Jan C. Zadoks - On The Political Economy of Plant Disease Epidemics - Capita Selecta in Historical Epidemiolgy-Wageningen Academic Publishers (2008)

On the
political economy
of
plant disease
epidemics
Capita selecta in historical epidemiology
ageningen Academic
J.C. Zadoks
u b l i s h e r s
On the political economy of plant disease epidemics
This publication was financially supported by the
‘Foundation Willie Commelin Scholten for Phytopathology’
(Stichting Willie Commelin Scholten voor de fytopathologie).
On the political economy
of plant disease epidemics
Capita selecta in historical epidemiology
J.C. Zadoks
Wageningen Academic
P u b l i s h e r s
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First published, 2008 the author.
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The Netherlands, 2008 of content derived from this publication.
To my wife, children and grandchildren who gave me the
pleasure of being.
To the memory of Jan de Vries and Jo de Vries-Bosscha,

and others, who gave me more than only physical shelter
in a time of fury (1940-1945).
‘Agriculture and gardening, though of such great utility in producing the nutriment of mankind,
continue to be only Arts, consisting of numerous detached facts and vague opinions, without
a true theory to connect them, and to appreciate their analogy; at a time when many parts
of knowledge of much inferior consequence have been nicely arranged, and digested into
Sciences.’
Erasmus Darwin – 1800. Phytologia; or the philosophy of agriculture and
gardening. London, Johnson, page VII.
Preface
Plant disease epidemics can strongly affect the life and happiness of individual farmers, their
dependents, and their nations. The linkage between agricultural production and the welfare
of the nation and state is covered by the 18th century term ‘political economy’. The branch of
epidemiology that reconstructs, describes, and explains plant disease epidemics of the past I
call ‘historical epidemiology’. In the case studies, presented here as capita selecta, I consciously
stepped over the demarcation line between historical epidemiology and agricultural history.
The emphasis in these ‘selected chapters’ is not so much on the biological causes, for which
I refer to the current text books, but rather on the human consequences of plant disease
epidemics. Not pretending to be a historian, I followed my own fancy in looking at some of the
consequences of selected plant disease epidemics on society at large.
Chapter 1. In ancient times the helplessness of people that had to face plant disease epidemics
without any means of control forced them to cope with plant disease and crop loss in ways
unfamiliar to the present Western mind. In classical times a severe rust epidemic on wheat, the
common staple in the Mediterranean area, meant hunger to the peasants and their families, and
maybe also ruin to their state. Having no knowledge of the underlying biology, they had to deal
with such catastrophes in symbolic terms, by means of folk tales and religious ceremonies.
Chapter 2. Whereas in the second half of the 20th century yellow stripe rust on wheat was
a familiar disease, causing occasional epidemics in all five continents, yellow rust on rye
disappeared in the first half of the century. Before, however, the disease could be locally severe.
The extent and impact of the yellow rust epidemic on rye in 1846 remains unmatched up to this
day. The impact of this epidemic on Belgium, the Netherlands and part of the Rhine Province
in Germany is demonstrated but its importance in a belt stretching from Denmark through
western Germany down into Switzerland remains uncertain. The epidemic also affected the
western part of modern Poland from the Carpathian Mountains to the Baltic Sea, but to what
degree? The losses came at the worst possible moment, when Continental Europe was in the
grip of potato late blight.
Chapter 3. Generally speaking plant disease epidemics had fewer and smaller effects than
some natural phenomena such as volcanic eruptions and prolonged droughts, or historical
phenomena such as political strife and war, but some epidemics had an exceptional impact
on human history. The outbreak of Phytophthora infestans in Europe, 1844-46, stands out as a
model with its unequalled social, economic, even political consequences. Historians focused
on the misery brought about by the ‘potato murrain’ in Ireland, whereas the equally adverse
but politically very different effects of the potato late blight on the European Continent have
been neglected. Chapter 3 intends to remedy this deficiency by introducing the ‘Continental
Famine’.
Chapter 4. During World War I the Netherlands, remaining ‘neutral’ during the turmoil, suffered
as the economy came to a stand-still. The food situation became precarious, to put it mildly. No
data exist on the losses of the major starch crops due to pathogens at a time when, amazingly,
the Dutch phytopathologists of the period showed little interest in food production. Applying
an unconventional method to a conventional long-term data set I made some tentative crop
loss estimates for wheat , rye, and potato. The results may be seen as a background for the
events of the next chapter.
On the political economy of plant disease epidemics 11

Chapter 5. Phytopathologists may be tempted to associate plant disease epidemics with big
historical events. One instance is the role of potato late blight in the defeat of Germany during
the First World War, 1914 - 1918, as indicated by two well-known phytopathologists. They may
have been over-eager in their historical judgement. Life is far too complex to accept a one-
to-one relationship between a plant disease and a great historical event. Political decisions
and the outcome of the fighting affected the epidemics as much as the epidemics affected the
decisions and the fighting. And never forget the weather!
Chapter 6. A historian associated a plant disease, ergot on rye caused by Claviceps purpurea,
with a major historical event, the French Revolution of 1789. This revolution changed the
course of European history. Though the association may not be unjustified the causation of
that revolution was complex as indicated by tens if not hundreds of books on the subject. These
books, however, overlooked the possible effect of ergot. Ergot of rye also caused a ‘non-event’
of historical importance. A military campaign that could have changed the history of Eastern
Europe and the Near East did not happen, a forgotten paragraph in the history of plant disease.
Two epidemics have been associated with famines, black stem rust of wheat with the Russian
famine of 1932-33 and brown spot of rice with the Bengal Famine of 1943. Though professional
historians do not deny the presence of rust and brown spot, respectively, they tend to believe
that these plant diseases were not decisive in causing the famines of the Soviet Union, 1932-
33, and of Bengal, 1943.
Chapter 7, contemplating the aspect of Good Governance, looks back to the foregoing chapters.
It strikes a more personal note.
Jan C. Zadoks
12 On the political economy of plant disease epidemics

Table of contents
Preface 11
List of abbreviations 17
List of tables 19
List of figures 21
List of boxes 23
1. Wheat rust in antiquity 25

1.1. Famines feared 25
1.2. Wheat and wheat rust 26
1.2.1. Wheat 26
1.2.2. Rust 26
1.2.3. Evidence for black stem rust 27
1.3. Magic 28
1.3.1. Magic and science 28
1.3.2. Cerealia 29
1.3.3. Robigalia 29
1.3.4. Sacrifices and processions 30
1.4. Science 31
1.4.1. A problem of timing 31
1.4.2. Phenology, the crop 31
1.4.3. Phenology, the rust 33
1.4.4. Astronomy, the Dogstar 34
1.4.5. Summing up 35
1.5. Rust, dogs and foxes 35
1.5.1. Associative thinking 35
1.5.2. Samson and the Philistines 35
1.5.3. Aesop’s fable 36
1.5.4. Dog sacrifices in antiquity 36
1.5.5. Linking East and West 37
1.6. Conclusions 38
2. A yellow rust epidemic on rye, 1846 39

2.1. A year of disaster 39
2.2. Prelude 40
2.2.1. The state of the art 40
2.2.2. Three cereal rusts 41
2.2.3. Epidemiologic phases 50
2.3. The rust on rye in 1846 51
2.3.1. The weather in Europe 52
2.3.2. The Netherlands 52
2.3.3. Other countries in Europe 58
2.3.4. Yellow rust pandemics 63
2.4. Discussion 64
2.5. Conclusions 67
Appendix 2.1. Reasoning applied to identify the rust species, extracting the

‘General Reports’ for 1845 and 1846, supported by my own
experience with the cereal rusts. 68
Appendix 2.2. Data from Belgium, 1846. 76
Appendix 2.3. Abstract from reviews by Löbe (1847) and Weber (1847) on grain
production in Europe, with special attention for rye. 78
3. The potato murrain on the European Continent and the revolutions of 1848 81
3.1. The continental Famine 81
3.2. Potato late blight and other discomforts 82
3.2.1. Potato cultivation and potato use 82
3.2.2. Potato diseases 83
3.2.3. The late blight epidemics of 1844, 1845 and 1846 84
3.2.4. Countries 86
3.2.5. Interaction between harmful agents 90
3.2.6. Other crop damages 91
3.2.7. Scientific interest 92
3.2.8. The quality of the information 97
3.3. Social consequences 97
3.3.1. General setting 97
3.3.2. Demographic effects 99
3.3.3. Pauperism 103
3.3.4. Hunger riots 105
3.3.5. Migration 106
3.3.6. Official relief 107
3.3.7. Private relief 108
3.3.8. Access to credit 109
3.4. The economic depression of the 1840s 110
3.4.1. Mercantilist attitudes 110
3.4.2. The ‘commercial crisis’ in NW Europe, 1847-1848 110
3.4.3. Economic liberalisation 112
3.4.4. Causes of famine 112
3.5. The events of 1848 113
3.5.1. Political aspects 113
3.5.2. The potato blight and the revolutions 115
3.5.3. The fate of the farmers 116
3.6. Conclusions 117
Appendix 3.1. Contemporaneous information as published in The Official
Newspaper of the Dutch Government (D: Staatscourant) of 1845. 118
4. Crop loss in the Netherlands during World War I, 1914-1918: productivity of major
food crops in a long-term perspective 121
4.1. Potato riots, 1917 121
4.2. Materials and methods 122
4.3. Results 125
4.3.1. National level – cultivation area 125
4.3.2. National level – yield in hl/ha 127
4.4. Crops and their major harmful agents 129
4.4.1. Potato 129
4.4.2. Wheat 131

4.4.3. Rye 133
4.5. Discussion 134
4.5.1. The data 134
4.5.2. Crop loss 134
4.5.3. Causes and effects 134
4.5.4. World War I and Dutch Agricultural policy 135
Appendix 4.1. Overview by years, 1903-1930. 140
5. Crop loss in Germany during World War I, 1914-1918: productivity of major food
crops and the outcome of the war 145
5.1. War and plant disease 145
5.2. The war situation 146
5.2.1. General position 146
5.2.2. Food policy 147
5.3. Agents of crop loss 148
5.3.1. Biotic and abiotic agents of loss 148
5.3.2. Potato – degeneration 149
5.3.3. Potato – late blight 150
5.4. A crop loss chronicle 150
5.4.1. 1914 – the rust year 151
5.4.2. 1915 – the drought year 152
5.4.3. 1916 – the blight year 153
5.4.4. 1917 – the frost year 155
5.4.5. 1918 – the meagre year 156
5.5. Food security in Germany 156
6. I mpact of plant disease epidemics on society, under-rated or over-estimated? 159

6.1. Plant disease epidemics and societal disruption 159
6.2. Plant disease and the Great French Revolution, 1789 160
6.2.1. Unrest in 18th century France 160
6.2.2. The Great Fear 161
6.2.3. Studies on ergotism 163
6.2.4. Tessier’s studies 167
6.2.5. Conclusions 169
6.3. The war that did not happen, 1722 169
6.4. Black rust of wheat and the Russian famine of 1932-1933 170
6.4.1. The epidemic of 1932 170
6.4.2. Industrialisation of Russian agriculture 171
6.5. Brown spot on rice and the Bengal Famine of 1943 172
6.5.1. Social order in Bengal 172
6.5.2. Brown spot in 1942 173
6.5.3. Food availability and purchasing power 175
6.6. An afterthought 176

7. Postscriptum 179
7.1. Food and politics 179
7.2. Six capita 179
7.3. Politics and food 181
7.4. Final comments 182
Acknowledgements 183
Publications by J.C. Zadoks relating to the history of plant disease 185
References 187
Curriculum vitae 211
Notes 213

List of abbreviations
[ ] = Comments inserted by author
~ = approximately
BCE = Before Christian Era

BP = Before Present
CE = Christian Era
D = Dutch
E = East
F = French
G = German
M = middle
N = north
NL = the Netherlands
R = Russian
RH = relative humidity
S = south
W = west
d = day
hl = hectoliter = 100 liter
kg = kilogram
l = liter
tonne = 1000 kg
y = year

List of tables
1.1. Data from rust interception trials near Rome. 32
2.1. Kingdom Prussia, 1846, yields per province. 61

2.2. Mean grain and straw losses in Belgium, 1846. 67
2.3. Mean grain and straw yields in Belgium, 1846. 76
3.1. Weekly budget of an average family of rural poor, 1845. 83

3.2. Birth, death, and population growth rate in six countries, 1846-1848. 100
3.3. Tentative estimates of excess mortality, 1846-1848. 101
4.1. The provinces chosen and some of their characteristics (seasons 1915-1918). 123
4.2. Monthly weather data averaged over 28 years, 1903 to 1930. 124
4.3. Summary table of national cultivation areas, yield levels and hectolitre weights
for the Netherlands, 1903-1930. 126
4.4. Trends in potato, wheat and rye yields for selected provinces and for the
Netherlands, 1903 to 1930. 127
4.5. Loss estimates of potato, rye and wheat using pairs of provinces. 132
4.6. Starch crop yields in the war years 1915 to 1918. 137
4.7. Total production of starch crops in the Netherlands during World War I. 138
5.1. Germany’s production of rye, wheat and potato, 1914-1918. 148

5.2. Yields of three generations of potato, 1916. 150
5.3. Schander’s 1916 experiment with halved tubers. 153
5.4. Schander’s 1916 experiment on planting distances. 154

List of figures
1.1. Drawings after the Robigo altar. 31
2.1. Puccinia glumarum (Schm.) Eriks. & Henn. – Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis
Westend. 45
2.2. Puccinia glumarum (Schm.) Eriks. & Henn. – Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis
Westend. 46
2.3. Cryptogamic herbarium or collection of cryptogamic plants that grow in Belgium,
by G.D. Westendorp and A.C.F. Wallays. 47
2.4. Uredo rubigo-vera Dec. - Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis Westend. 48
2.5a. Detail from 2.4, adaxial leaf side. 49
2.5b. Puccinia striaeformis West. – Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis Westend. 49
2.6. Map of the Netherlands around 1846. 53
2.7. Uredo rubigo. 54
2.8. National wheat and rye production of the Netherlands, 1837-1847. 56
2.9. Prices of rye and wheat in the Netherlands, 1841-1850. 56
2.10. Net imports of wheat and rye in the Netherlands, 1841-1850. 57
2.11. Map of Europe, situation of ~1845. 59
2.12. Imports of rye into Belgium, 1841-1850. 60
2.13. Tentative map of rye yields and losses in Continental Europe, 1846. 66
3.1. The Frost Index for the Netherlands over the years 1830-1850. 86
3.2. The Summer Index for the Netherlands over the years 1830-1850. 87
3.3. Monthly means of daily temperatures, the Netherlands in 1845 and 1846. 87
3.4. Monthly means of precipitation in De Bilt, the Netherlands, 1845 and 1846,
plotted as deviations from the 30-years averages (1831-1860). Monthly
precipitation in mm. Original data from General Reports. 88
3.5. Note on Botrytis the destroyer or the potato fungus. 94
3.6. Sketchy maps indicating the relationship between loss figures and areas involved
for 1845 and 1846. 98
3.7. Population growth in the Netherlands from 1810 to 1850. 99
3.8. Prices of major food commodities on the European Continent, 1845-1847. 113
4.1. Summer Indexes and Frost Indexes for the Netherlands, 1903-1930. 124
4.2. The national potato area, 1903-1930. 125
4.3. The national yields of potato, wheat, and rye over the years 1903 to 1930. 128
4.4. Spraying equipment. 129
4.5. Potato yields compared between Friesland and Zeeland. 131
4.6. Dutch wheat and rye imports just before, during, and just after World War I. 136
4.7. Dutch potato exports before, during, and just after World War I. 136
5.1. The 1916 weather in Bremen, NW Germany, as compared to a long-term average. 151
6.1. The Frost Index for the Netherlands in years 1770-1790. 161
6.2. Ergot on rye – Claviceps purpurea (Fr.) Tul. 165

List of boxes
1.1. Ovid on the Robigalia in Fasti. 28
1.2. The litanies of the Rogation Days. 30
1.3. Invocation on a border stone found in Tunesia. 34
2.1. The three rusts of rye. 41

2.2. Sir Joseph Banks, the rust and the blight. 42
2.3. Rubigo-vera – a nomen confusum. 44
2.4. Honeydew. 50
2.5. Yield losses of rye in the Netherlands, 1846, by province. 57
2.6. Quotes from the Allgemeine Zeitung, 1846, the S German ‘General Newspaper’ 62
3.1. Contemporary explanations of the ‘potato murrain’. 93

3.2. Quotations from the Reverend C. Hooijer (1847). 101
3.3. The fate of the poor during a famine, as stated by various authors. 104
6.1. Symptoms of gangrenous ergotism as described by Tessier in 1776. 163

6.2. The life-cycle of ergot, caused by the fungus Claviceps purpurea Tul. 164
6.3. Environmental conditions favouring ergot infection on rye and ergot control. 166
6.4. The effects of ergot poisoning in humans. 167
6.5. From a letter by embassador Campredor to Louis XIV, King of France. 170
6.6. Some quantitative considerations on the Bengal rice harvests in 1942. 174

1. Wheat rust in antiquity
In antiquity wheat rust was known and feared. The visual effects of the rust
were described in metaphorical language as red foxes and wheat fires. In
classical Rome the rust was personified as a numen and magic was applied to
propitiate it with sacrifices, processions, and religious feasts, the Cerealia
and Robigalia. Which rust species was involved? The field symptoms point
to black stem rust. Recent crop and rust phenology data and astronomical
comments by Roman authors were in fair agreement. To describe the damage
caused by rust a story was told in figurative language. Foxes, burning torches
bound to their tails, were said to set fire to the wheat fields. In Rome Ovid
versified the story 2000 years ago, the biblical tale of Samson is about 2700
years old, and the fable told by the legendary Aesop from Asia Minor may go
back beyond 2600 before present. The three narrations, sharing the element
of blazing foxes set free at harvest time, are seen as three versions of a folk-
tale circulating in the Mediterranean area, meant as a metaphor to describe
and explain the effect of a severe attack by black stem rust on wheat.
Rubigo quidem, maxima segetum pestis, lauri ramis in arvo defixis transit in ea folia ex arvis.
As for the greatest curse of corn, mildew, fixing branches of laurel in the ground makes it pass
out of the fields into their foliage.
Pliny the Elder (23/24-79 CE) – Naturalis historia XVIII: 161.
Translation by H. Rackam (1971).
‘The ancients having no rational Principles or Theory of Agriculture, plac’d their chief Confidence
in Magical Charms and Enchantments; which he, who has the Curiosity and Patience to read,
may find in the Title aforemention’d, in Cato, in Varro (and even Columella is as fulsome as any
of them) all written in very fine Language;’
Tull, J. (1733: 68) – The horse-hoing husbandry.
1.1. Famines feared
Famines have been a matter of constant fear among the farmers of the past. The causes of
famines were diverse, abiotic, biotic, or man-made. Man-made famines have been used as an
instrument of warfare1. Abiotic famines were climate-induced and due to either frosts, droughts
or floods. Among the biotic causes were pests2 and diseases3 of crops. In antiquity, one of the
diseases felt to be a real danger and a possible cause of famine was the wheat rust.
The classical agronomists could not identify the rust species as it is done today. This chapter4
intends to demonstrate that from ~3000 BP (Before Present) until recent times the black stem
rust, Puccinia graminis f.sp. tritici, was felt to be a permanent threat to the farming communities
of the Mediterranean Area and the Near East.

Chapter 1
In olden times, the link between the natural (drought, locust, ‘mildew’) and the super-natural
was evident to observing people. By lack of logical, not to say bio-logical, explanations
of catastrophic events anxious persons, threatened in their very existence, were driven to
super-natural explanations and magic5 within the framework of their religion. Priests of all
denominations drew moral lessons from agricultural mishaps and threatened their flocks to
keep them on the right religious track. At home, around the fire place, people told stories
which contained elements of admonition, explanation and consolation. The wording was
metaphorical, even poetical, and in no way scientific in the modern sense.
1.2. Wheat and wheat rust
1.2.1. Wheat
Wheat cultivation began some 12,000 years BP, when wheat was selected as a nutritious,
cultivatable and harvestable grass (Diamond, 1999). The ears of grasses tend to be fragmented
for easy dispersal of the seeds but an intact ear is crucial for harvesting a grain crop. The
intact ear is guaranteed by one double recessive gene. Finding this gene and maintaining it in
the double recessive state was the first step in wheat6 selection and breeding taken ~10,000
years ago.
1.2.2. Rust
Wheat can be infected by three rust species, yellow stripe rust, brown leaf rust, and black stem
rust, all three now occurring world wide. These parasitic fungi have co-evolved with their host
grasses7. The various species of grass rusts were not so choicy with regard to their host species,
in the Near East up to this very day (Wahl et al., 1984).
The life cycle of some of these rust species is quite complex. Several rusts are macrocyclic and
heteroecious8. Macrocyclic means that these rusts have different spore forms with different
functions. Heteroecious means that some of these spore forms, belonging to one and the
same rust species, need different host plants. Thus the black stem rust has two spore forms
on the common barberry (Berberis vulgaris), and three spore forms on grass, i.c. wheat. This
polymorphism can be seen as an adaptation to the climate. As long as the grasses are lush and
green, the rust multiplies and spreads by means of urediniospores. With the advent of summer
the grasses begin to dry and the rust produces telia with teliospores, a resting stage that bears
with adverse conditions, cold, heat and drought. When the rains set in the teliospores will
germinate and produce basidiospores that can drift about in the wind. The life cycle continues
when the basidiospores settle on the young leaflets of the barberry, freshly appearing after
the first rains. The basidiospores infecting the barberry leaflets produce pycnia and these lead,
after a fertilisation process, to aecia with aeciospores. Aecidiospores are shed and dispersed
by wind to grasses, among which wheat (Lehmann et al., 1937). In the space-time universe we
need barberry shrubs not too far from the grass or wheat fields, and an alarm-clock awakening
simultaneously the teliospores to produce infecting basidiospores and the dry barberry bushes
to produce infectible young leaflets. The first rains set the alarm.
Specialisation of black rust on selected grasses occurred in the more peripheral areas of
cultivation9. In Western Europe specialised forms of the rust exist on wheat, oats, rye and barley,
on perennial ryegrass, and so on. They all alternate with barberry, but they can do without host

Wheat rust in antiquity
alternation when offered a continuous, year-round crop10. The final choice depends on various
circumstances not relevant here. Curiously, no evidence has been found in modern Israel for
black rust on barberry (Anikster & Wahl, 1979).
Barberry, a thorny shrub, probably was common in the Mediterranean area. Supposedly it
occurred at the fringes where grassland and forest met. In recent times four vicariant species
have been distinguished which occur in a botanical association, the Berberidetum, in the
mountains at mid-height11. Barberry is an aggressive coloniser of disturbed land and, once
established, difficult to get rid of.
In Kanaänite antiquity numerous but relatively isolated villages, separated by stretches of

forest and grazing grounds, were surrounded by small fields. For safety reasons villages were
usually located on hill tops. The position of barberry in a landscape dominated by wilderness
is not clear. It may have occurred at the fringes where grassland and forest met. Much later,
the Romans established large estates in parts of the Mediterranean area, as in Tunisia, possibly
with barberry bushes in the roughages left over between fields.
In modern times B. vulgaris has been planted as an ornamental and medicinal plant. Hedges of
barberry have been planted to keep the cattle or the ‘naughty boys’ out12. Because of the black
rust the common barberry had to be eradicated.
1.2.3. Evidence for black stem rust
The Bible contains several curses that threaten crops to be ‘smitten with mildew’13, and ‘mildew’
is an old English term for what is now called rust, primarily black stem rust, more specifically the
telial stage14. Löw (1928: 40) related the words ‫ ירקון‬and ‫ שדפון‬to wheat diseases such as smut
and black rust. Lehmann et al. (1937) stated that Hebrew texts juxtapose the words yeraqon
and shidafon, referring to bleaching or yellowing and scorching or blackening, respectively. The
bleak and the black are the final colours of a wheat crop severely infected by stem rust.
If the Biblical texts refer indeed to rust, the choice of a species becomes easy. We have to look
at descriptions of ‘field symptoms’ from the pre-scientific period. A severe epidemic of black
rust in its terminal stage may end up in a miserable, ashen-grey crop15, sprinkled with dull
black spots. The crop is ‘of a dark livid colour’ and looks like ‘covered with soot’16. The rusted
crop seems to be scorched, even burnt. The association of black rust with fire comes naturally.
In serious cases the stems break and fall hither and thither17, the grain is shrivelled, and the
harvest is a complete failure. Wheat crops severely affected by yellow or brown rust may lead
to complete harvest failure18, though rarely so, and they may look miserable, but they do not
typically remind one of fire.
The classical Greek authors were extremely vague on plant disease and so we will disregard
them, one example excepted. Aristotle19 hinted at something that could be interpreted as rust
though the reference is not convincing: ‘Now red blight is due to moisture which is hot, but
comes from elsewhere’. The word translated as ‘red blight’ is erusibai, erysiphe – mildew – the
old English term for the final stage of black stem rust20.
Of far later date than our biblical informants are the various Roman authors21 knowledgeable in
agriculture and providing relevant information. Ovid (see Box 1.1) was pertinent as to ‘rust’, the

Chapter 1
Box 1.1. Ovid on the Robigalia in Fasti (IV: 905 ff; translation by Frazer, 1989).
The word Robigo was retained instead of Frazer’s ‘mildew’. Note the pun of rust on crops and on iron.
On that day, as I was returning from Nomentum to Rome, a white-robed crowd blocked the middle of
the road. A flamen [= priest] was on his way to the grove of ancient Robigo to throw the entrails of
a dog and the entrails of a sheep into the flames. Straightaway I went up to him to inform myself of
the rite. Thy flamen, O Quirinus, pronounced these words:
‘Thou scaly Robigo, spare the sprouting corn, and let the smooth top quiver on the surface of the
ground. O let the crops, nursed by the heaven’s propitious stars, grow till they are ripe for the
sickle. No feeble power is thine: the corn on which thou hast set thy mark, the sad husbandman
gives up for lost. Nor winds, nor showers, nor glistening frost, that nips the sallow corn, harm it so
much as when the sun warms the wet stalks; then, dread goddess, is the hour to wreak thy wrath. O
spare, I pray, and take thy scabby hands from off the harvest! Harm not the tilth; ‘tis enough that
thou hast the power to harm. Grip not the tender crops, but rather grip the hard iron. Forestall
the destroyer. Better that thou shouldst gnaw at swords and baneful weapons. There is no need
of them: the world is at peace … but let rust defile the arms, and when one essays to draw the
sword from the scabbard, let him feel it stick from long disuse. But do not thou profane the corn,
and ever may the husbandman be able to pay his vows to thee in thine absence.’
So he spoke. On his right hand hung a napkin with a loose nap, and he had a bowl of wine and a casket
of incense. The incense, and wine, and sheep’s guts, and the foul entrails of a filthy dog, he put upon
the hearth – we saw him do it. Then to me he said,
‘Thou askest why an unwonted victim is assigned to these rites?’ Indeed, I had asked the question.
‘Learn the cause,’ the flamen said. ‘There is a Dog (they call it the Icarian Dog), and when that
constellation rises the earth is parched and dry, and the crop ripens too soon. This dog is put on
the altar instead of the starry dog, and the only reason of killing him is his name.’
same that defiled the iron arms, with the rust-brown colour22 of the urediniospores. The field
symptoms, as perceived by the Romans, and the late appearance of the disease, after the barley
harvest23, both point to black rust, maxima segetum pestis24 (the worst pest of the crops). Pliny
the Elder (23/24-79 CE) characterised the weather conditions25 inducive to a rust outbreak,
clear night skies and warm days.
The biological evidence for black stem rust on wheat is quite convincing. Kislev (1982) found
black stem rust on charred remnants26 of wheat (Triticum parvicoccum) in an Israeli dig dated
~3000 BP.
1.3. Magic
1.3.1. Magic and science
Magic and science have in common that, in principle, a one-to-one relationship exists between
an action, the ‘cause’, and its result, the ‘effect’. In science the relationship is mechanistic,
in magic it is associative. The separation line between magic and religion is thin. Magic
implies that a specific desirable result follows from a specific human action27. Sacrifices and
processions, religious feasts and games, so common in antiquity all contain elements of magic.

In this chapter the Roman feasts called ‘Cerealia’, the grain feast, and ‘Robigalia’, the rust feast,
will be highlighted.
1.3.2. Cerealia
The Cerealia (April 12 to 19) were devoted to the cereals28. This feast contained elements of
magic. Ovid (43 BCE-17 CE, Fasti IV: 679 ff) described a curious event during the Cerealia. Foxes,
with burning torches bound to their tails29, were chased through the circus maximus in Rome30.
As an ‘explanation’ Ovid told a little story. A naughty boy, a farmer’s son, wanted to punish a
fox that had stolen many farmyard fowls by wrapping it ‘in straw and hay, and setting a light
to her’. The fox escaped. ´Where she fled, she set fire to the crops that clothed the fields, and a
breeze fanned the devouring flames’31. The breeze spreading the flames over the fields suggests
the contagious nature of the rust disease that, carried by the wind, affects an area rather than
a single field. Apparently, the ‘wheat fire’ was noticed just before harvest, when the wheat was
dry and burned easily. This timing is relevant, as we will see.
1.3.3. Robigalia
The Robigalia are known from Ovid (see Box 1.1). Roman calendars date the feast at April 25th,
nearly the date Ovid quoted for his encounter with a festive procession led by a sacrificer
(flamen). The Praenestine calendar32 added ‘The festival of Robigus takes place at the fifth
milestone on the Via Claudia, lest Robigo should harm the corn. A sacrifice is offered and games
are held by runners both men and boys’.
Robigo (female, threatening) or Robigus (male, protecting) originally was a numen, an abstract
notion, neither male nor female, representing a phenomenon (Leopold, 1926), e.g. a spring or a
special tree. Numina were commonly worshipped by the Romans. To appease the numen in good
time a ceremony was organised, the Robigalia. Pliny stated that this feast was established by
the Roman King Numa Pompilius (715-672 BCE) at ~700 BCE. Possibly, the king formalised an
older, possibly Etruscan, tradition.
Indeed, the ceremony was established at an early date as follows from the location, at the fifth
mile stone from the centre of Rome, once the border of the Roman ager, the city’s cultivated area.
It is at the border where one has to defend his crop. In Ovid’s time the Robigalia were apparently
a folkloristic event for townspeople rather than a religious ceremony for peasants.
Passing to more recent times the Christian Fathers Tertullian, Lactantius and Augustine referred
to Robigo. Emperor Constantine made Christianity the State Religion in 323 CE, keeping the
Robigalia in the calendar. Pope Gregory I (540-604) replaced the Robigalia in 598 by the Festum
S. Marci Evangelista, still on April 25th. The christianised procession should never be postponed,
according to a 1756 missal 33. It followed the old route northward along the Via Flaviana (the
present name of the first part of the Via Claudia), passed the Ponte Milvio, and then returned
to St Peter’s cathedral to celebrate mass.
April 25th and the three days preceding Ascension Thursday used to be called the Rogation
Days. Processions went out into the fields, invoking the benediction of the crops by singing the
litanies (see Box 1.2). Until the mid 20th century the Rogation Days were observed in many parts
of W Europe including the Netherlands (Goossen, 1980; various personal communications34).

Chapter 1
Box 1.2. The litanies of the Rogation Days.
On April 25th, the Major Rogation Day, the Litaniae Majores (major litanies) were sung. They contained
vocations to Saints, prayers and supplications (rogationes). A major rogation is:
Ut fructus terrae dare et conservare digneris.
(That You deign to give and preserve the fruits of the earth).
It was the only rogation repeated thrice (Verbruggen, 1957).
On the other rogation days, called Minor Rogation Days, the Litaniae Minores sufficed, a shortened
version with the rogation:
Ut fructus terrae dare et conservare digneris, te rogamus, audi nos,
(That You deign to give and preserve the fruits of the earth, we pray You, hear us).
This rogation was not repeated.
The Litaniae Majores were sung at a fixed date (April 25th) and the Litaniae Minores at a variable date,
depending on the date of Eastern. These two dating systems, fixed and variable, existed already in
Roman times.
The Litaniae Majores are no longer sung except in Rome, and since the Second Vatican Council,
1970, the Rogation Days are no more in the Missale Romanum. Thus a tradition nearly three
millennia old was abolished.
The Church (now we say the Roman Catholic Church), when spreading Christianity over Europe,
appeased local populations between the fourth and ninth century by christianising local
custom. Field processions in spring formed part of Gallic and Germanic traditions. In the
Netherlands, the protestant version of the Roman Catholic field processions is a day of prayer
for the crops, on the second Wednesday in March, observed up to this very day.
1.3.4. Sacrifices and processions
The Roman author Varro (116-27 BCE) wrote about ‘twelve gods who are the special patrons of
husbandmen’. Among them were ‘Robigo and Flora35; for when they are propitious the rust will
not harm the grain and the trees … wherefore, in honour of Robigus has been established the
solemn feast of Robigalia …’36. Sacrifices to the rust god Robigus37 were made alongside the
fields with standing corn38. Altars used to be temporary constructs of sods (Leopold, 1926).
Ancient Italian farmers carved their gods in wood. Sods and wood leave no remnants.
In 1922 a stone cylinder was found in a vineyard at Castiglioncelli, near Livorno, some 200 km
north of Rome (Galli, 1924; Figure 1.1). Measuring 88 cm in height and 71 cm in diameter, and
weighing some 800 kg, it consisted of reddish flint-stone quarried from nearby mountains. A
semi-spherical basin was carved out at the upper side, 35 cm deep, with two drains in which
traces of lead pipes were found. The decoration of the cylinder’s outside consisted of three
oxen heads, four dogs (two sitting and two standing with curling tails), festoons with fruits,
and a horned human head with snakes around the face. The human head supposedly represents
the evil goddess Robigo39. Horned oxen and horned human heads represent apotropaeic, evil
averting forces. The altar, dating from the first century BCE, may be the only material remnant
of the once lively Robigo cult.

Figure 1.1. Drawings after the Robigo altar, found at Castiglioncelli (from Galli, 1924).
1.4. Science
1.4.1. A problem of timing
Roman authors provided information that can be interpreted with today’s knowledge. Our
interpretation so far suggested an identification of the rust involved, a choice out of three
possible rust species. But there is more to it. The Roman authors were specific about dates and
we may investigate whether these dates make sense to us. Can they be used to confirm or refute
our interpretation? Three aspects of timing ask our attention, crop phenology, rust phenology,
and astronomy. We admit that the phenological argument is ‘softer’ than the astronomical
argument.
1.4.2. Phenology, the crop
Little is known about wheat phenology in antiquity. As the climate of Rome probably did not
change much between 500 BCE and today some of the more recent agricultural data may apply.
Piero de Crescentio (~1300) wrote a treatise De agricultura vulgare (On common agriculture). He
was a citizen of Bologna, a town at the southern edge of the Po valley, 250 km N of Rome. He
differentiated cold, normal and warm places. His data for warm places supposedly reflect the
situation in Latium, the wheat growing area near Rome. In Book XII he states:
November Best period for sowing wheat in warm places.

February/March Period for weeding the cereal crops.
May Flowering period.
June Early June – harvest period of barley; In warm places the wheat harvest is
completed towards the end of June40.
These dates are roughly confirmed by the isophanes of wheat harvests (Azzi, 1930), the Agro-
ecological Atlas (Broekhuizen, 1969), and by mid 20th century data from the International

Chapter 1
Yellow Rust Trials (Table 1.1; Zadoks, 1961: §15). Billiard (1928) and Stevens (1942) placed the
antique wheat harvest in June or early July.
One side remark has to be made. Italian wheat breeding since the 1930s aimed at early harvests
in order to avoid the black rust41. As to the damage caused by black stem rust an advance of the
harvest by one week can make a world of difference. It was known for long that late crops were
more severely damaged than early crops42, as in Tuscany, 1766 (Tozzetti, 1767).
Table 1.1. Data from rust interception trials near Rome.

Rust was observed in 14 out of 20 years (70%). For ten years adequate data were available. The mean date
of rust appearance, irrespective of rust species, was 101 days (σ = 22) from January 1st, corresponding
with April 11th. The calculation, based on classical epidemiological theory (Zadoks & Schein, 1979), uses
several questionable assumptions. The end result is an approximation only. Original data published by kind
permission of the late R.W. Stubbs.
Year Date of observation t 2a xmaxb Rust speciesc Δtd t1e

(day/month)
1962 10/07 191 + T - -

1963 - - - - - -
1964 ? - 1.00 GS 69 -
1965 05/05 125 + T - -
1966 26/05 146 0.05 S 31 115
1967 06/06 157 - - - -
1968 04/06 156 1.00 ST 69 87
1969 04/06 155 + T - -
1970 30/06 181 1.00 GST 69 112
1971 - - - - - -
1972 15/06 167 1.00 S 69 98
1973 - - - - - -
1974 04/06 155 0.90 GST 42 113
1975 - - - - - -
1976 - - - - - -
1977 04/05 124 1.00 GST 69 55
1978 02/06 153 1.00 S 69 84
1979 31/05 151 0.80 GST 53 98
1980 18/06 170 0.10 ST 35 135
1981 15/06 166 0.80 GST 33 113
a Date of observation, Julian day (in days from January 1st).

bx
max = maximum severity observed, espressed as a fraction (0 ≤ x ≤ 1).
c Puccinia species observed: G = P. graminis, S = P. striiformis, T = P. triticina).
d Δt = estmated time in days from rust appearance to rust observation. Δt = r -1 * (logit x
2 – logit x1)
with x1 = 0.0001 and r = 0.20; r = apparent infection rate.
e Estimated date (in Julian days) of first appearance of rust, t = t – Δt.
1 2

1.4.3. Phenology, the rust
The three wheat rusts occurred, in all probability, in the ancient fields as they do in more
modern crops. In recent times (~1960-1980) rusts appeared in the area of Rome around mid
April (Table 1.1). Yellow rust appeared first but remained insignificant. Brown rust appeared
later, sometimes became rather serious but seldom devastating. Black rust usually came last.
Though the order of appearance may have been the same in antiquity, being determined by the
temperature preferences of the rusts43, the dates of appearance and the quantities of primary
inoculum may have differed in past and present.
In antiquity barberry bushes may have been more frequent than today between fields and along
rivers and rivulets. If so, primary inoculum of black rust could have been more abundant than
today. The scientific literature describes local or at best regional epidemics of black rust with
barberry as their source44. Banks (1805) mentioned barberry-based local epidemics of black
rust in England, and a severe and general outbreak of black rust on wheat in 1804. A regular
source of local epidemics was found in Central France (Massenot, 1961). The author saw such
epidemics in Bavaria (Germany) and in former Yugoslavia around 1960; they must have occurred
in Italy.
Tozzetti (1767) mentioned several years with local or regional rust epidemics. He agreed with
Fontana (1767) that a severe black rust epidemic raged all over Italy in 1766. The summer
of 1765 was bad resulting in poor seed quality. The winter 1765/6 was cold, crops were late
and thin with a poor colour. Rust arriving early wrought heavock. The relation between the
appearance of rust, warm days and cool nights with dew and early morning fog was known to
Tozzetti.
During the build-up phase of the epidemic the summer spores (urediniospores) are formed in
great quantity. The crop may acquire a reddish hue. The farmer entering the field will find his
clothes and his dog’s fur coloured brown by rust spores. These sights are threatening to a man
who already foresees his family going hungry during the next winter. When the wheat ripens
the rust, forming telia, changes colour. The crop expected to ripen with golden yellow colour
turns ash-grey and – when severely affected – grey-black. The crop looks as being scorched by
fire. Stems and ears are densely covered by black telial flecks of the black rust, suggesting the
charred remains of a fire (see Box 2.2).
In classical nor in mediaeval texts references were found to severe rust epidemics devastating
the wheat crops. Authoritative history books45 did not mention wheat diseases. Nonetheless
rust was feared as shown by an inscription on a border stone found in Tunisia and dating from
the second century CE (see Box 1.3).

Chapter 1
Box 1.3. Invocation on a border stone found in Tunesia46. Among the deities are Egyptian, Semitic non-
Hebrew and, maybe, local gods (Anonymous, 1996).
‘Oreobazagra Oreob[azagra] Abrasax Semeseilam Stenakhta Lorsakthè Koriaukhe Adonaie, sovereign

gods, hinder, turn aside from this property and from what is growing on it – in the vineyards, the
olive-groves, in the seeding places – hail over the produce, grain-rust, fury of the Typhonian winds,
a swarm of harmful locusts, so that none of these pernicious things touch this field nor any of the
produce in it; but guard them altogether unharmed and uncorrupted, as long as these stones engraved
with your sacred names are here lying about the land’.
1.4.4. Astronomy, the Dogstar
Farmers in past and present tend to look at the sky when musing over a decision. The modern
distinction between astronomy and meteorology did not exist in antiquity; see Pliny’s
Natural History, Book XVIII, which abounds with remarks on stars and weather in the typical
combination of traditional farmer knowledge. Sirius, the Greater Dog Star, had a prominent
position in the agrometeorology of the Mediterranean area. The star was visible most of the
year. At the latitude of Rome Sirius was invisible only during ~85 days. About 700 BCE, when
the Robigalia were founded, the Dog Star disappeared from the evening sky (‘setting’) on April
25th and reappeared in the morning sky (‘rising’) on July 20th (Clark, 2007). Its morning ascent
announced the flooding of the Nile.
The Dog Star is in the constellation of the Dog, Κυων in Greek and Canis in Latin, which precedes
the hunter Orion. Sirius, Σειριος in Greek (= the scorching), is one of the clearest stars of
the firmament. Its Latin epitheton was flagrans (= the blazing). The real hot days of summer,
the Dog-days, began when Sirius became visible in the morning sky (heliacal rising47). Pliny
placed the event at 23 days after solstice (June 24th for him) or July 17th. The Dog-days48, dies
caniculares, were roughly between July 17th and August 8th. It was the period of the celestis
sterilitas, the ‘sterilizing influence of the heavens’49, the hottest period of the year.
Ovid clearly stated the relation between the Robigalia and the Dogstar, Sirius. The ceremony
that he described is usually seen as a sacrifice to avert damage by the summer heat during
the dog days (e.g. Blaive, 1995: 281). This view seems illogical since the crops were harvested
before the peak of the summer heat. Bömer (1958: 270) called the relation ‘sekundär’ but I
think, on the contrary, that it is crucial. The snag is in the timing. Ovid’s spokesman timed the
premature ripening of the crops quo sidero moto, when the star moves, apparently to be read
as ‘sets’. Thus, the true relation is with the Dogstar setting in the evening twilight49a. This
‘heliacal setting’ of Sirius occurred in Ovid’s time about May 1st and in 700 BCE about April 25th.
The date of the ceremony recalls its ancient origin50.
Pliny wrote51: ‘Numa in the eleventh year of his reign established the Feast of the Robigalia,
which is now [~50 CE] observed on April 25th, because that is about the time when the crops are
liable to be attacked by mildew [= rust]’ and ‘but the true explanation is that on one or other,
according to the latitude of the observers, of the four days from the 29th day of the spring
equinox [April 19th] to April 28 the Dog sets, a constellation of violent influence in itself …’.
The setting of Sirius toward the end of April announced a spell of trouble and mischief. To the

Romans, it seems, the heliacal setting of Sirius could lead to evil such as rust (see also Vegoia’s
curse, §1.5.5).
A chain of associations comes to mind, rust, blackened crops, summer burn, Dogstar, dogs,
sacrifices. There was indeed an association between rusts and dogs by way of a star, an
association that made sense to the ancients. Ovid, the worldly poet, was mistaken in his
timing. Pliny, the matter-of-fact scientist, was precise in his timing without going into
explanations. Coincidence, year after year, suggests causality. Sober-minded Pliny rejected
coercive causality52: ‘And in this matter admiration for Nature’s benevolence suggests itself,
as to the fact that ‘…, because of the fixed courses of the stars this disaster cannot possibly
happen every year, …’.
1.4.5. Summing up
Consensus existed already about the interpretation of the Roman ‘rust’ on wheat as ‘cereal rust’
in the modern sense. My text interpretation clearly suggests black stem rust (Puccinia graminis)
as the main candidate. An excursion into the realm of the natural sciences strengthens the
suggestion, but I admit that the other two rusts of wheat, and even other foliar diseases of
wheat, cannot be excluded completely. Returning to the literary trail we now aim at a wider
view.
1.5. Rust, dogs and foxes
1.5.1. Associative thinking
Ovid’s charming little story (§1.3.2) related a burning fox to wheat in fire, a case of associative
thinking. Scorched wheat supposedly is a metaphor of the visual effect of black rust, more
specifically of its telial stage. The uredinial stage precedes the telial stage, just as the fox in
the story precedes the wheat fire.
1.5.2. Samson and the Philistines
A comparable story is found in the Bible (Bömer, 1956). Judge Samson is depicted as an
impressive but unpleasant fellow, a womanizer, a vindictive person. He was a great foe of the
Philistines. Judges 15, verses 4 and 5 tell us ‘4. And Samson went and caught three hundred
foxes, and took firebrands, and turned tail to tail, and put a firebrand in the midst between two
tails. 5. And when he had set the brands on fire, he let them go into the standing corn of the
Philistines, and burnt up both the shocks, and also the standing corn, with the vineyards and
olives.’ (King James Bible).
One explanation of Samson’s story sees the foxes53 as the wildly moving clouds of a thunderstorm
and the firebrands or torches as the thunderbolts (Bakels, 1946). However, the torrential rains
during thunderstorms will rapidly extinguish fires kindled by lightning allowing at best a small
area to be burnt. We might also think of dry lightning54 kindling spontaneous wheat fires as
occur in the U.S.A., but wheat fires due to dry lightning have not been observed in present-day
Israel55.

Chapter 1
In Mediterranean antiquity, mixed cropping of ‘planted’ crops (olives, vines) and ‘seeded’ crops
(wheat, pulses) was common56 (White, 1970). Thus, if the wheat was set on fire the ‘vineyards
and olives’ could be scorched or even burnt. Samson himself might have ignited the wheat of
the Philistines. Note the timing ‘in the time of wheat harvest’ (Judges 15 verse 1).
A phytopathological explanation of the two verses seems attractive, an outbreak of black

stem rust, though the blackened vineyards and olives stand in its way. We might think of the
precipitation, rain and dew, necessary to create a severe black rust epidemic, a wetness that
could also induce the growth of sooty molds on fruits, and even leaves, of tree crops giving
them a dull black felty cover. Curiously, Pliny mentioned rust in wheat and scorching in vine57
in one sentence, but that comment bears no relation to fire.
1.5.3. Aesop’s fable
Ovid’s lovely sketch of the farmer’s son may have been inspired by one of Aesop’s fables (Bömer,
1956), ‘The man and the fox’ (Chambry, 1960). In free translation it runs as:
‘A man had bad feelings about a fox that caused him damage. He caught it and in revenge
he attached flax imbibed with oil to its tail, and put that to fire. But a demon directed the
fox to the fields of the catcher. It was harvest time. The man followed, deploring his lost
harvest.’
Note the ominous ‘it was harvest time’, the wheat ripe and dry in the field, as, literally, in Judges
15 verse 1, and, indirectly, in Ovid’s poem.
1.5.4. Dog sacrifices in antiquity
The dog-and-sheep sacrifice by Ovid’s flamen does not stand alone. Sacrifices of dogs belong
to an Indo-European tradition, often in a military context of purification or of the aversion of
evil (Blaive, 1995). A dog sacrifice was mentioned in a text from ~700 BCE, engraved in bronze
tablets58. A skeleton of a dog, probably a sacrifice, was found near a wall of Rimini, a city
founded in 268 BCE; it could symbolise a watch dog (Gianferrari, 1995). The threat to be averted
might have been directed either at the town itself or at the ager, the cultivated area around the
town, producing part of the town’s wheat supply. In the latter sense we may understand some
references to regular dog sacrifices by Pliny and Festus (see notes 59-61).
Columella59, referring to Etruscan religious practices, recommended to sacrifice a sucking

pup. Its blood and bowels served to propitiate goddess Robigo. The colour of the pup was not
mentioned. Confusion arises because of another dog sacrifice, meant to appease the scourging
summer heat personified by Sirius, the Dog-Star.
Allegedly Rome had a gate called the Doggy Gate, named after the Doggy Sacrifice60. Little
detail is known about this sacrifice, but it is certainly not the sacrifice of Ovid’s flamen. The
Doggy Sacrifice with augury was to be made around May 1st , ‘before the corn has sprouted from
the sheath, but not before it is in the sheath’, i.e. at the booting stage61. In this rite of variable
date (feria conceptiva) the dog, sacrificed to avert the ire of the Dogstar from the crops, should
be red or reddish62, the colour of both the she-fox and the uredinia of stem rust. The red could
refer to the summer heat as well as to the rust, the former being the usual interpretation and
the latter the author’s view.

We see two story lines crossing at the dog-and-sheep sacrifice to Robigo. The first is a rather
consistent line of stories on dog sacrifices for purificatory, apotropaeic or propitiatory purposes.
The second is a rather accidental story line on ‘fox and fire’ for allegorical description and
phantasmagorical explanation.
1.5.5. Linking East and West
Could it be that poorly understood natural phenomena were phrased in metaphorical terms
common to the Mediterranean world in the last millennium BCE? The resemblance between
the three stories, Samson’s deed, Aesop’s fable, and Ovid’s tale, is too obvious to let it pass
unnoticed.
The link between the ‘foxes and fires’ of Ovid and Samson may be old and precede by far the
dates quoted above. Dog sacrifices were found in digs of Etruscan remnants. Three complete
skeletons from the 3rd century BCE have been found near an Etruscan temple, a dog and a sheep
in one pit and a fox in another pit (Gianferrari, 1995). Does the trail lead back from Ovid’s stories
to the Etruscans?
Indeed, the trail leads to the Etruscans, and beyond. Cheats who displaced field border stones,
trespassing Etruscan law, were to be punished: fructus saepe ledentur decutienturque imbribus
atque grandine, caniculis interient, robigine occidentur (driving rains and hail will damage
and lodge the crops, when the doggy days set in, and the crops will perish by rust63). This is
Vegoia’s curse, dated ~90 BCE but of older Etruscan descent (Valvo, 1998). Ominously, the curse
continues multae dissensiones in populo (there will be much dissent among the people). Though
the Doggy Days are usually related to the summer heat following the heliacal rising of the
Dogstar, they might be connected as well with its heliacal setting. In springtime the Scirocco
may blow, the hot, dry and dusty wind coming straight from the Sahara Desert64. Even today
the Scirocco causes people in Rome to be irritated and nervous. The prophesy seems to confirm
the nervousness, disquietude, and unrest in that period of the year.
The Etruscans probably descended from people originating from the North-eastern part of Asia
Minor (Van der Meer, 2004; Achilli et al., 2007). Their predecessors may have arrived in Italy
around 1200-1000 BCE. They were connected to the ‘Sea Peoples’, fierce pirates from the Aegean
area, who ravaged the East Mediterranean coasts around 1200 BCE. According to an Egyptian
source the Philistines were among them. The Sea Peoples destroyed major cities in Kanaan such
as Ashdod and Ekron (Finkelstein & Silberman, 2002).
‘Fox and fire’ as a cultural link between the wheat fields wrecked by Samson ~2600 BP and the
sacrifice to Robigo sung of by Ovid ~2000 BP is far-fetched but not impossible as there was
international cultural intercourse. Philistine peasants, having brought the tale from Asia Minor,
may have shared it with their Jewish neighbours.
In antiquity, international travel and exchange was common, either in trade, tourism, or
warfare. A late but relevant example of a cultural link among the peoples of the Mediterranean
is given by a votive stone dated ~200 CE, marking the border of a domain in present Tunisia, at
the time one of the grain-sheds of Rome. The stone bears a text in Greek (see Box 1.3). In the
polytheistic culture of Rome the invocation of many Gods was apparently acceptable. Among
them was Adonai, the Lord of the Hebrews.

Chapter 1
The three ‘fox and fire’ tales must have a common root. The Roman festivals, Robigalia and
Cerealia, are said to be installed by the second king of Rome, Numa Pompilius65 (715–673/2 BCE).
They may have been of Etruscan origin or have been imported from Asia Minor by the Etruscans.
The book of Judges containing Samson’s story, part of the ‘Deuteronomistic History’, was put
on record somewhere between the reign of King Josiah (639-609 BCE) and the Babylonian Exile
(586-~440 BCE) (Finkelstein & Silberman, 2002). The story may have been original, may have
been shared between Jewish and Philistine farmers, and may have been part of the cultural
luggage carried by the Philistines from Asia Minor. The body of Aesop’s fables was a product
of classical Greek culture, about the third century BCE. Chambry (1960) saw some consensus
about a Phrygian or Lydian origin of the legendary ‘Aesop’, possibly in the sixth century BCE,
in Asia Minor again.
Could the revenge of Ovid’s farm boy and Samson’s wrath represent the western and eastern
branches, respectively, of a folk tale tradition66 originating in Asia Minor and common to the
populations of the East Mediterranean area?
1.6. Conclusions
1. Ovid (Fasti IV: 905 ff) referred to the heliacal setting of the Dogstar, Sirius, when the wheat
rusts used to appear.
2. Ovid’s ‘fox and fire’ was a western and Samson’s ‘fox and fire’ was an eastern version of a
common folk tale, which may have originated in Asia Minor before the 6th century BCE.
3. The ‘fox’ and the ‘red-coloured dogs’ refer symbolically to the uredinial stage of the black
stem rust on wheat.
4. The ‘fire’ alludes to the telial stage of the black stem rust on wheat.
5. The crucial moment of the ‘fox and fire’ stories is ‘it was harvest time’, when black stem rust
in its telial stage is most prominent and ominous.
6. ‘Fox and fire’ is a metaphor of a severe infection of wheat by black stem rust (Puccinia
graminis), an infection that could fill the farmer with a nearly mortal fear.

2. A yellow rust epidemic on rye, 1846
The year 1846 was a year of disaster in the Netherlands, and beyond. The
potato harvest failed bitterly due to potato late blight. The grain harvest
also failed, for a variety of reasons. The major cereal of the Netherlands was
rye. Historians mentioned the failure of the rye harvest without discussing
its cause. This paper argues that yellow rust was a major cause, though few
scientific papers are available to prove the point. The evidence had to be
brought together by bits and pieces, taken from a variety of sources. In the
end a fairly consistent picture of a yellow rust epidemic on rye could be
drawn, with sudden appearance over an area reaching from the Netherlands,
over Belgium, the western half of present Germany, the western part of
modern Poland, and touching Switzerland. In apparent contradiction rye
suffered considerable damage by drought in 1846 over large areas.
Nefaria ista pestis anni 1846…

This darned pest of the year 1846…
From a letter by B. Auerswald, Saxony, to J.-H. Léveillé, France (1848: 777).
2.1. A year of disaster
1846 was a year of disaster in the Netherlands. Economic recession, poverty, scarcity, even
hunger troubled the Dutch populace. The commoner was used to eat rye bread supplemented
by potatoes or, more modern, potatoes supplemented by rye bread. Unfortunately, the potato
harvest failed in 1846 due to Phytophthora infestans Berk., as in the preceding year. The wheat
harvest also failed in 1846 after inundations here and an outbreak of voles there (Chapter 3).
Rye was still the main food crop of the Netherlands and the rye harvest was a failure too
because of a rust. Which one?
There is little to tell about the cultivation of rye. Winter rye was grown in all districts and on
nearly all soils. Spring rye was far less important. All rye was susceptible to all three rusts,
black stem rust (Puccinia graminis f.sp. secalis), brown leaf rust (Puccinia recondita), and yellow
stripe rust (Puccinia striiformis f.sp. secalis). At the time, these rusts were still poorly known.
Scientists did not yet have the vocabulary needed to accurately describe what they saw. So the
evidence for one or the other rust had to be pieced together from little scraps of information
accepting the risk of a mistaken conclusion.
Contemporaneous scientific literature was practically silent about the rust in rye anno 1846,
possibly because the scientists of the day were fully occupied by the potato murrain (Chapter 3).
The newspapers, in contrast, were quite communicative about the rye and its rust. One of the
leading newspapers of the Netherlands, the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, kept its readership
between hope and fear. For the month of July, the harvest month, I counted 26 scattered notes
on the rye harvest in the Netherlands and 22 on rye beyond the Dutch border. This commercial

Chapter 2
intelligence, usually containing strictly local and rarely regional information, must have been
of great value to the trading and shipping companies of Rotterdam.
2.2. Prelude
2.2.1. The state of the art
Around 1800, professional scientists were rare but many persons had sufficient leisure time and
ambition to indulge in the natural sciences. These were largely descriptive, trying to name and
order the confusing diversity offered by nature (Foucault, 1966). Experimentation, common
in contemporary physics, chemistry and medicine, was still exceptional in biology. Fontana
(1767: 19) had performed an ‘experiment’, his own word, by placing rust spores under the
microscope. The period around 1800 was the epoque of general and professional encyclopaedia
and handbooks. Books were published on mycology, botany and agriculture67. Several books
mentioned diseases of cereals. Writings specifically devoted to plant disease were still rare
(Fabricius, 1774; Plenck, 1794).
Desmazières (1812) had a chapter on rust68 (F: rouille) in his treatise on grain production. He
considered rust on rye less fearsome than on wheat. ‘The Rust is a yellow dust, colour of iron
rust, that one observes on the stems and leaves of a large number of plants, and particularly,
from the month of April, on those of wheat. That dust there forms linear and parallel flecks’. The
globules [= urediniospores] were spherical or ovoid. They were ‘real intestinal plants, analogous
to those of the bunt, and of the genera Uredo and Puccinia’.
The wording does not exclude yellow rust though the colour indications are somewhat
contradictory. The linear and parallel flecks are a differential characteristic for yellow rust
but at the time the name for black stem rust was Uredo linearis, described as ‘with linear and
parallel pustules’. The shape of the urediniospores is not distinctive either. The timing, as of
April, pleads against black rust, is in favour of yellow rust but does not exclude brown rust.
Desmazières, a capable mycologist, was influenced by the naturalist De Candolle (1815).
Seringe (1818) in Switzerland also described rust on cereals. He considered the rust to be
a parasitic fungus. He chose his adjectives carefully; a rust on sedges was reddish from
the beginning, brown when old, and its pustules were sparse. Seringe’s words69 (quoting De
Candolle) ‘oval pustules … extraordinary small, but normally very numerous’ and ‘yellow dust’
recall yellow rust. His description of the urediniospores excludes black rust. The damage could
be severe. In his herbarium Seringe deposited a sample taken from rye that had not even
headed, probably due to ‘exhaustion that the rust had produced’. The severe early infection and
the numerous but small pustules suggest yellow rather than brown rust.
The state of the art was such that the three rust species on wheat and rye had not yet been
clearly separated (see below). Rather, the line was drawn between the uredinial and telial stages,
as by Fontana (1767), Persoon (1801) and Banks (1805). Cohabitation of, in today’s terminology,
urediniospores and teliospores in one pustule was known but not really appreciated70.

A yellow rust epidemic on rye, 1846
2.2.2. Three cereal rusts
The taxonomist rather than his taxonomy is relevant to the present subject since the taxonomist
often made a side-remark of interest to the epidemiologist. Unfortunately, the nomenclature
of cereal rusts has changed so much in the course of time that back-tracking is a bit tricky. For
today’s nomenclature I follow Savile (1984). As European and American vernacular names differ,
Europe’s black rust being America’s stem rust, I begin with combined names and continue with
the European designations (Box 2.1)71.
Box 2.1. The three rusts of rye.

Collated and simplified (after Rapilly, 1979; Roelfs, 1985; Savile, 1984; Zadoks, 1961).
European name: Black rust

American name: Stem rust
Latin name: Puccinia graminis (Persoon) f.sp. secalis (E. & H.)
Alternate host: Berberis vulgaris L. and other barberry species
Plant parts affected: Leaves, leaf sheaths, stems, and ears (glumes sporulating mainly on the
outside).
Ecology: Prefers higher day temperatures (optimum ~18 °C), cool dewy nights.
Spring sources: Local barberry bushes, sometimes long distance dissemination.
Oversummering: As telia on straw, also as uredinia on self-sown plants.
Overwintering: As telia on straw, in warmer climates as uredinial mycelium in fall-sown crops
or volunteer plants, and possibly on some grasses.
European name: Brown rust

American name: Leaf rust
Latin name: Puccinia recondita (Roberge ex Desmazières, 1857)
Alternate host: Anchusa and Echium spp.; some other Boraginaceae.
Plant parts affected: Leaves.
Ecology: Temperature preference intermediate, sporulates during mild winters.
Spring sources: Uredinia overwintering on rye, aecia on Anchusa and Echium spp.
Oversummering: As telia on straw, also as uredinia on self-sown plants.
Overwintering: As telia on straw, as uredinia on volunteer plants and fall-sown crops.
European name: Yellow rust

American name: Stripe rust
Latin name: Puccinia striiformis (Westendorp) f.sp. secalis (E. & H.)
Alternate host: Not known, probably non-existent.
Plant parts affected: Leaves, leaf sheaths (sporulating at the ad-axial side only, rare), stems (non-
sporulating, very rare), and ears (common, glumes mainly sporulating at the
inside).
Ecology: F.sp. secalis - no data; f.sp. tritici ‑ adapted to low temperatures, sporulating
and multiplying during mild winters, optimum temperature 7/12 °C, stops
growing and sporulating at day temperatures >20 °C.
Spring sources: Fall-sown crops, volunteer plants.
Oversummering: As uredinia on self-sown plants and on very late crops.
Overwintering: As uredinial mycelium in fall-sown crops and volunteer plants, also under snow
cover, as long as host plants survive.

Chapter 2
Black stem rust. Black rust of rye became very important in Denmark following the ‘division
of the commons’. Barberry hedges had been planted around 1800 to mark the divides between
fields and very severe epidemics of black rust occurred soon after (Hermannsen, 1968).
Outbreaks of black rust on rye following the planting of barberries was also seen in Germany
around 1804 (Windt, 1806).
In England black rust was locally important and in some years (1804) it caused severe damage on
wheat (Banks, 1805; see Box 2.2). We have no reason yet to believe that long-distance dispersal
of urediniospores by winds was important at the time; nonetheless, it may have occurred (Hogg
et al., 1969). In the Netherlands several cemeteries were surrounded by barberry hedges to
keep the cattle out, and the naughty boys. Around these cemeteries black rust of rye occurred
regularly (Oort, 1941).
Box 2.2. Sir Joseph Banks, the rust and the blight.
Banks (1805) wrote a small treatise on stem rust of wheat, published as an annex to a booklet on the
cultivation of meadow and lawn grasses (Curtis, 1805). Both were illustrated by beautiful coloured
plates. Following the disastrous wheat harvest of 1804 he studied the ‘blight in corn [= wheat]
occasioned by the growth of a minute parasitic fungus or mushroom on the leaves, stems, and glumes
of the living plant’. He saw each teliospore on its pedicel as an individual plantlet.
Banks called the uredinial stage ‘rust’ and the telial stage ‘blight’. He used the microscope to study
the ‘blight’, but there is no evidence of experimentation. Banks touched upon several points of
interest to the epidemiologist.
Quoting the farmers’ belief, ‘scarcely credited by botanists’, in a relationship between the barberry
and the ‘blight’ Banks speculated on the biological process underlying that relationship, without
coming to a firm conclusion72.
Banks mentioned a relationship between the ‘chocolate-brown’ rust and the black blight, that could
cohabitate in one pustule, but he preferred to stay on the safe side and, following Fontana (1767), he
considered them to be different species. He stated that the ‘rust’ was ‘believed to begin early in the
spring, and first to appear on the leaves of wheat in the form of rust, or orange-coloured powder’. I
surmise that this early rust was yellow rust, rather than brown or black rust that tend to show up at
a later stage of development.
‘The chocolate-coloured Blight is little observed till the corn is approaching very nearly to ripeness;
it appears then in the fields in spots, which increase very rapidly in size, and are in calm weather
somewhat circular, as if the disease took its origin from a central position’. The late appearance, the
colour, and the conspicuous focus formation are characteristic for black rust.
Banks believed the rust and the blight to be dispersed by wind, referring to the spores ejected by
puff ball fungi. He was impressed by the capacity for multiplication of the rust and the rapidity of
the malady’s spread. Banks had a feeling for what we now indicate as temperature dependent latency
period; ‘at this season [spring], the fungus will, in all probability, require as many weeks for its
progress from infancy to puberty as it does days during the heats of autumn’.
In 1848 black rust was known under various names such as Uredo linearis for the uredinial
stage and P. graminis for the telial stage73. The aecial stage on barberry was seen as a separate
rust species (Aecidium berberidis), though Banks and others had their suspicions. The host

alternation from barberry to rye or wheat was known by several non-academic practicians since
the early 19th century but in academia that relationship was ignored until it was conclusively
demonstrated by De Bary (1866).
Westendorp, a medical practitioner, was active in Belgium as an amateur mycologist of high

standing. In his commercial herbarium (Westendorp & Wallays, 1846) we find black rust in the
uredinial stage74 as Uredo linearis Pers. (Part 7 No. 331; ‘on the stems, the sheaths and the leaves
of cereals, mainly wheat’) and the telial stage75 as Puccinia graminis Pers. (Part 2 No. 91).
Brown leaf rust of rye was ill known as a separate species around 1850. Berkeley (1854/7) did
not mention brown rust in his ‘Vegetable Pathology’, nor did De Bary76 in 1853. Westendorp
(1860) described77 Puccinia recondita Rob. ex. Desm. on the wilting leaves of rye as a new record
for Belgium. Scattered uredinial pustules of ~2mm occur primarily on the adaxial side of the rye
leaves, also on the abaxial side, but quite seldom on leaf sheaths, stems, and heads. Their colour
changes in the course of time from yellow-brown to chestnut. The host alternation with Echium
and Anchusa spp was unknown until De Bary (1867). The brown rusts of rye and wheat look
similar but they are different species78. The literature abounds with confusion in naming the
brown rusts and several authors attached the name rubigo-vera (see Box 2.3) to brown rust79.
Historical evidence for a significant role of the alternate hosts is not available. We assume that
brown rust of rye in the Netherlands behaved epidemiologically as brown rust of wheat (Chester,
1946; Zadoks & Leemans, 1984) and yellow rust (see below). Since the two brown rusts have
higher temperature optima than yellow rust their overwintering will be less frequent and their
epidemic upsurges in spring will be later80. Wind dispersal of P. recondita urediniospores over
large distances may have occurred in the 19th century with its wide-spread rye cultivation but
there is no evidence whatsoever.
Yellow stripe rust (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) on rye seems to have been fairly general in the old days.
De Candolle (1815) described the uredo rust81 of cereals, Uredo rubigo-vera (see Box 2.3). This
rust ‘is born on the upper surface of the leaves, more rarely on the lower surface, on the sheath
of the leaves or on the stem of the gramineous plants, and primarily on wheat; there she forms
extraordinarily small oval pustules, but normally very numerous’. They produce a ‘yellow dust:
in the end, that dust becomes reddish, but never black’. ‘The ovoid spores are nearly round’.
The description excludes black rust, and typically fits yellow rust with the term ‘yellow dust’
and the superlatives ‘extraordinarily small’ and ‘very numerous’. Nevertheless, brown rust 82
is not completely excluded because in the end the dust becomes ‘reddish’. We meet with this
ambiguity83 in several descriptions as long as brown rust is not seen as a species per se.
De Candolle added that the rust, when abundant, exhausts the plants and causes considerable
damage. Berkeley (1856: §601, 95) stated that U. rubigo-vera could have disastrous effects
on wheat when ‘the spikelets and the germen are affected’. Meyen (1841: 134) wrote that U.
Rubigo-vera Dec. in many years was exceptionally frequent and ravaged whole counties. He
proceeded (ibid.: 140) with a rather detailed description of glume rust (Rubigo glumarum),
which he apparently considered to be another species than rubigo-vera. The comments by
Berkeley and Meyen point to yellow rust, since brown rust on glumes is extremely rare.
Interestingly, the Uredo rubigo-vera Dec. (1846 Part 5 No 231) of Westendorp & Wallays on
cereals was neither black nor brown rust, but yellow rust on rye (Figures 2.3 to 2.5a). As part

Chapter 2
Box 2.3. Rubigo-vera – a nomen confusum.
For an epidemiological interpretation of widely scattered data a first requirement is the identity of
the rust under consideration. To that purpose rust species have received names. Unfortunately, the
early rust taxonomy is utterly confusing, see e.g. the historical paragraphs in Eriksson & Henning
(1896: 143/5, 211/2). This box gives a few highlights84.
Persoon (1801) was convinced that Uredo and Puccinia were different genera. He rejected the idea of
a transition from the one into the other. ‘Observation: I fear that [V. linearis] is not but the younger
plantlet of P. graminis)’85. Most scientists followed his view, among whom Banks (1805), Fries86 (1829),
and Léveillé (1848). De Bary (1866) produced convincing experimental evidence to the contrary,
describing macrocyclic and heteroecious rusts.
Erroneous splitting was accompanied by wrong lumping. Decandolle (1807) introduced the name
rubigo-vera for rust on cereals in the uredinial phase. In Léveillé’s detailed description (1848: 777)
rubigo vera could infect leaves, sheaths, stems, glumes and even grains of cereals. He recognised two
spore forms, a large oval one and a smaller roundish one, stating that the large oval ones did not really
belong to the Rust (F: la Rouille). Thus he eliminated black rust from the complex. He knew that rubigo
vera was a rust that clearly changed colour in the course of time87. He also knew that an attack began
with oval dots, sometimes scattered (brown rust?), sometimes crowded (yellow rust?). He did not
conclude that he dealt with a complex of two rusts.
The final definition of ‘brown rust’ (Puccinia dispersa nov. spec.) was made by Eriksson & Henning
as late as 1896. Describing two formae speciales, tritici and secalis, these authors introduced a new
mistake. Presently the brown rust on wheat is triticina, a name dating from 1899, and that on rye is
recondita, a name dating from 1857 (Desmazières, 1857 p79888; Savile, 1984).
The original description of rubigo vera by Decandolle (1807), as quoted by Seringe (1818), perfectly
fits the yellow rust. I could not examine his herbarium with the specimen on rye but I did examine
the herbarium of Westendorp & Wallays (1850, Volume 5. No.231. Uredo rubigo-vera Dec.). I convinced
myself that their specimen of rubigo vera was yellow rust on rye. This is the ‘yellow rust line’ of rubigo
vera interpretation.
Meanwhile a ‘brown rust line’ of interpretation came into being. Eriksson & Henning (1896: 211/2) and
others mentioned rubigo vera in the context of triticina, brown rust of wheat (vide Wiese, 1977: 39).
The name glumarum was given to a rust, apparently yellow rust, by Schmidt (1817, ex Eriksson &
Henning, 1896), but I had no access to the source. Westendorp (1854b), in Desmazières’ trail, used
that name, but for what? Léveillé (1848) treated glumarum as a separate species, ‘which has much
analogy with the Rust, on glumes of wheat and rye, causing incidental abortion’. The phrasing does
not suggest that Léveillé had seen Desmazières’ glumarum89. The ‘abortion’ evidently referred to
rye only. Eriksson & Henning (1896) finally coupled glumarum to yellow rust (G: Gelbrost), Puccinia
glumarum nov. spec.
The rust epidemic of 1846 occurred in a period of taxonomic vagueness, so that we cannot trust names
but must look for symptoms, often at field level, such as early appearance.
5 was published in 1846 we may believe that the herbarium sample was collected during the
epidemic of yellow rust on rye in that year. The specimen90 consists of two pieces, each a
fragment of a stem with a complete leaf and part of a leaf sheath. ‘On the leaves of cereals’
says the text, without indication of host species, location, or date of collection. Glumes were
shown nor mentioned.

Figure 2.1. Puccinia glumarum (Schm.) Eriks. & Henn. – Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis Westend.
From plate VI in Eriksson & Henning (1896). No rye depicted.
66-72. Wheat.
66. Summer leaves, rust development in the course of 13 days.
67. Leaves in secondary stage of disease.
68. Leaves with dying rust, flecked.
71. Leaf sheath (x1), uredinia and telia.
72. Leaf sheath (x2), a - younger, b - older stage.
73. Barley, summer leaf, primary disease stage.

Chapter 2
Figure 2.2. Puccinia glumarum (Schm.) Eriks. & Henn. – Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis Westend.
From plate VII in Eriksson & Henning (1896).
74-80. Wheat.
74. Spike (x1).
75. Spikelet (x2).
76. Flower, a - glume, b - lemma, c – palea, d – outer and e - inner side of kernel.
77. Spikelet, awned (x2).
78. Spikelet (x2), uredinia and telia.
79. Glume (x2)
80. and lemma (x2), seen from inside, with uredinia and telia.
Desmazières91 called the rust on the inflorescences U. glumarum92. Wiegmann’s (1839: 115)
description of Uredo Glumarum (G: Spelzenrost, Kappenbrand, Balgbrand) points to yellow rust.
Westendorp (1854b) briefly mentioned Uredo glumarum Rob. ex Desm. The critical Berkeley
(1856: §602, 788) wrote ‘It is right to state that Desmazières considers the species which

Figure 2.3. Two volumes of the Herbier cryptogamique ou collection des plantes cryptogames qui croissent
en Belgique (Cryptogamic herbarium or collection of cryptogamic plants that grow in Belgium), by G.D.
Westendorp and A.C.F. Wallays, Gent, van Doosselaere. Present in the Library of the Wageningen University &
Research Centre. Book sizes about quarto.
grows on the inflorescence as different from that which grows on the leaves, and therefore
has published it as U. glumarum Roberge; but after an examination of his own specimens this
opinion is not borne out, for there is no one essential character to separate them, nor are the
spores as he describes them smooth, but minutely granulated as in undoubted U. rubigo-vera’93.
So, Berkeley’s rubigo-vera, possibly ambiguous, at least included our yellow rust.
In fungal taxonomy the step from anamorph (asexual stage, here urediniospores) to teleomorph
(sexual stage, here teleutospores) is important. Westendorp (1854a) described Uredo striaeformis
nov. sp. on grasses94 such as Holcus lanatus, on which I never found yellow rust. His description
included the telial stage, though the word ‘description’ is too honorific95. The combined volumes
21 and 22 of Westendorp & Wallays (1855) contain N° 1077, Puccinia striaeformis West, ‘on the
straw of cereals around Courtrai’ (Figure 2.5b). Macroscopic inspection showed the telial stage
of yellow stripe rust96. The species name, adjusted to striiformis, received priority because it
referred to the perfect stage (teleomorph) of the fungus (Hylander et al., 1953)97.
Finally, Eriksson & Henning described P. glumarum as a separate species. They (1896: 203)
considered P. glumarum f.sp. secalis on rye to be a separate forma specialis, morphologically
identical with the ff. sp. tritici and hordei on wheat and barley, respectively. They used, maybe
introduced (1896: 141), the name ‘yellow rust’ (G: Gelbrost). I have no reason to believe that
the ecological behaviour of the f.sp secalis differed from that of the other two formae speciales,
though I don’t know for sure. Yellow rust has no known alternate host.

Chapter 2
Figure 2.4. Uredo rubigo-vera Dec. - Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis Westend. From Westendorp &
Wallays (1846), Herbier cryptogamique ou collection de plantes cryptogames et agames qui croissent en
Belgique (Cryptogamic herbal or collection of cryptogamic and agamic plants that grow in Belgium), Brugge,
de Pachtere, Vol. 5, No. 231.
‘On the leaves of cereals. Received from Mr. L. Matthys’. The specimens are most probably rye, left the abaxial
and right the adaxial leaf side with the uredinial stage only. Possibly collected during the 1846 epidemic.

a. b.
Figure 2.5a. Uredo rubigo-vera Dec. – Detail from Figure 2.4, adaxial leaf side; b. Puccinia striaeformis
West. – Yellow stripe rust, now P. striiformis Westend. From Westendorp & Wallays (1855), Vol.21/22, No.
1077. On the culms of cereals around Courtrai. Probably on wheat, telial stage, no uredinia seen. The small
telia are arranged in stripes, shiny dark brown to black.
Vernacular names of plant diseases in the 19th century are a mess98. In Zeeland (SW Netherlands),
1957, an elderly farmer mentioned the name ‘honeydew’ (see Box 2.4) to me for yellow rust, a
rather non-specific term from the 19th century99. In the Dutch literature of the first half of the
19th century we find on rye the Dutch equivalents of ‘red-dog’, ‘red rust’ or ‘the red’ (Roessingh
& Schaars, 1996: 446). In my experience ‘red’, as used by farmers, is a non-specific term rather
meaning ‘not-green’100. However, the uredinia of brown rust are reddish brown and those of
black rust are somewhat darker fox-brown or chocolate-brown. The name ‘red-dog’ may have
been a reminder of classical writings (Chapter 1). Van Hall (1828: 314) quoted an informant
writing on ‘the red’ (Uredo Fabae Pers.) of broad beans101, thus providing a direct link between
the names ‘red’ and ‘rust’, a link he repeated in 1854 (284).

Chapter 2
Box 2.4. Honeydew (= D: honingdauw or honigdaauw, G: Honigthau).
In 1957, when I studied the epidemiology of yellow rust on wheat in the field (Zadoks, 1961), an
elderly farmer in Zeeland told me ‘formerly we used to call this honeydew’. As a vernacular name for
yellow rust the word ‘honeydew’ is legitimate though confusing. The old man’s comment led me to
the honeydew controversy. Around 1800, parasites such as rust were considered to be the cause of
disease by some, and the consequence of disease by others.
Cause. Fontana (1767), Banks (1805) and De Candolle (1815) were convinced that parasites were ‘plant’
species living separately from but housed on or even in their host plants. They were sitting – as it
were ‑ at the same table, the original meaning of the Greek work παρασιτος (= parasite, sitting by).
Clearly, Fontana (1767: 34) realised that these independent plants were living at the cost of their host
plant, the present meaning of the word parasite (ibid.: 34). So did Banks and De Candolle.
Consequence. The other party had reminiscences of the humoral theory, of classical Greek origin and
in accordance with 18th century medicine. Possibly they were troubled by Fabricius’ (1774: 36) fuzzy
discussion of ‘Honey-dew, Erysiphe’. Unger’s (1833) exanthematic theory was the apogee of that line
of thought in plant pathology, and also nearly the end. Plants in a poor condition exuded humors
that ‘cristallised’ into a shiny substance which today we call honeydew, or materialised into one or
another fungus. Unger described and named these fungi in the usual way, provided nice drawings of
fungi rooting in the host plant, but nevertheless considered them explicitly as the consequence of
disease. Wiegmann (1839) and others followed Unger’s line of thought102.
Van Hall (1828: 307), usually well informed, had read that insects could produce a substance, called
‘honeydew’, that precipitated on the leaves of plants but he was not fully convinced. He knew
that honeydew was on and rust in the leaf. He thought it improbable that honeydew and rust were
successive stages of the same disease, since he had observed honeydew without subsequent rust
and rust without preceding honeydew. However, in 1854 Van Hall (1854: 284) equated honeydew and
mildew (Erysiphe), being unaware of the fact that the old root ‘mil’ means honey and not meal. Van
Hall returned to the subject in 1859, evidently confused by Unger’s (1833) exanthema theory, and
then suggested that honeydew was an early phase of rust. Which rust?
Enklaar (1850: 177) wrote ‘The honeydew is the sweated, sugary juice of the crops’. He connected
honeydew and aphids, though in an inverted sense, first the honeydew and then the aphids.
The learned Dutchmen apparently overlooked a comment by Erasmus Darwin (1800: 326) ‘In a paper
written by Abbé Boissier de Sauvages, he describes two kinds of honey-dew; one of which he concludes
to be an exudation of the tree, and the other he asserts to be the excrement of one kind of aphis, which
the animal projects to the distance of some inches from its body on the leaves and ground beneath it;
and which he believes the animal acquires by piercing the sap-vessels of the leaf. The circumstances
are distinctly described, and by so great a philosopher103 as Sauvages of Montpellier, that it is difficult
to doubt the authenticity of the fact.’ Darwin was not convinced: ‘But that a material so nutritive
should be produced as the excrement of an insect is so totally contrary to the strongest analogy, that
it may nevertheless be suspected to be a morbid exudation from the tree; …’
2.2.3. Epidemiologic phases
A severe epidemic of yellow rust on wheat passes through several phases (Zadoks, 1961). Phase
1 is a wet summer with many volunteer plants permitting an ample oversummering of the rust.
Phase 2 is a fair and dry autumn which many early-sown winter crops allowing the switchover
of the rust from the preceding to the following crop104. Phase 3 is a mild winter enabling the

rust to settle in the new crops and to multiply repeatedly with comparatively short generation
periods, the overwintering. Phase 4 is a mild spring during which the rust multiplies at a faster
rate with increasing temperatures so that it ‘overtakes’ the rapidly growing crop, the outburst
of the rust. Supposedly the four stages apply also to yellow rust on rye in the 19th and 20th
centuries.
Good crop rotation reduces the risks of over-summering and switchover (Zadoks, 1961).
Unfortunately, the rye farmers on the sandy soils – especially those in the East of the
Netherlands – about the mid 19th century did not bother much about crop rotation, frequently
growing rye after rye (Van Zanden, 1985: 186).
Urediniospores of yellow rust can be wind-dispersed over hundreds of kilometres but these
wind-borne spores rarely initiate a typical outburst in the season of dispersal. A heavy epidemic
has a local origin and requires a build-up of a year (the four phases). As soon as the temperature
reaches a certain limit (~20 °C) the yellow rust epidemic comes to a stop whereas the brown
and black rust epidemics continue to grow.
Several authors mentioned that yellow rust could be more severe in well-fertilised crops, as is
my experience in the late fifties with nitrogen dosage experiments in wheat. The most amusing
remark was on the corn (read rye) grown at Altona (then Denmark) near Hamburg (Germany).
Rust became frequent when farmers began manuring their crops with ‘herring’ (Enklaar, 1847).
The waste of the herring industry provided cheap organic matter, rich in nitrogen.
2.3. The rust on rye in 1846
Retrospective identification of a disease agent is tricky. Fortunately, we find support in the

literature. Our primary source is the ‘General Report on the State of Agriculture in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands’105. This report collated the data provided by provincial informants. The
point is relevant since every province had its own informant(s). When a specific comment, e.g.
a symptom, is observed in two provinces we have – in principle – two independent and mutually
reinforcing pieces of evidence. The reservation ‘in principle’ refers to the possibility that two
informants discussed the symptoms before reporting.
In Appendix 2.1 the relevant sections are reproduced in bold and analysed. The Dutch has
not been translated into English as translation may introduce interpretation. The analysis
is organised by province. Quotes are [numbered] for further discussion. Arguments for and
against the conclusion ‘yellow rust’ are [lettered], written in English and arranged in order of
persuasiveness.
The conclusion is ‘yellow rust’, with the possibility of incidental ‘brown rust’ and with
exclusion of ‘black rust’. The main argument is the yellow-coloured infection of the glumes. A
characteristic observation was made by Anonymous (1846b: 47). The cloths of a person walking
through the crop turned yellow of the heavy fungal dust (conform author’s experience), and
dogs entering the crop came out yellow. None of the observations on the infestation, the
course of the epidemic, and the environmental conditions contradict the conclusion.
The evidence produced in this chapter in support of the conclusion ‘yellow rust’ is based on
epidemiological phenomena, macroscopic symptoms, and observations at the level of the hand

Chapter 2
lens. Observations under the microscope were rare and mainly referred to the roundish shape
of the urediniospores, a characteristic shared by the yellow and brown rusts, thus excluding
black rust. One observer mentioned that the spore walls were hyaline (Göppert, 1846), thus
excluding brown rust106.
2.3.1. The weather in Europe
The very mild winter 1845/6 and the favourable months of March and April were followed by an
exceptionally hot and dry summer in most of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from
the Netherlands to the Alps, even S to Sicily (Bourke & Lamb, 1993: Chapter 3). A variety of
crops, primarily spring-sown crops, was damaged by heat and/or drought. Rye, normally fall-
sown, was the preferred crop for the poorer soils that were drought-sensitive. Drought damage
in rye occurred from France to Poland.
In Poland and Silesia strong, cold winds from N and E directions damaged early winter rye when
about to bloom, hampering fertilisation and seed set. Large stretches of rye had completely
or partly deaf ears (Weber, 1847). Damaging night frosts must have occurred but the available
information is scanty and imprecise107.
Yellow rust can progress without rain as long as there is ample nightly dew (Zadoks, 1961). Many
records stated that the atmosphere was often humid, even oppressive. Under such conditions,
given clear night skies, dew is guaranteed, certainly in relatively low lying areas.
2.3.2. The Netherlands108
Naming the rust. Ponse (1810) wrote about honeydew as occurring mainly on wheat, especially
on late ripening wheat. In 1827 he responded to a price contest on honeydew. Evidently,
honeydew here stands for rust. Ponse followed Banks (1805). Some details suggest that he
dealt with yellow rust which gradually ‘turned into’ brown rust toward the end of the season. His
honeydew began early in spring, with excrescences of an orange colour, ‘and appears in the form
of rust, of orange-coloured dust’, as yellow rust does. ‘Chocolat-coloured honeydew is rarely
detected before the grain approaches its full ripeness, appears in tiny flat surfaces, somewhat
roundish when the weather is calm’. The term ‘chocolat-coloured’ comes straight from Banks who
used it for the colour of black rust uredinia. However, Ponse probably saw uredinia109 of brown
rust, which may indeed appear as oval ‘facets’ (Ponse’s term, D: ovale vlakjes), a description not
appropriate for black rust uredinia. Ponse used the word ‘rust’ (Banks’s term for the uredial
stage of black rust), saw both yellow and brown rust, but did not realise that the symptoms seen
belonged to different rust species110.
Enklaar (1850: 177) used the terms ‘rust’ en ‘honeydew’ in their modern sense but he did not
discuss rust species. He saw ‘… yellow, later rust-coloured flecks and stripes on the leaves and
stems, sometimes also in the ears of the cereals …’, mainly on wheat and rye. The fluent colour
transition reminds us of Ponse. The words ‘yellow’, ‘stripes’ and ‘ears’ suggest yellow rust. He
continued ‘thus the rye harvest of 1846 was destroyed for a large part by rust’. Anonymous
(1846b,c) described the epidemic in detail. He concluded correctly ‘Uredo vera Decandolle’, first
forgetting the ‘rubigo-’ (1846b: 48) but adding it later (1846c: 99).

Figure 2.6. Map of the Netherlands around 1846.
XY = Province Am Amsterdam
DR Drenthe Bn Brummen
FL Flevoland Dt Delft
FR Friesland Gn Groningen (town)
GE Gelderland Hn Harlingen
GR Groningen (province) He The Hague
LI Limburg Hm Hilversum
NB Noord-Brabant (shortly Brabant) Im Irnsum
NH Noord-Holland Le Leeuwarden
OV Overijssel Rm Rotterdam
UT Utrecht Se Smilde
ZE Zeeland Ss Sluis
ZH Zuid-Holland Td Ternaard
Be Beijerland
Bo Bommelerwaard
Tw Twente (E part of Overijssel)

Chapter 2
Van Hall (1854: 284) described rust on cereals. His Uredo Robigo (early infection in lower leaves,
later stems and ears attacked, orange-coloured spore mass) was certainly not brown or black
rust; a poor figure (Figure 2.7) showed the typical stripes of yellow rust. ‘Some years earlier the
rye harvest failed nearly completely’, he wrote without mentioning 1846 explicitly. As late as
1859 Van Hall adhered to the exanthematic theory111 of the origin of rust and mildew.
Figure 2.7. Uredo rubigo. Figure 286 in Van Hall (1854). ‘Some years ago the rye harvest herewith failed nearly
completely’. (‘Voor eenige jaren is hierdoor de oogst der rogge bijna geheel mislukt’).
Winter 1844/5. The winter 1844/5 had been exceptionally severe and long with much snow
(Easton, 1928: 151; Figuur 3.1). Many frozen winter crops were ploughed under to be reseeded
in the spring of 1845. Most rust inoculum will have disappeared but in places, some may have
survived under the snow cover (Zadoks, 1961). The 1845 harvest season must have been late
due to the long winter and, if so, the lateness favoured the oversummering and switchover of
the rust.
Summer 1845. The summer of 1845 had been wet as confirmed by the reports of some provincial
governors (Rüter, 1950):
• ‘In many regions the rye is germinating [= sprouting in the ear] due to wetness’ (Overijssel,
21 August: 400).
• ‘The rye suffered from prolonged rains, but harvest rather sufficient’ (Zeeland, 4 September:
403).
• ‘Corn [= rye] lodged due to frequent gusts of wind and rain’ (Noord-Holland, 29 August:
434).
• ‘Rye suffered by germination leading to quality loss’ (Gelderland, district Zutphen, 5
September: 441).
• ‘Rye harvest better than average, harvest much retarded by continuous rains, quality
much reduced’ (Drenthe, 1 September: 454).
• ‘Rye and wheat suffered much from wet weather and strong winds’ (Friesland, 8 September:
454).
This contemporaneous information is the best proxy available for oversummering and switchover
of yellow rust. The ‘General Report’ over 1845 did not mention rust on rye. Apparently the over-
summering and switchover had not been noticed.

Winter 1845/6. The winter of 1845/6 was very mild. The relatively high winter temperatures
must have facilitated the overwintering of yellow rust. No reference was found to direct
observation of the rust.
Spring and summer 1846. The outburst of the rust on rye was first seen in Gelderland (mid
April; Anonymous, 1846b: 46), in Brabant (end of April; General Report over 1846: 28), in
Groningen as of May 1st (ibid.: 40), and in Noord-Holland in the course of May (ibid.: 33). These
‘firsts’ are relatively late. Noteworthy is the observation of rust on winter barley in Groningen
in March and April (ibid.: 53), ‘apparently the same species which was later so common on rye’.
March and April cover the period of the early outburst of two rusts on winter barley, the yellow
rust (P. striiformis f.sp. hordei) and the brown rust of barley (P. hordei). The words ‘same species’
allow excluding the latter rust.
The First National Congress of Agriculture112, convening in June, 1846, discussed – among more
important matter – the situation of the corn [= rye]. Delegates tabled rusted rye culms for
examination and discussion. They were not farmers, no, they ‘had’ farmers, but their interest
was genuine. Some illuminated men called the rust on leaves and stems Vredo rubigo, omitting
De Candolle and his vera. But the rust on the heads, was it the same or a different one? In the
E part of the country expected losses were estimated at two thirds of a normal harvest. In
Friesland the rust was still spreading, from sandy to clay areas. At the second Congress, June,
1847, the worthy gentlemen looked forward to a bumper crop of rye; the pollen clouds had been
exceptionally profuse in 1847. Only then the participants remembered that the pollen clouds of
the rye in 1846 had been miserable, with the implication of a poor fruit set in that calamitous
year (Appendix 2.1, comment [30]).
The Governor of the Province Noord-Holland reported ‘Due to the rust, that made itself known
already on the leaves of the rye, and later spread to the lower part of the stem [i.e. leaf sheaths?]
and on to the heads, this crop did not produce more than half of the usual yield’(Van Ewyck,
1847). The same is approximately true for the national rye yield (Figure 2.8). Rye prices soared
and extra imports were needed (Figures 2.9 and 2.10).
The losses in 1846 were high, roughly about half of the expected yield (see Box 2.5). Rust
on rye and wheat occurred regularly in the Netherlands during the 19th century. Kops (1808:
81/4, 149) provides an example. After the mild winter 1806/7 rust or honeydew occurred in
various provinces. In rye this was ‘red rust’ (Groningen), ‘honeydew’ (Gelderland) and ‘the red’
(Drenthe). The lateness of observation, June (Groningen) and ‘after the flowering of the winter
rye’ (Drenthe) points to brown rust though it does not exclude yellow rust.

Chapter 2
Figure 2.8. National wheat and rye production of the Netherlands, 1837-1847.
Horizontal – years. Vertical – yield in units of 100,000 last (one rye last = 2100 kg). n = rye, l = wheat. The
two crops react roughly similar to the vagaries of the weather. The low rye yield in 1846 must be due to a
differential factor, here yellow stripe rust. The 1847 yields were quite good. Original data from Ackersdijck
et al. (1850).
Figure 2.9. Prices of rye and wheat in the Netherlands, 1841-1850.

Horizontal – years. Vertical – price in Dutch guilders per hl. n = rye, l = wheat. After Staring (1860: 586).

Figure 2.10. Net imports of wheat and rye in the Netherlands, 1841-1850.
Horizontal – years. Vertical – net imports in units of 10,000 last (one rye last = 2100 kg). n = rye, l = wheat.
Imports of rye peaked in the years 1846 and 1847. Original data in Ackersdijck et al. (1851: 243).
Box 2.5. Yield losses of rye in the Netherlands, 1846, by province (See also Appendix 2.1).
Drenthe. Bieleman (1987, graphs 6.16, 6.17) provided a long-term overview of rye yields in that
province. Yields were quite variable, for a variety of reasons. The rye yields of 1846 were ~50 per cent
of the mean for the yields in 1845 and 1847. No explanation was given. I presume that most of the
loss has to be ascribed to yellow rust.
The ‘General Report’ provided some scattered information according to province:

Friesland. Village Ternaard, some fields with total loss.
Groningen. 50 to 67 per cent loss relative to expected yields.
Drenthe. Village Smilde, ~50 per cent loss (see also above).
Gelderland. ~67 per cent loss. Wttewaal (1848) ascribed the loss to Uredo Rubigo vera De Cand. on
the leaves and ears and to Puccinia graminis Pers. on the ears. He may have seen the telial stage of P.
striiformis on the ears, at the time not yet described.
Noord-Holland. Loss locally over 50, at the village Hilversum up to 60 per cent.
Zuid-Limburg. Loss often 100 per cent, produce of many fields not threshed but fed to sheep.
At the First National Congress of Agriculture, 1846, loss estimates were reported (Anonymous,
1846/7):
Overijssel. Region Twente (E part of the province), ~67 per cent loss.
Gelderland. Village Brummen, ~67 per cent loss.
The usual comment was that the quality of the bagged rye was excellent.

Chapter 2
The aftermath. The ‘General Report’ over 1847 mentioned rust on rye in North Holland (‘some
fields’), Gelderland (‘not on the kernel’!) en Groningen (‘no damage to the kernel’!). The 1847
harvest was excellent, without losses. Wttewaall (1848) stated that Uredo rubigo vera Dec,
which had caused so much destruction in 1846, had not yet departed in 1847, though in the
General Report he mentioned the presence of some foliar rust in the second half of June. In
June, 1848, the rust was noticed in the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel, but it was too
late to cause damage. Apparently, people were on the alert113. It seems as if the epidemic of
yellow rust on rye vanished as fast as it appeared. However, severe yield losses in Drenthe, 1859,
have been associated with ‘red rust’ (Puccinia rubigo vera?; Bieleman, 1987: 655).
2.3.3. Other countries in Europe114
Eriksson & Henning (1896) did not see morphological differences between f.sp. tritici and f.sp.
secalis and they did not provide experimental evidence of a physiological difference between
the two formae speciales. They must have seen that sometimes the wheat and sometimes the rye
was infected, and that the rust apparently did not move from wheat to rye or vice versa115. They
had read Bjerkander’s116 (1794) description of severe attacks by yellow rust on rye in Sweden.
He wrote that the ears became yellow leading to formidable damage; nothing about wheat.
German data from 1846 recognised differences in rust appearance and severity between wheat
and rye. This implies that the difference between the two formae speciales existed already.
The climatic conditions in most of W Europe were comparable to those in the Netherlands, an
unusually severe and long winter 1844/5 with heavy snow cover, and a very mild winter 1845/6
(Easton, 1928: 151/2).
In Belgium, where rye was the dominant117 arable crop, great damage by rust occurred in
1846. Vanhaute (1992) wrote that in the Campina (‘Kempen’, the sandy part in the north) half
of the rye harvest had been lost without indicating a cause. Was it by frost, drought, or rust?
In Flanders, 1846, rye yielded 7 in stead of 18 hl/ha (Lamberty, 1949: 136). Lamberty did
not mention a cause, but Pirenne (1932: 128) wrote ‘rust’. Treviranus118 (1846) had travelled
through Belgium from 20 till 26 April and saw a very severe rust attack on rye, apparently yellow
rust. So far this is the only written indication that in Belgium yellow rust was the culprit.
Appendix 2.2 gives an overview of harvest data from Belgium. The high grain losses in
combination with a good quality (expressed as hl weight) remind us of the information from
the Netherlands and Germany about the combination of severe loss and good quality that is
typical for yellow rust on rye. Pirenne’s rust must have been yellow rust. The seriousness of
the situation is demonstrated by the net imports of rye into Belgium, which tripled during the
emergency years 1846 and 1847, whereas import prices nearly doubled (Figure 2.12). Telia were
not mentioned in 1846 though they must have been present.
Denmark. The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (July 25th, 1846) reported from Copenhagen that
people from nearly all regions complained about the rust in rye though they still hoped that
the rust would be of little consequence. Rye yielded about half the expected amounts due to
drought and, probably, rust (Löbe, 1847: 134). In Holstein, then Danish, rye yielded about one
third of the expected amount (Weber, 1847: 14).

Figure 2.11. Map of Europe, situation of ~1845.

In the W we see the rather stable nations Great Britain, France and Spain. The E is covered by the Russian,
Ottoman and Austrian Empires. Going from N to S in the central zone we see Sweden and Denmark, ‘the
Germanies’, future Switzerland, and future Italy. ‘The Germanies’ comprised numerous states, among which
Prussia (the largest and most powerful), Bavaria and Baden. Prussia reached roughly from the Netherlands
in the W to the Russian Empire in the E. The Kingdom of Poland was de facto incorporated in the Russian
Empire. The Austrian Empire comprised present Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and parts of
present Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, and N Italy. After Westermann (1956, maps 126 and 127,
Europe 1815, the peace arrangement by the Congress of Vienna).
Letter code: Countries, Areas, Seas, Rivers

11 Kent DN Département Am Amsterdam Is Istanbul (= Ps Paris
31 Flanders Nord Be Belgrade Constantinople) Ra Riga
32 Campine FR Frankenland Bl Berlin Kg Kaliningrad (= Re Rome
33 Wallonia HA Hannover Bm Bremen Königsberg) Rg Rendsburg
41 Friesland LI Lithuania Bn Bern Kw Kraków Sa Sofia
42 Groningen LL Les Landes Bp Budapest Lg Luxemburg Sn Stettin (=
43 Drenthe LV Latvia Bs Brussels Ln London Szczecin)
44 Noord-Brabant MA Masuria Bt Bucharest Lr La Rochelle Te Trieste
51 Schleswig- ME Mecklenburg Ce Cologne Md Madrid Tn Turin
Holstein PO Pommerania Cn Copenhagen Me Memel (= Va Vienna
61 Westfalia PY Pyrenees Dn Dublin Klaipéda) Ve Venice
AL Alsace SA Saxonia Eh Edinburgh Mh Munich Wr Wrocław (=
BR Brandenburg SE Serbia Ft Frankfurt Mn Milan Breslau)
BR Brittany SY Savoy Gg Göteborg Mü Münster Ww Warsaw
CD Courland VO Volhynia Gk Gdańsk (= Oa Odessa Zü Zürich
CR Croatia WA Wallachia Danzig) Pe Prague
WU Württemberg Hg Hamburg Pń Poznań (= Posen)

Chapter 2
Figure 2.12. Imports of rye into Belgium, 1841-1850 (After Degreve, 1982).
n = Net imports of rye in units of 10,000 tonnes, transit excluded; l = Mean import price of rye in units of
100 Belgian Francs per tonne. After Degreve (1982).
France. Léveillé (1848), writing shortly after the 1846 epidemic, would have made a statement
if yellow rust had been important in France. He didn’t, though he knew about the devastation
in Saxony. He knew that U. glumarum Rob. in Dsmz. occurred on the glumes of wheat and rye
and sometimes caused partial abortion in rye119. Various French authors concur in calling 1846
a very bad year for cereals, primarily due to excessive drought (e.g. Jardin & Tudesq, 1973: 234;
Chapter 3). The Alsacian rye harvest was not too good (see Box 2.6-2).
Germany. The loss data of the Kingdom Prussia were published early in 1847 (Table 2.1). No
explanation was given. Wehler (1987: 643) stated that the 1846 yield of rye in Prussia was
~57 per cent of the mean yield in earlier years, without mentioning a cause for the dramatic
loss implied in this figure. In Upper Silesia rust ‘devastated large stretches’ of rye120. The daily
newspaper Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (1846) quoted losses of ~50 per cent in the Pfaltz
(July 11th), 75 per cent in the Lower Rhine Valley (July 13th, 24th), 50 to 75 per cent in Wetterau,
the Lahn valley and the Bavarian Rheinpfaltz (July 24th), and recurrent rust problems near
Hamburg (July 18th). The German daily newspaper Allgemeine Zeitung tried to present a more
optimistic view, but between the lines a rather sad reality is seen (see Box 2.6).
Von Schlechtendal (1846) and De Bary (1853) used the name glumarum for the glume-rust121.
Auerswald wrote to Léveillé about that ‘darned pest’ (nefaria pestis) in Saxony, 1846122. Göppert
(Silesia, present S Poland) indicated that the rusts on rye and wheat were not identical123. In
the extreme NE of Prussia, in Sambia, the rye was bad, with an unidentified ear disease – yellow
rust?124 Without hesitation Eriksson & Henning (1896: 432) ascribed this epidemic on rye to
yellow rust.
A communication from Münster in Westfalia, dated June 10th, 1846, was submitted to the 46th
session of the Prussian Academy of Sciences (on July 4th, 1846). It said ‘… the disease-like
appearances, that before were observed only on the veritable leaves, now also proceeded to
the leaf sheaths, the culm, even on the ears and the kernel, and that the same could be found

Table 2.1. Kingdom Prussia, 1846, yields per province in per cent of ‘normal’.
Data (dated January 4th, 1847) were published in Anonymous (1847a: 400/1)125 and Anonymous (1847c). For
the present table three crops were selected. Yield loss in wheat probably represents the effect of the drought
and the high temperatures. The drought may have been worst in the E as suggested by the wheat losses, high
in the N, and modest in the W. Yield loss in rye probably represents the combined effect of drought and rust.
Note the very low yield in the Rhine Province where the yellow rust epidemic rampaged. Losses in potatoes
were due to drought, heat and late blight, with larger losses in the E than in the W, the opposite of the 1845
situation. In the E the heat damage to potatoes was worst (Chapter 3).
Province Situation Wheat Rye Potato
Prussia E 74 62 33
Poznań E 64 61 48
Pommerania NE 79 64 30
Brandenburg N 73 66 63
Silesia SE 71 60 53
Saxonia S 74 59 63
Westfalia NW 81 53 62
Rhine Province W 87 50 7
Kingdom Prussia 75 59 53
everywhere: no soil type, no cultivation method, no preceding crop seemed to make exception:
the more the rye develops, the more the disease on it appears at a higher stage’ (Anonymous126,
1847b: 179). The symptom descriptions suggested either black or yellow rust. As the epidemic
was general and early (a note from May 31st was mentioned) and not focal and related to the
vicinity of barberry (Windt, 1806), I opt for yellow rust127.
Braun (1846) described the glume-rust of rye, 1846, around Freiburg (Baden), where no rye field
was free of rust and seeds were sometimes totally destroyed, with serious losses. Uredinia were
arranged in stripes on the leaf disk, at the inner sides of the leaf sheaths, not on the stem, but
regularly on the glumes; typically yellow rust. The damage ran up to over 50 per cent of the
expected yield. In Rheinland-Pfalz, with Mainz as its capital and grain market, the rye harvest
failed (Box 2.6-3). Treviranus (1846) reported heavy damage on rye in the Rhine valley, around
Siegburg and in the dale of the river Ahre. He saw a relation between the location of the rye
field and its rust severity, protected fields in the valleys having more but high and exposed
fields less rust128. He did not see a relation between severity and soil type.
Braun and Treviranus were intrigued by the poor fertilisation of rye during the epidemic.
Severity was so high that in one third to one half of the florets no anthers appeared and
sometimes no stigmata either. The stigmata were dusted with yellow. Hardly one half of the
florets showed good fruit setting129. The harvest was meager, often less than one half of the
expected amount, but the grain quality was good130. Similar observations, a poor harvest but of
good quality, were made in the Netherlands (Anonymous 1846c: 100; Appendix 2.1 [n]). ‘Good
flour’ (Box 2.6-12) is to be read as an allusion to the frequent abortion in rye.

Chapter 2
Box 2.6. Quotes from the Allgemeine Zeitung, 1846, the S German ‘General Newspaper’
At the time, the German Allgemeine Zeitung (General Newspaper), Augsburg issue, was published by
Cotta in Stuttgart. A predecessor of the present, well-read Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, it had a
political rather than commercial orientation. Being a newspaper for the ruling class, the affluent and
the complacent, containing much international political news and pages on literature, arts, or travel,
it took a rosy view of the world. Bad news was clad in veiled language, often hidden among the small
lettering of market reports. Crops looked ‘just fine’. Nonetheless, grain prices did not go down as
they should at the approach of harvest. Merchants began to order grain from abroad. When harvest
data became available, the catastrophe could no longer be hidden. [note: /#issue/day-month/page
number.]
1. #202/21-07/1616. Breslau (Wroclaw, SW Poland) ‑ grain prices remain high, rye harvest expected
to be less than average.
2. #206/25-07/1644. Frankfurt am Main ‑ poor rye harvest will be compensated by good wheat crop.
Rye quality in Upper Alsace was poor.
3. #206/25-07/1648. Mainz ‑ rye harvest poor, merchants order rye from Russia and the USA.
4. #212 /31-07/1694. Posen (Poznań, present W Poland) – winter rye harvest bad, spring rye harvest
meagre, ‘grain prices continued to be high, and the distress of the working classes still does not
want to decrease’. (Die Getreidepreise halten sich andauernd hoch, und die Noth der arbeitenden
Classen will sich noch immer nicht mindern).
5. #216/04-08/1728. Silesia – rye harvest finished (no comments meaning bad news).
6. #217/05-08/1732. Brussels – Belgian rye harvest ½ of normal, famine expected if potatoes fail.
7. #218/06-08/1743. Teplitz (Teplica in Czech Republic) – grain harvest fair, grain weight low.
8. #222/10-08/1775. Lower Banat and Walachia (Middle and Lower Danube plains) – yields low, locally
severe damage by wood mice (probably the long-tailed field mouse, Apodemus sylvaticus L.).
9. #225/13-08/1800. Silesia (modern SW Poland) – Rye with much straw but little grain, yields down
to 1/3 of normal.
10. #228/16-08/1824. Bavaria – rye light in weight. County Mark – rye diseased, yields ½ to 1/3 of
normal, disease all along river Rhine from Cleve down to Bingen.
11. #230/18-08/ 1838. Posen (Poznań, present W Poland) – Harvest was less than medium. Rye
harvests in Prussia, Poland and N parts of Austrian Empire generally poor.
12. #236/24-08/1888. At 1300-1900 m altitude rye nearly ripe, but rusted. ‘Good corn will be rare,
but certainly there will be many fields in many regions which yield quite poorly. Much, very much
straw, but grain below average; good flour’. (Volkommenes Korn wird selten seyn, wohl aber gibt es
ganz gewiss in vielen Gegenden viele Aecker die ganz slecht ausgeben. Viel, sehr viel Stroh, im Korn
untermittelmässig; mehl gut). Yields averaged over the whole of the Germanies will be ~50 per cent
(14/27) of normal.
The various communications quoted above were confirmed in the review papers by Löbe and
Weber published in 1847 (Appendix 2.3). In Brunswick (N Germany) the rye was severely diseased,
as in Pommerania (NE Germany). In Silesia (modern SW Poland) rust on rye was destructive over
large areas, as in then Poland (modern E Poland). As the harvested grain was of good quality,
we think the rust was yellow rust indeed. The observation of the hyaline spore walls by Göppert
(1846), published in the Silesian Journal, supports this idea, that would also explain the disease
of the rye ears in Sambia, on the Baltic Coast.

The reviews bring four points to the fore. (1) Drought did much damage to spring cereals and
to fall-sown rye in the Austrian Empire, Germany, Denmark, and Poland. (2) The fates of winter
wheat and winter rye, usually coupled, often diverged in 1846 due to drought and rust. (3) The
rust was nearly ubiquitous in Continental Europe N of the Alpine ranges, with the exception of
France. (4) The available information, with several mentions of low grain yield but excellent
milling quality of the remaining grain, clearly points to yellow rust of rye. Point 4 does not
exclude, however, the possibility that brown and black rust appeared occasionally.
In 1846 rust on wheat was common too. An unidentified rust, not brown rust but either yellow
rust or black rust, ravaged wheat in Mecklenburg, N Germany (Pogge, 1893).
Switzerland. The head-gardener of Zürich College (Regel, 1854) knew his plants and his
literature. He described131 the ‘yellowing’ and the ‘light fruit’ of corn [= rye] due to Uredo
Rubigo vera, that caused so much damage in his area (N Switzerland). Using the microscope he
found some 9000 spores per sorus of some 2 mm long. This symptom is typical of yellow rust
and excludes black rust.
2.3.4. Yellow rust pandemics
The general appearance of yellow rust on rye over a large area, Belgium, Germany, present
Poland and the Netherlands, seems to contradict the local origin of a severe attack as indicated
above. Similar large-scale, nearly pandemic appearances of yellow rust are also known in wheat,
as in 1955, 1957 and 1961 (Zadoks, 1961, 1965). In the case of wheat the physiological races
varied per region in accordance with the dominant varieties of the regions. This fact supports
the idea of the local origins of severe outbreaks. Weather effects similar over large areas and
reigning over a period of a year or more are needed to produce yellow rust pandemics.
The information of the ‘General Report’ allows a generalisation on the long-term weather
leading to the 1846 epidemic. The severe winter 1844/5, which had caused heavy frost damage
to winter rye, delayed the spring growth of the fall-sown crop. I suppose that relatively much
spring rye was sown, which ripens later than winter rye. The delays were not corrected, maybe
even enhanced by a cool growing season, and the rye harvest was relatively late. I presume
that yellow rust had an opportunity to multiply and spread unnoticed. The harvest was delayed
by rains and storms.
More recent experience with wheat taught that such conditions may lead to many volunteer
plants sprouting from shattered grain, not mentioned in any contemporaneous report, on
which yellow rust can over-summer in abundance (Zadoks, 1961). The normal fall allowed timely
sowing of the winter rye 1845/6. The ‘green bridge’ (Zadoks, 1984b: Figure 27.3) spanning
the crop-free summer period was wide (much self-sown rye) and short (late harvest, timely
seeding). Ample infection of the newly emerging rye crops was possible. The winter 1845/6
was exceptionally mild and allowed for more successive rust generations than usual. Every
generation can produce a ten-fold multiplication of inoculum that may spread in all directions
without meeting varietal barriers. Under these conditions132 only a very hot and dry spring
can stop the epidemic.
Rye is an obligate cross-fertiliser with pollination by wind. Most pollen will land near to its site
of origin but some may be blown away over large distances, say hundreds of kilometres. European

Chapter 2
rye formed a meta-population with exchange of genes, including genes for susceptibility and
resistance to yellow rust. The two major populations were winter rye and spring rye with
different but overlapping flowering periods. Though landraces of rye must have existed in
the 19th century I believe that genetic barriers between various sub-populations were not
very effective against large-scale yellow rust epidemics. Epidemics may have had a suicidal
effect by selecting for minor gene resistance in the rye generation following the epidemic, as
Vanderplank (1968) suggested for maize and tropical maize rust in W Africa133.
These epidemiological considerations are highly speculative. The sequence of weather types
needed for over-summering, switchover, overwintering, and outburst should occur over a large
area of continental Europe. A pandemic of yellow rust can be understood as the composite
of many local epidemics, all driven by the same sequence of weather types over the period of
about one year. For example, the year 1904 was favourable to yellow rust of wheat in several
countries (Chapter 5), in Denmark also on rye (Rostrup, 1905: 355). The last large-scale epidemic
of yellow rust on rye134 known so far was in eastern Germany, Poland, Czechia, and Austria, 1916
(Chapter 5).
In Switzerland, 1957, I visited a breeder’s field with much yellow rust on rye, amidst severely
infected wheat fields. The lesions (stripes) were sharply delineated, chlorotic, poorly
sporulating, i.e. of a moderately resistant type. Such an infection cannot be attributed to
f.sp. secalis. The relatively susceptible rye selections (not commercial varieties) showed an
infection ‘mirrored’ from the epidemic on wheat that was ascribed to the ‘Probus race’ of the
f.sp. tritici (Zadoks, 1961).
2.4. Discussion
Early in my career, during the severe yellow rust epidemic on wheat, 1957, I was ‘requested’
(read ordered) to appear before the Counsellor for Plant Diseases and his number two at the
National Agricultural Advisory Service in Wageningen, Netherlands. The conversation took
place in a somewhat conspiratory atmosphere and astonishingly culminated in the question
how to differentiate between brown rust and yellow rust. Where two pre-eminently able and
well informed persons did not know that difference in 1957, differentiation must have been far
more difficult in the mid 19th century. The gap between the two dates spans over a century of
phytopathological research with great refinement of vocabulary and diagnostics.
Uredo rubigo vera, frequently mentioned as the 1846 rust on rye, is of a chimerical nature, yellow
rust in spring, brown rust – sometimes – in mid-season, and yellow rust again towards ripening.
Maybe, I am biased in favour of yellow rust, my first research subject. In my eyes, the evidence
for a yellow rust epidemic on rye in 1846 is convincing with its early start, yellow dust, stripes,
and with glumes, rachis, kernels and awns infected, as well as the inner sides of sheaths. The
oft repeated observation of abortion of some grains and good filling of the remaining ones, a
typical case of physiological compensation, records a new symptom, characteristic for yellow
rust on rye and not seen on wheat.
Retrospective conclusions based on symptom descriptions not yet up-to-standards are risky, a
high level of probability replacing absolute certainty. Accepting this reservation the conclusion
is clear, yellow rust, P. striiformis f.sp. secalis. Rust on wheat, 1846, was mentioned incidentally;
it could have been yellow rust but its appearance did not parallel the yellow rust on rye. Thus

I conclude that the f.sp. secalis was already in existence. The possibility that in some places
brown rust dominated cannot be excluded but I don’t have evidence in favour of this possibility.
Mixed occurrence of the two rusts is thinkable, but in wheat it is observed only at low severities
of either rust. At high severities one of the two rusts will dominate. The frequently mentioned
rust on the heads, in combination with the colours yellow and orange, are major arguments to
ascribe the damage on rye in 1846 to yellow rust.
Another argument is the typical damage to the grain. Severe rust on wheat causes shrivelling
of the grain, at times with some abortion at the tip of the ear. This is what I have seen with
yellow rust epidemics on wheat in the Netherlands. ‘Chicken fodder’, sneered the farmers135.
Here I add the differential effect of yellow rust on rye kernels, some aborted, others more
swollen than normal, without a fixed position of the aborted grains. This typical symptom,
which I associate with the open flowering of rye, was not mentioned by Eriksson & Henning
(1896) who – in their time – did not see a severe attack of yellow rust on rye. I did not find this
symptom in other books.
A thorough, contemporaneous discussion of the 1846 rust epidemic on rye is not available136.
My guess is that scientists were too busy with potato late blight (Chapter 3). The evidence
brought together consists of numerous little scraps of information made meaningful by a few
brief journal articles. Nonetheless, there is a fair degree of consistency in all these bits and
pieces as to symptomatology and damage. In as far as I know, historians (Pirenne excepted) did
not deal with the rye rust137, even though the dearth of rye in 1846/7 was discussed extensively
(Chapter 3).
The European dimension of the epidemic is still inadequately known; very severe in Belgium
and the Netherlands, severe or worse in various German states, and present in N Switzerland
and Denmark (then including Schleswig-Holstein). The epicentre of the epidemic seems to have
been within the triangle NE Belgium, SE Netherlands, and the German Rhine Province. Did the
epidemic have a wider reach? The answer is yes – Silesia and East Prussia, that is all of modern
W Poland, apparently suffered from yellow rust, as did Brandenburg and Saxonia (Figure 2.13).
I did not examine local newspapers and reports.
As an afterthought, an anomaly presses forward. Intense and prolonged drought in the East,
and severe and continuous drought in the W Europe, reduced the rye yields (§3.2.6), whereas
a disastrous yellow rust epidemic appeared in between. How is this possible? Where is the
moisture needed by the rust to infect? The tentative explanation is twofold. (1) A phase
difference may have occurred, the rust peaking earlier than the drought. (2) A few scattered
records suggest lack of rain combined with high humidity. Clear skies and high humidity lead
to heavy dew at night, providing the moisture (free water) allowing the rust to flourish138.
The effect of the drought on rye can be equated approximately to the yield reduction of wheat
that was in the order of twenty per cent (Tables 2.1 and 2.2; various authors) in Belgium, France
and Germany. The excess loss beyond twenty per cent might be ascribed to yellow rust if we
wish to ignore the effects of icy winds and night frost at florescence.
Yellow rust on rye is capricious, popping up here or there, and disappearing suddenly. The 1846
epidemic of yellow rust on rye was ephemeral. Its origin in 1845 is a matter of conjecture only.
Its aftermath is unknown, a few scattered sentences offering no holdfast.

Chapter 2
Figure 2.13. Tentative map of rye yields and losses in Continental Europe, 1846.
Numerals are losses in per cent (<80 means losses up to 80%) of the expected yields. The rationale for the
expected yields was rarely indicated. One may think of the mean yield over the preceding 3 to 5 years.
A = average yield, D = considerable damage, G = good yield, P = poor yield. Large letters and numerals refer
to national data, small ones to regional data. For details see Appendix 2.3. Losses may be due to drought
(mainly in the E and W), cold winds, night frost, yellow rust, voles (= field mice), or combinations.
NB: Figure 2.11 provides geographic details. Figure 3.6b shows some losses in cereals, wheat and rye combined,
whereas Figure 2.13 refers to rye only.
Well documented are the epidemic in Sweden, 1794139, and the epidemics in Middle Europe, 1914
and 1916140. Sweden, late 19th century, and Denmark, early 20th century, had some irregular
appearances141. Here, we add Continental Europe, 1846. So far, that’s it. The 1916 epidemic
is the last one on record for rye. The forma specialis secalis of the yellow rust seems to have
disappeared completely.

Table 2.2. Mean grain and straw losses in per cent for wheat and rye in the Belgian provinces, ‘adjusted
losses’, and hectoliter weights of rye and wheat (calculated from data in Table 2.3; hectolitre weights from
Anonymous, 1850b). ‘Adjusted loss’ of rye is rye loss in % minus wheat loss in %. ‘Adjusted loss’ is a proxy for
loss due to yellow rust, total loss corrected for general weather effects.
Province Grain loss in % Adjusted Straw loss in % Adjusted Hectoliter weight

grain loss straw loss in kg
in % in %
Wheat Rye Rye Wheat Rye Rye Rye Wheat
Antwerp 11 56 45 12 22 10 72 79
Brabant 15 70 55 10 25 15 71 79
W Flanders 11 57 46 20 22 2 70 77
E Flanders 16 58 42 12 17 5 72 79
Hainaut 24 62 38 21 25 4 70 77
Liège 9 69 60 6 15 9 72 79
Limbourg 22 71 49 11 26 15 72 78
Luxembourg 25 64 39 24 24 0 70 76
Namur 19 46 27 16 17 1 70 76
Belgium 17 61 44 15 22 7 71 78
2.5. Conclusions
1. A yellow rust epidemic appeared on rye in 1846, with damages up to one half, occasionally
even two thirds, of the expected yield.
2. The epidemic was ephemeral, appeared suddenly, and hardly left a trace.
3. The epidemic was severe in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Western Germany (Rhine Province,
Saxony, Baden), and also in present Poland. The epidemic reached north to Denmark, east to
the Baltic area and the Carpathian Mountains, south to Switzerland, and west to Belgium.
4. The rye crops suffered much from drought, in the East (present Poland) and in the West
(France), also in parts of Scandinavia. In the East cold cutting winds in late May and early
June were very damaging.
5. The yellow rust epidemic on rye has hardly been mentioned by historians; it was neglected
by scientists, possibly because of the overwhelming impact of the ‘potato murrain’.
6. The economic and social impact of the epidemic was considerable, since at the time rye was
still the major food of the poor.

Chapter 2
Appendix 2.1. R
easoning applied to identify the rust species, extracting the
‘General Reports’ for 1845 and 1846, supported by my own
experience with the cereal rusts.
As this is a linguistic analysis I did not translate from Dutch to English. The font code is:
Headings and sub-headings in bold italics.
Literal quotations in bold.
Short, non-literal paraphrases between ‘quotation marks’.
Comments in normal type.
The passages (in Dutch) are [numbered] and the summary remarks (in English) are [lettered].
Verslag 1845 - Milieu-factoren
Algemeen
[1] ‘Door lange winter laat gewas’.
Een laat gewas kan leiden tot een (iets) verlate oogst, en dat is gunstig voor het invangen
en vermenigvuldigen van roest-inoculum in het voorjaar.
[2] ‘Natte Augustus. Op 19 augustus woedde een zware zomerstorm (p. 8)’.
Het lijkt onwaarschijnlijk dat op 19 augustus nog veel winterrogge op stam staat, maar bij
zomerrogge kan dat misschien wel. Zomerstormen veroorzaken zaaduitval (bij tarwe soms
tot ~1 ton per ha) en dus opslag. Zaadval uit garven aan het stuuk is alleszins denkbaar bij
zware storm.
[3] ‘Lange winter, laat voorjaar, vochtige zomer, gemis aan zonneschijn (p. 11)’.
Een donkere, vochtige zomer met zomerregens vertraagt de afrijping en bevordert het
schot, de kieming van uitgevallen zaad en het aanslaan van opslag-rogge, essentieel voor
de overzomering van inoculum van ieder van de drie roestsoorten. Een late oogst gevolgd
door een vroege zaai bevordert de oversprong van inoculum. Voor zwarte roest heeft de
overzomering geen consequenties.
Limburg142
[4] ‘Zaad met schot. Laat rijp, 13 dagen regen in de 1e helft van Augustus, dus schot, toppen
van garven groen (p. 19)’.
Het schot is hier niet relevant, maar de regen bevordert massale kieming van rogge-opslag
(bij tarwe kan dat tot 1000 plantjes per m2 gaan), die zelfs door goede grondbewerking niet
totaal verwijderd kunnen worden.
Drenthe
[5] ‘Regenschade’. Zie [4].
Verslag 1846 – symptomen, milieu-omstandigheden, schade
Winter 1845/6 (p. 12)
… een ’ongemeen zachten winter en een’ buitengewoon warmen en droogen zomer, welke
weêrsgesteldheid tot laat in de herfst heeft voortgeduurd. … alle granen en vruchten
vroegtijdig ingezameld en van de akker verwijderd ….

[6] Dus enkele extra generaties mogelijk gedurende de winter zoals ook voorafgaand aan gele-
roestepidemieën op tarwe. Ook bruine roest kan van zachte winter profiteren (Chester, 1946;
Zadoks and Leemans, 1984).
Limburg
… dat men nooit zulk eenen onvoordeligen Rogge-oogst … heeft te betreuren gehad.
‘Op veel plaatsen kwam het dorsloon er niet uit, dus oogst niet gedorst maar aan de schapen
gevoerd (p. 27)’. Zij [de plant] begon te kwijnen en in haar onderste bladeren geel en roestig
te worden... De roest klom op in de schacht en tot in het onderste der aar, welker top ook
nog door vorst werd aangetast; zij werd gedeeltelijk ja zelfs geheel geel, waardoor het
korrelen volstrekt verhinderd werd, … (p. 27).
[7] geel en roestig

De gele kleur van het onderste blad duidt op gele roest.
[8] klom op
Het ‘opklimmen’ van de aantasting, tot in de aar, duidt op gele roest; bij bruine roest is het
opklimmen afwezig of weinig opvallend en aar-aantasting afwezig.
[9] aar … gedeeltelijk ja zelfs geheel geel
Aar-aantasting komt voor bij gele en zwarte roest, maar de kleur spreekt voor zich.
Noord-Brabant
…, toen men in het einde van April in de vroeg gezaaide Rogge een zeer verontrustend
bederf bespeurde, namelijk het verdorren der onderste lissen of bladeren, die met eene
klevige gele stof bezet werden, en zich meer en meer uitbreidende, binnen weinige dagen
tot alle met Rogge bezaaide akkers overging, … (p. 27). Deze, tot dus verre, zelfs bij
de oudste landlieden onbekende kwaal, die in den beginne algemeen voor honingdaauw
gehouden werd, doch naderhand met den naam van roest werd bestempeld … (p. 28).
[10] einde van April

Zwarte roest kan worden uitgesloten op grond van het vroege verschijnen van de roest en
van de verdere symptomen.
[11] klevige gele stof
Urediniosporen zijn geel en vormen bij sterke sporulatie een soort gele stoflaag op de
bladeren. Het gele stof blijft aan handen, kleren en schoenen hangen of kleven en is moeilijk
van de kleren te verwijderen. De kleur geel zal niet voor bruine roest gebruikt worden,
dat ook kan kleven maar wel in mindere mate. Volgens Rapilly (1979) is gele roest zeer
goed aangepast aan verspreiding door spattende druppels, hetgeen het ‘kleven’ zou kunnen
verklaren.
[12] zich meer en meer uitbreidende
De term zou kunnen slaan op de semi-systemische groei van de gele roest, waarbij
sporulerende lesies (vlekken op jong blad en strepen op oud blad) in de lengterichting van
het blad uitgroeien. De term kan ook slaan op uitdijende haarden.
[13] Onbekende kwaal
Het is moeilijk voor te stellen dat bruine roest als een onbekende kwaal wordt gekenschetst.
Bij gele roest is dat eerder denkbaar.

Chapter 2
[14] Honingdaauw
In de 19e en 20e eeuw gangbare, aspecifieke term voor verschillende verschijnselen, waaronder
gele roest143 (Ponse, 1827). Kennelijk hebben landbouwkundig geïnteresseerden in 1845
de term al ingewisseld voor roest, daarbij de keus latend uit één van de drie roestsoorten
op rogge (zie Box 2.4).
[15] verdorren der onderste lissen
Blijkbaar stierf het (onderste) blad geheel af, zoals bij een zware gele roest aantasting op
tarwe.
[16] ‘ging later in de aren over’
Aantasting van aren is normaal voor zwarte roest en komt voor bij zware epidemieën van
gele roest, maar niet bij bruine roest.
[17] binnen weinige dagen tot alle … akkers overging
d.w.z. bij alle akkers voor de passant zichtbaar wordend binnen een korte tijdspanne. Bij
gele roest vaak gezien, zou bij bruine roest kunnen maar minder opvallend zijn.
Noord Holland144
De Rogge heeft over ’t algemeen in de maand Mei aan de roest geleden, die aan de bladeren
een roodstofachtige kleur mededeelde, en zich van het onderste gedeelte van den halm
tot aan de aren uitbreidde (p. 33). De Hr. Perk te Hilversum meldde: de beste rogge leed het
meest van de roestziekte, gaf weinig koorn, veel maar slecht stroo, over het algemeen
geen half gewas (8 i.p.v. 20 mud). De kwaliteit goed en zeer zwaar, ...
[18] roodstofachtige kleur

In mijn ervaring wordt de kleur van gele roest regelmatig als rossig aangeduid; het volledig
verroeste en verdroogde onderste blad krijgt bij droog weer een roze tint. De kleuraanduiding
pleit meer voor bruine dan voor gele roest. Merk op dat de kleur van bruine roest wel als
rood maar nooit als geel wordt aangeduid. Von Schlechtendal noemde het sporenpoeder
‘oranjerood’, Braun schreef ‘roodachtig geel’ en ‘van pommeransgeel tot fel menierood’.
Beide auteurs hadden ongetwijfeld gele roest voor ogen.
[19] van het onderste gedeelte van den halm … uitbreidde
Het van onder naar boven opstijgen van de aantasting is kenmerkend voor een vroege gele
roest aantasting voortkomend uit ter plekke overwinterend (dus niet ingewaaid) inoculum.
Bij bruine roest zou dit ook kunnen maar veel minder opvallend zijn. Bruine roest heeft een
iets hogere temperatuur nodig dan gele roest en komt later op gang.
[20] tot aan de aren
Hoewel er niet staat ‘tot in de aren’ neem ik aan dat de waarnemer aantasting in de aren
gezien heeft. Dit komt bij bruine roest niet voor.
[21] kwaliteit goed en zeer zwaar
Deze opmerking kan geïnterpreteerd worden als zeer beperkte vruchtzetting, waarbij de
weinige fertiele vruchtbeginsels uitgroeiden tot goede zware korrels.
Utrecht
… zich vrij algemeen, doch het sterkst in de vroeg gezaaide [rogge], roest op de halmbladen
vertoonde, welk bederf zich ook tot aan de aren in de kafbladen en de korrel voortzette
(p. 34).

[22] vroeg gezaaide [rogge]

Vroeg gezaaide rogge kan door de gele roest al in het najaar geïnfecteerd zijn en zal dan
in het voorjaar ook het eerst duidelijke symptomen laten zien, mede dank zij de semi-
systemische groei van de roest in het overwinterende roggeblad. Vroeg gezaaide rogge kan
ook bruine roest vertonen maar dat valt weinig op door de trage vermenigvuldiging in de
winter en de afwezigheid van systemische groei.
[23] tot aan de aren in de kafbladen
Aantasting van de kafbladen of glumae is voor gele en zwarte roest kenmerkend. De gele
roest sporuleert aan de binnenzijde, de zwarte roest vooral aan de buitenzijde.
[24] en de korrel
Als de glumae zijn aangetast door gele roest sporuleren zij aan de binnenzijde en bedekken
de vruchtbeginsels met geel sporenpoeder. Sporen ‘op de korrel’ zijn vaak te zien bij een
ernstige gele-roestepidemie. Bovendien zijn in zeldzame gevallen op het nog groene
vruchtbeginsel kleine lesies te zien van niet-sporulerende gele roest.
Gelderland
De roestziekte, waardoor dezelve in het voorjaar is aangetast, heeft eerst voor een
algemeen misgewas doen vrezen; … ‘Oogst tenslotte 1/3 van verwachte oogst. Volgens
Wttewaal (1848)’ 1°. de bladen door de Uredo Rubigo vera De Cand. 2°. de aren door dezelfde
soort van roest, alsmede door de Puccinia graminis Pers. (p. 36; conform Anonymous 1846c:
98).
[25] Uredo rubigo vera De Cand.

De Candolle’s beschrijving dekt de gele roest zoals wij die nu kennen, zie Box 2.3.
[26] de aren door dezelfde soort van roest
Alweer, de aren werden aangetast en dat is kenmerkend voor gele en zwarte roest.
[27] Puccinia graminis Pers.
Nergens wordt een opmerking gemaakt over de voor zwarte roest kenmerkende
halmaantasting, hetgeen tegen de identificatie pleit; de telia van de gele roest zijn ook
zwart. De telia zijn bij zwarte roest groot en prominent, bij gele roest klein en weinig
opvallend. Bij gele roest zien we vaak binnen één lesie gele uredinia alterneren met zwarte
telia; soms neemt het zwart van de telia de overhand. De verwarring met zwarte roest ligt
dan voor de hand (Anonymus, 1846c: 98).
Overijssel
… de bloei ontwikkelde zich niet, en er kwam ene gele stof aan de bladeren en den stengel,
welke zich aan de aren mededeelde; de Rogge stoof niet of slechts weinig ... de ziekte,
roest genaamd, vermeerderde sterk en deed zelfs de korrel aan (p. 39; conform Anonymous
1846c: 100).
[28] ene gele stof aan de bladeren

Het gele stof duidt opnieuw op de urediniosporen, die kennelijk in een dikke laag aanwezig
waren.
[29] en den stengel
Dit is een nieuw element in de beschrijvingen. Het meest waarschijnlijk is dat de stengels
dicht bij de bladaanhechting bestoven waren met sporen. Misschien moeten we denken aan

Chapter 2
uredinia op de halm, zoals die bij gerst nog wel eens voorkomen, meestal niet-sporulerend,
en zelden bij tarwe. Halm-aantasting is kenmerkend voor zwarte roest, maar dan past het
‘geel stof’ niet.
[30] de Rogge stoof niet
Rogge is een obligate kruisbevruchter en windbestuiver. Bij bepaalde weersomstandigheden
ziet met wolken stuifmeel over het gewas wervelen. Blijkbaar waren hier de planten zo zeer
aangetast dat zij niet meer in staat waren stuifmeel te vormen of althans stuifmeel los te
laten. Dit symptoom is voor mij nieuw.
[31] en deed zelfs de korrel aan
Waarschijnlijk afzetting van urediniosporen, gevormd in de kafjes, op de vruchtbeginsels.
Friesland
… waarbij in het voorjaar of het begin van den zomer zich nog de roest voegde. … hier en
daar zo erg, dat men het op eenen aanmerkelijken afstand kon zien. ‘Bij Ternaard’ … vele
velden geheel mislukt… Een eigenaardig rood uitslag op stengel en bladen scheen de
hoofdoorzaak van die mislukking (p. 40).
[32] in het voorjaar

De tijdsaanduiding sluit zwarte roest vrijwel uit.
[33] op eenen aanmerkelijken afstand
Kenmerkend voor ernstige lokale aantasting door gele roest, bv in haarden of vroeg gezaaide
veldjes. Aantasting door bruine roest is op afstand moeilijk te zien.
[34] Een eigenaardig rood uitslag
Over de term ‘rood’ is hierboven al iets gezegd. ‘Uitslag op de stengel’ is kenmerkend voor
zwarte roest, komt niet voor bij bruine roest, en treedt bij uitzondering op bij gele roest
(zie boven). De opmerking kan ook duiden op afzetting van urediniosporen van gele of
bruine roest.
Groningen145
… maar daarenboven ontdekte men zeer algemeen de roest (Uredo rubigo) op de bladen, die
daardoor een ziekelijk-geel en roestkleurig aanzien verkregen. ‘Vanaf 1 mei’. De onderste
bladeren waren op laatst van Mei reeds geheel verwelkt en ook de bovenste bladen door
deze ziekte aangedaan. Bij het begin der bloeijing verspreidde dit kwaad zich ook op de
aar, en wel hoofdzakelijk op de binnenzijde der kafblaadjes (glumae) en klepjes (valvulae),
ja tastte ook enkele vruchtbeginsels zelve aan, en was als een geel poeder op de stempels
zelve zichtbaar (p. 40/1). ‘Opbrengst 1/2 tot 1/3’. … daar het roest bij enkele regens daarvan
als afgewasschen werd, en den grond der Roggelanden als met een roestkleurig poeder
bedekte.
[35] Uredo rubigo

Een nomen nudum, een lege naam, die brand-roest betekent, zie Box 2.3.
[36] een ziekelijk-geel en roestkleurig aanzien
Duidt op gele roest, maar ook koude, stikstofgebrek en pathogenen kunnen verkleuring
veroorzaken.

[37] ‘vanaf 1 mei’.

Een begin-datum zegt meer over de betrokkenheid van de waarnemer dan over de ziekte.
De datum is te vroeg voor zwarte roest.
[38] onderste bladeren waren op laatst van Mei reeds geheel verwelkt
Kenmerkend voor een vroege en zware gele-roestepidemie, bij bruine roest zeldzaam.
[39] hoofdzakelijk op de binnenzijde der kafblaadjes
Sporulatie op de binnenzijde der kafblaadjes is een onderscheidend kenmerk voor gele
roest.
[40] en klepjes
Is hier sprake van actieve sporulatie of van bedekking door sporen afkomstig van kafjes?
[41] tastte ook enkele vruchtbeginsels zelve aan
Opnieuw de vraag: vertoonden de vruchtbeginsels lesies, hetgeen zeer wel mogelijk is bij
vroege aantasting, of waren zij met sporenpoeder overdekt?
[42] geel poeder op de stempels
De stempels zijn kleverig om het stuifmeel op te vangen, maar zij kunnen dus ook
urediniosporen ‘vangen’. Voor mij nieuw symptoom. De vraag rijst of de aanwezigheid van
een overmaat gele roest sporen op de stempels de bevruchting kan verhinderen.
[43] het roest bij enkele regens … afgewasschen
Dit gebeurt inderdaad, vooral bij gele roest, waarvan de urediniosporen grote affiniteit tot
water vertonen (Rapilly, 1979). Vraag is echter of de waarnemer het ‘afwassen’ zelf gezien
heeft146 of slechts daartoe concludeert.
[44] den grond … met een roestkleurig poeder bedekte
Bij zware aantasting door gele roest ziet men vaak dat de grond onder het gewas geel of
geelachtig kleurt door de ‘sporenregen’. Dit gebeurt vooral als het waait, de halmbladeren
tegen elkaar aan slaan en de sporen van het blad geschud worden. Ik denk dat de term
‘regens’ niet te letterlijk moet worden genomen.
Drenthe
Reeds vóór dat de Rogge in bloei kwam, vertoonde zich een roode roest op het loof ...
dit ongemak nam gedurende den bloeitijd inzonderheid der Winter-Rogge sterk toe.
Verwachtingen gunstig ware niet de algemeene ziekte, bekend onder den naam van rood
of roest daarover gekomen (p. 44). ‘Te Smilde halve opbrengst door rood of roest maar’ … hare
hoedanigheid was uitmuntend, … (p. 45).
[45] roode roest

Aan de term ‘roest’ hoeft niet getwijfeld te worden, maar welke? De benaming van kleuren
is verwarrend, zie boven.
[46] rood of roest
Hier is niet duidelijk of ‘rood’ een kleuraanduiding is of (tevens) een alternatieve naam voor
roest, zoals in Overijssel147.
[47] hare hoedanigheid was uitmuntend
Kennelijk heeft de roest zoveel abortie veroorzaakt dat de weinige fertiele vruchtbeginsels
forse korrels konden produceren.

Chapter 2
Gerst – Groningen
In de tweede helft van Maart en het begin van April had men hier en daar wel eenige
roest (zoo het scheen dezelfde soort als die, welke op de Rogge later zoo algemeen is
voorgekomen) opgemerkt, maar dit herstelde zich weder; … (p. 53).
[48] tweede helft van Maart

Een goede waarnemer heeft al vroeg gekeken, in Maart. Vroege aantasting van wintergerst
duidt op gele roest. Ook dwergroest begint al vroeg in het jaar maar die valt in Maart minder
op.
[49] dezelfde soort als die … op de Rogge
Dit is een betekenisvolle opmerking. Zo vroeg in het jaar is zwarte roest uitgesloten.
Dwergroest van gerst (P. hordei) en bruine roest van rogge zijn nogal verschillend. Gele
roest van gerst, rogge en tarwe zien er hetzelfde uit. De opmerking wijst sterk in de richting
van gele roest.
Summary remarks
Symptoms point to the identity of the rust at species level.
[a] [23] [39] [40] Infection of glumes is characteristic of yellow and black rusts, even giving a
name to yellow rust (P. glumarum), but does not occur with brown rust.
[b] [16] [19] [20] [26] infection of the ears is characteristic for yellow and black rusts.
[c] [11] [14] [28] (sticky) yellow dust (sometimes mentioned as honeydew) characterises yellow
rust excluding the other two rusts.
[d] [12] ‘extending’ may indicate yellow rust, but the term is quite vague.
[e] [48] The similarity between the rusts on barley and rye strongly suggests yellow rust which
occurs rather regularly on winter barley and, apparently, quite incidentally on rye.
[f] [24] [31] [41] Infection (if that is meant) of the kernel is rather specific for yellow rust
but also rather rare. Spore powder on the kernel is seen with both yellow and black rust,
probably more with yellow rust. Yellow rust sporulates on the inner side of the glumes, black
rust usually on the outer side.
[g] [29] Rust (dust) on the stem may point to both yellow and black rust. The statement is too
weak for black rust characterised by conspicuously large lesions on the stem.
[h] [42] Trapping of urediniospores by the sticky stigmas is a new symptom, non-specific, but
indicative of the severity of the epidemic.
[i] [25] [27] [35] I think the Latin names are unreliable and non-discriminating (Box 2.3).
Field observations cannot proof the identity of a rust but they may be indicative.
[j] [38] Nearly complete killing of the lowest leaf is characteristic for a severe attack by yellow
rust, but it is not impossible with brown rust.
[k] [37] An early date is characteristic for an early epidemic of yellow rust, less so of brown rust,
and rules out black rust.
[l] [18] [34] [36] [45] [46] In my experience the term ‘red’ as colour indication is poorly
discriminating, in contrast to the term ‘yellow’. The term ‘red’ may also refer to brown rust
and, even more so, to black rust.

[m] [13] The expression ‘unknown ailment’ agrees with my experience in wheat. Brown rust
occurs nearly every season, yellow rust appears more as a surprise.
[n] [21] [47] In the obligately cross-fertilising rye fertilisation often fails due to a severe
infection by yellow rust, but if it succeeds the resulting kernel is well filled. This phenomenon,
which I have never seen in self-fertilising wheat, was mentioned explicitly by Braun (1846)
and Treviranus (1846).
Environmental factors cannot prove the identity of a rust, but they may add to the plausibility
of the choice for one or another rust species.
[o] [1] A late crop in the preceding year furthers the ‘switchover’ of the rust to the early- sown
following crop.
[p] [2] to [5] A wet harvest period stimulates the over-summering of inoculum. Self-sown
volunteer rye is essential but the ‘General Reports’ do not mention it. Points [1] to [5] are
valid for yellow and brown rust, not for black rust.
[q] [22] Fields sown early in the fall trap inoculum of various pathogens among which yellow
and brown rusts and hence promote the switchover of the rust from preceding to following
crop.
[r] [6] A mild winter is essential for yellow (Zadoks, 1961: §32.2) and brown rust since it allows for
more generations than usual and for a good quantity of inoculum to initiate the ‘outburst’.
Usually black rust does not normally overwinter in the uredinial stage in NW Europe.
[s] [10] [17] [32] [33] [47] Early infection, visible from a distance or at a field border, is
characteristic for yellow rust, less so for brown rust.
[t] [43] [44] Often I saw a yellow coloured soil under a wheat crop severely infected by yellow
rust, quite seldom I saw a brown coloured soil under a wheat crop severely infected by
brown rust.
[u] [30] The lack of pollen shedding and dispersal of rye during a severe epidemic is a new
symptom, but it is a non-specific symptom.
The most specific symptoms relate unambiguously to yellow rust, less specific symptoms do not
exclude brown rust. Black rust can be excluded, primarily because the most important symptom,
stem infection, has not been mentioned. Field observations clearly point to yellow rust but do
no completely exclude brown rust. Environmental factors indicate yellow rust, analogous to
the severe yellow rust epidemics on wheat in the period 1955 through 1961 (Zadoks, 1961).
My conclusion is that the nation-wide epidemic on rye, 1846, was due yellow rust (see Utrecht
and Groningen, also N Brabant), but that local outbreaks of brown rust or mixed occurrence of
yellow and brown rusts cannot be excluded.

Chapter 2
Appendix 2.2. Data from Belgium, 1846.
A detailed agricultural census was made in 1846 (Anonymous, 1850b). Rye covered 283,369 ha,
wheat 233,452 ha, and potatoes 115,062 ha. Rye, the poor man’s crop, was the most important
arable crop. Most of the rye (4/5) was used to feed the Flemish population. At the time, rural
Flanders impoverished, suffering from the decline of the cottage textile industry, whereas
the Walloon (French) speaking part of Belgium, rapidly industrialising, suffered little from the
harvest failures.
Provincial yield data were used to demonstrate the effects of the rust epidemic on rye. There
are at least two – more or less – independent effects on yield, the general weather situation
during the growing season and, in the case of rye, the putative effect of the rust.
The yield depression of rye was impressive, with a mean yield for Belgium of 7.25 hl/ha in 1846
versus a long-term average of 18.68 hl/ha (Table 2.3). A comparison with wheat provides more
detail. The overall yield of wheat was 15.35 versus 18.41 hl/ha, a grain loss of 17 per cent and a
straw loss of 15 per cent (Table 2.3). This loss cannot be due to a cold winter or a conspicuous
disease or pest, but might be attributed to summer drought, as in France (Agulhon et al., 1976:
140; Jardin & Tudesq, 1973: 234); Le Roy Ladurie, 2004: 623). Projecting this weather effect on
rye yields, the wheat losses in % are deducted from the rye losses in % and the resulting loss,
the ‘adjusted loss’, is attributed to yellow rust. For Belgium as a whole this boils down to 44%
grain loss and 7% straw loss.
The interesting point is the mean hl weight of 71 kg/hl, which is quite normal for rye (Table 2.3).
Knowing that a severe rust epidemic occurred in rye, the combination of a large yield depression
and, nonetheless, a good grain quality points indeed to yellow rust on rye. The limited ‘adjusted
Table 2.3. Mean grain yields in hl/ha and straw yields in kg/ha for wheat and rye in Belgian provinces (Data
from Anonymous, 1850b).
Province Wheat yield Rye yield
Grain (hl/ha) Straw (kg/ha) Grain (hl/ha) Straw (kg/ha)
1846 Normal 1846 Normal 1846 Normal 1846 Normal
Antwerp 15.85 17.83 2731 3120 8.11 18.25 2708 3457

Brabant 13.94 16.45 2639 2946 4.97 16.64 2344 3127
W Flanders 17.86 20.14 2355 2947 9.92 21.23 2340 3017
E Flanders 16.82 20.10 2654 3002 9.09 21.64 2907 3518
Hainaut 15.00 19.67 2693 3411 7.74 20.25 2834 3765
Liège 15.55 17.04 2816 3005 5.47 17.85 2760 3235
Limbourg 13.40 17.15 2449 2739 4.47 15.39 1973 2675
Luxembourg 11.07 14.74 1658 2171 10.41 19.37 2218 2904
Namur 12.93 15.90 2512 3005 5.87 16.42 2389 2890
Belgium 15.35 18.41 2581 3047 7.25 18.68 2520 3223

straw loss’ does not contradict this conclusion. For the explanation of the curious combination
of good quality grain with large grain losses see text.
The northern provinces (Antwerp, Brabant, Limbourg and Liège) were relatively hard hit
with grain losses from 45 to 60 per cent and straw losses of 9 to 15 per cent. The high straw
losses, especially, suggest a relatively early attack. In the Netherlands the rye of the southern
provinces (Limburg, Noord-Brabant), neighbouring Belgium, was also heavily damaged.

Chapter 2
Appendix 2.3. Abstract from reviews by Löbe (1847) and Weber (1847) on grain
production in Europe, with special attention for rye.
Fall-sown wheat and rye usually followed the same pattern of yield response to the year’s
weather (Chapter 4), but in exceptional years as in 1846 the responses diverged. Winter rye
suffered more from drought, cold cutting winds, and night frost than winter wheat. In the North
and the East of the Germanies the wheat was sometimes diseased, probably attacked by a rust,
but in the western part the wheat was healthy and high-yielding, in contrast to winter-rye.
Retrospectives on the 1846 harvest by Weber and Löbe in the Oekonomische Neuigkeiten of
1847 provided a varied picture of the damages. The mild winter produced an early crop. In
the East, Silesia and Poland, strong, cold NE winds in spring (late May, early June) damaged
the crops, causing poor seed set in rye. Spring frosts, mentioned occasionally as a damaging
agent, I interpret as night frosts to which rye is very sensitive during flowering and early seed
set. In several areas the rye, usually sown on the poorer soils, suffered much from drought.
In some areas patches with deaf ears were found that could have been due to early rust foci
or, alternatively, to some root or foot rot, or to night frost in low lying patches, or to the cold
winds impairing fertilisation. Rust was reported from Poland to Belgium and from Denmark to
Switzerland. Which rust?
The reviewers did not describe the rust in detail but mentioned its occurrence on foliage,
stems and ears. This probably excludes brown rust. The clue is in the remarks on quality. Black
rust, if on the stems, hardly prevents seed set and causes all seeds to be light and of poor
milling quality. In contrast, yellow rust on rye often prevents seed set and then the remaining
kernels are heavy and of good quality. Several comments concur in low yields but good grain or
milling quality. Key was a remark on Belgium, where the yield was poor but the quality good.
We reasoned already that Belgian rye suffered from yellow rust exclusively or primarily. By
extension I suggest that yellow rust was the main culprit in the Germanies.
Admittedly, the conclusion on yellow rust having been the dominant rust in the Germanies
of 1846 is based on an indirect argument, but it is the best available; it does not exclude the
occasional presence of brown or black rust.
The following is an abstract from the surveys by Weber (W) and Löbe (L), with page numbers
added. Note the differences between the two reviewers, Weber reporting earlier and far more
optimistically than Löbe. The remarks on good quality are written in italics.
Austrian Empire
Inner Austria (Styria, Rye harvest about average. Wheat good (L123).
Carinthia, Kranjska)
Lower Austria Drought damage in cereals (W15).
Winter cereals good (L123).
Upper Austria Drought damage in cereals (W15).
Banat (Present Romania) Cereals good (W15).
Bohemia Cereals good, except Ore Mountains where rye failed (W15).
Croatia Cereals good (W15).
Rye early and satisfactory (L124).
Dalmatia Cereals suffered from drought (L124).

Galicia Rye poor, wheat quite good (W15).

Rye moderate, wheat excellent (L123).
Hungary Drought damage in cereals (W15).
Winter cereals average (L123).
Moravia Drought damage in cereals (W15).
Transsylvania (Siebenbürgen, present Romania) Cereals good (L124).
The Germanies
Baden Rye good (W14).
Rye yields halved (L133).
Bavaria Wheat excellent and rye fair. Familiar words such as yellow dust and honeydew
in an incomprehensible text148 (L133).
Lower Bavaria – Bavaria’s grain shed, excellent rye (W14).
Lower Franconia – Cereals good but some night frost damage in fall-sown
cereals (W14).
Middle Franconia – Wheat very good (W14).
Würtzburg – Rust in spring wheat (W14).
Brandenburg Wheat good. Soon a disease appeared in rye, that in many areas, especially the
lower ones, reduced the yield by one third or even by one half (L125).
Brunswick Wheat good. Loss in rye 50 per cent (W14).
Rye yielded less than half the normal yield due to rust, wheat poor, spring sown
crops suffered badly from drought (L132).
Bremen Rye average, wheat good (W14).
Galicia Rye bad but wheat good (W15).
Rye average (L123)
Hanover Rust reduced rye yields considerably (L132).
Hesse Rye poor (L133).
Rye yields halved by rust (L133).
Marken (area around Berlin) – Rye good (W6).
Mecklenburg Rye yield medium (L132).
Mecklenburg-Schwerin – Cereals good (W14).
Oldenburg Rye yields moderate (L132).
Ore Mountains Rye with beautiful straw but few grains (W14).
Pommerania Cereals good (W12).
Rye suffered from fungal disease (G: Befallen). Harvest was poor. Rye fields had
large patches with wholly white, deaf ears (L125).
Poznań Cold nights with cutting winds (May/June). Rye yields often halved. Wheat
yields good (W12).
Cereals ripened prematurely because of the heat (L125/6).
Prussia East Prussia – Grain yields good (W12).
West Prussia – Rye good, some fields with poor yields excepted (W12).
Rhine Province Rust in rye and wheat, straw and grain yields not abundant (W13).
Newspaper quote ‘grain yields good, but not rye that suffered in places from
rust, mildew and honeydew …’ (W13).
Rye yields down to one fifth (L125).
Saxony Grain yields average, but rye often unsatisfactory (W13).
Rye with good average yield. In many places yield unsatisfactory, but with nice
flour content that compensates the low threshing (W13).
Wheat good but smutty (L125). Rye average because of rust (L125).

Chapter 2
In most fields rye suffered from rust, grain loss about one third, but good quality
compensates yield loss (L131).
According to a governmental publication the overall losses of rye in 1846 were
22 percent149.
Saxon Duchies – Wheat excellent, rye in some areas yields one quarter of normal
(L132).
Schleswig-Holstein Yields less than half the expected value, but grains heavy and rich in flour (L132).
Holstein – In the S losses in rye up to two thirds (W14).
Silesia Cereals satisfactory, spring cereals moderate due to drought, rye had not
enough kernels (W5).
Winter cereals suffered from cold winds and night frost. Wheat coloured red by
rust. Later rye became rusted too (L125).
The rust coloured all wheat red (brown leaf rust, or yellow rust?) and later
rye became infected too. ‘Under these conditions the ears remained either
completely deaf, or very incomplete. The remaining kernels, where they could be
formed, are very rich in flour’. Yields approximately halved. Wheat satisfactory.
Spring-sown cereals poor (L125).
Upper Silesia – Grain yields moderate to bad. From mid May icy NE winds, early
rye frozen. Winter rye, delayed by low temperatures, became rusty. Rye with
rust that destroyed large areas (W5).
Middle Silesia – Rye often 1/3 to ½ less kernels but these were of good quality
and they give very nice flour (G: die jedoch sehr schönes Mehl geben, W6).
Lower Silesia - Rye sometimes good (W6).
Silesian mountains – Rye and wheat good (W6).
Upper Lusatia - (Oberlausitz) Cereals good (W6).
Westfalia Münsterland – ‘Rye gives little promise of a good harvest as it seems to be
affected by rust, its red dust and moist rotting’ ‘… the kernels swelled and
were well developed and healthy; …’ Yield in retrospect good. Note: ‘In places
honeydew befell the rye, as probably meant by ‘rotting’’ (W13).
Rye yield meagre due to rust (L125).
Würtemberg Cereals average (L133).
Belgium Rye good (W15).
Rye harvest nearly failed but rye quality good. Wheat yields fair. Spring sown
cereals suffered from drought (L132).
Denmark Wheat good, rye and spring sown crops lost 50 per cent due to unfavourable
weather (L134).
Poland (East of river Wisła, under Russian rule) Rye not so good (W15).
Bad harvests. Rye suffered from spring frosts and fungal disease (G: Befallen);
large patches with white deaf ears (L135).
The Netherlands Rye gave normal yield on three quarters of the fields (W15).
‘The rust much reduced the rye yield’ (L132).

3. The potato murrain on the European Continent and the revolutions
of 1848
The tale of the Irish Famine, 1845-1847, following the outbreak of potato
late blight, has been told repeatedly. The parallel story of the ‘Continental
Famine’, 1845-1847, has not yet been told. The Continental Famine was
caused by poor harvests of potatoes, due to the same late blight, and of grain,
due to frost, drought, rust, voles, inopportune rains, floods and hailstorms.
The Continental Famine was enhanced by hoarding, speculation, and poor
governance. Hunger was followed by infectious disease. The demographic
effects are difficult to disentangle. The number of excess deaths due to
the Continental Famine cannot yet be determined with any precision, but
clearly it approaches that of the Irish Famine. The harvest failures of 1845
and 1846 and the resulting famine came on top of rural pauperisation and
urban discontent, and thus contributed to the revolutions of 1848 on the
European Continent. The statement ‘an epidemic of potato late blight caused
an epidemic of revolutions’ is largely exaggerated but it contains a grain of
truth.
Ce végétal est bien, comme il l’a dit, le plus beau présent que le Nouveau Monde ait fait à
l’Ancien.
This vegetal is really, as he said it, the nicest present that the New World has given to the
Old.
Antoine Parmentier, quoted by Augustin Sageret in the lemma ‘pomme de
terre’ (potato) in the Encyclopédie méthodique (Tessier et al., 1818: 713).
3.1. The continental Famine
Phytophthora infestans150 caused an epidemic disease in potato, then indicated as the ‘Potato
Murrain’, that destroyed the potato crop in Ireland and triggered the ‘Great hunger’ (Woodham-
Smith, 1962) of 1845-1847, also called the ‘Irish Famine’. The infection was imported from the
Americas151 into Belgium on new potato breeding material and it began already to spread in
1844 (Bourke & Lamb, 1993: 5, 35). The year 1845 was a blight year but, from a meteorological
point of view, not an extreme one152. Winds dispersed the inoculum in all directions over Europe,
also to the NW, so that England and later Ireland were affected (Bourke, 1964). The Irish crop
was exceptionally promising in 1845 until the blight killed the crop, sometimes within a week,
a real catastrophe. In the following year, 1846, the blight was disastrous again, due to the
weather, the late planting of the crop, and – supposedly – the tremendous amount of inoculum
coming from culled potatoes left about hither and thither.
The Irish were poor and they had little else to eat than potatoes. Under the ‘potato economy’
an Irish labourer ate ~5.4 kg of potatoes a day153, spread equally over three meals, as long as

Chapter 3
potatoes were available, roughly from November 1st to May 1st. Then came the summer dip, with
hunger and disease. Failure of the potato meant famine, and a famine was accompanied by its
usual complement of infectious diseases, intestinal infections, dysentery, typhoid, typhus,
and tuberculosis154. We cannot differentiate the numbers killed by hunger from those killed
by disease155. The results of the Irish Famine are well known, with ~600,000 excess deaths and
an emigration of ~1,300,000 people over the five-year period 1846/51156.
On the European continent the rural poor were, maybe, slightly better off than in Ireland. Their
diet consisted largely of potatoes and rye. In 1845 and 1846 their subsistence was threatened by
harvest failures in several major food crops, potatoes foremost. A famine followed, here called
the ‘Continental Famine’. The course of events on the Continent showed some similarities with
that in Ireland but its impact on society differed. In Ireland a breakdown of traditional society
took place with mass emigration but without political renewal, whereas on the Continent a
renewal of societies followed the revolutions of 1848. This paper156a discusses the relationship
of the phytopathological events in 1845-1846 and the political events in 1848.
Each section begins with some general comments, applicable to much of Continental Europe
(Figure 2.12), and continues to discuss the events in different countries, the Netherlands
(Figure 2.7) foremost.
3.2. Potato late blight and other discomforts
3.2.1. Potato cultivation and potato use
Between 1750 and 1850 the potato gradually gained ground upon the cereals, primarily rye
(e.g. Bieleman, 1987: 543), though with large phase differences between countries and regions
(Oliemans, 1988; Reader, 2008). Yields increased considerably between 1812 and 1845 (Van
Zanden, 1985: 166). Providing one to two times more calories per hectare than cereals, and
being a sturdy crop with regular yields, the potato became the staff of life for the poor, at least
for the rural poor. Many urban poor, however, had bad housing without cooking facilities, and
thus depended on bread only, rye bread of course (Jardin & Tudesq, 1973: 234).
Many potato varieties were in use, early, mid-late, and late. The late varieties should have a
good keeping quality since storage facilities were minimal in comparison with today. Keeping
quality had already become a problem in Ireland when the preferred potato variety changed
from ‘Apple’ over ‘Cup’ to ‘Lumper’ in a period of about one hundred years (Bourke, 1993 p33).
The average per capita consumption of potatoes in Ireland was ~800 kg/y, in the Netherlands157
~210 kg/y. The last figure seems representative for Continental Europe where calorie intake
was supplemented by rye for the poor and wheat for the rich. In times of scarcity the calorie
intake may vary considerable (Sen, 1981; Drèze & Sen, 1989). Heldring (1845) listed a weekly
budget of a poor rural worker’s family in the Netherlands (Table 3.1). No other data for the years
around 1845 were found.
The area under potato increased and part of the new produce was destined for industrial
processing. Potato flour (farina) was a new product. Distilleries produced malt wine, alcohol,
and vinegar. The vinegar served to savour the potatoes. The alcohol was used in the spirit
burner. Malt wine was the raw material of brandy. Use and abuse of brandy were considerable.
The average (!) male in the rural town of Goes (Zeeland, NL) consumed more than half a litre

The potato murrain on the European Continent and the revolutions of 1848
Table 3.1. Weekly budget of an average family of rural poor, consisting of three adults and three children,
according to Heldring (1845: 28). He compared the new prices, after the blight of 1845, with the old prices
before the blight. Prices are in Dutch cents. The casual labourer usually earned 5 cents per hour, in times of
unemployment (as in 1845) even less. This budget dates from the fall of 1845; prices peaked in the spring
of 1847.
Item Old price New price, fall 1845 Increase in per cent
Bread 90 140 56
Fat 35 35
Butter 50 50
Meal and buttermilk 50 75 50
Coffee 10 11 10
Treacle 5 5
Oil 12 12
Soap 5 5
Cloth, thread, buttons 10 10
Tobacco 5 5
Salt 10 10
Milk 7 7
Pepper 3 3
Vinegar 5 5
Fuel 50 50
Rents 50 50
Clothes 100 100
Pots, pans, ironwork 15 15
Potatoes, pulp or groats 50 140 180
Totals 542 708 31
of brandy per week. Pastor O.G. Heldring, deeply concerned with the condition of the poor,
thought that the potato contained a ‘principle of sin’ because it was also used to produce
jenever, the Dutch version of gin158. He saw the punishing hand of God in the potato blight
(Heldring, 1845). In the province of Brabant159, however, people were made to believe that the
blight was due to the introduction of the ‘polka’, a dance of Bohemian origin popular in Vienna
since 1829 (Van Oirschot et al., 1985: 4).
3.2.2. Potato diseases
The major potato disease during the late 18th and early 19th century was the ‘curl’, known since
1747 in Germany and 1764 (or 1751) in England. Today curl is attributed to a virus disease,
possibly potato virus Y (Salaman, 1949). Control was difficult but not impossible. The most
radical solution, though with a temporary effect only, was the selection of new varieties from
seedlings (Van Bavegem, 1782), a current practice during the 19th century160. ‘Renewal of seed’,
i.e. importing seed potatoes from less affected areas161, was practiced as a control measure
since ~1800 in Belgium and England162. A more subtle method of control was a form of ‘green
lifting’163, mentioned in Friesland (NL), 1807 and 1809, and in Scotland164.

Chapter 3
In the early 1840s an epidemic of ‘dry rot’ occurred Europe-wide, due to a Fusarium fungus (Von
Martius, 1842)165. In 1844, Flemish authorities, wanting to control the diseases ‘curl’ and ‘dry
rot’, planted potato tubers imported from North America on an experimental farm at Cureghem
in West Flanders166. After a while, some of the resulting plants showed curious brown flecks.
Some of the harvested potatoes rotted in storage. This is the putative onset of the potato late
blight epidemics in Europe (Bourke & Lamb, 1993: 5) that caused the Great Hunger 1845/47 in
Ireland and the Black Years 1845/9 in the Netherlands167. The story of the ‘potato murrain’, a
designation introduced by Berkeley (1846), in Ireland has been told over and over again.
The reports on 1846 rather frequently mention poor tuber formation, the number of tubers
being sometimes down by fifty per cent or more (e.g. Hlubek, 1847: 69). The contemporaneous
explanation was the response of the potato plants to excessive heat leading to long roots and
few tubers168.
3.2.3. The late blight epidemics of 1844, 1845 and 1846
1844. Late blight first appeared in 1844 in Belgium. Bourson (1845) impartially reviewed
opinions on the causes of the ‘evil’ (F: le mal). His report on the 1844 events in Belgium
is blurred by the then reigning confusion between ‘curl’, dry rot and wet rot, some savants
contending that the three were – in fact – one. Several provincial authorities, reporting a
good 1844 harvest, acknowledged that the potato quality was often poor in low places, an
observation not incompatible with the occurrence of late blight169. Bourson remained quite
vague on blight in Belgium, 1844, only quoting Kickx and Mareska, professors at the University
of Gent, who reported on the disease ‘that had wrought its ravages in secret’ (F: elle avait ...
exercé sourdement ses ravages).
Desmazières, botanist and mycologist, had seen the disease in 1844, in the department ‘Nord’,
in N France170. He gave a detailed description of the symptoms, mainly on the variety ‘blanche
tardive’ [= late white], and of the associated fungus that he called Botrytis fallax. The losses
around Lille were ‘considerable’171. The disease was seen frequently in SE England (near
Folkestone in Kent), where it arrived too late to seriously harm the foliage but early enough to
cause severe tuber infection leading to great storage losses (Mickle, 1845). Vis172 described the
loss of the tasty variety ‘Beaulieu’ in Zeeland (SW Netherlands) in 1844 due to a disease that
we now recognise as late blight.
1845. The winter 1844/5 was extremely cold and frost may have killed culled potatoes thus
eliminating inoculum. It also killed much fall-sown cereals and winter colza (rapeseed)173 in
the Low Countries and in M and N Europe. As a consequence farmers planted more potatoes
than usual in the Netherlands, Belgium, and N Germany174. Seed potatoes and groundkeepers175
may have carried inoculum through the winter. No relevant information is available. In 1845
the blight burst out in W Flanders (Bourson, 1845: 2720) and then spread over Europe as a first
order ‘focal epidemic’176, wonderfully illustrated by Bourke (1964) on the basis of hundreds of
original documents.
Bourke & Lamb (1993) analysed the seasonal weather for 1845. In most of NW Europe the
weather, ‘drab, cloudy and cold’ (ibid.: 41), was but moderately favourable to infection. Winds
could disperse inoculum from the focal centre in all directions. Extreme susceptibility of
the potato crops rather than exceptional weather conditions determined the severity of the

epidemic (Vanderplank, 1968: 153). The blight, beginning in West Flanders and severe already
in June, hit the potatoes early and hard in the Belgian sea polders. Münter (1846: 8) noted
a steep gradient in the wetness of 1845, from England (wet, cold, bad harvest), to NE Europe
(warm, dry).
In the Netherlands the alarm bells tinkled everywhere in August. The early potatoes had been
lifted safely, but the mid-late and late varieties became seriously diseased, sometimes up to
total loss. The sandy soils, less conducive to late blight, could still produce a crop, though even
in the peat-sand area of Drenthe the yield fell from ~210 hl/ha in 1844 to ~90 hl/ha in 1845, a
loss of ~57 per cent (Bieleman, 1987: 650).
1846. The mild winter of 1845/6 must have allowed the ample overwintering of inoculum in
culled potatoes, potato piles, groundkeepers, and seed potatoes, all over Continental Europe,
but this was poorly documented177. In Belgium, Quételet (1846) observed flowering plants178
throughout the winter. Late winter and early spring were unusually mild.
The summer of 1846, with its anti-cyclonal weather pattern over the continent, was, according
to Bourke & Lamb (1993: 49), dry and hot, and according to several contemporaries exceptionally
dry and hot. Drought damaged many crops over large areas. The rye crops suffered much in
France and in present Poland, and in several hill districts. In Lower Silesia (present W Poland)
the potato harvest failed by drought, not by late blight. Similarly, the early potatoes in Bavaria
– escaping the blight – could not form decent tubers by lack of water.
The statement by Bourke & Lamb that the potato crop ‘suffered more from drought than
from blight’ is strong but not far from the mark. Löbe (1847) and Weber (1847) reviewed the
information on the 1846 harvest in most of Continental Europe. The early potatoes generally
suffered little from late blight and excessive heat, and - usually – gave a fair yield. The late
potatoes, however, suffered much from heat and drought, as tuber formation was poor in many
areas. In Belgium and Schleswig-Holstein the number of tubers per stool was low. In the Rhine
Province ‘late potatoes yielded only few tubers’ (G: Spätkartoffeln liefern nur wenig Knollen).
The same complaint, ‘very few tubers’ (G: sehr wenig Knollen), came from Saxony. In Poznań the
potatoes failed, because ‘so far often only long roots were formed in stead of tubers’ (G: ...
statt der Knollen häufig nur lange Wurzeln bis dahin angesetzt haben). In Poland potato produced
about one third of the expected number of tubers and, occasionally, no tubers at all but only
long roots (Weber, 1847: 12). Many tubers stopped growing until the rains came and then
produced secondary growth. I did not (yet) find the complaint about poor tuber formation in
the Netherlands. Everywhere, loss by late blight came on top of loss by poor tuber formation.
The German daily Allgemeine Zeitung of 2 August 1846 wrote ‘Everywhere the continuing heat
melts the ice on the mountains. The summit of the Mont Blanc today presents naked rocks,
during many years the ice there did not disappear. In consequence several rivers burst their
banks, such as the Rhône, which flooded some 1000 Juchart (~300 ha) of cultivated fields’179.
Floods – destroying the crops – were reported from i.a. the Rhine in Lichtenstein and the
Vistula (P: Wisła, G: Weichsel) in present Poland. Clear skies might have led to severe night frosts
damaging the young potato crops and the flowering rye crops but the available information is
not satisfactory. Nightly dew was probably frequent. In many areas yellow stripe rust (Puccinia
striiformis) of rye took its toll (Chapter 2).

Chapter 3
Thunderstorms interrupted the fine weather and hailstorms could be very destructive. One such
hailstorm in Bavaria destroyed the food base of 15,000 people180. The additive effect of these
storms must have been considerable thus fuelling scarcity and distress. The thunderstorms in
July provided the wetness needed by late blight to explode. Exploding it did, and around the
end of July messages came in from Copenhagen and Gdańsk (G: Dantzig) in the North to the
Savoy in the South, from Ireland in the West to Bavaria, and – later – Ukraine, in the East.
3.2.4. Countries
Agriculture knows good years, when everything works together in favour of the crops, ‘normal’
years, and bad years, when wrong goes what can go wrong. 1846 was a bad year. Among the
mishaps were drought and excessive heat, yellow rust on rye – the staple for many Europeans –,
voles, hail storms, and floods. The potato murrain was the last of the mishaps, picking up
speed in August and becoming very destructive all over continental Europe. The 1846 data
suggest an E-W gradient, a weather gradient, in contrast to the W-E gradient of 1845, a dispersal
gradient.
The Netherlands. The subjective ‘feel’ of a season has been captured in a single figure181,
the ‘frost index’ for the winter and the ‘summer index’ for the summer (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
Temperature (monthly mean of daily temperatures) and precipitation (in mm per month) were
plotted as the deviations from their 30-years’ (1831-1860) means (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The
winter 1844/5 was bitterly cold182 with monthly mean temperatures ~5 °C below normal
in December, February, and March. The winter of 1845/6 was warm with monthly means of
2-4 °C above normal from November through March. The summer of 1846 was hot183, the second
hottest of the century. The winter 1846/7 was very cold again with monthly means of at least
3 °C below normal in December and January. Monthly precipitations were about normal in 1845
and 1846, with the exception of a high precipitation in December, 1845.
Figure 3.1. The Frost Index for the Netherlands over the years 1830-1850 (IJnsen, 1981).
The value of e.g. 1840 should be read as the value for the winter 1839/40. The winter 1844/5 was very cold, the
winter 1845/6 was exceptionally mild. Horizontal – years. Vertical – Frost Index (ranging from 0 to 100).

Figure 3.2. The Summer Index for the Netherlands over the years 1830-1850 (IJnsen, 1976).
The blight year 1846 was exceptionally warm. Horizontal – years. Vertical – Summer Index (ranging from 0
to 100).
Figure 3.3. Monthly means of daily temperatures, De Bilt, the Netherlands in 1845 and 1846, plotted as
deviations from the 30-years’ averages (1831-1860). Horizontal – months of the year beginning with January.
Vertical – Deviation in °C of the mean monthly temperature of 1845 from its long term mean (mean monthly
temperature of 1845 minus mean monthly temperature averaged over 1831-1860). Original data from General
Reports.
In the course of August, 1845, people realised that a catastrophe drew near. The Dutch
government reacted promptly. On 14 September 1845 the King signed an Order of Council,
proposed 9 September, to withdraw import duties on food commodities. Later, 16 November,
the Minister of Finance Van Hall declared in Parliament ‘All other artificial measures lie, in my
conviction, beyond the circle of duties of the Government’184. Dutch potato yield in 1845 was
only ~0.27 million tonnes (~3.9 million hl; General Report, 1846), nearly 60 per cent less than
needed.

Chapter 3
Figure 3.4. Monthly means of precipitation in De Bilt, the Netherlands, 1845 and 1846, plotted as deviations
from the 30-years averages (1831-1860). Monthly precipitation in mm. Original data from General Reports.
In 1846 the area under potatoes decreased in some provinces, as in the province of Noord-
Holland (Van Ewyck, 1847: 43). In the province of Friesland, the blight in 1846 was worse than
in 1845 (Wumkes, 1935: 225). In the province of Groningen the blight caused serious damage
again. In 1846 the total potato production of the Netherlands was ~0.4 million tonnes (~5.8
million hl; General Report, 1847). The 1846 deficit was clearly due to late blight but differed in
structure from the 1845 deficit185.
In the Netherlands the blight epidemics had several agricultural consequences. (1) The area
under potato was reduced, by 35 per cent in Groningen, by 75 per cent in the Beijerlanden,
south of Rotterdam, and by up to 100 per cent in the hard hit area of the Bommelerwaard186.
The old levels were regained with a delay of some 20 years. Potato was replaced by leguminous
crops for food and mangolds for feed. (2) The potato area shifted somewhat to the sandy soils
of Drenthe and Brabant, where the micro-climate was less conducive to blight187. (3) Early
potatoes received more attention as they often escaped the blight. The produce was readily
exported to the Dutch towns and abroad, to England foremost. (4) Several potato processing
plants had to close down. In Groningen, only two distilleries out of sixteen survived the 1846
crisis (Priester, 1991: 372). Dekadal average yields in hl/ha decreased from 185 (1831-1840)
to 126 (1841-1850), recovered slowly to 148 (1851/60), to reach the nearly normal level of 181
(1861-1870) with considerable delay (Priester, 1991: 350).
Austria188. In 1845, blight arrived in the Austrian Crownlands but the amount of damage is
uncertain. Probably there was just enough blight to infest the seed potatoes. The field crops
of Austrian Silesia (present SW Poland) yielded poorly, about 25 per cent less than in 1844.
Grain planting in the fall of 1844 and the spring of 1845 had been difficult or impossible due
to excess wetness of the soil. Many potatoes set in the spring did not emerge. The grain and
potato harvests 1845 suffered of bad weather (Nitsch, 1846).
In 1846 the potato harvest was ruined in Silesia and Galicia (both in the S of present Poland),
Bohemia and Moravia (present Czech Republic), and the Bukowina (present Ukraine and
Rumania). In Bohemia and the Bukowina losses were ≥75 per cent (Sandgruber, 1978: 64). The
disease was impressive in Styria and serious in Carinthia and Carniola [Kranjska]189. Tuber
formation was poor in Inner Austria leading to over 30 per cent loss (Weber, 1847: 5).

In 1847 the blight struck again causing an empire-wide loss of 27 percent190.
Belgium. The first outbreak op potato late blight in Europe occurred in Belgium (§3.2.3).
Unfortunately, I could find few details.
In 1845 the blight was early and severe. Tubers rotted in the soil and the 1845 harvest was
negligible, ~9 per cent of the expected harvest191. In the Flemish parish of Lippeloo people
flocked in from all sides to invoke Saint Anthony on behalf of the potato. Coins piled up in the
choir and had to be carried away by the basket (Lindemans, 1952: 189). The population was hard
hit because many grain fields had been lost by freezing in the winter 1844/5.
The potato failed again in 1846. Actual mean yield in 1846 was 133 in stead of an expected
200 hl/ha, or a country wide loss of ~33 per cent. The worst hit province was E Flanders with
a yield of 106 in stead of the expected yield of 200 hl/ha, a loss of ~47 per cent (Anonymous,
1850b).
The potato harvest of 1847 was not good but no useful data were found.
Denmark. The Duchies Schleswig and Holstein192 suffered great losses in 1845 (Kyrre, 1913: 68).
About 50 tonnes of potato bought in Denmark, seemingly healthy, were shipped to Hamburg.
Upon arrival they were rotten and had to be thrown into the sea (Morren, 1845a: 30).
In 1846 the blight was more severe than in the preceding year (Löbe, 1847: 134), also in the
duchy of Holstein. Export contracts had to be cancelled in 1846.
Estonia (then under Russian rule). In 1846 several potato crops suddenly turned black and
wilted after flowering, without night frost. Healthy and diseased tubers were found in one and
the same hill. Where late blight had not infested the crops, the potato harvest, with very small
tubers because of the heat and drought during summer, was of no importance (Anonymous,
1847d).
France. In 1844 the blight appeared in NE France, bordering Belgium (§3.2.3). Decaisne (1846)
quoted Desmazières, an able mycologist from Lille, who in 1844 already had seen an outbreak
of ‘Botrytis fallax’ on the variety Blanche tardive (= ‘late white’) in N France and had described
the symptoms.
In 1845, French growers, seeing the majority of the tubers rotted, were so depressed that they
often abandoned their potato fields (Roze, 1898: 290) and even ‘believed to be obliged to
abandon the cultivation of that precious tuber’ forever (Mangin, 1914: 93). Locally the 1845
losses were very high, about 90 per cent in the district Lille, in the NE, ~45 per cent in the
Savoy, and up to 100 per cent in some districts of SW France193. Country-wide, the potato yields
in both 1845 and 1846 were 78 in stead of the expected 103 million hl, a loss of 22 per cent
(Agulhon et al., 1976: 140). In 1847 yields were normal again.
The Germanies194. The harvest of 1844 was good. In 1845 the weather had a gradient from
very wet in W to hot and dry in NE Germany. Hence the losses by blight were up to 100 per cent
in the W, where the consumption quality suffered too, and negligible in the E (Münter, 1846:
6/12). Münter’s map clearly shows the blight gradient. In the W the tubers had been infected

Chapter 3
in the field, but in the E the disease was sometimes only found in the potato storage piles195
(Münter, 1846: 28/9). Overall, the potato harvest was 50 to 75 per cent below expectation in
1845 (Wehler, 1987: 643; see Table 2.1). In some areas, as in Silesia, the wet harvest weather
in combination with a mild winter caused great losses by warming and rotting in storage piles
(Schulz, 1846).
In 1846 losses were estimated at ~47 per cent. Potato suffered from drought and late blight196.
Complaints about deficient tuber formation were general (Löbe, 1847: 132). In several areas
drought did more damage than late blight. Many crops, too bad to be harvested, had to be
ploughed in.
Even the 1847 potato harvest was bad (33 per cent below expectation), a promising crop being
destroyed by blight when the weather turned foul at mid-summer. In Upper Silesia the 1847
loss approached 100 percent197.
Norway (then under Swedish rule). The murrain reached Norway late in 1845 (Bourke, 1964)198.
In SW Norway the blight was even worse in 1846 and the potatoes rotted again (Lamb, 1995:
22; Löbe, 1847: 134).
Poland (modern E Poland, then under Russian rule). The potatoes failed in 1846, as did the
grain. ‘The distress is thus indescribably great’199.
Sweden. The 1845 epidemic spread N up to the area of Uppsala, with great destruction in the
southernmost tip of the country (Eriksson, 1884). In 1846 the blight in Östergötland was more
severe than in 1845 (Löbe, 1846: 134).
Switzerland200 with its rapid population growth was hit hard by a famine in 1845/6 triggered
by the potato late blight (Gruner, 1968: 43, 47), ‘a warning from heaven’ (G: ein Mahnmal vom
Himmel). Bonjean (1846: 116) provided interesting detail about this ‘place of disaster’. In the
Rhine Valley two thirds of the harvest was lost and a lack of setting potatoes resulted. In 1847
the Swiss author Jeremias Gotthelf published a tear-jerking novel ‘Cathy the Grandmother’
describing the disastrous effects of the 1845 and 1846 blight on her little household, a ‘potato
mini-farm’ (G: Kartoffelzwergwirtschaft).
3.2.5. Interaction between harmful agents
A difficult and neglected subject is the interaction between harmful agents (Van der Wal &
Zadoks, 1971). Around 1900 it was common knowledge that ‘curl’ enhanced the effect of potato
late blight. Quanjer (1913: 62) observed that the rather blight resistant cultivar Paul Krüger
could be severely attacked by late blight when diseased by the curl. J.C. Dorst, who later
became a well-known plant breeder, made a pertinent remark to this effect, and he referred to
an English publication of 1872, making an equally pertinent statement 201. It seems as if this
knowledge has been lost. We have, unfortunately, no way to establish the relative impacts
of the two diseases and the importance of the interaction. Accepting the statements at face
value, the interaction must have enhanced the damages caused by the two diseases.

3.2.6. Other crop damages
The year 1845. The 1845 season was a poor season for cereals being either too cold, or too wet,
or too dry. The winter 1844/5 had been long and severe and fall-sown cereals had died by frost
all over the Continent. In the Netherlands, Belgium, France, N and M Germany winter cereals
were often replaced by potatoes (sic!).
The Netherlands. Winter wheat was poor and weedy, spring wheat did well. The rye harvest was
variable, failing in Limburg. In some other areas about one third got lost due to wet harvest
conditions (General Report, 1845).
Austria. Disastrous floods occurred in Galicia (present Poland, river Vistuła), Lombardy,
Bohemia202, and Hungary ruining the grain harvests (Macartney, 1968: 312). Rye yields were
generally low (Abel, 1974: 367). In Austrian Silesia the wheat was severely rusted and yielded
far less than in 1844 (Nitsch, 1846).
Belgium. Fields with winter wheat and winter colza had been destroyed (Reynebeau, 2005: 64).
For that reason more potatoes had been planted than usual in Flanders.
France. The French grain harvest was moderate, 113 million hl where 120 million hl was expected,
a loss of ~6 per cent (Agulhon et al., 1976: 140). In places, less than 50 per cent of the expected
rye yield was harvested. It is not clear what caused the loss, possibly winter damage. In Brittany
the winter grain was frozen and many cattle died from cold (Guin, 1982: 117).
The Germanies. Winter killing of cereals was widespread in N and M Germany (Abel, 1974: 366).
In Silesia rye suffered from voles, hail, and floods (Münter, 1846: 12). The Silesian grain harvest
was less than 60 per cent of the expected yield (Schulz, 1846). The wheat harvest was ~1/3
below normal in the Rhine Province and poor in W Prussia203. In Mecklenburg and Silesia the
wheat suffered badly from an unidentified rust; rye harvests were poor204 because of voles,
floods, and hail. The 1845 autumn in Upper Silesia was so wet that winter rye could be sown in
two thirds of the area, leading to scarcities in 1846, as in Austrian Silesia. In parts of Masuria
the rye did not produce its own seed205.
Poland. The grain harvest failed.
The year 1846. The winter was mild, the grain harvest was early, and harvest conditions were
good. Mild winters are favourable to cereal rusts, especially those without (active) perfect
stage, allowing the production of a few extra generations so that the new growing season
begins with abundant inoculum (Hogg et al., 1969; Zadoks, 1961). The summer of 1846 was
extremely hot over most of Europe and disastrous thunderstorms occurred in various areas, in
the alpine area accompanied by summer floods. Other summer floods were caused by the rapid
melting of alpine glaciers.
The Netherlands. A fitful winter followed by a dry summer often leads to an outburst of voles206.
This happened in 1846 (Hooijer, 1847) when voles and drought together caused a national wheat
loss of about thirty per cent (Van der Heiden, 2001). Wheat was not only damaged by voles but
also by floods, birds, and (in the NE) rust. In Friesland, where fewer potatoes had been planted
than usual, vole damage to cereals endangered food security (Jansma & Schoor, 1987: 59).

Chapter 3
Rye became severely rusted by yellow stripe rust and the rye harvest of 1846 generally failed
(Chapter 2). The damage was the more unfortunate since the poor, deprived from potatoes, now
had to pay dearly for their rye bread (General Report, 1846). The fall-sown crop of 1846/7 was,
again, damaged by voles that continued eating young sprouts in the fall and winter, sometimes
under the snow cover.
Austria. In the Austrian realm the cereal and hay harvests failed again, leading to great shortages
all over Central Europe and to hunger typhus in Styria, Bohemia and Silesia. A thunderstorm
caused great damage in Bohemia207 on July 6th. Prices went up and in several provinces people
suffered real famine (Springer, 1865: 136).
Belgium. Flanders (W Belgium) saw its rye harvest reduced by 60 per cent, from 18 to 7 hl/ha
(Lamberty, 1949: 136). On the poor soils of the ‘Kempen’ (N Belgium) loss was about 50 per cent
(Vanhaute, 1992). Two historians208 ascribed the loss to rust, now identified as yellow stripe
rust (Chapter 2).
France. In France209, the prolonged dry and hot spring of 1846 and the heavy summer rains
caused important losses in cereals. The grain harvest amounted to 91 in stead of an expected
120 million hl, a loss of ~24 per cent.
The Germanies. Grain harvests were miserable in the Kingdom of Prussia with a rye yield of 43
per cent and a wheat yield of 23 per cent below the mean yield 1841/5 (Chapter 2) See Table
2.1; Wehler, (1987: 643); several authors reported severe rust in wheat as in Brandenburg and
West Prussia210. A traveller reported the terrific effect of drought on rye in the NE of Prussia211.
Thunderstorms with hail and floods hit the country, W Prussia in particular; in Bavaria hail
storms completely destroyed the crops of 15,000 people212. Grain prices were excessively high
because of the dearth. The Poznań area (present W Poland) was struck by famine in July, 1846.
In some areas the country folks, without potatoes, bread and salt, had to eat weeds boiled in
water213.
Switzerland. The alpine valleys were threatened by floods. The princedom of Lichtenstein was
flooded by the river Rhine214.
The year 1847 was a year of recovery in most European countries, but not in parts of Austria,
where the grain harvests failed for the third time in succession, and in Silesia, primarily due to
floods215. Famine was general in some eastern areas, as in the south of modern Poland. In W
Europe grain prices plummeted in 1847 when a good harvest announced itself.
3.2.7. Scientific interest
Turner (2006) aptly described the scientific efforts after the famine, 1845 to 2000. Here we
focus on scientific efforts during the Continental Famine. Scientists in various countries
immediately zoomed in on the blight problem in a nearly feverish activity, producing a flurry of
lectures and publications. The fierce fight between the ‘fungalists’ and their opponents216, the
anti-fungalists, was depicted by Large (1940), Ordish (1976: 132ff), Peterson (1995), and Semal
(1995) with a lovely touch of drama; it does not need to be discussed here. Many explanations
of the disease were proposed (Box 3.1). In the end, the fungalists won.

Box 3.1. Contemporary explanations of the ‘potato murrain’.
Numerous explanations of the potato disease were proposed, supported by more or less serious
argumentation. A contemporaneous overview was found in Rüter (1950 p414ff) quoting 1845 reports
from provincial governors to the Dutch Home Secretary. Here follows a brief summary of some opinions
from the European Continent.
Atmospheric influences. A special weather constellation was a current, non-committal explanation
proposed by several committees (the Brussels Committee Commissions; ex Berkeley, 1846: 23;
Committee, 1845) and by Dumortier (1845: 291); Harting (1846: 56) ‘cosmic’ [= meteorological]
influences (fogs); Schacht (1856: 10), and others.
Excess nitrogen. An excessive multiplication of nitrogenous substances in the parenchyma in the
above and below ground parts of the potato plant is the source of the recent epidemic (Unger, 1847:
313; and others).
Heat. Enklaar (1846: 268/9); Mauz (1845: 29), a country physician, experimented extensively with
potatoes. He concluded that the summer heat in July, 1844, was the cause of the disease. The potatoes
might have been sensitised by a hidden agent in 1845, in view of the poor flowering of the potatoes
in that year.
Wetness. Many authors attributed the disease to excessive wetness, more or less in accordance with
the 18th century humoral theory of disease. Professor Blume (1845) from Leiden University used the
term ‘hydropisy’ (= dropsy) and Rupprecht (1847) ‘telosepsis epidemica’, in agreement with Unger’s
(1847) ‘stagnated plant sap’. Harting (1846: 56) quoted ‘telluric’ influences (clay soil, wet, manured)
enhancing disease.
Inner Life. The learned Director Gebel presented his opinion to the Prussian Academy, Session 53: 30
January 1847. He ascribed the disease to ‘the weakened inner life of the potato’217. A similar argument
is the ‘sunken life energy of the plants’ (Nitsch, 1846).
Dry rot. Several scientists confused late blight (wet rot) with dry rot, due to a Fusarium, that had
caused epidemics just before 1845 (Von Martius, 1842), stating that the new disease was just another
form of the old one (e.g. Bergsma, 1845: 12, 15; Dumortier, 1845: 291; Harting, 1846: 269).
Cryptogamic entity. In 1844 Desmazières described a fungus, which he named Botrytis fallax, as the
cause of the hitherto unknown leaf flecks on potato (ex Decaisne, 1846). The Belgian lady-mycologist
Marie-Anne Libert published a brief symptom description on 19 August 1845, and proposed the name
Botrytis vastatrix (ex Semal, 1995). More or less simultaneous and independent were statements to
this effect by Morren in Belgium and Montagne in France, both in 1845 (ex Berkeley, 1846: 36).
French observers compared the progress of the disease with an ‘epidemic’, meaning a large-scale
outbreak of disease as among humans or cattle. The conclusion that late blight was dispersed
by the wind was rarely drawn explicitly in the 1840s. Field observations induced Van Peyma and
others to conclude to aerial dispersal of the disease218. The modernist Morren (1845a: 13,15,
1845c, Figure 3.5) had a clear understanding of the spores, produced in enormous numbers,
travelling far, ‘swirling’ through the air in order to infect fresh foliage219.
A conservative view, however, held ‘that this disease is not an epidemic one, that means is
not generated by a disease substance present in the air, but, when it transfers itself from a
healthy to a diseased, that happens only by direct contact, as with fruits’ (Schirm, 1846). The
editor added a note ‘Science surely has not yet demonstrated a miasmatic epidemic – without

Chapter 3
Figure 3.5. Note on Botrytis the destroyer or the potato fungus (Morren, 1845c p287). The drawing is probably
by Morren himself; the paper is dated 24 September 1845. The explanation of Figure 2.1, given in the text, is
rendered here in modern terms.
1 A..B - Lower leaf surface, C, D - leaf hair, E - Young mycelium, F – ‘forest’ of mycelial threads.
2 Leaf hair, top and bottom dry.
3 The large number of spores (sporidies) formed.
4 Fungal thread with spore still attached.
5 Spores of Botrytis with two papillae (mamelons).
6 Plant cells with starch grains, A - healthy cell, B – germ tubes of zoospores, branched, intracellular, C – cell
content decomposing, filled with yellow granules that might be the reproductive bodies of the Botrytis.
7 Last stage of rotting, A - cell with degenerating grains, B – vibrions [bacteria?] or worms [nematodes?],
C..D – fusarium spores (fusispores).

contact – in the plant kingdom’, miasmatic to be read as wind-borne, an echo of the 18th century
miasmatic theory of disease persisting far into the 19th century220.
In 1845, governments responded quickly to the emergency and ordered both seed potatoes and
potato seeds from abroad for experimentation. They also requested their scientists to look
into the matter and suggest methods of control. Two lines of research were developed. One
line was to save whatever usable was left in the diseased tubers, by dry storage, producing dry
potato chips, extracting the undamaged starch, or feeding the diseased lots to either cattle
or distilleries. Diseased tubers, were they poisonous? The other line was to control or prevent
disease by appropriate storage methods for healthy seed potatoes, selection of more resistant
potato lines, correct dosage of manure, and – in the long run – selection of new varieties from
seedlings (Rapport, 1845). Several scientists observed varietal differences in susceptibility to
the blight221.
The Groningen Committee published sensible recommendations on 16 September (Committee,

1845). ‘The foliage of the diseased potatoes, that has no value, be burnt in the field and all
useless and rotten potatoes be destroyed, so that as little as possible of the sickly crop remains
on the field’222. If the disease reappears in the next season the affected foliage should be
mowed or burnt. Spraying chalk water or, better, diluted sulphuric acid was recommended. Seed
potatoes should be taken from slightly affected fields on sandy soils, and only from healthy
stools. Tubers should be planted in rows and plants be earthed up.
Diseased foliage should be cut and burnt, diseased tubers burnt or fed to farm animals223.
Chemical control was recommended by treating soil, seed tubers or plants with diluted sulphuric
acid or by chalking them224. Morren was near to the mark with his recommendation to treat soil
or tubers (not plants!) with a mixture containing copper sulphate. He observed the progress of
the disease from foliage to tuber and he demonstrated experimentally the infection from tuber
to tuber. Morren225 (1845b) noted that the metallic fumes of the zinc factories had completely
protected the potato crop226, but the observation did not lead to further action.
The Netherlands. Dutch scientists showed a keen interest in the new disease. Bergsma (1845:
9, 15, 30) inspected ‘several hundreds of hectares’. He wrote227 ‘Not rarely one saw a potato
field completely changing in appearance within a few days and one perceived, especially in
the evening, an unbearable stench228 that was dispersed over a considerable distance’. ‘The
observation that the disease in its spread often has followed the direction of the wind becomes
the more probable as some potatoes, growing behind hedges or trees, remained unaffected
and only later contracted the disease’. He believed in the fungal origin of disease and
became convinced ‘that the curl, rust and cancerous disease do not differ from each other’. His
recommendations were those generally given to control the potato dry rot. Moleschott & Von
Baumhauer (1845: 3), studying the new disease in their spare time, found what we call now the
sporophores and the oval spores of P. infestans (ibid.: 8) but could not convince themselves
that the new fungus was the cause of the disease. They gave the usual recommendations.
Harting (1846) looked into the botanical side of the blight229. Before the 1845 epidemic had
run its full course Vissering (1845) already discussed the socio-economic implications of the
potato murrain. The (liberalised) commodity market should do its work and, if the market failed,
charity should step in.

Chapter 3
At the request of the government Vrolik (1845) published his ad hoc field observations. The
Dutch government collected potato seed from several origins and invited knowledgeable
gentleman-farmers to grow the seeds. Mr H.C. Van Hall gave a sensible opinion on the 1846
tests230, ‘That the experiments, though, as regards the disease, not having answered objectives,
however, by producing new sorts on very different soils … not have been without importance,
in many respects instructive and promising not entirely unfavourable results for the future’
(Vrolik et al., 1846). The results were of little avail but we need not doubt the selection, in
time, of new and (slightly) more blight-resistant varieties231. Vanderplank (1968) argued that
the pre-scientific selection of varieties with at least some resistance was reasonably successful
in the 19th century. Grootegoed (1853) regretted the loss of several tasty varieties232 and the
necessity to eat varieties grown as cattle fodder. English potatoes had to be planted, less
susceptible to blight.
Belgium. In Belgium Bourson (1845) probed into the origin of the potato murrain. Du Mortier
(1845) published his field observations with a good symptomatology. He had seen the Botrytis
which he considered to be the consequence of a disease, more specifically the wet form of dry
rot epidemic during the early forties. Morren (1845a, b), in contrast, was a convinced fungalist.
The palm of honour I award to a lady mycologist, Marie-Anne Libert, one of the first to identify
a fungus as the cause of the disease, Botrytis vastatrix (Semal, 1995)233.
Denmark. The Danish authorities were quite alarmed in 1845. They sent out enquiries about
possible protective measures and requested some of their embassies to find information and
seeds. Three professors of the Polytechnical School in Copenhagen began research on disease
control, without obtaining useful results; the causal agent was not yet known to them (Kyrre,
1913).
France. The blight was the subject of a lively discussion e.g. in the Comptes Rendus de l’Académie
(Proceedings of the Academy), Paris, see its volume of 1845 and the contemporary list of
references in Decaisne (1846). Decaisne was a good microscopist who saw the same sporophores
and spores as Montagne. Nonetheless he decided that the ‘Botrytis’ was but the consequence
of the disease.
The Germanies. The Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences requested the botanist Münter (1846)
to study the blight. He carefully collected national and international information on the 1845
outbreak and on the response of various authorities to the emergency. A scientific committee,
meeting in Nürnberg on 22 and 24 September, 1845, produced sensible recommendations
for damage control 234. Many authors discussed the blight (see e.g. the 1846 volume of the
Botanische Zeitung). The focus was often on the processing of infested lots of potatoes to
utilise the remains as potato meal, alcohol, or cattle fodder. The detailed examination of the
sporulation process, with elegant drawings of the fungus sprouting forth from the stomata,
brought Unger (1847) near to the fungalist theory, though he was unable to sacrifice his ideas
on the exanthematic235 origin of plant disease.
Sweden. Several scientists took an interest in the new disease. The Royal Agricultural
Academy asked professor Wahlberg (1847) to report on the disease. The famous mycologist
Fries participated in the debate from the beginning and, interestingly, was against the fungal
theory of disease causation (Eriksson, 1884: 6ff).

3.2.8. The quality of the information
The quality of the information on potato yield losses tends to decrease with the distance from
the Netherlands, the bibliographic centre of this study. The information provided by historians
passed through several filters, with the risk of distortion. Fortunately, the Official Newspaper of
the Dutch Government (D: Staatscourant) of 1845 contained an unusually high number of scraps
on agriculture, obviously important to a nation obtaining its wealth from international trade
and shipping (Appendix 3.1). This contemporaneous information confirmed the data provided
in the more general history books quoted in the present chapter.
Similarly, the German daily newspaper Allgemeine Zeitung, July 1846, contained scattered pieces
of useful information, again providing contemporary confirmation of the historians’ data. Its
July message was simple, the potato crops were just fine. In contrast, the July issues of the
Dutch daily Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 1846, reported that the blight was popping up,
with local appearances scattered all over the Netherlands. The newspaper was even accused
of needless alarmism but the editors took a firm stand stating that their task was to provide
good information.
An enquiry by the National Economics Board of the Kingdom Prussia, late in 1846, arrived at
a national loss figure of ~47 per cent (Anonymous, 1847a; See Table 2.1), the best available
estimate based on experts’ opinions.
Figure 3.6 sketchily relates the losses in potato and cereals, as far as reasonably known, to the
areas involved, for 1845 and 1846.
3.3. Social consequences
3.3.1. General setting
In the Netherlands the position of the rural poor, and of the landless labourers foremost, had
deteriorated considerably between the mid 18th and mid 19th century236. Wages were sadly low,
‘the labourer earns too little to live, too much to die’ (Brugmans, 1929: 135). Most labourers of
the large-scale farms in Zeeland (NL) lived in abject poverty (Priester, 1998; Hoogerhuis, 2003).
Farm workers often rented small plots, sometimes at usurious prices, to grow potatoes with
and for their family237. Thus they could carry their family through the winter when they were
without work and income, and sometimes they even could feed a hog. Potatoes are relative
poor in protein but the protein is of a good nutritional quality. Potatoes contain much vitamin
C so that the health situation of the underprivileged improved (Van der Heide, 2001), with e.g.
scurvy disappearing238.
The blight brought destruction of the potato, hunger and famine to the already destitute
country dwellers. Whereas the situation in 1845/6 was bad but not unbearable (Bourke, 1983;
Hooijer, 1847) it became really disastrous in the winter of 1846/7 (Hooijer, 1847). The Dutch
situation is thought to be fairly representative of Continental Europe at large.

Chapter 3
Figure 3.6. Sketchy maps indicating the relationship between loss figures, as far as reasonably known (see
text), and areas involved for 1845 and 1846. The larger numerals represent national losses in per cent of
potato (roman) and cereal (italics) yields. The smaller numerals refer to regional losses. H (= high) stands
for economically and socially important losses. B = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DK = Denmark, F = France, G =
the Germanies (primarily Prussia), NL = Netherlands. See legend of Figure 2.11 for other abbreviations.

3.3.2. Demographic effects
The period 1750-1850 was characterised by a rapid population growth in many European
countries239, including Belgium, England, France, Ireland, Prussia and Switzerland. During the
half-century following the Napoleonic period the annual growth rate of the Dutch population
oscillated around 1 per cent, most of the time (Figure 3.7). Mouths had to eat and hands had
to work. The masses could be fed because potato growing became popular, potatoes producing
one to two times more calories per ha than rye240. Rye remained the number one in the popular
diet and potatoes came second, occasionally even first. Work for the hands declined on the
countryside because the cottage industry, spinning and weaving, was gradually replaced by
textile factories. The competition by modern industry caused a loss of labour opportunity and
of purchasing power to both cottiers and rural craftsmen.
Among the demographic effects of the famine were an increase of the death rate, especially
of children and elderly, and a decrease of the marriage and birth rates241 (Table 3.2). In some
areas as in Austria, Flanders, and the Netherlands (e.g. Zeeland) the population decreased in
absolute numbers. Areas that had recently seen a rapid population increase, such as the Dutch
clay soils, suffered most. As in Ireland, it is impossible to differentiate between deaths by
hunger and by disease, since epidemics were the normal corollary of famines (Dyson & Ó Gráda,
2002; Sen, 1981).
The number of excess deaths due to the famine and its corollary diseases is heavily debated.
The numbers for Ireland, 1845/9, vary from 500,000 to two or three millions242. Critical
demographers now seem to prefer the lower number of 500 to 600 thousands. The numbers of
excess deaths in Continental Europe can only be guessed at, examining population numbers
and death rates. The numbers provided here (Table 3.3) are calculated as excess deaths in 1846,
1847, and 1848 by subtracting the average number of deaths over 1841-1845 from the number
of deaths in the given years. The result must be considered with reservation as it needs critical
Figure 3.7. Population growth in the Netherlands from 1810 to 1850. Growth begins ~1815 and continues up
to 1847, followed by a slight but telling decline in 1848. The sudden rise in 1830 cannot be explained. Data
from Hofstee (1978), excluding the province of Limburg.

Chapter 3
Table 3.2. Birth rate, death rate, and population growth rate in six countries, data in per mil, averaged over
5-year periods. The increase in death rate and the decrease in birth rate from 1841/45 to 1846/50 is seen in
all six countries. Among the causes of excess mortality are hunger, typhus, and cholera. Dead-borne children
are excluded or ranked under mortality (Switzerland). Migration is disregarded.
Country Birth rate Death rate Population growth rate7
1841-1845 1846-1850 1841-1845 1846-1850 1841-1845 1846-1850
Austria1 13.0 11.2 29.6 35.8 9.7 1.5

Belgium2 32.1 28.5 23.2 25.2 8.9 3.3
France3 28.1 26.7 22.7 23.9 6.8 2.2
The Netherlands4 36.3 33.6 25.7 30.2 13.3 13.8
The Germanies5 36.8 35.6 26.1 27.4 1.0 0.2
Switzerland6 32.3 29.4 24.3 23.0 8.0 6.4
1 Bolognese-Leuchtenmuller (1978); Sandgruber (1978); emigration negligible.

2 André & Pereira-Roque (1974).
3 Braudel & Labrousse (1976); usually immigration surplus. Population growth rate data in Armengaud
(1971: 31) slightly different; the period 1846-1851 showed a net emigration of 276,000 persons (ibid.:
32).
4 Hofstee (1978); high growth rate because of immigration.
5 Estimated from Bolognese-Leuchtenmuller (1978); Sandgruber (1978).
6 Bickel (1947).
7 Emigration was of little importance in the numerical sense but emigration to other continents was of
great significance from a political point of view. Transmigration within Europe was considerable.
examination by professional demographers. The data in Table 3.3 include deaths by hunger ad
corollary diseases (mainly typhus). The year 1849 was not included because an epidemic of
cholera spread over Europe killing many people, especially the undernourished, and so the total
may have been under-estimated.
The Netherlands. Excess deaths due to hunger have been estimated at ≥53,000243 on a
population of ~three millions. Among the corollary diseases were typhoid, dysentery, cholera,
and malaria (Jansma & Schroor, 1987: 59). Symptoms of dysentery are recognisable in the
description of the wretched poor dying in the Bommelerwaard, a district in the Netherlands
where people were as dependent on potatoes as the Irish (Box 3.2). Malaria was common in the
coastal areas of the Netherlands. The brackish waters along the coast provided a good breeding
habitat for malaria mosquitos244. Malaria was a nuisance rather than a killer but it killed those
debilitated by lack of food245. At the time, the death rate in Zeeland could be over 4 per cent,
children, elderly and itinerant labourers, all with little immunity, dying first. In some Zeeland
communities infant and child death peaked246 in the famine years, especially in the extremely
hot year 1846 with lack of food and fresh water (Hoogerhuis, 2003: 273).
For some of the diseases the temporal relationship with the famine years is more evident than
the causal one. The hot and dry summer of 1946 created horrible conditions in crowded cities
such as Amsterdam, leading to a high death rate247. During the cold winter of 1847/8 influenza
struck the population (Terlouw, 1971: 288). In 1848/9 a wave of cholera swept over Europe,

Table 3.3. Tentative estimates of excess mortality due to potato late blight and its corollary diseases, 1846-
1848. For the calculation see §3.3.2. I did not consider 1849 in order to avoid most of the mortality due to
cholera. Cholera swept over Europe 1848-1849 and lingered on for years. Starved patients will succumb earlier
to cholera than well-fed persons, but it is questionable to consider cholera as a ‘corollary’ disease.
Country Population size 1846 Excess mortality 1846- Annual excess mortality
(thousands) 1848 (thousands) 1846-1848 (per thousand)
Austria1 17,902 371 7

Belgium2 3,933 30 3
France3 36,097 109 1
The Netherlands4 3,054 26 3
The Germanies5 33,197 213 2
Switzerland6 2,330 0 0
Total 96,513 749 3
1 Estimated from Bolognese-Leuchtenmuller (1978).

2 Hofstee (1978), present borders.
3 Estimated from Dupâquier (1988), NB excess mortality mainly because of cholera epidemic.
4 Hofstee (1978), mortality excluding ~22,000 cholera victims.
5 Estimated from Bolognese-Leuchtenmuller (1978).
6 Based on Bickel (1947: 135 and 148).
Box 3.2. Quotations from the Reverend C. Hooijer (1847).
The parson C. Hooijer made a passionate plea in favour of the deprived in the Bommelerwaard, a river
clay area West of Arnhem (NL) where typical ‘Irish’ conditions prevailed among which (1) potatoes
were the dominant crop with ~26 per cent of the arable area, in some communities even ~60 per cent
(Bieleman, 1992: 152), (2) the poor depended on potatoes for food, (3) labourers rented small potato
plots at high, often usurious rents. I translated some selected remarks:
1. During the winter 1845 farmers gave potatoes to the poor. These ate only potatoes, cooked at
noon, porridge in the evening, baked in the morning.
2. 1846 … large groups of beggars, who could no longer be fed by the citizens …
3. Because of the dearth relief paid only one quarter of the food needed. People consumed things
green from the land, boiled in water with some barley meal. Dung-hills were searched for
eatables.
4. … chew willow bark to silence hunger. … steal and cook cats and sick goats ...
5. … people wither away … hovels with in a corner nearly naked boys who, in their third year, cannot
yet walk.
6. … dry mother breasts with crying sucklings …
7. … in dark huts spectre-like persons who, in the most disgusting filth, with the most dismal
indifference laid down to die as beasts …

Chapter 3
causing ~22,000 deaths in the Netherlands248, and reached Ireland in 1849. Malnutrition may
have sensitised cholera patients but here we consider the cholera epidemic as independent
from the 1846/8 famine. Poor nutrition had the usual effect on the growth of youngsters. The
percentage of undersized conscripts (less than 1.57 m tall) was 14.2 in 1821 and 19.8 over
1850-1861 (Van Zanden, 1991: 22).
Austria. Annual population growth rates were -0.69 for 1847/8 and -1.28 for 1848/9 (Bolognese-
Leuchtenmuller, 1978: Tables 2, 36). Mortality data suggest excess deaths amounting to several
hundred thousands, primarily in Galicia (present Poland) with excess deaths of up to 300,000
and in Bohemia-Moravia (present Czech Republic) with excess deaths of up to 100,000. Hunger
typhus was a major cause of death. The Wadowiczer Comitat in Galicia (then under Austrian
rule, present S Poland), counted 60,000 to 80,000 deaths in 1847 due to hunger and typhus,
the typhus epidemic hitting somewhat earlier than in neighbouring Upper Silesia (Virchow,
1848: 38). In Austrian Silesia thousands ‘had nothing to eat except grass and nettles, coltsfoot,
clover and blood’. In the big cities of Austria maize and/or clover were added to the wheat flour
(Macartney, 1968: 313).
Belgium counted nearly 4,000,000 inhabitants in 1846/50. From 1845 to 1846 a famine raged
and many people died249. Death rates exceeded birth rates in several communities. The province
of West Flanders recorded a peak death rate of 3.93 per cent in 1847 (Hofstee, 1978: 199). In
Belgium the death rate was highest in 1847 with 2.77 per cent against an average of 2.33 per
cent over the period 1841/5, suggesting excess deaths of ≥35,000 from hunger and disease
(André & Pereira-Roque, 1974). All of Flanders was said to have ~50,000 deaths in excess (Ó
Gráda, 1989) including the ~12,000 killed by typhus in 1846/8 but excluding the nearly 6,000
deaths by the cholera epidemic of 1848 (Lamberty, 1949: 136).
France. Marriage and birth rates decreased and death rates increased. Population growth
slowed down considerably. Migration from the countryside to the cities intensified. Emigration
exceeded immigration (Table 3.2).
The Germanies. Excess deaths250 in the Kingdom of Prussia can be tentatively estimated at
~140,000. The province of East Prussia recorded 40,000 deaths from disease, winter 1847/8 and
spring 1848. In Upper Silesia (Prussia, present Poland) ~80,000 people suffered from hunger
typhus, with ~16,000 deaths (others say 30,000), and ~50,000 deaths in total. Data about
numbers and diseases are not quite consistent.
Though this not the place to discuss the medical aspects of the hunger epidemics that followed
the harvest failures, one exception has to be made. Early in 1848 the Prussian Government
had sent R. Virchow, a young and ambitious surgeon at the Charité Hospital in Berlin, to Upper
Silesia to investigate the ongoing typhus epidemic. He wrote an extensive scientific report
(Virchow, 1848) in which he left little doubt as to the nature of the major disease, which we
now call typhus (caused by a Rickettsia). Virchow was as critical of the Prussian government as
the circumstances allowed. He referred to an anonymous brochure on ‘The hunger pest in Upper
Silesia’ (Anonymous, 1848a), which really is an indictment of government policy. Besides a high
scientific motivation Virchow had a strong social interest.
Switzerland. During the blight years the marriage and birth rates went down, but the death
rate was not affected (Bickel, 1947: 123, 148).

3.3.3. Pauperism
Pauperism stands for the chronic poverty of the lower classes in a region and/or period251.
Toward the mid 19th century pauperism was widespread in Europe, where many states slid
into economic recessions in the 1840s. Rural pauperism was a rather new phenomenon with
causes differing according to region252. (1) Wages in rural areas hardly increased during the
first half of the 19th century, probably because of the relatively rapid population growth, as
in the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders) and Prussia. (2) The rise of modern textiles industry
caused a sharp decline of the cottage industry, as in Austria, Flanders and Prussia. (3) Division
of the commons increased the gap between estate owners and peasant farmers, as in Prussia.
(4) Extreme parcellation of land led to great poverty among peasant farmers as in SW, M and W
Germany, and in Switzerland.
The bad times caused a decrease in demand and so the craftsmen, then quite numerous in the
villages and rural cities, went out of business. They too had to apply for relief or to go begging.
Continent-wide the behaviour of the poor followed more or less the same pattern (Box 3.3).
The Netherlands. In a period when class distinctions were an accepted phenomenon pauperism
in itself was not rejected. Only revolutionaries could foster different ideas. The ‘haves’ should
be nice to the ‘have-nots’, do relief work, and feel good. In 1844 the country experienced a
slump, factories were closed. Labourers lost their jobs and became dependent on poor relief
funds (Brugmans, 1929: 216). In the year 1846 the rust, voles, drought and blight boosted food
prices and so deepened poverty, increased unemployment, and awakened slumbering unrest
in the cities.
Begging253 and theft increased considerably from 1845 to 1848. Hungry people roamed the
streets. Those having something to loose became afraid of group begging, with extortion under
threat. The police had much more work to do. In some parts of Zeeland more convictions for
begging were pronounced in 1846 and 1847 than in all twenty years before254. In the relatively
prosperous province of Friesland over 14 per cent of the rural population was on the dole and,
in the area with arable land mainly, over 20 per cent (Van Zanden, 1985).
Austria. Industrialisation led to underemployment and impoverishment on the countryside,

with pauperism of a ‘rural proletariat’ (Rumpler, 1997: 255) as the result. Many migrated to the
cities where, eventually, their situation became worse than ever.
Belgium. Over 400,000 Flemish persons lived off the textile industry (Lamberty & Lissens,
1951). On the Flemish countryside the cottage industry, mainly linen spinning and weaving,
was yielding to industrial production, ensuing loss of income and purchasing power. In one
Flemish parish with 225 households a hundred had to go begging (Lindemans, 1952: 189). Bands
of people marauded the fields and roamed the streets, begging and stealing. Windows were
smashed with the sole purpose to be incarcerated and fed (Lamberty, 1949: 136). The Walloon
provinces in Belgium were hardly affected because of their industrial expansion.
France. ‘Endemic misery’ reigned during the 1840s255. Land owners had begun to invest in
industry and movables disinvesting from agriculture256 (Droz, 1967: 267). The French estate
owners began to loose their grip on the peasantry256a. Peasants and landless poor obstinately
struggled for independence by all means, legal and illegal, as vividly depicted by the novelist

Chapter 3
Box 3.3. The fate of the poor during a famine, as stated by various authors.
The patterns described here were common to most crises de subsistance. The crisis sparked by the
potato murrain was the last in Continental Europe (Scandinavia and the Soviet Union excepted).
The flour for bread making, if available, was mixed with several admixtures among which bran, clover
meal, Faba bean meal, and meal 257 of queck grass roots (Elytrigia repens), maybe also with meal from
wood or hay as in other famines.
Most decent people went through a period of denial, sparing whatever food was available. The size of
the meals was reduced, and then the number of meals was reduced to two or one per day. Whatever
money available was spent on food and house rent and no goods were bought. Jewelry, cloths,
furniture, household utensils and professional equipment were sold. Families moved to cheaper
dwellings. Desperate people pilfered bakeries and food stalls. Members of town families roamed the
countryside to buy food at usurious prices.
Country people, who anyhow had little to sell, tightened their belts. If they were out of regular food
they collected whatever eatables they could find, browsing the fields, stealing from standing crops,
searching the refuse piles and dunghills, stealing sheep or goat, killing dogs, cats and rats, slaying
diseased animals, and digging for buried animals. Grass, nettles, clover, coltsfoot (Tussilago farfara),
fungi, and the bark of trees were on the menu. Some items, including rotten potatoes, were eaten raw
but, preferably, they were cooked in a stew that got thinner and thinner.
The able-bodied tried to find work, often relief work, e.g. heavy digging at low wages. The disabled,
by hunger and sickness, died rapidly from hunger typhus or slowly from intestinal afflictions,
tuberculosis, or physical exhaustion. Farmers dropped dead in their fields258.
Many jobless people found food with relief organisations, parishes, municipalities, private
institutions, often created for the purpose, or with private persons. Relief funds were always too
limited, and they sustained people partially and for a restricted time only, until the funds were
exhausted. ‘Relief fatigue’ with the sponsors was mentioned several times.
Setting aside their pride, people went begging, first individually, sometimes following a prescribed
route through town. Bands of beggars were formed by men, women, even children. These bands were
threatening and meant to threat. They visited farmsteads and, if they did not get their alms, they
might set farm or mill afire. They stopped the grain traffic on the roads intercepting and plundering
the grain-loaded carts.
Crime rate soared because of the many petty thefts. The ‘haves’ on the countryside became afraid
and fear spread over the country. The police, sometimes assisted by the military, cold no longer meet
the situation. Vagabonds were happy to be arrested, because in jail they were fed at least. Once in
jail, or in the workhouse, they ran the risk of dying from typhus or dysentery, or being infected by
tuberculosis.
In the typhus-stricken areas thousands of children were orphaned. If lucky, they were found, placed
in an orphanage, washed, given clean cloths, fed and taught. They had a fair chance to survive and
start a new life, without relatives.
On the countryside violence was frequent in France, quiet resignation dominated in the Netherlands
and in Belgium, inertia in Silesia, and sullenness in Austria.
Honoré de Balzac259 in ‘Les paysans’ (‘The peasants’). A departmental governer (F: préfet) in
the SW reporting on the winter 1845/6 said that at one town ‘Over 25,000 come to the point
of having nothing left to eat’ and at another town two thirds of the inhabitants ‘lack every
thing, no money, no bread, no potatoes and, finally, no credit’260. The catastrophic grain and

potato harvests of 1846 caused widespread distress (except, maybe, in S France) and great
social disturbance261.
The Germanies gave a similar picture. In the neat archduchy of Baden people in town and
countryside lived soberly, in mutual dependence, without many reserves. The failure of the
potato and grain harvest in 1846 caused a famine and an economic crisis among all strata of
society (Real, 1983). No wonder that ‘decent artisans’ without work or money went begging, to
the amazement (and irritation) of the Dutch reverend O.G. Heldring (1847) vacationing along
the river Rhine in 1847, at cherry picking time, just before the grain harvest.
3.3.4. Hunger riots
Throughout history the common people, when threatened in their subsistence by food scarcity,
had only one way to show their discontent to the ruling authorities, rioting. Food riots are of
all times.
The Netherlands. Generally speaking the Dutch rural workers were a subdue lot (Terlouw,
1971: 290), suffering in silence. ‘Labourers were powerless and slow, although not unwilling’
(Brugmans, 1929: 169). They had neither voice nor representation. On Sundays they were told to
trust in God. Pilfering was rare and severely punished. Nonetheless, quiet, complacent Holland
had its ‘potato riots’ in September, 1845, when townspeople protested against the high potato
prices. An eye witness mentioned the 1845 riots in Delft, where groceries and bakeries were
looted (Van der Hardt Aberson, 1893). Riots also occurred in Leiden and even in The Hague, the
seat of the Dutch government.
At the time, the Netherlands had changed from a grain eating to a potato eating nation, with
an annual production in the early 1840s of ~1 million tonnes (~14 million hectolitres). In the
first blight year, 1845, the national production was less than 0.3 million tons (<4 million hl), a
loss of over 70 per cent. Grain was rapidly imported and the consumption of legumes increased.
The winter of 1845-1846 was mild, funds for the relief of the poor had plenty of money, and
relief-work was organised. Things were under control.
Unfortunately, the blight struck again in 1846. The severe and long winter of 1846/7 added
immensely to the misery of the cottagers and jobless townspeople. Unrest flared up again in
June, 1847262. In the port of Harlingen a ship with destination England, the ‘Magnet’, had been
loaded with potatoes (Jansma & Schroor, 1987: 59), possibly from the early varieties of the 1847
harvest. A mob protested, molested officials, and turned to looting. The insurrection spread to
the towns of Leeuwarden and Groningen. In Groningen the dragoons had to restore order at the
price of five casualties (Van der Heiden, 2001). Radical politicians tried to exploit the general
discontent, with little success.
‘Liberals’ came into power in 1848. Concerned about the social unrest, they arranged
investigations into the morality of the working class. Provincial reports were published in
1851 (Van Zanden, 1991). The results were gloomy as e.g. whole families taught their children
to beg and steal firewood (as in Zeeland, ibid.: 12). The liberal answers were not oppression and
charity but good upbringing and school education, in the spirit of the Enlightenment.

Chapter 3
Austria. Unrest occurred everywhere in the Austrian realm, in the major cities but also on
the Polish countryside, where national politics and nascent liberalism added to the general
dissatisfaction with Austrian rule, enhanced by the dearth of the times. In the suburbs of
Vienna bakeries and market stalls were plundered (Lutz, 1985: 944).
Belgium. The rural population of Flanders appeared to be an ‘amorphous mass’. As an exception,

a few bakeries in the city of Ghent were pilfered (Lamberty, 1949: 136).
France. In France the poor harvests of 1846 caused a slump in consumer demand that triggered
an economic crisis. Gangs of hungry people roamed the countryside. Farmers, millers and grain
merchants were threatened with arson263 and extorted, sometimes by masked persons. Grain
transports were hold up, often by enraged women264. At times the rural masses burst out in
fury (Agulhon et al., 1976: 78), with destructions and smashing up of tax archives. Smouldering
unrest finally exploded in the February revolution, Paris, 1848 (see below). France was the only
country where rural unrest contributed to radical political change.
The Germanies. In the German speaking countries hunger riots (G: Hungerkrawallen) occurred
in the spring of 1847 in Berlin265, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Ulm, and various other towns (Lutz, 1985:
944; Wehler, 1987: 657).
3.3.5. Migration
Nothing in Continental Europe paralleled the massive emigration from Ireland to North America
(~1,000,000) and England (~300,000) during and after the hunger years. Nonetheless, emigration
to the Americas was frequent for economic, religious or political reasons. Disillusioned and
police-threatened political activists sometimes went digging in the recently found (1848)
goldfields of California.
Many in Continental Europe packed up and moved, or simply went adrift. Migration from the land
to the city is of all times, but it was intensified under the pressure of the circumstances. People
in search of work, that was hardly available in the 1840s, added to a new urban proletariat,
jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. Transmigration within and between W European
countries was frequent, as e.g. from Flanders (Belgium) to the industrial area of NE France.
The Netherlands. Discontented families emigrated to North America. Poverty, lack of prospects,
and religious dissidence were among the reasons. Emigration peaked in 1846 and 1847, but we
speak of only thousands of Dutch266, not the hundreds of thousands of Irish. Migration from
countryside to towns may have intensified in the late 1840s.
Austria. Impoverished country dwellers flocked into the cities in search of work. In Vienna they
only met with more misery and awful housing conditions.
Belgium. In Belgium, an exodus took place from hungry Flanders to the booming industrial
areas of francophone Belgium and N France. The numbers involved are estimated at tens of
thousands (Lamberty, 1949: 136).
France. France experienced an intensified ‘rural exodus’ of day labourers, craftsmen, construction
workers, and outworkers to the cities amounting to ~800,000 persons over the period 1831/51

(Agulhon et al., 1976 p80). Net emigration over the years 1846/51 was ~276,000 (Armengaud,
1971). Many emigrants went to Mexico, North America, and Algeria. Thousands of Germans,
stranded penniless at the port of Dunkirk, were shipped to Algeria by the French authorities.
The Germanies. Emigration to North America in the years 1840/4 averaged ~22,000, in the
years 1845/9 ~62,000, increasing in the 1850s to hundred thousands (Marschalck, 1973).
Switzerland. There was immigration and emigration but the numbers were feeble.
3.3.6. Official relief
The new liberal thinking with its laissez-faire was not much in favour of relief, at least at state
level. Governmental actions were usually limited to adjustment of levies and taxes with a view
to limit the price of rye (the food of the poor), by facilitating grain imports and, sometimes,
reducing exports. Intermediate levels (province, department) showed more readiness to act.
At municipal level many authorities, in face of the want of their citizens, felt compelled to take
action. Churches had relief systems stand-by. Private persons, individual or organised, readily
stepped in to help (§3.3.7).
The Netherlands. The Dutch Parliament discussed the withdrawal of the Dutch Corn Law
dispassionately, technically267. Import duties on food commodities were suspended, first
temporarily (§3.2.4), later definitively. The provincial governors were not allowed to provide
money for relief, not even on loan. The municipalities were discouraged to provide relief but,
inevitably confronted with the misery, they used existing poor-relief funds. They provided
public works, food, and price control of rye bread (the affluent ate wheaten bread). They
reduced municipal bread excises and milling taxes, and even went so far as to subsidise rye
bread. Soon their funds were exhausted. Some municipalities tried to supplement their funds
by imposing a levy on the well-to-do. Generally speaking, the municipalities did what they
could do. In the province Noord-Holland some 25 per cent of the population lived on the dole
in 1848 (Kossman & Krul, 1977: 71).
The Dutch Government showed its compassion by declaring 2 May 1847 a national day of prayer
(Van der Heiden, 2001). There is no evidence of any effect other than keeping the poor quiet
and poor. The day yielded a collection of sermons that showed how wide a social gap stood
between the reverends, ‘haves’ usually, and their suffering flocks268.
Austria. Some measures were taken to avoid a market catastrophe and a famine but public
works had to be stopped because the government went out of money (Macartney, 1968: 313).
The poor were referred to the parishes and to private charity. In Hungary hundreds of lives
could have been saved had there been adequate roads to transport grain to areas in need
(Elsner, 1847: 811).
Belgium. The state provided credit for work, purchase and transportation of grain, and subsidies
on bread prices (Abel, 1974: 379). Communal bakeries, bread coupons, and public kitchens were
among the means to reduce the misery in the towns but they were of no avail on the countryside
(Pirenne, 1932: 129). In 1847 about one third of the Flemish people lived on charity (Lamberty,
1949: 136).

Chapter 3
France. Departments and municipalities sometimes voted money for public works and support
of the poor269. Cities such as Toulouse and Bordeaux distributed bread coupons. At the local
level, the poor often received municipal or private support.
The Germanies. Münter (1846) gave an overview of immediate actions taken in 1845, among
them public works, credit, export bans, and the opening of military stores. In Upper Silesia
official relief was late. In the Rybnik area one third of the population received aid in the form
of a pound of meal per person per day (Virchow, 1848: 27). In the Rhine Province the city of
Cologne, not a poverty-stricken town, had 25,000 out of the 95,000 inhabitants registered on
the poor list (Lutz, 1985: 116).
Ireland. Robert Peele, Prime Minister of England during the early phase of the Irish Famine, was
a conservative with rather liberal ideas. Facing the emergency he did what he could do270. He
bought maize in the American colonies to provide for the hungry. His successor (June, 1846),
lord John Russell, stopped grain imports and public works, but in 1847 he felt compelled to
import food for the ‘soup kitchens’.
Poland. The distress was great, which is no surprise in view of the difficult transportation over
large distances (Elsner, 1847: 810).
3.3.7. Private relief
Private relief was very active and took many shapes. Existing organisations, primarily the
churches, usually acted first. Citizens organised themselves in ad hoc societies, or took action
individually. Here follows a somewhat arbitrary selection of examples.
The Netherlands. In the Netherlands charitable institutions, primarily the churches, were
very active. In the course of 1846, unfortunately, their funds became exhausted. During the
mild winter of 1845/6 private persons, farmers and manufacturers, could provide work so that
the poor labourer could earn some money. Most of this work was for improvement of roads,
waterways, and ditches. The severe frost of the winter 1846/7 made such work impossible and
the poor were left without income (Hooijer, 1847; Terlouw, 1971: 288).
Of course, a national campaign was organised for the relief the poor, though too late to prevent
early deaths (Bergman, 1967: 400). Private initiatives sprang up unexpectedly. Towards the
end of 1845 some wealthy retired tradesmen in Amsterdam bought a few shiploads of grain and
sold the grain at reasonable price in an attempt to lower grain market prices271, the opposite
of hoarding. In the small Frisian village of Irnsum ‘… the bread for the common folks had been
down-priced to five pennies, for which the expenses are found in a collection among the most
dignitary residents’272. In Dokkum, a Frisian town, a committee collected ‘generous gifts’ to
provide the poor with reduction coupons so that they could buy their rye bread at a fixed price
below the current retail price273.
Austria. The poor had to rely on parishes and on private charity. Some estate owners made food
from their stores available to the villagers, other did not.

France. In many places private money was collected in order to avoid food shortages (Houssel,
1976: 234) and to keep the people quiet. In the town of Lille a private association distributed
aid in cooperation with the town’s welfare office (Jardin & Tudesq, 1973: 236).
The Germanies. In the severely affected area of Upper Silesia, where the officials did not
want to see the misery, the ‘Breslau Committee’, which first had to beg for money in all of
Germany, was on the spot well before the government!, wrote a bitter Virchow274. The very
active chairman, Prince Biron von Curland, contracted typhus and died. In the city of Koblenz,
1849, a ‘Society for the Procurement of Cheaper Food’ bought Russian grain in the ports of
Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
Ireland. Shear numbers made relief a nearly hopeless enterprise but various charities took
action. The ‘Society of Friends’, the Quakers, operating from England, should be mentioned
explicitly (Bourke, 1993: 177, 182; Woodham-Smith, 1962).
3.3.8. Access to credit
In today’s developing countries access to credit for the poor, in the form of micro-credit, is
a hot item. Around the mid-19th century Continental Europe was a developing world where
(micro‑)credit would have been useful, as proposed by some enlightened thinkers. Early
initiatives in England led to the establishment of the first co-operatives.
The Netherlands of 1845 hardly participated in these developments. Social motivation, so

successful in the 20th century, was scarce among the ‘haves’ of the mid 19th century. O.G.
Heldring (1845: 21), parson in a hard-hit area, discussed the need of small local credit banks
for the poor. His plea remained without response. Ph.A. Bachiene, a tax administrator in
Sluis (Zeeland), worked hard to organise small loans (D: kleine voorschotten) for the poor with
remarkably little success (Bouman, 1946: 136). Micro-credit was not a successful issue (De
Bosch Kemper, 1851: 258). At the time, the Netherlands were not yet ready for modern banking,
borrowing money here and lending it out at a premium there (Brugmans, 1929: 71).
Austria. Credit was one of the themes discussed at the Tenth Meeting of German Farmers and
Foresters in Grätz (Styria), 18 September 1846 (Mentzel, 1848: 108).
France. The head of the 1848 interim government, General E.L. Cavaignac, wanted to provide
cheap credit to peasants. His proposals were rejected by the Assemblé Nationale (Newman &
Simpson, 1987: 897). Cavaignac had some modern ideas. He wanted to promote producer co-
operatives and farming schools.
The Germanies. In the province Prussia the estate owners could modernise their agriculture
because they had access to credit. A warm plea for credit to small farmers was made by Lette
(1848), after a visit to the province Prussia in 1846275. But it was F.W. Raiffeisen, mayor of
a rural town in Westfalia, who initiated farmer co-operatives, inspired by the misery of the
late 1840s. He wrote276 ‘As to the history of the loan societies, their birthplace is the lower
Westerwald, in the Prussian Rhine Province, the time proper of origin the emergency year 1847’.
What began as an informal ‘consumer society’ (rather a charity committee), that provided cheap
bread and later seed potatoes for the 1847 planting season, developed gradually into rural
banks, strictly local, non-profit, governed by village notables. Later these village-level banks

Chapter 3
were knitted together into the German Raiffeisenbank. Neighbouring countries followed the
example. In the Netherlands the RABO-bank (the RA remembers Raiffeisen) has become one of
the largest Dutch banks, still basically a co-operative, a bank with AAA status.
3.4. The economic depression of the 1840s
3.4.1. Mercantilist attitudes
The mercantilist policy of the 18th century, implying protection of the national production
against cheap imports by means of tariff walls, was continued by several nations until far
into the 19th century. One example were the English ‘Corn Laws’ protecting the English grain
producers by means of flexible import duties, high when grain prices at home were low and low
when they were high.
The Netherlands followed the example by the law of 29 December, 1835, ‘to promote the
interests of agriculture’, introduced after fierce resistance of the grain trade. A relaxation of
this protectionist measure occurred by the law of December 18th, 1845, under the pressure of
the grain merchants, and in recognition of the shortages caused by the potato blight (Terlouw,
1971: 276/7).
Austria. Austria distanced itself from the German Federation and maintained its tariff walls
(Wehler, 1987: 131).
Belgium, independent since 1839, had a commercial regime with few restrictions to international
trade (Pirenne, 1932).
France. The Emperor Napoleon III mitigated the mercantilist regulations only around 1860.
The Germanies. The German Federation (G: Deutsche Bund) had a comparatively liberal Customs
Agreement (G: Zollverein), promoting within-federation trade and facilitating international
trade (Wehler, 1987: 126/7, 557). Prussia was a wheat exporter.
3.4.2. The ‘commercial crisis’ in NW Europe, 1847-1848
An eye-witness of the ‘commercial crisis’ sketched the ‘career of the crisis’ as a three tier
process (Morier-Evans, 1848). (1) The 1840s were the hey-days of railway construction. A
‘railway-mania’ reached its peak in 1845 but in October of that year a panic in the share-market
punctured the bubble leaving many speculators penniless. (2) The poor harvest of 1846, of
potatoes in particular, necessitated the purchase of food abroad. Money was tight, interest
rates became high. Grain speculation was rampant277. Corn prices declined in May, 1847, and
caused the ‘food and money panic’. (3) On top of all this came the ‘French Revolution’ of 1848
causing a loss of trust. Asset values plummeted on the Stock Exchanges of London and of the
Continent278. The list of failing traders, merchants, money dealers and bankers is long. Crisis
sprawled over the Continent. Investment in railways, an investment in new communication
comparable to the ICT hype279 of the 1990s, became risky business in continental Europe280.
The English treasury remained in fair shape but several continental treasuries were in a critical
state (Lutz, 1985: 234/5), due to warfare and/or poor management, as in the Netherlands,

Austria, France and Prussia. The continental states had great difficulties to meet the financial
crisis. The Netherlands and Prussia, floating big loans, made a narrow escape.
The industrialisation of England in the first part of the 19th century was not matched on the
Continent. Rapid population growth and the dissolution of the cottage industry produced
a supply of labour that could not be absorbed by the national economies of the Continent.
Pauperism (§3.3.3) and the rise of a rural as well as an urban proletariat were among the
consequences.
On the Continent the harvest failures caused a steep rise in food prices, especially in the
towns, and this entailed a sharp dip in the demand for industrial products that, in turn, led
to dismissal of personnel, more unemployment and more poverty. The young surgeon Rudolf
Virchow in Berlin wrote to his father281 ‘every day new masses of manual workers loose their
means of support, the factories close down one after the other and all of us are disturbed in
our livelihood’.
The Netherlands. At the time the Netherlands were a somewhat self-contained nation,
relying on agriculture and commerce, but with little industry. The country was on the verge of
bankruptcy (Bergman, 1967: 417). In the fall of 1845 speculation in grain caused a temporary
lack of capital (Terlouw, 1971: 290). Factories came to a stop and unemployment rose rapidly.
Between January and April, 1848, Dutch shares lost ~40 per cent of their value, several foreign
shares over 50 per cent (Anonymous, 1849: 216). At least a dozen Amsterdam money dealers of
good renown had to suspend their payments (Morier-Evans, 1848: 119).
Austria, spending much money on the military, endured an acute financial crisis in 1847/8.
Grain speculation and hoarding boosted food prices, and because of the high food prices people
could no longer pay their taxes and other debts. Due to the lack of purchasing power of the
public several manufacturers could no longer sell their products, dismissed their labourers
and shut down. The famous bank Rothschild at Vienna, the Emperor’s financier, stopped its
payments on 6 March, 1848, thus informally acknowledging the bankruptcy of the Imperial
government (Lutz, 1985: 99; Rumpler, 1997: 276). A run on the banks occurred. Share values on
the Vienna stock market plummeted, especially of the railway shares.
Belgium. The Paris revolution caused a rush on the banks; share values were halved (Pirenne,
1932: 131). The government, however, stayed level-headed.
France. Again, a three-tier process was discernible with (1) a crisis in construction work and
railways, followed by (2) a crisis of confidence, deepened by (3) the agricultural crisis (Jardin
& Tudesq, 1973: 237/8). The catastrophic potato and grain harvests of 1846 increased the
food prices, forced up by speculation, and caused a sudden fall in the demand for industrial
products, leading to unemployment282. The nation slid into an acute depression, thought to be
due first and foremost by the harvest failures (Furet, 1988: 374). The 1847 harvest was relatively
good but made no end to under-consumption. Bankruptcies and unemployment spread, shares
dropped in value, credit became expensive or unavailable, and trust was lost283. Some banks
had to stop their operations (Braudel & Labrousse, 1976: 375).
The Germanies. Prussia experienced an economic crisis due to population growth, massive
unemployment, and extensive pauperism284. The failed potato harvest of 1846 deprived the

Chapter 3
poor from their staple food, not to mention the poor rye harvest of that year (Chapter 2).
Food and credit became expensive, unemployment increased, demand fell, industries and crafts
suffered. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange plummeted overnight. A highly respectable bank, the
Schaafhausensche Bankverein at Cologne, went bankrupt and closed its doors in March, 1848,
dragging along some 40,000 clients. The archduchy of Baden reached a state of emergency
(Riegger, 1998).
3.4.3. Economic liberalisation
Clearly, the authorities in many countries could no longer handle the explosive combination
of circumstances. Many of those in power adhered to classical liberalism with its ‘laissez faire’
as the leading doctrine. In their hands it was a cruel doctrine since the common people were
left to starve whereas some persons made much money in hoarding, grain speculation, wheat
exports (e.g. Prussia), and grain supply to distilleries (Prussia again). Brandy was the last
consolation of many poor and hungry people. Rudolf Virchow having visited Upper Silesia in
early 1848 wrote285 ‘the child at its mother’s breast is already fed with brandy’.
The Netherlands. The Finance Minister F.A. Van Hall, who had just saved the nation from
bankruptcy by floating a large loan286 at modest interest, is sketched as a sturdy non-
interventionist. He kept his stand against the pressure of many, even of King William II. In
Parliament, however, he defended the bill to suspend import duties of agricultural commodities
in order to stimulate the importation of potatoes and grain287. As the high food prices asked
for a concession by the Dutch Government, the Dutch ‘Corn Laws’ were suspended by law of
18 December 1845 (§3.2.4). The suspension was prolonged until 1 October 1847 since the bad
harvests of potatoes and rye in 1846 accentuated the importance of a free grain trade (Terlouw,
1971: 283). Thus the turn from protectionism to free trade, a first victory of economic liberalism
in the Netherlands, was made thanks to blight and rust. There was no way back (Terlouw, 1971:
248). In a similar vein Robert Peel, the conservative Prime Minister of England, was induced to
abolish the English ‘Corn Laws’ in 1846, as the dearth of food threatened the livelihood of the
industry workers.
3.4.4. Causes of famine
An extensive literature exists on the famine as a socio-economic phenomenon288. Let it suffice

here to recall that two major causes have been identified. The first is a strong ‘food availability
decline’ (FAD), obvious in the years 1845 and 1846 with their harvest failures. The second is
the lack of purchasing power to buy whatever food is available. Simplified, the farmers had
nothing to sell, they had no money to buy services of craftsmen or to purchase industrial
products, so that the manufacturers could not sell their produce and had to close down. The
jobless craftsmen, construction workers and industrial labourers could no longer pay for food
that rapidly increased in price (Figure 3.8). In the late 1840s the two causes were clearly
interrelated.
The actual situation was far more complicated and should be considered in terms of countryside
versus town, land owners versus day labourers, farming community versus craftsmen in villages
and rural towns, and so on. In some areas, among which E Prussia, food exports and hunger
existed nearly side by side.

Figure 3.8. Prices of major food commodities on the European Continent to illustrate the dearth in the years
1845-1847.
(A) Prices of late potatoes (maximum and minimum) at Leiden, Netherlands, in Dutch Guilders per mud = Dutch
bushel = ~70 kg (after Terlouw, 1971: 307). (B) Potato prices in Zürich, Switzerland, in Swiss Francs per 100 kg
(after Brugger, 1956: 114). (C) Wheat prices in France, in French Francs per hl (modified after Abel, 1974: Fig.
69). (D) Wheat (l) and rye (n) prices in the Netherlands in Dutch guilders per hl (Staring, 1860: 586).
3.5. The events of 1848

3.5.1. Political aspects
The Treaty of Vienna (1815) reorganised Continental Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, restoring
monarchism in old and new nations. Rulers of several reconstructed German principalities
donated constitutions to befriend their, often new, subjects289. The Netherlands were a newly
created nation composed of the present states of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.
In 1815 it became a constitutional kingdom with an agrarian north (present Netherlands)
and an industrialising south (present Belgium and Luxemburg). In 1839 this nation fell apart.
Belgium proclaimed independence and found a king willing to rule under its new and very
liberal constitution of 1831. Luxemburg became independent in 1867.
In many capitals intellectual life was fermenting in the 19th century. The Enlightenment of the
18th century had its political culmination point in the Great French Revolution of 1789. Two
main streams of political thinking built on that revolution’s credo ‘freedom, equality, fraternity’.
One stream, leading to socialism and communism, sought to realise its ideals by propagating
common property of production means. Many of its proponents addressed the street, wanting

Chapter 3
revolution. Marx & Engels published their ‘Communist Manifesto’ in 1848! Another stream,
liberalism290, wanted civil rights for individual citizens under protection of the law. Supported
by entrepreneurs, middle class people, academics and, often, high-placed civil servants, it
sought to attain its objectives by evolution. A third stream of political thought, nationalism,
was fed by Romanticism. These interconnected streams formed an explosive mixture.
The Netherlands. In the Netherlands the government suppressed all unrest, primarily the
relatively innocuous hunger riots, with undue force. When a crowd had collected on the Dam
Square in Amsterdam, in front of the Royal Palace291, King William II felt the threat of revolution
and apparently panicked (Jansma & Schroor, 1961: 61). A conservative, he became a liberal in one
night. He invited a Member of Parliament, Professor J.R. Thorbecke, to chair a committee and
write a new constitution. This constitution, for the time quite liberal, was written within four
weeks (Van Schie, 2006). Though liberals were a small minority in Parliament, the Constitution
was accepted in 1848, not without pressure by the King. The Constitution was so modern that,
with some inevitable modifications, it remained basically unchanged until today292.
Austria. Protests and demonstrations in Vienna, capital of the Austrian/Hungarian double

monarchy, followed the hunger winter of 1847/8 and, in the end, induced the Emperor to
proclaim a Constitution in 1848.
Belgium. The liberal constitution of 1831 stood out as an example. Thanks to its liberal climate
several revolutionaries flocked together in Brussels, among them Marx and Engels, during the
late 1840s. In 1848 an incipient revolution was crushed by the Brussels police (Eskens, 2000:
102/3). A relation between the revolutionary spirit in Brussels and the rural misery, in Flanders
especially, was not found.
France. The general discontent of the 1840s burst out in violence, first in Paris, on 22 February
1848. The Bourbon King was chased away on 24 February. On 10 December 1848 Prince Louis
Napoleon Bonaparte was chosen President of the Second Republic293. ‘The collapse of authority
unleashed a massive wave of direct action in towns and villages where capitalist industry
and agriculture and state politics had threatened livelihood’ (Newman & Simpson, 1978: 897).
The causal relationship between harvest failures and revolution is most obvious in France
(§3.3.3).
The Germanies. General discontent ‘had shaken the authority and credibility of the State’294.
The spark of revolution jumped over to Berlin (Prussia) where it ignited the ´March Revolution´,
which was suppressed by force. Nonetheless, Prussia received its first constitution in 1848.
Events were milder in the kingdom of Bavaria and the Archduchy of Baden (Riegger, 1998), in
the same year.
Hungary. Hungarian liberals, revolting in Budapest, wrote and accepted a liberal constitution
for Hungary in 1848.
Ireland. Inspired by the news from the Continent a small band attacked the police station
of Tipperary but this minor rebellion was crushed by the police295. Taking a long shot, Ordish
(1976: 138) commented ‘The blight … nourished the seeds of the Republic of Eire’.

Other countries. Revolts with a more nationalistic touch occurred in several city-states of
present Italy, 1848, Prague (Bohemia, then under Austrian rule), Poznań (in present Poland,
then under Prussian rule), and several other places, without much success. Switzerland, a
confederation of relatively independent democratically governed cantons, made a special
case. After serious inter-cantonal quarrels a liberal constitution was accepted in 1848,
notwithstanding the admonitions of the pious mister Gotthelf (1847)296. King Fredrick VII of
Denmark announced the introduction of parliamentary democracy on 20 January 1848, leading
to the constitution of 5 June 1849. England, with its archetype of a constitutional monarchy,
Spain and Russia remained untouched by the 1848 revolutions.
Counter-revolutions. ‘The revolution of 1848 was not the product of an intentional

revolutionary action: it was rather the implosion of a traditional form of government on the
European continent, of which the legitimate validity had collapsed and of which the fight for
its maintenance had at once been felt as hopeless’ wrote Mommsen (1998)297. Many new rights
had been obtained by the people in 1848.
When the worst was over countervailing forces tried to undo the results of revolution by means
of ‘counter-revolutions’. In Prussia and Austria and their dependent areas, and in various
German principalities, rulers cancelled several of the newly accorded rights, 1848 or 1849.
France followed in 1851. Some innovations, however, survived such as voting rights for at
least part of the male population, and other civil rights. Serfdom was abolished definitively.
Economic power was transferred from the nobility to the middle classes, an irrivocable change
‘from feudalism to capitalism’ (Gieysztor et al., 1979: 417).
3.5.2. The potato blight and the revolutions
An epidemic of potato late blight was followed by an epidemic of constitutions, more or less
liberal. Was there a causal relationship? Yes and no!
No, since the roots of liberalism reach far beyond 1844 when the blight struck first. No, as the
general discontent in the capitals, towns and rural areas had built up in the 1840s due to a
variety of reasons, economical and political.
Yes, as the fall of share values in 1846 was not only coincidence; it was also due to the high price
of credit needed to finance large grain imports. Yes, because the dearth and famine following
the poor potato and grain harvests deepened the discontent (Riegger, 1998). Hunger makes
rebels and insurgents. Yes, because the blight and, again, the poor grain harvest in France,
where the revolts began, triggered an acute economic depression that led to revolutionary
unrest.
I quote a few authors with different backgrounds:

• Wehler (1987), a German historian, had some reservations298. ‘To assume a direct connection
between hunger crisis, grain riots and potato revolts on the one hand, and the revolution
of 1848 on the other hand, would be to prefer a simplifying shortcut to more complicated
interrelationships’ but he considered ‘the crisis from 1845 to 1848 the prelude of the 1848
revolution in all of Europe’.
• Pirenne (1932), a Belgian historian, stated299 ‘the economic crisis was soon complicated
by a food crisis’.

Chapter 3
• The German historian Lutz (1985: 244) wrote300 ‘The structural economic crisis of the
forties, characterised by population pressure, massive unemployment and pauperism, was
sharpened by an acute crisis in 1846/7. Potato blight and harvest failures led to a famine
manifested by epidemics and a reduced birth rate’, (ibid.:245) ‘So grew, from famine and
hunger epidemic, oppositional criticism and public awareness formation’ and (ibid.: 245) ‘A
direct relationship between the hunger unrest 1847 and the revolution was also assumed
by non-socialist contemporaries’.
• The Dutch publicist Van der Heiden (2001) stated ‘The story of the, after all peacefully
achieved 1848 revision of the Constitution … should, strictly speaking, begin with
Phytophthora infestans’. Apparently he followed the Dutch historian of agriculture Sneller
who wrote ‘it [the potato blight] gave an additional impuls to the peaceful revolution of
the national government in the year 1848’301.
• And the French historian Le Roy Ladurie302 said in one of his inimitably intricate but highly
precise sentences ‘Raged after all, always with accidentality and variability, the long and
hot drought of the spring and summer of 1846, which, with the potato disease, notably in
Ireland, carries certain responsibilities by way of the economic depression of 1847 born from
that poor harvest; she implies effectively a kind of climatic guilt, though partial, in view
of the ultimate outbreak of the revolutions in France and then in West and Central Europe,
beginning February, 1848, in the environment of an economic crisis that indeed sprouts
from the difficult post-harvest year 1846-1847; in the environment, also, correlating, of a
certain discontent of the various populations’.
The number of excess deaths due to potato blight, failed grain harvests, and corollary diseases,
‘hunger typhus’ foremost, cannot (yet) be established with any accuracy. Continental Europe
suffered a terrific blow with ~700,000 victims (Table 3.3), a disastrous number approaching the
Irish catastrophy, though spread out over a larger area with a larger population.
3.5.3. The fate of the farmers
Though the fate of the farmers in the ‘Black Years’ is not my topic a few words may be said.
Landless labourers and rural craftsmen were hard hit by scarcity, hunger, death, sale of
possessions, and loss of self-esteem. So were the millions of peasants living at the margin of
self-sufficiency. Farmers with a surplus to be sold were better off as food prices soared. The
Dutch farmers as a class fared reasonably well in the years of crisis. During the discussion on
the ‘Bill to encourage the importation of food commodities’ the Hon. Hoffman mentioned the
‘… farmer, who finds in the high prices of his grain, more than compensation for the failure of
his potatoes’303. The Governor of Groningen reported304 ‘The past year [1845] has been, on the
whole, very advantageous to the agriculture in this province, not so much through a rich and
abundant harvest, as through the high prices of all products’. The large semi-industrial estates
in E Germany did exceedingly well, providing the needy cities (e.g. Berlin), exporting grain
overseas, and selling potatoes or grain to distilleries rather than to the folks nearby.
Where cash was scarce on the countryside usurers took their chance. Many farmers became
indebted and were, eventually, evicted. Social relations between labourers, farmers, and
landowners came under stress. The situation was particularly serious (or well studied?) in
France where the structure of rural society was uprooted and changed forever (Houssel, 1976:
242/4).

3.6. Conclusions305
1. The invasion of the European Continent (N of the Alpine Ranges and into W Russia) by
Phytophthora infestans in 1844/5 had a tremendous impact because of the crop failure it
caused, with famine and pestilence in its wake.
2. On the European Continent the harvest failures of 1845 and 1846, due to late blight on
potatoes, rust on rye, voles, frost and drought, caused scarcity, hunger, and famine, leading
to a recession with a drop in the demand of industrial products and a subsequent loss of
employment, thus exacerbating the existent poverty and discontent.
3. Continental Europe suffered badly from crop failures in 1845 and 1846, leading to
dearth, hoarding and speculation, rising prices, and finally resulting in an excess loss of
lives tentatively estimated at ~700,000, a number yet uncertain but approaching that of
Ireland.
4. Emigration overseas from Continental Europe seems to be in the order of one or a few
hundred thousand persons, far less than the Irish emigration. Transmigration, from the
countryside to the cities and the industrial areas, may have exceeded the transmigration
of the Irish to England (~300,000) by far.
5. In Continental Europe existed a substratum of discontent, related to widespread rural
pauperism and incipient urban proletariat, economic depression and empty treasuries, loss
of trust, value loss of shares and real estate, bankruptcies, social unrest, and new political
thinking. A general recession, with causes varying per state, came on top of the widely felt
discontent and prepared the ground for the 1848 revolutions
6. The course of events in Continental Europe differed from that in Ireland. Ireland lost about
one quarter of its population by death and emigration, but its political situation hardly
changed. On the Continent the 1848 revolutions reshaped the political landscape, now
determined by national Constitutions.
7. The ‘potato murrain’ was not the immediate cause of the revolutions, its pernicious
consequences being rather the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’. The epidemics of potato
late blight, 1845 and 1846, together with many other agricultural misfortunes in those
two years, contributed in an indirect way, but strongly, to the great political changes in
Continental Europe, 1848.

Chapter 3
Appendix 3.1. C ontemporaneous information as published in The Official

Newspaper of the Dutch Government (D: Staatscourant) of 1845.
‘Disease’ = potato late blight. Expected or estimated yields are given in fractions of normal
yield, arranged per country or area and per date (day-month-issue):
Austrian Empire
23-10-251 Trieste – no disease.
10-11-266 Austria – disease present in Galicia, Vorarlberg, Upper and Lower Austria.
19-11-274 Galicia – disease progressed, most of harvest rotting, storability low.
Belgium
19-09-222 Harvest largely lost. Export of grain and potatoes forbidden.
01-11-259 No seed potatoes available, purchases in Scotland.
Denmark
28-10-255 Disease extending on late varieties – exports suspended.
05-11-262 Hardly any healthy lot available, cheap delivery to distilleries, exports suspended.
08-11-265 Rendsburg [presently Germany] – harvest ½.
25-11-253 Holstein – harvest ¼.
The Germanies
17-10-246 Bavaria hopes for normal harvest.
28-10-255 Bavaria – exportation forbidden.
17-10-246 Bremen – harvest 2/3.
28-10-255 Frankenland – yield good, rarely diseased.
08-11-265 Frankfurt [am Main] – harvest adequate but disease in storage.
17-10-246 Hannover – little surplus for export.
23-10-251 Königsbergen [Kaliningrad] – harvest good but disease present, ship loads lost by
rotting306.
03-12-286 Königsbergen [Kaliningrad] – harvest abundant, disease incidental. Storage rot,
potatoes unfit for shipping.
03-12-286 Lithuania – harvest good.
03-12-286 Mazuria [Mazowze in present Poland] – harvest good.
01-11-259 Mecklenburg, Wismar – harvest <1/2.
18-12-299 Oldenburg – harvest 1/3, storability very poor.
23-10-251 Prussia – destruction.
01-11-259 Stettin [Szczecin, present N Poland] – harvest abundant but generally diseased.
28-10-255 Württemberg – exportation forbidden.
France
27-11-281 General overview – in 36 out of 86 departments harvest failure.
28-10-255 Alsace – harvest 2/3 to 3/4, rotting in storage.
05-11-262 Brittany, Brest – crops diseased – seed potatoes should be imported.
23-10-251 Brittany, Le Havre – harvest 1/4.
01-11-259 La Rochelle – harvest abundant and free from disease.
28-10-255 Les Landes – poor harvest, sometimes diseased.
23-10-251 Loire Valley – expected harvest 2/3.
28-10-255 Pyrenees– poor harvest, sometimes diseased.

Norway
01-11-259 Bergen – just enough for home consumption, no exports.
08-11-265 Norway – crop lost.
Russia
01-11-259 Memel [Klajpeda in present Lithuania] – harvest pending, no disease, yield
moderate.
04-12-287 Russia – Exportation from Livonia [present Estonia and Latvia] and Kurland [Kurseme,
present Latvia] forbidden.
Sweden
05-11-262 Disease near Göteborg, export forbidden.
08-11-265 Sweden – harvest was average.
Switzerland
28-10-255 Yield about 1/2, delivery to distilleries forbidden, prices low because of poor
storability.

4. Crop loss in the Netherlands during World War I, 1914-1918:
productivity of major food crops in a long-term perspective
During World War I, 1914-1918, the Netherlands were politically neutral,

but they felt pressures from two sides, being dependent on the Allies for
the incoming ships with grain and on the Central Forces for coal. Before
the war, the Netherlands were a net exporter of food commodities. During
the war Dutch agriculture had to adjust to self-sufficiency. Food scarcity
was common, certainly among the townspeople. Though there was no acute
hunger, under-nourishment was general, certainly among the workers’
class. Food riots occurred and those of 1917 in Amsterdam were notable.
This chapter discusses the productivity of the major food crops, potato, rye
and wheat, in a long term perspective, with special attention for the effect
of plant disease.
‘Wij hebben de medewerking van Engeland en Duitsland nodig. De medewerking schijnt gekocht te
moeten worden. Gekocht met aardappelen, die wij liever zelven zouden houden.’
We need the cooperation of England and Germany. It seems necessary to buy that cooperation.
To buy it with potatoes that we would prefer to keep ourselves.
Mayor of Amsterdam. Gemeenteblad van Amsterdam 1917 Vol II-2 p1479.
‘Als ik m’n man dat [= rijst] voorzet, krijg ik op me donder.’

If I put that [= rice] before my husband, I’ll get hell
Protesting womens’ comment on the offer of cheap rice. Gemeenteblad van
Amsterdam, 1917 Vol II-2: 1460.
4.1. Potato riots, 1917
A policeman with drawn sabre stood guard at the front door of my grandfather’s home in
Amsterdam, 1917, during the potato riots307. At the time, my grandfather – Dr N.M. Josephus
Jitta – , an amiable and peace-loving medical doctor, was one of the Aldermen of Amsterdam.
His portfolio included public health and, during World War I, food rationing308. The riots
began in a working-class district called ‘Jordaan’, a populous area housing many unemployed
labourers with their large and hungry families. The immediate cause triggering the riots was
the unloading of a ship with a cargo of old potatoes in the ‘Prinsengracht’, a canal bordering the
area, the potatoes being intended for the military garrison. This rather tactless move triggered
the fury of Jordaan women, of old a rebellious lot, who tried to loot the ship on 28 June, 1917
(Huijboom, 1992).
During World War I (1914-1918)309 food was rationed in the Netherlands310 as in most European
countries. What caused the scarcity of food, and of potatoes in special, in a country that used to
be an exporter of agricultural commodities, including potatoes? Were plant diseases involved
in crop failure, as in neighbouring Germany in 1916 (Chapter 5)?

Chapter 4
The present chapter investigates the effect of plant diseases on three major food crops and,
indirectly, to assess the impact of plant diseases on national well-being during the war. The
paper focuses on starch crops, potato, and, for purpose of comparison, wheat and rye. The Dutch
phytopathological literature is remarkably silent on the topic of food supply in war time. Trade
journals, such as De Veldbode and the Overijsselsch Landbouwblad, hardly mentioned potato late
blight or other plant diseases311. The major source of information on the subject is the series of
Annual Reports312 published by the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Public Works,
Commerce and Industry (§4.5.1).
4.2. Materials and methods
Integration levels. Data were available at various integration levels. The area and yield data for
the Annual Reports were collected by the municipal authorities to be combined at the provincial
and national levels. Yields were not determined scientifically but estimated. Generally speaking,
farmers know and knew yields (and prices) quite well, but whether intentional over- and under-
estimation may have occurred, I don’t know.
Total loss of a crop at the field or farm level was a familiar and not infrequent experience, far
more so than in recent times, when total crop failure is really exceptional. Reasons for total
crop failure mentioned during the period of interest were damage to winter cereals by freezing,
excess water, and slugs. Severely damaged fall-sown crops had to be ploughed in before the
spring plantings (mainly in the north and west of the country). Night frosts in May-June could
destroy potato and rye crops (mainly on the light soils of the east). Late blight could ravage the
potatoes (mainly in the south-west) to the degree that crops had to be abandoned.
Many mishaps were experienced at the field or farm level but weather-induced problems usually
affect larger areas, polders, municipalities, provinces, or the country as a whole. Drought,
extreme cold, excess rain water, fresh water inundations, and inundations by sea water due to
storm floods typically affect large areas covering several communities. In 1916, the Netherlands
were hit by the storm flood of 13-14 January that inundated some 14,000 ha with salt water313.
Since most of that inundated area was pasture land our data were not affected by this flood.
At the provincial level the large scale effects, the subject of the present study, became apparent,
especially so when there were typical differences between provinces. At the national level long
term trends were discerned (e.g. land use, productivity) and typical differences between years
could be demonstrated (due to e.g. wet or dry, and cold or warm seasons).
Data selection and preparation. This chapter focuses on the major food crops, potato, wheat and
rye, with emphasis on potato. To see more detail, two provinces per crop were compared, one in
the north or north-east and one in the south or south-west of the Netherlands (Table 4.1). For
cultural conditions, weather and diseases I followed the Annual Reports.
The potato categories ‘ware’, ‘industry’ and ‘seed’ were taken together, as only post-war data
separated ware and industry potato. Seed potatoes were not mentioned separately. Similarly,
data on autumn-sown and spring-sown wheat or rye were bulked. Where possible, the provincial
and national yield data of potatoes were averaged over categories using the respective
cultivation areas as weights. Spring wheat and spring rye usually covered less than ten per
cent of the total areas under wheat and rye.

Crop loss in the Netherlands during World War I, 1914-1918
Table 4.1. The provinces chosen for comparison and some of their characteristics (seasons 1915-1918). Source:
Annual Reports.
Province Crops in order of Main soil types Approximate hectareage in units of 1000 ha
of importance
Potato Wheat Rye
Groningen Potato, rye Clay, peaty sand 23 10 15

Friesland Potato Clay, sand 16 1 3
Zeeland Wheat, potato Clay 13 15 3
Noord Brabant Rye, potato Sand, clay 23 4 47
To study the effects of weather and disease on yield the statistic of interest was the yield per
ha, expressed in the traditional way as hectolitre per hectare (hl/ha). The deviation of a yield
in a particular year from the long-term trend was visualised by means of simple regression
analysis. To reveal trends in productivity I used twelve seasons before and after the war, the
periods 1903-1914 and 1919-1930, in addition to the war seasons 1915-1918.
The Annual Reports contain monthly means of daily temperature in °C, precipitation in mm
per month, number of rain days (days with a precipitation ≥1 mm) per month, measured by the
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute located near the centre of the country (Table 4.2).
Weather data were used as illustrations only. Where appropriate the monthly figures were
rendered as deviations d from the means over 28 years (1903 to 1930).
The summer weather was characterised by means of a ‘Summer Index’ (IJnsen, 1976), an index
of temperature only. Figure 4.1A shows that the summer of 1917 was relatively warm. The other
war summers were normal or ‘at the cool side’. The winter weather was captured in a single
figure, the ‘Frost Index’ (IJnsen, 1981). It only summarises winter temperatures. The winter
1916/7 (1917 in Figure 4.1B) was relatively cold, but the other war winters were mild. In crop
loss studies precipitation is as important as temperature. Relevant precipitation data are given
in Appendix 4.1.
Crop loss. Selected data sets were subjected to regression analysis of variable xt (usually hl/ha)
on time t (in years) over n = 28 years. The ‘expected yield’ (ye) of a province in a particular year
was that year’s value on the regression line. The ‘observed yield’ (yo) showed a deviation d314
from the expected yield with d = yo - ye.
Data were normalised by calculating the ‘standard error of the estimate’ (Sx) for each data
set. A dimension-less value δ is obtained dividing d by Sx (δ = d / Sx). The value (δ) expresses
the deviation of the observed from the expected value in a figure varying from ~-2 to ~+2.
The ‘approximate Wilk-Shapiro test’ for normality of the distribution of δ over years showed
no significant deviations from normality (Shapiro & Francia, 1972). This procedure permits
a normalised comparison between two yield data sets (xp and xq) from different crops or
provinces. To pinpoint interesting years the annual deviation Δ was calculated for the
difference between δxp and δxq. A year was considered interesting when the absolute value
of Δ exceeded 1, |Δ| > 1.

Chapter 4
Table 4.2. Monthly weather data averaged over 28 years, 1903 to 1930, as measured by the Royal Netherlands
Meteorological Institute at De Bilt, in the centre of the country. Source: Annual Reports.
Month Response
Temp. °C1 Prec. mm2 Rain days3
January 2.5 58.4 12.1

February 3.2 43.2 9.8
March 5.8 49.6 10.8
April 9.1 49.8 10.3
May 14.4 52.2 9.7
June 16.5 66.3 10.7
July 18.4 72.2 10.1
August 17.6 82.2 12.5
September 14.7 61.6 10.4
October 10.3 71.5 11.6
November 5.4 63.7 12.2
December 3.3 71.3 14.1
Year 10.1 742.5 134.4
1 Temp. = Monthly mean of mean daily temperatures in °C; year = mean of monthly means.
2 Prec. = Monthly precipitation in mm; year = mean annual precipitation in mm.
3 Rain days = Monthly number of rain days (days with precipitation ≥1 mm); year = mean annual number
of rain days.
Figure 4.1 (A). Summer Indexes for the Netherlands over the years 1903 through 1930. The summer of 1917
was relatively warm. Data from IJnsen (1976). Horizontal – years. Vertical – Summer Index (the higher the
index, the warmer the summer). (B). Frost Indexes for the Netherlands over the years 1903 through 1930. The
winter 1917 (1916/7) was relatively cold. Data from IJnsen (1981). Horizontal – years. Vertical – Frost Index
(the higher the index, the colder the winter).

‘Crop loss’ is defined as the difference between ‘attainable yield’ and ‘actual yield’ for any
particular crop, year and area (Zadoks & Schein, 1979: 245). As the actual yield (yo) of a province
I used the ‘observed yield’ from the Annual Reports. For the attainable yield of a loss area
(ya) I took the ‘observed yield’ of a control province. To avoid systematic differences in yield
level between provinces and years the observed yields were expressed as deviations δ from
the expected yield, with δC and δL for the control and loss province, respectively. Crop loss in
relative terms is CLr = δC – δL.
Estimated crop loss (CLe) in hl ha-1 is found by multiplying Δ with the Sy of the loss province.
Estimated crop loss in per cent (CL%) is calculated by relating CLe to the expected yield of the
loss area (ye), CL% = 100 x ( CLe / ye ).
4.3. Results
4.3.1. National level – cultivation area
Potato was grown on both clay and sandy soils. The national potato area increased slightly
but significantly (Table 4.3) from 1903 till 1930, though with considerable variation. Price
expectations were a major cause of variability but adverse conditions may have had an effect,
devastating night frosts foremost. The war years showed relatively large areas (Figure 4.2)
under potato.
Figure 4.2. The national potato area (hectares) over the years 1903 to 1930. The area includes ware, industry
and seed potatoes.
Horizontal – years. Vertical – area in units of 10,000 ha. The trend is shown as the regression line of hectareage
on years, with additional lines at ± 1 and ± 2 Sy. The regression with slope 659 (ha/year) is significant (p =
0.0009, n = 28, r2adj = 0.32). Original data from Annual Reports.

Chapter 4
Table 4.3. Summary table of national cultivation areas (ha), yield levels (hl/ha) and hectolitre weights
(kg/hl) for wheat, rye and potato, the Netherlands, 1903-1930. Source: Annual Reports.
Year Wheat1 Rye2 Potato
ha hl/ha kg/hl 3 ha hl/ha kg/hl 3 ha4 hl/ha5
1903 52,141 27.0 73.3 215,698 22.6 69.1 151,617 171

1904 54,081 28.8 78.7 212,849 22.0 73.0 158,732 209
1905 58,895 29.3 76.2 216,556 22.1 72.0 160,526 191
1906 53,730 30.7 76.7 218,220 22.5 71.7 161,114 209
1907 47,523 34.5 76.0 218,398 23.1 72.1 158,223 210
1908 51,320 32.1 - 219,566 25.2 - 159,887 213
1909 44,573 28.1 72.0 223,973 27.7 67.5 161,259 212
1910 54,784 28.6 - 219,956 24.4 - 162,215 192
1911 57,539 33.7 78.0 223,291 25.2 74.0 166,385 219
1912 57,854 34.1 72.0 228,044 24.9 70.0 172,344 249
1913 52,903 31.8 76.0 226,095 26.1 70.0 169,998 227
1914 56,500 33.9 76.5 227,674 20.9 69.5 171,513 248
1915 65,902 37.9 75.8 221,084 25.7 70.7 177,074 229
1916 52,438 31.1 74.0 199,855 20.5 69.7 171,833 216
1917 48,824 28.5 72.5 189,140 24.7 69.2 173,899 251
1918 60,009 31.9 75.0 191,165 24.0 71.7 177,952 258
1919 67,954 30.4 75.1 201,107 25.8 70.0 180,249 244
1920 61,489 34.3 74.3 199,270 25.7 69.4 172,884 248
1921 72,983 41.3 - 202,072 31.4 - 178,371 212
1922 60,551 35.8 - 202,168 29.9 - 192,884 297
1923 62,183 35.2 - 210,128 24.4 - 161,107 234
1924 47,898 34.6 - 197,903 28.1 - 167,456 247
1925 53,453 37.4 - 200,704 29.2 - 170,333 276
1926 53,340 36.8 - 197,298 24.7 - 170,336 260
1927 61,869 35.6 - 197,247 24.5 - 172,938 216
1928 59,943 42.8 - 196,135 31.6 - 179,103 322
1929 45,435 43.1 - 197,346 33.2 - 182,220 335
1930 57,518 37.7 - 192,374 27.7 - 160,712 281
1 Data adding winter and spring wheat. Spring wheat covered at most 10% of area.
2 Data adding winter and spring rye. Spring rye covered at most 10% of area.
3 No data on 1908 and 1910; no data after 1920.
4 Data adding ware and industry potatoes.
5 Data averaged over ware and industry potatoes weighted by areas. Industry potatoes far out-yield
ware potatoes but until 1920 no distinction was made. In Groningen, 1922, industry potatoes covered
61% of the area, out-yielding ware potatoes by 20%.
Wheat was grown on clay soils. The national wheat area showed great variation over the years
without significant trend. A major cause of variation was the frequent failure of the fall-sown
crops due to winter killing. Poor planting conditions in the autumn could affect the area sown.
The ploughing under of failed winter crops was mentioned frequently and the failed crop was

not always replaced by spring wheat. The expected price had some effect on planting decisions.
The war years had relatively high wheat areas, 1917 excepted.
Rye was grown primarily on sandy soils. The national rye area was on the increase before 1915,
dropped considerably during the war years, recovered briefly and declined. The war-time drop
may have been induced by two factors. One was the lack of fertilisers that might have made
rye growing unprofitable on the poor sandy soils, the other was to grow alternative crops
with higher profitability. The decline after 1923 was probably due to improved soil and water
management allowing substitution by crops with higher returns.
4.3.2. National level – yield in hl/ha
The upward trends in yield (hl/ha) of potato, wheat and rye over 28 years were highly
significant (Table 4.4, Figure 4.3A), a well-established fact, explained by improved soil and
water management, increased application of fertilisers, and plant breeding. Crop protection in
the period 1903 to 1930 was yet of little importance in cereals, weeding excepted, but it may
have played a role in potato, where late blight (Phytophthora infestans) could be controlled by
application of Bordeaux mixture.
The upward trend in potato yields from 1903 to 1930 amounted to 3.6 hectolitre/ha/year.
Variation in potato yields was considerable. Some of the outliers can be explained, others not.
Interregional seed potato exchange occurred already in 1878 (Van der Zaag, 1999: 95), when
Friesland exported seed potatoes to other Dutch provinces. Potato seed certification after
field selection was practiced in Friesland around 1910 at a limited scale (Anonymous, 1910).
Late blight control with Bordeaux mixture contributed to improved yields (various Annual
Reports).
Table 4.4. Trends in potato, wheat and rye yields for selected provinces and for the Netherlands, 1903 to
1930. The trend is given as the linear regression equation for yield (hl/ha) on time (years). n = 28. Original
data from Annual Reports.
Crop Area Constant1 p Slope2 p3 r2adj Sy4
Potato Netherlands 179 0.0000 3.60 0.0000 0.58 24.2

Wheat Netherlands 27.3 0.0000 0.395 0.0000 0.55 2.87
Rye Netherlands 21.5 0.0000 0.250 NS 0.38 2.48
Potato Friesland 232 0.0000 2.21 0.005 0.24 29.9
Zeeland 132 0.0000 4.52 0.0001 0.44 40.3
Wheat Groningen 32.2 0.0000 0.348 0.001 0.32 3.96
Zeeland 29.6 0.0000 0.438 0.0000 0.48 3.74
Rye Groningen 28.3 0.0000 0.364 0.0003 0.38 3.67
Noord Brabant 20.9 0.0000 0.094 NS 0.06 2.41
1 In hl/ha. Regression was calculated for (year – 1900). Thus 1915 was taken as 15.
2 In hl/ha/year.
3 p > 0.05 was considered non-significant (NS).
4 S = ‘Standard error of the estimate’, used to draw the confidence limits at ± 1 and ± 2 S .
y y

Chapter 4
Figure 4.3. The national yields (hl/ha) of (A) potato1, (B) wheat2, and (C) rye3 over the years 1903 to 1930.
Horizontal – years. Vertical – yield in hl/ha. The trend is shown as the regression line of yield on years, with
additional lines at ±1 and ±2 Sy. Original data from Annual Reports.
1 The data include ware, industry and seed potatoes. The regression line with slope ~3.6 hl/ha is significant
(p < 0.0000, n = 28, r2adj = 0.58).

2 Taking winter and spring wheats together. Spring wheat did not exceed 10 per cent of the total area under
wheat. The regression line with slope ~0.4 hl ha-1 is significant (p < 0.0000, n = 28, r2adj = 0.55).
3 Taking winter and spring rye together. Spring rye did not exceed 10 per cent of the total area under wheat.
The slope of the regression line is non-significant.
National wheat and rye yields (hl/ha) showed a similar upward trends (0.4 hl/ha/year for wheat
and 0.25 hl/ha/year for rye; Figures 4.3B and 4.3C), again with considerable scatter. Some of
the outliers can be explained. Wheat and rye yields were highly correlated. The correlation is
due primarily to the general upward trend in yield, but its relatively high r2adj (= 0.63) suggests
that the two crops were subject to the same ecological factors, see e.g. the high of 1915
relative to the low of 1916, or the peak of 1928 relative to the trough of 1927. The point was
also apparent from some typical comments in the Annual Reports (Appendix 4.1).
The weather data of the Meteorological Institute, far outside the major cropping areas, and
the comments of the Annual Reports did not always correspond. In the period 1903-1930 the
wettest year was 1903, with plenty late blight. The driest year was 1921, at the middle of a set
of three dry years. The coldest year was 1917. Warm summers occurred in 1911, 1913, 1917, 1921
and 1930 (Appendix 4.1). From a meteorological point of view the war years 1915 to 1918 were

not exceptional. The years 1915 and 1916 had a high precipitation whereas 1917, beginning
with a cold and long winter, had a hot June month.
4.4. Crops and their major harmful agents
4.4.1. Potato
Harmful agents. According to Quanjer315 (1921a) two diseases dominated the European potato
scene, late blight (P. infestans) and ‘degeneration’. The Annual Reports mentioned two other
harmful ‘agents’, night frosts and late summer and autumn rains. Night frosts were frequent in
late May and early June on the sandy soils in the SE (e.g. 1905). Late summer and autumn rains
favoured late blight and hampered timely lifting, with lots of rotting tubers and poor storage
quality as the results (e.g. 1930).
Late blight. Wet seasons favoured the sporulation, dispersal and infection of P. infestans
(e.g. 1903). Wet falls furthered the overwintering of P. infestans in groundkeepers, potato
refuse, and seed tubers. Varieties differed in resistance to late blight but these differences
are ignored here. As a rule, early varieties suffered less than late varieties316. Since Millardet
(Schneiderhan, 1933) potato late blight could be controlled by the application of Bordeaux
mixture and this was increasingly and successfully done in the Netherlands (Figure 4.4)317.
According to the Annual Reports two applications sufficed. In the Netherlands hand-operated
back-pack sprayers were utilised and later hand-held line sprayers with a central reservoir
and pump318. In 1904 the Netherlands counted 606 horse-drawn ‘spraying machines’319. Later
counts were not available. Spraying against late blight decreased during World War I because
copper became scarce and expensive320. Unfortunately little detail is available so that the
effect of decreased spraying cannot be assessed.
Figure 4.4. Spraying equipment (Quanjer, 1911).

Knapsack sprayer made by Vermorel (France), Model ‘Éclair N° 1’. 14.5 liter. Price DGL 21.
Horse-drawn sprayer, with six nozzles, made by Besnard (France), Model ‘Dispositif’. Price of set-up equipment
without cart DGL 115. In real life the driver sits on the cart.

Chapter 4
Degeneration had been known since the 18th century (§5.3.2). Its symptoms were described
as ‘curl’. The classical remedy was two-fold. First, new and not-yet-infested varieties could be
grown from seed321. Second, planting material could be obtained from areas with relatively
little infestation such as Scotland (England), Friesland Province (Netherlands), Eiffel Mountains
(Western part of Germany), or selected fields (Eastern part of Germany). Friesland as a seed
potato growing area had already some fame around 1910322. ‘Green lifting’ of plants for seed
potatoes was an old practice (e.g. Kops, 1810: 357), explained nowadays as avoidance of tuber
infection.
The cause of ‘degeneration’ was unknown and hardly studied. It was associated with ‘curl’,
mentioned frequently in the Annual Reports. Quanjer (1921b) stated that ‘curl’, the typical field
symptom of degeneration, was in fact a disease syndrome from which he isolated three separate
diseases for detailed studies, ‘leaf roll’ (phloem necrosis), ‘mosaic’ and ‘crinckle’. Salaman (1949)
attributed the ‘curl’ to Potato Virus Y. The typical ‘leaf roll’, due to the leaf roll virus, caused a
first large-scale outbreak in Germany, 1905323. Yield loss could be up to 80 per cent (De Bokx,
1982). Wennink (1918) measured losses of over 90 per cent due to leaf roll. Westerdijk (1916)
described the damage potential of potato mosaic (30 to 60 per cent yield loss).
Oortwijn Botjes (1920) demonstrated aphid transmission of leaf roll and mosaic, Quanjer et
al. (1916) had shown transmission by grafting. Quanjer (1921b) thought of a sub-microscopic
parasite but he avoided the word ‘virus’. The plant scientists at the time were not yet ready
to accept viruses as plant pathogens (Westerdijk, 1917) though, according to the standards of
the time, adequate proof was given in the Netherlands for ‘mosaic’ in tobacco (Mayer, 1882a,b)
and in tomato (Westerdijk, 1910).
Areas. Two provinces were selected for comparison, Friesland in the N and Zeeland in the SW
(data not shown). The Frisian data included up to ~10 per cent of industry potato. Zeeland did
not grow industry potato. The Frisian area under potato showed great scatter, with considerable
decrease after 1922, whereas the area in Zeeland increased irregularly but significantly. During
the war years 1915 to 1918 the area under potato had a dip in 1916, especially in Zeeland, a dip
attributed to the ploughing under of many potato fields destroyed by late blight. Relatively
large areas were planted in Friesland after 1916, with a peak in 1918.
Yields. Trends in potato yields from Friesland and Zeeland were compared (Figure 4.5, Table 4.4).
The Sy of Zeeland by far exceeded that of Friesland, suggesting that yield stability over the
years in Zeeland was much lower than in Friesland. Zeeland with its lack of fresh water may
have been more sensitive to summer drought, hampering potato development, than Friesland.
In some years the δ values of the two provinces were remarkably close (1910, 1920, 1921, 1925),
whereas in other years the δ values differed considerably, with Δ = 2.27 in 1903 and Δ = 2.38
in 1929 (Table 4.5). In 1903, the wettest year out of 28, late blight ravaged the north of the
country. During 1929, the one but driest year, potatoes in Zeeland must have suffered from
drought. The effects of these two harmful agents on yield at the provincial level was of the
same order of magnitude, |Δ| > 2, or a yield deficit of over 60 hl/ha.
Comments. National yield levels during the war years did not differ much from the expected
values, with an exceedingly bad yield in Zeeland, 1916 (a wet year), and a peak yield in Friesland,
1917 (a nice summer). In the post-war year 1919 potatoes suffered from leaf roll, mosaic, super
mild mosaic, and Verticillium wilt. A cold spring caused a hollow stand. Lack of fertilisers led

Figure 4.5. Potato yields compared between Friesland and Zeeland. Scatter plot of the difference Δ between
the Friesland (xo) and Zeeland (xe) values of the relative deviation δ of the observed from the expected yield.
Horizontal – years. Vertical – D. Only values of Δ ≥ |1| are used for further interpretation. For explanation
see text.
to modest yields on sandy soils. Early freezing in the fall damaged potatoes in the field and in
the pit (Annual Report on 1919: xvi-xvii). Usually we could not single out definite causes for
specific provincial losses, but Table 4.5 gives some indications.
4.4.2. Wheat
Harmful agents. Among the physical agents often mentioned were winter freezing, either
severe frost or repeated freezing and thawing, and excess winter wetness, leading to poor
soil conditions for the rest of the season. Among the biotic agents were slugs in the fall and
winter, voles, and rust. This rust was probably yellow stripe rust (Puccinia striiformis; Zadoks,
1961). Summer storms with heavy rain could cause lodging. Rainy summers often delayed the
wheat harvest and caused loss of quantity by shedding and/or sprouting in the ear, and loss of
quality by sprouting in the ear and rotting on the field or in the stack 324. The complex of foliar
diseases which drew so much attention during the second half of the 20 th century, among which
the septorias325, was never mentioned in the Annual Reports over the period 1903 to 1930.
Occasionally mention was made of bunt (Tilletia caries in Zeeland, 1923).
Areas. Two typical wheat provinces, Groningen in the NE and Zeeland in the SW of the country,
are climatically different, Zeeland having the milder climate. Harvests in Groningen are about
2 weeks later than in Zeeland. Weather fronts sweep over the country from SW to NE within a
day so that a rain period, post-harvest in Zeeland, may be pre-harvest in Groningen, causing
considerable damage to the Groningen harvest due to sprouting in the ear and rotting in the
stook or stack, as in 1927 (Table 4.5). Cold air invading from the NE may cause serious winter
damage in Groningen but not in Zeeland, as in 1907 and 1908 (Appendix 4.1).

Chapter 4
Table 4.5. Loss estimates (hl/ha) of potato, rye and wheat using pairs of provinces with a yield difference
exceeding one standard error of the estimate, Sy, with possible causes of loss.
Crop Year Control Loss δC 2 δL 3 Δ4 Sy 5 Loss Possible causes

area1 area1 (hl/ha)
Potato 1903 S F 0.18 -2.09 2.27 29.9 68 Late blight in the north
1904 Z F 1.19 -0.46 1.65 29.9 49 Poor soils in the north
1905 F Z 0.50 -1.88 2.38 40.3 96 Late blight Zeeland
1913 F Z 0.71 -0.71 1.42 40.3 57 Late blight Zeeland?
1916 F Z -0.28 -1.77 1.49 40.3 60 Curl, late blight Zeeland
1917 F Z 1.45 -0.14 1.59 40.3 64
1918 Z F 0.76 -0.36 1.12 29.9 33 Late blight Friesland
1929 Z F 2.26 1.00 1.26 29.9 38
Rye 1909 N G 1.31 0.28 1.03 3.67 3.8
1911 N G 0.86 -0.22 1.08 3.67 4.0
1916 G N -0.80 -2.82 2.02 2.41 4.9
1923 N G -0.36 -1.55 1.91 3.67 7.0
1927 N G -0.89 -1.91 1.02 3.67 3.7 Sprouting in the ear
1928 G N 2.35 0.65 1.70 2.41 4.1
1930 N G 0.20 -1.29 1.49 3.67 5.5
Wheat 1905 G Z 1.35 -0.80 2.15 3.74 8.5 Summer storms
1910 Z G 0.91 -0.32 1.23 3.96 4.9 Poor wet soils in NE
1912 G Z 1.61 0.53 1.08 3.74 4.0
1915 Z G -0.81 -1.83 1.02 3.96 4.0 Good weather in SW
1917 G Z 0.86 -0.41 1.27 3.74 4.7 Winter freezing Zeeland
1927 Z G -0.43 -1.56 1.13 3.96 4.5 Sprouting in the ear?
1929 Z G 2.30 1.24 1.06 3.96 4.2
1930 G Z 0.12 -1.13 1.25 3.74 4.7 Sprouting in the ear?
1 N = Noord Brabant, F = Friesland, G = Groningen, Z = Zeeland.

2 δ = The deviation of the observed from the expected value, control area.
C
3 δ = The deviation of the observed from the expected value, loss area.
L
4Δ = δ - δ .
C L
5 S = ‘Standard error of the estimate’, used to draw the confidence limits at ± 1 and ± 2 S .
y y
We only considered those hectareages that deviated more than one Sy from the trend line. The
levels of the two trend lines differ significantly at p<0.001 but their difference in slope is not
significant. Both provinces had low hectareages in 1913, with no obvious reason, and in 1924
and 1929, due to winter freezing. High hectareages occurred in 1921, possibly a post-war effect.
Zeeland had relatively low areas in 1906 and 1910, Groningen in 1903. The respective areas
during the war years 1915 to 1918 did not deviate much from the trend line, though Groningen
had a relatively high area in 1915 and a low area in 1917, the latter due to winter freezing.
Yields. Again, we only considered yields (hl/ha) deviating from the trend line by more than one
Sy. High yields in either province occurred in 1921, 1928 and 1929, mainly due to favourable
summer weather. Low yields in both provinces occurred in 1919, when harvest conditions

were miserable. Obvious differences between the two provinces are shown in Table 4.5, with
tentative explanations.
In some years the δ values of Groningen and Zeeland were remarkably close (1906, 1928),
whereas in other years the δ values differed considerably, with Δ = 1.27 in 1917 and Δ = 2.15 in
1905. Such large differences indicate specific regional effects within a relatively homogeneous
country (Table 4.5). In 1917 frost damage was considerable, especially in Zeeland. In 1905
wheat in Zeeland may have been hit by summer storms, rain and hail.
Comments. During the war years 1915 to 1918 six out of the eight regional wheat yields
considered were within the range δ < ±1 Sx , that is not far from their expected values. The two
exceptions were in Zeeland, with one very good year (1915) and one very bad year (1917). In
1916 the harvest weather was miserable, leading to relatively low yields in either province. In
1918 yields were moderate.
4.4.3. Rye
Harmful agents. Damage by winter cold and by summer rains was comparable to that in wheat. At
flowering and early seed set rye was susceptible to night frosts, late May and early June, as often
mentioned in the Annual Reports. Lodging due to heavy summer rains occurred incidentally.
Rust, probably Puccinia recondita, and nematodes, probably Ditylenchus dipsaci, were mentioned
occasionally. During the war, when labour was scarce, weeds became damaging, especially black
grass (foxtail, Alopecurus myosuroides).
Areas. Two rye-growing provinces were compared, Groningen in the NE and Brabant in the S.
In Brabant the decline of the rye area began before the war. The rye area reached a low level
in 1918, and stayed at an even lower level after the war. In Groningen the rye area was at its
lowest in 1917, with a remarkable peak just after the war.
Yields. Brabant yields did not increase significantly over the years 1903 to 1930 but in Groningen,
technically more advanced, they increased by 0.36 hl/ha per year, on average (Table 4.4). The
scatter in the Groningen rye yields increased markedly over the study period. Groningen and
Brabant had about equal δ’s in 1906, 1907, 1920 and 1925. Low yields occurred in both provinces,
in 1914, 1918, 1923, 1927, and 1930. For possible explanations of these low yields see Appendix
4.1. In Groningen yields were low in 1916 and 1917 and in Brabant in 1926. Years with relatively
high yields were the dry years 1921 and 1929 in these two provinces, 1928 in Groningen and
1909 and 1922 in Brabant. Between Groningen and Brabant Δ varied, with values of 1.91 in 1923
and 2.02 in 1916 (Table 4.5). The causes of the differences are not obvious.
Comment. The war years 1915 to 1918 show fair yields in 1915 and rather poor yields in the other
years but in Brabant, 1916, the yield was disastrously low. The scarcity of fertilisers, mentioned
in the Annual Reports, was not clearly reflected by the harvest figures in the two provinces
considered, but it may have influenced the decision not to plant rye in Brabant, 1918.

Chapter 4
4.5. Discussion
4.5.1. The data
All data used here are derived from the Annual Reports. Their weakness is in the aggregation of
field and farmer data to municipal data. Occasionally, the Annual Reports mention alternative
data pathways yielding somewhat different results. We may question the correctness of the
data received by the municipal officers and the reliability of the data transmitted by them326
to the higher levels, but as these data have been collected for nearly a century in more or less
the same way by over 900 municipalities, they are thought to be acceptable for purposes of
comparison, certainly at the higher integration levels.
Statistics on cultivation area were available. Cultivation areas were subjected to the discipline
of the market and, in times of dearth, to the regulation of the government. These aspects are
not discussed here. Sometimes, the adversity of the weather and, in its sequel, the damage by
disease affected recorded cultivation areas. Abandonment of crops because of winter killing,
night frosts, and late blight was mentioned above and in Appendix 4.1.
This paper concentrates on yield data expressed in hl/ha. Weights in kg/hl were available
for wheat and rye up to 1920, but not for potato (Table 4.3). Though hectolitre weights are
indicative of quality their use did not provide interesting new information.
4.5.2. Crop loss
As specification of yields in hl/ha was current during the period under consideration, I calculated
crop loss in terms of hl/ha, which is adequate for the present purpose, the identification of
good and bad years. These are identified by δC and δL being either both positive (potato, 1929;
Table 4.5), or both negative (wheat, 1915; Table 4.5). If the available information is pertinent
on the cause of the loss one may conclude that the loss due to that cause is ‘up to’ or ‘in the
order of’ the calculated value.
In addition to the quantitative losses estimated here the growers suffered qualitative losses
(storage, processing, and consumer qualities) that may have been financially more important
than loss of quantity. The Annual Reports sometimes alluded to these qualitative losses without
providing sufficient information to make any calculation.
4.5.3. Causes and effects
Many factors may cause damage but only a few, well-known factors cause such large-scale
damage that their effects become visible in aggregated data, at the provincial or national
level. For the period 1903 to 1930 some factors can be identified with reasonable certainty
(Appendix 4.1, Table 4.5).
A wet autumn may delay the potato harvest, favour late blight and bacterial rot, and produce
seed potatoes of poor quality as in 1909, leading to low yields in 1910. In addition, a wet
autumn may delay or preclude the planting of winter wheat as in 1923, reducing the 1924 wheat
area considerably (Table 4.3).

A ‘bad winter’, bad for agriculture, may be too wet, too cold, or both. On water-soaked soils
winter wheat may suffer from open stands due to slugs and mice (1903), or to alternate freezing
and thawing that damages the rootlets. Poor soil conditions may lead to low yields (1910,
Groningen). Severe frosts cause winter killing and sometimes total loss of winter wheat (1907,
1909, 1917, 1924, and 1929) and winter rye (1917, 1924).
In late spring and early summer (May, June) night frosts may injure potato and rye crops, as
the Annual Reports often mentioned, but in the aggregated data the effects are not obvious,
rye in 1914 excepted. Heavy rainfall in late spring and early summer may lead to weed and
lodging damage as in wheat and rye (1913) but in the aggregate the effect is not clear (rye in
Groningen, 1923, excepted).
Summer drought reduces potato growth and leads to low yields (1921) but such a drought may
be followed by a rich potato harvest in the next year327 (1922). Summer rains at the time of
the grain harvest can be very damaging to grain quality and even grain quantity by kernel loss,
sprouting in the ear, or rotting in the sheaf, stook or stack (wheat in Groningen, 1919 and 1927,
and in Zeeland, 1930; rye in Groningen, 1927, but not in Brabant). Heavy rains in late summer
may trigger severe late blight on potato (1903, 1905, and 1927). In 1927 the rains were so heavy
as to cause failure of Bordeaux mixture applications. In 1903 potato suffered much late blight
in Friesland but not in Zeeland and in 1905 the obverse happened (Table 4.5). When the rains
continued well into the fall potato lifting328 was hampered and tubers rotted in the soil or in
the pile.
4.5.4. World War I and Dutch Agricultural policy
With the tacit consent of the major belligerents, Germany and Great Britain, the Netherlands
remained neutral during World War I (Frey, 1998: 13). Neutrality required careful manoeuvring
by the Dutch Government to safeguard crucial imports and exports.
At the time, Dutch agriculture was part of an open economy, as it is today, with imports of basic
commodities, food, feed and fertiliser, and exports of a variety of agricultural end-products.
Among the imports (Figure 4.6) were wheat from Russia and the USA for human consumption,
maize from the USA as animal feed, and fertilisers such as potassium from Germany, nitrogen
from Chile and phosphorus and sulphur from England and Belgium. Among the exports were
dairy products, fruits, vegetables, fresh potatoes and various potato products, among which
potato flour. Exports to Germany continued well into 1916329, when political pressure by
England brought food exports to Germany to a stop330. Siney (1957: 248) stated that the British
interfered ‘in every part of Dutch life’.
In the summer of 1914, just before harvest time, the able-bodied young men were enlisted in
the services and a great many horses were requisitioned for the not-yet-motorised Dutch army.
Fortunately, harvest problems due to lack of labour or draught power had been avoided thanks
to the combination of fine harvest weather and unexpectedly great mutual assistance among
the farmers331. When war was definitive, imports decreased rapidly but exports continued
for some period. The government took appropriate measures to provide for the availability
and equitable distribution of fertilisers332 but in the course of the war seasons 1915 to 1918
the lack of fertilisers was increasingly felt. Dutch agriculture was certainly hampered by lack
of labour, draught power (horses), fertilisers, and copper sulphate. Most references to these

Chapter 4
Figure 4.6. Dutch wheat and rye imports just before, during, and just after World War I.
Horizontal – years. Vertical - Net imports of wheat n and rye l in units of 100,000 tonnes. The 1916 imports
of wheat were ~7.5 x 105 tonnes per year or ~300 grams per person per day. Source: Annual Report over 1920:
Table XXXIX.
shortages in the Annual Reports are incidental. At the provincial and national levels the effects
of these shortages on yield figures are not evident.
The government supervised the transition from an open export-oriented to a self-contained,

autarchic economy (Sneller, 1943: 110) by means of a growing set of injunctions, price control
measures, and centralised purchasing of food commodities to be redistributed among the
population at large333 (Jansma & Schroor, 1987: 288/9). Food exports came to a stand-still 334
(Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7. Dutch potato exports before, during, and just after World War I.
Horizontal – years. Vertical - Net export of fresh potatoes n and of potato flour335 l in units of 100,000
tonnes. The 1915 exports of fresh potatoes amounted to ~2.4x105 tonnes per year or ~100 grams per person
per day. Source: Annual Report over 1920 Table XXXIX.

Table 4.6 resumes the differences between observed and expected yields for potato, wheat and
rye of the war years 1915 to 1918. The expected yields are the yields predicted by the trend
lines. The calculated differences (hl/ha) are expressed in terms of the ‘standard error of the
estimate’ δ. When δ is positive the observed yield exceeds the expected yield. When δ ≥ 1, the
deviation is considered interesting. When δ ≥ 2 the deviation is statistically significant at p ≤
0.05 and considered to be important (rye, 1916).
Table 4.7 shows the total production of starch crops in the Netherlands during World War I.
Using 1916 yields and a population of 6.5 million people, refugees included, and estimating
the proportion for seed potatoes and storage and transportation losses at 10%, the availability
per person per year is about 5 hl or 350 kg. The 1910 consumption was about 250 kg potato per
person per year (Bieleman & Van Otterloo, 2000: 238), so that the potato supply apparently was
adequate, at least in principle. For rye the availability is about 0.56 hl or 39 kg and for wheat
0.33 hl or 16 kg. The 1910 consumption was 100 kg rye and 100 kg wheat per person per year.
Hence, the rye and wheat supplies were quite deficient. They were supplemented by stored and
imported grain, at least in the early war years. There was plenty of rice in store but the working
class refused to eat it 336. ‘Government bread’ contained an admixture of at least 5% potato
flour, making it unsightly and unpalatable to many.
Consumers had to compete with alternative uses such as animal consumption (hogs), potato
flour (farina) production, and exports. The rioters, or those behind them, objected indignantly
to these exports (§4.1). The Dutch government, trying to observe strict neutrality, wanted at
least some exportation to maintain good relations with the belligerent parties337. Ships and
trains loaded with potatoes were looted in the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The real
problem, however, was the provision with cereals of which the national production was, roughly,
in the order of ~20 per cent of the human home consumption. Imports continued throughout
the war period but did not suffice to feed animal stocks.
Table 4.6. Starch crop yields in the war years 1915 to 1918.
Entries δ are deviations from the respective trend lines expressed in standard errors of the estimate (Sy). Note
that δ is mostly positive in 1915, a ‘good’ year, and negative in 1916, a ‘bad’ year. Source: Annual Reports.
Area Crop Observed yields (hl/ha) δ per harvest year
1915 1916 1917 1918 1915 1916 1917 1918
Netherlands Potato 229 216 251 258 -0.17 -0.85 +0.45 +0.59
Rye 25.7 20.5 24.7 24.0 +0.18 -2.02 -0.42 -0.81
Wheat 37.9 31.1 28.5 31.9 +1.63 -0.88 -1.92 -0.88
Friesland Potato 298 259 313 261 +1.10 -0.28 +1.45 -0.36
Zeeland Potato 257 133 203 244 +1.42 -1.77 -0.14 +0.76
Groningen Rye 35.0 31.2 32.7 31.1 +0.34 -0.80 -0.49 -1.02
Noord Brabant Rye 24.3 15.6 19.5 21.3 +0.83 -2.82 -1.24 -0.54
Groningen Wheat 39.5 34.2 34.9 36.7 +0.53 -0.90 -0.81 -0.45
Zeeland Wheat 42.2 33.4 30.2 34.9 +1.61 -0.86 -1.83 -0.69

Chapter 4
Table 4.7. Total production (hl) of starch crops in the Netherlands during World War I. Source: Annual
Reports.
Potato Rye Wheat
1915 44,663,432 5,679,084 2,498,337

1916 37,051,037 4,103,766 1,686,573
1917 43,689,588 4,673,071 1,391,744
1918 45,913,166 4,589,070 1,913,895
The war years were not particularly good crop years but they were not as unfavourable as in
Germany (Chapter 5). Only the season of 1916 had rather low yields of potato, wheat and rye.
This may have been due in part to lack of fertilisers but that suggestion is not supported by the
yield data from 1917 and 1918. During the very cold winter of 1917 an unknown but possibly
considerable amount of potatoes was frozen in transit or storage in railway cars, and lost for
consumption.
The Dutch population (1914-1918: about 6.5 million338) was maybe somewhat undernourished339,
but it survived the war period without great problems even though it was temporarily enlarged
by nearly one million Belgian war refugees340. Protests and demonstrations against food
shortages typically occurred in early summer, when the stores had been (nearly) emptied and
the standing crop had not yet been harvested. Demonstrations took place in many towns in
the early summer of 1916341. In 1917, riots occurred in several cities342. The Amsterdam riots
were controlled with difficulty, at the expense of 114 wounded and nine casualties343. The
upheavals were spontaneous and, apparently, unexpected. A major objection was the continued
exportation of potatoes that the Dutch Government deemed necessary to please the belligerent
parties. After the riots the Dutch Government decided to send an extra train-load of potatoes
to Amsterdam.
The question remains to what degree the townspeople went hungry. The Gezondheidsraad
(National Health Council) stated that public health was not suffering much from the food
scarcity. Some Amsterdam physicians made an enquiry344 under labourers’ families (Sajet &
Polak, 1916). They reported a contrary opinion as they concluded that the diet of these families
was marginal at best and, certainly for the children, inadequate in the long run. Under-nutrition
was not yet acute, but resistance against diseases was undermined and tuberculosis was a
threat. The authors stated that the real paupers were far worse off. This was 1916, when the
worst was yet to come. The problem clearly had two sides. One was the limited supply of food,
the other the lack of purchasing power due to war-induced unemployment of the labourers. In
addition, there was the refusal to eat unfamiliar food (rice).
The initially unfriendly attitude of the townspeople toward the growers in agriculture and
horticulture was moderated in 1916 by a better understanding345. The obverse happened in
Germany346. During the war, the Germans suffered far more from food shortages than the Dutch.
In Germany losses due to weather and plant diseases contributed decisively to the population’s
distress.

4.6. Conclusions
1. This paper opened and ended with the ‘potato riots’, Amsterdam, 1917. The inhabitants of
Amsterdam suffered from food shortages. The poor were under-nourished but they did not
starve.
2. Nearly one million Belgian refugees, sojourning temporarily in the Netherlands, 1914/5,
could be fed adequately347.
3. The Dutch Government kept the Ship of State afloat with a relatively modest set of
injunctions and regulations but it could not avoid all food riots or protests.
4. Dutch agriculture managed to adjust to war conditions and to remain productive
notwithstanding lack of labour, draught power, fertilisers, and pesticides.
5. Areas of starch crops fluctuated under the influence of the weather and of profitability
considerations.
6. Yields of starch crops varied considerably but were fair in view of the long term trend, with
the exception of 1916 when yields were low.
7. Plant diseases (and pests) took their share as usual. They could be a definite nuisance at
the field and farm level. Potato losses in Zeeland, 1916 and 1917, were at least 60 hl/ha.
8. Seen in a long-term perspective (1903-1930) the negative effect of pests and diseases on
productivity of Dutch agriculture during World War I was not excessive.

Chapter 4
Appendix 4.1. Overview by years, 1903-1930.
Overview of weather conditions and crop damages, extracted from a large body of data in the
‘Annual Reports’ (Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Public Works, Commerce and
Industry), and annotated.
Year = harvest year. Some meteorological data are given by way of illustration. The d stands for
‘deviation from the 28-years mean (Table 4.2), with between brackets the period of d, one or
a few months, or a year. The next letter indicates the response involved, dP = deviation of the
monthly precipitation in mm, dR = deviation of the monthly number of rain days, dT = deviation
of temperature in degree-months (degrees as °C).
S = season, 1 = winter (January – March), 2 = spring (April – June) 3 = summer (July – September),
4 = autumn (including potato harvests and winter wheat planting; October – December).
Weather, crop and disease notes – Brief abstracts from the originals by the present author.
Year S Weather, crop and disease notes
1903; 1 In 1902 difficult autumn planting. Winter 1903 rather warm. Nonetheless
dP(Apr) = + 76.7; winter wheat damaged by frost, mice & slugs. In Groningen small area
dP(year) = + 184.4 harvested, in some polders 75 % ploughed, remainder open stands.
2 Spring fairly cold. Excess water in April.
3 Wet summer. Winter wheat – low yields. Rye – good yields but quality loss.
Harvest difficult.
4 Potato with heavy late blight, in Groningen many fields not harvested, in
North Holland many diseased tubers. Yields low. Autumn wet, poor tillage
and sowing. Slug damage in winter wheat.
1904 1 Slug damage in wheat, much winter wheat ploughed in Groningen and
North Brabant.
2 Climatically favourable season. March and April dry. Spring wheats
rusted348.
3 Wheat – open stands but fair yields of good quality. July through
September dry. Rye severely damaged by rye nematode in Limburg, worst
in 25 years.
4 Potato had only little late blight. Wet fall.
1905 1 Winter normal.
2 March warm, April cold. Night frost (24 May) damage in potato in S and
severe in rye in E.
3 June with hail. Good year for cereals, Zeeland excepted. Regional rain fall
differences349.
4 Potato good in Friesland, poor in SW due to late blight beginning July350.

1906 1 12-03 Storm flood, 3600 ha lost in Zeeland.

2 Normal.
3 Wheat yield and quality fairly good, SW excepted. Rye generally good.
Groningen, severe hail damage June 1st , torrential rains in July damaged
all crops.
4 Potato – yield good and quality excellent, though curl 351 in S and much
late blight in SW. Very low yields in Zeeland. Autumn relatively dry and
favourable.
1907; 1 Severe frost in January with damage to cereals. Wheat ploughed under in
dT(Jan+Feb) = -2.7; Groningen352.
dP(year) = -106.5 2 Cold. Rye suffered from night frost. Much spring wheat sown.
3 Dark, cool, wet. Wheat with peak yields, specially spring wheat.
4 Potato good, with little late blight but severe curl 353. Nice fall. Plantings
late.
1908; 1 Severe frost alternating with thawing. In Groningen 20% of winter wheat
dT(Jan) = -3.5; ploughed under.
dP(year) = -126.5 2 Severe night frost April 25th. May with heavy rain and hail damages.
3 Rye very good but locally in E hail, wireworms, ergot. Locally summer rain
damage354. Potato – no night frost, little late blight, some curl 355.
4 Potato good, little late blight and curl. Fall good for tillage and planting.
1909; 1 Winter with severe frosts. Much winter wheat ploughed under in N356.
dT(Jan+Feb+Mar) = -5.5 2 June cold and dry.
3 July and August with heavy rains. Wheat yields low, with much sprouting
in the ear. Rye yields low357. Potato curl prominent in some areas358.
4 Fall mild, very wet. Potato yields satisfactory but lifting late.
1910 1 Mild but wet winter with inundations in river district. Soils in poor
condition.
2 Favourable. Emergence of potatoes irregular due to bad quality of tubers.
3 Wheat with low grain and straw yields due to poor soil condition. Rye
harvested in bad weather.
4 Potato suffered from poor quality of seed potatoes; low yields. Bordeaux
mixture had good effect. Yields low. Crop failed in Friesland due to late
blight and curl. Nice fall weather.
1911; 1 Mild.
dP(Jly) = -39.2; 2 April cold and dry. Potato suffered from night frost in NE.
dP(year) = -99.5 3 Dry, especially in July. Rye good, wheat very good.
4 No late blight. Very good potato harvest. Tillage and sowing good.
1912; 1 Favourable winter with only a few days severe frost in N.
dP (Aug) = +84.8; 2 Spring planted crops irregular and thin.
dP (year) = +171.5 3 Cold, wet, late. From August onwards much rain. Rye yields good359. Wheat
yield and quality poor when harvested after summer rains.
4 Potato harvest late with high yields, on clay soils in W many rotten tubers.
Much wetness. Poor tillage. Plantings delayed.
1913; 1 Mild winter.
dP(May+Jne) = +44.5 2 Rains in May & June caused severe weed & lodging damage.
3 In E severe damage by white grubs (larvae of Tipula spp). Wheat in
Groningen had much whiteheads360. Rye good. Early, untreated potato
varieties killed by late blight 361.
4 Potato profited from spraying. Fall dry, favourable for planting

Chapter 4
1914 1 Mild.
2 Groningen: severe rust in winter barley. Feet and trousers coloured orange-
yellow (probably Puccinia hordei). Wet March and April with dry E winds
lead to crust formation. Wheat in Groningen grassy, rust 362 disquieting.
3 May with severe night frosts (rye). Much rust 363 in rye. Summer fair.
Harvest normal notwithstanding mobilisation.
4 Potato gave rich harvest of good quality. Good autumn.
1915; 1 Mild, very wet.
dP(Jly+Aug) = +52.6; 2 May & June with rains and night frosts. Potato in sandy areas suffered
dR(Jly) = + 4.9 from 3 night frosts, losses in NE up to 80%.
3 Late July wet, hail damage; late August wet, Wheat – good yields, modest
quality; wet harvest in Groningen.
4 Potato with little blight in S, but much in Friesland due to lack of labour
and of copper for spraying. Nice autumn.
1916; 1 Wet, little frost, winter wheat damaged by water-logging. Zuyderzee dikes
dP(Dec+Jan+Feb) = broken due to storm flood.
+101.1; 2 March & April wet. Potato area reduced because of poor financial results in
dT(Jne) = - 2.5 1915 and good prospects of sugar beet, onions and other crops
3 June cold, late August wet. Barley had much rust 364 in early summer, low
yields. Wheat harvest wet, yield and quality modest, hl weight low. Rye
suffered from poor weather, weediness, lack of labour & lack of fertiliser.
4 Potato yields low by lack of fertiliser & labour, much weediness365, heavy
curl, much late blight. Fall favourable, but tillage and sowing late.
1917; 1 Severe winter January – March, many winter cereals lost.
dT(Jan+Feb) = -6.7; 2 April cold, May clear & dry. Rye retarded, meagre due to lack of fertilisers.
dP(Oct) = + 82.6 3 June clear & dry. Potato in N damaged by night frost 6/7 June. Winter
wheat and winter rye with low yields due to winter frost damage. Potato
rarely treated because of expensive copper but yield and quality generally
good.
4 October wet. Potato and beet harvests delayed by rains. Late blight late,
damage only in low lying areas of South Holland. Fall too wet, few winter
crops sown.
1918; 1 Mild.
dT(Jne) = -1.5; 2 Early spring, May cold and dry.
dP(May+Jne) = -57.5 3 June cold and dry, night frosts 5-7 June. Wheat yield and quality good
except Groningen. Rye with much lodging, otherwise yields good. Potato
with poor foliage due to cool and dry spring, and lack of fertiliser; top
necrosis, curl, rhizoctonia, Verticillium wilt, but little late blight366.
4 Wet, potato lifting late, many rotten tubers.
1919; 1 No problems.
dP(year) = -47.5 2 Rather cold, wet March. Late, poor spring tillage. May sunny and dry with 4
frost nights.
3 June & July cool & wet, good wheat and rye harvests, Groningen excepted.
Potato in Zeeland of poor stand, in Friesland with late blight. Potato yields
moderate, much curl mosaic, top necrosis, and Verticillium wilt.
4 Dry fall, early planting. November frosts.

1920; 1 Mild winter, wet till February.

dP(year) = -126.5 2 February and March dry, early tillage. Winter wheat with good stand.
3 June sunny, July sufficient rain, August cold & wet, good cereal crops.
4 Potato fair which rather much though variable late blight, in France frozen
in the pits. Dry fall.
1921; 1 Dry, good winter crops.
dP(year) = -306.5 2 April too dry, crops delayed.
3 Dry, winter cereals good yields of good quality. Rye yields exceptionally
high.
4 Ware potatoes good, but chain tuberisation. No late blight.
1922; 1 Alternate freezing & thawing. Wheat and rye partly ploughed under. Rye
dT(Jan+Feb) = -2.7 with poor stand.
2 March & April bleak with nightfrosts. May dry & warm, much spring wheat
sown.
3 June & July rainy, August cold. Rye recovered but straw short.
4 Potato yields peaked (as in 1912 after dry year), prices low, much leaf roll &
top necrosis. Relatively dry fall.
1923; 1 Mild, frost & snow, warm March.
dT(Jne) = -3.5; 2 April dry, May & June cold.
dT(Jly) = +2.6; 3 6-14 July hot. Wheats good, much straw, rust in Gelderland & bunt in
dP(Oct) = +50.6; Zeeland. Rye with heavy crops, lodging.
dR(Oct) = +9.4 4 Potato regular. Very wet fall, lifting difficult. Winter crops sown late or not
at all.
1924; 1 Cold & long winter, many winter cereals ploughed under.
dR(Aug+Sep) = + 9.1 2 Favourable May, nightfrosts 5 & 6 June.
3 June & July good, August & September wet, poor harvest weather.
4 Potato suffered from sudden late blight in July with incidental losses in
the SW 25 to 75 %. Fall normal.
1925; 1 Mild.
dP(Dec) = +69.7 2 Dry March, little night frost.
3 June – August dry, about 1 August many thunderstorms, tornado on 10
August, September wet, good year for cereals & potatoes.
4 Fall-sown crops damaged by inundations from heavy December rains.
1926 1 Frost damage, dry March.
2 Cold May.
3 June through September favourable. Wheat and rye – much straw but
meager yield.
4 Favourable. Potatoes locally killed by late blight 367.
1927; 1 Mild.
dP(Jne) = +69.7; 2 April wet & cool, May dry with night frosts.
dP(Aug+Sep) = 62.1 3 June very wet, August & Sept wet. Rye with much sprouting in the ear.
4 Potato suddenly with late blight, spraying had little effect due to heavy
rains, much rotting in storage, prices up. Favourable autumn. December
with snow & frost.
1928 1 Frost damage in March.
2 April & May cold, May wet.
3 June cool & sunny, July and August sunny, high grain yields.
4 Potato with much ‘blue’ but no late blight. Autumn good for tillage and
planting.

Chapter 4
1929; 1 Severe & long winter, wheat in N lost, in SW protected by snow.

dT(Jan+Feb) = -11.2; 2 Favourable. Rye with open stands, remedied by extra N fertiliser.
dP(Year) = -151.2 3 Dry and sunny, wheat and rye yields high.
4 Very large potato harvest, no late blight, prices down. Favourable autumn.
1930; 1 Mild. No winter damage.
dP(Year) = +130.5 2 Dry, rains in May.
3 Very hot days in June. July, August & September rainy. Cereals with wind
damage, much lodging, sprouting in the ear, rotting.
4 Potato harvest late, much late blight, difficult to control on soaked soils,
modest quality, much refuse.

5. Crop loss in Germany during World War I, 1914-1918: productivity
of major food crops and the outcome of the war
Starving the civilian population was one of the instruments of war during
World War I. In this aspect the Allies were more successful than the Central
Forces led by Germany. Germany had bad luck as the weather during the war
was generally unfavourable to agriculture. Mobilisation of men and horses,
combined with shortage of manure and fertilisers, reduced agricultural
production. Lack of human care enhanced plant diseases and pests. Plant
diseases and pests, in turn, greatly reduced yields of the main starch crops.
Some 700,000 Germans died of hunger and corollary disease. The fighting
spirit of the German troops suffered greatly by the misery at home and
the poor food at the front. The highly developed, science-based German
agriculture failed to sustain the warring nation. The main culprit, however,
was neither weather nor plant disease but the complete disorganisation of
food production, food storage and food distribution, due to the utter neglect
of the nation’s food base by the military dreaming only of a rapid victory that
did not materialise.
‘In the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king and in what is beneficial to the
subjects his own benefit. What is dear to himself is not beneficial to the king, but what is dear
to the subjects is beneficial (to him).’
Kauţilīya arthaśāstra, Part II: 1.19.34 (Kangle, 1986).
‘Da dies alles fehlte, setzte mit Ausbruch des Krieges eine völlige Kopflosigkeit ein.’
As all this lacked a complete brainlessness set in with the outbreak of the war.
F. Aereboe (1927: 48) on agricultural policy and stocks of grain in ‘Der
Einfluss des Krieges auf die landwirtschaftliche Produktion in Deutschland’.
5.1. War and plant disease
War and plant disease form an unpopular combination largely neglected by the phytopathological
literature. There are exceptions. Vanderplank (1963) had the courage to write a chapter ‘Plant
disease in biological warfare’, a topical theme in the present period with anxiety of bioterrorism.
Horsfall & Cowling (1978) discussed the role of plant disease epidemics in human history under
two headings, ‘Impact of plant disease epidemics on war’ and ‘Impact of war on plant disease
epidemics’. One case was the blow that potato late blight dealt to Germany during the first
World War, 1914-1918. Apparently, they built their case on data provided by Carefoot & Sprott
(1967: 87), but that story368 painted only part of the picture.
Indeed, crop loss due to late blight during World War I contributed to Germany’s misery, but
there is more about it. This chapter is a non-exhaustive study of the crop protection problems,
and of some agricultural problems in general, of a country at war. It focuses on the major starch

Chapter 5
crops, potato, rye, and wheat. The easily accessible German phytopathological literature led
to only a few specific (e.g. potato late blight) and non-specific (e.g. ‘degeneration’ of potato)
diseases, and to several more general problems such as drought and voles. Supposedly, other
diseases such as ‘blackleg’ of potatoes were important but they were mentioned rarely in the
papers consulted.
The historical epidemiologist is interested in disentangling the factors that led to an epidemic,
both environmental and human factors, supposing that there is one (and only one) clearly
defined epidemic with one identifiable pathogen on one host crop. He might also be interested
in the consequences of such an epidemic on the human condition, expressed in conduct, distress,
or warfare. However, historical reality defies the natural scientist’s bias to reduce complex
situations to a one-to-one relationship. Accepting this challenge, I will try to disentangle ‘the
impact of war on plant disease epidemics’ and ‘the impact of plant disease epidemics on war’
in the case of Germany during World War I.
5.2. The war situation
5.2.1. General position
During World War I, 1914 to 1918369, two parties on the European scene attempted to starve
each other. One party, Great Britain, belonged to the ‘Allies’ with, among others, France, Russia
and, as of 1917, the United States of America. The other party, the ‘Central Powers’, was formed
primarily by imperial Germany and the Austrian-Hungarian double monarchy. War fronts existed
in western and eastern Europe, the Balkan, the Far East, the Near East, and Africa.
The war was not only a world war370 because of the many fighting arenas, but also because it
was explicitly directed towards the non-fighting civilian population by means of bombing open
cities and of intentional starvation of civilians. To this purpose Britain blockaded Germany by
closing the Channel and the North Sea, intercepting any overseas shipping to or from Germany.
Germany tried to blockade Britain by means of its submarines in the high seas, cutting off its
food imports. In the end, England was more successful than Germany.
Before World War I Germany was a constitutional monarchy, with a weak parliament and a
strong monarch, the Emperor Wilhelm II. It was also a conglomerate of numerous principalities
and a few free cities, all with their own jurisdictions. Foreign affairs and war were centralised
functions of state. Geographically Germany covered the area of the present Federal Republic of
Germany extended to the West with the Alsace and to the East with part of present Poland up
to the river Wisła (G: Weichsel), and to the North-East even beyond (East Prussia). Population
size (1913) was ~67 million persons (Meher, 1917).
Germany up to 1914 had a strongly protected, science-supported, highly productive

agriculture371. Nonetheless it imported wheat from Russia (including Ukraine) and the
Americas. Rye, produced in surplus, was exported ‘in exchange of wheat’ so to say.
Several other commodities had to be imported such as meat, fat and vegetable oils, all paid
by the export of industrial products. Germany produced large surpluses of potato that were
used as animal feed and as inputs for the alcohol and starch industries. The war changed this
situation drastically. Food imports rapidly decreased. Germany tried to become self-supporting

Crop loss in Germany during World War I, 1914-1918
but, unfortunately, the war situation imposed many restrictions on German agriculture372,
among which lack of labour, draught power, manure, fertilisers, and machinery. Gradually food
became scarce (Berthold, 1974).
Most able-bodied young men were called to arms373. The high wages in the war industry enticed
many farm workers. With so much work to be done by women, children and elderly an amazing
productivity was maintained. Lack of labour in agriculture is mentioned regularly (e.g. Fischer,
1915) but its effect seems limited since apparently the rural population had a surplus of labour.
The necessary work was done though its quality may have suffered. The large enterprises in
the East, employing hundred thousands of prisoners of war (Berthold, 1974), did better than
the small farmers. The latter often ploughed and planted in wet soil, a practice374 said to be
disastrous for the potato crop.
Draught power (horses, oxen) was reduced quantitatively, due to requisition of over one million
horses by the army, and qualitatively, due to lack of fodder and concentrates that decreased
the effectiveness of the remaining draught animals. Tillage was neglected more and more, with
increasing loss of soil fertility (Aereboe, 1927: 37). Weeds became an overwhelming problem
so that children brigades had to go weeding375. In 1917 and 1918, the military made draught
power available for field work in spring and autumn.
The number of livestock (horses, cattle, hogs) decreased gradually by slaughtering, thus
reducing available manure. In addition, the amount and quality of manure decreased by lack
of concentrates. Even green manure was deficient as the 1915 harvest of clover and serradella
(Ornithopus sativus) seed failed and the seed became too expensive376. The supply of fertilisers
decreased drastically. Potassium remained available and some phosphorus, but most nitrate and
phosphorus came from guano (Chile saltpetre) that was no longer available. Soils impoverished
in the course of the war years.
New machinery was not produced and spare parts of old machinery became scarce. Mechanics
for the maintenance of agricultural machinery were in the army and machinery gradually
broke down. Threshing was delayed by late delivery of fuel, lack of electricity, and absence of
spare parts; only the field mice rejoiced. The war industry needed supplies otherwise used in
agriculture, among which nitrate for explosives and copper for bullets.
5.2.2. Food policy
The military, convinced of their own superiority, expected the war to be of short duration377,
a few months only. No food had been stored in advance (Aereboe, 1927 p29). A rapid conquest
of large territories would ensure Germany’s food supply. This was a major miscalculation.
A technical reason was the limited stock of explosives made from imported nitrate, guano
primarily (Herzfeld, 1968: 259), a limitation removed by the timely development of the Haber-
Bosch procedure378, 1913, for the production of ammonia that was transformed into nitrate.
Little nitrate was available to agriculture (Kielmansegg, 1980: 171). The carelessness of the
military with respect to food security was such that the war department did not even employ
one agricultural scientist.
When the years of reality replaced the months of expectation several policy measures were
taken, often ineffective or even counter-productive, that need not be discussed here. The

Chapter 5
end result was a general decline of the agricultural production (Table 5.1) due to exhaustion
of soils, poor tillage, neglect of crop care, and weediness. The area under major food crops
decreased due to increased fallowing and shifts toward more profitable, non-starch crops.
National yields of major food crops, cereals and potatoes, went down by one third.
Science-based agriculture flourished with large estates in the east (present Poland) whereas
small farms dominated in the south and west. Though some minor efforts (see below) were
made agricultural science was unable to support the war economy. German agriculture was
unfortunate during the war years as it was plagued by adverse weather reducing the productivity
of the crops directly, either by drought or excess rain, or indirectly, by diseases.
Table 5.1. Germany’s production of rye, wheat and potato during the war years, 1914-1918.
At the time, Germany encompassed the Alsace and a sizeable part of present Poland. Total production in
millions of metric tonnes (M t’s) and in per cent of mean over 1908-1913, tonnes per hectare (t/ha), and
Millions of hectares (M ha). Data sources: Flemming (1978: 84). The M ha values were estimated from total
production and hectare yield. Note that Aereboe (1927: 86) and Berthold (1974: 92, 99, 101) stressed the
unreliability of the agricultural statistics in Germany during the first decades of the 20th century. According
to Flemming (1978: 81) harvest data were systematically 10-15 per cent too high. Nonetheless, the trend, as
shown by the data presented here, is clear.
Year(s) Rye Wheat Potato
M t’s % t/ha M ha M t’s % t/ha M ha M t’s % t/ha M ha
1908-13 11.2 100 1.8 6.2 4.1 100 2.1 2.0 45.9 100 13.8 3.3
1914 10.4 93 1.6 6.5 4.0 98 2.0 2.0 45.6 99 13.5 3.4
1915 9.2 82 1.4 6.6 3.9 95 1.9 2.1 54.0 118 15.1 3.6
1916 8.9 80 1.5 5.9 3.1 76 1.8 1.7 25.1 55 9.0 2.8
1917 7.0 63 1.3 5.4 2.3 56 1.5 1.6 34.9 76 13.7 2.5
1918 6.7 60 1.4 4.6 2.3 56 1.7 1.4 24.7 54 10.1 2.4
5.3. Agents of crop loss
5.3.1. Biotic and abiotic agents of loss
Agriculture had gradually learned to cope with all kinds of damaging agents causing crop loss.
The agricultural science of the time aimed primarily at good crop husbandry. Selection of
profitable varieties was ongoing but plant breeding was yet in its infancy. Crop protection as
a discipline did already exist but was not yet very effective. Soil and water management were
on their way. The phytopathological literature of the war years discussed only few pests and
diseases in sufficient detail to be referenced here.
Agriculture could deal with abiotic agents such as extreme cold or heat, and excess or lack
of water, up to a degree. When the excess was marked nothing could be done, as in the 1911
drought when yield loss of potato was over 20 per cent at national level (6 to 38 per cent at

provincial level; Schander, 1917: 146). When fall-sown crops were frozen in winter, spring crops
could be planted to reduce the losses.
The control of biotic agents, as far as possible, was primarily by means of good care, seed
selection, mechanical or even hand-weeding, crop rotation, and on-farm hygiene. Chemical
control was hardly existent, except against potato late blight and grape mildews. Chemical seed
disinfection was emerging (Schmidt, 1917: 69). Usually, weather related outbreaks of pests and
diseases could not be stopped.
An interesting feature is that several diseases considered important in recent times, among
which various foliar diseases of wheat, did not receive mention at the time though they were
already known. They may have been considered part of the normal farmer risk and not worthy
of attention. It is difficult to believe that they were not present at all 379.
5.3.2. Potato – degeneration
‘Degeneration’ was known since the 18th century380. The classical remedy was two-fold. First,
new and not-yet-infested genotypes could be grown from seed. Second, planting material
could be obtained from areas with relatively limited infestations such as the Eiffel Mountains
(Western part of Germany) and selected fields (Eastern part of Germany). In Germany, the
produce from fields with little infestation could be sold as seed potatoes. Degeneration (G:
Abbau) in potatoes was a major problem in Germany. Many studies were devoted to degeneration,
also known as ‘curl’ (G: Kräuselkrankheit). Appel (1906a,b) recognised ‘curl’ as a complex from
which he singled out a disease he called ‘leaf roll’ (G: Blattrollkrankheit), that had caused an
epidemic in 1905381.
Quanjer’s pioneering work, ultimately leading to the distinction of a number of different virus
diseases, was ignored or even rejected382. Quanjer (1921a) himself thought highly of German
potato research with the exception of degeneration studies that he dubbed ‘a hopeless failure’
(D: hopelooze mislukking, ibid.: 13). Quanjer (1921b) stated that ‘degeneration’ was a complex
syndrome from which he had already separated distinct diseases called ‘leaf-roll’, ‘mosaic’ and
‘crinckle’. He had taken these diseases, tentatively attributed to ultra-microscopic parasites,
in ‘pure culture’ (in planta, in living plants). In Germany, however, degeneration was seen as a
physiological disorder, probably soil-induced383, ‘heritable’ at best. The literature suggests a
‘not-invented-here’ attitude, leading to systematic disregard of foreign publications384.
Degeneration was especially common on the heavy soils of the Rhineland Province385.
Rhineland regularly imported seed potatoes from the Eiffel mountains, where healthy crops
grew in a slightly cooler and more windy climate, and later from Eastern Germany, where
good seed potatoes could be grown on light soils386. During the war the delivery of seed
potatoes was suspended387. Thus, Rhineland had to use home-grown seed potatoes which were
much degenerated. This degeneration became apparent as an increasingly open crop, with
missing plants. Many surviving plants produced leafroll-like and blackleg-like symptoms. The
symptomatology of leaf roll was well-established at the time (Appel, 1906a,b) but knowledge
of other plant viruses, and of their identification and epidemiology, was nascent at best.
Schander (1917) quoted an experiment, apparently performed near Bromberg, Pommerania (now
Bydgoszcz, Poland), with ‘original’ seed potatoes and their progeny. In the relatively good years

Chapter 5
1912 and 1913 the yield loss due to degeneration was some 46% (average of 12 varieties) and
in the war years 1915 and 1916 ~47% (average of 23 varieties). Schander (1917) also quoted an
experiment in which three generations of seed potatoes are compared simultaneously in 1916
(Table 5.2). After two generation the loss was ~37 percent 388. The ‘year effect’ was obvious.
Table 5.2. Yields of three generations of potato planted simultaneously in 1916. Data are means of 6 varieties.
From Schander (1917).
Generation Year of origin Yield in tonnes/ha
Original seed 1915 21.0

First generation 1914 20.2
Second generation 1913 13.1
5.3.3. Potato – late blight
The predominant idea in Germany was that late blight should be controlled by means of
resistance breeding389 rather than by spraying Bordeaux mixture. Schander, well aware of the
favourable effect of Bordeaux mixture390, thought treatment useful for the early and mid-late
varieties but not for the late varieties with their exuberant production of sprawling vines, then
and there, that made penetration of the crop by men, horses and equipment impracticable. In
the war years no treatments were applied because the necessary personnel and horses were
not available. Pulverisation (Souheur, 1892) had not been successful by lack of a suitable
compound. During the war the copper in the Bordeaux mixture was needed for bullet shells
and this may have been another, unmentionable, reason not to use Bordeaux mixture391 at a
time when it would have been most appropriate to do so.
The suggestion was made (Quanjer et al., 1920: 54; §3.2.5) that degeneration or curl made
potato plants more susceptible to late blight 392. Whether this is true or not, potato late blight
was the second problem in German potato cultivation.
5.4. A crop loss chronicle
In this chronicle the data are arranged according to harvest year. Weather systems sweep over
Europe north of the Alpine ranges and have similar effects in different countries. The prime
phytopathological example is the outbreak and rapid spread of potato late blight in 1845 and
the quite dissimilar epidemic of 1846 all over NW Europe, preceded and followed by the very
cold winters 1844/5 and 1846/7 (Chapter 3).
Weather data were taken to be more or less uniform over Germany. This is a very rough
approximation at best since Germany, 1914, stretched out over more than 14 degrees longitude
and 7 degrees latitude, approximately one thousand km in E-W and 800 km in N-S direction. The
simplification is justified by focussing on the pattern. Regional variations and localised events,
super-imposed on the general weather patterns, are not considered here.

Per year some dominant features of the weather are given, followed by damages to the main
starch crops, potato, wheat and rye (Figures 5.1A and B). A selection was made since only large
effects are relevant to this story. Unfortunately, the crop protection literature dealing with
the war period is not rich.
Figure 5.1. The 1916 weather in Bremen, NW Germany, as compared to a long-term average.
(A) Mean monthly temperature in °C in excess of the long term average. (B) Precipitation in mm per month
in excess of the long term average. (C) Number of rain days per month in excess of the long term average.
(D) Sunshine in hours per month in excess of the long term average. Original data: Ritter (1917), long-term
average not specified.
5.4.1. 1914 – the rust year
Weather. The relatively mild winter 1913-14 allowed the over-wintering of yellow stripe rust
and voles. Winter wetness and snow in March favoured Fusarium snow mould and foot rot in rye
in the Rhine Province, Westfalia and Pommerania (Schmidt, 1917: 68/9). A dry spring caused a
crusty soil and hence a delay of the spring-sown crops. The summer was warm (Zimmermann,
1916a).
Potato. The potatoes had relatively much late blight and bacterial rot (Anonymous, 1916), but
the potato production in 1914 was about normal, with some ‘blackleg’393 in the Austrian areas
(Kornauth, 1915).

Chapter 5
Cereals. The wheat crop, harvested just before the outbreak of the war, suffered severe
attacks by yellow stripe rust 394 (Puccinia striiformis Westend.). Rust infections extended from
NE Netherlands through Germany, well into Austria and present Czech Republic and modern
Poland395, where it was exceptionally severe in Silesia, in the area of Bromberg (present
Bydgoszcz, Poland). In Saxony, district Halle, the winter wheat suffered losses in the order
of 20 per cent. In N Germany spring wheat was retarded and became subject to a yellow rust
epidemic. The effect of disease on yield is not clear but, since imports of wheat were incidental
at best, losses must have weighed heavily.
An outbreak of voles, probably with the common vole (Microtus arvalis Pall.) as the main culprit,
occurred in 1914, sometimes in clover396 but also in wheat, where it could be devastating. In
1914, voles were quite active in various parts of Europe, as in the Ukraine where some 11,000
ha of wheat was completely destroyed (Rossikow, 1916). An unusually severe outbreak occurred
in W Prussia397 and Poznań (present Poland), from spring to fall 398. Control was possible in
principle399 but labour-intensive, and probably received little attention in 1914. The fall-sown
rye in Mecklenburg suffered from vole and slug damage, and from a sudden November frost
(Zimmermann, 1916b).
5.4.2. 1915 – the drought year
Weather. The early summer of 1915 was extremely dry, the drought causing great losses in
cereals and some damage to potato. Mommsen (1995 p688) stated explicitly ‘harvest failure’,
whereas Kielmansegg (1980: 1777) called the harvest ‘not very good’. Grain harvests were bad
in Hungary, 1915 (Hirschfeld et al., 2003: 461).
Potato. The early summer of 1915 was very dry and the rains toward the end of June came too
late for a good yield of the early varieties. The late varieties did extremely well. ‘Gipfelrollen’
(‘top roll’) occurred frequently. Schander (1917: 154) describe ‘top roll’ elaborately without
suggesting a causal agent. Probably he saw Verticillium wilt caused by V. albo-atrum and/or V.
dahliae. Early and severe frosts occurred over large areas in N Germany on 21 September and
following days. In the end, a bumper crop yielded at least twice the amount needed400. Possibly,
it was a good year for aphids and virus spread401, with some after-effects402 in 1916.
Storage became the great problem (Löhr vom Wachendorf, 1954: 114/5). The government,
having confiscated most of the produce, had taken the responsibility for storage but it had
no appropriate storage facilities. Railway carriages were used to store the potatoes; many
potatoes were frozen during the winter, and lost. Cellars of town halls and schools were filled
with potatoes. These, stored at too high temperatures, gradually began to rot. In the spring
of 1916 the stench became unbearable and the school kids had to stay at home with ‘stench
vacation’ (G: Stinkeferien). The dirty mess had to be cleared, the precious food was gone, and
the enormous surplus had evaporated by a ‘nearly criminal waste’403.
So far, I did not find independent information on these storage losses. Schander404 provided
indirect evidence when discussing the need of drying potatoes before storing them in cellars;
he stated ‘In the year 1916 [but preceding the 1916 harvest] hundreds of tonnes of potatoes
[of the 1915 harvest] could have been saved and utilised for human consumption, when the
drying had begun in time’. Probably, harvest time had been rainy, with tuber infection by late
blight and bacterial pathogens. Early in 1916 farmers kept lots of potatoes in store to feed

their animals (Kielmansegg, 1980: 178). Farmers, of course, knew how to store potatoes but the
authorities in their superior wisdom followed their own fancy405.
Cereals. The rye crops in Mecklenburg, some already damaged in the preceding fall, suffered from
alternating freezing and thawing in March, so that serious harvest failures occurred (Zimmermann,
1916b). The wet winter of 1914-15 led to severe Fusarium406 problems in Pommerania (present
NW Poland). Fusarium was exceptionally frequent in Bavaria (Schmidt, 1917). Drought caused a
loss of cereal production estimated at 20 to 25 per cent of the ‘normal’ yield. The drought during
early summer caused many crop failures in cereals (Schander, 1917: 154).
5.4.3. 1916 – the blight year
Weather. Spring and early summer 1916 were cool and moist, with many rain-days, but without
excessive precipitation. Ritter (1917) in Bremen gave a phenological description of the year
1916. Spring was exceptionally early (~14 days). In contrast, late summer was slightly retarded
(~4 days), whereas the fall was very early again (~13 days). Temperatures were about normal
except for a warm January and a cold June. May was wet and the months July through September
were dry. The year was poor in sunshine with a deficit of 289 hours. The number of sunshine
hours per month was very low in March and in the months May through August. The number
of rain-days per month was above normal with peaks in January and June (Figure 5.1). The
weather, generally wet and dull, had a serious impact on agricultural production. 1916 was a
bad crop year in England, the Netherlands, and Germany407.
Potato. A Potato Ordnance (G: Kartoffelverordnung) required the farmers to save as many tubers
as possible for human consumption (G: Saatgutsparnis; Schander, 1917: 165). Several methods
were available. (1) The archaic practice of cutting seed potatoes in two or more parts was
revived in 1916. The practice was attractive since the tubers harvested from healthy 1915
crops were few but large. Under favourable, warm and not too wet conditions the practice did
not cause problems but it was disastrous in the cold and wet spring of 1916, leading to many
diseased and missing plants (Table 5.3). (2) Wide planting was often applied but caused yield
reductions (Table 5.4). (3) Small seed tubers were planted, a practice without much risk of loss
when the tubers are really ripe and disease-free, but very risky when they are not fully ripened
and/or diseased. Method (1) was not frequently used and had little effect on national yield, but
methods (2) and (3) were more common and may have contributed to the harvest failure408.
May and June showed typical April weather, leading to slow and late emergence of the 1916 crop.
Seed potatoes that were cut or blighted suffered most and often did not emerge at all. Crops
remained open and tuber formation was delayed. These problems were more serious with early
Table 5.3. Schander’s 1916 experiment with halved tubers versus intact tubers, the tuber halves and the intact
tubers being equal in weight. From Schander (1917).
Tubers Yield in tonnes/ha Missing plants % Yield loss %
Intact 24.4 2.5 -

Halved 15.1 22.5 38

Chapter 5
Table 5.4. Schander’s 1916 experiment at Kleschewo on planting distances. No additional specifics given. One
Zentner per Morgen = 196.1 kg/ha. From Schander (1917).
Variety Yield in Zentner/Morgen at planting distance Loss
Wide Narrow %
Wohltmann 132 117 11

Imperator 92 70 24
Ella 109 103 5
Industry 123 109 11
Mean 114 100 12
plantings and on heavy soils, late plantings faring much better. Later, frequent rain showers
caused severe crusting of the soil under the open crops, notwithstanding regular ridging.
Schander (1917) discussed a special problem, the quality of seed potatoes for the 1916 planting.
The early summer of 1915 had been excessively dry and the potato crops had shown specific
symptoms, indicated as ‘top roll’ (G: Gipfelrollen). Varieties differed in drought sensitivity, the
mid-late varieties suffering most. The late development of many 1915 potato crops, with poor
ripening, supposedly had a negative effect on the quality of the seed potatoes planted in
1916 (Kuhn, 1918). Indeed, many seed potatoes were found to be diseased, leading to open
stands. Holdefleisz (1917) added another thought. In Saxony, district Halle, he observed great
differences between potato crops, even on one field or farm. Some crops hardly emerged. As
large and apparently good seed tubers often produced miserable crops the variation was, again,
attributed to seed potato quality. Holdefleisz suggested that the severe September night frosts,
that killed many stands right-a-way in 1915, had damaged the tubers to the degree that they
could hardly produce sprouts and shoots409.
Remy (1916: 818), working in W Germany (Bonn), complained that the ‘seed potato supply, so
exceptionally difficult due to the war’, had caused a nasty situation in the Rhine districts.
Schander (1917: 150), stationed in the east410, confirmed the existence of an ‘export restriction’,
a regulation limiting the usual shipping of seed potatoes from east to west411. Remy thought
that this official measure was the major cause of the potato harvest failure in W Germany, 1916,
since the Rhine districts had been forced to use their own seed potatoes transmitting the feared
degeneration (G: Entarting, Abbau). The clay soils of the west were known to be conducive to
degeneration whereas the light soils of the east generally produced seed potatoes practically
free from it412. Maybe, the early and severe drought of 1915 stimulated the multiplication of
aphids and hence the transmission of virus413, with effects becoming visible only in the next
year, 1916.
The potato season 1916 was disastrous with potato late blight (Phytophthora infestans (Mont.)
Berk.) as the most conspicuous cause of disaster. As most of the summer was cool and cloudy
with a rainfall that was not excessive but regular (a high number of rain days), the conditions
for a late blight epidemic were ideal. Warming up in July, 1916, the weather remained wet,
creating perfect conditions for late blight and also for bacterial blackleg414. Early and mid-late
crops were ruined and yields reduced to 50%, at times even to 25% of the expected value. In

many fields the early and mid-late potatoes were not worth lifting. Sometimes, only nut-sized
potatoes were produced415. Differences in disease severity occurred between locations, soils
and varieties, as usual. The damage by late blight was more severe than usual416 because of the
growth retardation during the early summer. In E Germany leaf roll417 was rare but ‘black leg’,
in a generic sense, and ‘Gipfelrollen’ were common, varying according to the provenance of the
seed potatoes (Schander, 1918: 157).
Schander (1917) went into the effects of war conditions, the lack of draught power, labour, and
manure. In 1916 the large estates in the east managed somehow to plant at the right time and
in the right way. The small farmers there often ploughed when the soil was wet and planted
before the soil had dried sufficiently, to the detriment of the potato crop. The modest quality
of the seed potatoes used for the 1916 crop was thought to have only a limited effect, at least
in the eastern part of the country, though wide planting distances, halved seed potatoes and
too small seed potatoes might have reduced yields. Schander, however, concluded that ‘natural
causes’ explained the harvest failure. These reduced early potato growth and stimulated disease
development, especially of black leg and late blight. ‘Degeneration’ was not mentioned in the
final conclusions. In the end, the author gave little weight to war-induced limitations of potato
cultivation, at least in the eastern part of Germany418.
Cereals. Wheat diseases were common because of the low temperatures in early summer419.
A yellow stripe rust epidemic hit the wheat, as in 1914, but its quantitative effects are not
clear420. In Prussia (present Poland) the rust was sometimes more local than general, as in
Bohemia (present Czeckia). In the district Halle yellow rust was unusually heavy, and losses
varied from 5 to 20 per cent with extremes up to 50 per cent. Curiously, yellow rust was severe on
rye in Moravia (in present Czeckia) and N Lower Austria, and noteworthy on rye in West Prussia
(Chapter 2). This yellow rust epidemic on rye was probably the last ever on rye. In Mecklenburg
vole damage in cereals was very severe and at places the crop was lost (Zimmermann, 1916b).
5.4.4. 1917 – the frost year
Weather. Severe and prolonged frosts in early 1917 were disastrous in Germany, as in the
Netherlands, for a variety of reasons. The waterways were frozen for a long time so that
transportation and distribution of coal for heating and of food were hampered for months, to
the distress of the civilian population421. Railways were overburdened.
Many fall-sown crops were winter-killed. Spring tillage had to be done hurriedly as the spring
arrived late. On heavy soils severe crust formation impeded the usual tillage operations
(Schander, 1918: 205). The retarded spring ended in an intensive drought lasting well into July.
The spring crops that had been planted in time showed a good early growth422. The summer of
1917 was clear and dry, and crops were harvested late. Though summer weather was favourable
many cereal crops suffered from drought423.
Potato. The long winter and very dry spring caused delays in planting, even up to 20 June, and
in crop emergence. Strong crust formation impeded ridging. Late blight appeared late, mid
September 1917, this year on the late varieties only. In the Berlin area, however, most of the
potato plants were diseased424. Due to the late growing season the tubers had insufficient time
to ripen. The tubers remained loose-skinned leading to storage problems. Leaf roll appeared

Chapter 5
in pure form, but not so frequently, and few other diseases occurred. These notes refer to NE
Germany primarily425. For Germany as a whole potato yields were relatively good426.
Cereals. Winter damage in wheat and rye was considerable, as in Bavaria and E Prussia427. Due
to drought up to mid-July the grain harvest was low428, especially in Prussia. Little evidence
of loss was found except for the gross figure in Table 5.1, indicating that the productivity of
cereals in tonnes per ha reached its war-time low in 1917.
5.4.5. 1918 – the meagre year
Weather. The 1918 weather was about normal, with a mild winter and rather cool and dry spring
and summer.
Potato. The 1918 potato yields were nearly as miserable as those of 1916 (Table 5.1). I did
not find a specific explanation. I tend to believe that the well-known war effects, lack of
equipment, draught power, labour and manure, to which might be added a waning human energy
with flagging interest in crop care, explain the poor harvest results.
Cereals. In the fall of 1917 voles in rye became a problem in just emerged fall-sown rye in
Thuringia429. Only in the large fields some crop was left in the middle the field430. The fall-sown
rye had become very frost-sensitive due to Fusarium infection of seed and seedlings during the
cool and wet summer of 1917 and the late 1917 harvest431. It is not clear whether the damaged
1918 crops were thin only, or lost completely.
S Germany suffered a serious outbreak of voles that caused great damage in spring and early
summer, mainly in Saxony and Thuringia but also in Baden, Bavaria, and Württemberg (Schwarz,
1919). In Moravia (present Czeckia) great damage to cereals was done over 18,000 ha by the
corn ground beetle432.
Comment. The cultivation areas of wheat, rye and potatoes had been strongly reduced. Yields
of wheat and rye were rather low and of potato very low (Table 5.1), probably due to lack of
fertilisers and inadequate crop care.
5.5. Food security in Germany
The Allies were successful with their blockade of Germany at sea. The political pressure exerted
by Great Britain on the neutral countries, among which the Netherlands, became so strong that
they gradually stopped exporting to Germany433 (Chapter 4). Within Germany supply to the
army had, of course, priority but toward the end of the war even the soldiers went hungry.
The German authorities issued several orders to regulate food production and distribution.
The results were disastrous. Delivery problems were frequent leading to long queues in front
of the shops. The black markets flourished and became a ‘second economy’434. Lack of draught
power and labour induced farmers to grow less labour-intensive crops that did not contribute
much to food production. When fertilisers and manure were not available they often preferred
fallowing their land; the productive area was reduced by ~16 per cent (4 million hectares)
(Flemming, 1978: 84; Table 5.1).

Consumers woke up after the first sudden increase of food prices, December, 1914. The food
situation deteriorated continuously (Flemming, 1978: 78). No wonder that strong animosity
arose between townspeople and farmers435, a feeling that became increasingly confounded
with a deepening political fissure between ‘left’ in the cities and ‘right’ on the countryside.
In the Netherlands, in contrast, the city dwellers’ appreciation of farmers increased during
the war (§4.5.4). The government produced over-regulation, bureaucracy, inefficiency, ruled
against the farmers’ interests, and led people into a dead alley (Hirschfeld, 2003: 237). The
‘fully incomprehensible economic and pricing policy’ was blamed436. A solid German agricultural
economist described the agricultural policy as ‘complete brainlessness’437.
German food policy was catastrophic. Even the nationalistic Honkamp complained in 1918
about ‘inhibitive official measures’438. The first public demonstration, with food rather than
peace as the issue, was in 1915439, followed by strikes. Imports of food commodities, e.g.
potatoes from the Netherlands and grain from Romania440, had little impact. Poor weather
enhanced the result of an evident neglect of food production by the Central Powers, and the
blockade did the rest.
The winter 1916-17 was a hunger winter known as the ‘swedes winter’ (G: Steckrübenwinter)441.
The scarcity was primarily due to poor harvests, but failure of the price regulation system
induced farmers to feed potatoes to their animals or sell it to distilleries rather than to the
authorities (Mommsen, 1995: 686) or to the craving population. Excess deaths due to hunger
were considerable. An official communication442 entitled ‘Hunger in Germany due to the British
sea blockade’ read:
‘According to calculations only 130 grams of protein and 1344 calories were available per
person per day in de big cities in 1916, whereas 2569 are desirable, that is about half. In
the spring of 1917 the quantities were reduced to 30 grams and 1100 calories. The increase
of deaths among the German population amounted to 9.5% in 1915, 14% in 1916, 32% in
1917, and 37 % in 1918. Among children from 6 to 15 years old the increase of deaths was
55%. Accordingly, the Home Department calculated the death sacrifices of the blockade at
260,000 in 1917, 294,000 in 1918 and 763,000 in total over 1915 through 1918.’
The people suffered heavily and the public support for the war, at the onset very positive,
decreased accordingly. The awkward plight of civilians was aptly sketched in the bestseller
novel by Remarque443. The fighting spirit of the soldiers diminished at the thought of the
suffering of the folks at home. Aereboe stated444 ‘Correct is only, that the difficulties in feeding
the people at the front and in the country after all have broken the stamina of the German
people’.
In most cases deaths by famine and by infectious disease accompanying famine cannot be
distinguished (Dyson & Ó Gráda, 2002). Fortunately, medical care in Germany was so good
that, though infectious diseases popped up occasionally, epidemics could be prevented. Under-
nourishment favoured morbidity by pulmonary tuberculosis445 and mortality by influenza,
especially in 1918. The death rate of children (not infants) increased by 50 per cent, over-
all morbidity of children by the usual child diseases decreased but child morbidity due to
tuberculosis and rachitis increased in the cities446.
The food situation in Austrian-Hungarian double monarchy and other ‘Central Powers’ was not
better than in Germany (Bruckmüller, 2001). The lack of equity in the access to food led to

Chapter 5
unrest, protest actions, and strikes447. Excess deaths of civilians amounted to 400,000 (Audoin-
Rouzeau, 2003). Similar figures (300,000) were quoted for Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia.
Generally speaking, the various countries composing the Central Powers underwent the same
fate as Germany suffering want and hunger, disorder and disorganisation. The Central Powers
shared military affairs, not food (Siney, 1957: 257). Famines occurred in Galicia (today sprawled
over the border Poland-Ukraine) and N Italy, areas then under Austrian rule (Hirschfeld et al.,
2003: 565).
In 1917 the USA entered the war and changed the balance of power among the warring parties.
In Germany and its associated countries political unrest led to changes in governments.
Starvation and hunger undermined the morale of the civilians and, hence, of the soldiers448.
Germany’s military supremacy broke down in 1917 but the final armistice was delayed until
November 11th in 1918. The Peace Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919.
5.6. Conclusions
Limiting449 myself to the German ‘Kaiserreich’, to three starch crops (rye, wheat, potato), and to
plant protection problems mainly, I arrive at the following points.
1. World War I had a strong impact on plant protection affairs in Germany, due to lack of labour,
crop care, draught power, planting material, fertilisers, and pesticides. War does indeed
affect plant disease epidemics.
2. Plant protection problems did affect the course of World War I, contributing to food
scarcity, causing malnutrition, hunger and famine, and thus reducing the fighting spirit of
the soldiers and the endurance of the German people. Plant disease and pest epidemics do
affect warfare.
3. Potato late blight conducted its own ‘Blitzkrieg’ in 1916, reduced yields, spoiled storages,
and thus added to the starvation of the German people, together with other potato diseases
(bacterial blackleg is a candidate) and with pests and diseases of cereals.
4. Late blight and ‘degeneration’ of potato, epidemic diseases of cereals, outbreaks of voles,
and possibly other pests and diseases should, at least in part, be seen as symptoms of
one societal syndrome, the gradual but inevitable collapse of a well-organised agricultural
production system, due as much to incredible mismanagement as to war scarcities.
5. As to the weather, Germany had bad luck. Honcamp450 complained rightly ‘… that during
all of the war … the weather god has not chosen sides with us …’.
6. History has few one-to-one relationships. During World War I plant disease was important,
impressive even, but not in itself decisive. It was but one of the many factors affecting the
outcome of the war.
7. Poor governance deepened an inevitable food crisis that killed at least 700,000 people in
Germany and a similar number in the other Central Powers.

6. Impact of plant disease epidemics on society, under-rated or over-
estimated?
The foregoing chapters taught that a one-to-one relationship between a

plant disease epidemic and a social event of historical significance is rare.
The impact of plant disease epidemics on society may be underrated or
overestimated. Two examples of each case are given. Underestimation is
exemplified by the epidemics of ergot on rye, in France, 1789, and Russia,
1722. The first case might have contributed to the French Revolution of 1789.
The second case led to an historical non-event. Examples of overestimation
are the association of black stem rust on wheat with the Russian Famine,
1932/3, and of brown spot on rice with the Bengal Famine, 1943.
‘Les souverains peuvent avoir plus ou moins de puissance, mais ils ont partout les mêmes devoirs.’
The monarchs can have more or less power, but they have the same obligations everywhere.
Malesherbes to King Louis XV, Remonstrance451 of 18 February 1771 (Badinter, 1978).
‘According to the unwritten compact between king and people, in return for their submission,
the king promised to assure them their subsistence.’
S.L. Kaplan (1982: 66) on 18th century France.
‘Au roi de bonté et de charité, les paysans opposent tous ceux dont ils supportent la domination et
les prédations, et d’abord les seigneurs «sans cesse occupés de sucer leur sang»’.
To the king of goodness and charity, the farmers oppose all those of whom they undergo the
domination and the predations, and first the landowners ‘continuously engaged in sucking
their blood’.
Furet & Ozouf (1988: 106) on the preparations for the French elections of 1789.
6.1. Plant disease epidemics and societal disruption
A plant disease epidemic, could it lead to a devastating famine, the fury of a revolution, a lost
war, the implosion of a governmental system, the collapse of an organised society? Or should
we think of a plant disease epidemic as a symptom only of a society already disintegrating and
sliding downhill?
Both views are attractive in their simplicity. In the period covered by the Chapters1-5 little
could be done to stop an epidemic once it was on its way. Where people depended on a single
crop hunger and starvation were inevitable. Such dependence was in itself a symptom of
societal distortion, as in Ireland and in the Bommelerwaard (in the Netherlands), 1845/6. The
occurrence of epidemics on two major food crops, rye (Chapter 2) and potato (Chapter 3) in one
year – 1846 – was really a stroke of bad luck. A well-organised society might attenuate the ill
consequences of an epidemic by opening food stores, importing grain, regulating food prices,
forbidding hoarding and speculation, and so on. All this was done in 1845/6, sometimes too late
and always too little. The rural masses could hardly be reached. Several governments, unable

Chapter 6
to cope with the emergency, imploded. The epidemics were among the proximate causes of the
implosion but the ultimate causes had little to do with agriculture (Chapter 3).
During World War I the weather gods took side against Germany but neither did they spare the
Netherlands. The German government made a mess of food security (Chapter 5); the Dutch
government muddled through and did not do so badly (Chapter 4). The neutral Netherlands had
the foresight to store grain (e.g. rice) in advance but belligerent Germany expected to take food
from the areas conquered in a brief war. In both countries plant diseases made their impact
on major starch crops, in Germany more than in the Netherlands, but there is little evidence of
decisive epidemics.
It seems as if plant pathologists experience difficulties to value the societal effects of plant
disease epidemics, sometimes jumping at conclusions and either under-rating the effects of
‘their’ epidemics or over-estimating them. The present chapter provides two examples of each
case in a tentative manner as the necessary documentation is not (yet?) available.
6.2. Plant disease and the Great French Revolution, 1789
6.2.1. Unrest in 18th century France
For rural France the 1780s were a miserable period with poor weather, meagre harvests, and
wide-spread social unrest. Taxes weighed heavily upon the French peasants, among which
land rent in money or in kind, the King’s rights, the Church’s tithes, import/export duties at
provincial borders, levies to enter town or market place, tolls at the many turnpikes, milling
rights, and the hated ‘Gabelle’, the tax on salt. Needless to say that the nobility and the Church,
both rich in land, enjoyed tax exemption.
Peasants were not free to move. Many were, in fact, serfs. They were obliged to work a certain
number of days per year for the landowner. The latter enjoyed hunting rights. The hunters could
chase through the crop, even when ripe for harvesting, without compensating the farmers.
The humiliations were difficult to bear. Discontent was general, disturbances were frequent.
In years when food was really scarce just before harvest people became panicky, rumours flew
over the countryside, and a curious kind of ‘fear’ (F: peur) arose, a panic (as also in 1845/6,
Chapter 3).
The harvest of 1788 had failed in France, and had been poor in most of W Europe. The winter
1788-89 had been unusually severe (Figure 6.1; Le Roy Ladurie, 1967: 621). Food scarcity
reigned and people were discontented. The increase of the food prices and the decrease of job
opportunity for labourers and artisans led to unrest and strikes, as e.g. in Germany (Dirlmeijer,
1995: 232). In the Netherlands bread prices had to be regulated and even subsidised in 1789
(Anonymous, 1789).
In France the situation was worse. The rural poor lived under horrible conditions (Goubert,
1974). The French had to import grain from the Baltic area, by way of Amsterdam, for ‘the in high
revolution fever burning Paris’ (Brugmans, 1937: 28). This transit trade was much against the
wish of the Dutch populace that was in serious need of grain too, but the weakening of France
was politically welcome to the Dutch Republic.

Impact of plant disease epidemics on society, under-rated or over-estimated?
Figure 6.1. The Frost Index for the Netherlands in years 1770-1790 (IJnsen, 1981).
The value for e.g. 1780 should be read as the value for the winter 1799/80. The winter 1788/89 was extremely
cold, the winter 1789/90 was mild. Horizontal – years. Vertical – Frost Index (ranging from 0 to 100).
In several districts of France the wheat had been extremely affected by bunt during the years
1784-87, to the degree that threshers fell ill, even died, due to the dust of the bunt spores
(Rozier, 1809: 488). The 1788 harvest had been so bad that food shortages appeared on the
country-side in September already (Lefèbvre, 1932). Where the townsfolk may have had enough
money to buy food, scarcity reigned in the rural areas. After the severe winter 1788-89 people
must have been desperate. Bands of errant beggars appeared, the ‘poor of the night’. Standing
crops had to be guarded, lest the corn be stolen before ripening, ‘cut green’ (F: coupé en vert).
In the towns the poor rioted in the spring of 1789. The grain harvest of 1789 was bad again,
two thirds of normal or even less452.
6.2.2. The Great Fear
Fear spread over the country. Farmers feared beggars and robbers. Armoured bands roamed
about. Townspeople feared country people, vice versa. Paris feared the provinces, nobles feared
the king. Farmers hated the nobles, who lacked cash and tried to squeeze money out of them.
Nobles feared the farmers, who refused to pay the inordinately high taxes. In the end, the
‘people scared itself’ (F: le peuple se faisait peur à lui-même), in a way hardly imaginable today.
The army weakened and anarchy grew. Towns, villages and individuals took to arms, the alarm
clock (F: tocsin) was in readiness. Autosuggestion played a role in nightly panics that built
up gradually into local ‘fears’ as of May, 1789. A xenophobia arose and rumours about foreign
troops began to circulate. The aristocracy was thought to plot with foreign powers. The nobles
were suspected to hire errant men. Aristocrats mistrusted their servants and several fled to
neighbour countries. Meanwhile the bread became so expensive that new insurgencies burst
out in July, 1789, the ‘grain troubles’ (F: troubles frumentaires).
The situation was highly inflammable. King Louis XVI was in fear too. The state had run out of
money and it was not feasible to raise taxes once more. In his anxiety the king had summoned
the States General, to meet on 15 May 1798, for the first time since 1614. They consisted of

Chapter 6
three States (F: États) or chambers, nobility, church, and bourgeoisie. The peasants and other
country folks, the Fourth State so to say, were not represented, of course not.
While the gentlemen at Versailles, near Paris, were discussing the reorganisation of the French
state the panic on the countryside reached its boiling point when everybody became afraid of
everybody else. People took to arms, guns, scythes, pitch-forks, or sticks with stones tied on.
A lonely wanderer in the twilight could arouse a village alert. Women and children left their
homes to hide in the forest, taking along some food and a few valuables. A group of cattle in
the dark was seen as a band of dreaded ‘brigands’, ready to attack the hamlet. An ordinary fear
became the ‘Great Fear’ (F: la Grande Peur) of the French historians (Lefèbvre, 1932).
There was, also, serious rioting. A few castles were set in flames. Several tax archives were
destroyed by infuriated peasants. The gentlemen assembling in Versailles, nobles, clergymen,
and bourgeois, panicked in turn. Progress had been slow but in face of the ‘danger’ the
congregants experienced a shake-up.
On 14 July 1789 the Paris rabble had stormed the Bastille, the hated prison-castle downtown
(presently, 14 July is National Day of France). The king, deeply impressed, became more
positively inclined toward some of the revolutionary ideas. Information about the rural panic
and the various disturbances in the country was, of course, received in Versailles. In response,
the Constituante (Constituent Meeting) decided in the night of 4 to 5 August to abolish the
feudal system, including serfdom, and privileges of clergy and nobility. This was a crucial step
in a lengthy process called ‘The French revolution’.
In times of want such fears, fed by a ‘famine plot persuasion’ (Kaplan, 1982), were not uncommon
in France. But when does a ‘common fear’ pass into a ‘Great Fear’? When the state, the king, the
nobility ran out of cash and could no longer press money out of murmuring if not mutinying
peasants? When the government, loosing its grip on state affairs, collapsed? When everybody
turned against everybody, often with weapons at hand? Suddenly, beginning ~20 July, a panic
spread over most of France, sometimes as fast as a horse could gallop. The Great Fear had a few
focal points from where it spread in various directions453. What happened?
Comes in Matossian (1989), the historian who studied food poisoning by naturally occurring
fungi. She reasoned that ergotism made the French rural population so suggestible that an
‘ordinary ‘fear’ changed into the ‘Great Fear’. Here I recall some of her points. (1) The weather in
the early summer of 1789 had been very favourable for ergot on rye. (2) The Great Fear occurred
only where rye was the main crop. The areas with maize, potato, or buckwheat as main crops
remained unaffected. (3) Miscarriage and mental illness were unusually frequent during the
summer of 1789. (4) The spread of the panic showed a pattern, with a number of foci that is
difficult to explain. Its N to S movement may be associated with the pattern of the rye trade,
infested rye from N France being carted southward (ibid.: 84). Curiously, Barger (1931), the
ergot specialist, did not mention 1789 on his list of typical ergot years. Bouchard (1972: 101),
chronicler of ergot stricken Sologne in MW France, mentioned 1789 only as a year with poor
grain harvests.
Matossian (1989: 82ff) combed the literature for ergotism in 1789. Her harvest was meagre but
positive454. There was much ergot in N France and in parts of England, and a case of ergotism
in N Italy. In some areas of France miscarriage was frequent during the summer months, a more

pertinent sign of ergotism. One physician ‘chronicled a marked deterioration in public health
in the second half of July’ that he attributed to the consumption of ‘bad flour’. In Paris a clear
increase of nervous diseases in the second half of July was attributed, again, to ‘bad bread’.
The timing of the Great Fear relative to the grain harvest is of interest. It was harvest time, a
capital date in rural life (F: ‘date capitale de la vie rurale’; Furet & Richet, 1973: 86). Unfortunately,
few precise data were found. In the Dauphiné the stewards of the estates considered the Great
Fear an undesirable interruption of the work [harvesting?] on the land (Palou, 1955: 53). In the
Poitiers the Great Fear interrupted fieldwork at harvest time, 28 July, in one place; in another
place the panic began at the peak of the grain harvest (F: en pleine moisson; Diné, 1951: 118,
122). These tiny bits of information are not incompatible with the idea that unripe, ergoted rye
had been eaten just before the outbreak of the Great Fear.
Matossian (1989: 87) summarised her findings: ‘it appears likely that certain ergot alkaloids
created a suggestible state of mind among the rye-eating populations’. Cultural factors would
then shape the associated visions such as ‘brigands coming to steal crops’. She concludes ‘The
Great Fear of 1789 was among the last of the bizarre events in European history that may be
explained by food poisoning’455. Ergotism may have been instrumental in the shift from an
‘ordinary fear’ to the ‘Great Fear’. Thus it may have lead to the famous ‘oath at the fives-court’,
sworn by the parliamentarians at Versailles in the night of 4 to 5 August, to abolish the ‘Ancien
Régime’.
6.2.3. Studies on ergotism
The history of ergotism, reaching back for millennia, has been rendered by among others Barger
(1931) and Chaumartin (1946). The European population was struck by terrible epidemics
time and again. The poor suffered most. The two major forms are gangrenous (Box 6.1) and
convulsive ergotism. France has been plagued by ergotism from the Middle Ages onwards.
Intuitive knowledge linking symptoms to ergot existed, without scientific proof. A more solid
link between the symptoms of ergotism and the ergot of rye was laid around 1670 by a French
country physician named Thuiller (Carefoot & Sprott, 1967: 24), but his ideas had not been
accepted by everybody. Present knowledge on ergot is summarised in Boxes 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
Box 6.1. Symptoms of gangrenous ergotism as described by Tessier in 1776 (Bouchard, 1972: 112/3; own
translation).
‘The sick persons, especially those better off, experienced headaches and stomach pains during the
first two to three days. The fever came, they all felt painful fatigues in the lower extremities. These
parts swelled up without apparent inflammation; they became rigid, cold and pale, and gangrened.
Sometimes they oozed a stinking cruelty, or drops of blackish blood; sometimes worms were formed
[?]. Ordinarily, a narrow band of light inflammation was above the gangrene, where it was bounded,
and where later on the limb was separated by itself. The gangrene began at the centre of the part,
and only appeared on the skin a long time after. The toes fell off first and successively all the joints
detached. The upper extremities, though more rarely, underwent the same fate. Unlucky persons were
seen whom nothing remained but the trunk, and who survived another few days in that state. The
limbs detached by themselves without bleeding. It happened sometimes, that in stead of detaching,
they emaciated, and detached without falling apart in dust. The persons affected by that disease were
stupefied; they had a swollen belly, a light and rapid pulse.’

Chapter 6
Box 6.2. The life-cycle of ergot, caused by the fungus Claviceps purpurea Tul. Data from Butler & Jones
(1955).
The life cycle of ergot (Figure 6.2) has been elucidated primarily by the Tulasne brothers (1853: 45).
Ergot is caused by a fungus that infects the inflorescences of various grasses and cereals. On rye it
appears in its most conspicuous stage as sclerotia, black kernels ~10-25 mm long and 5-8 mm wide,
replacing rye kernels in the ears. In rye, usually 1-2 sclerotia per ear are found. These sclerotia ripen at
the same time as the kernels. The ripe sclerotia fall to the ground or they are ‘harvested’ with the grain.
If no precautions are taken they are milled with the grain or sown with the rye seed in early fall.
Sclerotia on or in the ground easily overwinter, resisting severe cold. In the spring, when favourable
conditions prevail (Box 6.3), sclerotia on or just under the soil surface germinate. They produce ~6
club-shaped stalks of 5-25 mm long (called clavae) with a pink cap (a stroma) in which perithecia are
formed that produce ascospores after ~6 days.
The ascospores are extruded as a viscid mass allowing dispersal by rain splash or insects, or
alternatively they are produced dry and forcibly ejected up to 20 mm high to be dispersed by turbulent
air. Ascospore production is somehow synchronised with early anthesis. Open rye florets remain
infectable up to ~14 days. Ears just flowering are the most vulnerable.
The ascospores land and germinate on the young stigmata of the rye florets, the primary infection. A
germ tube grows toward the ovarium where it forms a mycelium that produces ‘honeydew’, a sweetish,
sticky, yellow fluid loaded with conidiospores. The honeydew attracts insects that disperse the spores
from floret to floret and from ear to ear, thus causing secondary infection. The spores can be splash-
dispersed during rain showers. They can also be mechanically transmitted from ear to ear by direct
contact. The conidiospores germinate and infect the ovarium that is converted into a sclerotium
(called ergot) colouring from white over orange-red to purplish black.
Field edges bordering verges with infected grasses and low lying humid parts of the rye field are the
most vulnerable parts of the field. Irregular crops, sown too thin or damaged by frost, are particularly
at risk because infectable young ears appear over a prolonged period.
The fungus has various races of which some attack rye. Among the rye-infecting races exist strains
with different alkaloid content, varying according to geographic area and historical period. Some
strains cause gangrene in humans, others cause convulsive ergotism. Rarely a strain causes both
types of ergotism.

Figure 6.2. Ergot on rye – Claviceps purpurea (Fr.) Tul. From J.B. F. Bulliard (1791), Herbier de la France.
Seconde division. Histoire des champignons de la France. II. Paris, Didot. Plate 111.
A. Spikelet. E…F. Various shapes of ergot.
B. Spikelet, one flower removed. M. Flowering spike.
C. Ovary N. Spike [ripe] with good kernels and ergots.
D. Kernel, two sides.

Chapter 6
Box 6.3. Environmental conditions favouring ergot infection on rye and ergot control (Data from Butler
& Jones, 1955 and others).
Environmental conditions
Sclerotia A moist environment in the preceding fall.
Winter damage creating an open crop with great variation in flowering time of
main, secondary, and late tillers.
Germination Moist spring with minimum temperature ~11 °C and maximum temperature of
~18 °C.
Ascospores Extrusion requires high humidity, RH >77%.
Dispersal by insects, rain splash, and by direct ejection and turbulent air
stream.
Conidia Production during cool and moist weather, RH ≥74%, Temp ≤13-15 °C.
Dispersal by insects, rain splash, or direct contact.
Control
Use healthy seed Eliminate sclerotia by hand-picking or brining.
With hand-picking fragments of broken sclerotia may be missed.
With brining in salt water floating sclerotia are removed, sunken rye kernels are
washed and dried.
Use old seed; sclerotia age and become ineffective within 2-3 years.
Avoid infection Early mowing of field borders, especially in wet, sheltered places, removes ergot
on grasses that can infect rye.
Rotation, 2-3 years without rye eliminates infective sclerotia left in the soil.
Deep-ploughing buries infective sclerotia.
Crop husbandry Produce a rather dense, regular crop.
A dense crop hampers dispersal of ascospores, but may further dispersal of
conidia.
A regular crop with all ears heading and flowering at the same time reduces the
infectable period of the rye.
Don’t use growth regulators.
The French Royal Society of Medicine, wanting to bring the confusion around ergot and ergotism
to an end, requested father Tessier, professor of Medicine at the Sorbonne, Paris, to study the
problem and write a report. Tessier went to Sologne in July 1777. He reported the results of
his studies e.g. in his treatise on cereal diseases (Tessier, 1783). Sologne is the district south
of Orléans, between the rivers Loire and Cher. It is a sandy area, generally humid, with large
forests and many ponds. The inhabitants, the Solognese, were poor and always had too little
to eat, though their diet was varied. They ripened late and died early, suffering annually from
intestinal diseases and malaria (Bouchard, 1972).
Sologne was known as the area with endemic ergotism. ‘The inhabitants of Sologne, where
the gangrenous disease occurred most frequently, and where the ergot is more abundant than
elsewhere, live, during the first three months following the harvest, only on bread made from
rye, the bran included’456. The Solognese knew the relationship between ergot and disease
(Bouchard, 1972: 105) but did little about it, out of indifference but also for a technical
reason. Ergots in rye, if not lost during harvesting, could be hand-picked because of their

Box 6.4. The effects of ergot poisoning in humans. Data collated from Matossian (1989), Van Genderen
et al. (1996), and Wikipedia.
Ergots contain 0.02-1 per cent alkaloids of the indol-alkaloid type, the ergolines. Ergolines usually
have two parts, a lysergic acid amide and an amino acid. Lysergic acid is the base material for the
production of lysergid or LSD. Some 30 different ergoline molecules are known.
A dose of 5-10 g of fresh ergot kills an adult person. The no-toxic-effect-level is 0.1 mg per kg body
weight. The no-intervention-level is 1 ppm.
Ergotamine leads to vasoconstriction. Ergometrine leads to contraction of the uterus. Hence, ergot
was used in medicine to stem bleeding after child birth. By the same token it can be used as a birth
inducer and as an abortive. Ergot has also been used to correct hypotonia at morning rising.
Ergot enters the food chain when the sclerotia have not been eliminated before milling the rye. This
happens by, sometimes criminal, negligence or by the hurry to get food after a summer period of
scarcity.
Symptoms of ergot poisoning vary considerably. Light symptoms are indicated as itching of the skin
(G: Kriebelkrankheit). Acute poisoning affects the central nervous system, with vomiting, headache,
confusion, hallucinations, fear, convulsion, and unconsciousnous (convulsive ergotism).
Chronic poisoning leads to vasoconstriction, ischaemia (cold skin), heavy pain in hands and feet
(Saint Anthony’s fire). Severe poisoning leads to gangrene (gangrenous ergotism, Box 6.1).
colour (purplish black) and size (up to one inch). The Solognese version of ergot, however, used
to be of the same size as the rye kernels (Tessier, 1783: 25) so that mechanical removal was
hardly feasible. The alternative, brining the grain in salt water and floating the ergots (the rye
kernels would sink) was out of reach as salt was heavily taxed and expensive. Sologne was a
well-chosen study area.
6.2.4. Tessier’s studies
Many grasses were ergoted but among the cereals it was mainly rye (Bulliard, 1783: 49). Linnaeus
(1751: 243) classified ergot (L: clavus) as a plant disease without further comment. Fabricius
(1774: 48) ranked ergot under Class V ‘Injury’, Genus II ‘Galls’, thinking it the result of an insect
puncture, a current idea at the time. Darwin (1800: 322) correctly thought ergot to be an
‘internal disease’457. The educated people of the 18th century knew about the relationship
between ergot and the ‘itching disease’ (G: Kriebelkrankheit), some with a certain degree of
disbelief458.
If the 17th century was the age of classification the 18th century was the age of experimentation.
H.-A. Tessier (1741-1837), physician and agronomist, reviewed the already extensive literature
on ergotism (Tessier, 1783). He was dissatisfied with the quality of the experiments recorded
so far. No starting conditions were specified, no controls were available, and no witnesses
were called in. The results were contradictory. Tessier began a series of agronomical and
toxicological experiments.
The appearance of ergot on rye varied somewhat per region. The rye in Sologne usually had
rather small ergots, four to five per ear, sometimes ten to twelve, rarely twenty. The secondary
tillers of winter rye, smaller and damper, had more ergot that primary tillers. Tessier459 knew

Chapter 6
that the amount of ergot varied according to season and locality, more in humid places and
on fields recently reclaimed after fallowing. The year 1777 was wet with much and 1780 dry
with little ergot. Frequent ploughing reduced the risk of ergot. Whereas ‘méteil’, the mixture of
wheat and rye had relatively less ergot than rye pure, ‘hyvernache’, a mixture of rye and vetch
had more, the rye roots kept moist by the vetch.
Tessier had seen the shiny, viscous, sweet sap on the ears, with the taste of honey, even on the
glumes that enclosed nascent ergots. He observed the honeydew, but he was not sure about its
meaning since he saw ergot also on ears without honeydew. Tessier noticed the white substance
replacing the rye kernel that became a cockspur-like, violet ergot eight days later. He measured
the growth rate of ergots as ~2 mm per day.
For the causation of ergot Tessier quoted several explanations but he wanted facts, not
reasoning. So he performed various experiments. He punctured flowers with a pointed knife,
without result; thus he excluded puncturing insects as a cause. He tested various soils and
different irrigation regimes. The poorer the soil and the wetter, the more ergot he obtained. In
his 1780 experiment (the dry year) the irrigated plot, measuring 1.20x5.12 m2, produced eight
times more ergot than the dry plot; he made no replications. Watering the ears did not promote
ergot. He concluded that ergot was due to the wetness of the soil. A [further] explanation of
ergot was unknown and unnecessary, he declared.
The results of toxicological experiments published so far were confusing and had to be repeated.
Tessier performed several experiments, sometimes repeating those of predecessors, but taking
extra precautions such as using animals of different species, healthy, in their prime, in good
accommodations, with good care, and he invited witnesses. Dosages were up to one quarter
ergot, as with humans. A duck fed with ergot died within a week, a turkey needed three weeks
to die, one hog six and another hog 10 weeks. A six weeks old hog died with convulsions after
three weeks. A strong hog of six months old did not like his ergoted porridge but ate it. Five
days later he had red eyes, on day 13 he was dizzy, on day 69 he died with convulsions. A young
dog disliked his ergoted porridge too much and did not die460.
Whereas the experimental animals were healthy at the start the Solognese people were ill-
fed and weak (Bouchard, 1972: 108), and breathed noxious vapours461. The disease was not
contagious, affecting men more than women. With ergotism pregnant women aborted and
nursing women dried up. The disease killed; of the 120 patients in the hospital of the town
Orléans only four to five recovered462.
Tessier was well aware of the medical applications of ergot, though somewhat sceptical, inducing
or precipitating childbirth, staunching the flow of blood. The use of ergot as an abortive was
a well-known secret. The Reverend Berkeley (1860: 66) commented primly ‘Ergoted grain,
however, which ows its origin to a closely allied Fungus [Cordiceps], is a most valuable medicine
in the hands of the regular practitioner, though often grievously abused from the specific
action on the womb’.
The proposition that ergotism changed the existing ‘fear’ into a ‘Great Fear’ is attractive. In
times of want the rye was harvested prematurely, dried, threshed, and eaten, ergots and all,
the bread often inadequately baked. The timing of the Great Fear fits, approximately, with the
harvest time of rye in France.

6.2.5. Conclusions
1. The evidence for ergot and ergotism in 1789 is scanty but Matossian’s reasoning remains
attractive. Except, maybe, in Sologne the symptoms of ergotism appeared to be mild, with
mental stress primarily.
2. The frequent observation in 1789 that a local community was affected instantaneously and
as a whole points to ergotism, as do the visions, hallucinations, and fears on record.
3. A relatively mild intoxication by ergot in July, around harvest time, may have made the
difference between an ‘ordinary fear’ and the ‘Great Fear’ of 1789.
4. The Bastille in Paris had been stormed on 14 July and the Great Revolution was already on
its way. The Great Fear, and hence ergot, seems to have been instrumental in speeding up
the revolutionary process.
5. If so, a plant disease contributed to a sudden and unexpected political phenomenon, the
decision of the States in the night of 3 to 4 August 1789 to abolish the privileges, among
which tax exemption and serfdom, of church and nobility.
6.3. The war that did not happen, 1722
Peter the Great (1672-1725), Czar of all Russians, was a visionary man. He wanted to modernise
the then quite backward Russia, opening his self-contained country to the West. He needed
access to seaports for trade. To this purpose he successfully fought the Swedes and in 1703
he founded St Petersburg, on the river Newa, looking West over the Baltic Sea. At the time
Russia had no free access to the Mediterranean or the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire stood
in its way.
In 1722 Czar Peter assembled a large army near Astrakhan, where the Wolga discharged into
the Caspian Sea. The plan was to march along the Caucasus and to attack the Ottomans in the
rear. Some 25,000 troops were ready to go. The army, men and horses, had to be fed. Rye was
carted in from a large area, the fresh harvest of 1722. Then, the unexpected happened. Men and
horses fell ill, with terrible convulsions. Death followed soon and many men who survived lost
hands, feet, or even limbs. The disease was not contagious but the losses were so severe that
the campaign had to be cancelled.
Czar Peter had the case investigated by the German physician Schober, who published a note in
1723463. The ambassador of France at Moscow, Mr Campredor, mentioned the case to the French
ruler King Louis XIV in a letter dated 29 January 1723 (Barger, 1931: 80/1; Box 6.5).
Two independent witnesses gave a description that leads to one conclusion only, ergotism! It was
a case of acute poisoning by freshly harvested ergot. At harvest time the toxin concentration
is at its highest. Apparently, the 1722 poisoning caused the gangrenous and convulsive forms
simultaneously, as occurred a few times more in Russia (Barger, 1931: 81)464. Ergot did the army
in. The Ottoman Empire was saved. Had the Czar been successful, the political maps of Europe
and the Near East would have been very different from their present state.
The Russian side of the story has a different ring465. The ‘Persian campaign’ of 1722-23 under
the command of Peter I had the objective ‘to help the peoples of Transcaucasia to liberate
themselves from Iranian domination, establish Russia’s trade relations with the Orient, and
prevent Turkish aggression in Transcaucasia.’ In July 1722 the Russian army, with 22,000

Chapter 6
Box 6.5. From a letter by embassador Campredor to Louis XIV, King of France (from Barger, 1931: 80/1;
own translation).
‘I believe that the Czar is too prudent to engage in a war that would considerably reduce his forces,
whatever success that war could have. All the cavalry, he had brought to Astrakan, is ruined, and his
finances are in a very poor state. The bad harvest of the past year [1722], the prodigal quantity of grain
perished on the Caspian Sea, will make the provision of the stores difficult, and over twenty thousand
persons died already around Nijny [Novgorod?] due to the scarcity. First it was thought that it was the
plague, but the physicians who had been sent, have reported after a very precise examination that
this disease was not contagious, that she came forth only from the bad grain, that the men have eaten.
It was reddish and rather resembles the [intoxicating] ryegrass [Lolium temulentum L.], having been
spoilt, as is thought by poisonous fogs. The persons, the moment they have eaten from this bread,
had become dizzy, with great contractions of nerves, so that those, who did not die that day, have lost
their hands and feet, that fell off, as happens in this country, when those limbs are frozen. None of the
remedies, applied with infectious diseases, did work on the patients, and only those who had taken
good food and eaten different bread, have escaped. The dissertation which the doctors have made
at this occasion, is quite interesting, and if I can get a copy, I will have the honour to send it to Your
Eminence. Well, as this disease can have odious consequences, by the difficulty to find good rye for
the subsistence of the inhabitants and of an army and by the quantity of the bad [corn], ordered to be
burnt and that for the rest the events of a war against the Turks could weaken suddenly and without
resources the forces and the consideration of the Czar, it is evident, at least up to the present, that
the movements, that he did make his troops, have as the prime motive only to show off to the Turkish
envoy who is induced to proceed very slowly.’
infantrymen, joined by about 22,000 cavalrymen, moved into S Dagestan. ‘In the fall, heavy
storms disrupted the supply of the Russian troops, and Peter I was forced to abandon the
campaign on Baku and returned to Astrakhan ...’ ‘The success of the Russian troops and the
Turkish invasion of Transcaucasia in the spring of 1723 forced the Iranian government on
September 12 to conclude the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1723’, giving up a wide territory
among which Baku.
An event of historical dimension, a clash between Russian Orthodox and Ottoman Muslim
armies, did not happen466. The rest is silence.
6.4. Black rust of wheat and the Russian famine of 1932-1933
6.4.1. The epidemic of 1932
In 1932, a severe epidemic of black stem rust (Puccinia graminis f.sp. tritici) devastated the
wheat crops in many East European countries. This epidemic is well documented (Hogg et al.,
1969; Scheibe, 1933; Zadoks, 1965). It began in Bulgaria, strongly affected Romania (Savulescu,
1953: 144), spread westward through the Danube valley and eastward to the Ukraine, rounded
the Carpathian mountains and touched Poland, Germany and some Scandinavian countries. An
easy guess relates this epidemic to the Russian famine which peaked 1932-1933, with an excess
mortality of millions of people.

This extremely severe 1932-33 famine in the Soviet Union was studied in detail by Russia
specialists Davies & Wheatcroft (2004), who had access to the Russian archives. They did not
ignore the stem rust epidemic but gave it a footnote only. Far more important, in their view,
were the dekulakisation (R: kulak = prosperous farmer467) and the collectivisation, imposed
upon Russian and Ukrainian agriculture and forced through in a very short time. The communist
rulers knew next to nothing about agriculture and they destroyed the existing infra-structure
without establishing an adequate new one. Farmers hardly cooperated.
Everything went wrong in 1931 and 1932. The 1931 weather was unfavourable with summer
drought and so much rain in the fall that the potatoes could not be lifted. Seed was delivered
too late. Hence the wheat sowing was delayed. Several wheat diseases, among which primarily
rusts, insects and weeds could damage the crops. Supposedly, the severe black rust epidemic
of 1932 struck the Soviet Union heavily. Elements contributing to the severity were retarded
delivery of seed in the fall, a late and cool spring, delays in sowing spring wheat due to poor
weather, and heavy summer rains. The Central Russian Plateau near Kursk was hard hit, possibly
because of its somewhat higher altitude (>200 m), which might have delayed ripening so much
that an extra generation of rust could develop in comparison to its lower surroundings.
As a pathologist I was inclined to see the rust as the proximate and major cause of distress but
this view is contested.
6.4.2. Industrialisation of Russian agriculture
At the time, the Soviet Union went through a period of spasmodic change. Industrialisation
was imposed at a high rate as was collectivisation of agriculture (Davies & Wheatcroft, 2004).
Peasants were forced into collectivisation. Some 2 million people were expelled from their
lands. Those who resisted were punished, often by deportation. The rate of change was so high
that agriculture became completely disorganised. Compulsory area extension conflicted with
necessary crop rotation, and led to reduced yields. Draught power failed since horses died by
lack of feed, and they were not replaced in time by tractors. The quality of tillage was poor, too
late, and/or too superficial. Weed control was miserable. Voroshilov, member of the Politburo,
reported on 26 July 1932 that the North Caucasus gave ‘a depressing picture of the scandalous
infestation of the grain with weeds’, an impression confirmed by Western observers. Harvesting
was delayed by late ploughing and seeding, by rains, and by lack of machinery or draught power.
Finally the weather was not conducive to high grain yields.
Davies & Wheatcroft (2004: 434) clearly stated that the fundamental cause was the ‘unremitting
state pressure on rural resources’. ‘… Soviet leadership which was struggling with a famine
crisis which had been caused partly by their wrongheaded policies, but which was unexpected
and undesirable. …’. ‘They [the policies] were formulated by men with little formal education
and limited knowledge of agriculture’. ‘Above all, they were a consequence of the decision
to industrialise this peasant country at breakneck speed’. In short, the political pressures of
that particular period, with intentional societal disorganisation, were the ultimate cause of
the famine. The then current terminology was ‘machinations of class enemies and inefficient
organisation’. Biotic actors such as weeds, locusts and, maybe, rust were at best proximate
causes enhancing rather than triggering the crop losses.

Chapter 6
Yields were good in 1930, the last year before the collectivisation of agriculture. In 1931 the
grain yielded poorly, in part due to adverse weather. In 1932 yields were even worse, but in 1933
they recovered. Poor yields and disorganisation caused an incredibly severe rural famine, from
spring 1932 until harvest 1933, during which an estimated 5.7 million people died, especially
the children, the sick and the aged. Cases of cannibalism occurred by the hundreds. Apart from
the incredible suffering and despair of the population468, recruitment plummeted with long-
lasting effects, childbirth going down drastically in 1933. As usual with famines infectious
diseases, among which primarily typhus, took their toll.
The worst came in 1933, a rural famine in the main grain areas with mortality rates up to nine
times the ordinary rate (Volga area). The famine was too general and too bad to remedy. Russia
suffered immensely. According to the historians, it was intentional societal disorganisation
that was the ultimate cause of the famine. Plant disease was hardly thought instrumental and
it was not considered a proximate cause of the famine.
Today, I see good reason to invert the argument. The disorganisation led to such delays in crop
development that the wheat crops became an easy victim of the rust blown in from the SW.
6.4.3. Conclusions
1. In 1932 there was simultaneity of a wheat rust epidemic and the beginning of a famine.
2. The precipitated collectivisation of Russian agriculture caused an incredible disorganisation
of agriculture that led to poor crops and low yields.
3. The resulting famine was typically man-made and, according to some, intentional.
4. Delays in planting, crop development, and harvesting allowed the rust to intensify and
develop into a severe epidemic.
5. The black rust epidemic probably was an unintended outcome of intentional disorganisation
rather than the cause of the general distress.
6.5. Brown spot on rice and the Bengal Famine of 1943

6.5.1. Social order in Bengal
Bengal, presently Bangla Desh and the state of West Bengal in India, but in 1939-1945 a province
of British India, was a land of ease where life centred around rice. The social system was
relatively simple. Landlords, often dignified as king (B: rājā) ‘maintained legitimacy primarily
by fulfilling the conventional code of conduct deemed appropriate for kings (B: rājā-dharma)’.
The king maintained a ‘court’ and was indulgent to his subjects, the rice-producing tenants.
The tenants were expected to pay rents to the landlord and to show him deference. The landlord
was expected to protect the tenants and their dependents, to be indulgent, and to feed them
from his own stock in times of dearth (Greenough, 1982).
In this idealised picture the king was the ‘destined provider of subsistence’ (B: annadātā = rice
giver) for ‘dependent persons requiring nurture’. Among the dependents were the tenants, often
Muslims, but also the Brahmans, healers, astrologers, fortune tellers and caste genealogists.
The king, usually a Hindu, might give grants to Muslim scholars and privileged-tenure lands to
persons or institutions of great learning.

Not all authors share the rosy view of a relatively happy, decentralised society, only incidentally
affected by misfortune. In fact, the social situation had gradually deteriorated under the
pressure of imported capitalism. Bailey (1945) observed that peasants were ‘living perpetually
on the verge of starvation’, extremely poor, on holdings too small to make a decent living. One
major misfortune was associated with plant disease, the ‘Great Bengal Famine’ of 1943. Millions
of people died of starvation (1943) and of its corollary of infectious diseases, among which
cholera, malaria and smallpox. Estimates vary from 1.5 over 3 to 3.5 million excess deaths in
the years 1942 to 1946. A birth deficit was most marked in 1944 469.
6.5.2. Brown spot in 1942
The plant pathologist Padmanabhan (1973) was an eye witness of the 1943 starvation and
death when reporting for duty at Dacca in October, 1943, at about the peak of the famine. He
vividly depicted the cause of the Bengal Famine. The main rice crop, the aman crop harvested
toward the end of the year, failed in 1942, with losses of 50 per cent and more relative to the
1941 crop. Padmanabhan et al. (1948) described the disease in its normal, mild and relatively
harmless form and in its aggressive, epidemic form. He gave no explanation of the change from
the one form to the other470.
Padmanabhan (1973) studied the weather data of 1942. From September through November
rainfall, cloudiness, and humidity were higher than usual. Apparently the very dark and wet fall
of 1942 prompted widespread and severe occurrence of the causal fungus Helminthosporium
oryzae (Cochliobolus myabeanus) on rice in Bengal. This common fungus, causing the disease
called ‘brown spot’, is a relatively weak pathogen which seizes its opportunity when poor soil
condition and/or radiation deficiency hamper the growth of the rice (Klomp, 1977). Since
rice needs high light intensities to produce a good crop471 part of the damage might even be
ascribed to the radiation deficiency during that particular season472.
A comparison of yields from variety trials on two locations, with up to 23 varieties, showed
that losses during the epidemic season 1942 varied from 10 to 90 per cent relative to the yields
of the normal season 1941 (Padmanabhan, 1973). The data show convincingly that the disease
was present and damaging. These two trials, supposedly the worst affected ones, were part of a
network of trials (Tauger, 2003). Should we believe that the other trials were equally affected?
I don’t think so.
I would not have questioned Padmanabhan’s analysis of the immediate cause of the rice crop
failure if he had not mentioned himself that he was not on the spot in 1942. Padmanabhan
was a highly competent plant pathologist but his conclusion was based on the analysis of
observations from two experimental fields made by others. His detailed studies on losses due
to brown spot date from the years following the debacle.
In the treasure trove of rice diseases written by Ou (1985: 202) we read ‘The most dramatic
aspect of the disease so far recorded was that it was considered to be a major factor contributing
to the Bengal famine of 1942 (report of the Famine Inquiry headed by Sir John Woodhead, 1945),
the losses then amounting to 50-90% (Ghose et al., 1960; Padmanabhan, 1973).’ Unfortunately,
I had no access to information on the varieties grown in the farmers’ fields, the area covered
by each variety, the disease severity per variety, and the geographic extent of the diseased
varieties. Nor did I find detailed information on the effects of the radiation deficiency, the

Chapter 6
storms and the floods. What were the effects due to the lack of manure or fertiliser in times of
war (as in Chapters 4 and 5), or of reduced crop care during a period of trouble (as in Chapter 5)?
I have a suspicion that the loss figures began their own life foregoing reality. In fact, the 1942
āman or winter crop yielded ~83 per cent of the mean of the four preceding years, not enough
– of course – but not really bad473 (Sen, 1981: 52). Sen’s figures are contested. Goswami (1990)
estimated these losses 32 per cent relative to the foregoing year and 19 per cent relative to
the average of the last five years. In Box 6.6 I used Uppal’s (1884) data.
Box 6.6. Some quantitative considerations on the Bengal rice harvests in 1942.
Bengal statistics are confusing, to say the least474. Here I use data provided by Uppal (1984).
Bengal rice area in the years 1938-40 was 25 million acres or ~10.3 million hectares, yielding ~0.38
tonnes per acre or 0.964 tonnes/ha (ibid.: 73). Projecting these figures on 1942 we find a total rice
(paddy) yield of ~10 million tonnes, disregarding any mishaps. This figure approximates that quoted
for total rice production over 1942, 10.8 million tonnes (ibid.: 73). Presumably, the cyclone and disease
effects were incorporated in this figure. Bengal needed about 10 million tonnes per year (ibid.: 58).
The total amount of rice available in 1942 was ~10.1 million tonnes (ibid.: 73), ranking 1942 among the
three top years (all with >10 million tonnes) out of the last fifteen years. The population of Bengal in
1941 amounted to 60.3 million (ibid.: 54). Using this figure for 1942 the result is ~166 kg rice (paddy)
per person per year, including infants, children, adults, and elderly but excluding the military and the
hundreds of thousands of refugees from Burma. The 166 kg per person per year amount to 454 gram
paddy per person per day and 0.7 x 454 = 319 gram of milled rice per person per day, or ~1100 Calories
per person per day. Considering the sizeable imports of wheat, the 1100 Calories seem neither too
good nor too bad.
The area damaged by the cyclone was estimated at 3200 square miles (ibid.: 67), equal to ~830.000
ha. Assuming this area to incorporate open waters, roads, built areas and non-rice crops, I guess that
some 400,000 ha of paddy fields were lost, or 4 per cent of the total Bengal rice area. One source (ibid.:
67) stated the rice diseases caused more damage than the cyclone, say between 4 and 8 per cent loss
of paddy for all of Bengal.
This relatively modest loss estimate is very different from the percentages given by Padmanabhan
(1973), who probably selected the two worst affected trial fields among the many variety trials
scattered over Bengal with the intent to show the extremes of loss due to brown spot. It is plausible
that there were indeed many variety trials, as also suggested by Tauger (2003), and that the data from
the not-mentioned trials did not serve Padmanabhan’s purpose.
With the mental reservation that the Bengal statistics I could examine so far are rather confusing, I
conclude that both cyclone and disease must have been disastrous in certain areas, but that neither
cyclone nor disease can be held responsible for the wide-spread famine of 1943 following the
unsatisfactory but not too bad harvests of 1942.
Unfortunately, I haven’t found an independent testimony. Brennan (1988) mentions crop

failure, in part due to July rains that damaged the aus crop, a minor crop preceeding the aman
crop and harvested in September-October. The aus crop may have provided massive brown
spot inoculum for the aman crop. Other mishaps in 1942, exceptionally high floods and severe
cyclone damage in parts of Bengal, contributed to the crop failure475. Tauger (2003) brushed

up the importance of the disease, using Padmanabhan’s data, in an unwarranted extrapolation,

without offering new information.
6.5.3. Food availability and purchasing power
At first sight the present case is a straightforward example of a famine due to a plant pathogen.
However, there is more to it. In the exchange of telegrams and letters between the British and
the British Indian Governments cyclone and flood damage had been mentioned (Mansergh,
1973: 437) but not disease damage. Amarthya Sen (1981), Nobel Price Laureate in economics,
being in Calcutta as a 6-year old boy was another witness of the misery. He saw people dying
in front of well-stocked shops. Sen made a cool socio-economic ex post facto analysis. The total
amount of food in Bengal, 1942, had never been so large, he wrote, and ‘on average’ it would
have been sufficient to feed the population, even though imports from Burma and from other
Indian states had been cut off due to war conditions.
World War II raged from 1939 to1945. The Japanese troops, having conquered Burma, were
threatening India and the British Government of India had to think of war, displacement of
troops, and supplying the war machine. Thanks to all these unusual activities a war economy was
booming. A rampant inflation was fed by printing fresh bank notes. Rice prices sky-rocketed.
The price index in August 1943 was 536 with December 1941 as 100 (Sen, 1981: 66). At the same
time, disasters of different nature occurred, cyclone damage with high floods, local drought
affecting the jute production, and falling jute prices. In addition, local society was disrupted
by political strife, the ‘Quit India Movement’ in late 1942 (Brennan, 1998: 548).
Sen (1981: 52) and Greenough (1982) mentioned ‘a plant disease’ only in passing, rather for
completeness sake than as an explanatory variable. Both stated that the famine was ‘man-
made’. By error of judgement and serious mismanagement of the Bengal government, not to
mention corruption, the Bengal authorities could not prevent the famine. Measures taken by
the Administration to mitigate the famine had contrary effects, storage of rice and hoarding,
and price boosts. In fact, enough rice was available but the working class and the small farmers
could no longer pay the price. Calculations (Box 6.6) suggest that neither cyclone nor brown
spot disease could have caused the Bengal-wide famine of 1943.
The Bengal social system with gives and takes for landowners and their dependents, farmers
and otherwise, broke down completely because stocks and funds of the landowners dried up.
Landlords, no longer able or willing to feed their tenants, had to dismiss dependents and these
added to the hungry mass of landless labourers who, without a source of income, migrated in
search of food. Social disruption helps to explain the multitude of the landless, roaming about,
begging for food, starving and dying.
Indeed, the Bengal Famine was ‘man-made’476. Besides the incompetence of the Bengali
Government477 and the corruption within the administration, besides the unrest caused by
the war and by the national politics with forward-casting shadows of Partition (1947) and
Independence (1950), Greenough (1982) described another and underexposed man-made effect.
The time-honoured Bengali social system had cracked under pressure of imported capitalistic
attitudes. Now it broke down. Under unbearable stress even individual families were broken up.
So the ‘man-made’ effect occurred at two levels, the provincial government at the top and the

Chapter 6
landowners and tenant families at the base. Starvation reached its peak in November, 1943, at
about the time the bumper crop of 1943 was being harvested.
Landless labourers and small peasants, poor anyhow, who had lost their crop were left without
purchasing power. They could not buy whatever was available. India had a long tradition in
dealing with famines, a governmental Famine Code stemming from the 19th century. Famines in
one or another state belonged to the facts of Indian life. India was so large that usually food
could be brought in from elsewhere by truck and train, but it had to be paid. ‘Work for food’
programs were not unusual.
The British Government, struggling for the survival of Great Britain, could not spend much
attention to India. The Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell wrote in a letter to Prime-Minister
Churchill dated 24 October 1944 ‘the vital problems of India are being treated by His Majesty’s
Government with neglect, even sometimes with hostility and contempt’ (Sen, 1981: 97).
The situation was complicated because of the world-wide war and because in India political
events threw their shadows ahead, strife between Muslim and Hindu factions, struggle for
independence. The Partition between largely Hindu India and primarily Muslim Pakistan478
dates from 1947. The famine itself became part of the ammunition in the psychological warfare
between the nationalists and the British, which led to the independence of India in 1950.
6.5.4. Conclusions
1. The dark and wet fall in Bengal, 1942, may have reduced the rice yields and may have
sensitised the rice crop so that an epidemic of brown spot on rice could develop.
2. Indeed there was a serious outbreak of brown spot in the aman crop of 1942, but its severity,
extent, and impact on yield are not known. Dull weather, floods and cyclone damage may
have been more important than plant disease.
3. The brown spot epidemic of late 1942, preceding and associated with the Great Bengal
Famine of 1943, was not its immediate cause.
4. The real cause was poor governance. The famine was typically man-made.
6.6. An afterthought
The epidemiologist has the task to solve the riddles of an epidemic, caused by one pathogen
with one vector on one crop. Though fascinatingly complex in detail the issue itself is
straightforward, a one-to-one-to-one problem. The historian will try to describe and explain
the ‘human condition’, or some aspect thereof, finding a grand picture by piecing together
innumerable bits of evidence, and putting aside a hundred times more.
Whereas the epidemiologist hardly touches the human condition the historian has, often, little
eye for agricultural detail, let alone for phytopathological finesse. The historical epidemiologist
may try to link biological bits and pieces, that shape an epidemic, to the human condition that
manifests itself by phenomena such as famine, revolution, or war. The historical epidemiologist
should find his way through two scientific areas to collect his own scraps of evidence, having
put on his own blinkers to avoid distraction by interesting side-issues. The historian can reduce
a plant disease epidemic to a footnote under a dramatic episode of human history, and he has
obvious difficulties to handle something that did not happen, a non-event.

Remarkably, a historian – Matossian – unearthed the role of a plant disease in a drama of

decisive historical importance, the Great French Revolution of 1789, a supportive role rather
than the leading part (§6.2). Historians have little to tell about the military campaign of 1722
that may have failed because of a plant disease (§6.3). Once I believed that a plant disease was
a major player in the Russian Famine of 1932-33 (§6.4), but now I think it was an unfortunate
coincidence of an epidemic with the industrialisation of Russian agriculture. The general
neglect delayed the ripening of the wheat and enhanced the epidemic that might have added
to the food shortage. Similarly, a plant pathologist over-emphasised the contribution of a plant
disease to the Bengal Famine of 1943 (§6.5), whereas an economist reduced its importance to
a few side remarks only.
In all four cases the agricultural data are too poor to pass a final judgement. In all four cases
poor and sometimes even criminal governance enhanced the impact of plant disease. Obviously,
the rulers addressed in the introductory quotations failed miserably.

7. Postscriptum
The preceding chapters dealt with plant disease epidemics and tried to
connect agriculture and its frequent failures to human affairs at large. Poor
governance often aggravated the nefarious effects of plant disease epidemics
and good governance seldom mitigated them. From utter helplessness, as
in Chapter 1, to the refined but still not perfect crop protection of today
mankind covered much mileage along the road from poor to good governance,
promoting agricultural science and harnessing social science for the fight
against hunger. The end of the road is, however, not yet in sight.
‘… the grand essential to the exercise of royal government, a heart on the part of the Sovereign
impatient of the sufferings of the people, and eager to protect them and make them happy …’
(conversation with King Hsüan).
Mencius (Măng-Tsze) ~372-289 BC (Legge, 1970)
7.1. Food and politics
In the Western World of today, around the year 2000, food and agriculture have become non-
issues. Food is always available at the supermarket. The consumer’s main concern is the length
of the queue at the checkout.
Some 160 years ago, say 1850, food was a capital issue. The well-being and even the size of a
population depended on its food production, in a Malthusian way. Crops were threatened by all
kinds of natural phenomena among which bad weather – either too hot or to cold, too dry or too
wet – , volcanic eruptions, infestation by weeds, and outbreaks of pests and diseases.
To these natural phenomena should be added the man-made phenomena, the burden of taxation,
extortion, hunting rights, war, and poor governance. Food supply was insecure. Grain shipping
overseas – in sailing vessels – was relatively well-organised but grain transportation overland
– in bullock-drawn carts over muddy roads – was rather un-organised, awkward and risky.
Grain storage was far from perfect. Hoarding and speculation were common in times of want,
notwithstanding frequent prohibitions.
When scarcity and dearth reigned, the rank and file became rebellious. They reproached the
authorities of town and state to take inadequate care of the commoner and the poor. Local
risings were frequent, often with women in the forefront. Risings could lead to revolts, and
revolts to revolutions. In the past there were obvious links between adverse natural conditions,
economics, and politics.
7.2. Six capita
Towards the end of a career devoted to the study of plant disease epidemics I became intrigued
by these links, choosing epidemics as one species of natural phenomena causing disaster. The

Chapter 7
capita selecta of this book are tied together by a curiosity-driven, personal choice. Plant disease
epidemics come and go, as individuals sui generis (Gäumann, 1946). What is their place in the
course of human events? Imperceptibly a structure imposed itself.
Caput 1 reaches back to my high-school years and my fascination with the classics, Biblical,
Greek, and Latin. In the pre-scientific era, when calamities could not be understood in the way
we pretend to do now, the super-natural was nearby. No clear borderline between the natural
and the super-natural was seen. Fear and despair, hope and ambition were made manageable
by religion. Preachers interpreted calamities, including those due to rust and blight, as the
wrath of the gods shattered over mankind in punishment of disobedience. Where no remedy
was available people wanted to do at least something and turned to magic.
Caput 2 is a late echo of my most creative years, when imaginative principals stimulated me
to prepare a doctoral thesis (Zadoks, 1961) on yellow rust of wheat, covering half of Europe
in space and half a century in time. The calamitous year 1846 was a rust year. Wheat suffered
from an un-identified rust, possibly yellow rust, but the real problem was yellow rust on rye.
The epidemic was reconstructed, using many tiny bits of information, but the eastern wing of
the epidemic remained a bit nebulous. The effects of drought and rust, an unusual combination,
could not be sorted out satisfactorily. Their economic and social effects were overshadowed
by those of potato late blight.
As a career epidemiologist I could not resist the temptation to study potato late blight though
little came out of it. Caput 3 reflects my interest in the ‘potato murrain’ during the tumultuous
years 1845-1848.
Caput 3. Mencius, the Chinese sage quoted above, saw the Good Prince as key to human welfare,
based on a stable agriculture. Under a wise ruler, he believed, no harm will touch the crops.
This is, unfortunately, too good to be true. The ‘potato murrain’ appeared out of the blue in
1844, hitting hard in 1845 and 1846. No Good Prince could not have avoided the blow but, in
the modern disguise of Good Governance, he could have done more to mitigate its nefarious
effects on human affairs. Poor Governance ruined France in 1848. The Prince, King Louis
Philippe d’Orléans, lost his throne. The governments of Belgium and the Netherlands responded
immediately to the emergency of 1845 and, according to the standards of the time, adequately.
Belgium, then a new and energetic nation, went one step further in meeting the needs of its
people than the Netherlands, but neither country could prevent hunger and distress. We cannot
accuse these countries of poor governance but neither can we praise them for excellence in
the sense of Mencius.
The Capita 2 and 3 form a pair, as do the Capita 4 and 5.
Caput 4. Growing into adolescence during World War II, half-aware of scarcity and famine in
parts of the Netherlands, I became dedicated to agriculture. From Word War II my thoughts
went back to World War I. By chance I found out about my grandfather, then an Alderman of
Amsterdam, who had to face angry women demanding potatoes, not just food but potatoes.
What happened in Holland during that gruesome period, and what in neighbouring Germany?
Caput 5 sketches the complexities of feeding Germany, a country at war, successful in military
campaigns but isolated from the world. Though potato late blight was important in 1916, the

Postscriptum
blight was but one nasty event among several other agricultural mishaps. Mismanagement of
the food chain contributed to the distress of the people at home and in the end also of the
soldiers at the front. What was worse, the poor governance by Germany’s rulers or the arrogant
ignorance of the military in matters of food?
Caput 6. A plant disease epidemiologist, focused too much on ‘his’ epidemic, runs the risk of
becoming myopic. Linking the 1932-33 Russian Famine to the black stem rust epidemic of 1932
I fell into that trap. A prominent Indian scientist was similarly entrapped when connecting
the 1942 brown spot epidemic on rice to the Bengal Famine of 1943. Historians and economists
reduced the Russian rust epidemic to a footnote and the Bengal brown spot epidemic to a few
casual remarks. Poor Governance in the latter case and Criminal Governance in the former
caused human tragedies with millions of deaths. Poor Governance prepared the ground for the
French Revolution of 1789. The exasperation of the rural poor, possibly enhanced by ergotism,
culminated in la Grande Peur, the panic of 1789. The Prince, King Louis XVI, tried to be good
but his efforts were too late and too little. He lost his throne and his head. The Great French
Revolution changed the Western World profoundly.
7.3. Politics and food
Of old, farmers were practically helpless against the calamities that visited them time and
again, be it drought or flood, volcanic activity, war, or excessive exploitation. The ‘Good Prince’
supported his farmers, was trusted by his farmers, maintained law and order, organised public
works such as roads, irrigation and drainage systems, and – in exchange – took his share of
the produce with moderation. Good Princes were rare, but several are on record that opened
their stores to people in need. Joseph, Viceroy of Egypt, is the shining example of a Prince with
foresight (Genesis 41 and 47).
The science of crop protection was of little avail during the emergencies discussed in this volume
but farmers were not totally helpless. The lore and science of crop husbandry was developed
gradually. In the 18th century England took the lead. Early in the 19th century agricultural
science was remarkably well established in France. Later in the 19th century Germany took
over. New varieties of crops were selected, consciously or unconsciously. Chemical control
came into being in the course of the 19th century. Academics, government-paid, took the lead
in developing agricultural science. Toward the end of the 19th century governments became
interested and initiated agricultural research stations, a great step on the road toward Good
Governance (Koeman & Zadoks, 1999).
In the 20th century governments gradually came to recognise the power of agricultural
science, including crop protection science. Mankind learned – slowly – to control plant disease
epidemics by good husbandry, preventing them by genetics, and fighting them by chemistry.
The ill effects of such epidemics on humans can be attenuated by various social and economic
measures. Strategic reserves of grain were set up that contribute to the resilience of societies.
In the case of an emergency, international food-streams can be re-directed. Good Governance
has made progress indeed. Around the year 2000, nonetheless, many are hungry or under-
nourished. More work needs to be done. This task is, however, largely beyond the reach of
epidemiology.

Chapter 7
7.4. Final comments
Being a natural scientist I am not familiar with the rigorous methods of the historian who,
supposedly, digs deep into manuscripts, minutes of meetings, hand-written letters, throw-
away notes on scraps of paper, and contemporaneous newspapers. Formal publications were
the basic material of the studies presented here. Nonetheless, these provide new information,
unexpected combinations, or fresh criticism. A consistent overall view of the historical impact
of plant disease epidemics was beyond reach but a start has been made.
The results I offer to my family, friends and relations at the occasion of my eightieth birthday
with a feeling of gratitude that I have been allowed to work in and for agriculture, digging deep
into the challenging field of plant disease epidemiology, and sprawling out over the areas of
research, education, extension, administration and consultancy, within the narrow confines of
the Netherlands but also far beyond, in Europe, and in the world at large.

Acknowledgements
The kind invitation by the Swedish Agricultural University at Uppsala, 2005, to accept an
Honorary Doctorate from the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, was at the origin of this book. I
was requested to present my reflections on plant disease epidemiology to an educated public
unfamiliar with the details of my trade. The resulting two lectures now form the core of the
Chapters 3 and 6. Fascinated by the unexpected perspectives I continued my investigations.
My wife, Mrs J.C. van Heuven created a favourable environment to ruminate the subject matter
and write. She was an invaluable source of criticism and stimulation.
Professor P.C. Struik (Wageningen University) carefully read the manuscripts of several chapters
and provided valuable suggestions. Professor F.P.M. Govers (Wageningen University) critically
contributed to the Chapters 3, 4, and 5 on Phytophthora infestans.
Chapter 1. Several spokesmen participated in their youth in the field processions of the
Rogation Days, around World War II (1939-1945). Mr. B. Kruseman (Zeiss Planetarium, The
Hague) advised me in 1967 on the astronomical implications of celestial dates. Dr. L.B. van
der Meer (Leiden State University, the Netherlands) contributed by constructive criticism
and valuable suggestions. Professor Amos Dinoor, Hebrew University (Rehovot), gave useful
information. Mr. A.P. Zadoks critically read earlier versions of the manuscript.
Chapter 2. Professor Jonathan Yuen (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala)

kindly provided information on and translation of Swedish texts.
Chapter 3. Thanks are due to Dr. S. Savary (France) for many useful suggestions. Professor
Jonathan Yuen (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala) contributed valuable
information. Dr Pamela Anderson (CIP, Peru) showed a most stimulating interest in the subject
matter of this chapter.
This book could not have been written without the assistance of many libraries. The Dutch
libraries contain a wealth of old journals and books that can be found by means of the
computerised PICARTA system. The organisation of these libraries with their many sub-libraries,
spread out over numerous addresses, is somewhat confusing, and so that I mention only some
major libraries:
• The Library of Wageningen University and Research Center (WUR), its Special Collections,
and its former Crop Protection Centre Library in particular.
• The University Libraries of Amsterdam, Leiden, and Groningen.
• The Royal Library at The Hague.
• The libraries of the Netherlands Entomological Society at Amsterdam, the Amsterdam
Zoo ‘Artis Natura Magister’, the National Herbarium at Leiden, the Municipal Archive of
Amsterdam, the Peace Palace at the Hague, and Teylers Museum at Haarlem.

Publications by J.C. Zadoks relating to the history of plant disease
1961. Yellow rust on wheat, studies in epidemiology and physiologic specialization. Tijdschrift
over Plantenziekten (Netherlands Journal of Plant Pathology) 67: 69-256.
1965. Epidemiology of wheat rusts in Europe. FAO Plant Protection Bull. 13: 97-108.
1969. Hogg, W.H., Hounam, C.E., Mallik, A.K. & Z. – Meteorological factors affecting the
epidemiology of wheat rusts. World Meteorological Organization, Techn. Note No. 99,
Geneva, Switzerland: 143 pp.
1976. Z & Koster, L.M. – A historical survey of botanical epidemiology. A sketch of the
development of ideas in ecological phytopathology. Meded. Landbouwhogeschool,
Wageningen 76-12: 56 pp.
1981. Mr. DUHAMEL’s 1728 treatise on the violet root rot of saffron crocus: ‘Physical explanation
of a disease that perishes several plants in the Gastinois, and Saffron in particular’.
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool, Wageningen 81-7: 31 pp.
1984. Cereal rusts, dogs, and stars in Antiquity. Garcia de Orta, Ser. Est. Agron. Lisboa 9 (1982):
13-29.
1984. A quarter century of disease warning, 1958‑1983. Plant Disease 68: 352-355.
1985. Z & Bouwman, J.J. – Epidemiology in Europe, pp. 329-369. In: Roelfs, A.P., Bushnell, W.R.
(Eds.) The cereal rusts, Vol. II. Orlando, Academic Press. ca 600 pp.
1988. Twenty five years of botanical epidemiology. Philosophical Transactions Royal Society
London B 321: 377-387.
1991. A hundred and more years of plant protection in the Netherlands. Netherlands Journal
of Plant Pathology 97: 3-24.
1992. The partial past. Comments on the history of thinking about resistance of plants against
insects, nematodes, fungi, and other harmful agents, pp. 11-22. In: Th. Jacobs and J.E.
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Curriculum vitae
Jan C. Zadoks was born in Amsterdam, 1929. He studied biology at the University of Amsterdam.
He graduated in 1957, when he was a research officer at the Institute for Plant Protection
Research (IPO-DLO), Wageningen. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam in
1961, with honors, on a thesis ‘Yellow rust on wheat, studies in epidemiology and physiologic
specialisation’. He is married, and has four grown‑up children and five grandchildren.
In 1961, Jan Zadoks joined the Wageningen Agricultural University. He became full professor of
ecological plant pathology in 1969. He served 6 years as the honorary secretary of the Netherlands
Phytopathological Society, 2 years as the secretary of the University Curriculum Committee, 3
years as the Dean of the Wageningen Agricultural University, and 2 years as Vice-President +
2 years as President of the Biology Section of the Netherlands Science Foundation (NWO). He
served 3 years in the Pesticides Registration Board of The Netherlands. For 10 years he was a
member of the Committee on Genetic Modification COGEM (‘NGO Release Committee’) of The
Netherlands, with 5 years as chairman of the Subcommittee on Genetically Modified Plants.
He developed what was possibly the world’s first course with practical in ‘Plant disease
epidemiology’ and also courses in ‘Aerobiology’, ‘Crop loss’, ‘Genetics of resistance’ and ‘Plant
protection and society’. The first course led to Zadoks & Schein’s 1979 book ‘Epidemiology and
plant disease management’. He initiated several (inter)national post-graduate courses on dynamic
simulation in crop protection. Several post-graduates spent a sabbatical period with him. He
lectured in many countries and presented invitational key-note lectures in various assemblies.
He did research in stripe rust, leaf rust, glume blotch and speckled leaf blotch of wheat. His
1974 scale for growth stages of cereals (‘Decimal Code’) became UPOV and FAO standard. He
developed dynamic simulation in plant disease epidemiology, and initiated the development
of the computerised pest and disease warning system EPIPRE for wheat. Later, he was involved
in field studies, computer simulations and mathematical analyses of focus formation in plant
disease. He took an interest in the development of ‘alternative’ agriculture and edited the 1989
booklet ‘Development of farming systems, evaluation of the five-year period 1980-1984’. He
(co-)authored over 400 papers. He supervised over 40 Ph.D. theses and he served repeatedly
as an overseas external examiner.
Jan Zadoks had a strong interest in international agriculture. He founded the ‘European and
Mediterranean Cereal Rusts Foundation’ in 1969. He performed consultancy missions overseas
for FAO and for the Dutch and French governments (crop loss, resistance, IPM, teaching). He
was a Scientific Councillor to the French overseas research organisations ORSTOM in France and
IIRSDA in Ivory Coast. He participated in quinquennial reviews of DFPV, ICRISAT, IPO, IRHO, IRRI
and ITC. For 14 years, he was a member of the FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts for Integrated Pest
Control. He was a visiting professor at the University of Paris, France. He organised the XIIIth
International Plant Protection Congress, 1995, The Netherlands.
He received the ‘Adventurers in Agricultural Science Award of Distinction’, Washington

(1979), two Dutch Royal Awards for Public Merit (1980, officer in the ‘Order of Orange Nassau’;
1993, knight in the ‘Order of the Netherlands Lion’), and the Biannual Award of the Royal
Netherlands Phytopathological Society (2002). He was appointed a ‘Fellow’ of the American
Phytopathological Society in 1994, and he received an ‘honorary doctorate’ in agriculture from
the Swedish Agricultural University, 2005.

Notes
Chapter 1
1 E.g. the famine due to the siege of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, 2 Kings 25: 3 ‘And on the ninth day of
the fourth month the famine prevailed in the city, and there was no bread for the people on the land.’
2 E.g. locusts, one of the plagues of Egypt, Exodus 10: 12.
3 E.g. Amos 4: 9 ‘I have smitten you with blasting and mildew: …’
4 The present paper is a compilation with amendments of two earlier papers (Zadoks 1984a, 2007).
5 Magic involves a specific human act performed to obtain a specific material effect, in a one-to-one
relation, thought to be a causal relation; e.g. a typical rain dance to obtain rain during a prolonged
drought. Magic connects the earthly world with the transcendental world.
6 Compare Diamond (1997). Many species of wheat exist, with one to three sets of chromosomes, i.e. from
diploid to hexaploid. The term ‘wheat’ is used here for the cultivated crop, irrespective of species.
7 For speciation the co-evolution of the rust with its alternate host, on which the rust’s sexual stage
occurs, was as important as the co-evolution with its grass host (Wahl et al., 1984; Anikster & Wahl,
1979). For the evolution of black rust and its adaptation to wheat see Urban (1967), Urban & Marková
(1983) and Savile (1984).
8 Macrocyclic – the stem rust fungus goes through an annual cycle with five spore forms. The rust
overwinters in black pustules (telia) on wheat straw. Heteroecious – changing host plant species. In
spring the telia produce teliospores that infect barberry bushes (Berberis vulgaris L.). On the barberry
the rust produces first pycnidiospores and later aecidiospores (spring spores). The latter are wind-blown
to the grass lands and wheat crops on which they cause fox-red pustules loaded with urediniospores
(summer spores). This is the repetitive stage of the annual cycle with multiplication and dissemination,
so that an epidemic may build up if conditions are favourable. The red pustules later turn black filling
up with teliospores.
The wind-blown spring and summer spores can cover long distances (up to hundreds of kilometres) so
that the sources of infection may remain unknown.
In the Mediterranean Area severe epidemics may appear without host plant alternation when the
uredinial stage of the rust overwinters in pockets where suitable gramineous host plants, moisture and
temperature concur.
A sentence by Pliny (NH XVIII. xlv. 161) can be read as suggesting a relation of the rust to barberries.
‘As for the greatest curse of corn, mildew, fixing branches of laurel in the ground makes it pass out of
the fields into their foliage’. (Rubigo quidem, maximum segetum pestis, lauri ramis in arvo defixis transit
in ea folia ex arvis.) If the interpretation is correct, the rust was thought to pass from the fields into the
barberry. Today we know that in the spring the rust passes from the barberry into the fields.
9Anikster & Wahl (1979: 372). Today’s black rust may have evolved in an environment of open forests
with grasslands by doubling its chromosome numbers and specialising as a tetraploid on wheat (Urban,
1967). The final word has not yet been said (Urban & Marková, 1983).

Notes
10 ‘Crop’
should not be taken literally; self-sown wheat and grasses can also provide the bridge from one
cropping season to the next.
11 From W to E Berberis hispanica in the Atlas and the Spanish sierras, B. aetnensis on Corsica, Sardinia,
Sicily and in Calabria, B. cretica on Crete and in Lebanon, and B. crataegina in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
These taxa should be seen as subspecies of B. vulgaris (Rikli, 1946). They are low shrubs op to ~70 cm.
Barberry rapidly colonises abandoned land. It may have been more common in antiquity than today since
land use was less intensive.
12In Denmark barberry was planted extensively around 1800 for the ‘division of the commons’ with
horrible consequences (Hermannsen, 1968). For the naughty boys see Oort (1941: 112).
13 See e.g. Solomon’s prayer in 1 Kings 8: 37 ‘If there be in the land famine, if there be pestilence, blasting,
mildew, locust, or if there be caterpillar; …’ (King James Bible).
14Banks (1805) describing what is now called P. graminis f.sp. tritici distinguished rust (the uredinial
stage) and mildew (the telial stage), as did the mycologists of that period.
15 Forthe effect of black rust on rye stems the term ‘chalk white’ (G: kalkweisz) was also used (Windt,
1806: 9).
16 Livid
(Marshall, 1795: 359ff); ‘… a remarkably fine field of wheat … as if it were covered with soot’
(Lambert, 1789); Lambert’s ‘soot’ quoted by Darwin (1800: 321). Field ‘blasted’ (Lambert, 1798).
17 See field symptoms of black rust on rye in Windt (1806: 9, 25).
18 Chester (1946); Hogg et al. (1969).
19 Aristotle, Problems XXVI: 17, translation by Rackham (1965: 83).
20 We cannot exclude the presence of brown leaf rust with rusty-brown pustules (uredinia) in addition to
black stem rust with more fox-brown pustules. Descriptions of colour variants are notoriously unreliable
(§2.2.2 and Appendix 2.1).
21 Cato, Varro, Vergil, Columella, Ovid, Plinius, Palladius and others (Orlob, 1973: 127ff).
22 Note the confusion. The final (= telial) stage of black stem rust is black, not brown or red.
23 PlinyNaturalis Historia XVIII: 79. … hordeum ex omni frumento minime calamitosum, quia ante tollitur
quam triticum occupet rubigo. (Barley is the least liable to damage of all corn, because it is harvested
before the wheat is attacked by mildew). Mildew is an old English term for black rust (telial stage). The
barley harvest may precede the wheat harvest several weeks (§1.4.2).
24 Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 161.
25Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 92. … sed minus quam cetera frumenta in stipula periclitatur, quoniam
semper rectam habet spicam nec rorem continent qui robiginem faciat. (But it [the wheat] is less exposed
to danger in the straw than other cereals, because it always has the ear on a straight stalk and it does
not hold dew to cause rust). In the modern eye this is a questionable statement.

Notes
Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 154. … caeleste frugum vinearumque malum nullo minus noxium est robigo.
Frequentissima haec in roscido tractu convallibusque ac perflatum non habentibus; e diverso carent ea
ventosa et excelsa. (One of the most harmful climatic maladies of corn crops and vines is rust. This is
most frequent in a district exposed to dew and in shut-in valleys that have no current of air through them,
whereas windy places and high ground on the contrary are free from it.) This is a correct statement. The
‘rust’ on vines refers to brown discoloration of vine leaves.
Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 279.
See Hogg et al., 1969. During clear nights following hot days, heavy dew may be formed, necessary for
the germination of the black rust spores. The sequence of temperatures, cool nights and warm days, is
just right for penetration and infection.
26 The pustules were on the inner, concave side of a lemma. The uredeniospores with their four equatorial
germpores clearly belonged to P. graminis. Tetraploid T. parvicoccum is sometimes included in T.

turgidum.
27 Example: During a prolonged drought people may perform a specific rain dance to invoke the much
desired rain.
28 Ovid,
Fasti IV: 679 ff. The cereals were wheat and barley. Often, leguminous crops such as beans and
peas were included in the cereals, seen as ‘seed crops’.
29 Ovid, Fasti IV: 681/2. Cur igitur missae vinctis ardentia taedis terga ferant volpes,causa docenda mihi est.
(I must therefore explain the reason why foxes are let loose with torches tied to their burning backs.)
30 Or through the land of Carseoli, a town near Rome; the text is not clear about the location.
31 Ovid, Fasti IV: 683 ff.
32The Praenestine calender of Roman festivals was engraved in marble. Fragments were found in the
Italian town of Praeneste, now Palestrina, SE of Rome (Wikipedia, English version).
33 Missale romanum ex decreto sacrosancti concilii tridentni restitutum …, Venice, Pezzana, 1756.
34 See Bain et al. (1995: 33) on France.
35 A feast, the Floralia, was held on April 28th in honour of the goddess Flora.
36 Varro in ‘On agriculture’ I: i, 6 (Hooper & Boyd Ash, 1967): ‘… Robigum ac Floram; quibus propitiis neque
robigo frumenta atque arbores corrumpit … Itaque publice Robigo feriae Robigalia … instituti.’ (… Robigo
and Flora; for when they are propitious the rust will not harm the grain and the trees … wherefore, in
honour of Robigus has been established the solemn feast of the Robigalia …)
37Elsewhere also called Robigo. The gender of the deity varies, female and male possibly expressing
malevolence and benevolence, respectively (Leopold, 1926).
38 Varro, De lingua Latina VI §16 (Kent, 1967). Robigalia dicta ab Robigo; secundum segetes huic deo
sacrificatur, ne robigo occupet segetes. (The Robigalia ‘Festival of Robigus’ was named from Robigus ‘God
of Rust’; to this god sacrifice is made along the cornfields, that rust may not seize upon the standing
corn.)

Notes
39I have no doubt about the correctness of Leopold’s (1926) statements on Roman antiquity but his
biology was weak; he thought ergot and rust to be the same thing.
40 The barley – wheat difference was mentioned by Pliny (Naturalis Historia XVIII: 79).
41 Nazareno Strampelli (1866-1942), Italian plant breeder, created new wheat varieties (~1920/30) with
early ripening, to escape from stem rust (Enciclopedia Italiana; Wikipedia). These varieties can be
harvested one to two weeks before traditional varieties. The Broekhuizen (1969) data refer to the new
varieties.
42 Compare Tull (1733: 55) on wheat drilling ‘if too thin, it may happen to tiller so late in the Spring, that
some of the Ears may be blighted, yet a little thicker or thinner does not matter.’
43 The three wheat rust species, yellow stripe rust (Puccinia striiformis), brown leaf rust (P. triticina) and
black stem rust (P. graminis) tend to appear in this order. Stripe rust prefers lower and stem rust higher
temperatures, whereas leaf rust has a broad intermediate temperature preference (see Box 2.1).
44 An early reference is Marshall, 1795 (Minutes 13 and 133). See Hogg et al. (1969: 7).
45 Such as Orlob (1973), Postan (1966), Slicher Van Bath (1987).
46 Translation by R. Kotansky (1994).
47 Clark
(2007): ‘The heliacal setting is the last day when the star [Sirius] sets and the sun is far enough
below the western horizon to make the star visible in the evening twilight’. Follows a period of ~85 days
during which Sirius is invisible. ‘The heliacal rising is the first day when the star rises and the sun is far
enough below the eastern horizon to make it visible in the morning twilight’. Precise dates vary with
time and geographic position of the observer.
48 Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 288/9.
49 Pliny
Naturalis Historia XVIII: 290 ‘Within these periods falls the sterilising influence of the heavens,
though I would not deny the possibility that it is liable to alteration by local climatic conditions …’.
49a In Zadoks (2007) I wrongly called Sirius the ‘morning star’ in stead of ‘evening star’.
50 At Roman latitude the heliacal setting of Sirius took place when the sun was in the tenth degree of
the Bull (Varro quoted by Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 285). The ancients knew that the heliacal rising
of Sirius took place when the sun rose in the sign of the Lion, a timing accepted by the Romans. Today
the two stars rise simultaneously in the sign of Cancer, the heliacal rising of Sirius at the latitude of
Rome being August 11th and its setting May 18th. The Cancer-Lion difference is due to the precession,
the astronomical phenomenon of the slow but constant change in position of the equinoxes relative to
the stars.
51 Plinius Naturalis Historia XVIII: 285. Robigalia Numa constituit anno regni sui XI, quae nunc aguntur a.d.
VII kal. Mai., quoniam tunc fere segetes robigo occupat. … canis occidit, sidus et per se vehemens …
52 Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 291: et in hoc mirari benignitatem naturae succurrit: iam primum hanc
iniuriam omnibus annis accidere non posse propter statos siderum cursus, …

Notes
53 In the Bible, Solomon’s Song 2: 15, damaging foxes are mentioned that cannot be related to wheat rust.
‘Take us the foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vines: …’.
54 Isaw such restricted burnt areas in forests, Washington State, U.S.A., with areas measuring few ares.
For dry wheat fires see http://emd.wa.gov/6-mrr/resp/seoo/stats-archive/stats-02/seoo-07-02.htm
accessed January, 2006. Burnt areas covered many hectares.
55 Professor Amos Dinoor from the Hebrew University kindly informed me so.
56 In
Southern Europe, intercropping of olives and wheat was frequent up to the 1950s at least (author’s
observation).
57 Pliny
Naturalis Historia XVIII: 275. The term ‘rust’ was used in its present specific meaning but also in
a more general sense indicating brownish discolorations of leaves, e.g. by nightfrost.
58 The Iguvine Tablets, made ~200 BCE, and containing a text from ~700 BCE were found in Gubbio, a town
in Umbria, Italy (Rosenzweig, 1937; Devoto, 1948).
59 Columella X: 342/3. Hinc mala rubigo virides ne torreat herbas, sanguine lactentis catuli placatur et extis.
(Hence, lest fell Rubigo parch the fresh, green plants, her anger is appeased with blood and entrails of a
suckling whelp: Forster & Heffner, 1968)
60 Ovid (Frazer, 1989: 422): The dog sacrifice (sacrum canaria) near the Doggy Gate (Porta Catularia).
Festus 45.10 (Lindsay, 1965): Catularia porta Romae dicta est, quia non longe ab ea ad placandum caniculae
sidus frugibus inimicum rufae canes immolabantur, ut fruges flavescentes at maturitatem perducerentur.
(It was said that there is a Doggy Gate at Rome, since not far away red-haired dogs were sacrificed to
conciliate the Dogstar, hostile to the crops, so that the crops may yellow and attain full maturity).
61 PlinyNaturalis Historia XVIII: 14. Augurio canario agenda dies constituatur priusquam frumenta vaginis
exeant et antequam in vaginas perveniant. (Let a day be fixed for taking augury by the sacrifice of a dog
before the corn comes out of the sheath and before it penetrates through into the sheath; i.e. booting
stage = DC 45; Zadoks et al., 1974).
62Red – Festus 45.10; reddish – Festus 397.25 (Lindsay, 1965). Rutilae canes, id est non procul a rubro
colore, immolantur, ut ait Ateius Capito, canario sacrificio pro frugibus deprecandae saevitiae causa sideris
caniculae. (Reddish dogs, that is not far from the red colour, are sacrificed, alleges Ateius Capito, to avert
the Dogstar’s rage by sacrificing a dog on behalf of the crops).
Elsewhere a suckling whelp is mentioned. Fasti: X-342ff.
63Biologically the passage makes sense. During a wet period with lodging of the wheat crop various
fungal diseases get the opportunity to infect stems, leaves and ears. When the wetness is over and the
crop dries the crop will look dirty, as if scorched. During good weather after a wet period dews may be
heavy due to nightly distillation of water from warm soil to cool leaves. Such dews favour rust, as may
be seen today on irrigated fields in a semi-arid environment.
64 This is the time when the Scirocco may blow, a hot and dusty southern wind straight from the Sahara.
People may suffer of drought, heat and dust (‘scirocco’ in Wikipedia, Italian version). In modern Rome, it
is said, the frequency of suicides and car collisions increases markedly during Scirocco.

Notes
65 Pliny Naturalis Historia XVIII: 284/7. Columella X: 341. … et tempestatem Tuscis avertere sacris. (to avert
by Tuscan [= Etrurian] rites the tempest).
66 Chambry (1960: xiv) cited another ‘international’ tale, the story of the silver cup that Joseph placed
in Benjamin’s luggage (Genesis 44: 2), a trick also used against Aesop.
Chapter 2
67 Just a few examples: encyclopaedia, general – Pancoucke (1777/1832, see under Tessier et al., 1818),
professional – Rozier (1809), mycology – Persoon (1801), De Candolle (1807, 1815), botany – Bulliard
(1783), agriculture – Darwin (1800), Ponse (1810), Rozier (1809).
68 Desmazières (1812: 122/3): ‘La rouille est une poussière jaune, couleur de rouille de fer, que l’on remarque
sur les tiges et les feuilles d’un grand nombre de végétaux, et particulièrement, dès le mois d’Avril, sur celles
du blé. Cette poussière y forme des taches linéaires et parallèles;’ and ‘… vraies plantes intestines, analogues
à celles de la carie, et des genres Urédo et Puccinie.’
69 Seringe (1818: 201/2). ‘… pustules ovales, extraordinairement petites, mais ordinairement très-nombreuses
…. Et laisse voir une poussière jaune’. ‘…l’épuisement qu’avait produit la rouille…’. ‘Cette poussière …
présente … des capsules ovoïdes, presque sphériques …’
70 De Candolle (1815: 84 #624) came back from his original – and correct - opinion (Decandolle, 1807: 73)
that Uredo linearis and Puccinia graminum were stages of the same fungal species.
71 The color indications in the European trivial names of the cereal rusts date from Eriksson & Henning
(1896). The ‘color names’ are used in all West-European languages. They gained official status at the
various European Rust Conferences, among them the First European Yellow Rust Conference in Brunswick
(Germany, 1956), the Colloque Européen sur la rouille noire des céréales ([first] European Colloquium on
black rust of cereals) in Versailles (France, 1958), and the First European Brown Rust Conference, part of
the Cereal Rust Conferences (plural!), at Cambridge (UK, 1964; proceedings published in 1966).
72 De Bary (1866, 1867) demonstrated experimentally the existence of ‘dimorphism’, different spore forms
belonging to one and the same rust species. Tulasne (1854: 81) discussed ‘dimorphism’ at length, with the
side remark ‘These opinions agree with the feeling of the farmers who believe that the orange rusts and
the black rusts of the grain crops be but the different ages of a single parasite (F: Ces opinions s’accordent
avec le sentiment des agriculteurs qui veulent que les rouilles oranges et les rouilles noires ne soient que
des ages différents d’un seul parasite).
73 P.graminis Pers. in De Candolle (1815: 59 #596) and Uredo linearis Pers. (p84, #624). Berkeley (1860
§601: 95), in accordance with some French mycologists (i.a. Decandolle, 1807), was convinced that Uredo
linearis as the younger stage gradually changed into Puccinia graminis as the older stage (Berkeley,
1854/7).
74The sample consists of a segment of a wheat stem, the leaf and leaf sheath with about 50 per cent
infection by black rust. The authors did show nor mention the glumes.
75 ‘Sur
les chaumes, les gaines et les feuilles de plusieurs espèces de graminées’. (On the stems, the sheaths
and the leaves of several species of gramineous plants). The sample consists of a segment of a grassy

Notes
stem, possibly of couch grass, the leaves and leaf sheaths with about 50 per cent infection by black rust.
Again, the authors did show nor mention the glumes.
76 De Bary (1853: 102) mentioned the red-yellow uredial stages of Trichobasis Rubigo vera (DC.) and T.
linearis (= present P. graminis) on stems and leaves and the red-yellow flecks on the beards and glumes
of Uredo glumarum (Trichobasis glumarum Lév.). In the latter case, considering the confusing colour
description, the plant part rather than the rust species dictated the rust’s name. Both yellow rust and
black rust can infect the awns, at least of wheat. Brown rust is not normally seen on glumes or awns.
77 Westendorp (1860: 9 #25): Puccinia recondita Rob. – Desmaz. Pl. Crypt. De Fr., nouvelle série, no. 252:
Sur les feuilles languissantes du seigle. (On the wilting leaves of rye).
78 On rye – Puccinia recondita Roberge ex Desmazières; on wheat – P. triticina Eriksson.
79 Among others Fuckel (1869) and Delacroix & Maublanc (1916: 156).
The confusion continued for a long time, as with von Thümen (1886 p20) who described the ‘straw and
stripe rust’ of cereals (no crop specified) which occurs on culms, leaves and leaf sheaths. His Uredo Rubigo
vera De C. seems to be a mixture of the brown and yellow rusts. It could appear in epidemic form on young
wheat in the fall, sometimes so severe that fields had to be ploughed (probably yellow rust).
Pinckert (1867: 155/6) mentioned rust on rye. One he called ‘crown rust’ and the other ‘grass rust’; the
latter ‘is more yellowish coloured and forms [?] stripes that follow the leaf veins …’. The latter one was
probably yellow rust. ‘Crown rust’ is a misnomer. P. coronata does not occur on rye. The original error was
made by Kühn (1858: 104). ‘Grass rust’ (his ‘P. graminis’) seems to have been used in a general sense. ‘Die
andere Form ist mehr gelblich gefärbt und bildet keimförmige [?], den Blattnerven folgende Streifen; man
nennt sie Grasrost (Puccinia graminis).’ (The other form is more yellowish and produces germ-shaped [?]
stripes which follow the leaf veins; she is called grass rust (Puccinia graminis)).
The apogee of confusion is in Karsten (1879: 29) who described the cereal brown rusts under the name
P. striaeformis West. (syn. Uredo rubigo-vera De C.).
80 Practice oriented Kühn (1858: 101) alluded to the overwintering of rust in the field but he did not see
it for himself. He confused different rust species.
81 De Candolle (1815: 83, #623d). This rust ‘naît sur la surface supérieure des feuilles, et plus rarement sur
la face inférieure, sur la gaine des feuilles ou sur la tige des graminées, et principalement du froment; elle y
forme des pustules ovales extraordinairement petites, mais ordinairement très-nombreuses’. The epidermis
splits and ‘laisse voir une poussière jaune: enfin, cette poussière devient rousse, mais jamais noire’. ‘… des
capsules [= spores] ovoïdes presque sphériques …’.
82 In this case brown rust of wheat, Puccinia triticina Eriksson & Henning.
83 Lind (1913: 305) on P. rubigo vera de Candolle: ‘From the accounts and descriptions of the more ancient
authors it is sometimes to be perceived which species they have been dealing with, but as a rule they
have dealt with all promiscuously.’ On page 308 #1425 we find P. glumarum (Schmidt) Eriksson & Henning
1896, found on rye, wheat and grasses.
84 In old documents there is an endless variation in the spelling of rust names.
85 Persoon (1801: 216) wrote in Latin ‘OBS. Vereor, [Vredo linearis] ne iunior plantula Pucciniae graminis
modo sit.’

Notes
86 Fries (1829: 509) thought that from a taxonomic viewpoint Uredines in Puccinias numquam abire possunt
(Uredos can never change into Puccinias) but added Potius Uredo est Puccinia evolutione praecipita (Rather
the Uredo is a Puccinia with a rushed development). Apparently, Fries was somewhat in doubt.
87 The colour change may have been from yellow to brown rust, or from the uredial to the telial stage. The
latter option fits better with the remarks by De Candolle and others.
88 Desmazière (1857: 798) had seen the brown rust of rye in the herbarium of Roberge, provided a good
Latin description of the rust, and maintained its name as given by Roberge.
89 In1853 De Bary mentioned a glume rust (G: Klappenrost), Uredo glumarum, causing red-yellow flecks,
possibly a composite of the yellow and black rusts, a confusing statement.
90 Afraid to damage the specimen, I examined it by means of hand lens and torch. The rust I recognised as
yellow rust, on the right hand leaf (upper side) with a severity of ~80 per cent. The leaves I believe to be
rye leaves, one showing the adaxial side and one the abaxial side, but the identification is not definitive
since auricles and ligulas were too much damaged. At places I saw the leaf hairs indicative of rye. Size
and shape of the leaves were those of rye rather than of wheat, shown in a specimen with Uredo linearis
(black rust). Leaf veins were somewhat less pronounced than in the wheat leaf, as normal for rye.
91 Desmazières (1847: 10).
92 Schmidt (1817) is said to have described yellow rust on glumes under the name of Uredo glumarum. The
name was also used by Fries in 1821 (Eriksson & Henning, 1896). Westendorp (1854a) and Kickx (1867:
89) followed with U. glumarum Rob. ex Desm.
93 Westendorp (1854a: 28, #135). Uredo glumarum Rob. – Desmaz. – HCB., no 568. The only comment was:
Dans l’intérieur des balles et des glumes du froment. (Inside the chaff and the glumes of wheat). ‘Inside
the glumes’ is typical for yellow rust. The critical Berkeley (see text) used Léveillé’s generic name in
Trichobasis glumarum Lév. (on glumes of cereals; Berkeley, 1860).
94 Westendorp (1854a: 29, #144. Uredo striaeformis Nov. sp. ‘Groupes linéaires, parallèles, allongés, nombreux,
confluents, noirâtres, s’ouvrant suivant les sens des fibres de la feuille. Sporidies assez grosses, globuleuses,
d’un brun foncé. …. Sur les jeunes pousses de l’Holcus lanatus et de l’Anthoxanthemum odoratum, dont il
empêche le développement’. (Groups linear, parallel, prolonged, numerous, confluent, blackish, opening
in the direction of the veins of the leaf. Spores rather large, roundish, of a dark brown. … On the young
shoots of H. lanatus and of A. odoratum, of which it inhibits the development). The comment ‘rather large’
is meant in comparison with spores of stripe smut (Ustilago longissima) on Glyceria spp. Westendorp was
followed by his fellow-countryman Kickx (1867: 55) with P. striaeformis West. (on straw of cereals).
95 Kickx (1867: 55) quoting Westendorp gave a rather precise description of stripe rust, including the
telial stage.
96 Westendorp & Wallays (1855) N° 1077 ‘sur les chaumes des céréales aux environs de Courtrai’. A leaf
fragment of ~10 cm long is shown, probably of wheat, not of Holcus lanatus. Telia are arranged in stripes.
These telia are small, blackish, closed and shiny. They certainly do not belong to P. triticina or P. graminis.
I did not see uredinia at macroscopic inspection.

Notes
97Fuckel (1869) mentioned telia and gave the yellow rust fungus the name P. straminis, which has no
priority.
98 Spahr Van der Hoek & Postma (1952, Vol. I: 624) told that rye in Friesland suffered a yield loss of ~50
per cent due to a kind of ‘blast’ (D: brand), that infected stems and ears and coloured them black (at
least in wheat). The description reminds us first of black rust but it may also be inspired by the telia of
yellow rust that can appear on stems and heads. ‘Blast’ was a frequently used but non-specific indication
of diseases that coloured plant parts brown or black, as with rye in Roessingh & Schaars (1996: 110).
Treviranus (1846) called the yellow rust ‘glume blast’. Even the great de Bary (1853) used ‘blast’ (G:
Brand) in a broad sense.
99 Roessingh & Schaars (1996: 110). The text could be read as if ‘honeydew’ were not identical with ‘red-
dog’ (1996: 434/5): ‘Honeydew’ on rye is, in today’s view, a non-specific term then used for a cover on
leaves due to either mildew, rust, the sugary excretion of aphids, or – on the ears – the sweet droplets
produced by ergot.
100 See also Bieleman (1987: 657) and note 585 (ibid.: 805). Tiesing (1923) mentioned ‘red rust’ (D: roode
roest) on rye, probably meaning the brown rust (P. recondita).
101 Now Uromyces fabae de Bary, the broad bean rust.
102Wiegmann (1839: 101): ‘Der Honigtropfen war also offenbar zur Natur der Pilze übergegangen, seine
Auszenfläche in die der Blattpilze, sein Inneres in die der Schimmelarten.’ (The droplet of honey apparently
changed to the nature of a fungus, its outer surface in that of the foliar fungi, its inner side in that of
the mould species).
103 ‘Philosopher’ was a late 18th century word for ‘scientist’, student of the natural sciences.
104 Fall infection of the recently emerged winter rye was not recorded in the Netherlands, 1845. Eriksson
& Henning (1896: 146) mentioned severe fall infections of young rye in Denmark, 1874, and Sweden,
1887.
105 My starting point is the ‘General Report’ (D: Algemeen Verslag) over the year 1846, written by a
committee of the ‘Netherlands Company for the Promotion of Industry’ (D: Nederlandsche Maatschappij
ter Bevordering van Nijverheid), seated at Haarlem. The Committee consisted of knowledgeable persons,
working at the request of the Company’s Board, who collected data from provincial informants.
106 The decisive characteristic mentioned by Göppert (1846) is the ‘skin’ of the spores, consisting of
‘a water-clear transparent skin’ (… einer wasserhellen durchsichtigen Haut …). Anonymous (1846b: 48)
states ‘dust ... consists of small round grainlets, yellow in color and translucent in the middle’ (stof ...
bestaat uit kleine, ronde korreltjes, geel van kleur en in het midden doorschijnend). See Cummins (1971:
151) – wall pale yellowish or nearly colorless; Savile (1984: 99) – wall hyaline (subhyaline). The other rye
rusts have coloured urediniospore walls.
107 In the duchy of Limburg (S Netherlands) night frost damaging the tips of the rye ears was mentioned
explicitly (General Report 1846: 27) ); same in Gelderland (Anonymous 1846b: 56).
108 Thenames and places mentioned in this paragraph are shown on the map of the Netherlands around
1846 (Figure 2.6).

Notes
109 Withsome good will one could think of telia of yellow rust, but all telia are black and not chocolate-
coloured. The description does not fit the black rust.
110 Banks was inclined to believe that the ‘rust’, the uredinial stage of black rust on wheat, and the ‘blight’,
the telial stage, were two different species; Banks preferred to follow Fontana (1767).
111 VanHall (1859) followed and quoted Unger (1833) and in the postscript the learned Harting did not
disagree.
112 See congress reports in Anonymous (1846/7). The text paraphrases two passages:
1846 ‘de bezwarende verschijnselen in de aren der rogge waargenomen, twee derden verloren.
Uredo rubigo op de bladeren, geen vrees, gaat niet verder. U. caries of U. segetium op de schutblaadjes van de
aartjes, daarna op korrel zelf, op vele akkers de oogst hebben weggenomen’ and 1847 ‘en algemeen was men
het daarover eens, dat het verwaaijen van het stuifmeel, dat het vorig jaar was achtergebleven, en thans in
zoo ruime mate had plaats gehad, dat men somtijds in eene wolk daarvan gehuld was, op grond van ervaring
het vaste vertrouwen gaf, dan men van de roest, al kwam ze nog, niets meer te vrezen had.’
113 In the ‘General Report’ on 1852 complaints about rust in rye were mentioned (Friesland, p83); the
annually returning rust in rye did much damage (Groningen, p87). It is a fair guess to identify this rust
as yellow rust.
114 The names and places mentioned in this paragraph are shown on the map of Europe around 1846
(Figure 2.12).
115In this way the ‘field races’ of yellow rust on wheat were discovered. Later, their existence was
demonstrated experimentally (Zadoks, 1961).
116Bjerkander (1794 Num. 98) Secale cereale. Rågen sades vara denne Sommar ymnig öfver hela Riket.
Härstädes hade han på några ställen mycken rost. Den 8 Junii syntes alla Rågbladen gulla, när de granskades
med et stort Microscop, voro de beklädde liksom med små blemmor, hafvande uti sig et fint gult mjöl, som
skådadt genom Microscopet, bestod af små gula Gerber. Den 6 Julii voro Axen gula af samma rost, somlige
hade uti sig ingen Råg, utan voro aldeles fördärsvade, somlige ägde ej större än gryn och alla voro i topparna
öfverklädde med de gula Gerberna eller rost. (This summer the rye crops were abundant over the whole
country. Nearby we have had much rust in some places. On 8 June all leaves were yellow, upon examination
under a strong microscope they were covered as with small pustules, that contained a fine yellow powder,
and seen under the microscope consisted of small yellow [powder]. On 6 July the ears were yellow by the
same rust, and some had no kernels in them, but were completely destroyed, some were no larger than
[grains], and all were covered with the yellow [powder] at the tips).
117 Anonymous (1850b); Blok (1977: 59/91).
118 Ludolph Christian Treviranus, professor of botany at Bonn University, must be considered a reliable
observer. He wrote an impressive textbook Physiology der Gewächse (Plant physiology), 1835, 1838.
119 Léveillé(1848: 777). ‘Une espèce (Uredo glumarum Rob. in Dsmz., Pl. crypt. de France, éd. 2, no 107, 6;
et An. Sc. Na., 3e sér., tom. VIII: 10), qui a beaucoup d’analogie avec la Rouille, s’observe sur les glumes du
Froment et du Seigle qu’elle déforme, et dont elle produit quelquefois l’avortement.’ (A species (…), that
shows much analogy with the Rust, is seen on the glumes of wheat and rye which she deforms, and of
which she sometimes causes abortion.)

Notes
120 Weber (1847: 5) … die grosze Strecken verwüstete …
121 In1853 De Bary still followed the customary separation between Uredo and Puccinia. He mentioned
Trichobasis Rubigo vera (DC.) and T. linearis, yellow-brown rust and black rust, following Léveillé (1848).
He also mentioned U. glumarum as glume rust (G: Klappenrost), without making clear which rust he
meant.
122 Léveillé (1848: 777) ‘Dans une note que j’ai reçue de M. Auerswald, j’apprends qu’elle a été très funeste
en Saxe il y a trois ans. Nefaria ista pestis anni 1846, telles sont les expressions dont il se sert pour me
peindre ses effets.’ (From a note which I received from Mr. Auerswald I understood that she had been very
disastrous in Saxony three years ago. This darned pest of the year 1846, that is the expression which he
uses to paint me its effects).
123 From Eriksson & Henning, 1896.
124 E:
Sambia, G: Samland, the peninsula NW of Kaliningrad. Von Viebahn (1848: 43). The disease could
have been yellow rust, black rust or Fusarium.
125 Data were derived from a well-designed enquiry among the Agricultural Societies of the Kingdom
Prussia yielding a large but non-specified number of entries, with yield estimates weighted for areas
covered. The ‘norm’ was not indicated; it probably was something like the average yield over 1840 to
1844. The Agricultural Societies represented the estate owners with relatively high standards of crop
husbandry. The small farmers, often with low standards of crop husbandry, have most probably suffered
larger losses. The impact of small farmer information on the tabulated data can only be guessed.
126 Anonymous (1847b). ‘… dasz die krankhafte Erscheinungen, welche früher nur auf den eigentlichen
Blättern bemerkt worden, nunmehr auch auf die Blattscheiden, den Halm, selbst auf die Aehren und das Korn
übergegangen, und dasz dieselben all überall zu finden seien: - keine Bodenart, keine Bestellungsweise, keine
Vorfrucht scheine eine Ausnahme zu machen: je weiter der Roggen entwickelt, in einem desto höheren Stadio
zeige sich auch bei ihm die Krankheit.’ The text continues with an utterly confused attempt at naming
the rust.
127 Windt(1806: 58), who worked in a similar area (near Minden), tentatively mentioned that the black
rust appeared in rye around barberry shortly before or during flowering.
128 Generally speaking this observation is correct but it is not specific for any rust species. Pliny (Naturalis
Historia XVIII: 154), Theophrastus (VIII, x, 2; Hort, 1916 Vol. 2: 203), and Windt (1806: 23) made the same
observation.
129 These observations were confirmed in Austria, 1916, by Fruwirth (1916), who mentioned empty
spikelets and empty (‘deaf’) ears of rye after a severe yellow rust attack on the glumes.
130 Inwheat I did not see such inhibition of fructification. When the yellow rust infection was severe
the grain setting usually was regular but the grain quality might be quite poor, light weighted, ‘chicken
fodder’, as the farmers said. Infertility did sometimes occur at the tip of the ears.
131 Regel (1854) ‘So der in Form von gelbbraunen Punkten und Streifen am Getreide erscheinende Rost (Uredo
Rubigo vera und linearis). Derselbe ist in manchen Jahren sehr häufig, bedingt das sogenannte Vergelben
des Getreides und leichte Frucht. So richtete er z.B. 1846 vielen Schaden bei uns an.’ U. Rubigo-vera is the

Notes
yellow rust, U. linearis the black rust. Apparently, the yellow rust dominated in 1846. NB. Barberry and
black rust used to be common high up in the Alpine valleys until cultivation of the Alpine fields lost its
profitability after World War II.
132 Thispassage attempts a reconstruction of past conditions favouring a yellow rust epidemic based
upon recent knowledge (Zadoks, 1961) and scanty information from 1845/6. More detailed weather
data from 1845/6 were available (Bourke & Lamb, 1993), but I don’t believe that their analysis would
contribute essentially new information.
133 Vanderplank (1968: 155ff). The selection pressure by tropical maize rust (Puccinia polysora Underw.)
on maize, a cross-fertiliser as rye, in W Africa lasted for years, allowing gradual genetic adaptation of the
crop toward higher resistance levels by the accumulation of minor genes. It is difficult to imagine that
a strong but once-only selection pressure, as in 1846, could have a similar effect.
134 Appel
(1931), working in Germany, mentioned the existence of yellow rust on rye in passing, without
epidemiological details.
135 Shrivelled
grain is in the handbooks, as in Eriksson & Henning (1896). It can also be caused by black
rust (Lehmann et al., 1937: 372), more rarely by brown rust.
136 Thisepidemic is not listed in Zadoks (1961) or Hogg et al. (1969). Around 1825 the sensitivity of rye
to inundation (winter rye), drought, summer rainfall, and ‘red dog’ (D: roodhond), possibly brown leaf
rust (Puccinia recondita), was well-known (Roessingh & Schaars, 1996: 110). Kühn (1858: 101) may have
suspected the overwintering of rust on rye, by mentioning fall infection on early sown crops and early
May appearance; he described Uredo Rubigo-vera, merging the present Puccinia triticina (on wheat), P.
recondita (on rye) and P. coronata (on oats). Rust on rye could at times cause important damages (ibid.:
100), he wrote. Which rust?
137 Contemporaneous scientific papers on the ‘potato murrain’ abounded (Chapter 3) but those on the
rust of rye were scarce indeed. The catastrophe of the potatoes by far overshadowed the failure of the
rye. The excellent agricultural history of the Netherlands edited by Sneller (1943) discussed the ‘potato
murrain’ seven times but the rust on rye was never mentioned.
138 This I observed during the hot and dry summer of 1959 (Zadoks, 1961: §37.2).
139 Bjerkander (1794).
140 See Chapter 5.
141 Denmark (Kølpin Ravn, 1914: 112), Sweden (Eriksson & Henning, 1896: 203).
142 Around the mid-19th century cereals on the löss soils of Limburg covered about ¾ of the arable land,
with rye as the main crop (Bieleman, 1992: 159/60). On the sandy soils crop rotation was restricted, with
much rye (van Zanden, 1985: 168), which may have facilitated the switchover of the rust.
143 Ponse (1827) began with an excerpt from Banks (1805). The description clearly refers to rust on wheat.
Ponse’s rust is a combination of yellow rust (early in the season) and brown rust (late in the season).

Notes
144 Inthe 17th century and long after, apparently up into the mid 19 th century, much rye was grown on a
particular sandy soil type (D: geestgronden) behind the dunes of N and S Holland (Bieleman, 1992: 75).
145 At the time, rye was also grown on clay soils; rust severities on clay and sandy soils were about the
same.
146 During rain showers I used a suction device, placed in a crop severely diseased by yellow rust, to
collect surface water from healthy plants. The water from the healthy leaves was heavily loaded with
urediniospores of yellow rust.
147 ‘The red’ (D: Het roode) is a term for rust (Roessingh & Schaars, 1996: 446) and probably ‘red’ (D: rood)
also.
148 The unusual text from Bavaria reads as: ‘In winter rye the yellow blast (G: Brand) was seen at many
locations. Yellow exudation at the tip of the kernel. Each glume, where the curling at the tip of the kernel
was yellow, was also covered with yellow dust. Such diseased kernels were sweeter than the healthy ones.
Each ear had two or more yellow-blasted kernels.’ Author’s comment: The sweetness reminds of ergot
rather than yellow rust but the yellow powder points to yellow rust. No mention was made of ergot at
harvest. Yields were reported to be good. So, what caused the affliction?
149 Oekonomische Neuigkeiten und Verhandlungen 73 (1847): 199.
Chapter 3
150 For the new taxonomic position of P. infestans see Govers & Gijzen (2006).
151 The original North American and Irish (= European) strain(s) of P. infestans, closely related, were from
Andean origin (Gómez-Alpizar et al., 2007).
152 Bourke & Lamb (1993: 49).
153 Bourke (1993: 12) – Ireland, 4.5-6.3 kg/day, 5.4 on average; Connell (1950: 149) – on average 4.5
kg/day. Hooijer (1847: 1, on the Bommelerwaard, NL): ‘The poorest ate potatoes only, cooked at noon, as
porridge at supper, fried at breakfast’, no amounts specified. Note: An active young male needs ~3000
kcal/day equivalent to roughly 3.75 kg of potatoes per day; a labourer needs more for heavy manual
labour. Note that a diet of potatoes only, supplemented by some fresh milk or buttermilk, was healthy and
allowed to raise large families, according to Reader (2008). Curiously, Van Bavegem (medical practitioner
at Dendermonde, Belgium, between Gent and Antwerp) mentioned the same diet for poor families in 1782
(Van Bavegem, 1782: 28).
154 At the time, 1845/50, the differences between typhus, typhoid and several other diseases were not so
well defined as today. Whereas ‘hygienists’ (today we would say ‘epidemiologists’) had fair ideas about
the environmental conditions favouring one or the other disease, the causal agents and the modes of
transmission of these epidemic diseases were unknown. We distinguish typhus, caused by a rickettsia
(Rickettsia prowazeki) and transmitted by body lice, and typhoid, caused by a bacterium (Salmonella
typhi) and transmitted by water. The accurate description by Virchow (1848) clearly points to an epidemic
of typhus. In view of the hygiene, or better the lack of hygiene, on the countryside we might think of
typhoid when the original texts are not clear.

Notes
155 Bourke, 1993; Dyson & Ó Gráda, 2002; and many others.
156 Dupâquier,
1980: 173; The ‘Census Commission’ of 1851 said ‘very nearly one million’ (total or excess)
deaths? (Woodward, 1938: 340). Woodham-Smith (1962: 411) stated that the Irish population dropped
between 1841 and 1851 from 8,175,124 to 6,552,385, a loss of 1,622,739 persons, adding that the
population censuses were quite unreliable.
156a An abridged version of this chapter was published as Zadoks (2008).
157Good data are scarce. Geertsema (1868: 218) quoted data for a farm family with 3 children and 3
personnel that suggest a daily intake of ~2 kg/day per adult; Priester (1991: 365) quotes an estimate
from 1882 for a labourer’s family, man, woman, 3 or 4 children of 1,600 l/year, or ~3 kg/day per family, or
probably well over 1 kg/day for the labourer; in either case I suppose that the potatoes were supplemented
with other food.
158 Wehnelt (1943: 178) quotes Dietrich (1850) with a similar clause by a pastor in Giebichenstein
near Halle (Germany). The interesting detail is the reference to the sloppy cultivation of potatoes for
distillation purposes.
159 Brabant for short, officially Noord Brabant.
160 Belgium – Van Bavegem (1782); Belgium and the Netherlands - Van der Zaag (1999: 93/5); England
– Vanderplank (1949); France – Van Aelbroeck (1830: 187); contemporaneous instructions – Soetens
(1834), Albert (1845), Uilkens (1853: 43).
161 Potatovirus Y and several other potato viruses are transmitted by aphids, which are less frequent in
cool, moist and windy areas.
162 Salaman (1949: 120); Van der Zaag (1999: 92/3); contemporaneous recommendation – Uilkens (1855:
87).
163 Green lifting implies potatoes being lifted (harvested) when the foliage is still green and lush, in the
expectation that eventual viruses have not yet descended from the foliage into the tubers. Before green
lifting the foliage must be destroyed.
164 Friesland– 1807 ex Spahr Van der Hoek (1952: 646), 1809 ex Kops (1810: 357); Scotland – ex Van der
Zaag (1999: 92).
165 A few authors stated that the late blight disease was first found in Denmark, 1842 (De Bary, 1861; Gram
et al., 1940: 68). This date is not confirmed by the overwhelming evidence presented in this chapter. I
presume that the 1842 quotation is due to an erroneous interpretation of a report (not known to me) on
the hard rot disease of potato. In the early days the two diseases, due to a Fusarium and a Phytophthora,
respectively, were often confounded.
166 According to Bourson (1845) my statement would be too strong. On 18 July, 1843, the Provincial
Council of West Flanders voted 2000 BFR to import potatoes from the USA. Small quantities may have
been imported but the government refused to import potatoes by the shipload (F: cargaison). Though
foreign potatoes had been tested at Cureghem already for at least two years, Bourson is not explicit as
to the actual planting of tubers with USA provenance. He mentioned that at least one private person

Notes
experimented with potatoes obtained from the USA [probably at the University of Gent]. Bourson’s
vagueness may have been deliberate as he worked for the Belgian Ministry of the Interior.
I could not locate Cureghem in W Flanders. There is another Cureghem, a district in the municipality of
Anderlecht, in the W of the Brussels agglomeration.
167 Great Hunger - Woodham-Smith (1962); Black Years – Hoogerhuis (2003: 31).
168 I venture two possible, complemenary explanations, inadequate ripening of seed potatoes lifted
in a wet autumn 1845 and stored at relatively high temperatures, and drought combined with high
temperatures during early summer 1846.
169The observation that late blight in England began in low places was repeated many times in The
Gardeners’ Chronicle, 1845, as on page 592.
170 Decaisne (1846) quoted extensively from Desmazières; Bourson (1845: 2698); Roze (1898: 292).
171 Lestiboudois (1845: 245).
172 Vis(1845: 2-3) stated that the favoured variety Beaulieu was lost in 1844 ‘by the blackening of the
leaves and the dying of the plant’ (door zwart worden der bladeren en versterving der plant). He added that
the disease could not have come from the roots as in that case the foliage would have yellowed first.
173 Colza, swede rape, rape seed, Brassica napus L.
174 The Netherlands – Van der Zaag (1999: 108); general – Abel (1974: 365).
175 Un-harvested potatoes producing volunteer plants in the following season.
176Heesterbeek & Zadoks (1987); Zadoks & Van den Bosch (1994). In contemporaneous language: la
marche de la maladie était rayonante et successive (the course of the malady was radiating and gradual;
Bourson, 1845: 2720).
177 Two contemporaneous references found: Sauberg (1845: 30) ‘The last, worst and by wet rot affected
potatoes remain lying on the field’ (G: Die letzten, schlechtesten und nasse Fäulnis übergegangenen
Kartoffeln bleiben auf dem Felde liegen.) Anonymous (1846d: 213), in Overijssel, Netherlands: ‘In the
spring [of 1846] self-sown potatoes also appeared everywhere, that had been left on the field during
reaping or had been thrown aside as diseased or decayed, whereas the frost had not killed them during
the mild winter [1845/6].’ (Eveneens sloegen in het voorjaar overal de aardappels op, welke op den akker bij
het rooijen achtergelaten of als ziek en bedorven weggeworpen waren, terwijl gedurende den zachten winter
de vorst deze niet had gedood). Note that Fürnrohr (1845) recommended removal of rotting tubers from
the field.
178 Among others Bellis perennnis, Primula auricularia, Senecio vulgaris, Viola tricolor; mean temperature
in January 1846 was 5.1 °C, far beyond the 1833-1845 average of 1.9 °C.
179Allgemeine Zeitung #214, August 2nd , p1708. Die andauernde Hitze schmeltzt überall das Eis auf den
Bergen. Die Spitze des Montblanc ist gegenwärtig nackter Felsen, seit vielen Jahren war das Eis dort nicht
verschwunden. Mehrere Flüsse sind in Folgedessen aus ihren Ufern getreten, so der Rhone, welcher im Kanton

Notes
Wallis neuerdings 1000 Juchart Acker überschwemmte. The Mont Blanc (4807 m) is the highest mountain of
the Alps. The Allgemeine Zeitung was the semi-official organ of the Austrian government (Blum, 1948).
180 Allgemeine Zeitung #194 July 13th p1549 (Bavaria); #198 July 17th p1583 – a destructive hurricane
swept over Bohemia; #217 August 5th p1723 – a severe storm broke or even uprooted many trees and hail
destroyed the crops near Füssen in S Bavaria; etcetera.
181Strictly speaking these indexes, developed by IJnsen (1976 and 1981), are valid only for De Bilt in
the centre of the Netherlands, but they are indicative for the Netherlands and even beyond (the West
European Climate Zone). High values indicate hot summers and cold winters, respectively. The indexes run
from 0 to 100. The summer index has a normal distribution. The winter index is skewed to the right.
182 In his diary Hoekstra (1879) mentioned 16 March, 1845, as the coldest day since time immemorial. On
25 March harness races for horses had been organised on the ice of the Zuyderzee near Lemmer. At the
time the Zuyderzee was a salt water bay of the North Sea. Records of several similar exploits exist.
183 Hoekstra (1879) in his diary called the summer of 1846 the hottest summer within living memory. In
fact, it was the second hottest summer of the 19th century, the hottest being 1868.
184 Ising (1892: 71) Alle andere kunstmatige middelen liggen, naar onze overtuiging, buiten den kring van
pligten der Regering.
185 The~60 per cent loss in 1845 can be ascribed do the direct effect of late blight on the potato crop.
The ~40 per cent loss of 1846 is largely due to indirect effects. (1) A reduced potato area. (2) Transfer
of potato cultivation from clay soils to less productive sandy soils. (3) Shift to less productive early
potatoes. (4) Early summer drought. Direct effects occurred in places, usually less than in 1845.
186 Groningen (Priester, 1991: 342); Beijerland (Baars, 1973: 136), text of page 136, not clearly confirmed
by Fig. 61 on page 218; Bommelerwaard (Bieleman, 1992: 152); etc.
187 Bieleman (1987: 550); Priester (1991: 342). Generally speaking, potato crops on the sandy soils of the
Netherlands have a dryer micro-climate than on the clay soils, less conducive to late blight.
188 Atthe time, the Austrian-Hungarian double monarchy with the Austrian Crownlands covered a large
part of Central Europe, stretching roughly from S-Poland to N-Italy, and from Switzerland to the Ukraine.
In this paper Austria encompasses Imperial Austria and its Crownlands, with ~25 million inhabitants
(Bolognese-Leuchtenmuller, 1978; Hungarian Kingdom excluded).
189 Hlubek (1847: 65), Unger (1847: 307).
190 Macartney (1968: 313), Blum (1948: 110).
191 Lamberty (1949: 136); Lindemans (1952: 188).
192 See also Staats-Courant 1845 N° 237 dated 7 October. At the time the Dutchies Schleswig and Holstein
were under Danish rule. As Schleswig-Holstein they presently are a state of Germany, except for a northern
strip that voted to remain Danish.

Notes
193 Lille – Lestiboudois (1845: 245). SW France (Aquitaine) – Armengaud (1961: 173). Duchy of Savoy
– Bonjean’s (1846: 122) calculation of the loss in Savoy has to be updated. If a is the (known) amount
harvested and b is the (estimated) amount lost, Bonjean calculated the loss in terms of percentage as 100
x b/a = 100 x 1,645,976 / 2,002,914 = 82.2 per cent. Today we prefer to calculate the loss as 100 x b/(a+b)
= 100 x 1,645,976 / 3,648,890 = 45.1 per cent. Bonjean’s (ibid.: 123) estimate of financial loss is different.
He valued the harvest at 15.5 million francs (on a shaky base) and estimated the loss at 5 million francs
(without underlying data). At constant prices this would mean a loss of 24.4 per cent. We reject Bonjean’s
original figure (86 per cent) and prefer the use Bonjean’s tabulated data leading to ~45 per cent loss.
194 This term was borrowed from Newman & Simpson (1987) to indicate the various countries forming the
German Federation (G: Deutsche Bund) and the areas under their rule. Silesia (in present SW Poland), for
example, though ruled by Prussia, the most powerful country of the German Federation, did not belong
to the Federation. Austria belonged to the German Federation but not the many areas ruled by Austria,
Hungary foremost. Austria is discussed separately.
195 The combination of light foliar infection and considerable tuber infection is not exceptional, occurring
when the rains set in after a drought period, maybe because spores from the foliage are washed down to
the tubers through cracks in the soil. It happened in 2006 in some areas in the Netherlands (Besteman,
2007: 209).
196 Weber (1847) reported on the Germanies, 1846: Brunswick – Potatoes healthy but loss (by drought?)
25 per cent; Poznań – sometimes no tubers, only long roots; Prussia – in some areas loss (by drought)
over 60 per cent; Rhine Province – losses due to late blight; Silesia – In Upper-Silesia fields had to be
ploughed in. In Middle-Silesia poor tuber setting, much secondary growth after July rains, and late
blight. In Lower-Silesia drought damage.
197 Anonymous (1848b: 373): potato losses in Kingdom Prussia 31 per cent of average, in Silesia 61 per
cent of average; Virchow (1848: 37) in Upper Silesa nearly 100 per cent.
198 See also Staats-Courant 1846 N° 21 dated 24 January: 2.
199 Oekonomische Neuigkeiten 71: 204 (G: Die Noth is deshalb unbeschreiblich grosz).
200 Atthe time Switzerland was a geographic area, a conglomerate of fairly independent cantons, rather
than a nation-state. After the civil war fought in 1847 it became a nation-state.
201 The comments are quite pertinent in Quanjer et al. (1916: 12) and Quanjer et al. (1920: 54). In the
latter paper Dorst refers to a report of the ‘Royal Agricultural Society’, Londen, 1872, stating that many
potato varieties were degenerated and consequently highly susceptible to late blight. This interaction
was mentioned again by Schick & Klinkowski (1962: 1175, interaction with potato viruses X and Y).
202 Allgemeine Zeitung 1846 #198 July 17th: 1583.
203 Note that Prussia is the name of a kingdom and of a province or area within that kingdom.
204 Mecklenburg – Pogge (1893: 58); Silesia – Oekonomische Neuigkeiten und Verhandlungen 71 (1845:
64, 191).
205 Anonymous (1846a: 193).

Notes
206 Jansma & Schroor (1987: 59); Bieleman (1992: 51).
207 Allgemeine Zeitung 1846 #198 July 17th: 1583.
208 Pirenne (1932: 128), Dumont (1977: 399).
209 Agulhon et al. (1976: 140), Jardin & Tudesq (1973: 234), Le Roy Ladurie (2004: 623), Newman & Simpson
(1987: 383).
210 See
Table 2.1; Wehler, (1987: 643); several authors reported severe rust in wheat as in Brandenburg
and West Prussia.
211 Von Viebahn (1848: 14) visited the district along the river Netz (presently N Poland) on 10 June, 1846:
‘Der Stand der Früchte in dieser Landschaft hatte durch die anhaltende Dürre wesentich gelitten; insbesondere
der Roggen stand an manchen Stellen so slecht, dasz keine ergiebige Erndte mehr gehofft werden konnte.’
(The stand of the crops in this area suffered materially from the continuing drought; the rye especially
was so bad in many places that a good yield could no longer be hoped for).
212 W Prussia – Anonymous, 1846a; Bavaria – Allgemeine Zeitung 1846 #194 July 13th: 1549.
213 Allgemeine Zeitung 1846 #212 July 31st: 1694.
214 Wallis – Allgemeine Zeitung #201 July 20 th: 1607; Lichtenstein – Allgemeine Zeitung #202 July 21st:
1612.
215Austria – Macartney (1968: 313); Silesia (Prussia) – Anonymous (1848b: 381). Wikipedia – famine
general.
216 Experimental techniques were yet in the suckling stage. Fungal spores will infect plants only when the
environmental conditions are just right. If not, fungal spores will not germinate and penetrate their host
plant. Then, the serious experimentalist is bound to take sides with the anti-fungalists (e.g. Decaisne,
1846: 12; Gadichaud, 1846: 281; Harting, 1846: 247; Martens, 1845: 365/6; Unger, 1847: 309/10; Schacht,
1856: 9). According to my experience experimenters must have the right mind-set to persevere and bring
their experiments to a success. Maybe the anti-fungalists, ‘exanthemists’ and ‘environmentalists’, had
a prejudice against the concept of contagiousness of fungal disease and so did not persevere in their
efforts.
217 Gebel in Annalen der Landwirthschaft 1848, Vol. 11: 156 ‘das geschwächte innere Leben der Kartoffel’.
Nitsch (1846: 291) ‘Unläugbar ist es, dasz die Kartoffelkrankheiten in der gesunkenen Lebensenergie der
Pflanze liegen und dadurch ein krankhafter Vegetationsprocesz bedingt ist.’ (It is undeniable that the potato
diseases lie in the sunken life energy of the plants and that this determines a sickly vegetation process).
Note: Such views are typically echoes of ‘romantic phytopathology’ (Wehnelt, 1943).
218 Van Peyma (1845: 20) ‘The contamination and infection then occurs as it were quick as lightning
through air and wind stream, …’ (De besmetting en aansteking geschiedt dan als het ware vliegend snel
door lucht en windstroom, …); Committee (1845), the Committee described an incredibly fast infection
starting from initial foci, mentioning that many had seen a downwind dispersal, and delayed infection
of fields sheltered from the wind by forest.

Notes
219 In his review the Dutchman Uilkens (1852: 77/9) accepted the infectious nature of the fungus and the
wind-borne character of the epidemic.
220 A similar argument was worded in France (Lestiboudois, 1845: 263) ‘... by the noxious action of a
miasma among plants, the application of that doctrine on plants will be pushed back by the facts …(…
par l’action délétère d’un miasme chez les végétaux, l’application de cette doctrine à la maladie actuelle serait
repoussée par les faits …) and on p263 he quoted the otherwise well-informed Desmazières ‘… because,
according to him, it is unheard that a cryptogam would completely destroy a harvest, … (…parce que,
suivant lui, il est inoui qu’une cryptogame détruise complètement une récolte, …).
221 Among them Harting (1846: 288). La disposition à être atteint par le mal n’a pas été la même pour toutes
les variétés des pommes de terre (The disposition to be affected by the blight has not been the same for
all potato varieties); Martens (1845: 359) thought of quality differences among seed potatoes; see also
Hlubek (1847: 65); Lestiboudois (1845: 247); many others.
222 Committee (1845) Het loof der zieke aardappelen, dat buitendien geene waarde heeft, worde op het veld
verbrand en men verniele tevens alle onbruikbare en verrotte aardappelen, zoodat er van het ziekelijk gewas
zoo min mogelijk op het veld overblijve.
223 Foliage (Morren, 1845a), tubers (Hlubek, 1847: 69).
224 Dilutedsulphuric acid: Moleschott & Von Baumhauer (1845: 15); Morren (1845a).
Chalking: Molenschott & Von Baumhauer (1845: 1518); Morren (1845a). The latter advised to use a
mixture of chalk, salt and copper sulphate, in water or as a dry powder.
225 Morren (1845b: 376). ‘Toutes les récoltes de pommes de terre faites autour des usines de zinc, à Angleur,
à St-Léonard, à la Vieille-Montagne, dans le cercle d’action des substances volatiles qui s’échappent autour de
ses usines et qui font tant de ravage parmi quelques espèces d’arbres, ont été excellentes et à l’abri complet du
fléau.’ ‘… et ce fait est de la plus haute importance, car il ne peut s’expliquer que par l’action d’une substance
métallique comme matière de chaulage sur la végétation.’ (All the potato harvests made around the zinc
factories at Angleur, St-Léonard and Vieille-Montagne, within the action radius of the volatile substances
that escape around their factories and that do so much damage to some tree species, have been excellent
and completely protected from the scourge. … and this fact is of the highest importance, because it
can be explained only by the action of a metallic substance as a chalking [= chemical treatment] on the
vegetation).
226A similar observation was made on potatoes growing around copper smelting works in Wales, 4
September 1846 (Reader, 2008: 206).
227 Bergsma (1845: 9): ‘Niet zelden zag men een land met aardappelen in een paar dagen geheel van
voorkomen veranderen en bespeurde men, vooral des avonds, eenen ondragelijken stank, welke zich op eenen
aamerkelijken afstand verspreidde’. (ibid.: 30): ‘De waarnemingen dat de ziekte bij derzelver verspreiding
dikwijls de rigting van den wind gevolgd is, wordt nog meer waarschijnlijk, daar sommige, achter heggen of
boomen groeijende aardappelen, verschoond gebleven zijn, en eerst later de ziekte gekregen hebben.’ (ibid.:
15): ‘…, dat wij tot het besluit moeten komen, dat de krul, roest en kankerachtige ziekte van elkander niet
verschillen.’ Bergsma was deeply impressed by the potato dry rot epidemic (Von Martius, 1842) that had
already affected many Dutch potato fields. He had translated Von Martius’ treatise into Dutch. The word
‘rust’ (D: roest) for potato blight came out of the blue. Bergsma apparently used it in a non-specific way
similar to the old usage of the word ‘blight’.

Notes
228 Thestench was a typical symptom at field level, mentioned by several authors (e.g. Bergsma, 1845);
very unlike the smell of a healthy potato field (Schacht, 1856).
229Harting (1846), an influential biologist, performed quite sensible infection experiments that,
unfortunately, failed. Thus he became an anti-fungalist, referring to Unger (1833).
230 Vrolik
et al. (1846: 12) Dat de proeven, hoewel, wat de ziekte betreft, niet aan het oogmerk beantwoord
hebbende, echter, door het op zeer onderscheiden gronden voortbrengen van nieuwe soorten … niet
onbelangrijk geweest zijn, in vele opzichten leerzaam en niet geheel ongunstige resultaten voor de toekomst
belovende.
231 Butler & Jones (1955: 521); Uilkens (1855: 39); Van der Zaag (1999); Vanderplank (1968: 153) provided
a 20th century empirical argument.
232 Enklaar (1846: 273) stated that the more tasty varieties suffered more from the disease.
233 Desmazières described Botrytis fallax in 1844 already but he rather thought it to be the consequence
and not the cause of the disease. The priest Van den Hecke identified a Botrytis, 31 July 1845. A fungus
was inculpated by Martens on 14 August, by Vanoye and by Morren on 18 August 1845 (Bourson, 1845;
Semal, 1995).
234 Fürnrohr (1845): Selection of healthy tubers for planting in 1846 and continuous health surveillance,
winter storage of consumption potatoes, industrial use of diseased tubers, removal of rotting tubers
from the field.
235 Unger (1833) claimed that fungi, that we now see as pathogens, were not the cause but the consequence
of disease; they appeared rather as a kind of ‘rash’ (exanthema) on internally diseased plants.
236 Sneller, 1943: 73ff, 434; Van Zanden, 1985: 116 (starheid van het loonpeil = ‘rigidity of the wage level’,
specifically in the first half of the 19th century).
237 Around 1850, a landless labourer rented a potato plot of about 1/3 ha (with hog ½ ha) at the price of
twenty days’ work (Van der Zaag, 1999: 111).
238In his eulogy on the potato Parmentier (1781: 151) already quoted the beneficial effect of potato
eating on sailors suffering from scurvy.
239 E.g. Agulhon et al. (1976: 10); Hofstee (1978); Figure 3.7.
240 Augustin Sageret in Tessier et al. (1818: 756) wrote enthousiastically that one arpent (an area measure)
of potatoes could feed 5-6 times as many persons as one arpent of wheat. A more normal ratio was 2 to 3
times. Slicher Van Bath (1987: 293 and 407 – note 205) and Reader (2008: 128) quoted authors relating
rapid population growth to the then new cultivation of the potato. For a similar, contemporaneous
remark see Hlubek (1847: 65).
241Many authors, e.g. Bergman (1967: 400); Hofstee (1978); Lutz (1985: 244). In Drenthe (NL), a poor
province, the birth rate decreased from ~10 (mean over 1841/45) to 3 per cent (mean over 1846/50;
Bieleman, 1987: 97). Zeeland – Priester (1998: 77).

Notes
242 500,000 (Connell, 1962: 64; Dupâquier, 1980), 2 million (Woodham-Smith, 1962).
243 Hofstee (1978: 212). Excess deaths not due to cholera amounted to ~53,000, disregarding the provinces
of Brabant and Limburg, over the years 1846-1849. This figure approaches the 60,000 of Turner (2006:
342, no source given).
244 The late J.B. Ritzema van Ikema, when president of the Wageningen Agricultural University, used to
tell me about letters written by one of his forefathers, a well-to-do farmer in the NW corner of Groningen,
neighbouring the sea, complaining about the poor quality of the quinine delivered by the Groningen
chemist. I remember that in ~1938, just before World War II, my mother, living in a marshy area just
outside Amsterdam, got malaria. Thanks to DDT malaria was eradicated from the Netherlands shortly
after World War II.
245 Priester (1998: 62); De Meere (1982) – The malaria outbreak in Amsterdam, 1846, caused many excess
deaths in the severe winter 1846/7 due to under-nourishment. Also Jansen & de Meere (1982).
246 We do not know whether these peaks are statistically significant.
247A sketch of the abject situation in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam was given by the Allgemeine
Zeitung #183 dd 02-07-1846: 1460 (Augsburg Edition). For disease and mortality rates see Jansen & de
Meere (1982: 186ff).
248 The Netherlands – Hofstee (1978: 210); Terlouw (1971: 288); ~6,000 deaths in Belgium – Lamberty
(1949: 136); ~146,000 deaths in France – Dupâquier (1988: 293); Ireland – Powell (1998: 1106).
249 Belgium – André & Pereira-Roque (1974); Flanders – Lamberty (1949: 136); Ó Gráda (1989: 60); West
Flanders – Hofstee (1978: 199).
250 Estimatefor Prussia based on tables by Mohorst (1977) and Kraus (1980). Data for East Prussia from
Wehler (1987: 653), for Upper Silesia from Lutz (1985: 444). Abel (1974: 388) comparing 1844 and 1847
stated that deaths in Prussia increased from 403 to 512 thousands, implying 109,000 excess deaths.
Diseases and figures vary. Wehler (1987: 653) speaks of typhus with 30,000 deaths in Upper Silesia, and
50,000 (excess?) deaths in total.
251More precisely: the pre-industrial chronic poverty of large numbers of people in a region and/or
period. The term seems to be typical for the early and mid 19th century.
252The Netherlands – Brugmans (1929: 73); Flanders – Lamberty (1949: 135); the Germanies – Lutz
(1985: 84, 94).
253 Mr.Ph.J. Bachine, a respectable gentleman living in the city of Sluis, near the border with Flanders
(Belgium), complained that up to 200 beggars a day knocked on his door in the early winter of 1845 (ex
Kroes, 1987: 34).
254 De Joode (1981: 143); original source not known.
255 ‘... la misère... à l’état endémique...’ (Agulhon et al., 1976: 78).

Notes
256 Mosthistorians think that the economic crisis in France began as a rural crisis but Droz (1967: 267)
inverted the argument. Agriculture was dragged into the crisis because landowners withdrew money
from agriculture to invest in movables.
256a ‘...
des explosions de colère dans les masses rurales.’ (‘... explosions of fury among the rural masses.’
Agulhon et al., 1976: 78).
257 For a recipe see von Bujanovics (1847).
258 Guin (1982: 116).
259 See Goebel’s (1980) insightful analysis of ‘Les Paysans’. This novel is situated in about 1844. The first
part appeared in serial form in ‘La Presse’, 1844. The complete text was published posthumously in 1855.
The fictional but factual content and its moral background are precisely confirmed by historical evidence
as presented by e.g. Vigreux (1998).
260 Armengaud (1961: 179) ‘Plus de 25,000 personnes touchent au moment de n’avoir plus d’aliments’ and
at Rimont two thirds of the inhabitants ‘manquent de tout: sans argent, sans pain, sans pommes de terre,
sans travail, sans crédit enfin’.
261 Agulhon et al. (1967: 399), Newman & Simpson (1987: 897), Vigreux (1998: 227/238).
262 Bergman (1967: 405) shows a map of Dutch towns with riots in 1845/7.
263 Vigreux (1998: 233) commented that the straw-thatched cottages could have caught fire spontaneously,
or by imprudence, during the excessively hot and dry summer of 1846.
264 Jardin & Tudesq (1973: 236); Vigreux 1998: 232/3).
265 Berlin, April 21-23, 1847, had its potato revolution (G: Kartoffelrevolution) with pilfering of food shops;
the revolutionaries had no political aims (Droz, 1957: 109).
266 Hoekstra (1879); Hoogerhuis (2003: 31); Priester (1998: 60); Terlouw (1971: 290). In the period 1845-
1847 some 1100 Dutch families sailed for America, among them many Frisian farmers (Wumkes, 1934:
222). Probably, the number is too low.
267 Bergman (1967); Ising (1892); Terlouw (1971).
268 The rule was confirmed by its exceptions, among them the parsons Heldring (1845) and Hooijer (1847),
who earnestly tried to organise relief work.
269E.g. Abel (1974: 379); Armengaud (1961: 180); Jardin & Tudesq (1973: 236) – Toulouse and
Bordeaux.
270 The very Irish gentleman Austin Bourke (1993: 178) stated ‘It should be said right away that there is
not a title of evidence during these years which points to deliberate malintent towards the Irish people
on the part of the British government or its representatives in Ireland. There is, on the contrary, ample
proof, in all their deliberations and acts, of a sincere desire, within the then accepted ideas of the limits
of legitimate government action, to alleviate the crisis brought on by the potato failure.’

Notes
271 De Bosch Kemper (1882: 68). Note that this action is meant to be the opposite of ‘hoarding’, merchants
buying grain and keeping it until the price had gone up, as in France, 1846 (Agulhon et al., 1976: 141).
272 Hoekstra (1879) in 1846: Men heeft hier te Irnsum voor de gemeene man het brood afgeslagen tot op 5
stuivers, waarvoor de uitgaven uit een kollect bij de notabelste ingezetenen gevonden worden.
273 Newspaper clip 31 May, 1847 (Wumkes, 1934: 219).
274 Virchow(1848: 39/41). Breslau is present Wrocław in S Poland. Das Breslauer Comité, welches erst aus
ganz Deutschand Geld zusammenbetteln musste, war eher auf dem Platz, als die Regierung!
275 Lette, XX (1847: 28) ‘Über die bäuerlichen Creditverhältnisse der Provinz’. (On the farmers’credit situation
in the province).
276 Seelman-Eggebert (1928: 62) Was nun die Geschichte dieser Vereine betrifft, so ist deren Geburtsstätte
der untere Westerwald, in der Preussischen Rheinprovinz, die eigentliche ursprüngliche Zeit der Entstehung
das Notjahr 1847.
277Terlouw (1971: 291) ascribes the financial crisis in London to grain speculation; Woodham-Smith
(1962: 408) mentions the financial crisis of 1847 without comment. See also Reader (2008: 184 ff).
278 Paris – Furet (1988: 372); Newman & Simpson (1987: 898). New York, London, Frankfurt – Wehler
(1987: 651); London – Ó Gráda (1989: 46); Vienna – Rumpler (1997: 276). Bickel (1974: 123) stated that
this financial crisis was the first that originated in the USA but Wyckoff (1972: 223) wrote that the crisis
at the New York Stock Exchange was imported from Europe.
279 ICT = Interactive Computer Technology.
280The German daily Allgemeine Zeitung, usually avoiding detail, reported on railway shares in Europe
every day of July and August, 1848.
281 Rabl (1906: 149), letter dated 18 May, 1848, that is 2 months after the March Revolution in Berlin: ‘…,
täglich werden neue Massen von Handwerkern brodlos, die Fabriken stehen eine nach der andere still u. wir
Alle werden in unserer Nährung gestört’.
282 Ackersdijck et al. (1852: 324): Paris industry produced a value of 1.46 billion French Francs in 1847
but only 0.67 in 1848, a decrease of over 50 per cent. Some 186,000 workers out of 342,000 were without
work, again over 50 per cent.
283 Houssel (1976: 236), Furet (1988: 374), Jardin & Tudesq (1973: 238).
284 Lutz (1985: 244); Wehler (1987: 641); many others.
285 Virchow (1848: 13) … ‚das Kind an der Mutterbrust wurde schon mit Schnapps gefüttert’.
286 Dutch citizens subscribed to the loan, not without some moral pressure.
287 Bergman (1967: 418), Terlouw (1971: 272).

Notes
288 See e.g. Sen (1981); Drèze & Sen (1989).
289 Leonhard (2006: 11), e.g. Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg, but not Prussia and Austria.
290 The 19th century liberalism bears little relationship with the current idea of a ‘liberal’ in the USA
around 2000, where it is nearly a term of abuse. The Constitution of the USA (1787) typically resounds a
‘liberal’ tone, liberal in its classical meaning.
291 This gathering of March, 24th , 1848, was later described as emancipatory and non-revolutionary though
it ended inevitably with some window smashing and pilfering (Brugmans, 1929: 188). Nonetheless it
impressed the King, an emotional person. According to Fuchs (1970: 58/9) a foreign communist agitator
manoeuvred in the background.
292 De Beus (2006: 86): ‘It entailed sovereignty of the Dutch state, constitutional monarchy, bicameral
parliament, ministerial responsibility and unity of cabinet policy, separation of state and church …,
basic rights and liberties for all citizens,… public utility monopolies, assistance of the poor, education,
and arts and sciences’.
293The Second French Republic under Cavaignac’s new ‘Constitution of the Republic’ held until 2
December, 1852, when Bonaparte became Emperor of France, ruling as an absolute monarch with a lame
Parliament.
294 Droz (1957: 111) ‘avait ébranlé l’autorité et le crédit de l’État’.
295 Mitchel with his ‘Young Ireland Party’ and a group of peasants attacked the police station of Tipperary.
Mitchel was caught within a week (Woodward, 1938: 3342).
296 Gotthelf,
a pious protestant, warned against the ‘liberals’. Gotthelf (meaning ‘so help me God’) was
the pseudonym of Albert Bitzius, a prolific writer with a keen eye for actuality.
297 Mommsen (1998): Die Revolution von 1848 war nicht das Produkt zielbewusster revolutionärer Aktionen:
sie war eher eine Implosion der überkommenen Statsordnung auf dem Europäischen Kontinent, deren
Legitimitätsgeltung schlagartig eingebrochen war und für deren Erhaltung zu Kämpfen mit einem Male als
aussichtslos empfunden wurde.’
298 Wehler (1987: 659) Einen direkten Nexus zwischen Hungerkrise, Getreidetumulten and Kartoffelrevolten
einerseits, der Revolution von 1848 andererseits zu unterstellen, hiesse, einer simplifizierenden Verkürzung
Komplizierteren Zusammenhänge zu erliegen and he added ... der Krise von 1845 bis 1848‚ das Präludium
zur 48er Revolution in ganz Europa.
299 Pirenne (1932: 128) La crise économique se complique bientôt d’une crise alimentaire.
300 Lutz (1985: 244) Die wirtschaftliche Strukturkrise der vierziger Jahre, die durch Bevölkerungsdruck,
Massenarbeitslosigkeit und Pauperismus gekennzeichnet war, wurde 1846/7 durch eine akute Krise verschärft.
Die Kartoffelkrankheit und Missernten führten zu einer Hungersnot, die sich in Epidemieen und in einem
Rückgang der Geburtenrate äusserte. (ibid.: 245): So erwuchsen aus Hungersnot und Hungerepidemie
oppositionelle Kritik und öffentliche Bewusstseinsbildung, and (ibid.: 245) Ein unmittelbarer Zusammenhang
zwischen den Hungerunruhen 1847 und der Revolution wurde auch von nichtsozialistischen Zeitgenossen
angenommen.

Notes
301 Sneller (1943: 436). … het gaf tevens den stoot mee tot de vreedzame omwenteling in het landsbestuur
in het jaar 1848 ….
302 Le Roy Ladurie (2004: 623): Sévit enfin, s’agissant toujours d’événementiel et de variabilité, la longue et
chaude sécheresse du printemps et de l’été 1846, laquelle, avec la maladie des pommes de terre, notamment
irlandaises, porte certaines responsabilités via la dépression économique de 1847 née de cette mauvaise
récolte; elle implique effectivement une espèce de culpabilité climatique, fût-elle partielle, vis-à-vis du
déclenchement ultérieur de révolutions de France et puis d’Europe occidentale et centrale, à partir de février
1848, dans l’ambiance d’une crise de l’économie qui procède en effet de la difficile année-post-récolte 1846-
1847; dans l’ambiance aussi, corrélative, d’un certain mécontentement des peuples divers. 
303 Ising
(1892: 47) ‘… landbouwer, die voor het mislukken van zijn aardappelen in de hooge prijzen zijner
granen meer dan vergoeding vindt …’
304 Rüter (1950: 524): Het afgeloopene jaar is voor den landbouw in dit gewest, over het geheel, zeer
voordeelig geweest, niet zoozeer door een rijken en overvloedigen oogst, als wel door de hooge prijzen van
alle voortbrengselen.
305 The weight of the evidence presented in this paper is variable. Population statistics were sufficiently
accurate for the present purpose, migration data excepted. Yield statistics were not readily available
except for the excellent data from Belgium, 1846, and the more approximative Prussian data. Most
yield data are from quotations by historians who did not mention their sources. Data on the late blight
epidemic, 1845, from the Netherlands, Belgium and Prussia are considered fairly reliable though not very
accurate; independent and contemporaneous confirmation was found in the Staatscourant (Appendix
3.1). The 1846 data from the Netherlands, however, are vague. For the Netherlands contemporaneous
and independent confirmation was found in the newspaper Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant with its daily
updates. With increasing distance from a nuclear area, roughly the Netherlands, Belgium and W Prussia,
the information became less accessible, vaguer, lighter. Nonetheless, I believe to have given a fair and
consistent picture of potato late blight and its consequences in Continental Europe.
306 Rotting during transport was mentioned several times. In Bremen a shipload of potatoes was thrown
in the river because they were rotting (Fürnrohr, 1845: 935). Van Rossum (1845) received about 25
October, 1845, 1500 ‘mud’ (= ~1000 hl) of good quality potatoes from Stettin (= Gdańsk) but some tubers
were rotten and several others infected.
Chapter 4
307 Unpublished biographical note by my grandfather’s eldest son, then 26 years old, a person blessed
with an absolute memory. So far I did not find a confirmation in Amsterdam police reports. Dr Nicolaas
Marinus Josephus Jitta, ophthalmologist and ‘hygienist’ (= epidemiologist), was chosen a member of the
Amsterdam City Council, 1899, for the Liberal Union. In 1905 he became the Alderman for Public Health
and Market Trade. An administrator rather than a politician, he relinquished late in 1917, feeling deeply
hurt by the violent attacks of the opposition in the City Council after the riots.
308 Amsterdam Municipal Archive, minutes of the City Council meetings. Gemeenteblad van Amsterdam
1917 Vol. I-2: 859-868 (Mayor’s answers to interpellations in Council Session), Vol. II-2 (Public discussion
in Council, 11 July 1917)

Notes
309 World War I began 1 August 1914, when Germany declared war to Russia, and ended 11 November 1918
with the armistice signed at Compiègne in France. The peace treaty was signed at Versailles (France) on
28 June, 1919. From an agricultural point of view the harvest seasons 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918 are of
interest.
310 Potatoes had been rationed temporarily.
311 The Dutch farmers’ weekly De Veldbode (= The Field Messenger) did not discuss potato late blight in
1915, 1916, or 1917. The profitability of Bordeaux mixture was mentioned casually in an unrelated paper
(Vol. 14 – 1916: 112). Overijsselsch Landbouwblad (Agricultural Journal of Overijssel), 1-3 (1916-1918).
312 Annual Reports 1903-1930 (1851-1960).
313 Annual Report on 1921: 26.
314In a more formal treatment we should relate the variables d, yo and ye to the specific year t under
consideration: dt = yo(t) – ye(t), and δt = dt / Sx. The index t has been omitted.
315H.M. Quanjer, pharmacist by training, assistant of Professor J. Ritzema Bos in Amsterdam and
Wageningen, later Professor of Phytopathology at the Wageningen Agricultural College, founder of the
Laboratory for Mycology and Potato Research at Wageningen, the only ‘European Correspondent’ ever of
the American journal ‘Phytopathology’.
316 This statement, not infrequent in Dutch and German literature of the time, is contrary to recent
experience. Two explanations, not mutually exclusive, are proposed. (1) The late blight appeared late,
when the early potatoes had already completed their growth, as suggested repeatedly. (2) In recent times
the late varieties have ‘field resistance’, a characteristic selected for after World War II. I surmise that
the late varieties around 1900 were, in modern eyes, highly susceptible. During World War I a cultivar
such as ‘Bintje’ was coming into favour and its relative susceptibility apparently was not an obstacle; it
fell out of grace around 2000 when it was considered far too susceptible.
317 Quanjer (1911, 1912, 1914); Ritzema Bos (1919).
318 See for illustration Bieleman & Van Otterloo (2000: 212).
319 SeeTable 7 in Van der Poel (1967: 213). Spraying machine dated 1913 in Van der Poel (1967, Figure
82: 212).
320 Annual Report on 1917 (XVIII): little spraying because of dearth of CuSO4.
321 Van Bavegem (1782); Uilkens (1853); Vanderplank (1949).
322 Anonymous (1910: XXI); Annual Report on 1913: XVI.
323 Salaman (1949) wrote 1904. Otto Appel (1906a) introduced the name ‘Blattrollkrankheit’ (= leaf roll
disease) for the new potato disease of 1905, resembling the old ‘curl’ but sufficiently distinct to be given
a separate name. In Denmark Rostrup (1906) called 1905 a typical insect-year (Danish: Insektaar). In the
Netherlands the summer index of 1905 was 60 (Figure 4.1A). Both data suggest a fine summer with little
rain, that might have been favourable to aphids and hence to dispersal of viruses.

Notes
324 Combine harvesters were not yet in use.
325Septoria tritici (Mycosphaerella graminicola) and Septoria nodorum (Leptosphaeria (Stagonospora)

nodorum), not to mention various Helminthosporium and Fusarium diseases. See historical overview on
the Septorias by Zadoks (2003).
326 The Annual Reports sometimes mention other sources of information providing slightly different
figures.
327 I have not found a mechanistic or physiological explanation for the effect. Possibly the good quality
of seed potatoes, fully ripened and little infested by pathogens, is part of the explanation.
328 At the time the potato harvest was not yet mechanised.
329 Kielmansegg (1980: 177); Herzfeld (1968: 184).
330 Herzfeld (1968: 185); Siney (1957: 36).
331 ‘Annual Report’ on 1914: VII, LXXIII.
332 ‘Annual Report’ on 1914: LXXIV ff, 1915: LXVIII ff, 1916: LXVII ff, 1917: LXVI, 1918: LIX. Farmers were
invited to make fertiliser claims, and these were checked by the municipal authorities. Fertilisers were
distributed in proportion to the approved claims.
333The Annual Reports of 1914 to 1918 contained short paragraphs on ‘Agriculture and war’ (D: De
landbouw en de oorlog), that emphasised the transition from open export-oriented to closed self-
supporting production. Rapid rises in production costs could not always be compensated by rises in
product prices. The reports expressed great concern about the supply of fertilisers since most had to
imported. However, yield figures do not convincingly indicate production losses due to lack of fertilisers.
(1914: VII, 1915: VII, 1916: VII, 1917: VII, 1918: V).
334 Annual Report on 1918: LXXVI. Practically all exports had been prohibited.
335If we assume, as a first guess, that starch potatoes at the time contained about 20% starch, the
potato flour exports were roughly equivalent to the fresh potato exports. Other potato products can be
neglected here.
336 As an Alderman my grandfather offered cheap rice, of which there was ample stock, to the protesting
Amsterdam women but they refused the offer indignantly. One woman worded the reason ‘If I put this
[= rice] before my husband, I’ll get hell’ (Anonymous, 1917: 1460). Refusal to change the diet in times of
scarcity is of all times and all countries, and may lead to a misplaced famine alarm.
337 Typical is the dejected comment by the Mayor of Amsterdam in the city Council Meeting after the 1917
food riots: ‘We need the cooperation of England and Germany. It seems necessary to buy that cooperation.
To buy it with potatoes that we would prefer to keep ourselves.’ (Wij hebben de medewerking van Engeland
en Duitsland nodig. De medewerking schijnt gekocht te moeten worden. Gekocht met aardappelen, die wij
liever zelven zouden houden) Gemeenteblad van Amsterdam 1917 Vol II-2: 1479.
338 www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Europe/netherlc.htm. Accessed April, 2006.

Notes
339 Opinionsvary about the health effects of the scarcity (Bieleman & Van Otterloo, 2000: 256 ff), from
pernicious to just tolerable.
340 When the Germans bombed Antwerp, October 1914, about one million Belgians fled to the Netherlands.
Some 30,000 arrived by train in Amsterdam (Kruizinga, 2002: 120). In the course of 1914 and early 1915
some 900,000 Belgians repatriated (Pirenne, 1928: 278).
341 In
June, 1916, the scarcity of potatoes was threatening and what was available had a poor quality.
Demonstrations occurred in many Dutch cities.
342 Among which, notably, Rotterdam, 1917 (Bieleman & Van Otterloo, 2000: 256 ff).
343 Potato riot (D: Aardappeloproer). The spring of 1917 saw many protests again. The week following
28 June, 1917, riots, lootings and strikes occurred in Amsterdam and several other places (Huijboom,
1992; Kruizinga, 2002: 15). For Amsterdam, the Gemeenteblad I-2: 868 quoted 9 casualties, 114 wounded
civilians, and looting of 8 shops, 5 warehouses, 1 hand-cart(!), 2 wagons, 3 railway vans, and 3 barges
(Fuchs, 1970: 121, gives slightly different figures).
The government wanted to export potatoes to remain at good terms with England as well as with Germany.
It was said that two wagons loaded with potatoes for exportation, stationed in the Amsterdam railway
yard ‘De Rietlanden’, were looted by a crowd of hundreds of angry women. The official version, however,
reads that these potatoes were being transferred to a barge with the grocery market as its destination,
that the women exacted a sale and that the enforced sale – not without the consent of the owners of
the potatoes - took place under the supervision of the police (Anonymous, 1917 II-2: 1297/8). Small
quantities (3 kg per person) were sold at the official price. Women, who did not carry their purse with
them, obtained the potatoes on credit (Anonymous, 1917 II-2: 1469).
344 According to modern standards the enquiry was not representative; it was serious but possible
prejudiced; its emotional impact was considerable.
345 Annual Report on 1916: VIII.
346 Kielmansegg (1980: 178) and various other German authors. Sneller (1943: 24).
347 Thispaper did not consider grain in storage before the outbreak of the war nor grain imported in the
early war years.
348 The rust was probably yellow stripe rust (Puccinia striiformis); a yellow rust epidemic developed
in S Germany, Bavaria (Hiltner, 1905). Yellow rust was prominent in Denmark on wheat, barley and rye
(Rostrup, 1905: 355).
349 Inthe period June through August there were large precipitation differences between N (< 200 mm)
and S (> 300 mm; Annual Report over 1905: IX), visible in potato yields (ibid.: XVI). See Table 4.5.
350In N Germany 1905 was a typical blight year; simultaneously an epidemic of the ‘curl’ developed
with ‘leaf roll’ as the prominent symptom (Appel, 1906: 122). No mention was found of curl, 1905, in the
Netherlands.
351 Accordingto De Bokx (1982) 1906 was a typical curl year. Present author’s comment: Seed potatoes
could have been infected during the relatively fine (and possibly aphid-rich) summer of 1905.

Notes
352 Groningen wheat area at least 25 % below mean of 1906 and 1908.
353 Annual Report on 1908 (XIV) mentioned ´threatening curl in 1907´.
354 Rain damage to wheat in July (Groningen) and in August (Zeeland).
355 According to De Bokx (1982) 1908 was a typical curl year again.
356 In De Bilt temperatures down to -16 °C, in Groningen some 20% of winter wheat frozen and ploughed
under (locally up to 50%), but in Zeeland good yields though poor quality.
357 In
Brabant rye damaged by corn thrips (possibly Limothrips cerealium), in Limburg increase in stem
nematode (Ditylenchys dipsaci) damage.
358 According to De Bokx 1909 was another typical curl year.
359 Comment not confirmed by Figure 4.3c. I have no explanation of the discrepancy.
360 Probably due to the fungus Gäumannomyces graminis.
361 Good effect of Bordeaux mixture. In Zeeland the 10% of fields that had been sprayed produced good
yield and quality (Annual Report on 1913: XVI-XVII).
362 The rust was most probably yellow rust (Puccinia striiformis). It affected mainly new wheat varieties
from Svalöff (Sweden) and spring wheat Japhet. In 1914 yellow rust was epidemic from the Netherlands
to far into present Poland, Austria and S Germany (various sources in Zeitschrift für Pflanzenkrankheiten,
1914-1918). Rust on barley might have been P. striiformis. This rust and P. hordei respond in nearly the
same way to environmental conditions.
363 Probably the brown rust (Puccinia recondita); it was severe in some areas of Germany.
364 Probably barley dwarf rust (Puccinia hordei).
365 Mainly black grass (slender foxtail, Alopecurus myosuroides, D: wintergras, duist).
366 Verticillium wilt probably due to Verticillium albo-atrum. The Annual Report on 1918 mentioned an
increase in potato area in reaction to higher prices (XVI) and an improved procurement of seed potatoes
as field inspection services extended and farmers strived for change of seed potatoes (XVII).
367 Disastrous late blight epidemic in Germany (Schick & Klinkowski, 1962: 1170).
Chapter 5
368 These authors probably based their judgment on an explicit statement by Löhr vom Wachendorf (1954:
121), a statement not incorrect but exaggerated and too one-sided.
369The armistice was signed on 11 November 1918 in a railway carriage, in the forest of Compiègne,
France. The blockade of Germany was continued except for food. The Peace Treaty was signed 28 June
1919 in Versailles, France.

Notes
370 World War I affected all aspects of civilian life by propaganda, psychological warfare, food rationing,
female and child labour, bombing of open cities, starving the enemy, and so on. It affected numerous
countries and spread over Europe, Africa, Asia (Near and Far East), the Atlantic Ocan, and beyond.
371 Mommsen (2004: 92/3).
372 According to various authors, e.g. Hirschfeld et al. (2003: 461, 565); Mommsen (1995: 682).
373 Flemming (1978: 82). Two million out of 3.4 million able-bodied men were drafted.
374 ‘Wet planting’ (G: nasze Bestellung; Schander, 1917: 162). No explanation of this comment was found.
Supposedly the small farmers were in a hurry to plant in view of the lack of labour.
375 Weediness was stressed by Aereboe (1927: 38, 94). See also Illustrierte Landwirtschaftliche
Zeitung 37#4 (1917) January 13th - Weeding is light work, can be done by school youth. Deutsche
Landwirtschaftliche Presse 44 (1917: 43, 235) – Weeding by school kids was obligatory in Prussia as of
3 February, 1917.
376 Schander (1917: 162); Flemming (1978: 86), overcropping, premature exhausting (G: Raubbau) of soil
and people.
377 E.g. Herzfeld (1968: 180); Flemming (1978: 96) ‘As the dogma of the war’s short duration had prevented
prospective activities for an economic mobilisation in peace-time’.
378 The Haber-Bosch procedure produced ammonia from H2 and N2 in the air applying a large input of
energy (from coal). Ammmonia was oxydised to nitrate. Industrial application of the procedure began
in 1913.
379 In my experience rusts, mildew, and ripening diseases of cereals often have a reduced impact on yield
when nutrient supply, especially of N, is poor. No comments to this effect were found.
380 See also §4.4.1. D: Degeneratie, ontaarding, verval, veroudering. E: Degeneration, deterioration, running
out. F: déchéance, dégéneration. G: Abbau, Entartung, Verfall, Herabzüchtung. The phenomenon was well
known but attitudes differed. The German Hoppe was the first to describe the disease, in 1747 (Salaman,
1949). The German Kühn (1858) thought it nonsense, being only of local occurrence. Quanjer (1921a)
identified several non-filterable agents that could be reproduced in pure culture (in planta). French
(e.g. Blanchard & Perret, 1917) and German researchers thought of environmental conditions primarily,
though they did not negate ‘vertical transmission’. German resistance to the idea of viruses as causal
agents re-appeared in the review by Morstatt (1925: 44), who quoted a colleague ‘The Dutch concept of
degeneration cannot be considered as generally correct’ (G: Die Holländische Auffassung des Abbaues kann
nicht als allgemein richtig gesehen worden). Morstatt mentioned the word ‘virus’ rarely (ibid.: 50, 64) and
not at all in his conclusions where ‘local conditions’ (G: Standortsbedingungen) is the one-but-last word.
Several potato viruses are transmitted by aphids which thrive during periods of dry weather.
381The epidemic spread to the Netherlands (De Bokx, 1982), Denmark (Lind, 1916a), and other
countries.
382 Denial of Quanjer views (e.g. Schander & Tiesenhausen, 1914; Esmarch, 1919; Neger, 1919) was common
in Germany. Only A. Mayer quoted Quanjer in a positive sense (Fülings Landwirtschaftliche Zeitung 65:

Notes
474-478). O. Appel acknowledged the idea of an infectious contagium (Fühlings Landwirtschaftliche

Zeitung 67, 1918: 85).
383 Blanchard & Perret (1917).
384 Rozendaal (1949: 105), Van der Zaag (1999: 96).
385 Remy (1916); Remy was stationed in Bonn, on the river Rhine, in W Germany.
386 Compare seed potatoes grown in Scotland and exported to England, and those grown in Friesland and
exported to other parts of the Netherlands (Van der Zaag, 1999).
387 German rail transportation was excellent. During the war it was made subservient to military
purposes. It became a total mess only during the winter 1916-1917 when, unfortunately, transportation
by water had become impossible because all waterways had been frozen (Herzfeld, 1968). In addition,
recent regulations ruled against seed potato exchange. Remy (1916: 818) complained about difficulties
in shipping seed potatoes from E to W Germany; see also Schander (1917: 150).
388 Lossesas quoted by Schander are not too bad. Wennink (1918) found that loss due to leaf-roll could
be up to 90 per cent.
389 Quanjer et al. (1921a: 13), Schander (1918: 219).
390 Schander (1918: 220); in the Netherlands good results were obtained by spraying Bordeaux mixture
(Quanjer, 1912, 1914; Ritzema Bos, 1919), but in the war years copper was scarce and costly. In Denmark,
two applications of Bordeaux mixture could prolong crop life by one month, thus boosting crop
productivity (Lind, 1916b).
391 References to lack of Bordeaux mixture were found in Dutch reports (Annual Report over 1917, and
1918: XVIII; Chapter 4).
392Schick & Klinkowski (1962) mentioned this interaction between potato late blight and the potato
viruses X and Y without details. A loose, contemporaneous comment was made by Kuhn (1918),
‘degenerated planting material was more susceptible to disease’.
393 Anonymous (1919: 47/9). The term ‘blackleg’ is indicative of a symptom, blackening of the stem base
of the potato. The most common cause is a bacterial disease, due to Erwinia atroseptica. This disease,
transmitted a.o. by seed tubers, is favoured by continuous moist weather and by wet soils. When the
green plant is affected yield decreases, when the tubers are affected they may rot in storage (Appel,
1928: 222ff).
394 Mitteilungen aus der Biologischen Reichsanstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft 16 (1916: 59).
395 On the 1914 yellow rust epidemic: the Netherlands: Annual Report on 1915, mentioning severe yellow
stripe rust infection in Groningen, in the NE, especially on varieties of the Swedish breeding station
Svalöf. Germany: Anonymous (1916), central station received many samples; Müller & Molz (1917), much
yellow rust on wheat in Saxony, heavy dews; von Wahl & Müller (1915), on wheat in Baden; Zimmermann
(1916a), explicit epidemic on wheat in Mecklenburg; Present Poland: Oberstein (1914), Silesia, mainly
on wheat, also on rye; Schander & Krause (1917), yellow stripe rust on wheat with unusual severity (G:

Notes
ungewöhnlicher Heftigkeit) in Posen (Poznań) and W Prussia near Bromberg (= Bydgoszcz) on the river
Weichsel (= Visła), rye also infected; Austria: Anonymous (1914), on wheat and rye; Kornauth (1915), on
wheat and rye.
396Vole attacks in 1914: Oberstein (1914) – Silesia, severe attack by voles mainly in clover; Schander
(1915, 1917) – same; Zimmermann (1916) – really exceptional were damages in wheat by voles, locally
crops were beyond hope.
397 In Chapter 3 the name ‘Prussia’ referred to the Kingdom of Prussia and/or to its E parts; in Chapter 5
it refers to the NE provinces of the German Empire.
398 Schander & Krause (1915: 215), Zimmermann (1916b: 321).
399Control of voles in the field could be obtained by frequent tillage, at home in the granaries by
immediate threshing and strict hygiene. Control by means of CS, poisoned baits, and mouse traps was
also applied; these were labour-intensive methods (Schander & Krause, 1915: 216; Schander & Krause,
1917: 129).
400 Carefoot & Sprott (1967: 87); Löhr vom Wachendorf (1954: 113).
401 Several potato viruses are transmitted by aphids which thrive during periods of dry weather.
402 Schander (1917).
403 Löhr vom Wachendorf (1954: 114), spring 1916 stench vacation (G: Stinkeferien). Löhr’s book was
written in the style of a novel, but his facts were usually correct. The tragedy revealed by Löhr was quoted
by Carefoot & Sprott (1967: 87). Löhr apparently was a soldier at the time (ibid.: 116) and an eye witness
of this shameful episode with ‘fast verbrecherische Verplempung’. We do not know whether these storage
losses were local, and Löhr’s personal experience only, or general. I have not met with an independent
confirmation of Löhr’s data, not even in the knowledgeable and critical treatise by Aereboe (1927), except
for an allusion by Schander (1918: 224). Is it by chance that Schander & Krause (1917: 130) reported in
1916 on experiments in potato storage during the winter 1913-14? Storage in ‘pits’ (G: Mieten) was better
than in warmer storage rooms.
404
Schander (1918: 224) ‘Im Jahre 1916 hätten tausenden von Zentnern Kartoffeln erhalten und für die
menschliche Ernährung nutzbar gemacht werden können, wenn die Trocknung rechtzeitig eingesetzt hätte.’
405 It may not be accidental that G. Schneider published three papers on potato storage in 1918.
406At the time, Fusarium research was in its infancy. The data are not very clear. Snow mold was well
known, as was red discolouration of wheat and rye grains.
407Mommsen (1995: 692). Honcamp (1918: 436), who liked exaggeration, spoke of a completely failed
potato crop (G: völlige Kartoffelmissernte). In England the potato harvest was disastrous too (Salaman,
1970: 574). In the Netherlands potato yields were low because of curl and late blight (Chapter 4).
408 Theenemy country, England, had a good potato harvest in 1918, mainly due to a great extension of
the potato hectareage (Salaman, 1970: 576), as contrasted to Germany with a shrinking hectareage.

Notes
409The quality of seed potatoes is determined by genetic characteristics, a variety of environmental

factors during the growing season and the storage period, tuber handling, and pests and diseases. At
the time some empirical knowledge was available but the publications suggest much guesswork in the
explanation of seed quality characteristics. More systematic knowledge was acquired during the second
half of the 20 th century (Struik & Wiersema, 1999). Reverse projection of present knowledge on forgotten
varieties and old practices is risky and has not been attempted.
410 R. Schander was stationed in E Germany, in Bromberg, Pommerania (now Bydgoszcz in Poland).
411The ‘export limitation’ (G: Ausfuhrbeschränkung; Schander, 1917: 150) apparently was a regional
Prussian affair.
412 Seed potatoes were taken from healthy fields. Apparently, field inspection with elimination of diseased
plants was not yet practiced. Pedigree selection was known but still unusual.
413 In the Netherlands the hot and dry year 1959 was a typical aphid year leading to a severe outbreak of
potato virus YN; similarly, the very dry and warm year 1976 saw an explosion of potato virus YN (de Bokx,
1982: 24). The text suggests that in the case of virus YN the disease exploded in the dry year itself. In
Germany, however, the effect of wide-spread virus infection (here not YN) during 1915 became manifest
in the following year, 1916.
414 Black leg was and is attributed primarily to a bacterial disease caused by Erwinia carotovora subsp.
atroseptica (Van Hall) Dye, which flourishes during periods of prolonged wet and warm weather.
415 Mitteilungen aus der Biologischen Reichsanstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft 17 (1919: 17, blackleg:
48).
416 Mitteilungen
aus den Kaiserlichen Anstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft 17 (1919: 17), the harvest
1916 produced only nut-sized potatoes.
417 Leaf roll – a ‘degeneration’ disease due to a potato virus. An early epidemic occurred in 1905 (Appel,
1906). The disease is transmitted by aphids. Ritter (1917) said that 1916 was an insect-poor year. In the
field the symptoms of leaf roll can easily be confounded with symptoms caused by the fungus Rhizoctonia
solani (Appel, 1917) and the fungus Verticillium alboatrum (Quanjer, 1921b).
418 In view of the lengthy explanations in the paper by Schander we cannot avoid the suspicion that
his conclusions, published in 1917, were politically coloured. The complete absence of any reference to
potato spraying feeds this impression.
419 Mitteilungen aus den Biologischen Reichsanstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft 17 (1919: 47).
420 On the 1916 yellow rust epidemic on wheat and rye: Austria: Fruwirth (1916), empty spikelets and
even empty ears; Kornauth (1918), yellow rust very severe in Moravia and N Lower Austria (G: herschte
sehr arg), also in Bohemia; Germany: Halle (Upper Saxonia) - Müller & Molz (1917), Holdefleisz (1917);
Samples of wheat with yellow rust, brown rust, and/or Gäumannomyces graminis exceptionally numerous
(Anonymous, 1919: 47) Report on 1916; early summer was cold, much P. striiformis, P. recondita and G.
graminis); Schander & Krause (1917), Prussia (Posnań, present Poland), yellow rust on wheat in early May
already; Mitteilungen aus der Biologischen Reichsanstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft 17 (1919: 47);
for yellow rust epidemics see Hogg et al. (1969); Zadoks (1961); Chapter 2.

Notes
421 Herzfeld (1968: 265); Mommsen (1995: 692). In the Netherlands too the coal distribution got stuck
by the freezing of the canals (Smit, 1973: 10).
422 Schander (1918: 104); Deutsche Landwirtschaftliche Presse 44 (1917: 407).
423 Honcamp (1918: 436) ‘Dürre des Jahres 1917 … ungenügende Kornernte’.
424 Mitteilungen aus der Biologischen Reichsanstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft 17 (1919: 59).
425 Schander (1918: 213 – leaf roll, 216/8 – late blight, 221 – loose skin, 217 – other diseases).
426 Honcamp (1918: 437), on Germany, ‘splendid potato harvest’ (G: Glänzenden Kartoffelernte des Jahres
1917). Salaman (1970: 576) on England, potato harvest 1917 very good. In the Netherlands the potato
harvest was good (Chapter 4).
427 Deutsche Landwirtschaftliche Presse 44 (1917: 263). In the Netherlands winter killing of fall sown
wheat was in the order of ten per cent (Chapter 4). In France, Paris region, over 65 per cent of the winter
wheat was winter-killed (Comptes Rendues de l’Académie d’Agriculture de France, Séance du 25me d’Avril
1917: 427/8).
428 Honcamp (1918: 436), Kielmansegg (1980: 181).
429 Deutsche Landwirthschaftliche Presse 44 (1917: 697).
430Vole attacks in 1917/8: Deutsche landwirtschaftliche Presse 44 (1917: 697); Schwarz (1920) large
outbreak, 1918, in S Germany.
431 Hiltner, in Fühlings Landwirtschaftliche Zeitung (1918: 435).
432 Kornauth (1919), Zabrus tenebrioides Goeze (G: Getreidelaufkäfer) greatly damaged cereals, mainly rye,
in Moravia, 1918, where several fields had to be ploughed.
433 Frey (1998), Siney (1957: 248), and several other authors.
434 Many authors, e.g. Flemming (1978: 88), Mommsen (1995: 693). The second economy amounted to at
least 10 per cent of the national economy.
435Flemming (1978: 78); Hirschfeld et al. (2003: 616); Mommsen (1995: 688); Mommsen (2004: 95,
133).
436 Honcamp (1918: 439), … ganz unverständlichen Wirtschafts- und Preispolitik.
437 Aereboe (1927: 48) G: völlige Kopflosigkeit.
438 Honcamp (1918: 442) G: hemmender behördlicher Masznahmen.
439Protest demonstrations in Berlin, 1915/6; January and February, 1917, in several cities (Mommsen,
1995: 692; 2004: 95); January, 1918 (Hirschfeld et al., 2003: 565); Strikes in the Ruhrgebiet, the industrial

Notes
area along the river Ruhr, in early 1917 (Mommsen, 1995: 692) and climaxing in Leipzig, April, 1917
(Mommsen, 2004: 95).
440Grain from Romania was taken as booty, good to feed Germany during one month; as a joke it was
mentioned that the British had already paid 90,000 tonnes (Deutsche Landwirtschaftliche Presse 44
(1917: 472).
441Swede = Brassica napus var. napobrassica, grown primarily as cattle fodder (Hirschfeld et al., 2003:
461).
442 Mommsen (1984: 362); The text quoted by Vocke (1984: 362), translated here, is nearly identical. The
year of communication, 1917, may be mistaken. No distinction was made between hunger and hunger-
associated disease.
443 Remarque (1929). This bestseller was the first of a flush of German ‘front novels’. It was banned and
burned by the Nazis (Rüter, 1980).
444 Aereboe(1927: 106) ‘Richtig ist nur, dass die Schwierigkeiten der Ernährung der Menschen an der Front
und im Lande schliesslich die Wiederstandskraft des deutschen Volkes gebrochen haben’. See also Löhr vom
Wachendorf (1954: 121), Kielmansegg (1980: 172).
445 Also Flemming (1978: 88).
446 Bumm (1928 Vol. I: 40, 41, 48, 57, 98).
447 Hirschfeld et al. (2003: 565): as in Vienna, winter 1917/8.
448 Several authors, e.g. Mommsen (2004: 125), who mentioned the decrease of Leidensfähigkeit among
civilians, the ‘ability to suffer’.
449A comparable story could have been written for Germany’s partner in war, the Austrian-Hungarian
double monarchy (e.g. F. Hilmer, 1916).
450 Honcamp (1918: 41) ‘… dass während des ganzen Krieges in landwirtschaflicher Beziehung der Wettergot
nich auf unserer Seite gewesen ist, nicht einmal auf der neutralen.’
Chapter 6
451 Chrétien-Guillaume Lamoignon de Malesherbes, president of the ‘Cour des Aides’ (High Tax Court), in
the ‘remonstrance’ to King Louis XV of France, 18 February 1771 (Badinter, 1978: 156).
452 Le Roy Ladurie (1967: 621), Matossian (1989: 84).
453 SeeLefèbvre (1932), maps simplified by Matossian (1989: 85). Most but not all historians agree with
the idea of a focal spread of the panic.
454 Noergotism occurred in Germany where people had learned to avoid toxic grain. I did not find data
on ergotism in the Netherlands.

Notes
455The possibility of ergot poisoning was also mentioned (independently?) by Le Couteur & Burreson
(2003: 240): ‘a bout of insanity in the peasant population with ‘bad flour’ as possible cause.’
456 Tessier (1783: 103). ‘Les habitans de Sologne, où la maladie gangreneuse a régné le plus souvent, & où
l’ergot est plus abondant qu’ailleurs, ne vivent, pendant les trois premiers mois qui suivent la récolte, que de
pain fait de seigle, en y comprenant le son’.
457 In Darwin’s (1800) classification the ‘external diseases’ were due to external causes such as frost and
heat. This Darwin was the grandfather of Charles Darwin.
458 See e.g. Adanson (1763: 45); Bulliart (1791: Plate 111); Plenck (1794: 157)
459Tessier (1783: 25 – ergots per ear; 31 – season & locality; 35&80 – fallowing; 31 – reclamation;
71&78 – watering; 80 – experiment; 80 – ploughing; 28, 63, 83 – mixed cultivation, 28&83 – tillers; 81
– wetness; 69 – facts; 73 – insects; 78 – irrigation; 84 – explanation unnecessary.
460Tessier (1783): precautions p102; witnesses p103; dosages p103&107; ducks p107&110; hog p113;
dog p122.
461 Theterm ‘noxious vapours’ recalls the ‘miasmatic’ theory of disease, of malaria in special, current in
the 18th century (and long after). The Solognese suffered malaria annually, mainly in autumn (Bouchard,
1972: 48). From September to May frequent ill-smelling fogs occurred, the stench due to tannery and
rotting of hemp.
462 Tessier (1773: 108 – health situation, 160 – abortion, 161 – nursing, 103&184 – rye consumption).
463 Barger (1931: 80). German report not consulted.
464 The episode is mentioned by Le Couteur & Burrreson, 2003: 240, who estimated the loss of troops at
20,000.
465 Quotations from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia – 1978. New York, Macmillan. Vol. 19: 456.
466 Graham (1929) is not explicit about the fate of the army near Astrakhan. He mentioned an army of
well over 100,000 men in total, an army too large to be provided for (and far more than the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia mentions).
467Conquest (1986: 117): On 27 December 1929 Stalin announced ‘the liquidation of the kulaks’. The
Ukrainian kulaks had already been reduced to small though independent farmers, with some three cows
and one paid worker each.
468 An extensive literature exists on the sufferings of the Ukrainian people due to the Stalin regime, e.g.
Conquest (1984).
469 Greenough (1982: 314): Birth rate in 1944 was 0.89 per cent versus 1.20 and more in normal years.
470 In the next paragraph I suggest that the radiation deficiency of the 1942 season may have weakened
the rice. It is known that weakened rice plants, apparently having lost their usual resistance, easily

Notes
succumb to brown spot (Klomp, 1977). If so, the host crop changed and not the fungus. Obviously, the
environmental conditions were favourable to sporulation, dispersal, and infection.
471 ‘… the rice plant shows no adaptability in its photosynthetic ability to weak irradiation.’ (Matsuo et
al., 1995: 601).
472 I
did not see this point, radiation deficiency, reducing rice growth and yield without brown spot and
making rice more susceptible to brown spot, mentioned in Indian literature so far.
473 Sen-Gupta (1945): Yields of the 1942/3 season were poor but not far below average poor.
474 For example, it is not clear whether the 1942 data incorporate the complete aman crop of 1942 that is
harvested in the period December-January. Several yield and stock estimates have been said to be rough
guesses made without on-the-spot visits.
475 (Sen (1981: 52) and Brennan (1998: 545) mentioned the Midnapore cyclone.
476 Uppal (1984). Tauger (2003), reaching back to Padmanabhan, follows an implausible reasoning.
477 Incompetence of the Bengal Government was mentioned by Field Marshall Viscount Wavell, who, after
installation as Viceroy of India, on 20 October 1943 visited Bengal already 26-28 October (Mansergh,
1973: #199).
478The newly formed country Pakistan consisted of two parts, West Pakistan (= today’s Pakistan) and
East Pakistan (= today’s Bangladesh).

Jan C. Zadoks - On The Political Economy of Plant Disease Epidemics - Capita Selecta in Historical Epidemiolgy-Wageningen Academic Publishers (2008)

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Capita selecta in historical epidemiology

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To the memory of Jan de Vries and Jo de Vries-Bosscha,

On the political economy of plant disease epidemics 11

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1. Wheat rust in antiquity 25

2. A yellow rust epidemic on rye, 1846 39

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6. I mpact of plant disease epidemics on society, under-rated or over-estimated? 159

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Publications by J.C. Zadoks relating to the history of plant disease 185

Curriculum vitae 211

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BCE = Before Christian Era

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2.1. Kingdom Prussia, 1846, yields per province. 61

3.1. Weekly budget of an average family of rural poor, 1845. 83

5.1. Germany’s production of rye, wheat and potato, 1914-1918. 148

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On the political economy of plant disease epidemics 21

2.1. The three rusts of rye. 41

3.1. Contemporary explanations of the ‘potato murrain’. 93

6.1. Symptoms of gangrenous ergotism as described by Tessier in 1776. 163

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1.1. Famines feared

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1.2. Wheat and wheat rust

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In Kanaänite antiquity numerous but relatively isolated villages, separated by stretches of

1.2.3. Evidence for black stem rust

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1.3.1. Magic and science

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Box 1.2. The litanies of the Rogation Days.

1.3.4. Sacrifices and processions

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1.4.1. A problem of timing

1.4.2. Phenology, the crop

November Best period for sowing wheat in warm places.

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Table 1.1. Data from rust interception trials near Rome.

Year Date of observation t 2a xmaxb Rust speciesc Δtd t1e

1962 10/07 191 + T - -

a Date of observation, Julian day (in days from January 1st).

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1.4.3. Phenology, the rust

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‘Oreobazagra Oreob[azagra] Abrasax Semeseilam Stenakhta Lorsakthè Koriaukhe Adonaie, sovereign

1.4.4. Astronomy, the Dogstar

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1.5. Rust, dogs and foxes

1.5.1. Associative thinking

1.5.2. Samson and the Philistines

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A phytopathological explanation of the two verses seems attractive, an outbreak of black

1.5.3. Aesop’s fable

1.5.4. Dog sacrifices in antiquity

Columella59, referring to Etruscan religious practices, recommended to sacrifice a sucking

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1.5.5. Linking East and West

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