnohcoat per indiriidual. 

h; Bwoater.. It was unanirnously agraad to retain 

the sweatcr, hi& neck, and to issuo !t on the basj.3 of 0110 

per individual. 

i, Miscellaneous, That raiucel.laneous itom 3uch a8 

trousur suspcnaors aiid-EZTlers be eliminated but that tho 

sleepinR bag and two v?ool blankets per individual he Tetaincd. 

193. Rasults. Tho adoption of. elm rucoinuended wintor uaiform 

would provide a sultable uniform for troops in the 

Rurqean and. otbcr theaters with aiiilller elimtiD conditions, 

It would sirqlio su'gply and distribution, eliminate 21 itenis 

currently issued, reduce tho nuber of roquired sizes by 59, 

and re:ucz. thc nuuber of basic fabrics fra! ton to four. By 

tho a8ditfon of a nacktio and a wool garrison cap, it could be 

converted to a non-combat uniform which would measure up to a 

high standard 02 military uppearanco. For spocinl opcratlons 

01- tinusual conditions thc unlform mi@ roquiro additions, but 

no ohangos, For ejrmple, snow caniouflago could bo quickly proridod 

13jr tbc addition of trousers, parkas and mittens, over whit6. 

- 128 - 

R-E-5-T-EL-I-C-T-Z-D


R-E-94-R-I-C -T-E-D 

SECTION 3 

COXCLUSIONS AND REcOMbW3ATIONS 

a. That the clothing and equipment, and allowances 

were generally satisfactory, but there were too 

many items to insure proper supply and distribution. 

b. That there is 8 definite need for a basic 

uniform and for continued research and development to 

develop better and more adaptable clothing and equipment. 


a, That aUaSi0 combat, dress and fatigue uniform 

be adopted for all components of the Army. The combat 

uniform to consist of the followine: 

Steel helmet, liner and cap, field, 

cotton. 

Combat aliirt and trousers (one light 

wool oombinafioa and a heavier wool 

fabric for cold weather. Same standard 

color for both). 

Combat boot s. 

Underwear and socks of a high wool content 

for winter; ootton for summer. 

Muffler and highneck Sweater.. 

Overcoat of the trench coat type. 

b. That research and develop” continue towardtr 

the development of better and more adaptable clothing and 

equipment, 

c. That the recummendations mBe by the Board 

of Officers convened at Heedquarters Army Ground Forces, 

Vashington, D.C., in August 1944, to study the eQuipment 

of the post war army be genarally aoaeptad. 

- 129 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D


Biblioeraphy 

Chaptcr 15 

1. AR 615-40, Sec I, Far la and b, Par 2. 

2. Qh; Technical CLr Ltr, No. 19, 16 March 1.945. *(22.) 

3. 12th Army Group SOP. *(23) 

4. Kq TMET, OTCQ;, Ltr, subject: Qomcnts on qt: Supply 

stuay~~, 

aatLa 13 D ~ C45. 

5. 

Hq Com 2, dT0, TLchnical Kaiiual Uo. 2, Dec-%bor 1944. 

6. SSgdP Cmittce vn Dolotion of lJon-$ssontial Itons.*j24) 

7. AGGPReport PTO. 786, 7 ~pr45. 

8. ,fD Observcrs Riport No. 677, 23 Feb L+5. *(25) 

9. AGF Ruport Eo. 4E7, 2 Jan 45. *(2G) 

10. Scvath US Army Quarttrnmstw Vonnage Bid for Puriod 

8-15 Oct 4.b". 

11. Lkjnorandum, subject : ".linter Uniformif, to the Quartermastdr 

General t-b.ou&,hthe Sur&eon, 5uroyoan Thuatcr of 

Opuratione, from thc; Chief Quartormastar, Iiwadquarters, 

Communioations Zone, dat;ed 9 Kay 19b.5. 

*Number in psrentheses is Catalog Number used in Inventory 

of Malntorinl, GI SWdy No. 109, (Closs I1 &, IV 

supply), file R 401/11. 

- 130 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

3-E-S-T-B-14-T -E-D 

WARTERNASTER SALES 0,PERATTONS 

SGTION 1 

QUA~FRWSTER SALES COXPANY, T/O k E 10-152 

196. Xission Prescribed and Actual. The Qusrtermster 

seles company was designed to make available for sele to 

officers only, certain-items of clothing and unlform 

aocesories and to sell certain merchandise such a post 

exchange items to both enlisted men and Actually, 

it sola items of clothing and equipmeat to offioers, 

nurses, officers cf the Vomen's Army Corps, civilians of 

officer status, end authorized Allied officers. The distribution 

and sale of p st exchange item were handled 

thrcugh other ohnnnels.q Tho company operated both in 

the combat zone and in the Conmunications Xoncs, establishiug 

I: static store as ti base find dispatching mobile 

stores to othw nreas.3 

107. Orgtmiaatm. 

a. The company is composed of R comFany headqmrters 

and three operating platoons. EEoh platoon in 

turn is organized into four operating sections. Tech 

seotion is capable of 'ndependont action and has a Cap.olty 

of 10,000 troops.i Its nobility Is restrioted to 

the cne truck And trailer author1 ed for thc tronsyortation 

OI both nersonnel and sto0k.t The company is flexible, 

but tho momt of stmk thet cun La carriad is 

limited and short of normal requirements.5 

b. The ccxpnny headquortors narformed the usual 

administrat,ive and housekeepinq functions for the company 

as E Wholc, sunerviaod the sales activities end handled 

the oroperty and noney accounts of the operating platoons 

snd sections.3 

198. Experience in the hbropean Theater 3f Operations. 

o, Troop Easis. The troop basis for the mssignmnt 

cP tke salgs company durinR Operations was two plntoons 

Der army. During the initial phases of operation 

on the continent sales companies ware not avciloble in 

sufficient number for such an allocation, end front line 

unitn inveyiobly reportod that no sales friOilitlb6 were 

zvellable. Even le,ter, when sufficient numbcrs were 

iivalleblo, it was found thnt the allocation was inad quste 

ard that et least one company per army was required. 3 

b. 0 erntion, In the oombat zone the rssponsibility 

for t h b n t operotion of the Sales unlt rested 

with the Army Class I1 and TV officer. Administretive control 

WEB exercised by the bzttsllon or group to which the 

unit was assigned. The general method Cf amploymcnt In 

eaelI army, with the two platoons assign6d, was to establish 

a static store operated by one plitoon, ana GO dlspntoh 

a mobile store, operated by the remaining pletoon, 

to the outlyinq units. This mobile unit, by utillaing the 

transportation of both pletoons and therefore carrying a 

- 131 - 

B-E-5-T-R- I-0-T-E-R


larger stock than would otherwise have been poasible, visited 

division, corps and army ereas. The platoon operating 

the static store was ordinarily Installed in or near the 

arq depot area, making sa 8s and Drocuring and storing 

stock for the mobile unit.' The oporation within the 

Communications Sone Was shiler, with the exception that 

the majority of storos were more or less static, and that 

in more permanont installations,, permanent or smi-permnent 

stores were established, The CormKlnding gensrels 

of secticns were authorized to establish and close snles 

stores as- required upon approve1 of the Chief Q,uwtermnster.7 

SECTION 2 

SALES STORE OPEIULTIOlJS 

199. Operating Units End Parsonnel. The c)uartermoster 

seles company sns the nucleus for the OperfitiOn of sales 

stores on the continent. Civilians were generally hired 

6s clerks to assist in the operntion of the large statio 

installations. Occsslonally, provisional sales units ware 

orgenized within comhet units to augnent the c$artermeater 

sales Store facilities. The 1st Infentry Division dcvaloped 

an organization which mdu purchases from the army 

seles store on a OOhSOl~dtIted diviaion order, and then 

broke down tbc items to unit supply officrjrs for r snle 

to the officers of their respective organizations. B 

200. Sales ?rocedurvs and Accounti ,9 Sales procedure, 

accountability,. and the appointment of2alc.8 off lcers are 

covered in appropriato '&r Dcpertmsnt regulations. The 

procedures in the European Theater of Operetions generally 

followed these re@letions, and were mrther covered by 

regulptions pu lisbad in circulcrs of the ruropean Theater 

of oDerations.4 Sales offioers were anpointed, bondcd, 

and made financially nccountable. The accounts were subject 

to monthly cudit by the Sales Audit Division. Normal 

prooedures were followed in sales inventories, daposits 

of funds, end adjustment of accounts. 

201. Procurement of Stocks.7 Pequisitions for sales 

Storm itoms -#ere subdnitted to the Chief ?,uartsl.a&stor by 

each section Qunrtermastor not leter thnn the 20th of each 

month for the followin& month's requirements. The Quertermastor 

of the Advance Saction included the requirements 

of the armies in his requisitions. Based on thc above 

requisitions, credits were astublished at the assignEd 

depots in the form of credit letters issued to Section Quuertermsters 

by the Chief Quartermster. At the end of tho 

perlod unused credits were nutomatically cancelled. 

202. Rationin .? Rationing gf sales store itens wos 

set up aa-a meas$e to secure more equitnble distribution 

of items in short supply. Ration curds were issued to 

thuss eligible to make purchases. If, in thc judgment of 

the Chief Pwrteraaster, the supply situation required, 

he could increaae or decrecse the ration; make special 

distribution of rationed items without reference to the 

rp-tion card; suspend rationing on any prticiilar item or 

Items; and clnssifg sales, varying th6 ration by type OS 

purchases to secure D more equitable distribution of the 

avail~able supply to all personnel authorized to purchese. 

- 132 -


Beoause of limited transporteticn hcilitics on tho continent, 

it WLLS extremely dlffL0ul.t to maintain balanaed 

stooks in ull 7,uunrtermaster sales facilities. hies 

Officers Could reduce the established rations oonsietent 

with existing stooks to aohievs an equitable distribution 

of supplies. 

203. Prices.10 Thc gelling price or all item was at 

oost plus- lxroent overhead. The price list of all 

wles items was published by the Office of the Chief quusrtermster 

frm t he to time, and all mioes listed inoludsd 

the OVQrheQd. 

204. dditional Servioes Rendered. 8916s stores 7uer6 

normqlly tot set up to.rendar additional servioes such as 

t61loring and shoe repair. Tailoring eervioe was smetimes 

given in lnrge or statio installstions where oivillan labor 

and fecilitia aermitte8. Shoe repeir servioa was also 

given in some case6 by errangement with a nearby Salvage 

repDir unit. Shoes were eooepted at the sales store, t ake 

to the repair unit, md generally returned within a wsek. 

PriCee cbarged were governed by appropriate War Dopartnent 

Circularsa 

205, conciusions. 

SECTION 3 

CONCLUSXCNS AND RECOB~aATfON3 

a. That the sales company is a flexible and 

oPiloient unit, but laoks the neoeesary transportation 

to aarry the required amount of stook. 

b. mhtlt its mission in the Zuropean Theater of 

Operations was to operate as an offioePs a:.les store for 

the eale of olothing and non-issuc equipment, 

c. That the ellooation of two platoons per arniy 

was Lnadequete. 

206. Reoonmendations. 

a. That the sales company be made more mobile 

by ths organic assignment of additional t~anspcrtatian. 

b. That provisions be made for tailoring and for 

shoe remir servtce within the company. 

c. Thst pertinent doatrlnes, teohniques and 

Tebles of Ormnieation end Fpuipnent b6 amended by appropriete 

agencies of the'%r 'Oeportment . 

- 133 - 

R-E-S-T -R-14-T-B-D

11 PE! 10-5, QM Oaerotiona, 29 April 1943. 

2. 12th Army Group Study, ttQuartermaster sales Compmyii. *(12) 

3. Field Manuel 10-10 , Zuortsrmaster Service in Theater of 

Operntions, 2 March 1945. 

4. T/O & F: 10-157, 28 May 1943. *(13) 

5. 

aifteenth US Army Quartermaster t'Class 11 and TV AftQr 

Action Report!', 31 July 1945. 

6. L2th Army Group Quartermaster t'Fina1 After pction Report". 

(14) 

7. qi Technical Cir Ztr, Wo. 14, Hq Con ?one, ETO, O CW, 

24 March 1945. *(11) 

8. 1st Infantry nivision, "After Action Report". *(15) 

9. Hq ETQIJSA Cir No. 16, 23 April 1915. *(16) 

10. Office of the Flscal Ufrector, Ssles Audit Branch, ETO, 

Ltr to all sales officers, BTOUSA, subjcot: ~Inllortermaster 

Salas store hcoounts", 1 July 1944. *(17) 

11. Ninth US euy flQuaPtormastor Salt6 store Operationst?. *(18) 

* Number in perentheses La Catelog Wumbcr uprd in 

Inventory of Material, QJl Study No. 109, (Glass I1 

& IV Supply), file R LOl/ll. 

- 134 - 

R-E-S -T-R -I-C -T-E-D


- 

-PART FIX3 

,uZASS I11 bXTX?LY 

SECTION 1 

INTROWOTI:ON 

B. The Victul'i(ius strategy und tfictics of 

.;~rldi r u I1 were Ltiacd cn, Lnd ciependent upon, obr 

bbllity to subply Our mechanized forces GI. larid, sea 

and tdr xith petrolem, oil f.ad LubrioGrits. 

b. To provide the fuel rjctceesary to opereto 

the vWt clzcurculcticn uf mecheniaecj transport, the oil 

ir,austrg iu the Clnited Statas of imerica had to cxpand 

ln size, kn~dedge and tecrvlique at an equal pace with 

the mchmizction uo that a constant an0 deimidable supkly 

of this ell ikportant product wauld ulways be .wailable 

iii the quality mil quantities desired. It w w the e;jpliuatio:r 

in tirue of war of the experience an6 n.:etbods davelopd 

ia t h e ai peace by the oil induetry in the G.~IIU- 

Pxtwe cmi xian3portation or ptrolauo: products that 

nEl.5 €i 

Great factor in r!.alcint it possible for lis to cruah 

our eneales puickly ana with n prepnderaooe of uechauized 

Ii?.@lt. 

c. An Arn;y-%rvy Yetroleurn Board v!aq creesed 

by the Joiii't J-hiefs af Ztalf in ;laahlr&tou to asaen:bla 

3itish hird mierican reguifaiKents In every theater of 

olerations and to nrrnn(,s for the fL;l?illnlen$ end aisptch 

of these requirsnsnts. The +.rmy-Knvy Petroletn 

Bo6l.d Ma 88 ito representativa an Ar@a FeZroleun; Offioer 

, a1;;pointed by the Tteetgr Joei..under conoerned, In 

emi; theator cf oporatiu.~.3 

d. The following study is r3 review of the 

mthoilr of distribution of petroleurr., uil did lubricants 

to Iinitod BCete.9 Field ~OXCES in the Ewopeen 

Theater of Oprations. 

208. Dcfinitione. 

a. jlh't;e -- a lory: term requirement report, 

8hmlnL astinetea cdutixltities roquirvd to neet supply 

aemtCia over t 6,lven puriod of tim. 

b. Bulk -- Eny quantity ul product in a 

ahgale container rhich would be too hehvy to banilie 

by parsonnal withcut the aid of mechanical devices, 

ncmma:lp any conntainer bavily mre tban 55 United States 

gullons quantity,

c. Packaged -- any quantity of product in a 

siil@;lecontainer which may be handled by parSOMel without 

the use of meohanical devices, normally use6 in reforunce 

to five gallon cans. 

d. POL -- the British abbroviatlon for Petrol, 

Oil tind Lubricants. 

e, class I11 Products -- all petroleum and 

solid fuel protluots, othcr than those which carry an 

air forao specification. 

f. Class 111 (A) Products -- all Petroleum 

products whioh met air force apecifications, excluding 

speoialty item for which the air forces is solely 

rLsponsible. Itms consist mainly of aviation fuels 

and lubricants. 

g. Jorri-can -- A german type five-gallon 

gtlsolint! can with clamp type cover with pouring Spout 

mug onto can. 

h. heri-can -- a five-gallon gasoline can 

with screw-on cover and Which requires a nozzle, tube, 

flexible, steel, to pour oontents from can into gasu- 

line sanks. 

i, Dacmtlng -- the process of dispensing 

gasolino from bulk to packages. 

j. filled products -- petroleum proaucts other 

thw gasoline, such as oils, greases, and other lubricants,l 

SECTION 2 

mcHANIcs OF SUPPLY 

209. Levels of S U I . Stock lovels were prescribed 

for asmy servicR areas and for advance, internediate 

and base seotions of the Commnications Zone, based 

upon plannea oporatlons and the time required for replenishmnt. 

Levels varied from time to time as the 

operfition progressed. Xrmy Guartormsters, however, 

attempted to insure et all tines that suffioient levels 

were on hand in army areas, or immediately in rear in 

the Advwe Seotion to mot planned or UeXpected requirements. 

Operational supplies ae carried by the 

individual units were limited by the number of ontainare 

and the mount of transportation available, e 

210, Requisition, 

a. The original plan for the invasion of the 

coiitinent caLled for the issue of Class I11 supplies to ugts 

on requisition. This plan was found to be impractioablo. 

- 136 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-IS-.$-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

It vias dotormimd, however, thst the return of em$y c 

fcr rofi1lii:g was essential. Tho can-for-calx rsouisit 

,;mmcaure wns thorefme iilstituted to cL-::serve the !;UTI 

f July i,limx the ddvailco Sectisr, 

Cnwiur!ioctims ZOlib assmod c.int;*ol. 

b. Effective 15 kuE;ust 19l+t+,resupply ;rf all i:asolino 

:iroducts ts thc arrdes w s placed cn ir daily tclegrtln 

begis.? Tnlcermns were SCiit to the P:ogt?luting station with 

iiifarnation conies ts the advance Seetian Had to tho chief 

Qua?2terLlastCr.~,2 The R.rr.dm at timos oxporiunccd diffl- 

culty in sbtainiil& the qualtitics nrid types irf graducts 

which vore callcd for in tho deily telepraris. It CES fncnt, xany truins wore broken mcl ShipWJitS oftcn 

urrivcd pieconocll in the arny areas. Ir.atieaunte docuriuntatiirn 

also added. to the ao~~fusioi?, and it vms oftos inpassible 

for tho Amy Quartermaster to rocc!i.cilc his receipts 

with his daily to1cgrai.i roquire:m,“nts.R 1,luch af this diffioulty 

was i)vcrcar.m by roquisiti:ci;ig basrsd upcn noxirur.1 

arid niriinuri quantities requirocl to mko up a cLmploto 

train of Clew 111, thus olifi1lcutii~ brokon train lots 

wliich were hard ti: cciitrcl. 

211. ’,ioquirenmts. 

8.. The Advance Sectim v7as su;iglied by dosicwtxl 

,;ir:terriediato and trsso aoCti.cn aepots i.n.thc farward noas. 

Tho 3hiGf Qusrtcrm6ster dcsicnutod ports for tho supply of 

ii-.tcriiodiute and ~ L S Gdcyts.10 fjoctim Quclrter:t?stcrs 

oetinntod ::.ad. subrdtted thoir rcquirenonts Lo the Chicf 

Cpxrtcrixstcr i;n L: 30-dag basis vary 10 doys.11 Each 

estiLz;tc gavc thr: final revised mtimte for the ocxt BUCcocdiric 

10-duy p risd, a rcvised ostinK\to far the follxricy. 

1C-dsy :>eriaid, a d c first estiru.te for thc lcat 10 days i)f 

tho 30-duy period. 16 These cstirxtes o!mblad tha Chief 

Quartorrustor t.? subiit requirad crstimtos to h1,yhcr hcadquarters 

md provided a basis for na.‘:i!ig awLltblc sufficient 

sup>lics to neat uiiy rcquircmnts. 

b. The Erigixer Potrolouii, Oil arid Lubricsnt 

Ermch of tho Southern Lirn of Cs?municnticnS handled the 

wocureuGl?t, storcge, distributixi and is.~ucs;rf pctrulbun 

groducts i;! Suuthorn Fruncc throuch February 1945.13 

liftor tho arulprmtian of Gcuthsrii Liilc af Gtouad.catirw3 

with the Co:kiuiiicb tioiio GoliC, those fulctid:?s were takoil 

mer by tho Ca”:icatioiia Zoi!c rmd the smo divisim botwmi 

Ei?~inccr mid Quortorricstor rcspoiisibilit existed as 

iii tho 1Turthcr:i p&rt al” tho Buropeun Thonter,2g 

c. Importstim of Fuel during tho initial staeos 

af the nporatiiiii could Lot be plawud rioru thall ~i few days 

in cdvorica, &ftcr n f irn f oothola waf! o8tabliahod, hawcver, 

t,.nlrara crrivod on n rogular lO-d,,y schedulo. Lata:, the 

Britiob ;kr Offico and Sugroi3e IImdpuartors blliad axgodi- 

tiant;ry Forces colLborated i)JI tho procoduro for abtoiJ:ii2$ 

all >c;tr,:;leuli .?raducts. All co.iaon .X:tl’sloUli produots 

wx*e 81etcil una cc.ntrallcd (;E the coatiwat by Sugronc 

ticzdnuurtors, j’.lliod Tx],oaitim ry Farci:6, i?lltho bzsi:; 

- 137 - 

R-E-S-T-R-J-C-T-E-D

of 8 rmithly Slat0 ca~~s~~lidutod by th-t hcndguartcrg. 

3ulk getralcun ~IRScol.lcd fi)rrar&by ric8i.s of 10-dsy dcrmds 

by Sup-m Iicpdquartors, hlliod 2xGzd:timi;ry Pqrc.zs, 

whilo the pockarcd pri.dUOtS wrc calloS fnr,raM by tho 

Garlnunicatizns Zir:io; The 10-day su!?ply *wri 

t1irsuC;hout the oporatioi; as tho port situ!rti 

in a position tJ perriit a 30-d~~ slntc tir be 

orfaot.5 

d. Prim- to D-Day tho Chiof Quorternaatcr hn8 

aCcUr-;lUlet0b 0 hrge stack Jf psckLp,cd Pu.01~md J.ii3ric~r.bs 

sufficient t? 1;10ut cmtirer.ts1 requlroi,ie:ito for u thrcoraor!th 

perid. Those stocks vore hsld ii: t2o Unitcd 1Cir:g- 

Cisi?, mid ware caLlGd fcrward by tho Chiof Quuorterrmstcr 9s 

roguirod. Aftor D-Dug pockuCcd products VICIO shippod 

direct frcmthe Uriitod States as called fsr by thc Chief 

Qunrtorriastor ail noi1th3.y roquisitirpns. 5 

0. Tho Slatirig proccduro of Suprmo Huadquortcrs 

Allied Expodititx!&ry Porcos funishcd potr,lcun prsduct 

requireimits far ono :iw.th bid inticipatod roquimnwts for 

the lsllowiq three successive U3,iithS. Tho bulk quantities 

shom on thc slate for tho IIGC~~I wora usca us 3 

tho 10-day dcmxls to procure niid ship t,;.ikcor CB 

The .?acl;ngod oatha tos, h-wcvcp, wrc used ~nly 

hnd the Chief Quartern6stcr reqiiisit io:xod o mct onomit s 

lrsm the Now YJrk Port cf Ccihsrl:ntiili, thrswh tho Arm 

Pctrnlcun Office, or frciii Zho British-lYcr Officc throunh 

the Coiieral Purchcsix figcnt.5 

212. z4110cations. 

n. Brori D-Day until Octaber 194.!1, nll t;iR:?qc 

rwvomocts wro oi~.:trhllorl by thc Birst cind Third US ~2l'r.l~~ 

alnco the conplctc inf;!rri~ition a!.i thc roquirznw!ts aiid 

avoilob lity of trs:i~port:~tiin110s 01: hmb mly ik thohoacli3, 

rrnd storage arcas, ond thc ostiimtad btink car, tank truck, 

r!nd bnrge lift ovailublc fiBrthe nilvcnoiltr, QuriiiF: the next 

culoilclar nai:th. Tho Chief Quartorrunster ir. turr. fiiriiished 

the 0-4 with n breakdom of tol:uogo shah5ng thc 0pprO::i- 

mto amount noodca for daily -mixtoii~.nc.ea d the tirbxmt 

Ileodcd far build-up of reserves. Thc Chiof C&Iurter;mstcr 

0100 includod o prsposod grogrnn of Ou,pplylr,p tho Uuil:g

agencies, giving the method of transportation to be use 

an8 the oatimted emergency tonnage requiring air lift.e2 

c. Based 011 thcso estiriates, the 0-4, in conjmction 

with the Ch.i€f of Transportation and the Chiefs 

of Rcrvioos , propared and submitted to Comunicatiorx 

Zono Seotions ard Chlcfs of Scrviccs tho approved WVQ!T%Lt 

sch~c?ul~ for all classes duriw the next cnlender aonth, 

Thl8 sygtom proved vcry sttisPuotory.~2 

213. Distribution. 

n. csrsolino supply we8 basod upon the thcory tlrt 

lnrgo~volumcsor msoliuc should bo introd.uc6d at dotip-water 

?or:Us, tronsported tliroup,h str~~togicallg looatsd pipolinos 

to front Uno arcas, and distrfhutcd in tank cars, tank 

truczs,. an*. containers to the usinR egoncios. 5 

b. Initially, nL1 avoilablo bulk storage in EnglunA 

m s plaoo5. undor control of tho British Futroleum 

Bocrd. A11 stocks wrc hi16 by thc Rritish Petroleum Romd 

anr: iasuod to t!;o United ::tatus on ruvorso lond-lease. The 

avnilablo tanlcor flcot of Groat Rrltoin end tho Unitcd 

Rtotos ms usod o build-lip dusirod stock lcvols preparatory 

to thc invasion,! ma inj.tia1 assault forco carried fivr: 

gallon conteinors came ovor tho bmohes, and on 23 

Junc 194.1,,thi; first tonkar nrd.vod at a Ilommdy gort. .Yt 

tiinos it was also noccssary to fly paclcoged fucl dircot to 

tho continonb from tho Unitcd E'ingdom, 

o. Bctnil distribution or dkliver7 of pasolino 

WRS mdo cithcr from bulk storopo with the iropcr dispoiising 

oqulpmcnt, or from dram, fiw or 55-za13on. RUB storage 

was satisfactory on:'.y when Chr! location of ths using unit 

was rolntively static and easily nocessiblc to tho bulk 

storaRo site. ",'hilo bulk storage distribution invoivod 

lass handlilu: and was morc eoonomicel, it was oxtromly 

limited in flcxibility and was usGd primarily for Comani- 

ontions Yono or rctir aroa troons. Rotail distribution in 

55-~nllondrum vias never satisiflotcry dub to itfl wi@t 

and :iulk, ana nlmyrr broueht corqlntnts from the using units 

bocauso of thc difficulty in handlinp. 1X"rous cascs of 

hornia lcrc rttributoi to tho usc of the 55-qallon drums, 

nnd thcir usc was conacqricntly hcld t o. rinimum cxctipt in 

tha :7outhorn Tdnc of Gowlunicntiono. z5 

d. Rotail. distribution by mans of fivc callon 

gnsolinc containors vms tlloroforc ahost mndatory, porticu- 

larly in tho rorwnrcl co:tbnt arcas: Tho fivc gallon oontain- 

ors RSC rolativoly light ill i:cielit, sm1.l in bulk, 8118 canpurP.tivcly 

c?nsy'to handlo. Gnch vi.hiclc, cjrcogt tr.nlcs and 

tank dcstrovors, ms oquipycd with spcicrl rac!;s to carry 

oufficicnt msalino in fivo-~allcn containers to last Sor given 

pcri0d.s of ti;:o, Bud distribution was madc by cxohiinging tho 

empty cxis of o. unit for full cans. In addition, divinioii 

Q,uc,rtoi-ma.stGrs wlro autl..oriaod cdditional cans for tho oporation 

of distributing points. In ordci to s?cod rind. facilitntc 

ciistribution to thc using units, it Wn13 originally ploencd 

that rll aacknKin5 and dccnnt.inq from bulk to fivc-gallon oontc.incrs 

bo Oonc by t3o Cmxmication.s Zone, Nld thct 0.11 

Bnlivcrics o tinny supply points bo mdo in five-gcllon 

contnincrs.3 Tho speod of thc farvrnrd movomont OS tho 

- 139 - 

R-T-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

=:des, the time required for nev pipeline csnstructicn, 

%he size af tho can population, thc oandition of railroads 

and rail equipmnt, on6 tho docontin;- T cilities all 

had an offcct an decanting operations, and it was often 

necossar tc dallvor psolirro to khc army supyly paints 

In bulk.% In such cases decanting was dono by the ur~~les. 

e. In viovi of the fact that retail distribution 

by five-gallon containors was the only netbad suitable for 

csabat and othor units, a can gopulntian sufficient to 

met tho nccds of such distribution vfas cssoaticl. Such 

factors JS tho nuraber of troops, tho nubor of vehicles involvad, 

typo of pLinned opcrettlons - pertlculurly t!;osa 

calling for tho oaplsynimt of largo srriorod Tarccs, and %hi 

rapid fomard iisrencnt of tho arilios, all hnd to bc csnsid- 

ercd in deternining thc size af tho can 2opuldtIon. In a 

fast novinr situation such as thc drive &cross Pranco it 

was essential that full cans ba alwoys availablo when 

nocdod, and additiand oms for naiiitennnco wcro afton roquired 

by the coabnt units. il sufficient stock ha2 to bo 

on hand ta elinln.,tc &lay caused by waiLlnF, Tor cans to 

bo rGfillod 5r for bulk gasnlirio to bo dcczntod. ‘!ithwt 

such a stock af oms on h;nd to supi?ort thc cmbat units, 

thc drivc acrms Bruncc ciuld nilvor haw bcan rmdo. In 

such a drivo, tho oasc ana rapidity of ecsclino dlstrl- 

bution to tho using units nnd ‘to tho individual vohicles, 

io of priiic csnsidcratlon. It ws ilrifinally ost- 

imted thRt seven xJ.lllon cans w“. sup?nrt the ooil?at 

forces throuphout tho operations in thc %uro>cen UeaCcr. 

This included not only thu iiimliatc? rcqiiircaonts cf thc 

grnics, ‘Jut also tho rcquiromnts or thk) Ssmunicotions 

Zono troJps cnEclgcd in haulinC: to tho aimiils. Bofor~ 

hostilitics ccasod, thirty-Tivc nillisn cms wre iaportcd 

to thc aontincnt, and to this was ddGd an indr;t?r- 

ninablc nuiibor of copiured Gcriloa cons. In s3itc of this 

largo nwibor, vhilc thoro was novcr a roal s.hortn{:c except 

in isolatod instances, them was ncvor un ovor abundant 

su.pply, and it Y ~ Sstill nocossary tn ricidly oiiforca 

can di iplinc in order to naintain o sufflclcnt stcic!c ‘an 

hand. $8 

214. Pipulines. 

a. i, linltcd mount r;f fuel was pwlped frcri the 

Uiiitod 13ngdsr.i by undervrntcr pipelipcs . This opcrstion was 

holm as Pluto (pigclino wder tho ocaan). Thoro wcro two 

systorm: Banbl, whloh was a four lino systo:i that Irovad 

of llttlo iuportanco duo to the enell qkmnttty c1olivi;rad 

nnd tho cxpcnslvc Dpcraticnal trouble t?X:>C”xa; and hbo; a 

15 Uno systcu DCPCWS the narrov nock of thj ZKqliuh Channol 

which avemgcd, up to the cnd ~f hostilities, 27,000 barrcls 

n day, The operational ccat of this systoa in mnpowor was 

also cxcossive, and elttiough the systcn Va‘a D SucceES it 

was oonsidorod th;t tho transilissim by bulk tanker delivery 

wns for narc satisfaotory as lone na oir an2 naval sugciria-ity 

axistod. 

b. Tho ?ipclinc system was thc backbone of tho 

aistribution systen an tho contlncnt. It pomittcd tho 

tronsrzissim of gasoliuc bvcr torrain ti)c rwgcd for othcr 

nenna sf transportstion, avoldod rood ctmgcstion wkcro road 

capocity was lidtad and trarri,c heavy, ond corricd 50~solina 

ovor vnryirq distnncoa whoro onony action mdu ;>tbor 

mens of trnnsportotisn impracticable. 

- l/+O -

c. The annr Systun !vas installed an tho continent 

bopinning D plus 3 tu provido E bulk clistributicn systcn 

durim tho initial poriod preceding tho capture of Chcrbiicrg 

(0-1020). Facilities ~orcmstructcd ut Port en Uaasin 

(T-70fk:) for unlahding soverol small tankcrs. Two six-inah 

lines were providod for 1HT-80 gusolino and ane six-inch line 

for aviation gasolino. Thoso pipolinos wore oxtondod to 

dispensing points a t Etroham (T-7060), Caroritan (T-3000) 

and La Forge (1-40GO). 

d. Thu IIaior Syston (A.?pandix 15) miginatcd in 

the Port of Chorbourg (0-1020) , with two six-inch IZT-80 

psolino lines and ant six-inch aviation gasoline linc oxtonding 

south through St. La (T-I+060) to Chslms-aurdI::monc 

(Y-7050) . Frcr.i Chalons-su--lIarne, tr:n six-inch IIT-CO gasoline 

lines axtendad to ThfanvilLo (U-8080),Fiancc, and irm 

Thiclnvillc, ml? six-inch lino vias carriucl ccrms tho Ithinc 

River inti; Germny, 8 total distzncc of t*ppro;rirwtoly 600 

milos fron Chcrb;,ur&. 

c.. The Narthern Systcn (Appendix15 ) startcd frm 

tlis Port of Antwerp (U-7090), l?dciu;%. Ona eix-inch and 

t-ro fourrinch MT-eO gasolina lines and tvc four-inch 

ovitition gasolino lines war@ constructod to Ihastricht ~ 

(IC-5552), Hollmd. Tho three NT-00 gasolino lincs were 

ccntiiiucd northooutward Trr.:.: i:c.astricht und acr3ss tho 

Rhino RivGr to llescl (h-Z2l,.l],Gar~mny. Tho linear distanco 

from fsitrrer? to :.:cso~ 5s lea nilcs.15 

Tho St~JUthOrn SyStGrl arigintstod at lItw3cillCS 

(T-'l+010), Frcincc;, kind was built ta sup9mt tho 6t:i Array 

Group. Prom Karsoillos, one six-inch and i!no fcrur-inch lirio 

was built narthard to La Porco (P-4080)ncur SfiarburE, 

Oorr:ony. Iror:iLa FmcQ throe fsur-inch lines irere continuod 

ticrass tho Rhinu at Frmknthal (Ii-l+505), Gcrany. 

Tho linear diatoncc was 620 nilos. Tho systm consistcd 

of 1,507 milos nf pipclinc, und tronsnittod 569,000,000 

pallms of motor i;nd. sviotion gasiilinc Up to 15 Soptenbcr 

i94.5 15 

p. In additian t o thwc no.jor PipClinG SyStCI&s, 

thoro wcre nuiorous smull pipclinc GpOratiaS on Chc corttincnt, 

such os tho Rhino Rivor pipclinc crossing, Kehlon 

fL-Oht(2) to Konigswintor (F-6232). IIorr~,gasi!lino was roceivod 

by rail tank cars at lbhlon and pmped across tho 

rlvor to o truck filling insto1lotion"iin tho autobahn 

northueet of Konicswintor. This rclievcd tho Rcmgon 

(1-4432) ontoon bridgos of o oansidcrablo sncunt of truck 

traPric.d Thcrd -.&?re 3,600 xlllos i.rf pipollns laid ts thc 

asst side of tho Rhihe Rivor up to cessation of hostilitics, 

with a total capacity of l50,OOO barrels per day.15 

h. Tank ctus wora usod ti, heul bulk easolinc 

frmi soaport m6 pipolino tarninals to 3amunications Zone 

ant! army' &canti= points, m for trnnsiar to tank t.rucko.21 

Tank truoks hauled gasoline from bulk storoga tanks, aipoline 

terrdnals, ana r.Jil tank cLm ta Comiunications Zone 

or amy{ decanting points ilr fillin(F stations. Approxluatoly 

3,000 rail tank cars and 1,055 tan!< truoks with a asaacity 

of 2,000 or 750 gallons each wero us0d.~7 

215. hocounting.

- 

142 .

Suyxne Ticodguortcrs, .Uliod 2xmX.tionorg Porccs , ms 

chnrsod with ccardinatin6. ond chtmllin thc supply :>f 

pctrilloun prsducta to tho Bllicd Psrcos.fE Tho hrcn Pct- 

rolauri Offioa was char@ with etcff r~3ponsibflit~ for the 

ossrdinoticm of 31; mttors gcrtoiniq ta zdepustc su2.ply 

far cll ~~urposca.l7It is thw oSv1~7u3th-t there was axi 

swrl~pi>inenn8. duplicutim of fcactions and rcqmnsibiliticrs. 

SECTIOU 3 

217. iiroy-Novg ~otr.nleuLi acarP. 17 The krv-l~~vy Potrg- 

1eU.i Bourd was thc fieoncy of the J;rlnt Chicfs of E:tuff uni. 

was ohorgod with thG follming functisns rchting ta petri:loui 

.>nA pCtr%JlCun products: 

E.. Ihintnin doso comxlinntion md liciaor, botimn 

thG Vur and Hnvy Dopnrtnents cnb vrizh tho Patrc'luun 

fdrd.nis2rntisn for ?far. 

b. Prepare md Llcintilin full inforrution una 

stotus of petrolom and potrslouri products rmttors vith 

whioh tho Var ,md ITnvy Dcportncnts vmre cmcorned. 

c. Inourc ci~nrdinotlon, br,sed on ovcrcill Isgistical 

plrclns, CJf prmuroriont, wcraous shigmnt, snd storngc 

fin hrny snt! Invy. 

rl. Efloct collcbcrotiun pc~trolourinattcrs 

witli othor Unitod llntlcm sa diroctud by tho Joint Chicfn 

of 3tcl-f. 

c. 3orcoii and ct-nsolic7Qtc Arny and Navy rcguircrionts 

and cocmlincto with tha Yt:.troloum AddninistiJtor for 

Uar tho cqmcity of inCuvtry to prmidc the roqairorionts. 

218, kruo Pctr;;lcun Officc. Tiie Area PoBroloun Offico 

vrns En agoncy nf the i.rny-Biivg aoarci with Euprcne Hcndquarters, 

Nliod EX3oditiiJnllr!l Parco, Cort:,fn rccclrds GI 

roquLrorlonta and stocks were iwiiitainod rc:wrts propnrod 

for thc ArEIy-ITQVy ?otrslcm Board. Technioul 

.i.ni"ormtion af pctrolcuu/prmluota was disse:iinc%ab 

thrmqh ohnnnclo. Tho Arzo Petrolouu Offioo wna divided 

int,.r u Tochnioal Branch, a Planning and Rcquircnents 

Branch, and a Stock und Bhippi~Rronch. It6 principal 

funations woro : 

u. Stuff rcsponsiblity for caorbinatim uf i:ll 

rslttors ,wrtoininc to udequato suj>ply for cll p~rposcs, 

b. Roprcsciit tho 1say-l:kvy Potrslourr Rorrd with 

upgroprioto British ngonoics. Act .m len6.-lcoee and reverse 

lond-lonoe os rcquircd. 

c, Rcgrescnt the armd forcos os rOqUirQd in 

&linistdng. nlliod potri:.lcuti na"YCora with coubinod 

bi:.irds (?rcamittoes in Lcndm. 

a. Combinate requeste by the Unitea Stotcs

g. Supcrvisc productlcn of gnsolinc and Water 

cans at tho assanbly plant in tho Vnitcd 1;ingd:w. 

h. Reproacnt tho Ghicf (luurtcjmaster Lind min- 

tala liaism Tiith other solcvicos on Class I11 suppig mttorp. 

221. Basc Bu0ticrlIS.l Base SQCtiiXI Quertc?rimstcrs w‘ICi’c 

rcsgcnsiblc fbr thc subd~~ion of raquiromnts far tho op- 

er2ti.m jf a11 grcund vc+hiclos, installati;~ns, 2nd rsr rdscol1snoi:ug 

us08 within tho cnumnd. Thcy consslidstad 

doyt ra;?c.rts and dcsignatad the suiiply pointg fm sorvicing 

tr,:sps vithin thoir raspcctive areas. 

222. Advance; Sectism. 21 The :~dvsnooSocticn Quartcr- 

mstorg, in oeaopc.i7ati(.n snd csnjunctii,n :iith tha G-l, and 

Tmnspiirttitifhulk at.:rego 

facilitlos. Burqdics wcre un1;)ndcd frm vmscls, 

traUapi;rtod hg ?ipclincs, iind stncd in bulk by tho En- 

Fineor mrvico. Cuntc.dg passed ti. tha Qunrtcrnastcr whcn 

tho gesalins supply oimpany gaoksgod tho product or crthcrwisa 

asaulxd cmtral. Tho Ui::.itary Pipdllno sorvicc vraa 

rus’\imsiSlc for thc c. netructinn .f hulk potroloun hond- 

line anc? 8t:rage. fhcilitics undc-r the tCChniCQl suporvisiijn 

of tho Chiuf: Engin::or, Simunicstii~nsZ: no. 

22C. ih ntinciital Lavanoc Bcoti5ii. Aftcr 1 Ilsrch 1945, 

tho Cmtinont,l Advance Bocti-i?: was an ogcrs.xtine agcncjr 

i.f thc Ca”niaatic;ns Zum, Suriipcan Thoatsr ;i Oacrati:lns, 

and 7‘108 cmtiguous ti\ tho owbat zmo. Its dssi;.n in 

im.mdiatc sup,wrt end naihtcnancc .cf tho 6th hnry Grilup, 

WQS to MCOIVO, stwc and mvo Icmara mtcrial snd supp- 

lies as rcquirod.22 Its functions were sinilar tu thosc 

of the’hdvanoo Ocoticn, Oa”nicatims 2, .ne. Prinr til 

that tiw, tho Cmtinontdl ;;dvmco Sectifin porfnrned tho 

Sac Su;rglg role fer tho Bituthf?l’ll LinD of CoiX.IlUliCQticm8. 

During part rif tbis porisd tho Petroleum, Oil, End Lubricants 

socti::n vma n sc.gerato soct1.m csmplotuly divnrccd 

frail tho Quartomstor Ciirps. It controlled sufficiont 

gasJlinc supply mapanios, sorvico csnpanies, and Ewinecr 

Pipolinc conpanics to pcrforu its i.lisrriim, 

- 145 - 

8-E-R-T-R-I -C -T-E-D

The Quartermaster asswd cmtrol when the Contiiientcl .*dvmoe 

Sectim moved forvard rind the Specj.al Petrf;leum Section 

remained behind vith Delta Base Section. lfovever, the 

Quartemaster was relieved of this function in January 194.5, 

but assued cdntrol again in Llmrch 1945.vhen the Continental 

Advance Section becorae an agency of the Corti“ioatiqms 

Zone. 23 

225,Southern Line sf Comunicatims. The aisoim of 

the Petr7deun Branch, Engineer Sectlon, Southern Line of 

Cumuniaations, was to slate the procurenent of Engineer 

pipeline supplies for maintenanoe und c,nstructiJn 01 Pipeline 

systems and terminal bulk installatinne , operote the 

pipeline and buik storage iaoilities and deternine require- 

ments. The Petroleum Eranah wfis charged with the procurement, 

storbge, distribution. and issue of petrc :iroduots, 

oonttiiners, laboratory su’Tplies and equipeat. Bm 

226. Field Forqes. The respansibilitiea and functi~ns 

of the various ochelans throuchaut the field forces ?rere in 

penerul the same for Class IiI 3u ,ply as fur the sup:ilg of 

other classes, The my grsu3 supervised distribution 9,nd 

insured maintenance and proper stock 1ewl.s. It soreened 

estimates and mde allocations 8s necessary and mintfiined 

current study of logistical factars ond rates of cainsunption?& 

The cmies estimRteC raquiremnts and effectod, 

through noma1 channels by the maintenance of stock levels, 

the supply of :ietrolew, oil, an6 lubricants tci all troops 

within the arny area.25 

227. Cijnclusicns, 

n. That the supply of petroleun, oil tmd lubrioants 

in the European Theater of Operations *.1u8 generally 

adequate ana satisfactary, - except during September 

and October 194$ wken stock level6 were ’ dangerously 

ELOW. 

b. That without n large flve-gsllan can populatlim 

cn hand sufficient to meet tho requircmonte , prrticularlg 

of fast moving ccnbat units an& c.!omunicatl;ms Zone trsogs 

cmagcd in haullne troops uqd supplies in sup,i>rt af tho 

armies, distributiou uf gasoltwJ probkb’ly would how failea, 

viith a sorloua rosultant dotrimntB1 offoct on tho combat 

opurations . 

c. That aiatribution by f ive-gallow containers 

was found to ba the only suitable method or distribution 

In the European Theator, anC that in futuro oporatlons 

aaroful stuciy must be given ts the win populotinn rcquircd 

to austain and su:coart the units ongeged. 

a. That accounting procedure thrroughaut tho 

echelans was not stendaraizsd or rolnted. 

e. Pluto (pipcline urldor tho ixosn) was maorately 

aucoossful. Bulk tanker dolivary iJVCr a lurge body 

’3-I-R-T-R-1 -C-?--$-D

~f mter is much mare ecmcnical Vuhm eir and naval suixri.;1:i;;y 

ar1sts. 

f. Pipclinos an tho continent were ver:' succcssfill 

,-nd ahsclutolg necessary for ths su?gnrt iP inur large 

fialii forces, 

228, E\oc.,:lrwndetions. 

e. Thet aoodmtinp, nrscedwnsbs stonderdizod. 

5. Thtjt pigcliiio cunvtructicn end 3pcrpD tim 30 

mado ano subject af Iouro and canstat rcscarch. 

c. Thot tho nunbcr ;)f agemius charpd %lthClass 

11: oporatlonz bo hmld to a miair.isw ti; av[.id cmfusim and 

Buplicetim. 

(1. Tht in futuc ngorsticnu omcful study be 

given t3 thc sizo of the con poptilot9;m requlrod ta sustain 

end support tho units c.xeycd, snd thi:t neor?saary ect.i;:n 

Le tahn tc insure a aufficfent stack cef nontai. cry .In hand 

thr.m&out' all cnholons.

1. ETO-SOP #3E, Cxitinental Supply Prc:cedurc for Pctrslom 

Products and Related Ehndlinl: Equipmmt dated 19 ,L,uEust 

1944 and 12 Jiino 19/+5.*(9) 

2. ETO-SOP i’7, Sur, 1 Praoeduro an the Contirient aatod 2 

February 1945 .a$6T 

3, Ifemorandun; Quartornastcr Scctim to G-I+ Section, 12th 

Amy Grsup, dated 6 Bcbrumy 19b5.*(37) 

L. Advance Sectii;.i, C.rmw-icttions Lono Opw. tianal I!istcry 

1943-45, imdatcd.*(22) 

5. History of lrrsa Pctroloum Office, undatod.*(l6) 

6. Rcplirt “Fiold Gervico L,:f‘l stlo@’, 12th Amy Grnup, G-4 

Sccticn, undatoa. 

7. First US brny Rcpnrt on Dpordtims, hnnox En. 14.*(43) 

8. 12th Amy Group Final After Actl,n Rcp rt.*(32) 

9. F.uartcrmauter SOP, 12th Arny Grmp. “(32) 

10. Hq Cam 2, ETO, OC@l Circular Lcttcr y97, Praccduro for 

distribution cd O,uartont.stcr Supplies t., p,r,iios, hdvanoc 

Soctions and 3acti,m8, dated 5 Dcccribcr 19kL 

11. Hq CLu Z, ZTO, OCPTI Circulhr Lottur ,:14, PruOGd.Ure fi,r 

Distributim OP Quertcrnastcr Su?Tlics on tho Cnntinont , 

datod 9 Fobruurg 1945.*(11) 

12. Eq ETOUSA, filo AG 400/1 OSD, Subjcct: Proocdurc for 

Planning, Rcooption and I:nvenont of Supplies, Equiy” 

and Bersmnal, datod 10 January 1945, 

15 

Histnry nf Southern Line of Caxmunicatimn, undatcd. 

Hq 6th Amy Group Adminietrativo Instructions UP, 5 , 

dated 20 Bwc3bbcr 1944. 

Enginoor Section, ETOUSA - History i,f POL Facilities, 

unaatcd.* (15) 

16. Bq Can Z, El%. OCQf Circultir Lottor NL. 52, Pmcodura 

for Supply of Tuartormastor Itoms im tho Gmtincnt, 

datwd 16 Septonbcr 194.11. 

17. Joint Chiofs irf 3taff , fsr;ly-IJavy Potrolowr Board Chartor 

dated 13 Octsbor 1943. 

18. SFLTF Administrebiw bk” No. 25, IIsintcnanoa 3f the 

Allied Expcdi-ticnarg Forccs in Petrolour3 Prsdu ts - 

!kwtcrn Europoan Theater, dated 21 July 194k.*?l) 

19* Hq ETO, QCW Circular Lottcr t32, Rcspmsibilities of 

Quartorsster Sorvicc, 3POUSA, for Pucl, Lubriosntfi an8 

Handling Equipnwnt, dated 22 July 1944.

20. Hq ZTOUSA, SOP $47, liil.itary Pipdino Service, 22 Scptombor 

L944.*(10] 

21. Cq Advance bectian, CUmuniCatinhS Z'me, SOP for Pctrol, 

Oils ma Lubricants (POL)Supply, datcd 19 April 19C4, 

22. Orcsnizafion of G,mtinontal Advance Socti m, Comunicatixis 

Zone, ETO, aated 1 Fcbruary 1945. 

2.3. Oqenizatiia, Bunctions and Opsr~tion of C&tincntal kdvanac 

Bt,ction, Con Z, ETO, dated 1 Fubruury 1945. 

24. Limo rrrm C-4, 6th Aruy Gr ,up to)AGF Qwrtmmastor Obsower, 

27 M:Rrch 1945, 

25. 110 6th Arng Fhup, G-L+ Seotiun Orfioe ?IOU Ea. 13, 1 

iIarch 1945.*(30) 

26. Quartcrnustcr SOP'S tX the firnlcs.*(42) 

27. IIist2,rionl Data fr.n P & Y Diviniirn, OGCH Piloo.*(15) 

20. C3,rmonts, Lcttcr, Thaatcr Chiof Quartomaster, 13 DQCCIIbor 

194.5, to Thw G m " l Bl,ard.* (56) 

29, 12th hrny Grcvp - C-lr Pcriudic Ropsrto.

LOC-1STIC.U FACTOW 

229. Definition. Logistics is the art of plannin and 

carrying o m i t n r y movement , evacuction and supp1y.f Tagiatical 

factors, as discussed in this chapter, are t!,ose factors 

dealing with the most important phase of sup_nly -- the 

comautation of requirements. 

230. Types of ZoRistical Factors. 

'a. There are three methods of expressing petro- 

leum, oil, and lubricant logistical factors for coqmtation 

of large soale renuirements: 

(1) Pounds per man per day. 

(2) Gallons per .mn per day. 

(3) mpresslon of reouirements of HT-80 gasoline 

by either of t%se first two methods, 

and recluirements of allied products as 

percentages of ?!T-80, 

b. There is easentiallg no differenoe in either 

of the three metbods of expressing petrolem, oil and lubricant 

logistical faotora. The use of "Pounds per LW per 

day"*is desirable whon requirements are to be stated in 

tons, and ",qallons per luau per day:' (greases excepted) is 

desirable when requirements are to be expressed in total 

gallons or barrels. 

231. Eethods of Determinatim. There are.two gener- 

ally accepted methods of detsmining petroI.eun, oil and 

lubricant logistical factors: 

a. The vehicular raethod , in which the average 

daily reauirenents of any unit or nimber or units can be 

determined by computing from experience the average numScr 

of niles to be traveled daily by all ~6hhleSinvolvod, 

nultipljjing the average nunbar of miles to be travclcd by 

the total number of each type vehicle involved, and crithar 

multiplying tho result VJ the avornge oonmnn?tlon rate (increased 

by safety faotora) in Gallons pormllo for each 

type vehicle (taken from Ff 9-2600) , or dividing thb result 

by the averace consum2tqon .rate in :lilca por .pallon for 

each typo mhicle involvcd. Norr~~lly, the total requirements 

of msoline for potmr oqulo"t, coolcinq, hoatinc, 

lightina: and other miscellaneous needs arG figurcd nt twenty 

porcont of the gasoline reouiromcnts for the vehicles. The 

total figure can be dlvid6.d 5y the irlachine records unit 

etrenRth or by tho ration strmqth to ohtdn the rcauironats 

in eallons mr 3811pr day. O i l and lubricants aro rlso 

normally dotomined as percentaces of t_otalfuLl rquirementa. 

rcrccntagea usually used are: .,nqinc oil - 34'. of 

total fuel rcouirmcnts; gaar oil - J$ of'total ruol requirements: 

and grease - 1.5$ of total fuel roauirmonts. 

Appcndicas l6& 17 list thc roquirmonts for largo forcet?as 

computed by tho Office of tho Chief ?uartcrmastor, 3uropean 

Theater of Oiorations. This ncthod is flcxiblo and Is 

- 150 - ' 

R E S T R I C T E D

R-E-S-T-R-I -C -T-E-D 

applicablc to both mall units ana field foroea. Ono can 

ooiuputa the 8mo.unt of gasoline needoa to mow unit vohioies 

On0 mile, and tlluR Porecast ronuiramont8 from day to day by 

multiplying the tlqallona roquircd pcr d.lo" for tho unit 

by tho anticipated number of nibs to bo travclad. Corps 

und largcr organizations find this method cumbcrsom baccutsc 

of thc constant challgo in thc units assigned or attachod, 

which affcctd thc numbor and typcjs ol vehicles, and because 

tho avcracc daily,movonront.of units will vary from day to 

day. This mothod, howcvor, js mandatary when no cxpcjsianoct 

oonsrmption factors arc availabl0.2,3 

b. Thc oxpcricncc consumption mto mthod involvcs 

thc actcrr.aination of rates basod on thc total gallons or 

pounds of pctrolcum, oil and lubricants consmud during UXtcndcd 

oocrations of largo mssos of troops, diviaod by tho 

total moohino records unit strcngth or tho ration strength 

of all troops who ocnsunod those products. Thus, tho roquircmonts 

gor man ?cr day aro dctcrriincd from actual cxp~rionoc. 

"ken past cxpcrionco data Is not availablc , C11~vchicular 

mcthod should bo usod un%ilthc oprations have procrcsscd 

sufficiently for cxporienco consum:ltion ratl;s to bo 

OONpilOd. nation strcngth data is ~ asil~ obtaincd and is 

mom noourato for lar@ P~QRSOS of troops than nachinL rucords 

strong@ data. 

232. rlapninp Factors dcvplop.td by tha Area Pctroleum 

M. 

a. Prior to D-Day, rmuirc,ments wwa kesed upon 

coabat anci non-oombat.logistica1 factors. Thas~factors reprcsontcd 

consumption, oxolusivc of rsouiromclnt3 usod in 

building up a rcsemo stoclc pile. Thc faotors woro: 

Froduot U S Nan- combat Combat 

?IT-80 Cal/man/day 0.4 l.bG 

nmoi GRl/man/day 0.04. 0.27 

Koroacno wf/man/day 0.005 0.005 

TLlgino oils $ Of (bE-80r)ieSQl) 2. 3. 

Fear Oils $ of (MT-80 Diosol) 0.5 1. 

crcasos $ of ("80 T)loscl) 1. 1.5 

Casol-ino {for of (IilT-~oM.osol) - 0.08 

cooking) 

The oonbat rcquirements wore 214. net tons of POL pcr day for 

uaoh divisional slico of k0,000 poops, Tho non-combat roquiromonta 

amounted to 50.6 nct bons for tho sama numbor of 

troops, 

b, Tust 'prior to D-Dcy, conparison vias modo with 

factors dovoloncld and usad by Allied Poroen Wadquclrtcrs in 

Italy. Rcauirencnts in Jtoly rcvcalcd n oonswption ram of 

150 liquid 'tons VT-SO; 9.s dicscl mcl; 2.7$ korosono; and 

2.9'4 cngino oils, 'Roar lubricants and groasus. Based upon 

tkc abovcs figures, it wag agrcjd to plan rccuiremcnts for 

thG instiax opcrations in thc Europcan Theater of Oporations 

on n daily con9un tion rato of 153 not tons for caoh divisional 

slice of &0,008 troom, of a ioh 79.0@ was 18-80 gosolino; 

- 151 - 

3-E- S-T-9-I-C-T-E-D

H-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

0, In Octobcr 1944, hmovtr, thG factors wore rovised 

bosod upon actual oxpc-rionco in tho ?hropoaa Thuiltor 

of Optrstions and upon tho devclopmcnt of accurcto records. 

Pin00 OOnsumPtlOn had hen pector thm onticipatod, th dai- 

ly roauircmcnts wGrc raisud to 217 nct tons while --- thr. --- nnn- --_- 

ohnbfit ConsUWtiOn rat0 incrcasod 66 nct ions, a ~ .basGd 

upon 0 aivisiCne.l slico of 40,000 troops. Tho nc.w rbquiro- 

IUOUtS wcro broken down 0.8 follows: 

TIT-80 1.700 US gcil/m/day 

Unloaded fuol 0.002 I1 

Koroscnc 0.003 If 

%os01 fu0l 0.170 It 

Rngino O i l 0.0561 I’ (3$ of fuc.1) 

Gonr O i l O.O?.e? (1% Of fuol) 

[*;Poaec 0.0250 Sbls/man/day (16‘3of fucl) 

d. In Januery 1945 consm>tion rooords from D-Day 

to inoludc 31 noooirbor 19b4 wGro avnilsble and at that tine 

it w s dotcwnod thst ruquiromnts mro 192 net tons, based 

upon tho BNRO €tivisional slicp. 

233. Actunl Planning: Factors Usd by Field Foroes. 

a. In plosnfng a daily consu$ilon figure for . 

pOtrCl~um products, thoro woro two basic thoorlee, First, 

thnt tho fl~uurashoul3 06 oxprcs-ad as a total Euantity 

bascd upon tho nmbcr of oiorationsl milas por dey for all 

YGhiclos invoLvod, end SSCOnd that tho fipyP.3 should bo exprossod 

i-.s n hctor in ounds par nien par dayr! for all 

troons involvod. It m ~ b o to 6 USG P factor of 15.4.788 

pounds por mn por dey, as computoa bo tho Chi~fQmrtcrmastor. 

This fi uro was ksad on 50 operational milos gcr 

vchiolcr pcr day YLppcndix 17). Tho First US rigrood 

with tho daily opcrationcllmilongo, but aonafdcrod the actual 

vehicular oonsunption figurc to be grcctor thcn thet which 

wm uaad in tho CMbf n,mrtLrmostcr’s calculctions, and 

bcliovcd thnt a Ifborn1 safoty factor should also bo in- 

~ludod. Tho ’First UR Army thoraforc cn1cul:tcd tho factcx 

to bc approximtolg 24 pounds pcr mcn pur 9w. 54 of thc 

12th ,!amy nroup oonpurrGd in thcr First UY -vta FGOO~ORdntions, 

nnd tho 24 pounds por r3nn pcr day ff&tOr was adoptcd 

nnd usca TOT approxhatoly two months nftcr D-Day. 5 

b,. b3tcr oporctiona ComCnoud in tho EUrOpom “hmtor 

of Oporr.tlons, studios wLro m.do on consmpticn rates to 

Eovclog plnnnfng fnctors based upon oxporlonoc, It ms soon 

rocognlaod thpt tho faotor prcviowly ncocptcd in tho oonputnCion 

of tho’day of mpply for potroloum, oil nnB lubriognt 

pr&uo*,s I nwcly, 24 pounds par nan pcr Cay, ms 01:coasivo, 

an?. this figure wcs disoilrdtd in favor of tho fagtor 

15.47, fis origina].lg P ~ O ~ O Sby C ~ tho ahid “11tWtCl’IXiStQr. 

or L4s tho rapid advc.ncc, ?.cross tho Continent pro- 

- 152 - 

+$-s-T-R-I-G-T-E-D

B-E-S-T-F+I-C-T-'E-D 

gressod, additional experience facSual data was.accmulatcd 

and compilod by tho Fotroloun and Fuola Section, Office of 

the Chief'?mrtcmester, as of 31 Dcoeffihsr 194b.9 These 

factors vwo basGd unon tho conswption of petrolom, oil 

nnd lubricents frmi '6 JUaC 1944 to 31 Dcombcr 1944 by r.11 

Unitod P.tp.tc8 Forces,.nnd as I? result ft emward rovision 

of proviaus OstimFltos, particliLnrly In th6 casc of allied 

products, IWclS LEldG. 

d, !bo Conmanding CGncra1, 123 .Amy c;rou.p, lr.tLr 

eubnitted to tho Co"nding Crofrcrnl, &ropean Thcnter 02 . 

Oporntions, United Rtntos b.rr~,a roport on thc potrolcw, 

oil nnd 1 brlcGnt consmption from 1.4up,wt 1944. to 28 Elibrunry 

1945.tf ' mcso figuros wcrc -nnnlpzed ma ncw factorE 

WC~Orscommendct! fcjr ostimtlnfl t!m ro;ulre2onts for fiold 

f.orces. Rocormondod fnctors pcr mn per dsy wre: 

-1ton Gcllons Founds 

IT-80 1.0153 8.2526 

Dicsol O i l ,0353 42773 

Xagino Oils ,0234 ,2032 

Qcar Oil .0028 .0025 

Grcascs .0012 ,0123 

Keroseno ,0051 ,0436 

Thoee above figures WGrE bQSGd on ration strcngth and illcluded 

a 20$ inorease for additional rnisoellanoous units. 

Pnragraphe 6 & 7 of th 8 reGort or0 quotcd J.n oxplamtion Qf 

thOEQ revised factors. 3 

"6. A nurvoy of tho strength figuroe of tlw mjor 

comw-3da indicates that thcro is normally n lnrge 

perce.it.i@e of troops in ench sroo who am serviced 

by n g1rr.m omand but whosc numcr!.cnl strunfitfitas 

ztro not lncluclod in tho ::.ssignncd i:nd nttachcd 

strength figurcj 02 thc br,sic com?.cd. TkIa aocountod 

for additional stronTth (4ir Form, Communications 

Zona troops, Allied trooy, oto.) 

vnrios bctwon 20 nnr! 35 pcircont of thc bnsio 

strength figllroe of th3 oonrmr?nd and pono'rnlly 

oorrosgonds to the ratloc. strength. ,Bquricnoo 

has provcn thnt tho factors, a8 ofltablishod in 

tho 1.w.rtcmasta ~orviocBof wouco natn, onlling 

for 15.47 pounds ?or mn p~?:dey md acnputad 

on the notup.1 c.ssigned cnd nttcohsc? strcmgth, . 

d3finitoly rosults in a surplus of ell POL itwas, 

with thG cxcop-tion of koroson.0. .Thus, it-ia appnrcnt 

tktt the factor is oxoessivo, I'lhGro&s, the 

strongttii figuro is insuffizicnt. Thc two conponsating 

wrors, howovcr havc hc.d the nct rcsult 

of ostabllshing qwiltities in toma of doys of' 

eupply on a mom or less workehlc hsie. 

''7. TO cstPLhl18h thG Supply Of POL ItOIUS on 

mor0 oxact basis and to provide unifcrdty 

thmughout thG thontcr it is nrOpOSGd: 

"a. Thnt now factors IJG cstcbllshd, bascd 

- 153 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D

H-B-S-I'-H-L -G-18-E-JJ 

upon actual cxporicncr. which will call for tho 

propor proportion of all FOL itoms. 

"b. That tho basis for applying such fac- 

tors bc on tho ration strongth ratahathan on thc 

aotual asaipnod and attached strungth of tiic command. 

%, That tho ncw factors bo bascd on a high 

avcraqc ueo of caoh product rathcr than thc oxact 

avcrauga. On this basis, amios will bG adcqutc- 

ly providcd for ovGr a pcriod of tirnc eltbough 

i;hGrc may bo short poriods of oxtondcd action or 

unusual activity in which tho actual consumption 

will bc grcatcr than tho cornputcd day of sw?ply. 

In planning for pcriods of abnormal activity, 

allowances will naturally bo ma& for additional 

quantitios.I7 

234. Factors Finally Dovolopod. 

a. Tho f$tnti8tiCS Scotion, Office of the Aasistant 

Chicf of qtaff, G-4, Suprano Xiadquartms, +lid 3pcditionary 

Forccs, compilcd,a ropcrt on conoumption fig- . 

urce from 24. Fcbmry to 23 Itarch 1945 for tho First, Third, 

and Winth US MOB, an3 trom 24 February 1945 to 21 IZarch 

1945 Tor tho %VGrLtth US ?.my and tho First Frcnah ,UXW 

(*.mondix 18),. This roport is in mrcommt with the factors 

as iinally flovclopod. 

b. Aftor mor ten months of exjxricrncc in supply 

of forcos in thc Xurcpcan Tb-oatcr ugdcr combat conditions, 

tho followinR factors wcrc mrkod out ae rc~irosontativr.of 

tho roquiromcnts for fuol and lu ricw.ts for thG Zuropoan 

Thoatcr undor combat conditione:B 

IPT-80 1.43 Gallons/man/dny 

Dicsol fucl .10 It 

Ecrcscno .om I 

"rhitc gasoline .002 11 

PhT 10 onginc oil ,0069 n 

SAX 30 onRinG oil ,0252 If 

SAX 50 ongino oil ,0105 1) 

RAE 90 guar o il .0122 tt 

Greascs 0 and 1 ,0166 pounds/man/day 

Groascs 2 and 3 0091 17 

Groaso 4 .ooll I! 

This represents about 177 toil# -pr divisional slioo of 

40,000 mon or approximatclg 11.7 pounds pcr man por day. 

0. Factors dOVClOpCd by tho offioo Of tho Chicf 

%nrtcrmastcr varicd SawWhQt fro3 thosc Rbovo. The figuro 

- 154 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

3-E-S-T-A-T-C-T-E-D 

rccommondcd was 13.48 pounds pcr mnn por day, broken down 

11s follocvs:ll 

ZIT-80 12 00 pounds/man/day 

OthGr fUOlS 1.00 n 

Lubes -242 

Total 13.4% I 

Thc diacrLpnncg bctwcm thcsc factors r.nd those dcvdoncd 

bv thu Area Petrolam Office nppnrently liLs in tho us0 of 

di ffcrcdt oonsunption records RS wGll ?s difforont manpower 

rigurcs. 

23 5. Conclwions , 

R. That tb mcthods and proccdures of computing 

loAisticnl f ectors wLro gsnerally sotisfnctory. 

b. Tit tho fnctors as finally dcvelopcd and concnrrod 

in by thc vnricus -goncibs concGrncd v&rC SntiSiWTtOIy. 

236. €?ccom-wnc?,atlcb. That PGrtiiIGIlt aOCtrhCS, techniques 

and ‘br Dooortmont publiccticns bo nmltndd. by approprIRt6 

Pgoriclas of the ‘ror Dcpurtnont. 

- 155 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D


Bibliography 

Chapter 18 

1. Dictionarp of United Qtntas Anny T~rins,!IN 20-205, dtd 

18 S a 44. 

2. OtafT OPficor's Piold Ibnucl, Organization, TGchnicol 

and LoRistical nata, m 101-10 oot 43. 

3. nuartc-mastar Scrvicc.Rofcrcnco nata, (Section 111, 

Chapter 3, Volume 111, Hq, SOS, CTQIJSA, dtd 1 Tcn 44.*(19) 

4. stmdnrd ''ilitary VChiclcS, TI1 9-2800, dtd 6 "3r 43. 

6. 12th ,2131~"roup Yinal ffitcr Action Papart, ChnFtcr 4, 

26 rlul - 14 SCO 44. *(32) 

7. J,tr, '.qs, 12th O..smy Croup to Commanc?ing Goncral, EMUZA 

dtd 25, ?lor 45. *(bo) 

8. Crea Totroloum DfPicc I:xporience Rqcrt, UndatQd. *(16) 

10. Ccnsukytion Rates of U8 Forccs In the 71~11Advance to 

the XhinG, PRmF, dt2 24 ADr 45 (TrepGrod by C;totisr;ics 

Suction, (3-4niv.) 

11, n,uartsrmstcr Oporational Analysis ?lo. 4, aubj: :'Quartormastor 

Pounds par Ian ncr Dcy, noted, 17 movembor 1945. 

*Number in parentheses I s Catalog IWabcr used in Inventor 

or Phtori&l, ($ Study No. 109, (2lans 111 

~uGply7,file R ~ ol/ll. 

- 156 - 

R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-Z-D

R-B-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

CW'JXR 19 

S%ICTION i 

LISSIOi;, ORoBilIQTIOIJ AND FUNCTION 

237. Ussion. The mission of the Gesglfse Sup;Lg' Company 

is t o opermss I11 distributint and bulk reduotion points 

for the supply and issue of gasoline, oil and lubricants to the 

using forces. It was the operatink base of Class I11 suyply 

in the European Theater of Operations, both in the Communications 

Zone and in the Combat Eone.3 It operated ht beachheads, 

truckheads, rpilheads, gipeline terminals, exid airfields. St 

also establishea roadside fillin& stations .3 

238. Orr.anization.1 

a. The Gasoline Sup,dy Company is a flexible orLanization, 

oomposed of a company liendquarters and tido operating 

platoons. Each ylatoon can operate inaependently. A total of 

56 laborers are provided for handline. 

b. There are 21 truoks, 2A-toa oargo and trailers 

arganio in the company for hauling gasoline a d allied proaucts.. 

The following teohnical equipment is organic to the coupany: 

12 - extinauishers, fire, oarbon-dioxide, permanent 

sl!ut-off 1.5 pounds 

1 - oleaning equipaent, bun, gasoline, engine 

driven 

- tanks, colla&ble, 3,000 gallon capacity, 

for r;et,rolew products 

3200 - cans, gasoline, five gallons 

4. - pumps, gasoline dispensikg, 100 gallons 

per minute 

4 - p~mp~, Eaooline dispensing, 30 gallons 

per ninute 

4 - pumps, barrel, kerosene or gasoline, with 

hose and nozzle 

8 - pumps, barrel, oil dispensing 

Q. Experience proved the organic fire figlitiw equipment 

to be inadequate, unless used imclediately at the start of 

a fire. Once the Pire wa8 w ell started, the limit$ ran e and 

core of effectiveness of the extinguisher rendered it reffitjively 

useless, while the danger to using personnel was correspondingly 

hlgh.5 

239. Functions. 

a. The col;rpany is desicned to handle all matters 

pertahing to the receipt, storage and issue of' $aeoline and 

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R-E-5-T-R-ILC-T-E-D

allied prodacts.2 

P-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

b. The corspany normally issued Lasoline on a oan- 

for-can exchange basis. It was res2onslble for the cleaning, 

refillin&a and ta@nL of the empty cans. It received gasoline 

in five-gallon cans or in bulk by pipeline or rail tank 

cars. ,men it received &asolineIn bulk, the company was res- 

FOnSlble for its reduction into five-gallon or 55-gaI.lon containers 

suitable for issue. Retail distribution of gasoline 

in 55-gallon drums was held to a mini" except in the Southern 

Line of Communications where It was extensively used. Distributlon 

by this method always elicited complaints I?" cammanders 

and $uflrtermasters of combat units because of tho difficulty 

in handlin; the full 55-gallon drum. The use of this 

method resulted in numerous cases of hei-nia and it should not 

be ornployed except as a last resort& The cmpany establish- 

ed distributing points in such a manner as to facilitate receipt, 

storage and issue, and take advantage of camouflage 

and di8,Jersion. Distributint goints were normally located 

within a convenient distance of the usin, units and of the 

souroo of sugply from the next higher echelon. 

0. Each operating platoon has the followink rated 

daily oapaoity, assuming that the trips from railheads or 

bulk redu tion points to issue pointo conwe an average of 

one hour: f 

Bulk reduction of 72,000 gallons of gasoline and 

oleaning of 3000 five-gallon buns and 300 55-gallon drums 

8. In the &noliean Theater of Operations, the aotual 

cnpaoits of gasoline supv oompanies was considerably leas 

than the re& capacity. lfi Lo additional labor attaolied, 

and a normal trip the of two houra, the company could nornal- 

ljr receive in bulk, reduce and issue e.Liproximately 50,000 &allons 

per day. :nth one Quertermester service campany attaohed 

for labor, and all reoeipts in five Lallon cans, the capao- 

ity was raised to a maximun of pOO,~v30 eallons. 

2110. Troop Basis and Control. 

ah The Commandin, General, Comunicatione Zone, 

allocated Gasoline Supyly Com;:anies to sections and base sections, 

Communicatione Zone, and to Army Groups depending upon 

their availability. The Army Group in turn allocated the companies 

to the Armies on the basis that normally one oompany is 

required to servioe armv troops and one coolpang to service a 

typ3 corps, or that a total of five to eieht companies is required 

for a field army.3 

b. The ooa1,any was normally attached to a Quartermaster 

Battalion for administration and technical oontrol. 

The battalion in turn, was attached to a Quartermaster Group 

that operated directly under tLe &arternraster of the Advance 

or Base Seotions, Conununioations Zona, or under the Arqr Quartermaeter. 

At times, functional control was eliminated from 

tha Quartermaster Group and waa direct frou the Section or 

m v Quartermaster to the company or ba%tai.ion.b 

- 158 -

-R-E-S-T-RI-C-T-E-D 

241. Bulk Delivery and Reduction. 

a. Delivery of bulk gasoline was normcllp msde by 

pipe linc or rail tank cars. Delivery by air was exyerhsnted 

with and. provc?d overwhelmingly successful, notably durint the 

leriod 30 Xcirch to 14 b1by 1945 durin, which time an aggrecate 

of 43,021 net tons were successfully delivered to thti First, 

Third, Seventh and Rinth US Armies. This method has a distinct 

disadvantage, pakticularly over loni loeiutic lines4 

The delivery to the Bruieg just mentionod consumed almost half 

as much gasoline as it delivered, expressed in terns of aviation 

e;nd motor Lasoline roso~ctively.13 In some instances 

tank trucks were usod to cai-ry the bulk Essoline beyond the 

facilities of the pipe Uno or rail cars, ond required the 

punpint: of the Lasolinc frm the tank cars to tho tank trucks. 

This dns done by use of the 100 gallon pcr minute dispenser, 

and later with a 350 gallon per minute llispsnsu mounted on a 

trailer .7 

b. Bulk reduction (decanting) was acoomplished at 

all types of installations, althGueh normally this operation 

was centered in the Communications zone.3 Tho four 100 gallon 

per minute dispensers were utilized for this operation. Addi-: 

tional dispensers were often mcessary to obtain additional 

capcity. Large uzvitg dispensin; s2stems in lieu of power 

dispensers were used only in an emerF_ency,sin06 experience 

provod them too lieht for hLsa duty. They overheated repidly 

and presented a fire hazard,83,10 The uesi@ of the 100 tallon 

per minute dis,>cnsar proved a constant souroa of difficulty. 

It is suspended fron ono ond only, and as the bearin@ became 

worn the rotor habitually got off center and soorod the housin&, 

necessituting excessive ra,airs. It was necessary to mass 

produce 10CQlly spare cafltings for the rotor and to rebore the 

housine to permit the opsration of the ovorsiscd casting. A 

100 Callon per minuto dispnser dosiLned with %he rotor mountod 

in a journal at each and would have buen more aatisfactory.13 

c. For efficient bulk rdduction and issue it was 

necessary to have largo numbers of five-&allon Gasoline cans 

available. Tha allovranco of 3,200 cor~pqvwas insufficient, 

and augneotation from theater stocks was thc rule.l3 In the 

Communications zone, operations at pipa linc terminals required 

frori eicht to ll+ five-gallorh oaas daily for each five-&allon 

om issuod to usily units. 

242. Packaged Recaipts. The dalivcry of kasoline in fiva- 

gallon cans oliminated thL nccasity fer docanting and shplified 

opurations. All rocaipts en beachheads were packaged. 

There, distnnces wore short and rw$irQirAbnta were normally 

smnll.5 Rcceipts were also ,ackn,ed when air lift WOS usad 

for dolivery in enerbencius. Issue was mde in such cases diroct 

from tho airfield or fron nearby distributing points.6 

243. Operations. 

a. Tha operation of tht. company oonformed in Lcnara1 

with preseribcd prooedura. Aupentation in pcl'sonnel and 

transpcrtation was normal, The roadside fillin&, stctions which 

wore establishcd in many areas to serve individual vohioles 

provod inadequate for larLe melo consumption. They were effective, 

howavbr, in eliminating individual vahiolee from tho 

traffio of distributix pointis and truckheads. 

b. Accurate bookkeepinc was casuntiol in order to

R-E- S-T-R-14-T-E-U 

mointfiin a balanced stock of pctrolem products End to kuep 

higher headquartcrs informed 05 tho consumption rata cnd of 

the status of supply at 811 simea.12 Thdu waru 110 standard 

accounting forms, howt,vur, and each army prescrib~dits ovm. 

The genaral inexperience of tho gw compaay yursonnul in ac- 

counting procedure, coupled with the vsriations in procedure 

among the armies, resulted at timus in coafusion ond general 

inaccuracy of reoords. 

c. Trans ortotion was short. Ths maxhum rated ccpccity 

of the two pfatoons is 144,000 @llons. Tho 21 trucks, 

two and one-half ton, ossiignod arc capablo of trnns;lorting 

npproximatdy 16,000 gcllons, thc Pull 3 ,200 containtr allowance, 

esch trip. Due to thu distmoas betwcon bulk wduction 

points and truckhsnds or distributing points, End the thd Tuquired 

to Lond nnd unload vehiclos ench trip Dormfilly consumed 

two hours. In thu normal 10 hour &orking day, thoufore, an 

tiVW&gQ of only E0,000 gallons could bo transported in orkcnic 

vahiclQs without overloading. 


a. That thu rated capccity of tho Gasolind. Supply 

Company was not attained due to S~OP~UE~ of personnel and 

transportation. 

b. That tho fire-fighting equipraaont Wac innclequate. 

c. That tho 3O-g&llon-p6r-s~nutt &isdenser wns not 

used due to its inedequzcy, snd tho nwiber of 100-~~illon-perminute 

dispensers ofton provbd insuffioient. The design of 

the 100-gallon-por-ninutu dispenser also proved inadequate. 


a. That tho mount of prsonnel and transportation 

and the number of gosolinu d.rm8 be incruased ii1 sufficient 

quantities to enGblo thc company to mebt its norm1 rcqdirementa. 

b. That EL firo-fighting sootion, with suitable 

eo_u.ipment, be included in each platoon. 

c. That pertinent doctrines, tacliniques nnd Tables 

of Or&.anization and dquipinmt be amended by nplpopririte agencies 

of the Wnr I)opartmGnt. 

- 160 - 


R-E-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D 

Bibliotraphy 

Chaptcr 19 

1. Qatod 21 

2. ai 10-465, ;Luc.rt~..rrarister Bnndbook IIGosoline Supply 

Company", datud 5;r.y 1943. 

3. Study on Ogorntions of 4.: Grsolins Supply Compcnlcs, 

brtliovd to hcve ori;inc:tod nt Hq ZTOUSA, undcLtud. *(l3) 

b. Study on Oporntlous cf ;luc.rtcrmastu Gosolinu Sug?ly 

Caipnny, Hq 12th hFd7 Group, undated. *(34). 

5. First US Army Roport of Oyiratlons, Annex No. 14, 20 

0ctobL.r 1943 to 1AuLust 1944. *(44). 

6. Aftir Action SeEort, Third US Army, Quu.?rtewosttrr, 

1 Aueust 1944 t o 9 Aky 1945. (Airil C;icrntions). 

7. AGF Raport Bo. 830, dflted 9 April 1945. *(23 ) . 

a. h:amo for record - Visit to Firat cnd Ninth Armies, 

Re6dquorters Twelfth Army Group, Quuertermmter Section, 

dcted 17 1:ovsmbcr 1944. *(35). 

9. L;w~D C4 to Quartermastsr, FUSAG, dated 13 b;ny 1944. 

*(41!. 

10. Informal Report on Ilecenting Oporetlons from Thoator 

Chief &uartormstm to tho Gonoral Board, undatod. *(55). 

11. AGF Raprt 110. 981, dated 22 1;ny 191~5. *(29). 

12. Oca1 Cir Lottor No. 10, HwaaoUortGr3 Seventh Amy, 

dated 13 April 1945. 

Cmients, LetterI Thootcr Chiof Quartornosttr, 13 DUO 

45, to tho Goncroi Board. *(56). 

* - Number in prcnthcsus 1s Catalog Numbvr used in 

Invontory of Uaterial, 0;Study No. lo9 (Class 

111 supply), File R 401j11. 

- 161 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E- S-T-R- I-C-T-E-D 

CHAPTER 20 

CLASS In (SOLIDFUELS) OFEXATIOI.JS 

SICTION 1 

GXNEFAL 

246. Source and Availability_. 

8. The supply ~'fSolid fuels throughout opera- 

tions in the mropean Theater was rarely adequate, The 

suDplg of Coal immediately following the invasion of Normandy 

was critLcal. Indigenous production in France, 

Relgium and YOllsnd was approximately 50 percent of normal, 

and there was an even greater reauction in the amount of 

imported coal which, under norms1 c nditiom, hsd provided 

one-third of civilian requirements.8 Coal was requisitioned 

and supplied from the Uzited Kingdom. Limitations 

on ship transport provented large scele im@orts from either 

the TJnited Kingdom or the United Stntes. Accordingly, reqUb%iY3Ita 

were met largely from local sources, A system 

of priorities was established to insure that both military 

and essential civilian requirements were fllled.7 

b. The ahcrt supply of coal in the fall of 1944 

forced the exploltation of wood resources of fiance. Readycut 

wood 888 Durchased an8 cuttirlg r!ghts were secured in 

forests in various Tarts of France. Results, however, were 

not satisfactory. Transportation was short, and it waa 

often found that the cut wood rllocated by the French waa 

not available or that it could not be moved out when an 

attempt was made to pick it up. Of the 104,722 cords of 

cut wood allocated by the French government between 1 November 

19 4 and 30 April 1945, only 18,888 cords were de- 

livered. 8 

c. Production of coal in Germany was negiigible 

by 9 V:ay 1945. The overall military and civilian auropean 

demand exceeded the supply. Stops were taken immediately 

to reorganize the luines and resume production, but it was 

neoesswy also to or anize production of fuel wood to supplement 

coal supply. i! 

247. Comparison of F~'ilels.6 For troop USE, the fuel 

value of one cord of wood is considered the equlvalent of 

one ton of bituminous coal. With wood cutting tools and 

equipment normally available, production of one cord of 

firewood normally requires three man days. The production 

of on8 ton of coal normally requires one man day. In order 

to obtain maximum fuel value of wood 8 seasoning period 

of from six to eight months should be allcwed subsequent 

to the felllng of the tree. Coal has full heating valus 

as soon a8 mined. To transport a quantity Of Wood aqua1 

ln fuel value to a quantity of coal requires more than 

twice the traneportabion facilities. Thus, coal, in addition 

to b6hg less bulky, more effioiect and easi6r to 

handle than wood, is also preferable to wood from both 

produotion and transportation atandpoints. 

248. Alloflances. In order to oonserve coal and insure 

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R-2-S-IF-R-I-C -T-E -D 

its iasue for the essential requirements a system f - wjarities 

and allowances was established as fo1lows:g 

a. Hospitals - 12 pound6 per bed per day during 

winter, f iVG pounds per bed per day during ather. seBisons. 

b. Coffee Rcasters - 400 pounds per day per roaster. 

e. space heatin?, cooking and hot water - four 

pounds per man per day du&g mace' heatinpmn only. 

During other seasons, one and one-halP pounds Der nhn per 

day for cooking and hot water. 

d. Engineer blacksmith forges - six -Jounds per 

forse per day. 

e. Others - static bakeries, bath units, laundries, 

?ed cross, et- authorized by the Chlef Quartermaster. 

Fuel wood was substituted for coal as necessary. Local pro- 

ourement of solid fuels, except wood, was prohibited except 

where specifically authorized. 

249. Procedure. The su>ply of solid fuels was a Tu r 

termaster function ana followed normal supply c1mnnels.I: ,g 

The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Sup- 

ply Division, was the overall controlling agency. It 

soreened both military and civilJan requirements, and allo- 

cated the fuele to the sepalate agencies based on priorities 

and availability or the fuels.ls2 The Qu&r',erm&ster 

Corps, based upon the allocation recelved, procured, stored 

and Issued the fuels to the uainq forces based on the pri- 

oiity and allowances established. 

250. Requirements 

SEOTION 2 

O"TOP?S 

a. Coal for the iriitlal invasion of the continent 

w4s ship_ned from the Trdted Kingdom. Shipments were made 

based upon estimates of requirements submitted by supreme 

FTeadquarters, Alliea Ex editionary Forces, and approved by 

the Eritish '!far Office.4 The init:.al estimate for the 

United states military foroes WES mads by the First US Army 

and submitted to the 21st Army Group for consolidation and 

approval. by Supreme Headquarters. As the sjtuation grogeseed 

the Chief Quartermaster reoeived the estimates from 

the armies, air fcroeg, Kavy on shore, and section Quartermasters; 

edited and oonsolldated the Pequirements; and submltted 

the estimated total requirements for all United States 

Forces to supreme Heaciquar$ers, Similar eatinates of requirements 

by other Allied Forces were submitted for screenine 

and approval to Supreme Eeadquarters.9 

b. each estimate containod a statement of anticipated 

fuel consmption during t'Ie calendar nonth, a consolidated 

requisition for the following month, and an 

estimate of fuel needs for the next sucoeeding month.9 

- 163 - 

a-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-2-D

251. Responsibility. 

R-E-ST-R-I-C-T-E-D 

a. supreme Eeadquarterg maintained control throush- 

out the operation. As the operations on the continent pro- 

gressed and more countries were liberated or occupied, 

Suprema Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, reorgan- 

ized and decentralized control. It established, in each 

country, a Solid Fuels Sub-Seotion composed of the military 

and civilian representatives of governmen transportation, 

and the coal mines or production A9 the sub- 

sections were organized, the Allied Forces submitted tieir 

estlmates of rue1 requirements within ench coun r scparately 

to the sub-section of the country concerned.trg The subsection 

operated directly under the Solid Fuels Section of 

Supreme Headquarters, and was responsibls for:3 

Alvising on all matters pertaining to indigenous 

production ai solid fuels, and 

for carrying out instructions of Supreme 

Headquarters relative to Solid Fuels production. 

Rcrsening essential civilian requirements. 

Presentation of military solid fuels requireffients. 

lreparation of proposed a.llocations for 

approval. 

Arrangement and coordination with appro- 

priate civilian and military authorities 

for the dlstribution of solid fuels within 

the country to the normal divtribution 

cor-tera, by railway, water or road. 

Coordination of the movement and bistri- 

bution of exported or imported solld fuels. 

b. As ,he operating solid fuels aqency for the 

United States military forces, the Chlsf '),uartermaster was 

responsible for:4,8 

Submitting estimates afl required and xe- 

CeiVhg the allOOtitiGn8. 

Coordinating with the Chief of Transportation, 

Zuropean Thcater of Oporatlons, 

for the shipment and delivery of coal from 

continental point of origin r port to 

destination for consumption. t? 

Maintaining daily contact with the Britiah 

Var Office for the implementing of the 

agree& coal shipmGnt Drogran. 

Accounting for all coal received from all 

sources by all United Dtates forces, except 

some coal procbed by the Goneral 

%chasing Agsnt by diroct neg0tiati0n.l~ 

c. The Quartermasters of the field armies were 

re8pOnsible for submitting sstiaates of fuel required, and 

- 164 - 

R-E-S-T-R-1-C-T-E-D

R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E-D 

for the procurenent, storage and issue of solid fuels to 

subordinate unlts for both military and essential civilian 

use. 

252. Operations. 

a. The Advance Seotion, Communications Zone, began 

solid fuels operations on the oontinent when sacked coal 

began to arrive early in July l9lJ+, and the first Advance 

Secti n OOSl dump was eetablished In Cherbourg on 14 July 

1944.q Deliveries of coal thrOUghOUt the operation failed 

to meet the allocations establishcd by Supreme Headquarters, 

dua princi ally to the shortage of production and trans- 

portation.f2,13 

b. Loce ocuremnt was at times instituted by 

the field forces.iipCoal was procurd by requisition from 

local Belgian and French mines efter approval of headquarters, 

Advanoe Section, or Canmunioations Lone. At times, 

when the situation was critical, representhtives from th 

armfcs were stationed at the dries to expedite shi ment fo 

coal was also prooured from captured snamg stocks.flt12. 

0. Considering the entire period of operations on 

the continent, a supply of coal was obtained barely adequate 

to meet military requirements on drastically reduced standards. 

The supply was always critical from D-Day until 

April 1945, at H$ioh time small stoo!? piles were eOQUmUlated. 

rlequirmasnts for essentfal civill3n use wero at the 

minimum standard to sustain communities. 

253. T)istribution. 

a. Distribution to the using units was made on 

the basis of the allowances eateblished by Supreme Head- 

quarters, In the Third US Army, hOWtiVBr, It was necessery 

to reduce the allowances in ,Tanuary 1945, from four pounds 

per man to two pounds, and to request a decrease of1ppercent 

in consumption by a?!r&y ana corps headquarters. 

During the winter months of 1944-45 lasue of solid fuels 

was made by the armies a8 received.20 It was impossible 

to accumulate reserve stockpilee in the army areas until 

later In 1945 when the weather bocame less severe.12 

b. Dump distribution was normally maae either 

at army coal dumps, whioh stocked only aolid fuels, or at 

army Class IT1 sJppDly pints, which stocked solid futls in 

addition to normal supplies. In either case, the dumps 

were operated by Quartermaster service oompany personnel. 

Using units drew dirsot from the dumps. At other times, 

when the Army zone of Operations inoluded the coal mining 

district of Germany, ardes sometimes issued direct from 

the mines to the using units. martermester serviae coapany 

personnel pwformed the administrative work at tho 

minee and German ctvilians performed the labor. 

254. Conclusions, 

SECTION 3 

COIJCLUSIONS AND RECOImNDATIOW 

a. That for operational use oonl is greatly 

- 165 - 

R-E-9-T-R-1-C-T-E-D

R-E-3-T-R-I -C-T-E-D 

preferable to WOO& us fuel becnuse it minimiaos the transportation 

problem and requires fewer mn-dLys of production. 

b. That the suaply of fuel for military require- 

ments t,v4r$~pbfained at the minimum standard. Supply for 

essent€nl civilian requiremnts was at the extreme minimum 

standard to suppcrt communities. 

o. Thet transportation and coal production were 

short of the established requirements. 

d. That organization and nathods and procedures 

used in the supply of solid fuels were generally suitable, 

but that the military forces were dependent at all times 

on ooncessions froIc governments of liberated countries for 

an adequate supply of coal. 

255. Recomendations. 

a. That copl be used in preference to wood whenever 

possible. 

b. That 511 possible steps be taken in future 

operations to plan and provide for produotion and shipment 

of fuele to meet both military and civilian requirements. 

- 166 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S-T -R-I-Cl -T-E -D 

Pibliography 

Chapter 20 

i. .qclriinistrative !!em WC. L4, $HAET, dzted 2P Jan L5 

(?SO ITT,h r 5). *(4) 

2. innsx A, Adnioistrntive Kemo Wo. i+L+, SYAEF, dated 

13 April 45. “(4) 

3. :,&inlstretive !.0no No. 64, =Am, doted 28 Jsn 45 

(sec TIT, Par 6). *(41 

4. Addnietrotive Marc@ No. 44, WB,doted 28 Jan 45 

(Sec 111, Qar 7). *(4! 

5. 3” Tech Cir Ltr No. 16, Hq Com 2, dated 4 April 45. 

*(1.2) 

6. Infornfil Report to The Generel Boord, Quartorcaster 

Slcss I11 C erations, Theater Chiai Quertermster, 

undcted. *PI&) 

7. Operational History, Advance Section, Cm“n1cotions 

7flne 1943-1945 (Extrect fron Chapter VTI, Section 11) 

*P2J 

8. Administrative Memo No. 44, SHtXF, deted 28 Jen 45 

(SFC IT, Par 9) *(4) 

9. SOP No. dated 4 July 44 (Coal PrC - 

oedure) 

10. First TTS Army Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 

22 Pebruer 19115 (Annex No. 10, Guartermaster Section 

?emrt). g(4j) 

11. After Action Eeport, Third US Army, Quartermuster 

@ectioc, 1 AWuBt 1’344 - 9 Mar 1945. 

12. 4fter Action %port, Ninth UF, Amy, dated lh Dec 44. 

13. Conferenoe with Captain VI. 14, Eunney, BAEF G-4. 

Solid TueIs Sub-Section, 15 June 1945. 

11,. Confsrence ;uIth Captain J. 8. Tolbert, Fifteenth US 

Army, Solid ‘We16 Division, 17 Nov 1945. 

15. Comments Letter, Theater Chiof Quartermaster, 13 Dec 45, 

to The General Board. *( 56) 

* Nunber in parentheses is Dotalop Nmber used 14 

Inventory of bbteriels, Stud? No. 109, (Class 

I11 supply), fila R 401/11. 

- 167 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

CL.qs.5 I 

75 

60 

75 

Ltr.dated 29 Hov 1942-37.D.,Sabj. 

Levels of supply, Em. 

Cable It-97113 dated 20 June 1943. 

?able a-6493 dated 3 irec 1543. 

bb Ltr. dated 20 Jan 1944-;il.D., 

75 

subj. Levels of supply. 

Ltr. dated 26 aril lYM-ii.D., 

subj . Levels of supply. 

bo Ltr. dated 26 j.$ril 1944-W.D. 

Subj- Levels of Supply. 

60 Ltr. dated 23 ~ov1$4W,r.n., 

50 

SSj. Levels 02 su;iply. 

Ckljle 3iAIX-4b9ll dated 3 Larch 

1945. 

L tile levels shmn were dutliorxeo. for y'l'criJ5~, the Chief Quartermaster voluntarily elected to 

utfii;e t k levels ~ shown beloui. Levels shmn reamed ii effect until I&reh l%5, at w15ch time 

levois conl'ormed to those sho:dli above. 

I 

I1 

III 

E 

P.x.

400.312 (C-4 SUD) 

SUBJXT: Rewlsitioninr and ::oveiient of SuDplies, 

28 Octobcr 19/d+ 

TO : comand l.ng General, Smmunicetions Tone, .'PO GG7, 

1. ''rith the concurrence of your hea0.n-uarters, represea- 

tatives of e-4 and the Spocial.9taff Sections of this heod- 

quartcrs have followed throuph, fron the tine originated 

until supplies vme delivered, rec;.u?.sitions which wcrc ?laced 

by the First fray on 2G and 30 Septenher 191:.&. ,Illmpresentatives 

i"w repyired to reyort on their observations while 

on t?ie mission, tozet!icr vith any reco;moiidetionu t&y consitered 

a-,yropriate. 

2. rertinent cozicnts in the report- of these zepresen- 

tatives have been extracted and ooiidensed pi13 are agpended 

hereto as inclosures 1 t o 12 inclusive. In acdition iiovei'nunt 

tables of truck and. rail Crans:>ortation aro likewise aplienfied 

as inclosures lj t o 17, inclusive. 

3. Prom th o'mervations of our representatives the 

followinp conclu.sions are drawn: 

a. The stock records of the Services in Treadquarters, 

Coimimications Zone are and vrill yeain inaccurete un- . 

ti1 proper cor.mwice.tione me established. The eutkority for 

dli-eotinc shipments is centralized., and procedures aholitGd 

by the services for thelr depots R ~ Bunifom. 

b. me Service re?resentatives In the Po~-md.y Base. 

section ?Teadque.rters nake many ChnnpS Ln the Slii??i)iw ortors, 

releases, or r.equisitions sent dovm frcn Puis. 

c. P.s Indicated in the observation Jf the 1:edical 

and Pinnal representatives, the desi,qatioii of only one of 

many de?ots for fillin,? roquisiti ons eliilinateo tyie :,ossibilitg 

of obtaining all itert:is recuested on the requisitions 

even If all are available in thc sevcral depots. 

d. The faot that many aystam of docmentation exist 

in the depots nelresmit a?Foar that no unifora procerlui'e has 

been established. .?roper tally outs, end mybills for rail 

and truck wou.ld ellainate nany errprs in shi:>mnts and vrould 

assist in expeditinc delivarles. .lany shi,pionts reach tho 

Amdes with no or little evidence as to I:.hst the itca3 me 

supposed to be and the identifj.cfltioon :dth my particular 

ahippinc ordm or Fequisition is iGlgrObnbl6, if not impossible, 

Any snstmi, uniformly establf shed, ~711icbvould carry 

tho identity of the rcquisitlcii number of the Arw, the item 

shipped, end the .,roper destination would lilaterial1:r I~IXCOVB 

the flow Of Sl?~pliQS. 

e. The train symbols of asslnnsd. trains iluot be 

aaintalned from point of oriqin to ultimate destinatiOn. 

Further, standard trains should be formed in such rmnnor thct 

they may be keyt intact fron origin to destination. This 

would assist In an even flow of supply and. enable the accur 

ate passin? of infomntion to be sent to the reglllatinCr, 

station. 

AP?m!DC: 2 of 3 pagas - 1 -

f. Lack of control of truck s!?lyaents an< delqvs, 

in soxe iistmces renulted in fellures to receive s n ~ q 

ahi:i.ients. 110 thorouc?l check could be xade at i>e Z?s along 

t:ia rhiite Of lnolm COilL*OgS m

R-+~;-T-BI-+T-,+L) 

within 24. hours of the shipped, all supplies shipped , requisitions 

of the .!Jmy th& cfillod tor these supplies, nethod of 

shiment, and if TracticaSlc, ex:?ectc& orrlval time, 

e. h syten of comunication be estahlished which 

will enable shiments to be ?roperly controlled , inforiytlon 

fonvarvled grom>tly, an& oontrol of trains ct railheads Imgroved, 

f. Eupplies beinc transferred fron truok to rail 

be kept to3cther by claoses and Services. 

e. r;u$ply ohlpents he given precedence, exce:2t for 

hospitfll treins. 

h. Information on supply ?olicies and. yrooeGures be 

adequately Rnd promptly' communimted to all 6uborCinel;es that 

handle su7ply s:iipients. 

i, ".hen itom o.re not aveilable, Informstion be 

furnished proqtly to the Amies whioh will enable them to 

plan on the future availability or the iten. 

finish, 

j. Trains oarry the sea3 doslpqation frm start to 

17 Inclosures (not included) 

For the A%y Grou!, Cormander: 

/s/ Raymond Otone Jr. 

RAYNOIJD.STON2 Jli. 

Colonel, AMI 

Asat Adj Cen

HOW SENT TE1 S” ”_-- 

1. Xailhead (as of 2400) ^__-I-c 

2, Reporting Unit _-I-- 

3. Total StrenLth for Rations , ________ 

4. List of Org~~ic units w/strength (inoluda in Item 31- 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13 - 

14. 

15 

16. 

17 

18. 

19 m 

- ~ ~- 

Llst of Attz.ciled Units w/stren&h (inclucle in Iten 3)- 

-lDesi&nation of Eender Time Signed 

AUTIIORI!UD TO BE 

SENT W CLEAR 

signature of Officer Signcture & Grade of 

?ri ter 

Incl No. 1, 602 

Third uny, 1943.

SUBJJ~CT: ;uar termast er Re Guireuents , 

VOC/JLD/bq 

7 October 191,4 

TO : Co~mmendingGeneral, Continental dvance Section, 

U. S. Lrmy, AFTdlITIOI?: Quartermaster. 

1. Reference letter, this headr;ucirters, dated 30 Eeptember 

194.4. file AG 400.213 Q.I,subjeat W,uarterxaster 

Requ'iretieiitsTt, effecsive upon the receipt of this letter 

the require~ents contained in the reference letter m e superseded 

by those listed below and shi-nents baled on the 

net7 recjuirer.ents are to begin on 15 October. 

a. EPIliAL - For VI Corps & .iriny 'L'roops 

J. 

(1) Class I 

Rations, Type nBtl 110,300. ea 

Rations, Type ttlO-ln-lf' 59,000 en 

Rations, Type 'ICq1 5,700 ea 

Amy Pack E77 mses 

Coffee 2,592 lbs 

bXlk 6,474 cans 

Sugar 6,474 lbs 

Soap 17,550 1bs 

Toilet Paper 3,510 rolls 

itabrine 25,000 ea 

Eialazorre 25,000 ea 

f:osp, Sip,)lenent 700 cases 

Vitamin Tcblets 70,000 ea 

Sub Total Tonnage 375.7 L.T. 

Brand baking ingredients 

Flour 60,700 ibs 

Yeast 910 lb8 

S R l t 1,210 lbs 

Sug&r 1,825 lbs 

Lard substitute 1,625 ibs 

t!ilk, d.rq, pwd, skim 1,210 lhS. 

Sub botal tonnage 30 L.T. 

Total Class I Tonnaie 405.7 L.T. 

loo,$ IIBlI ration included Tor A ir Corps 

strenkth of 15,000, plus.30;b build up. 

(2) Glass 11 - Torweeme requirenents for Class 

I1 @ SV from 15 Ootober l9ft.L to 21 October 

1944 will be 325 toils ~ e day. r This 

notes an increase ns to p-evious zecuii-ementa, 

but it is iuperative to have above 

tonnage so that initial issue of winter 

clothing (Coxlbat) eild tenttihe { heevy) can 

be move& into this nrea. 

LUNTfILLE - For XV Gorp8 

(1) Class I 

Rations, 

R8tiOUS, 

TyL3e 'I3" 

!i3778 'llo-kl-l'l 

50,000 

45,000 ea 

ea

:'-&S-P-K-I-i-T-& u 

Rations, TJT,e ~IC?! 9,000 ea 

Aooy Pack 520 ctises 

Coffee 2,160 lbs 

hiilk 5,400 cans 

Sujar 5,400 lbs 

Soap 10,400 lbs 

Toilet Paper 2,060 rolls 

atabrine Tablets 17,000 es 

IIalazone tablets 17,050 ea 

IIosp Supplcunent 400 c6ses 

Vit min tablet s 60,000 ea 

Sub total toiiiihge 251.1 L.T. 

Bread bekin& inbredients 

Flour 36,000 lbs 

Yeast 540 lbs 

Selt 700 lbs 

Sugar 1,080 1bs 

Lc re, substitute 1,OGO lbs 

Milk, dry, pvd, skin 7U0 ibs 

Sub total toiffiage 18 L.T. 

Totnl Class 1 toimage 269.1 L.T. 

2. Request that supplies for each delivery pcint be 

loeded as a separate shiifiieilt Qad that ench railroad car be 

cLearly mrked rrith its destinttion. 

9. The obove date &iven for shi2nents to begin is 

based on rail COrmimicetioiiS being olened. In event they 

are not you will be notified by cable. 

DISTRIBUIPIOK: 

- 

3 0" 

1 - iiG 

1 - G-4 

1 - Col Lmssey 

1 - Oieretions 

2 - Bile 

For the Commondint General:


HZAD~U,QTERS SEVENTH AEE 

A-)O 758 U.S. ARrf WC/JLD/bq 

AG 400.217 Q! 7 Ootober 1944 

3JBJECT: N.artermaster Cluss 111 Requlrements. 

TC : Cowanding General Continental Advance Section, 

rJ.7. Amy. Attention: Petroleum Officer. 

1. Reference letter, this headquarters, dated 30 September 

1944, f ile AG 400.213 1,Subject: "Quartermaster 

Class I11 Requirements", effective upon the receipt of this 

letter the requirements contalned in the reference letter 

are superseded by those listed below and shipnents based 

on the new requirements ere to begin 15 October, 

a, PFTU 

Gasoline, Y-PO 180,000 gals. 

Diesel Fuel Cil 7,20G gals. 

I'erosens 1,450 gals. 

Engine Oil, SAT 10 700 gals. 

Engine Oil, SIC? 30 3,800 Gals. 

Pnqine Oil, SAX 50 600 gals. 

Universal Gear Lub SAE 90 800 gals, 

Grease, Ga ql 700 lbe. 

cream, GP $2 400 lbs. 

Grease, 3 ''3 200 lbs. 

Grease, '13 $4 /+8 lbs. 

Total Tonnage 650.6 L.T. 

b. LLJNXVILLE 

Gasoline, V-80 120,000 gals. 

Diem*, Fuel Oil b,800 gala. 

Kerosene 950 jals. 

gn5ine Oil, 3LE 10 500 gals. 

Engine Oil, SM 30 2,500 gals. 

xngine Oil, 50 400 qal 8. 

Universal Gear Lub S&E 90 600 gals. 

Grease, G" 41 500 Ibs. 

crease, GP $2 300 lbs. 

crease, VP 'fg 150 lbs, 

Grease, 1% 'il, 36 lbs, 

Total Tonnage 43k.3 I.?. 

NOTX: %e ebove tonneges inolude shipment of 370 tons x' 

~~-80 in rail tank car9 dally es predioated ln CES 

oable. 

2. Dequest that all Easoline bB shipped by tank car 

or it 5 qal IT,,$. containers. xo 55 gal ~.~UJUS of V-80 gas- 

oline or any ,rerry cans me desired ih the Army Area. 

5.hipment of Diesel me1 Oil in 55 gal drums is satisfaotory. 

3. Supplies for each delivery nolnt to be loaded 

a8 a oeparate shipment and eaoh oar to be marked Clearly 

with its destinetion. 

4. he above data given for shipents to be&n is 

AI?P&tQIx 5 of 2 pages - 1 -

DIST31IBUT"ION: 

3 - co" 

1 - AG 

1 - G-& 

1 - Go1 Lasse?; 

1 - Operotioiis 

2 - iFile

Office of the Chief Quartermaster 

AT0 6F7 

WTPJSCT: Yission of the Charlero: Depot Area, 

Ti! : The Quartermaster, Channel Base Sect'tcn, AFO 228, 

11. S, Arm (Thru Cowanding General) 

1. Enclosed is the mission for the Chmleroi Depot 

Area, Q-lF3. You will note thnt the PX mission is being 

shifted h"diately from Lille-Mons Depot, 6-185, t o Charleroi. 

2. Charleroi will be the grincipal Base Depot on the 

Continent for Class I supaliea, and in addition to backing 

up present depots, It must be prerared to assist in naking 

shi?ments to build up Advance Depots wtich rill be established 

in the future to support the First, ITinth, Third and 

gaventh Armies. The maximum storage mission of 240,000 long 

tons of Class 1 m y never be reached. Porrever, stora:e capacity 

to this extent auPt be held in readiness as Theater ?eserve 

%ace to meet suoh fluctuating requuirenents as nay 

arise. 

3. The attached iaission io substantially tte same as 

draft coqiea which have been discussed in detail with your 

office qnd repreeentatives of the De?ot, botk at Chsrlerci 

and in Paris. It is requested ttat you have tte Depot hi?"diately 

prepare a cietailed ?1an to lmpleaent this ICission, 

to inolude planned utilization and allooation of storage 

space and planned method of handlinq :n acd out tonnages. 

It Is further requested that the Depot and your office send 

their key olanninf: officers to Paris at the earliest possible 

date with this detailed !>lan rf operation to iron out any 

difficulties. 

/s/ aohn B. Franks 

Briq. Gen. USA 

for /t/ ROPEllT 2:. LITTIEJCEN 

Yajor General, IJ.3.A. 

Chief Quarterma st er. 

1 Tncl: Kission of the ChQrlerOi Depot Area. 

.six 6) conies to @artermster, Channel 3aae Section, APO 228 

six 16) conies to Gomiandin,? Officer, 52nd 31 Base Denot, 

AVO 228

MI36ION OF CEULQZlTEOI DEPOT AREA. 

-TQW)---- 

I. Charleroi Depot area has two basic missions: 

a. As a Ease end Internediate Dewt it will: 

(1) Receive and store re~ervas of Class I supplies 

and make shipments to kmies and 

other Depots 8s requlred, Charlerol will 

be the pincipal source of Class I for 

initial stockage of Advence Depots to be 

established in the near future. 

(2) Receive and store a nortion ox the thea- 

ter Class I11 Fackaqed DOL reserve and 

make shipments forwar9 to Depots and 

Arffiies as required. 

(3) 8eceive and store reserves of sumes 

for First and Ninth Armies and ADRZC 

(north) and mke shipments as requirea. 

b. As a Distribution bnot it will: 

(1) Receive, store end distribute all classes 

of sugply to trooqs in the Depot Xrea as 

directed by the Sase Section Comnander; 

and receive, store and distribute aviation 

gas to Air Corps Units 8s designhCBd by 

USSTAF. 

2. a. The ebove basic nissions are smarided a8 

fellows: 

Class I - 45 days for 600,000 

(Tluo ~I/C‘,OCCIL/T additional 

Class I) 

Class I1 - Retall only as djrected by 

Ease Section Commander. 

Clsss ITT - 9etail of MT e0 and Allied Produets 

as directed by Dase 

Bection Com”der. 

~ u l kstorage and issue of 

Aviation qas to Air Corps 

Units as deslTnoted by USSKF” 

rortion of theater reserves of 

paakaqed POL (About 42,COO 

L/T). 

Class IY - ?eta11 only a9 directed by 

Rase Seotlon Commnnder. 

7% - L5 days for 650,000 (leas gratuitous 

iss~e items) 

~5 davs for 400,000 (all item) 

Plue’ lg,OOO L/T additional FX 

civil Affairs- Aoproxlmately 25,000 L/T 

(Class 1) 

b. men Advance Depot(s) are established to support 

thc airst and :Tinth pm~les,the Class I ni8SiOn of 

Charleroi will be reduced to l+5 days for 200,000 sen, for 

troops in the Depot area. I!owever, all faoilities will be 

retailed aa theater reserve mace for use as repuired.

&&&T-.]-I-C-T-&D 

3. ??sthate of total tonnages to be stored and handled 

to nccomnlish the above mission is as follcws: 

Lonq Tons to be 

Lon.: Ton6 to handled dally 

be Stored (In and Out) (a) 

Cless I 2/0,000 6,000 

Class I1 AS directed by Base Section 

Commander 

ClSSS IIT M)L 

Retail As directed by Bbse ?ection 

Commander 

Theater Reserves of 

Packaged POL 

Aviation Cas 

TY 

Civil Affairs sunplies 

42,000 

3,000 

20,000 

25,000 

AB direoted by CCQK 

1,000 

PO0 

1,500 

(a) Tonneges to be hnndled reoresent 

the I’dxinwr. tonnape %hat the 

de-ot must be nrenared to k,anh?la. 

Actual tonnage w i l l fluotuate 

below these fjgures. 

1. To assist in oaloulating items, weights and storage 

snaoe, the foll0win.l; publloRtion8 of this offioe have been 

distributed to all deyots: 

Eaoio ?-ode1 Ytooks, dated 20 January 1945. 

Inltial Issue and Replaoemnt Taotoro, daced 

20 Tecer‘ber 1944. 

“a0kin.l: and RtriToin.: Data, datetl 1 ;Tovepiber 19L4. 

(::uaolerient to Q’ .Service Relerencc- Data, 7701 I1 

Revised) 

5. Vis nisoion is sat forth in detail in attached 

Annex A. 

1 Tncl. - Annex A

Class of Supply 

--__-__-_I 

CLASS I 

iron-Perisnables - 

45 days for 600,000 

broken dom as 

follows: 

Backq for Liebe 

DePot (includes 

R>.C icits/gratuitous 

issue rx) 

Retail for 

Depot Area 

Additional Class I 

Wssion 

15 days for 

1,000, om 

45 days for 

2N,000 

Theater Reserve 

space 

to be used 

as iiiected 

by OCQM 

14 days for 

100,000 

10 days far 

Zoo, 000 

AS airected 

by Base SectionCommander. 

__ 

Area Served 

I_ 

First & 1Gint.h 

Armies and 

;miC (Worth) 

As Lirected by 

Base Section 

Coimxder 

Internecikte & 

advance Liejots 

Depot Area 

Depot Area 

Depot Area 

Lo% Tons 

to be 

Stored 

45,000 

25,000 

170,000 

700 

1,000 

kll Class I 

Non-Perishable%-.- 

-~ 

6,000 

75 

250 

Represents baiance of level not stored 

by Lie~e(e179)for First 0 Ninth Arnies 

and kDSEC(1Iorth). Ilorma3J.y shipments 

ill be made to Liege Depot and not direct 

to Armies. It is planned that 

later this mission will be transferred 

to Advance Depot(s) to be established 

for support of First & IIinth Armies. 

Distritution nission. 

Clizrler o i will receive, sort,classify, 

and make balanced and balancinL ship- 

r,ients of Clsss I to Advince & Intermediate 

Depots zs required. It w ill be 

the principal source of initid stook- 

age of Adnnce Uepots to be established 

in the near future. 

Distribution nission. 

Distribution nlissioii. Represents local 

procurement to mxi~mmextent. 

Distribution i.ussion only as directed 

by Base Section Commcier . 

An". "x"-Fa&e 1

Class of Su>& 

CLASS rII 

Mission drea bervai 

Lor& Tons 

-Go be 

stored 

POL: 

hT-@ Gas Lqd 

f.llieti procucts 

As directed bg 

Base Section 

CommsnCer. 

Depot Area 5,000 1,000 Eistrib-ution mission. Tonn2;e to be 

handled represents incominb bulk POL 

receivec di decsmteci. 

1 

t-. 

0' 

I 

Y 

3 

H 

I 

c2I 

? 

M 

I 

VI 

I 

The,t er ileserve s 

Pachked POL 

viat ti on cas 

Soliu Fuels: 

cod 

As directed by 

ccU!J 

Bulk supply to A b Corps 

Air corps units un;ts 65 

in Depot Area desi6mted 

by USSTAF 

AS directec. ty Depot Area 

Base Section 

Conmcier 

42,W0 

3,@J:, 

4,000 

1,000 

Torumbe to be storea: 

30,000 L/T packz;;eu LT Kl 

~2,000 LJT pec!chec: Allied protiucts 

Aviation Gas Storage point nust be 

preparec to receive a C issue up to 

full capacity of present facilitiest. 

y 

G 

5 

H 

n 

e3 

M 

W 

-- 

viooci (See Remrks) 

CLASS IV 

A5 directed by 

Base Section 

cormdnder 

45 hys for First an8 

850, a13 iiinth grnie 

Supmidon oi wood-cuttin& activities t5 

an& procurecient of X D O ~2s ana when 

directed by the c&rmrmzster, Chdnnel 

Base Section.

P o\ CIVIL AFPAF-S 

I (ClSSS I) 

C I 

Uission 

I+5 days for 

400,~o 

Thehter Xeserve 

Space 

for use as 

directed by 

CCW. 

ZLLk shipments/issues 

DI;TAILr;D IdISSION OF CHdUROI DEPOT 2&a (Q-183) 

Long Tons 

to be 

Area Served Stored. 

-l-- 

Depot Area Total FX 

1 20,000 

I 

I 

frou Forts to Charlsroi bj GCr&;. 

Autnorized 

agencies ir? 

depot are&, 

md to ~mies 

art Eegats cs 

reyuireu. 

25,000 1,500 1 Does not include Class 111. 

(a) 

Toraahes to be lientiled represent the rlIa.xiimiz 

tumase thLt the Gepot must be :repded to 

hannle. j,ctuei tonni-.ja will fluctuate below 

thest: iL&,WeS-

Allocation Letter No. 45 

AD 400-1 (Civil) GE-AGL 9 July 194.4. 

(SWP/G-5/SUp/2342/1 

- Oseration OERLORD - D plus 91 t o D idus 120. 

SUBmCT: AllOCatiOn of Credita - Civil Affairs Supplies/Stores 

TO : Commander-in-Chief 21 lcrmy Grcup. 

(Rear Headquarters! 

1. Listed below fire additional items of Supplies/Stores 

approvod by this headquarters for use by British and U.S. Forces 

under your oommend in the period D plus 91 to D plus 120. 

Net Weight Proourement 

1TCI; Long Tons Re sponeibi1it;r 

Biscuits 2902 UK 

Vit Chocolate 660 UK 

Salt 146 UK 

Flour 4355 us 

M&V 653 us 

Saup 291 us 

TOTAL 9007 

2. Allocation of milk roquirements ifi under considera- 

tion and will be the subjeot of a subsequent communication. 

3. Details of' the allocations nade by this letter are 

attaohed as Inclosure I. Sub-allocations between British and 

U.S. Zones shown therein ma;' be varied as rquired to meet operotlonal 

needs. 

4. This letter is your authority for calli^ forward 

the above items as operational needs tiay recuire. 

5. All gertinent instructions oontained in Allocatibn 

Letter No. 1, this headquarters, file AG 400-1 (Civil) GE-AOM, 

dated 13 April 1944 will bo observed in connection with tho 

dietribution of the Suyplies/Stores approved by this letter, 

1 Inal: Technical data. 

By cammand of General LISlUHO'3ER: 

E. C. HCEl-It?;E 

Oolonel, AGD 

Aajutant General

1. Details of Supplies/Stores aiproved by 

Allocation Letter Number 45 dated 9 July 1944 

for use of 21 Army Group are:- 

BZITISH ZOIE U.S. ZO1U Total Procue- 

Im,I Net JeiLht Net ;leight Not 'v:eiEht msnt 

tone Tons Lone Tonns Lon~Tons Rospon- 

- sibility. 

BlSCUitS 2743 159 2902 UK 

Tit Chocolate 216 444 660 mc 

Salt 138 8 146 UK 

Flour 4116 239 4355 us 

M & vf 517 36 653 us 

soup 275 16 291 us 

TOTALS: 8005 902 9007

SUBJECT: Allocation of Credits - Civil Affairs Su&plies/ 

Stores - U.S. Forcos - Operation OTLRLORD. 

To : Commanding QBneral, Communication8 Zono, duropean 

ThGater of Operations, U.S. Army, 

1. The followinC supplles/etores of U.K. procuremont 

souroe nro approved by this hoadquartors for use by U.S. 

FOrCciS 8uriu, thc svriod D plus 91 to D plus 180, O,,eratlon 

@TdRLORD: 

_I Item Gross ,!eight, Lone Tons 

Industrial Salt 200 

2. This letter is your authority for calling forward 

these supplies/atores as requirbd. 

3. M1 pertinent instructions contained in Apgendlx "B-1 

to Allocation Lettor l?o. US/l, this headquarters, SHAZB /Q-5 

(Sup)/2342, datad 22 Au&urjti 194.4, will be obsertred. 

For the Supreme Commander: 

T. H. ULVIS, 

Briydier General, USA 

Adjutant General.

430 ?.qub 

SUBJECT: Composite riation for C.T.O.U.S.I. 

TO : The *~~.rtcrslaster.C-tsner~l, 

0 StFeet S,", 

%h?ngton, Deb. 

27 April 1943 

1. Waerisnoe in ITorth nJ'rioa has psoved a definite 

need aurin? operatiom for a coqosita-packed ration to replaoo 

the bttlk-gaokod m e W i ?ation. 

2, Rsfereme ia aade to tfio following: 

Exhibit A - Letter, Col. J.31.Sullive.n to rraj 

GQn. Ehund B. Greqory, dated 17 Elnrch l.943, 

with attachents. 

Exhibit B - Letter, Obief ?.uar"ster 

Hdqra. SOS .?TO to Chief Quarteiuaster 

AFHQ, AT0 700 dated 31 January 1983, 

subject: BubaIatencs Problains in Vorth Africa, 

with re>li?sfrffii: 

Lt. Col. RIA. Roas, Ora. 

$1 N.P. Vllli€lm, Qm 

Lt. Col:V;J, MacbaupUin, VrC 

Cant. m.D. Pratt;o&C and 

2nd Lt, E. 9alLard, VrC, joint 

Exhibit 0 - rhotographs of Class I supplies 

during North dfrioa cmipaign. 

3, Tt 18 not desirable that de?endence be ?laced on 

the r\ri%ish oom9osite ration (14 in 1) for futufe oprations. 

"Chilo it was not woful in North li.frioc;ite nonus ;re poorly 

adapted to :narioan tastes. ?!oreover, produotion cnpa- 

City on this'tn!o ration will be strained to meet British 

recluirenents . 

4.. The !pyp 5-In-1 Ration is not satisfactory for use 

over porids of several weeks, an6 in addition, is too 

for Qff'iOfiQnt han8ling. 

5, Difflcultiss in handlirlE and dlatributin8 the 

'B' Ration emphasize the need for 8 composite-paolred US. 

I?rmg ration. mia ration ahould have the followiap, oharacterietios: 

8; Eaoh 0886 should oontnin twelve rations for one 

basio monii. Variety Bhould be providod by offering five 

aiiteront >onus. proper segregation aurinp; operations 

foreign labor require8 simple cas0 aarkinc, f.0. BI-BZ-BJ- 

I34 and 13-5. 

-b, It should bQ IlUtritiOnallY Rdetluabe*

R-A-S- T-R-I-c-T-E-D 

de Except for powdared whole ml~,powdered whole 

eggs and fa”ClYstals, dehydrated and concentrated fooas 

nust be oxoluded. This is necessary booausa this ration 1.dll 

be used in operation whore there’will not be tiRe or oaportunity, 

first to purify mtor wd, seoond, to rooonstitutc dohydrated 

item. Cross Wight should not oxceed 75 lbs, Five 

proposed menus for R 12-in-1 conposite-paoircd rs.tion cre attachQd 

as Exhibit ‘T”. 

BI A Can OPQner, mntohes, cigarettes, mtor 3uyifioation 

element md latrine ;>apes should bc included. 

-f . Eaoh oaso must contain three hating units. 

These w ill yovide enouzh hoating units to su7oly weil .~I.oU~~S 

soparated from their coolciny; facilltios. 

8. Casos should bo of seaeonod t!’.nbor, battcnsd and 

suitably strappod. 

6. It is planned to us0 the proposcd 12-in-1 rctlon in 

opcrntions aftor tho initial assault phcsa. Its U ~ G:rill 

continuo inacfinitoly in the forward areas to vrhioh distri- 

bution of bulk rations is diffioult; troops in tho r6-ir ?mas 

~dll bo sup~iliod with Type ::Btf Ra.tion in biilk as early as 

praoticablo. 

7. It is propoacd to ;>rovido a 40 day suiyily of coqosite 

rations for 600,000 trooys, inolusivc of a mstsgo foctor. 

Total. roqulromonls Rro ostimatod et 24,000,000 retions, 

8. In rccowition of tho gros89nR nood, rv oifio6 hos 

dcmlopod a 12-in-1 cmposite-paoked ration usinn cayoncnts 

or tho ppo TF.” Ration aid offerin(: five ncnus. Lack of a2prcpriato 

items paokod in small containsrs‘will lMt this 

offort to rot Tiorc thm 3,OOO,OOO rations, Difficultios have 

been cncountaroti 01: those points: 

a. Cortain basic itens Faclrod in containor3 ovcraim 

for %he purposo havz haZ. to bc included (oX€ic~>lOS: 

Bacon in 12 lb. cans; arid o:gs iii 5 lb cans; proswfcd 

buttor in 5 Yo cans) , This has inoreased thd groas WiiW 

of tho omqosito pack wid v d l l unc‘oiibtedly rosult iil Sua3 

waste, 

b. CasillrP, zmtcrialo a10 In VGY s:’ort SUY~Y in 

tho Unitor Kingdom. 

0, Labor for bu.i.Xing 0886s and p.lCl:lnp, thm is 

also in sfiort supply. 

d. m1a avsraKz age of invontorics is on2 y ~ and r 

it is q,uostlonable that the assmiblinp, of lW30 gmtitios 

Of oon~oaits-paoksshould bo Rttoupted from any cXCGl)t the 

nowest stom.

undor authority of lettor datcd 3 Ap?il 1943, from ?onbark 

to Co"a6.ing C-onoral, SOS'ETO, Subjeot: Tditing pooeduro 

fo? ?cquIaitions fron D.K., for Lnolusion of tki6 typo. 

mol: (4) 

Xxhibit A 

:7 B) Plot inClUdGd in. hppcndiocs. 

11 fI n 

W I7 I1 

R. 14. I.ImJOHN 

Brig. Gcnoral, n;fC 

Chi. cf n,L\ur t omastor

R-E-5-T-R-I-C-TLE-D 

.L5 120 

,005 4 

.08 54 

io15 12 

28 

40000 

16 

2 

b000 

Cendy, hard - p1:ts 1 4-00 

GWI, chcwfng - sticlc I 

1 400

June 'k4 

July 

Auqust 

September 

October 

llovenber 

Mcenber 

January '45 

lebrua Ty 

IBrch 

Apr i1 

hlay 

June 

July 

Auqust 

Sectember 

Average 

IJR Army 

strength in 

the Theater 

1,601,892 

1,725I 000 

1,P50,50@ 

1,'35,000 

2,132,000 

2,407,010 

2,659,000 

2,780,500 

2,899,000 

2,999,000 

3,064,500 

3,061 ,500 

2,st?:!,4LO 

2,670,e32 

2,279,221 

1,c33 .wn 

Averege 

Da Ily 

Rations 

Issued 

Average daily 

:-umber of 

Rations Issued 

Fer Kan Per Dax, 

1,636,750 1.02 

~ 3 , 7 5 0 1.15 

2,3861517 1-28 

2,636,368 1.32 

2,550,162 1.19 

21721,197 1.13 

2,&?e3,e18 1.08 

3,038 553 1-09 

3,031,972 1.04 

3,366,966 1.12 

3,706,te9 1.20 

3,550,342 1.15 

3,151,352 1 .C9 

2,762,632 1.03 

2 392,7?2 1.04 

2 .Ot2,700 1.12

- Date 

June (6th-)Oth),1944 

July 

Al.l,"USt 

se?tenber 

October 

ITovember 

Deoeizber 

Jenuary, 1945 

February 

?:arch 

Type A/B 

- 

57 % 

52 5 

58 k 

79 % 

Be sg 

87 % 

91 $ 

91 % 

FP 

7h k 

e7 % 

Type 10-in-1 

71 7 

28 $ 

20 d 

14 P 

09 $p 

04 $ 

05 $ 

64 % 

03 % 

03 $ 

11 $ 

07 $ 

ITO'OTZ: Issue 3n the Southern Line of Conmunlcations is 

included in sbove percenta&es from 1 April 1945 onwar&. 

Percentage of tvne rations iesued in the fol'hl- 

01, SOLOC aea ;"nious"to tint date are sliowa belovr: 

15 Aufyst 1944 - 

31 I!arcb 1945

1. The Army Catering Corps is a coi,batant corps coa- 

posed of personnel, as described in paragraph 2(b), for 

the purpose of providing the Army with;- 

(a) advisers and instructors who are experts in 

oatering End cooking. 

(b) efficient N.C.O. and cook 1,ersonael for units 

The incorporation of catering experts and qualified 

oooks into one corps controls their posting and 

ensures distribution, throughout the Army, to the best ad- 

vantage. 

Prior to the outbreak of the Ka-n a number of 

expert caterers were brought into the Armg direct to fill 

key positions as Catering Advisers. On the comencen;ent of 

hostilities the expansion of the Army neoessitated their 

Eugmentation in greatly increased numbers and Officers Pmergenoy 

Reserve Commissions were initially uanted caterers 

with qualifications as set out in paragraph 9 to fill appointments 

as Catering Advisers or Specialist Xessing Officers. 

Similarly the personnel to fill vacancies as cookery 

instructors were enlisted direct from the Catering industry 

and after a few weeks military training were appointed War- 

rant Officer Class 11, Staff- Sergeant Instructor of Cookery. 

All vacancies now occurring both for officers and 

for men, are filled by promotion within the corps. 

Cooks now receive the normal military training 

as Civen to all arms of the service, after whioh they are 

sent on cooks' courses. 

2. The organization include8 :- 

(a) Establishment -Para 

War Offiae Catering Branoh, S.T.!+..,.,. 3 

Wax Office Personnel Branch A.G.lC(c).. 4 

Army Caterin Corps Trainlng Centre 

(Adlershot?. ......................... 24 

Schools of Cookery (Iiome and Overseas). 25 

Messing Officers Training Centres.. ,,.. 26 

A.C.C. Reoord ond Pay Office 

(Edinburgh).......................... 4 

(b) Personnel 

command Catering Advisers. ............. 6 

Catering kavisers........,.........,... 7 

A.C.C. Specialist 'hssing Officers..... 12 

Supervising Officers, Emereency Cookery 

Training Centres.....,....,...... 14 

Chief Instruotors (Officers). .......... 17 

Warrant Offioers and fi.C.0. Cookery . 

Instructors at E.C.'?.Cs... ........... 16 

Travelling Cookery Instruotors......... 18 

APl'ENDIX 13 of 12 pages - 1 -

R-$4- T-R-I-C-T-8-D 

'svatrant Officers) * 

Staff Serjeants 

Ser jeants Serving as 

Corporfils cooks with 

Privht e s Units.. .............. 20 

S.T.4. is a Dranoh of the Uirectorote of Supplies 

ana Transport. As the technioal brnnch it selects all 

specialist personnel and is responsible for all training 

in catering and oooking. 

4. THE WAR OFFICE I.EFSONNEL BF?GXiA.G,l!+(cL 

A.G.lk(o) is the ersonnel branch, under the 

Direotor of Organization wiiah OOEtrClS SostlQs, ;.roaotion, 

pay, etc., through:- 

The Officer I/c A.C.C. Record8 

The Regimental Paymaster, A.C.C. 

5. m. 

The ranks of ti.C'.C. Officers in the senior appointmnts 

are:- 

- 

War Office Oversea. 

Deputy bireator 

Assistant Director 

Bputy Assistant 

Director 

Steff qaptain 

Chief lnspector 

op Training 

-Colonel 

-Lt Colonel 

- 

-I& j or 

-Captaifi 

-Lt Oolonel 

F!fic?~-%-~2 

G.H.q, 

Army E.L. 

L Of G,€.I.L, 

Divisional 

H.L. 

Com:i3 Lazsriu:, Kdviser -!:a jor 

Oateriug AdViSov (Commnd $001) -2a;tain 

6. Coman$-;htedni, kd-

&pproxl.mtely with that Of C.s.liS. in the Gomend carrying 

only bo the extent that some c.S.1)~. subsist too Any units 

for one G.A., while SIQalhrC.S.DS maj- be ErcuFed under one 

:.A. is allotted one clerk. 

At horLe it has been fomd in practice that this 

netiiod is better than attachment to Districts, heas, Divisions 

or brleados for the followin6 reasons:- 

(a) Eoonomiaally there is an obvious savinG in 

tice, petrol und travelling exsenses, 

(b) Improvement in efficiency by closer udherence 

to Directorate policy. 

(0) The state of' messing and the cook situation 

of newly inooming units is at once ascertained; urgent 

requirements can be met and close supervision civen and 

maintained in baoklvard units. 

(dl Continuous touch is kept with all bnlts through 

their Messing Officers or representative who must visit tte 

Supbly UeLot at least onoe a week. 

(e) The close prosimitg to Units allows ample time 

to visit early and late meals. t It 

(f) Improved knowledge of local resources of 

mrket produce. 

8. Cuterink, Advisers Overseas 

In order to meet operational requirements Ceter- 

inL xuvieers are appointed to:- 

G.h.L,. (Oklef catorin6 idviser) 

Army 11.C'. 

Divisional H.L. 

L of C Areas 

9. The Qualiriccitiogs of E Caterig JraViSer 

A Cateriq Adviser'e techniool qualfficktions mSt 

take precedenoe over his military qualifications. He must 

In fact have served an apprertioeship in the oaterine Profeusion, 

oommenoiq, in the kitchen and then graaUati43 

through the var1ou.s branches to n recognized position of 

responsibility. No other ohoioe of prsomel Will satisfy 

tho demand for organization and decision which Will be 

tlrust upon him a t a moments notice, To appoint 83 hterins 

Advisers men who are Very keen on messi~",'%now 

good foodtf, or who are more sympathetic catering 'Well 

wisherscl is disast.rous. 

The moat likely types are obtained from IDOW OW^^ 

Caterers and Hoteliers who have rtrcoenized executive Or 

administrative organizine ability such as:- 

Catering rhnagers from large firm] ~ b \ - 1io oervioes, Hailway Companies 

'kYiiF;hen 

Hotel :,Imagers 

) ezleri- 

Banqueting :&nagere 

) ence 

- 3 -

10. -duties of a Ceterinp; Adviser. 

The duties of a Catering iidviser my be ~~~mr.arized 

us fo1lcws:- 

I 

a) Visits to Units 

b) Relations with Con!nt;iw Cfficers and Dnits 

Collaboration vrith Unit Ileasirg: Officers 

(:I Liaison with Supply Officers R1:d N.A.C.F.1. 

representatives 

Tralnlw of Gooks 

Assistance to Bone Guards, Cadets, Feedim of 

Troops in transit, et Railway Laltene do Repas, and emergency 

cil-tlian catering arrangemnts. 

(a) Visits t o Units 

Visits to units bear no semblance to an inepec- 

tion. The Catering gives the units the benefit of his 

exkert advice on all technical questions apperthinine to 

catering, thereby advising the unit how to bring about a 

satisfaotory high standard of caterin$. Reports are kept 

down to the barest minja" all. that is required by the 

Gutericg Adviser is to complete one copy of the roport form 

which is kept in his office for his inforn,ation aid for the 

necessary fffollowup" visits. 

The details of the retort form are tgbulated 

on a very sircplet preoiae re:,ort form which enables the 

InsMctily Officers to see at a glanoe the general state of 

meusing and the degree of urgency of such question of Fereo;mel, 

engineer, ordnanoe and otter requirercents ao have 

been brought to the notice of knit Commmders. A copy of 

the precise report is forwarded woeklg to the Command Oater- 

ing adviser for information. 

(b) &lttions with-C~manbioR Offiaers and h i t E 

The Catering &viser:- 

(i) Gives exrert advise on fautters pertainine 

to catering 

(ii) Assists formations and units with 

instruct1on end demonstration either 

by hi~seli ox through the medium of a 

travelling instructor. 

(lil) Assists with all questions dealing with 

cooks an2 their suitability for Ironotion 

course8. 

(iv) Ynsures, in collaboration with the 

C'fficer l/c A.C.G. Reoords, that formations 

and units are supplied "11th a full 

establishment of effloient K'.G.Os. end 

cooks, 

(u) Assists Corcmendiog Offioors on questions 

rolative to ineffioient cooks. 

(0) Collaboration with Unit Idessim Officer 

Tho Catering Adviser!" 

(i) fio16s periotiical conferences for all 

- 4 -

:&$sing Officers at which toric31 

questions are disoussed and yractioai 

dsmoastrations are Liven. 

(ii) hnsures that the ration is used to the 

best aovanta,e and that ail waste is 

eliminated. 

(ill) Advises on the best .mans of spen~in~: 

the ration cash alloihnca. 

(iv) hdVlSeS on rtethods to be effiluoyed in 

obtaining the best reslllts by fin 

efficient use of all cooking apphrhtus 

with sgecial em,nLasis on ec0nGrT 01 fuel. 

(v) Gives izactical aavice on tho construc- 

tion oi. improvised fielo cookiq, approtus 

and on ;bas Tin Coohery. 

vi) When occasion arises, in conjunction with 

the hbssix Officer, may be oallea upon 

to arrawe for hot mais to be supllitld 

to troops in transit at Railwy iiElltos 

de R6paS. 

(a) Liaison with Supply Offioers and N.A.A.F.I. 

Representatives 

The Catering ,iuviser:- 

(I)Effects continuous lioison bothwen the 

four yhrties whose callaboretion is 

essential to good masing, nwly the 

Yu&ply Officer, N. A, A, F. I. rrjpresentotive, 

:desbl~Offioer and hfmeeli, 

(ii) In conjunction with those officers ho 

couvenes regular muotiiLLs for urlt Meso- 

1% Ofricers at Comt.n2 Yupply besots 

which are mtPe as interesting BR yossible 

by pructlcal 6emonstrLtious. For example 

with the asslstanoe of a bugervielng 

Travelling InsLruotor, instruction is 

Given in Fropxrim, cooklwj cni serving, 

new iter:s or food introuucsd lntc tho 

rction scale. The uvailaWl1ty of sup 

plies and coinpiletion of Bill8 of Fere 

are uiscussea an6 atttntion is drown to 

A.C.13. huvilig tl bearin& on cctorlx etc. 

(e) Trainlnl: of Gooks 

The Catcriny k3vieer: - 

(i)Is ,responsible for the efficient rwlninc 

of Emergency Cookery Troining Centres 

and enewe6 that the syllabus of training 

is aclhered to, throqh the medium of 

the Supervising Officers of E.C.T.CS. 

(ii)Is expeoted to taka a keen Interest in 

the welfare, pay, prornotion and upgrading 

of Cooks. 

(f) Assistance to Homs Guuds. Cadet_q~,troops in 

transit and "Blitz" feeding 

The Cateriq A6viaer:- 

- 5 -

11. Trarisport 

(i) Must be available if required to help 

Home Guard Gnits in all matters rela- 

ting to catering and to assist in the 

training of their cooks, 

(ii) Assist Cadet Force Camps anG Cadet Units 

who seek advice on oatering or training 

of cooks. 

(iii) In the event of a "Blitz", helps in prc- 

viding such emergency catering arranee- 

ments a6 may be required by the civil 

authorities. 

It will be seen from para, 10 above that the main 

Lutg of a Catering Auviser is t o be "out ana aboKtfl among 

his units and for that reason ho must be mobile and trans- 

port must be made available. 

12. Specialist Messing Officers 

(8) Full time Speoialist Kessing Officers are appointed 

Lo Training Units Where the establishment exceeds 

1,000, The Officers filling these appoiritments are catering 

experts. \,here the establishments exceaii 1500 the rank of 

Captain is authorized and for units over 1,000 and under 

1,500 the rank of the Messing Officer is that of a Lieutenant. 

(b) The special conditions attaching to the 

appointments of tlese officers are as undor:- 

(i) Their services 3re utilized wholly in 

connection with unit mossing and they 

are not utilized for other normel regi- 

mentni duties. 

(ii) To compensate for this specielist service, 

rations are unucrdrawn by the unit to 

the extent of 2f in every 100, subject 

to the unit being under reasonable ocn- 

tralized conctitions of cooMng and messin&. 

13. The kualifications of a Specialiet Xessing Officer 

The qualifications are the same as for a Catering 

Adviser. In practice the Catering hdvigers are selectad 

from the iJessir4 Officers who show initiative and organizing 

ability. 

The duties of a Speoialist Officer 

(a) To provide shroughout the week 4 adequate 

meals a day, including a supper mal scrvod at a time which 

Suits the troops evenil- habits and not before 19.00 hours. 

For thosc who go out in the evening there must also be a 

supber available on .their rcturn between 21,OO hours and 

22.00 hours. 

(b) To prepare the indents for both R.A.S.C. and 

N.w.A.F.1, portions of the ration and to supervise their 

reoeption, welght checking and distribution and URintain 

all requisite books or aooounts. 

- 6 -

R-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-O 

(c) To ensure a wise and properly balanced 

expenditure of the Ration Cash Allowtlncti. 

(d) To arrange a weekly Bill of Fare, oompiled 

so that the tastes of the men, as ascertained at the bn's 

&deesinge (which are held weekly) are provided for in the 

produotion of a groporly balanced diet. 

(u) To ensure thet duty rostera am prepared 

and posted for a11 personnel employed on mssing duties,, 

and to be responsible for the organization, work, discipline, 

and cleanliness of tho L.C.OS., cooks an8 mess 

orderlies. 

(f) To suporvise the preparation and oooking of 

the food, adjusting the timine to the prescribei meal 

hOWS 

(g) To supervise tho serving of mals and to prevent, 

by careful distribution, any tendency to waste due 

to badijr served portions, caruless cutting up of bread, 

or inconsideratc tabla manners. 

(h] To make all arrangaments for early und late 

mods lor guards and parties arriving, aopsrting or on 

speaial uuties. 

(1) To provide all personnel, undortakiog journeys 

by road or rail with adequate liavtrsack rations, 

(J) To see that all oookhouses, storm, diniw 

rooma and premises used for messing art kept scrupulously 

clsan and the equipment properly maintained. 

(k) To ensuru the conservation and tho segregation 

of all By-Produots and to inspect bins and swill area daily 

bofore Oontactor removos contents. 

(1) To maintain tf;s cookhouse porsonnel up to 

full eetablishmont in numbers add ronks, not forgetting 

understuiiies and learner cooks. 

(m) To keog himssll up to date regarding ail 

orders relating to tho training, uHradirw, pay and promotion 

of cooks and to watch that relovant entries are ma6e 

in tho soldier'e pay book. 

(n) To maintain oonstnnt liaison with his local 

Supply Offlaer, N.L.A.F.I. MEuiagoq Catering kdvissr, P.A.D. 

0.S. and D.C.R.E, 

(0) To effect an underbawal of 24% conplete 

rations providing the unit Is reasonably aentrally messed, 

U. supervisiuq Offiosrs of EmorRenoy Cookery Traiqinn 

Cdntres 

These Ofiicers are sclocted Prom highly qualified 

oivilinn chefs who havo had lzmy expericnco a6 oookery 

Instructors. In praotice it is found that eaoh Officer is 

Bblo to supervise six Emergency Cookery Training Centres 

(para, 15) each training 60 soldier cooks or kg h.T.3, 

cooks. Their rank is Lieutenant (Qr,Mr.). 

- 7 -

R-.E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D 

15. Emergency Cookery Training - Centres (Home and 

hbroad) 

(a) Trainiw Men 

Establishment Of 4 A.C.C. cooke,, 

instructors (1W.0 1 s/sjt., 2 sjts) 

Period of training - i’weeks 

Nmbers undqr training - 60. 

E.C.T.Cs. functian to produce trained unit cooke. 

Those reaching the required standard aro transferred to 

the A.C.C. Those bQlOVJ k.d.C. standard remain RS regimental 

cooks, but aro eligible for test later for transfer to A.C.G. 

Incluaing 0.T.S. (para. (b) below) there are 

up to 100 E.C.T.Cs in Commands at hcm, 

E.C.T.Cs are attached to units large enough 

to give each centre 400-600 ratiocs to cook. In moat 

cases, units to which 3.C.T.Cs are attached arci able to 

give up some or their cooks and so help the man-power situation. 

Eaoh cLntre trains 60 students for D weeks in 4 

cltlssg8, the intake beiiy arranged so that 15 atudents 

comb in avery fortnight and corresponding number are posted 

out. E.C.T.Cs are easy to open or closc down. The follow- 

ing are used:- 

(I)11 oookhouse containing a fixed range or facllities 

for preparation of food, 

(ii) A cookhouse containing gortablrr cup equipmont 

auoh ae Bluff ranges,Triplex ranges, Boyer 

stoves etc. 

(iii) Field kitchen where every type of improvised 

oveu &nd kettle tr6nCh is oonstructed by 

students who am roquired to cook food in 

the oven they have built. 

Among thu types apparotus constructed are tho 

Aillershot ovens, oil-drkm oven, kettle tronch and special 

stress is laid on the oil and water method of firing. 

E.C.T.Cs, are usually housed in Nissen huts, one 

of whioh is sot aside for ldoture purposos. 

Follows closely the arrangements for men, 

exce t that there are 3 instructors training 48 students 

for weeks. There aro 3 alhsses and the fortnight intake 

and output is 16. x.C.C. and A.T.S. instructors are enployed. 

16. Warrant Offioare and N.C.C. Cookery InstructDrS 

for E.C.T.Cs (Para.15) 

Originally selootcd as dcscribbd in para 1. 

Vace.noies noir fillscl by promotion from within the corps. 

17. chief Instructors (Of‘ficers) 

At tho large traidng ostabllshmcnts the Chief 

hStrUCt0r (and deputies are specially seleckd officers

R-E-S-T-R-Y-C-T-&D 

with civilian qualifioations as caterers and instructors. 

Those for Messing Officers Trainine Centres are soloctcd 

from the best of the Suporvising Offioers (para 14) having 

partioular regard to their ability 8s lectures and 

teaohers. 

1El. Supervising Travellinn Instructors (S.T&) 

'these trsvelling cookery instructors are exotrptionally 

good ail around chufs who have proved their cater- 

ing and organizing abilities as cookory Instructors at 

B.C.T,Cs. from which thoy arb specially sclccted. Their 

duties in Comands, under thc direction of the C.C.A. are 

to help nowly formed or backward units in their messing 

arrangements End in this connection to domnstratc tho 

oorrect methods of i\rmy cooking and catering to unit cooks, 

S.T,Is. usually stay several days with om unit before passing 

on the noxt. iill Marrunt Offioors Glass SI. 

They are allotted to each Gomand Pool and oycr- 

ato from C.S.Ds. unilor tho llpcolrt catwing Advisor (para.7). 

19. Flexibility of the Arqy Caterlag ilorDs 

b point to note in the organization of the h,G,C. 

is its flexibility. 

Any emergenoy can be met by a "switchingrf of 

poreonnel. For sxumple a party of advisory oxparts can bo 

made up by a contribution from Command Pcol~ of Gatering 

Advisers and Supervising Travolling Instructors. This 

prty, with tho addition of workin& teams of student oooks 

from x.c.T.0~. under thoir own instructors oan bo expandod 

to organize the feuding of an expuditionary force in 

transit or a 'tblitzedft populatiou. 

The Cisemination of informfitlor for thr, special 

guidance of the A.C.C. Offioors is effeotcid by the issue 

gtlriodically of Catering Circulars. 

20. Army Gatering Gorgs cooks sclrviiq with unit.? 

War establishments of all units show A,G.C, personnel 

as trattachedtr. Cook personnel coiisist or: - 

Uarrant Officers (Class 11) Cooks 

Staff Serjoant cocks 

Sorjeant Looks 

Corporal Cooks 

Private 

A.C.C. Standard must bo reaohod bufore unit Cooks 

Bre transferrcd to the A.C,C. 

21. A.T.5. Cooks 

Tho training of A.T.S. oooks is controllod by 

6.T.4. This service is thore olosaly linkod with the Army 

Catering Corps. 

Training, classification, promotion, otc., we 

bsed on A.C.C, design end all instruction is given in 

- 9 - 

R-E-S-T-R-I4-T-E-D

R-G-S-T-R-1-C -T-E-I) 

A.J.G. controlled cookery training astablisbnts, 

22' %Spital Cooks (R.A.M.C. c0"itmGnt) 

Hoapital Cooks (R.A.Y.C. and V.A.D.) is a nora 

ArnW Idedical Corps commitment but tho octual trainirg, in 

hospital cookery is undertakan at the Army Catering Corps 

Trclinine Centra, hdlershot , 

Catmi% Adviser test hospital oooks prior to 

upgradii:g and iiromotion. 

23. Rogimmtal Butchers 

Thorc are two types of butchers:- 

Royal Army Service Corps trbdclsmon butchers. 

lab! Regimnttil (Ron-tradesmen) butchers. 

All QXCCpt the srcallest unit a m allowed a 

(regimntal) non-trhhasman butcher. This t:iSa of unit 

porsonnel ia tr~iin~cl unaar A.C.C. Lrrangemonts controlled 

by S.T.L. 

-24. The hrmy htoring Corps Training Centre, Adlershot 

(a) This modern establisholrnt (a pru-war concep 

tion, comiAoted ,in 1940) is tho hoadqiarters of the Army 

Cotoring Corps, It is modelled on the most practical lines 

to ensure that students roccive up to date instruction in 

cookery in all its branchcs. 

The A,C.C. Training Cwntre consists of:- 

(a) hodquartors 

Instructional Croup 

Administrative Battalion cottsisting of - 

En. H.(L. Aclministratfvo Coy, 

u. Branch Iioldlng Coy. 

2 Studtnt Joys. 

ThL principal ay&ointments arc:- 

Commendant - Colonel 

O.C. hdun. En.- Lt Oolonol 

CNef Xnstruotor - Major 

(b) Tho avorage strongth of tho whole Cantrd 

2,200 mado up os un6er:- 

620 Studcnts (including 70 Officcrs, 150 

A.T.S. 1 

180 Instructional and AWnistrative &iff. 

700 Holding ar.d &waiting draft. 

Instructors permanently detaehed to 

con" E.C.'?.Cs. (pra 161 

(c) Tho building occupies an area of 10,000 Waft 

and is equipped with tho lateet types of' ccokinB OquiPmnt 

fuullsd by gas, steam and solid fuel. The arrangomcnt Of 

- 10 . 

R-&S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

RE-S-T-R-$-C-T-E-D 

the building ia cmofully pi?&ed to faCilitctQ tho e~ep 

rolotion of work, aonuoncing Vdth tho roooptibn of tho 

bulk goods into tho rnin storrgo room -nd hiatribution 

ChGi'lCo irlt0 vnrious l?.rduS, pcStry MOL19 2nd kitchew 

tho 1.crgor of whioh cro on tho ground floor, 

&in dotails of tho .U.y-Out X'G under:- 

Ground Floor - 5 oonpl~t~ ltitchcn dcportunts - 

kitchen - ltrdor - 3 Dining hclle 

sor-tin@;500, 400 cnd 60, pcetry, 

Officors and Sorjor.nts !Iesscs, 

Mninistmtion Orfioos 

Ihin Leoturo Hr.11 sorting 250 

fittod with doqonstrntion 8-8 

ovens nnd appmrtus r.nd oinwtogrnph 

Equipimt , 

Vcgatrblo prG?rmtion rooms. 

Rntlon cnd utonsll stores. 

Ref rigoration ohmbcrs. 

Cooking cyparctus r.nd equip" . 

consisting of nodorn 000.1, GFS, 

stcrn rnd olcctric.1 nppnratua. 

First Floor - 10 Solf oontainctl kitchcn - clcss 

room GCOh COUplOtolg fitted. 

6 Lccturo room. 

Studcnts ohr.nging room providod 

with hot nnd cold xter, 

Wnsb bneins nnd individual lookers, 

Adninistration Ofi'i06@md stores. 

Outbuilding - Fully oquippod lcitohon and Borvice 

- 

supplying 700=ty hdl, 

hole - 2 largo fully oquippod kitohone, 

lardors and p,m%rlcs. 

Field Kitchen- Contching all typw of fiold 

Cookor8 rind Ovcne such CE Blufi 

range8 , Lldorflhot ovona, onnp 

bollors cnd enr.ll cqul~I2ont, 

Inprovisod r.ppar?.ts, drun ovons, 

kettlo trenohcs hot plctas cnd 

lnrgor dugout dtohors for 

dosort w.rfr.ro, *.:1 appcrrhns . 

opcratod by wood, cod, ooko, 

sr.wduSt diosol oil, OrudQ Oil, 

nn8 Wp.&o oil taa wntir. 

(d) hcporimontal work, Now idons on aoolCW 

nppnratus doaigns nro onoourcgcd. Now invrjr.tions, oovoring 

all typos of cooklrig r.pporatus, and oquipmont, nro twtd 

for tho Mr Offloo. 

(0) Bosonroh work, Cooking tests rro oarriod mt 

for tho Offloo in con unction with S.T.6. (SupplP 

Rmnch) and tho Ninistry if Food. 

(f) Trainin Tho mnin types of Coursos of In-, 

struation inold' 

Commanding orficors' (Inoluding ,I,T.S,~ 

Course on Nossing 

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-I!

Rogimntal iiessing Officers' Cohrsc (including 

A.T.S. ) 

€&gu.icr mmy Cooks' Zourses (for post war 

pwposes) 

Sorjuants Cook&' Zourse (Men anti A.T.S.) 

Corporal Cooks' Course (ivIon rind A.T,S- ) 

Cooks' Grading Coursc: (Mcn :lnd A.T.S. ) 

Iiospital Cooks Sou.rsc ( ~.A,X.C., V,X.D. 

and A,T.S. ) 

Officers ;.le~sCooks' Course (KECI~and 1i.T.S) 

Regimenta1 autc hers c oursc . 

Ytudcmts under training cook fron 5,000 to 7,000 

ratioiis daily for neighbouring static forffiatiolls. Fcod is 

convbyed hot from the Cciritro in insulated contrtincrs or 

coolred in tho unit cookhouses bg7 students, from advanced 

c1assc.s, unticr their instructors. 

25. Army Schools of Cookery. 

Schools of Cookery arc designed to train iorge 

numbers t it one the, as distinct from thi "sausage machine" 

output of 15 ctv2ry fortnight at an E.C.T.C. (para.15) ivhich 

can be uitr-Lchod t o an cstablishaont giving primry militxy 

tmirling to ftiiitakcsfffrom civil lifc. 

Thcr lerger tiii: numbur undcr training, tho larger 

t hr, building rbquircd and adminiBtrativc sta?f nccessury. 

Army Schools of iookory arc opuroting as under:- 

Micldlc bust School or Cookery 

London School of Cookory 

26. Ikssing Officers' Training Ckntres 

Thu c;st;lbli.shmont of a 1,Iossing Officers' Training 

Centrt: includes:- 

A Commtlndaut - Major 

ChiLf Instructor - Lt. Ldm 

Instructor - L.0, Class I1 

Thorc i m ; 40 Ofricers undcr traiiiing at one tine 

on COU~SOSof 10 d:qs duration, for thi: IgGssing; Officers' 

coursb, or 2 days for FI ComanLing Officers Coursu. 

This typt; of Ccntm, pi&rili Cosignird for the 

training OF ri:glmcntal messing Officers in units whose 

strt:rigth is 1,009 (units of 1,000 End ovcr haw an A.C.C. 

Spuciulist Kessing OfY'icur) is operated in 3 Home Cormnands. 

Mussing Of'ficers in otliur Commands arc trnined at thc * 

A.C.C. Tr::ining Centre. 

27, Trailling in Cotering and Cookin&. (Not iricludod 

26. Syllabus of trt>ining_ (Not included) 

29. Rctus of.* (Not included) 

30. Thc hrmy Catcrj.ng Gorp Rcgimcntal Associction 

(Not included) 

Thc War Office (S.T.) . 

October, 1942. 

- 12 -

Belt, web Waist 

cap, Piale, cotton, OD OT OT 

Cap wool, knit 

Coat, mackinaw 

Drawers, cotton, short short 

Drawers, wool 

cloves, leatrier, heavy 

GlOV.30, wool, OD, leuther pallii 

Handkerchiefs 

Headbands, liner, helmet, M-1 

Jackets, field, OD or 

Jackets, fidG, la-113 

Jackots, herringbone twill 

Laces, leggings 

Laces, shoe 

Le&bmS, C2JlVa8 

Id”,helmet, fibre 

lieckbmds, liner, hehaat, hi-1 

Overshoes, Arctic 

Raincoats, synthetic, OD 

Shirts, flannel 

Shoerr, sarvice or boots, camtrat 

socl~s,wool, cusldon sole 

socks, wool, likht 

socks, wool, eld 

Smater, hiLh neck 

‘L’rousers, herrixbone twill 

Trousers, rvool serge 

Untier8hirt, Cotton 

Uncershirt, wool 

1mwlR SuPPLm5: 

-ORCxNlZATIGNAL &JJJ.F’hl+T: 

Axe, choyp~,s-le bit 

Bucket, general purpose, &&I,. 

Y qt. 

Cans, cornyated, *alv. 

Cans, water, 5 gallon 

Cwtahers, round, insulated, 

w/inaerta 

Haater, water mersion typ 

Lantern, gasoline 

Lantern, kerosene 

Outxit, cooking, 1-burner 

Outfit, coolfj~~~, 2-burner 

Outfat, cook-, Xrnan 

Picks, railroad 

Zan~e, field, la-37, Pack” fl~lt 

Ranhe field, U-37, Pack W I 

Shwais, round ,,yneral 

purpose, Jhhclfzint 

E~UIFACI! : 

Ma&, canvas, fie16 

Bag, canvas, water, aterilizin& 

Ea&, cmrying, arm0 

6%, carryin&, rocket 

Ea&, sleepink, wool 

Delt, im6aeine, BAR 

Belt, cartri%e, cal. .30 dismountec 

Blanket, 17001, OD 

Can, meat 

Canteen, M-1910 

Carrier, pichttwk, intrenchkg 

Case, sle.eep- bat, water repellent 

Cover, canteen 

cup, canteen 

pork, u-26 

W e , L-26 

Pack, field. odat (Haversack and 

Carrior, pack ~dll be issued 

until exhausted) 

Piclaaattwk, intrenchh& 

Pins, tent, shelter, wood 

Pocket mswzine, carbine, Gal. 30 

pole, tent, single section (Pole, 

tent, shelter half will be 

issued until. exhausted) 

Carrier, shovel, intrenching 

Pouch, first aid packet 

Shovel, intrenching 

Spoons, K-26 

Strap, chrryiw., general purpose 

Suspenders, belt, M-1736 

Tag, itientification 

Tent, shelter half 

Toitel, bath 

r31PENDkBI.E: 

Broom, corn 

Brushee, sanitary, 17“ 

Brush, ecrubbing 

Candles 

Calcium, hypochloride, ampUhB 

Crmyound, yerralcidal rinee, 3.3 

Insecticide, powder, body, 2 ob cat 

Imeoticide, spray, DDT 

Dubbin 

Handles, mop, 5LT 

Lime, c;hl.orinated 

Matches, safety 

Mop, cotton 

P~per,toilet, 1,ooO sheet rp 

Powrim, scouring 

Prophylactic 5, chemical 

ProphylactiCs, mechanical 

Sprayers, hqdd 

Soap, laundry 

Tablets hdia5011e 

wool, &el

~oolsets, carpenter 

~001sets, carpenters & wheelrkht 

Typewriters, portable dnZ no-portable 

Wta, fire for rhw-3, field, ht-37 

OFFICIZ SUPPLE&: 

I----- 

Envelopes 

Fluid, duplicstiw, apirit process 

Ink, mimeoyaph, 1 lb. can 

I&, writ-, fluid 

Paper, bond 

Paper, carbon 

pcper, carbon ciuplicrt-, spirit proceaa 

Paper, manifold 

Psper, mheogreph 

Paper, master copy 

paper, pint&, offset 

pencils, lea6 

stencils, waxless, dry

Galpsition of GclLona ~ e r 

Fames (Per Gent I h De? Day 

of Total)

Office of the Chief Qunrtereicister 

Quartermster Service Reference Data 

VOUJIE I1 (Revised) 

OPWIONS-P"G 1 JANUARY 1944 

-- 

Chapter 6 

PER MAN PER MY FIGURhlY - POL PRODUCTS 

(Conbat Conditions) 

&llone (US) Poundsiinolud- 

--- ill& ooatainer) 

l.iT gasoline 80 0cTGiGi- 

(Including Pkwered Equipmect ) 1.48 128 03 

Diesel Fuel .27 2.12 

(Includin&Poiiered Squipx" : 

for vehicles) 

Total me1 IiicluGiiig Gasoline 1.75 14 I 15 

for Poimred Equii-nt ~ ___L___l______..__I_ 

&is for Cookine and Heating .08 -65 

Total Fuel Includint gas for 

oooking and Beating 1.83 ll+.OO 

- -.....- -- 

&cine O i l so525 .454---- 

Gear Oil -0175 ,151 

Kerosene .0049 042 

---- 

Total Oil ,0749 ,647 

Crease - PoXnds ---- .u31r-- 

Grease - Converted to Gsls ,0032 ----- 

TOTAL POL l.pasl--i33-RT- 

Gallons !'Per man der day" very irith the il&e-up of the total 

troop strength depciidiiig on the :Jroportion of Yield, Air and 

SOS Forces. The above fi[,ures are reoomisiided for uw when 

these proportions are not known.

POUHJ P a h.4X 12.873 3-L-649 7.762 11.763 12.964 7.527 10.689 f ll.381 

'KIT& EIV bAYS jj2 371 i 329 1,050 379 2 5 1,644 

?OI.S/r3IV/LIi.Y 1513.923 1 155.202 I 83-757 129.310 126.617 93.260 U4.544. I 123.974

Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...

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