Torts-Damages Eh404-2017-2018

LISANIE
TORTS AN D DAM AGES| Dean Joan Largo | EH 404 TORTS and DAMAGES COMMITTEE A.Y. 2017-2018
LISANIE
PART 1. TORTS
R ULI N G:
I. QUASI- DELICT (ARTS. 2176-2194, NCC)
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil
negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, having always had its
a. I N TRODUCTORY CON CEP TS own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
a.1 N ature, scope and coverage which may be punishable by law. It results that the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
DOLO VS. CULP A quasi-delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
2 ways of committing a crime under the Art. 3, RPC:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the Article 2176 is
1. Dolo – something that is done with intent entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the RPC. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for
 If the act or omission causing damage is committed with the same act or omission of the defendant.
intent to cause such damage, the act becomes a crime
and is governed by RPC. Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
2. Culpa or Fault – done through negligence whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
 Absence of intent whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section
Difference betw een torts and quasi-delict: 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
Torts Quasi-delict
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
Common Law (customs and Civil Law (enacted by
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
usages) congress)
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law.
May be intentional Unintentional (may or may not
be voluntary) Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
May be criminal May be criminal (such as those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case
criminal negligence) of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In
No pre-existing contractual No pre-existing contractual the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
obligation obligation married was living with his father and getting subsistence from him
at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore,
Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father.
ELCANO V. HI LL, 77 SCR A 98 “It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending
FACTS: child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing
Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was charged criminallyfor damage to third persons. On the other hand the clear implication of
the killing of Agapito Elcano, son of plaintiffs Elcano spouses. Atthe Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
time of the killing, Reginald was a minor, married and was livingwith not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
his father Marvin and receiving subsistence from him.Reginald was parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminalbecause of lack enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
of intent to kill coupled with mistake. Subsequently theElcano litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
spouses filed a civil action for damages against Reginald and his Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child, while still a minor,
father arising from the killing of their son. The casewas dismissed by does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
the lower court andplaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. One of while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same
the questions raisedwas whether the father of the minor who was manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of
already married but livingwith, and receiving subsistence from said money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot
father was liable in damagesfor the crime committed by the minor. be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2170
I SSUE: applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
Reginald in the criminal case. subsidiary to that of his son.”
LISANIE
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, GR N o.97336, Feb. 19, 1993 Difference betw een Quasi-delict (Article 2176) and Torts:
FA C TS: o Article 2176: QUASI DELICT
On October 27, 1987, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial  It is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged the notion of willfulness or intent.
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of  known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a
good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; civil law concept
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student. o TORTS
Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry
her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married;  an Anglo-American or common law concept
they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to
live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time;  much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such
towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
her. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not
to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to
someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to
be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations
against him. After trial, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the
private respondent damages.
I SSUE:
W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not

an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed
to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court
held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.
LISANIE
Coca-Cola Bottlers P hils., I nc. Vs. CA, GR N o. 110295, Oct. N AVI DA V. DI ZON ET. AL G.R. N O. 125078, M AY 30, 2011
18, 1993
FACTS:
FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries,
against petitioner. She alleges in her complaint that she was the including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages
proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to
engaged in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. Some parents of the (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases
students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal
by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
particles. She brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were
of the DOH for examination; subsequently, the DOH informed her "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was
that the samples she submitted "are adulterated”. Due to this, her docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-
day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses; not long 95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the
after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless and destitute. dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the
I SSUE: Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss. NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft drinks of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed,
warranty against hidden defects or merchantability pursuant to among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the
Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the early 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same in the
public respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided
Article 1146 of the same Code. within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA,
et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault
HELD: or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they
produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is found DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were
on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant
Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to
allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, the former's health and well-being. The RTC of General Santos City
which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption." determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because
the acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their
2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their
by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract becoming part of the stream of commerce which occurred abroad.
between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of
the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort
from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also alleged by NAVIDA, et al., in their complaint is a tort category that is
be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine not recognized in Philippine laws.
Islands, this Court stated:
I SSUE:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a W/N DOLE Inc., should be held liable for damages due to exposure
tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of the nematocides.
of damages therefor.
HELD:
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations. The liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended JointComplaints of
injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies
warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to
misrepresentation.Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et
Code, is homologous but not identical to tort under the common al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill
law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive
acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. system. Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the
cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi-delict, which under
the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2176.Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
LISANIE
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and o FAULT
ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to
DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in  voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the
the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of
areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the the actor to repair such damage.
Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which
undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos  requires the execution of a positive act which causes
City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to damage to another
assume jurisdiction over the cases.
o NEGLIGENCE
 failure to observe for the protection of the interest of

a.2 R equisites another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence(lack of foresight/lack of skill), is  Consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if to another.
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the
Chapter. door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points
that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under
In order that liability under Art.2176 of the Civil Code will arise, the the principle of res ipsa loquitor. There is sufficient basis to sustain a
following requisites must exist: finding of liability on petitioners' part. Our pronouncement that
Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out
(a) There must be damage or prejudice, which must be proven using the door, negates petitioners' other contention that the
by the party claiming it; proximate cause of the accident was Timothy's own negligence. The
injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and
(b) There must be an unlawful act or omission amounting to continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause that
fault or negligence; and originated from CLC's own negligence.
(c) There must be a direct causal connection between the

damage or prejudice and the act or omission.
CHI LD LEAR NI N G V. TAGORI O, GR N O.150920, NOV. 25,

2005
FACTS:
Timothy Tagario entered the boy's comfort room at the third floor of
the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however,
found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to
panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times
for help. When no help arrived, he decided to open the window to
call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went
right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized
and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. An
action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents
against the Child Learning Center. The trial court found in favor of
respondents. The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
I SSUE:
W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other

person for whose act he must respond
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or

negligence and the damages incurred.
Difference between fault and negligence:

LISANIE
b. QUASI -DELI CT DI STI N GUI SHED FR OM : the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
b.1 CULP A CRI M I NAL responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a
Culpa crim inal Culpa aquiliana civil liability arising from a crime under the penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
As to interest Public Private the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited
render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
As to purpose Punitive / Corrective Reparation through defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903
indemnification of the Civil Code.
JOSEP H V. BAUTI STA, GR NO.L-41423, FEB. 23, 1989

As to basis of There must be a law Include all acts in
liability which punishes the which any kind of
act or omission fault or negligence FACTS:
intervenes
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for
conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan
City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by
defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner
BARR EDO V. GARCI A AND ALM AR I O, GR NO. 48006, JULY 8,
boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P
1942
9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck
was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila,
FACTS:
defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise
proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a
truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto
carretela occurred. The carretela was overturned and one of its
Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to
passengers, a son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the
overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking
injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee of
the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right
sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
to institute a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia
and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of
I SSUE:
contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and
Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan,
Fausto Barredo thus making him primarily and directly responsible Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson
Fontanilla. and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that
respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way
HELD: of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement. The trial court
arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or decided in favor of respondents
create an action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. I SSUE:
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of cause of
the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are: action.
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are HELD:
only of private concern.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a
merely repairs the damage. bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is
untenable. If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts,
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no
former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person.
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
"any king of fault or negligence intervenes. However, it should correlative rights of action against the different respondents through
be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only
when nobody is hurt. one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked
by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
LISANIE
or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule d e l i c t under Article 2176 of the Civil Code [civil liability
against unjust enrichment. quasi delicto].
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot the same negligent act or omission of the accused (Article 2177 of
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the the Civil Code). In other words, "the same act or omission can
defendant. create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which
R AFAEL R EYES TR UCK I NG CORP OR ATI ON V. P EOP LE OF THE "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under
P HI LI P P I N ES, ET.AL. GR N O.129029, AP R. 3, 2000 Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability."
FA CTS:
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation civil action for damages against Reyes Trucking as employer
engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San of Dunca, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Miguel Corporation (SMC). Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is Code of the Philippines.
the white truck trailer driven by Romeo Dunca. At around 4:00
o’clock in the morning while the truck was descending at a slight Under the law, the vicarious liability of the employer is founded on
downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, at least two specific provisions of law:
it approached a damaged portion of the road which was uneven
because there were potholes about five to six inches deep. The left Art. 2176 in relation to Art. Article 103 of the
lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. Before 2180 of the Civil Code R evised P enal Code
approaching the potholes, Dunca and his truck helper saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction.  Preponderance of  Proof Beyond
They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lane but Evidence Reasonable Doubt
at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they
had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly.  Liability of employer is  Liability of
Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left Direct and Primary employer is
invading the lane of the Nissan. The Nissan was severely damaged, subject to the defense subsidiary to the
and its two passengers, Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died of due diligence in the liability of the
instantly. Reyes Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita. selection and employee.
The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the criminal action but did not supervision of the
withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against Reyes employee.
Trucking. They also withdrew their reservation to file a separate
civil action against Dunca and manifested that they would  Employer and  Liability attaches
prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. TC employee are solidarily when the
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint liable, thus, it does not employee is found
trial of the same. TC held Dunca guilty of the crime of Double require the employer to to be insolvent.
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor be insolvent.
Vehicle Law and liable to indemnify the heirs of Dy for damages
and the dismissal of the complaint in the separate civil case. TC
rendered a supplemental decision ordering Reyes
Trucking subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to
the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the
Dunca.
I SSUES:
May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the damages

awarded to the heirs of Dy in the criminal action against Dunca,
despite the filing of a separate civil action against Reyes Trucking?
HELD:
No.
Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has been

adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence,
cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the
separate civil action based on q u a s i d e l i c t against it. However,
Reyes Trucking, as defendant in the separate civil action for
damages filed against it, based on q u a s i d e l i c t , may be held
liable thereon.
 Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence cases, the

aggrieved party has the choice between:
(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime

under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code [civil liability
ex delicto]; and (2) a separate action for q u a s i
LISANIE
SP S. SAN TOS, EL. AL. V. P I ZARDO, ET. AL., GR N O.151452, M ANLI CLI C V. CALAUNAN, GR N O.150157, JAN. 25, 2007
JUL. 29, 2005
FA CTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.Because of
Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless
Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries.
which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three of its Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical and PRBLI.According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the
injuries to five of the van's passengers. Sibayan was convicted and speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the
sentenced due to the said crime. There was a reservation to file a expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and
separate civil action. in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit
the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine
In the filing of the separate civil action, the trial court dismissed the Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep
already prescribed. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner,
CA which dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to
appeal. the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the
left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it.Petitioner
I SSUE: was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However,
in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made
W/N the trial court is correct in dismissing the case on the ground of to pay damages to respondent.
prescription based on quasi delict and not on ex delicto.
I SSUE:
HELD:
What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil case?
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil HELD:
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclic’s acquittal does
act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or not affect the case. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, DAMAGES.
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.Either of these individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
the similar proscription against double recovery. civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based
the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused
expressly reserved. is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime
or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,

same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on
ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of
the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
LISANIE
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
LUM ANTAS, M .D., vs. CALAP I Z satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the
Facts: judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
A child (Hanz Calapiz) had been brought by his parents for an prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
emergency appendectomy. He was attended by petitioner, who judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
suggested to the parents that he also undergo circumcision. On the liability might arise did not exist."
following day after the appendectomy and circumcision, Hanz
complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. The child Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an
urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
catheter but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal. against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court
Later on, he was discharged and was directed to continue taking finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might
antibiotics. arise did not exist.
Several days thereafter, the child was confined because of the Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a
abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged,
Because this, he was operated on three times to repair his damaged the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for
urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of
reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for
petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainant’s
injuries. recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a
separate civil action for that purpose.
The prosecution presented the Dr. Rufino Agudera, the physician
who operated the child’s damaged urethra, who satisfactorily The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable
explained that the injury had been caused by trauma. However, the because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant
physician could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal
the injury. In his defense, the petitioner alleged to have observed negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him
diligence in attending with the child and that the abscess formation that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him
between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had
by Hanz’s burst appendicitis. sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on
the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma
The RTC acquitted petitioner in the criminal aspect but ordered him could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform
to pay Hanz P50,000 as moral damages because there was a findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again
preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the the evidence considered in the proceedings a quo. The Court, by
injurious trauma from his circumcision by the petitioner. The CA virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest
affirmed the RTC. It opined that even if the petitioner had been respect to the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily in the absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that such findings
mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering that the were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of Hanz as
the result of the circumcision.
I ssue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability

despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries.
R uling:
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also

civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime
charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the two kinds
of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects
of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on

the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained
of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance
is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
LISANIE
TMBI notified Sony of the loss and sent BMT a letter demanding
payment for the lost shipment. BMT refused so insisting the goods
b.2 CULP A-CON TR ACTUAL were ‘hijacked,’.
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance SONY filed an insurance claim with the Mitsui, the insurer of goods.
of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may Mitsui paid Sony P7,293,386.23. After being subrogated to Sony’s
be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. rights, Mitsui sent TMBI a demand letter for payment of the lost
goods. TMBI refused to pay. Mitsui then filed a complaint against
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the TMBI. TMBI impleaded BMT as a 3rd party defendant, alleging BMT’s
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the driver responsible and claimed BMT’s negligence as the proximate
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of cause. TMBI prayed that in te event it is held liable to Mitsui, it
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the should be reimbursed by BMT.
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
RTC found BMT and TMBI jointly and solidarily liable. That they have
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is been doing business since early 80’s and the same incident
to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good happened on Sony’s cargo in 1997 but neither sony nor its insurer
father of a family shall be required. filed a complaint.
Culpa contractual Culpa BMT AND TMBI appealed.

aquiliana
TMBI denied that it was a common carrier required to exercise
As to liability Incidental Direct extraordinary diligence and that ‘hijack’ is a fortuitous event.
As to cause of Must prove: Negligence BMT claimed that it exercised extraordinary diligence and ye loss
action result from a forfuitous event.
1. Existence of
contract I ssue:
2. Breach of
contract 1. WON TMBI is a common carrier engaged in the business
of transporting goods for the general public for a fee
As to diligence Extraordinary diligence Ordinary 2. WON TMBI and BMT are solidarily liable to MITSUI
required (in case of common diligence 3. WON BMT is directly liable to Sony or Mitsui
carriers) 4. WON BMT is liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of
carriage
As to defense of Not available Available
due diligence in R uling:
the selection
and supervision
of em ployees
1.A brokerage may be considered a common carrier if it also
undertakes to deliver the goods for its customers. Common carriers
are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
TORRES M ADRI D BR OKER AGE I N C. VS FEB M I TSUI AN D business of transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
BM T or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. They
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for reasons of public
Facts: policy in the vigilance over the goods and in rhe safety of their
passengers. The law does not disringuish between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who
Sony engaged the services of Torres Madrid Brokerage (TMBI) to
facilitate, process, withdraw, and deliver the shipment of various undertakes this task only as an ancillary activity.TMBI’s delivery of
the goods is an integral, albeit ancillary, part of its brokerage
electronic goods from Thailand at the port to its warehouse in Biñan,
Laguna. services. As long as an entity holds itself to the public for the
transport of goods as a business, it os considered a common carrier
regardless of whether it owns a vehicle or has actually to hire one.
TMBI subcontracted the services of Benjamin Manalastas’ company,
BMT Trucking services (BMT) to transport the shipment as they do
not own any delivery trucks. TMBI notified Sony and had no Consequently, as in the case of theft or robbery of goods,, a
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
objections of the arrangement.
negligently, unless it can prove that it observed extraordinary
diligence. And that a robbery attended by grave or irresistble threat,
4 BMT trucks picked up the shipment from the port on Oct. 7, 2000
violence or force is a fortuitous event that absolves the common
but due to the truck ban they could not undertake delivery
carrier from liability.
immediately and bec the ff. Day was Sunday. BMT scheduled
delivery on Oct. 9 2000. October 9 early morning however, only 3
trucks arrived at Sony’s Biñan warehouse. The 4th truck was seen In the present case, despite the subcontract, TMBI remained
responsible for the cargo. Under Article 1763, a common carrier’s
abandoned along Diversion Road in Filinvest, Alabang, Muntinlupa
City at 12noon wherein both the driver Rufo Lapesura and the extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time these goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the
shipments were missing.
carrier for transportation, until they are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee.TMBI simply argued
Victor Torres, TMBI’s general manager, filed with NBI against
that it was not a common carrier bound to observe extraordinary
Lapesura for’hijacking’
diligence. Its failure to successfully establish this premise carries with
it the presumption of fault thus rendering it liably to Sony or Mitsui
for breach of contract
LISANIE
2.NO. TMBI’s liability to Mitsui does not stem from a quasi delict but In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaims, G & S claimed that
from its breach of contract. Th e tie that binds TMBI with Mitsui is Jose Marcial boarded an Avis taxicab driven by its employee, Bibiano
contractual, albeit one that oassed on to Mitsui as a result of TMBI’s Padilla (Padilla), at the Domestic Airport to bring him to Teacher’s
contract of carriage with Sony to which Mitsui had been subrogated Village in Quezon City. While passing the Santolan fly-over, however,
as an insurer. The legal reality that results from this contractual tie the Avis taxicab was bumped by an on-rushing delivery van at the
precludes the application of quasi- delict right portion causing the taxicab to veer to the left, ram through the
left side of the railings of the fly-over and fall to the center of the
3.No. There is no direct contractual relationship existed between island below. The taxicab was split into two and Jose Marcial was
Sony/Mitsui. Mitsui did not even sue BMT, much less prove any thrown 10 meters away. G & S posited that the proximate cause of
negligence on its part. There is no basis to directly hold BMT Liable Jose Marcial’s death is a fortuitous event and/or the fault or
to Mitsui for quasi-delict negligence of the driver of the delivery van that hit the taxicab. It
likewise claimed that it exercised the diligence required of a good
4.YES. By subcontracting the delivery, TMBI entered into its ownc father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees
contract of carriage with a fellow common carrier. The cargo was including Padilla. By way of compulsory counterclaim, G & S sought
lost after is transfer to BMT’s custody based on its contract with to recover from the heirs the amount of P300,000.00 as attorney’s
TMBI. Following Article 1735, BMT Is presumed to be at fault.Since fees and costs of suit.
BMT failed to provethat it observed extraordinary diligence, it is
liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage Trial court rendered a Decision finding the vehicular mishap not
caused by a fortuitous event but by the negligence of Padilla. It
TMBI is liable to Sony/Mitsui for breaching the contract of carriage. likewise found the evidence adduced by G & S to show that it
In turn, TMBI is entitled to reimbursement from BMT due to the exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
latter’s won breach of its contract of carriage with TMBI and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the trial
court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. It was affirmed by CA
with modifications as to damages awarded.
OCHOA VS. G & S TR AN SP OR T, G.R. NO. 170071, M ARCH 9, Issues:

2011 AN D G.R. NO. 170125
1. What is the proximate cause of the death of Jose Marcial? Is the
testimony of prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G & S exercise
Facts: the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees?
Sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, at the Manila Domestic
Airport, the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab, a 2. Whether or not CA gravely erred in completely deleting the award
passenger vehicle for hire owned and operated by defendant for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased and in reducing the
corporation and driven by its employee and authorized driver Bibiano award for moral damages.
Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher’s Village, Diliman, Quezon
City. Held:
At about 11:00 p.m., the taxicab was cruising along [EDSA], in front A contract of carriage existed between G & S and Jose Marcial. As a
of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While going up the common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far
Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of circumstances."However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his
the fly-over and the ten-wheeler truck, the taxi cab was unable to destination safely as he died during the course of the travel. "In a
pass and because of its speed, its driver was unable to control it. To contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at
avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact,
causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of
and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory
the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured exercised extraordinary diligence."Unfortunately, G & S miserably
and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical Center, failed to overcome this presumption.
Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared
dead on arrival from the accident. The death certificate issued by the The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of his instant case for breach of contract.
death as vehicular accident.
This thus now leaves us with the remaining issue raised by G & S,
Heirs of Ochoa, through counsel, sent G & S a letter demanding that that is, whether the CA gravely erred in not taking note of the fact
the latter indemnify them for Jose Marcial’s death, his loss of earning that Padilla has already been acquitted of the crime of reckless
capacity, and funeral expenses in the total amount imprudence resulting in homicide, a charge which arose from the
of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed to heed the same, the heirs filed same incident subject of this case.
a Complaint for Damages.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides When the civil action is based on
The heirs alleged that G & S, as a common carrier, failed to observe an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
and exercise this extraordinary diligence because its employee failed felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
to transport Jose Marcial to his destination safely. They averred that proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
G & S is liable to them for having breached the contract of common
carriage. As an alternative cause of action, they asserted that G & S In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by
is likewise liable for damages based on quasi-delict pursuant to petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The heirs distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not
thus prayed for G & S to pay them actual damages, moral damages, being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender w ill have
LISANIE
no bearing on said independent civil action based on an
entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual."
GUTI ER REZ V. GUTI ER REZ, 56 P HI L 177 (1913)
In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery
of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly FACTS:
committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising
from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs while attempting to pass each other on the Talon Bridge on the
against Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of Manila South Road in Las Pinas, Rizal. As a result of the collision a
Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no passenger in the truck, Narciso Gutierrez, suffered a fracture in his
bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no right leg. The truck was owned by the defendant Saturnino Cortez.
error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard The automobile was operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years
to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. & Mrs.
criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the Manuel Gutierrez, also defendants in this case. At the time of the
MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however find that those collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother together with
quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S’ claim that the several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were in
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the car. The court found that both drivers of the truck and the car
the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without were negligent.
those quoted portions, the appellate court’s ultimate finding that it
was Padilla’s negligence which was the proximate cause of the I SSUE:
mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact,
already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Who among the passenger truck and the automobile is liable for
Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from which the subject damages due to negligence?
quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is
therefore immaterial. HELD:
In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the bus
2. The denial by the CA of the heirs’ claim for lost earnings is driver on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle,
unwarranted the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and
severally liable for damages.
CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground that
the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns
unreliable. The CA sweepingly concluded that the USAID Certification the Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio
is self-serving and unreliable without elaborating on how it was able was an incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive
to arrive at such a conclusion. A research on USAID reveals that it is rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he
the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident.
countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a
engaging in democratic reforms." It is an "independent federal license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the
government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of
from the Secretary of the State [of the United States]."Given this Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or
background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
certification containing unreliable information regarding an
employee’s income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed. On the contrary, we find said
certification sufficient basis for the court to make a fair and
reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity just
like in Tamayo v. Señora where we based the victim’s gross annual
income on his pay slip from the Philippine National Police. Hence, we
uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity.
The award of moral damages should be modified
Moral and exemplary damages are based on different jural

foundations. They are different in nature and require separate
determination.The amount of one cannot be made to depend on the
other. Here, there is no question that the heirs are likewise entitled
to moral damages, considering the mental anguish suffered by them
by reason of Jose Marcial’s untimely death.
LISANIE
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
P HI LI P P I N E SCHOOL OF BUSI N ESS ADM I N I STRATI ON , which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding
ET.AL. V. CA, GR N O. 84698, JAN 4, 1992 to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
FACTS: AI R FR AN CE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCR A 155
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while FACTS:
on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
suit for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. Air France issued a “first
the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year class” round trip ticket from Manila to Rome.
commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants From Manila to Bangkok, passenger Carrascoso traveled in first class
were not members of the school's academic community but were but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the
elements from outside the school. first class seat because a white man had a better right to it. The
purser wrote in his record book “First class passenger was forced to
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' go to the tourist class against his will, and the captain refused to
contention and denied their motion to dismiss. The respondent intervene” which was written in French. Petitioner contends that
appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders. damages must be averred that there was fraud and bad faith in
order that claim for damages should set in.
I SSUE:
I SSUE:
W/N PSBA is liable for civil damages through quasi-delictdue to
negligence. W/N passenger Carrascoso was entitled to damages.
HELD: R ULI N G:
No. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly,
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school purpose."
could be made liable.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law.For the
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Because employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do AR T. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept;
not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code,
even when there obtains a contract. moral damages are recoverable.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public its business is
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect
test of Cangco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only ground for an action for damages.
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was
It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types not ejected." Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
security measures installed, the same may still fail against an breaks the contract may be also a tort".
individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside
school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
LISANIE
R EGI NO V. P ANGASI NAN COLLEGES OF SCI EN CE AND M ANI LA R AI LR OAD CO. V. LA COM P AN I ATR ASATLANTI CA,
TECHNOLOGY, GR N O. 156109, N OV 18, 2004 GR NO. 11318, OCT 26, 1918
Even if there is a contact, it’s possible to take it as separate cause of FACTS:

action if the act constituting breach of contract amounts to torts.
A steamship belonging to the Compañia Transatlantica de Barcelona,
FACTS: arrived at Manila with two locomotive boilers aboard, the property of
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science The Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship for
student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and discharging heavy cargo was not sufficiently strong to handle these
Technology (PCST). She was enrolled in logic and statistics subjects boilers, and it was therefore necessary for the Steamship Company
under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, to procure assistance in the port of Manila. Atlantic Company was
respectively, as teachers. PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed accordingly employed by the Steamship Company.
the “Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were
to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts. Upon the arrival of the steamship, the Atlantic company sent out its
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students crane in charge of one Leyden. The crane and the boiler were
who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; however damaged when discharging the cargoes. It was found to be
those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the so badly damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it
final examinations. At the scheduled dates of the final examinations was rebuilt, and afterwards was returned to Manila. The Railroad
in logic and statistics, respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Company made expenses for the damage; to recover these damages
Baladad allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. the present action was instituted by the Railroad Company against
the Steamship Company. The latter caused the Atlantic Company to
I SSUE: be brought in as a codefendant. The trial court gave judgment in
favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but the absolved
W/N respondents are liable for tort. the Steamship Company from the complaint.
HELD: I SSUE:
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, W/N Atlantic Company is liable for damages.
mental agony and “demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in
violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. HELD:
Art. 26.Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, It is desirable to bring out the distinction between negligence in the
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not negligence considered as an independent source of obligation
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for between parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana). This
damages, prevention and other relief: distinction is well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully
recognized in the provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this,
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; we quote the following passage from the opinion of this Court in the
well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., and in this
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family quotation we reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a
relations of another; more correct English version of said passage.
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood
friends; to be those not growing out of preexisting duties of the parties
to one another. But where relations already formed give arise
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract,
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103,
defect, or other personal condition.” and 1104 of the same code.
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses,
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held either as culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, constitutes the source of an obligation between two person not
since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. In sum, formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the
the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action performance of an obligation which already existed, and which
against respondents, and that it should not have been summarily increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation.
dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents
liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in
due course by the court a quo. If there had been no contract of any sort between the Atlantic
company and the Steamship Company, an action could have been
maintained by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic
Company to recover the damages sustained by the former. Such
damages would have been demandable under article 1103 of the
Civil Code and the action would not have been subject to the
qualification expressed in the last paragraph of article 1903. It is
equally obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract, the Railroad
Company can have no right of action to recover damages from the
Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which constituted the violation
of said contract. The rights of the plaintiff can only be made effective
through the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona with whom the
contract of affreightment was made.
LISANIE
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages against CDCP,
BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the
CALALAS V. CA, GR N O. 122039, M AY 31, 2000 Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court rendered a decision
finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for damages. The
FACTS: CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the amount
of damages.
Private respondent Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already I SSUE:
full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear
end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a Whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable
passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck for the damages sustained by respondents.
owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint HELD:
against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a
third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action
and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of
to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage. those persons for whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action
based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an
I SSUE: employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of
the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense
Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. In
the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove
HELD: that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.
Yes.
It is well-settled that the owner of the other vehicle which collided
The first , quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tort feasor. the same. The same rule of liability was applied in situations where
the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding
The second , breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of
upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of
his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove N or should it m ake any difference that the liability of
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 petitioner [bus ow ner] springs from contract w hile that
and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the of respondents [ow ner and driver of other vehicle]
common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to
was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and severally liable for damages.
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any
the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by
all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no
defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any
CON STRUCTI ON DEVELOP M ENT CORP OR ATI ON OF THE excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
P HI LI P P I N ES V. ESTR ELLA, ET.AL., GR N O.147791, SEP T. 8, compared to that of the others.
2006
FACTS:
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.

Fletcher, boarded a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they
never reached their destination because their bus was rammed from
behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The
strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to
the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when
rescuers created a hole in the bus and extricated their legs from
under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical Center.
LISANIE
II. ACT OR OMISSION I SSUE:
W/N petitioner is negligent for the accident resulting to the death of

Art. 1173, N CC.The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in Dayata.
the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of HELD:
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is
determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata
Art. 3, (R P C). Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage
law are felonies (delitos). began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on
the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment
by means of fault (culpa). immediately after the victim was run over and the point when
petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, FI R ST STAGE: Petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage.
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate
P R OX I M ATE CAUSE, defined cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his
own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get
P rox im ate Cause – that cause which, in natural and continuous a ride. In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed came from behind on the left side.
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
GAI D vs. P EOP LE, GR N o. 171636, Apr. 7, 2009 protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
FACTS: whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple
negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the
Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
where the Laguindingan National High School is At the time several immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in
students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner's jeepney which reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the
was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither did law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to
petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point. failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was pinned to the rear provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind
the jeepney. Dayata was then seen lying on the groundand caught in SECOND P ART: The Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of
between the rear tires.Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing to stop driving at
jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side. Mellalos the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the
heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off appellate court was referring to the second stage of the incident.
the jeepney to help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be
carrying the body of the victim. Mellalos loaded the victim on a shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought P rox im ate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
to the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent
Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival. operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan found damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the
lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that proximate cause of an injury.
the victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point
of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle after The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved
noticing that the jeepney's left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-
tilt towards the right."On appeal, the Regional Trial Court mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident.
(RTC) affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC. The Court of Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment with modification in that have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were
it found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in fatal. Mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have
homicide. lived had petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a conviction in
a criminal case. The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the
accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.Conviction must
rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.
The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
LISANIE
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to his other person suffers injury. The test by which to determine the
guilt. Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as
proximate cause of the victim's death was petitioner's alleged follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident. reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHI N G, GR N O.161803, FEB. 4, 2008
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission
FACTS: of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the
same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga,
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution
Trading, Inc. along the National which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same
situation.
Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City.
A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime
towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle
mover with a trailer that suffered a tire blowout, owned by private occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. The driver, private respondent passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left
Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the
substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that
passenger bus. He parked the prime mover with trailer at the the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a
shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the cemented serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga
highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.
highway which was not equipped with triangular, collapsible Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing
reflectorized plates. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in
occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, proper condition.
onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright
and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He
pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming DAYW ALT V. COR P OR ACI ON DE P P . AGUSTI N OS R ECOLETOS,
bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The 39 P HI L587
passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
FACTS:
Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents prime mover owner and driver with In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she
the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel
impleaded as defendant in the complaint. The RTC rendered a of land for P4,000. They agreed that a deed should be executed as
decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. The RTC held soon as Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of
that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name. When the
improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property
the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle. The CA measured 1,248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially
reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that the proximate cause of believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the whole
the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an
or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus. amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt
filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to
I SSUE: convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, the La Corporacion
de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious
W/N Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle. corporation, which owned an estate immediately adjacent to the
property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz,
HELD: the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and
ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national easily subject to the influence of other people. Father Sanz knew of
highway; he failed to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her
motorists. from conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages
against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, of the land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title.
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if Daywalt claims that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of
called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the the property and its conversion into a sugar mill.
following requisites must concur:
I SSUE:
(a) damage suffered by plaintiff;
Whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt for damages.
(b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
HELD:
(c) connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of defendant and No.
the damage incurred by plaintiff.
Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could not be
N egligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such prompted by no mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have
LISANIE
surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
but for the influence and promptings of members of the defendant’s injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
corporation. But the idea that they were in any degree influenced to pursued. If so, the law im poses a duty on the actor to refrain
the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous
paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable
the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff can’t be credited. foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of
this prevision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.
The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties
cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the Note: Court also discussed that there was contributory negligence on
nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he the part of Picart for being on the wrong side of the road but
intermeddles. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the doctrine of last clear chance (kabalo namo ani.  ) was applied
Recoletos, there isfirst a need to consider the liability of Endencia to making Smith liable.
Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt fromEndencia cannot be
recovered from her, first, because these are special damages which
were notwithin the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was made, and secondly, these damagesare too remote to be the
subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to N EGLI GENCE, defined
Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable.
N EGLI GEN CE – conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another.
It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and
P I CART VS SM I TH vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other
G.R. N o. L-12219. M arch 15, 1918 person suffers injury. (Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v.
Borja, G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002)
FACTS: Picart was riding his pony over Carlatan bridge, San
Fernando, La Union when Smith approached from the opposite - want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
direction on his automobile. As Smith neared the bridge, he blew his comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon
horn as a warning of his approach since Picart was on the wrong the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance
side of the road. which the circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is
great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it
Having been perturbed by the novelty of the automobile or the is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (US v. Juanillo,
rapidity of its approach, Picart improperly pulled his horse over to G.R. No. 7255, Oct. 3, 1912)
the railing on the right. Smith, however, assuming that the horseman
would move to the other side, guided his automobile without Elem ents:
diminution of speed toward such same side, that being the proper
side of the road for the car. When Smith was only a few feet away,  Reasonable foresight of harm
he then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that
the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the
passing car. Picart filed for damages for the death of his pony and  Failure to take necessary precaution
also for the contusions he received which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
I SSUE: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence as to give

rise to civil liability.
HELD: Yes. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the
right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the
proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must
in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to
cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was no longer within
the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a
place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car
to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on
the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from
the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was

almost upon the horse. He was deceived into doing this by the fact
that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known
nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited
and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the
defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our
opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an

act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person
LISANIE
established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer
was remiss in the selection and supervision of his employee. To
R TR AN SP OR T COR P ORATI ON V. LUI SI TO G. YU overcome said presumption, convincing proof must be shown
GR N o. 174161, Februar7 18, 2015 by the employer that it exercised the diligence required of it.
Unfortunately, this R Transport failed to do. No evidence of
Facts: whatever nature was ever presented proving that it exercised
Loreta Yu, after alighting from a passenger bus in front of Robinson’s the required diligence.
Galleria along EDSA, was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio
Gimena, who was then employed by R Transport. Loreta was rushed 2. Yes. Article 2194 of the NCC provides that the responsibility of
the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. Her husband, two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
Luisito Yu, thus filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict Petitioner cannot rely on the ruling in Tamayo v. Aquino as said
against R Transport, Antonio Gimena and Metro Manila Transport case is one for breach of contract and not for quasi-delict.
Corporation (MMTC).
The principle holding the registered owner liable for damages
Arguments of the defendants: notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has
already been transferred to another, is designed to protect the
MMTC denied liability claiming that it is merely the registered owner public and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous
of the bus, the actual owner being R Transport.1 On its part, R transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, in order to free
Transport alleged that Luisito Yu had no cause of action against it for itself from liability arising from its own negligent. It is thus for
it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its the better protection of the public for both the owner of record
employees and that its buses are in good condition. Moreover, it and the actual operator to be adjudged solidarily liable with the
claims that since it is not the registered owner of the bus, it cannot driver.
be held liable for the damage caused by the same. Antonio Gimena
on the other hand was declared in default for failure to file an Dispositive: Instant petition is denied, and the decision of the
answer. lower courts are affirmed.
Decisions of the lower courts:

UM ALI V. BACANI , 69 SCRA 263
The trial court ruled in favor of Luisito Yu, holding that Antonio
Gimena was negligent in hitting and running over the victim and FACTS:
ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. R
Transport is consequently liable for the damages caused by its On May 14, 1972 a storm with strong rain hit Alcala, Pangasinan.
employees. MMTC was held solidarily liable with R Transport as it During the storm banana plants standing on an elevated ground
would unduly prejudice a third person who is a victim of a tort to along the barrio road near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric
look beyond the certificate of registration and prove who the actual Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result the
owner is in order to enforce a right of action. live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the
electric post and the other fell on the ground under the fallen
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with a banana plants. At about 9:00 o’clock the following morning the
modification that Antonio Gimena also be made solidarily liable for barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and
damages. Thus, this petition. he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they
might get hurt. He also told an employee of the electric plant of the
I ssues: broken line and asked him to fix it. The employee replied that he
1. Whether R Transport is liable for damages based on quasi-delict. could not do it but he was going to look for a lineman to fix it.
2. Whether R Transport should be solidarily liable with MMTC. Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months old whose house was
just opposite the road, went to the place where the broken line was
R uling: and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and
1. Yes. The RTC and the CA concurred in finding that Antonio subsequently died. Fidel Saynes father of the boy brought an action
Gimena was negligent and ruled that his negligence was the for damages against Teodoro Umali the owner and manager of the
proximate cause of the loss. Negligence is the omission to do electric plant. One of Umali’s defenses was that as owner and
something which a reasonable man, guided by those manager of the electric plant he was not liable on a quasidelict or
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human tort because the boy’s death was not due to any negligence on his
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent part but to a fortuitous event which was the storm that caused the
and reasonable man would not do. banana plants to fall and cut the electric line.
In this case, the records show that Gimean was clearly running I SSUE:
at a reckless speed. If it weren’t the case, how could the
deceased’s clothes be ripped off from her body and her brain W/N Alcala Electric can be liable for TORT.
spewed out from her skull and spilled over the road? Moreover,
records show that the deceased was bumped in a loading and HELD:
unloading area of a commercial center. Gimena should have
observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by Alcala Electric is LIABLE under TORT
slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing
the area. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and
tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an
Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers are liable for the elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which were
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet
their assigned tasks. Once negligence of the employee is the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could
have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric
1 It claimed that under the Installment Purchase Program of the government, it merely line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did
purchased the subject bus for resale to R Transport, which will in turn operate the same not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of
within Metro Manila. Not being the actual operator nor the employer of the driver therefore,
danger to the electric line.
it was not liable.
LISANIE
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972,
could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible CI VI L AER ONAUTI CS ADM I NI STR ATI ON V. CA, ET.AL., GR
threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the N O. L-51806, NOV 8, 1988
flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily
done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. FACTS:
Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul
of the incident because even if he was already made aware of the General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila
live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was
posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck to watch
the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation
live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the
foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he
that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property. filed a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the airport.
On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's
death could be attributed to the parents' negligence in allowing a I SSUE:
child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily
see that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on W/N CAA was negligent
the part of defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying on
the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, HELD:
anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an
innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim. CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate
It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip
negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but
child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning to drain water on the floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular
of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in
house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of
electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but we planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding,
cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.
constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death because the
real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat Responsibility of CAA
to life and property on that morning due to the series of
negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees Pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists
and which could have killed any other person who might by in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
accident get into contact with it. the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person,
of the time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires
plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the come to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are
defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law the CAA should made sure that no dangerous obstructions or
may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm
liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees to the public.
negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, which states: Contributory Negligence
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the
in the service of the branches in which the latter are proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage.
employed or on tile occasion of their functions. The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, considering the following test formulated in the early case
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of Picart v. Smith:
of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise
supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in
that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to
inadequately supervising them over their work. This defense was be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding. the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a

prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
LISANIE
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the as already existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations other, and which increases the liability arising from the already
cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably existing obligation.
said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They ASSOCI ATED BANK v. TAN, GR N o. 156940, Dec 14, 2004
are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future.
Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is FACTS:
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as Vicente Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of the Associated
a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of Bank. He deposited a postdated UCPB check with the said bank in
the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. the amount of P101,000.00 which was added to his original deposit.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the The check was duly entered in his bank record and upon advice and
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before instruction of the bank that it was already cleared and backed up by
negligence can be held to exist.... sufficient funds, Tan, on the same date, withdrew the sum
of P240,000.00. A day after, Tan deposited the amount
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the of P50,000.00 making his existing balance in the amount
lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would of P107,793.45, because he has issued several checks to his
befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if business partners. However, his suppliers and business partners
the private respondent had been looking where he was going, went back to him alleging that the checks he issued bounced for
the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Tan, thru his lawyer, informed the
construction. bank to take positive steps regarding the matter for he has adequate
and sufficient funds to pay the amount of the subject checks.
R AKES V. AG & P , 7 P HI L 359 Nonetheless, the bank did not bother nor offer any apology
regarding the incident. Consequently, Tan filed a Complaint for
FACTS: Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.
Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While transporting iron The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and
rails from a barge to the company’s yard using a railroad hand car, against the petitioner. It was shown that respondent was not
Rakes broke his leg when the hand car toppled over and the rails fell officially informed about the debiting of the P101,000.00 from his
on him. It appears that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion of existing balance and that the bank merely allowed the respondent to
the track that gave with the weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the use the fund prior to clearing merely for accommodation because the
weak state of the rail but did nothing to repair it. When Rakes filed bank considered him as one of its valued clients. It ruled that the
an action for damages, Atlantic’s defense was that Rakes’ injuries bank manager was negligent in handling the particular checking
were caused by his own negligence in walking alongside the car, account of the respondent stating that such lapses caused all the
instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers were told to do. inconveniences to the respondent. Affirming the trial court, the CA
ruled that the bank should not have authorized the withdrawal of the
I SSUES: value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. Having done so,
contrary to its obligation to treat respondents account with
1. Whether Rakes was negligent. meticulous care, the bank violated its own policy. Without such
notice, it is estopped from blaming respondent for failing to fund his
2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes. account.
HELD: I SSUE:
1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his superiors W/N petitioner, which is acting as a depository bank and a collecting
when he walked alongside the car instead of in front or behind it. agent, has properly exercised its right to set-off the account of its
client for a check deposit which was dishonored by the drawee bank.
2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of Rakes will not totally
bar him from recovering anything from Atlantic, although the liability HELD:
of the latter will be mitigated as a result of Rakes’ contributory
negligence. This is because although Rakes contributed with his own 1. Obligation as a depositor bank
negligence, the primary cause of the accident was still the weak rails,
which Atlantic refused to repair. The banking business is impressed with public interest.
"Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. By
between the event itself, without which there could have been no the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the
accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. The degree of
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a
family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its depositors is concerned. Indeed, the banking business is vested with
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the trust and confidence of the public; hence the "appropriate
the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree of
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event diligence." The standard applies, regardless of whether the account
should pay for such injury, less a sum deemedequivalent for his own consists of only a few hundred pesos or of millions. The fiduciary
imprudence. nature of banking, previously imposed by case law, is now enshrined
in Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or negligence, Section 2 of the law specifically says that the State recognizes the
may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa, "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity
substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in and performance."
an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other
obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or
LISANIE
The respondents did not treat the account of the petitioner with the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
highest degree of care. It is undisputed -- nay, even admitted -- that existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
purportedly as an act of accommodation to a valued client, petitioner quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
allowed the withdrawal of the face value of the deposited check prior
to its clearing. That act certainly disregarded the clearance A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
requirement of the banking system. possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely
dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
2. Obligation as a collecting agent Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities
has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
and declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous
of their employment. Due to the very nature of their business, banks weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun
are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about
selection and supervision of their employees. Jurisprudence has firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded
established that the lack of diligence of a servant is imputed to the weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
negligence of the employer, when the negligent or wrongful act of others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his
the former proximately results in an injury to a third person; in this store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
case, the depositor. The manager of the banks Cabanatuan branch, separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for
Consorcia Santiago, categorically admitted that she and the ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the
employees under her control had breached bank policies. They store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
admittedly breached those policies when, without clearance from the defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
drawee bank in Baguio, they allowed respondent to withdraw on happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he
October 1, 1990, the amount of the check deposited. accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without
ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective
P ACI S v. M OR ALES, GR N O. 169467, Feb 25, 2010 gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it
FACTS: was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. For failing to
ensure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old, died due to a gunshot wound negligent. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care
in the head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
Baguio City. The gun store was owned and operated by defendant weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
Jerome Jovanne Morales. The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis
was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for S.D. M ARTI NEZ v. BUSK I RK , GR N o. L-5691, Dec 27, 1910
repair which was left by defendant Morales, who was in Manila that
time, in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store. It appears FACTS:
that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the
drawer and placed it on top of the table to which Alfred Dennis Pacis The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata
got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant which was
the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite
off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that
thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that
The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
caused his death was partly due to the negligence of respondent’s crowded close to the sidewalk and stopped, in order to give
employee Aristedes Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that
Herbolario (Herbolario) were employees of respondent even if they instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
were only paid on a commission basis. Under the Civil Code, carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
respondent is liable for the damages caused by Matibag on the severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her
occasion of the performance of his duties, unless respondent proved head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon
that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the horse which was drawing it.
the damage. The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be
held civilly liable since there was no employer-employee relationship The cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon, was a good
between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the
Matibag was not under the control of respondent with respect to the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage and for the purpose
means and methods in the performance of his work. Even if no of delivery the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee
employer-employee relationship existed, it found that no negligence tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery
can be attributed to respondent. wagon and then went back inside of the wagon to unload the forage;
that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it
I SSUE: out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip
and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached
W/N respondent is negligent for the death of Alfred Dennis Pacis. to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown
from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
HELD: and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and
on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for
that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, I SSUE:
based on a person’s own negligence.
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
LISANIE
2. Were there acts and omissions on the part of private
respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have
HELD: direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in HELD:
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which 1. Soriano cannot be made responsible for the death of the child
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses school of arts and trades.
several years and the other for five or six months; that he had been
in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not
which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts
run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a
due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can
the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident be held liable. However, respondent Aquino can be held liable under
was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to
defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
their employers. persons.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the 2. YES, Aquino is liable for damages.
universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of
that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils
that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just
productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one
objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was
decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the
sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that
We think not. occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of
private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would
YLAR DE, ET. AL., V. AQUI N O, ET.AL., GR N O. L-33722, JUL 29, not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private
1988 respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger. A truly careful and cautious person would
FACTS: have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did.
Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today,
Gabaldon Primary School wherein private respondent Edgardo a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary
Aquino was a teacher therein. That time, the school was fittered with precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great
several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop anguish all these years.
that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones
were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries
name of Sergio Banez started burying them. Deciding to help his which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his
colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered some of his own reckless imprudence. It should be remembered that he was only
pupils aged ten to eleven after class dismissal to to dig beside a one- ten years old at the time of the incident. As such, he is expected to
ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age.
buried. As teacher-in-charge, he called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, to dig until the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor
excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. When the should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his
depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. He then persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which
left the students to level the loose soil around the open hole while he a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care
went to see Banez to get some Rope. Three of the four kids, Alonso, ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso imprudence.
and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time
but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he
could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position which
caused him several injuries and later on died. Petitioners filed a suit
for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano.
The lower court dismissed the complaint and was affirmed by the CA.
I SSUE:
1. W/N both private respondents can be held liable for damages.

LISANIE
drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila
had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
P HI L. HAW K COR P . V. VI VI AN TAN LEE, GR N O. 166869, FEB.
16, 2010 R EGALA V. CARI N
FACTS: FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Las Pias
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence
which was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and by constructing a second floor with a terrace atop the dividing wall
was then being driven by Margarito Avila. Respondent testified that he, under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence,
she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who approached respondent for permission to bore a hole through a
was on the wheel. They were on a stop position at the side of the perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which
highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a bus respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would
running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a clean the area affected by the work. Petitioner’s real intention was to
jeep parked on the roadside, and their motorcycle as well. She lost build a second floor with a terrace
consciousness and was brought to the hospital but her husband died
due to the vehicular accident. In the course of the construction, respondent and his
wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell on their
The driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident testified property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondent’s
that his jeep was parked on the left side of the highway. He did not satisfaction, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus City Engineer and Building Official alleging that despite the lack of a
dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus building permit for the construction of a second floor, petitioner had
bumped his jeep and sped away. The driver of petitioner's bus demolished the dividing wall, failed to clean the debris falling
testified that he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the therefrom, allowed his laborers to come in and out of his
Maharlika Highway. When a motorcycle ran from his left side of the (respondents) property without permission by simply jumping over
highway, and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed the path the wall, and trampled on his vegetable garden; and that despite his
of the bus, and so he turned the bus to the right. From his side protestations, petitioner persisted in proceeding with the
mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He construction, he claiming to be the owner of the perimeter wall.
did not stop to help out of fear for his life, but drove on and
surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped the motorcycle. Because no satisfactory agreement was reached during the barangay
The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and defendant conciliation proceedings and petitioner continued the construction
Margarito Avila which affirmed by the CA. work despite issuance of several stop-work notices from the City
Engineers Office for lack of building permit. Respondent filed a
I SSUE: complaint for damages.
W/N negligence may be attributed to petitioner's driver, and whether Petitioner, denying respondents allegations, claimed that he was the
negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, sole and exclusive owner of the wall referred to as a perimeter wall,
resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to the same having been built within the confines of his property and
respondent. being part and parcel of the house and lot package he purchased
from the developer, BF Homes, Inc. He added that he eventually
HELD: secured the requisite building permit and had duly paid the
administrative fine.
There is negligence indeed on the part of petitioner’s driver
Margarito Avila. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or Architect Antonio Punzalan III testified that he installed GI sheets to
failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would prevent debris from falling onto respondents property and had
have realized that certain interests of certain persons were instructed his workers to clean the affected area after every work
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In day at 5:00 p.m., but they were later barred by respondent from
this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the entering his property.
road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before
the collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to Engineer Crisostomo Chan from the Office of the Building Official Las
slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the Pias City testified that a building permit was eventually issued to
passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the petitioner.
bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the
motorcycle and the passenger jeep. Engineer Sonia Haduca declared that upon a joint survey conducted
on the properties of both petitioner and respondent, she found an
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to encroachment by petitioner of six centimeters at the lower portion of
another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer the existing wall negligible, since the Land Survey Law permits an
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in encroachment of up to ten centimeters.
the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a
quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Applying Article 2176
the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts, the trial court ruled that petitioner
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection was at fault and negligent for failing to undertake sufficient safety
and supervision of his employee. measures to prevent inconvenience and damage to respondent and
thus entitles respondent to moral and exemplary damages.
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the
road. Indeed, petitioner's tests were concentrated on the ability to
LISANIE
I SSUE: plaintiff, respondent herein, which has been violated or invaded by
Whether or not there is competent proof to warrant the grant of the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.[29]
R ULI N G:
The petition is partly impressed with merit. W HEREFOR E, the petition is GR AN TED. The May 26, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals is VACATED. The Court orders
The trial courts award of moral and exemplary damages, as affirmed petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P25,000 as nominal
by the appellate court, was premised on the damage and suffering damages.
sustained by respondent arising from quasi-delict under Article 2176
of the Civil Code.
FR AN CI SCO V. CHEM I CAL BULK CAR RI ER S
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an
exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be FACTS:
punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched Respondent Chemical Bulk Carriers Inc. (CBCI) filed a case against
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and Petitioner Francisco for damages based on Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22
similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an of the Civil Code. CBCI alleged that its diesel fuels were delivered
award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered and sold to Francisco by a certain Gregorio Bacsa who represent
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the himself as an employee of CBCI. However, Bacsa was not authorized
cases listed in Articles 2219[19] and 2220[20] of the Civil Code. by CBCI and that Bacsa only stole the diesel fuels. CBCI wanted to
Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of recover the diesel fuels from Francisco but this cannot longer be
a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the done because Francisco had already sold it to third persons. Hence,
factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the CBCI filed this case for damages against Francisco.
defendant.
In his defense, the heirs of Francisco, who substituted Francisco in
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) the case, argued that he cannot be held liable for damages because
evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or he is a purchaser in good faith. The heirs of Francisco argue that the
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that Francisco was liable to
or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or CBCI because he failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages family when he bought the diesel fuel. They argue that since
sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated Francisco was blind, the standard of conduct that was required of
on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and him was that of a reasonable person under like disability. Moreover,
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. they insist that Francisco exercised due care in purchasing the diesel
fuel by doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his son to check the
In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct delivery from Petron,
convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the the supplier of CBCI; (3) Francisco required that he be named as the
proximate effect of petitioners act or omission. consignee in the invoice; and (4) Francisco required separate
receipts from Bacsa to evidence actual payment.
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of
his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he
initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented I SSUE:
his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack
of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner Whether or not Francisco is liable for damages for failing to exercise
liable to administrative sanctions or penalties. the required diligence under the circumstances in purchasing the
diesel fuels of CBCI which was just stolen by Bacsa.
The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifically Architect
Punzalan, demonstrates that they had actually taken measures to
prevent, or at the very least, minimize the damage to respondents
property occasioned by the construction work. R ULI N G:
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a Francisco is liable for damages. Francisco should pay the actual value
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different of the diesel fuels which can no longer be recovered. He failed to
from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith exercise the required diligence under the circumstances.
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will.[27] While the Court harbors no doubt that the One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of
incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical
anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as
upon respondents property was malicious or willful, an element blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances
crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of
Civil Code. conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who
is blind.
Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary damages.
[
We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and
Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever. operating the Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a
Respondent and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their hindrance for him to transact business until this time. In this instance,
property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the however, we rule that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of
incident borne of petitioners construction work. Any pecuniary loss or conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.
damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records
are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same. Nominal First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to
damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the determine if he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any
LISANIE
other background check on the identity and authority of Bacsa. 1. N ineteen of the accused-
Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt
fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he did not verify was not established by proof beyond reasonable
with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, doubt.
Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were 2. Four of the accused-appellants — Vincent Tecson,
typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and
exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) — were found
receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries; also
in Petron’s invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim
the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the 3. Tw o of the accused-appellants — Fidelito
standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind. Dizon and Artem io Villareal — were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of hom icide
Since CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its property, it may recover
from Francisco, even if Francisco pleads good faith. G.R. N o. 151258 — Villareal v. People
 Villareal's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 raises
two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA -first, denial
VI LLAR EAL VS. P EOPLE (long case, 50 pages full text) of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
These are 5 consolidated cases involving the victim of a hazing- reasonable doubt.
related death.  Counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party
that petitioner Villareal already died. Counsel thus asserts that
FACTS: the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner
 In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de does not survive the death of the accused.
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). G.R. N o. 155101 — Dizon v. People
 The neophytes were briefed on what to expect during the initiation  Accused Dizon sets forth two main issues — first, that he was
rites. They were informed that there would be physical beatings, denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court's
and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he
scheduled to last for three days. was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him
 The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the
"initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which other accused."
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol G.R. N o. 154954 — People v. Court of Appeals
Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their  This Petition seeks the reversal of the CA's Decision insofar as it
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of
Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on criminalized at the time Lenny died.
their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical G.R. N os. 178057 and 178080 — Villa v. Escalona
pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also  Petitioner Villa assails the CA's dismissal of the criminal case
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
day of initiation. and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their
 On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay,
required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. as the original records and the required evidence were not at its
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same R esolution on P relim inary M atters
manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. G.R. N o. 151258 — Villareal v. People
 After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by the W hether or not the death of Villareal ex tinguished his
shivering and incoherent mumblings of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa, crim inal liability
the victim in this case. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed  According to Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the
they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of death of the convict.
the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and  In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. imprisonment penalties, while the term "pecuniary
 Consequently, a crim inal case for hom icide was filed against 35 penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including
Aquilans civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of
(i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability based on a
R TC = held the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of
the crim e of hom icide the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.
CA = set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial  Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal
court and m odified the crim inal liability of each of the ex tinguished his crim inal liability for both personal and
accused according to individual participation. Accused De pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly
Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied arising from the delict com plained of. Consequently, his
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz.:
LISANIE
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him  No grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of the case
deemed closed and terminated. against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held
G.R. N o. 155101 (Dizon v. People) that the absence of the records in the trial court was due to
W hether or not Dizon w as deprived of due process the fact that the records of the case w ere elevated to the
 Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of Court of Appeals, and the prosecution's failure to com ply
due process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to w ith the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 certified true copies of the sam e.
August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified,  For a period of alm ost seven years, there w as no action at
since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to all on the part of the court a quo . Ex cept for the pleadings
start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the case
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on rem ained dorm ant for a considerable length of tim e. This
the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay
for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact that the constitution frowns upon
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed  Accused Escalona et al.'s right to speedy trial was violated.
by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in
accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby G.R. N o. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
invalidating the finding of his guilt. W hether or not the CA erred in convicting accused of the
 The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by lesser offense of slight physical injuries instead of hom icide
no less than the Constitution itself. This constitutional right  The rule on double jeopardy dictates that when a person is
includes the right to present evidence in one's defense, as well charged with an offense, and the case is terminated — either by
as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
stage of the proceedings. consent of the accused — the accused cannot again be charged
 The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner with the same or an identical offense.
to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right  In People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of
to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits
the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
another accused — General — had made a last-minute adoption accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-
of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal,
of the five days set for Dizon's testimonial evidence. Stripping from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing
the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
process. securing a greater penalty." We further stressed that "an
 Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard consequence of the finality of his acquittal."
does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal  This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial challenge the lower court's acquittal of the accused or the
court. imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
 In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of
in the present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount
accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of
waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of
that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of discretion.
another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court  The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule
must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
exact nature and consequences of a waiver. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
G.R. N os. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)  Indeed, in a line of cases, SC ruled that double jeopardy
W hether or not the CA erred in dism issing the case for similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial penalty against the accused. SC had also recognized, however,
 The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon
the 1987 Constitution which requires that there be a trial free from a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to grave abuse of discretion.
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable  CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment
The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It
weighed. Also to be considered are factors such as the length of then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the
delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple
wrought upon the defendant. traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.
 Dism issal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment
to speedy trial is tantam ount to acquittal. As a consequence, heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was patently
an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight
violation of the principle of double jeopardy. physical injuries, which is a light felony.
LISANIE
 Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless
perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even his intentions are.
if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person  Thus, in a number of instances, the mere infliction of physical
is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of automatically liable for an intentional felony.
the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal  Lenny died during Aquila's fraternity initiation rites. The night
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is before the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what
mandatory, and not subject to discretion. to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings,
 Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could
their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol
of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies' Privilege Round." The
he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that crim inal beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes' arms and
responsibility should redound to all those w ho have legs.
been proven to have directly participated in the infliction  These rituals were performed with Lenny's consent. A few days
of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising before the "rites," he asked both his parents for permission to join
on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we the Aquila Fraternity. His father knew that Lenny would go through
find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting an initiation process and would be gone for three days.
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda,  Even after going through Aquila's grueling traditional rituals during
and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, SC therefore second day of initiation.
gave due course to the Petition.  Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further
proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule
R esolution on Ultim ate Findings that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case.
THE EX I STEN CE OF ANIM US IN TERFICENDI OR I N TENT TO Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other
K I LL N OT P ROVEN BEYON D R EASONABLE DOUBT modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and
 If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
equipped with a guilty mind — whether or not there is a contextual of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
background or factual premise — they are still criminally liable for fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
intentional felony. reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that
 Without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon's behavior must not the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional
be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of
to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the
the fraternity's psychological initiation. This Court points out that it consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused
was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the
really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than
to the veracity of Dizon's threats. The testimony of Lenny's co- the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny.
neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms.
Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which
making it up. . . ." Even the trial court did not give weight to the were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and
utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further
acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional"
rites . . . ." The Solicitor General shares the same view. initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically
 Verily, SC cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common
basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot crimes. The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken
and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable into consideration.
doubt of such intent. Instead, w e adopt and reinstate the  For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that constrained to rule against the trial court's finding of malicious
none of the fraternity m em bers had the specific intent to intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
kill Lenny Villa. proof beyond reasonable doubt of the ex istence of
m alicious intent to inflict physical injuries or anim us
THE EX I STEN CE OF AN IM US IN IUR IANDI OR M ALI CI OUS iniuriandi as required in m ala in se cases, considering the
I N TENT TO I N JURE N OT P R OVEN BEYON D R EASONABLE contex tual background of his death, the unique nature of
DOUBT hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
 In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under
Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the em ploym ent THE ACCUSED FR ATER NI TY M EM BERS GUI LTY OF
of physical injuries m ust be coupled w ith dolus m alus . As R ECK LESS I M P RUDEN CE R ESULTI N G I N HOM I CI DE
an act that ismala in se, the existence of malicious intent is  The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately
wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no devoid of criminal liability.
criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an  There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny
intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under Villa. SHDAEC
the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus  The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa's arms and
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the
integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death.
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing
beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to
overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched,
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects
LISANIE
on their arms, legs, and thighs. They were also "paddled" at the
back of their thighs or legs; and slapped on their faces. They were
made to play rough basketball. Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, III. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER
saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine." The NBI medico-legal
officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative (See discussion on Dam ages, infra.)
effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.
 Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of
DAMAGE
Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations
owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the
process. TI SON ET AL V. SP S P OM ASI N , G.R. N O. 173180 AUGUST 24,
 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of 2011
reckless im prudence resulting in hom icide. Since the N BI
m edico-legal officer found that the victim 's death w as the FACTS:
cum ulative effect of the injuries suffered, crim inal
responsibility redounds to all those w ho directly Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay
injuries. last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney
 It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven
have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going
Aquila Fraternity — accused Dizon and Villareal — restrained towards Naga City.
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites.
Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital in
show that the other fraternity members participated in the Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa
reopened initiation rites — having in mind the concept of Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His
"seniority" in fraternities — the implication of the presence of other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie
alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His wife, Consorcia
further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated Pomasin, another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky
during Lenny's initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio
Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti- Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained injuries. On the other hand, Jabon
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of and one of the passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.
non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 19
penalties.
 Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the
imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners.
Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in
effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all I SSUE:
been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment). Since there was no law Who is the negligent part or the party at fault?
prohibiting the act of hazing w hen Lenny died, w e are
constrained to rule according to ex isting law s at the tim e HELD:
of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.'s individual participation This interplay of rules and exceptions is more pronounced in this
in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa. As to accused case of quasi-delict in which, according to Article 2176 of the Civil
Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To
sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff. These requisites must be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore,
establish their claim or cause of action by preponderance of evidence,
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of
negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating
any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist
between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation.
It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise
controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we
reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability
LISANIE
for damages. In said case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken
attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety pox.
violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself.
Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in I SSUE:
themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against
the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the W/N Hoa’s negligence is the proximate cause of the death Bladimir.
link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as
having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' HELD:
s own liability." We took the occasion to state that:
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may damages based on torts, the employeremployee relationship being
arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is torts, three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3)
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the
to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide
up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should adequate medical assistance
not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is
no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 20
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable
so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm breach is committed.
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the
conduct of other. AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered
as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the
collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately
Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the
code 8 in his license. evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and
OCEAN BUI LDER S V. SP S CUBACUB G.R. N O. 150898, AP RI L that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
13, 2011 probable consequence of the act or omission.
FACTS: Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The
dissent, apart from adopting the appellate court's findings, finds that
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was
thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company's general negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or
manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company's isolating him as well. This finding is not, however, borne by the
"barracks" where he lives free of charge. records. Nowhere in the appellate court's or even the trial court's
decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chicken pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another
chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified
cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another
asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened.
to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga
of Bladimir's intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered
Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus

brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga
Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from
the office of the company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then
confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April
13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed
to talk to Bladimir's parents, hence, on Silangga's request, their co-
workers June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimir's parents from
Tarlac. AIcaDC
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995,
Bladimir's parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr.
Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and
transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH)
where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the following
day, April 14, 1995.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir's

immediate cause of death as cardiorespiratory arrest and the
antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death
certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as
LISANIE
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such
as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen
a. Doctrine of P rox im ate Cause unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar
occurred because the victims on their own and without authority
P R OX I M ATE CAUSE – that cause which, in natural and continuous from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this
(American Express International Inc. v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job.
Oct. 14, 2005) His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
Q: W hen m ay a person be held liable for his negligent act?
DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHI N G, supra.
A: A person may be held liable for his negligent act if such is the
proximate cause of the injury, even though it is merely one of many I SSUE:
concurring efficient causes.
W/N prime mover driver Limbaga’s negligence was the proximate
FER NANDO V. CA, 208 SCRA 714 cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
FA CTS: HELD:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao SC held that the skewed parking of the prime mover (negligence of
Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property the driver) was the proximate cause of the collision.
of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank
in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito P rox im ate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that
specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the
taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
victim sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from it intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were result therefrom.
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear
of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate
put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient
conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link
hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach.
which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the
matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners, children of the deceased, act or omission.
file a complaint for damages. TC: Dismissed. CA: In favor of
petitioners, based on social justice. CA on MR: Reversed, in favor Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan
of Davao City. van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the
prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the
I SSUE: prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga
failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the
W/N Davao City is liable. prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision,
particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.
HELD: The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
No. We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.
BATACLAN V. M EDI NA, 102 P HI L 181
While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in
its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was FACTS:
not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market
master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina
in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano
responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and
it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape
public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including
measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the
that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them
tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the
toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch.
LISANIE
Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the CA forwarded the case to the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn
SC due to the amount involved. the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
I SSUE: codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759
and 1763.
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other
passengers? M ANI LA ELECTRI C CO V. R EM OQUI LLO, 99 P HI L 117
HELD: FACTS:
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of Efren Magno went to repair a “media agua” of the house of his
contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having brother-in-law on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila. While making the
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. repair, a galvanized iron roofing which he was holding came into
We also agree that there was negligence on the part of the contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co.
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. At the time of the strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2-1/2 feet from
blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. The electric wire
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the was already in the premises at the time the house was built. This
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the distance of 2-1/2 feet of the “media agua” from the electric wire was
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the not in accordance with city regulations which required a distance of
bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 3 feet but somehow or other the owner of the building was able to
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the have the construction approved. In an action for damages brought
brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which by the heirs of Magno against the Manila Electric Co. the CA awarded
the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a damages holding that although the owner of the house in
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. constructing the “media agua” exceeded the limits fixed in the permit,
still after making that finally approved because he was given a final
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant permit to occupy the house and that the company was at fault and
carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been
definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 installed long before the construction of the house the electric
of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. company did not exercise due diligence nor take other precautionary
It is as follows: measures as may be warranted. Said decision was appealed to the
SC.
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the HELD:
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that SC held that the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by or negligent act of Magno himself.
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua”
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So,
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was
default that an injury to some person might probably result standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms
therefrom. length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the
In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the But even assuming for a moment that the defendant electric
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in so close to the house and ‘mediaagua’ in question, and in failing to
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of
because it was dark (about 2:30 am), the rescuers had to carry a that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the defendant liable in
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus,
the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate
and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact cause with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:
LISANIE
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself.
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone
injury, even though such injury would not have or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about
happened but for such injury would not have happened by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show
but for such condition or occasion. If not danger existed clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
in the condition except because of the independent reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl,
if an independent negligent act or defective condition 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the
sets into operation the circumstances which result in match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
injury because of prior defection condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the
TAYLOR V. M ANI LA ELECTRI C R AI LR OAD & LI GHT CO., 16 ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
P HI L 8 anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well
knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
FA CTS: from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that
The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and
blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that
power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, in company with defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for
another boy 12 years of age, entered the premises of the defendant, injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
saw the fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon reaching
home they made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to
the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the
result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in
filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable
held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things
contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys. This the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the
action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
injuries which he suffered. consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have
such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
I SSUE: consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to
have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the
W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by
him.
HELD:
SAN I TAR Y STEAM LAUNDR Y V. CA, 300 SCR A 20
No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which
resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match FACTS:
to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner
recover." and a cimarron which caused the death of three persons and injuries
to several others. Petitioner’s truck crashed the cimarron when the
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's driver stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this
property without defendant's express invitation or permission would caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of
not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioner’s driver to be responsible for
there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were the accident and awarded damages in favor of Private respondents.
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion Petitioner contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of
that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of traffic rules
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the and regulations (overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which of mishap. He also argued that sudden swerving of a vehicle caused
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He
of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that further argued that the driver should be exonerated based on the
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the person who has
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and the last clear chance of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the
defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that the
incurred. cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an accident.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well- I SSUE:
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than
the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; 1. W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory negligence due to
was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty violation of traffic rules and regulation which added to the
days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses proximate cause of the accident or such was based solely on
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of the negligence of the panel truck driver.
himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
LISANIE
2. W/N petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such
and supervision of its employees. negligence was the proximate cause of respondents accident.
HELD: HELD:
1. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles.
Petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
contributed thereto. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
vehicle with only one functioning headlight during night time
certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron Requisites under Art. 2176:
had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the
fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
"decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are convinced that no
maneuvering which the Cimarron driver could have done would have (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the
events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial. (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident plaintiff.
was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the
swerving of petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent
not only that petitioners driver was running the vehicle at a very high Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a
speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient,
as well. the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing
medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave
2. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care
physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the
such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said: business which the law demands.
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, Proximate Cause

were conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job
training and seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a
of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done. natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
There were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after an otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
emergency occurs. All these could only mean failure on the part case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy,
of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good and precedent.
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners
sense. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the
the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that
beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law. But petitioner respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a
did not show in what manner drivers were supervised to ensure collision. Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same
that they drove their vehicles in a safe way. Code.The employer of a negligent employee is liable for the
damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the
M ERCUR Y DRUG V. BAKI N G, GR N O. 156037, M AY 25, 2007 negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer,
FACTS: either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him,
after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by
Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised
check-up. Respondent was given two medical prescriptions the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. and supervision of his employee. Thus, petitioner's failure to prove
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable
prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum, a potent for damages caused by the latter.
sleeping tablet. On the third day of taking the medicine, respondent
figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with
the car of one Josie Peralta due to falling asleep while driving. He
could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his
physical and mental state at the time of the collision, respondent
returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was
sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed
Diamicron. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondent and this was affirmed by the CA in toto.
I SSUE:
LISANIE
car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite
the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
BP I V. SUAREZ, GR N O. 167750, M AR 15, 2010 through the intersection.
FACTS: Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the

expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to Estela. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to
maintain both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the
the Philippine Islands (BPI). Suarez had a client who planned to Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC
purchase several parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not rendered the decision exculpating Ramos from liability. RTC affirmed
to deal directly with the land owners. They agreed that the client the decision of the MeTC. The CA affirmed the view that Aquilino
would deposit the money in Suarez’s BPI account as payment for the was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Tagaytay properties and then, Suarez would issue checks to the Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila
sellers. An RCBC check was then deposited to Suarez’s current Development Authority (MMDA).
account in BPI. Suarez instructed his secretary, Garaygay, to confirm
from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was already I SSUE:
credited to his account that same day it was deposited. It was
alleged that BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver,
With this, Suarez issued on the same day five checks for the Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty for damages
purchase of the Tagaytay properties. Days after while in the U.S. for suffered in a vehicular collision.
vacation, he was informed by Garaygay that the checks issued were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds with penalties despite an HELD:
assurance from RCBC that it has already been debited in his account
and fully funded. Claiming that BPI mishandled his account through Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this
negligence, Suarez filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for case, viz:
damages. The TC rendered judgment in favor of respondent which
was affirmed by CA. Article 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
I SSUE: damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn against insufficient defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
funds), instead of DAUD (drawn against uncollected deposit)on the but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
checks,is the proximate cause of respondents injury.
Article 2185.Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
HELD: presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury traffic regulation.
was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the
checks. Proximate Cause has been defined as any cause which, in If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his
which would not have occurred. There is nothing in Suarez’s superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third
testimony which convincingly shows that the erroneous marking of person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence
DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is
social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered humiliation made.
and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to Tagaytay
properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks, not Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case,
due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda
had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it
transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any
justified dishonor of the checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the
compensatory damages for his own negligence. accident.P rox im ate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
R AM OS V. C.O.L. R EALTY, GR N O. 184905, AUG. 28, 2009 intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate
FACTS: legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
(Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty) result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the probably result therefrom.
car’s right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the
sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan
A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened.
injuries. Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition
negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that the sedan within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had
LISANIE
reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural driver, Cabanilla, which would have made the latter liable for quasi-
and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never been
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of established by respondent. To the contrary, the totality of the
the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni evidence presented during trial shows that the proximate cause of
Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to the
have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. It is Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
accident. that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
VALLACAR TRANSI T, I N C. VS JOCELYN CATUBI G continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
FACTS the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
Respondent's husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr., while trying to overtake and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
a cargo truck with his motorcycle, collided with the Ceres Bulilit moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
driven by Cabanilla which was approaching from the opposite probably result therefrom.
direction resulting to Catubig's death and that of his companion.
The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving
Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double his vehicle along the proper lane, while the driver of the motorcycle,
homicide. MCTC dismissed the criminal charge against Cabanilla Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he was
finding no negligence, not even contributory, on Cabanillas part. approaching a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of
the law on reckless driving, at the risk of his life and that of his
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC on a Complaint for employee, Emperado.
Damages against petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary
damages for the death of her husband based on Article 2180, in The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of
relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code. Respondent alleged that the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees. Having
petitioner is civilly liable because the latters employee driver, adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision
Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus which resulting in Catubigs death was his own negligence, and there was
collided with Catubigs motorcycle. no fault or negligence on Cabanillas part, then such presumption of
fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanillas employer,
Petitioner contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the
collision was the sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection
overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.
of the road.
RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and
motorcycle was the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle,
Catubig. The RTC, moreover, was convinced through the testimony
of Maypa, the Administrative and Personnel Manager of the
Dumaguete branch of petitioner, that petitioner had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee drivers,
including Cabanilla.
CA held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving

their respective vehicles. Catubig, on one hand, failed to use
reasonable care for his own safety and ignored the hazard when he
tried to overtake a truck at a curve. Cabanilla, on the other hand,
was running his vehicle at a high speed of 100 kilometers per
hour. The Court of Appeals also brushed aside the defense of
petitioner that it exercised the degree of diligence exacted by law in
the conduct of its business.
I SSUE
WoN petitioner, as employer of the Ceres Bus driver, liable under

Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code.
R ULI N G
No.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code imputing fault or negligence on the

part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its employee does
not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee
LISANIE
N OTE: At the tim e of the incident, Jabon w as prohibited

b. Doctrine of I m puted N egligence from driving the truck due to the restriction im posed on his
driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial
the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been immediately after the accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least (Cynthia), one of Gregorio' s daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed
twice within the next preceding two months. an Affidavit of Desistance.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article Pomasins filed a complaint for damages against Tison and Jabon
2180 are applicable. before RTC. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of perished in the accident
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
I ssue: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his R uling:
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms
and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give
indispensable in his occupation or business. weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached
by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the
Burden of P roof: vehicular collision. One reason why the trial court found credible the
version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more
Q: W ho has the burden of proving that the defendant w as focused than that of a mere passenger.
negligent?
Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative
A: As a general rule, the person alleging negligence has the burden positions of a driver and a passenger in a vehicle was not the only
of proving the same. But there are two notable exceptions to the basis of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabon's
rule: (1) where the law itself provides for instances where negligence alleged vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court
is presumed; and (2) when the thing speaks for itself (res ipsa also took into consideration Gregorio's admission that prior to the
loquitor). accident, the jitney was running on the "curving and downward"
portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took into
Ex ceptions: account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was
- Presumption of Negligence (Art 2184 & Art 2185) their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to reach a
curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and encroaching
- Res Ipsa Loquitor the jitney's lane. We perused the transcript of stenographic notes
and found that the truck was actually ascending the highway when it
- Vicarious Liability collided with the descending jitney.
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall
TI SON V. P OM ASI N into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the
jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before
Facts: it hit the tractor-trailer. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer
was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of
mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay. the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Jitney – driven by Laarni Pomasin was going towards the direction of Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it
Legaspi. can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon
Tractor-Trailer – driven by Claudio Jabon – traversing the opposite seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer.
lane to Naga. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in this
case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni's father, was on board the jitney maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from
and seated on the passenger's side. He testified that while the jitney collision with the jitney oncoming downhill
was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-
trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio's daughter, Laarni was the
jitney's lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was proximate cause of the accident. We did not lose sight of the fact
dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers. that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving
the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver's
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3.
tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the
shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.
manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of
collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating
where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist
meters away. between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation.
LISANIE
It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal observance of traffic rules before he can own a motor vehicle. The
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him
reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law,
for damages. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services,
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks would be effectively proscribed.
to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform
up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over
sustained. ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between may be imputed to his master.
the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular
collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the
Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his
code 8 in his license. failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only
gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act
upon it.
CAEDO V. YU K HE THAI , 26 SCR A 381
We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as
FACTS: has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of
morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver.
vicinity of San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was
members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did
direction was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And
driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have
speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
(rig). Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from
meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind,
caretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make
obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a
the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
to avoid the collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred required by law to prevent the misfortune.
just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and K APALARAN BUS LI N E V. COR ONADO, GR N O. 85331, AUG
owner of the Cadillac car. 25, 1989
I SSUE: FACTS:
W/N Bernardo is liable? If Yes, W/N Yu Khe Thai is solidarily liable The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached the intersection
with Bernardo? where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped and cautiously treated
the intersection as a "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus
HELD: was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver
Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. The regular itinerary of
YES. Bernardo is liable, because facts reveal that the collision was the KBL bus is through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at times
directly traceable to his negligence. BUT, owner, Yu Khe Thai is not it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded with passengers and can
solidarily liable with his driver. no longer accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL bus
neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired from his conductor
Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a master’s liability in a vehicular if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they
accident.Note however that the 2nd sentence of Art 2184 qualifies were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed
before the owner can be made solidarity liable with the negligent along the national highway. Virgilio Llamoso admitted that there was
driver. This is because the basis of the master’s liability is not another motor vehicle ahead of him. The general rule is that the
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but rather the relationship of vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way as against a
PATERFAMILIAS. The theory is that, the negligence of the servant, feeder road.
is known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him,
reflects the master’s negligence if he fails to correct it order to Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad, the
prevent injury or damage.Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 is sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held in a uniform and intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the
LISANIE
jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move overpass and that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and
forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the supervision of Macasasa. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about this time, the KBL court’s decision.
bus was approaching the intersection and its driver was engaged in
determining from his conductor if they would still pass through the I SSUE:
town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they were already full, he
turned his attention to the road and found the stopped vehicles at W/N petitioner is liable and W/N respondent is guilty of contributory
the intersection with the jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The negligence.
KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming
into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL HELD:
driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the
jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to Application of Article 2185
cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the
KBL bus. The gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off. The impact Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is
indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 traffic regulations. The records show that Macasasa violated two
meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post. After trial, the traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he
trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private respondents which failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. Both the
was affirmed by the CA but modified the award of damages. trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding. The
records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he
I SSUE: was hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from
the point of impact.Both circumstances support the conclusion that
W/N petitioner is liable for the accident. the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second,
Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim,
HELD: in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the
Kapalaran’s driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. What remains undisputed is that
the bus and traveling in the same direction had already stopped at he did not report the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a
the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to doctor.
another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who
was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an Application of Article 2180
intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be able to
slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the
which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of
and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection. the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that
Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in the Land prevent the damage.While respondents could recover damages from
Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended. Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could become subsidiarily
Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent, a liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and
presumption that Kapalaran was unable to overthrow. separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in
supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that this damage suit is
Application of Article 2180: for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for
the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee.
The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner
Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the
employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the damages caused by Macasasa. Respondents could recover directly
supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for from petitioner since the latter failed to prove that she exercised the
damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa.
negligent employee. The liability of the employer under Article 2180
of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon Contributory Negligence
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano
petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian
negligence on its own part. overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that
the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate
M ENDOZA V. SORI ANO, ET.AL, GR N O. 164012, JUNE 8, 2007 court had properly reduced by 20% the amount of damages it
awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction of the amount earlier
FACTS: awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. He was thrown proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
from the point of impact. One of Soriano’s companions, proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but after checking care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to mitigate the damages to be awarded.
flee. A school bus brought him to the hospital where he later died.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner.
It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by
using a small gap in the islands fencing rather than the pedestrian
LISANIE
injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which
was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
AN ONUEVO V. CA, ET. AL., GR N O. 130003, OCT. 20, 2004 violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of
the injury.
FACTS:
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
with owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks
brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should
sustained serious injuries as a result. As testified by eyewitness not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is
Alfredo Sorsano, Añonuevo was “umaarangkada,” or speeding as he no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury
made the left turn into Libertad and that Añonuevo failed to exercise sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not
the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
that the accident could have been avoided. remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and conduct of others.
Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. The RTC rendered
judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo while the Court WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE:
of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver
I SSUE: causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do
not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an
to non-motorized vehicles and whether Villagracia’s own fault and ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating
negligence serves to absolve the Añonuevo of any liability for the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings
damages. about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a
legal cause of the harm.
HELD:
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is
The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to motor vehicles not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of
only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in
broader coverage. which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia,
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any resulting from his violation of an ordinance?
traffic regulation.
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles
As distinguished, motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety
engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving
direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A bicycles. At face value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he
is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized violated. However, there is the fact which we consider as proven,
vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such
inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless
collision. behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the
path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection, whether
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put
to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle
to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code been up to par with safety regulations, especially considering that
would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he
vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to
thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights,
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver
there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn. The
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices,
vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to
under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established
standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise
not on equal footing with other types of vehicles. Thus, we cannot finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the
sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause
vehicles, even if by analogy. of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. Añonuevo
had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of
NEGLIGENCE PER SE: Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s
injury.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence
per se. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis
for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the
LISANIE
A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation

FI LI P I N AS SYN THETI C FI BER COR P ORATI ON, vs . W I LFREDO Report and the sketch of the accident would reveal
DE LOS SAN TOS nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a
reckless speed that it collided with the car bearing the
FACTS deceased. The impact was such that the bus landed
Teresa Elena, the wife of respondent Wilfredo, performed at the astride the car, dragged the car across the right lane of
Rizal Theater in Makati City, Metro Manila as a member of the cast White Plains Road, across the concrete island/flower box in
for the musical play, Woman of the Year. the center of White Plains Road, destroying the lamp post
in the island until both vehicles landed by the petitioner
On that same night, at the request of Wilfredo, his brother Armando, fence of Camp Aguinaldo.
husband of respondent Carmina, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch
Teresa Elena after the latter's performance. He drove a 1980 From those evidence, borne out by the records, there was
Mitsubishi Galant Sigma with Plate No. NSL 559, a company car proof more than preponderant to conclude that Mejia was
assigned to Wilfredo. traveling at an unlawful speed, hence, the negligent driver.
We, therefore, cannot find any error on the part of the trial
Two other members of the cast of Woman of the Year, namely, court in concluding that he (Mejia) was driving more than
Annabel Vilches and Jerome Macuja, joined Teresa Elena in the his claim of 70 kilometers per hour. Significantly, the
Galant Sigma. claimed speed of Mejia is still unlawful, considering that
Section 35 of RA 4136 states that the maximum allowable
Around 11:30 p.m., the Galant Sigm a collided w ith the shuttle speed for trucks and buses must not exceed 50 kilometers
bus ow ned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. M ejia per hour. We are, therefore, unpersuaded by the
(M ejia), an em ployee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was defendants-appellants' claim that it was the driver of [the]
dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact landing near the Galant Sigma who was negligent by not observing Sections
perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, w here the Galant Sigm a 42(d) and 43(c) of RA 4136-A. Second sentence of Section
burst into flam es and burned to death beyond recognition all 42 provides that the driver of any vehicle traveling at any
four occupants of the car. unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he
might otherwise have. A person driving a vehicle is
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia, which violating a traffic regulation. The excessive speed
was decided in favor of Mejia employed by Mejia was the proximate cause of the
collision that led to the sudden death of Teresa Elena and
A civil case was filed by the family of Annabel against petitioner and Armando. If the defendants-appellants truly believe that
Mejia. Wilfredo and Carmina, joined by their minor children, also the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver of
filed separate actions for damages against petitioner and Mejia. The the Galant Sigma, they should have presented Mejia to the
said cases were eventually consolidated witness stand. Being the driver, Mejia would have been in
the best position to establish their thesis that he was
RTC decided in favor of herein respondents negligent when the mishap happened. Under the RULES
CA affirmed the decision of RTC OF EVIDENCE (Section 3[e], Rule 131), such suppression
gives rise to the presumption that his testimony would
ISSUE: WON Petitioner Mejia was negligent have been adverse, if presented. It must be stressed
further that Mejia left the scene, not reporting the fatal
RULING: Yes. accident to the authorities neither did he wait for the
police to arrive. He only resurfaced on the day after the
Petitioner insists that the CA was not correct in ruling that Mejia was incident. This is a clear transgression of Section 55 of RA
negligent. Further, P etitioner argues that the R TC adm itted 4136-A
that De los Santos m ade a turn along W hite P lains R oad
w ithout ex ercising the necessary care w hich could have
prevented the accident from happening
Petitioners argument deserves scant consideration.
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the
rate of speed required by law specifically Section 35 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 4136. Given the circum stances, the allow ed rate of
speed for M ejia's vehicle w as 50 kilom eters per hour, w hile
the records show that he w as driving at the speed of 70
kilom eters per hour.
Under the New Civil Code, it is presum ed that a person driving

a m otor vehicle has been negligent if at the tim e of the
m ishap, he w as violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in
the present case, M ejia's violation of the traffic rules does not
erase the presum ption that he w as the one negligent at the
tim e of the collision.
To suggest that De los Santos w as equally negligent based

on that sole statem ent of the R TC is erroneous. The entire
evidence presented must be considered as a whole. Incidentally, a
close reading of the ruling of the CA w ould clearly show the
negligence of M ejia. A portion of the decision reads:
LISANIE
d. R es I psa Loquitur M AAO CENTRAL CO. V. CA, GR N O. 83491, AUG. 27, 1990
Translation: “The thing speaks for itself.” FA CTS:

The doctrine: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner,
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught
arose from want of care. his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead
 Not a rule of substantive law but a mere procedural on the spot. The claims for death and other benefits having been
convenience. denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in
o Rationale: Res ipsa loquitur has no legal basis. the RTC of Bago City. Judge Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but
 Applicable only when there is no direct proof of deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the
negligence available. decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of
o Meaning: Due to the nature of the incident, it is P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving
impossible to find direct evidence of negligence. from the SSS for the next five years. The widow appealed, claiming
R equisites: that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the
1. Event does not ordinarily occur ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In
o NOTE: The test is not based on “rarity” but that its own decision, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial court
it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and
negligence. disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.
2. Exclusive control of defendant
3. No other cause I SSUE:
4. No fault on party injured
W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty
of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Art
R es ipsa loquitur in culpa R es ipsa loquitur in 2176 of the Civil Code.
aquiliana culpa contractual
HELD:
Must eliminate all other causes Negligence is presumed by
the fact of breach Petitioner is guilty of negligence and cannot claim defense under Art
2176.
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF

 N egligence and prox im ate cause are QUESTIONS OF FACT. EMPLOYEES; NOT EXERCISED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
o Effect: Cannot be reviewed by the SC. (General Rule)
The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of
Elem ents: the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree.
 arises when no direct evidence is available The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the
necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to
prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour."
 applicable to pure (non-contractual) torts Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out
prescribed forms reporting derailments — which reports have not
 CAVEAT: no contributory negligence in the one invoking been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments — is not the
kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
I nferences:
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
 instrumentality is within the management and exclusive
control of the defendant We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of
contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his
 the injury would have happened in the ordinary course of assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been
things if the defendant was not negligent a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed
to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to
Q: W hen there is no direct proof of negligence, does res ipsa suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the
loquitur autom atically apply? front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed because
he chose to ride in the caboose. Contributory negligence has been
A: No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not automatically apply. defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care
The party invoking the doctrine must first establish that there is no on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
direct proof of negligence AVAILABLE. Only after establishing that defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has
may he rely upon the inferences under res ipsa loquitur. been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries,
it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his
Q: W hy is the doctrine inapplicable in culpa contractual? injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body." There is no showing that the caboose where
Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly
A: Because in culpa contractual, the breach of the contract is already
dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
an act of presumed negligence. The contract governs the conduct of
the parties so that if there is a breach, all that the plaintiff needs to
prove is the existence of the contract and the breach thereof. RES IPSA LOQUITOR
LISANIE
The absence of the fish plates — whatever the cause or reason — is Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's
by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances
loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. would suffice to support a finding of negligence.Even then the fire
Intermediate Appellate Court. (167 SCRA 376) thus: Where the thing possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants,
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to
things does not happen if those who have the management use prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an negligence,therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of fire but also with respect tothe spread thereof to the neighboring
care. houses.
FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR N O. 52732, AUG 29, 1988 In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found
guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall
FA CTS: between its property and private respondents' residence which
sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure
The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had
situatedadjacent to the residence of the Mables.Sometime in been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v.
August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a
firewall be constructed between the shop and Mable’s residence. US V. CRAM E, 30 P HI L 2
The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf
ears.In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in FA CTS:
Cruz’s shop.Cruz’s employees, who slept in the shop premises,
tried to put out the fire, buttheir efforts proved futile. The fire Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while driving along
spread to the Mables’ house. Both the shopand the house were Calle Herran in the city of Manila, knocked down, dragged, and ran
razed to the ground.The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the over the body of George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who
insurance on their house and thecontents thereof.The Mables filed was then crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, and
an action for damages against the Cruz’s.The TC ruled in favor of bruises. Moreover, such injuries damaged his mental faculties and
the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages. incapacitated him from further performance of his duties as a
soldier. Crame alleges that he was only going at about 10 miles
I SSUE: per hour, and that since Coombs suddenly appeared in front of the
car, he tried but failed to change the course of the automobile so
W/N the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to the case. as to avoid hitting him. The trial court convicted Crame of serious
physical injuries by imprudencia temeraria, on the ground that: 1)
HELD: he did not reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he attempt to stop
to avoid an accident; 2) he did not sound his horn or whistle or use
YES. The doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to the his voice to call the attention of Coombs to notify him that he
case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss should stop and avoid being struck by the car; and 3) Crame was
sustained by the Mables’. driving in the center, or a little to the right of the center of the
street instead of on the left side thereof.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:
I SSUE:
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused to Coombs.
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or HELD:
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE MORE THAN
arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. SUSTAINED.
L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car was very
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty, especially
doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a since the street was wide and unobstructed, with no buildings on
furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood either side from which a person can dart out so suddenly.
chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for Moreover, the street was also well-lighted, so there is no reason
machinery may be found thereon. why Crame did not see Coombs long before he had reached the
position in the street where he was struck down.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part
of petitioneror its employees was not merely presumed.Cruz failed The presence of the carromata was not corroborated by any of the
to construct a firewall between its shop and the residenceof the witnesses. Moreover, it would have obscured his vision only for a
Mables as required by a city ordinance: moment. Besides, it is the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a
moving vehicle on public streets and highways to use due care and
- that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor diligence to see to it that persons who may be crossing behind the
or a litcigarette moving vehicle are not run down by them.
- that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the It is clearly established that Crame was driving along the right-
shop; and hand side of the streetwhen the accident happened. According to
the law of the road and the custom ofthe country, he should have
- that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop been on the left-hand side of the street. According towitnesses
there was abundant room for him to drive on such side.
LISANIE
There is no evidence which shows negligence on the part of The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the
Coombs. At the time he was struck, he had a right to be where the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was
law fully protected him from vehicles traveling in the direction in transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage
which the accused was driving at the time of injury. There is no when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence.
evidence to show that the soldier was drunk at the time of the Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians
accident. And even if he were, mere intoxication is not negligence, often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is
nor does it establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is
prove negligence. If one’s conduct is characterized by a proper located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4)
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2½ meters
or sober. high at most and cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in
case of fire.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
LAYUGAN V. I AC, 167 SCRA 363
Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an automobile
for running down and injuring a pedestrian crossing a street, it FACTS:
appeared that at the time the injury was produced, the injured
person was where he had a right to be, that the automobile was Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo
being driven on the wrong side of the street, and no warning was Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the
given of its approach, it was properly held that there was a Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver and that the which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that
burden of proof was on him to establish that the accident occurred defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the
through other causes than his negligence. plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.
Serrano bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, while
AFRI CA V. CALTEX [P HI L], GR N O.L-12986, M AR. 31, 1966 the same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it has
been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff
FA CTS: was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police report
confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started Serrano on cross-examination. The collision dislodged the jack from
while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the ground. As a result
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire then spread to The left leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on
and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal amputated when gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him
properties and effects inside them.The owners of the houses, incapacitated for work depriving him of his income. The trial court
among them petitioners here, sued Caltex and Boquiren (agent in rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff, however, the
charge of operation).Trial court and CA found that petitioners Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court
failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due and dismissed the complaint.
care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their
employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res I SSUE:
ipsaloquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the
Philippines, there seemsto be nothing definite,” and that while the Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine or res ipsa
rules do not prohibit its adoption inappropriate cases, “in the case loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis and if not, who is negligent?
at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.”
HELD:
I SSUE:
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking
doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r should apply as to presume into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
negligence on the part of the appellees. lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
HELD: driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent,
still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
DOCTRINE OF R E S I P S A L O Q U I T U R APPLIES. CALTEX IS consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his
LIABLE. left forearm and left foot.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of
caused the injurycomplained of is shown to be under the care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing
management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur
have its management or control use proper care, it affords to escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that court committed reversible error.
the incident happened because of want of care.
DOCTRI N E OF R ES I P SA LOQUI TUR:
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
person who knew or could have known how the fire started were ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
the appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the absence of any explanation by the defendant, that the accident
incident happened because of want of care. arose from want of care.
LISANIE
AS DEFINED UNDER BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law.Based
on the same report, a criminal complaint for “Reckless Imprudence
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption Resulting to Damage in Property” was filed against petitioner
or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the
that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant’s exclusive amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial
control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not building. At the prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for
happen in the absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from mere fact that accident happened provided character of Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint
accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that based on quasi-delict against petitioners for a “sum of money and
in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing damages,” alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while
which caused injury is shown to have been under management and petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection
control of alleged wrongdoer. and supervision of Pascual as its employee.
RULE OF EVIDENCE: I SSUES:
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine and W/N Perla
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence Compania liable under tort
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of HELD:
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima a.) YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can only be R es ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of
direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant
all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance,
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone
when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no to establish negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a
inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be
the source of the evidence, as in this case. able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident
complained of. Thus, it is the defendant’s responsibility to show
P ER LA COM P AN I A DE SEGUR OS, I N C. V. SP S.SAR AN GAYA, that there was no negligence on his part.
GR N O. 147746, OCT. 25, 2005
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res
FA CTS: ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as “Super A 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily
Building” and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was occur unless someone is negligent;
leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive
behind the second and third doors of the building.In 1988, control of the person in charge and
petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch
manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building.” Perla voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The person injured.
left side wasconverted into an office while the right was used by
Pascual as a garage for a 1981model 4-door Ford Cortina. Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does
not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. A flame spewing
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a
not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned, and normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car
decided to “warm up” the car. When he pulled up the handbrake engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence
and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and did not start. He again stepped on the accelerator and started comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on
the car but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and
a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, responsible for the accident.
alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage
when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that
engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive
suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.Meanwhile, respondents control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where
were busy watching television when they heard two loud the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its
explosions. In no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure
their belongings, furniture and appliances.The city fire marshall c its proper functioning. Where the circumstances which caused the
submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall and concluded accident are shown to have been under the management or
that the fire was “accidental.” The report also disclosed that control of a certain person and, in the normal course of events, the
LISANIE
incident would not have happened had that person used proper
care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. RTC held that:
The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish
that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and
from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed. controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the
jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even
that respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access without the ignition key, they should have taken the necessary
to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized
even if it was parked in a building they owned. persons like Allan.
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE: Concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and
foresight constitute negligence making the registered owner of the
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same.
particular case may be stated as follows: did the
defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use CA held that:
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person in the same situation would have The preliminary issue on employer-employee relationship between
employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Here, Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident was determined
the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, through affirmative and credibile testimonies.
failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically
checked (as its year-model and condition required) Adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and
known thata14-year-old car, constantly used in primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused
provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.'s defense
other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed
the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because,
inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the
upkeep of the car. implied permission to use the subject vehicle.
b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT

I SSUE: Whether or not an owner of a vehicle can escape liability
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required from a negligence, caused by an employee, presumed under res ipsa
to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service loquitur
records. While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have
erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision R ULI N G:
over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.In the
supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including follows:
documentary evidence that they complied with everything that was 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
incumbent on them. someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
CARM EN, JR . VS. BACOY person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
FACTS: action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Emilia Bacoy Monsalud is the wife of Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. Both The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just
and their daughter were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep driven walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over
by Allan but owned by Oscar Carmen Jr. All three died. by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle
had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was
A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr.
homicide was filed against the driver, Allan and the employer Oscar entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct
Jr (owner of the Fuso jeep). him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep's use,
including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep
Emilia's Father, Geronimo Bacoy, in behalf of the six minor children may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to
of the Monsalud spouses, filed an independent civil action for park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
damages based on culpa aquiliana. observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the
death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution
Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial on their part.
expenses, as well as the award of attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims, The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a
and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have
public school teacher at the time of her death. overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in
preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to
Oscar Jr. claimed that the jeepney was stolen while it was parked do so.
beside his driver's rendted house to take it for a joyride. Oscar and a
mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by
mere pushing without the ignition key and the vehicle's engine shall Affirmed the decision of the CA that Allan was Oscar Jr's employee.
run but without any headlights on. The contention of Oscar Jr. that Allan drove in his private capacity,
LISANIE
thus he is only secondarily liable, for it is the employee's fault under In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to
Art. 2180 is inapplicable. protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to
as standards of care, set the duty of the physician in respect of the
Art. 2180 cannot defer a well settled doctrine concerning accidents patient. The standard of care is an objective standard which conduct
involving registered motor vehicles because the registered owner of of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured,
any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be and it does not depend therefore, on any individual’s physician’s own
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from
Unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen are the valid both plaintiff and defense experts is required.
defenses available to a registered owner. Having failed to establish
the car being stolen, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor means that where the thing which
resulting from his jeep's use. causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have management use proper care, it
SOLI DUM VS P EOPLE OF THE P HI LI P P I N ES GR N o. 192123 affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
M arch 10, 2014 defendant that the accident arose from want of care.
Facts: Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has
imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald under went been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of
intestine out through the abdominal walls, enabling him to excrete proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
17, 1995, Gerald was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull- perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccionheaded the surgical upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Lucerio, Dr.Donatella Valeria situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologist included Drs. Abella, matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
Razon and Solidum. During the operation, Gerald experienced consequences of professional care were not as such as would
bradycardia and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks , ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction
but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
longer see, hear, or move. A complaint for reckless imprudence occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if
resulting in serious physical injuries were filed by Gerald’s parents the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
against the team of doctors alleging that there was failure in those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
monitoring the anesthesia administered to Gerald. doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit against
a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of
I ssues: Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical negligence. a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his
peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
Whether or not res ipsa liquitor can be resorted to in medical any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired results.
negligence cases.
Thus, res ipsa liquitor is not available in a malpractice suit if the only
showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was
not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in
Held: No. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, event outside the routine performance occurred which is beyond the
precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on which if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without average man as the negligent case or causes of the untoward
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person to perform doctrine of res ipsa liquitor may be utilized and the dependent is
or failing to perform such act. called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
could.
The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of N I LO B. R OSI T, petitioner, vs. DAVAO DOCTORS HOSP I TAL
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. and DR. R OLANDO G. GESTUVO
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence and unbroken by any efficient intervening Facts:
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. He fractured his jaw and was
referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular (jaw area) injuries,
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or who operated on the latter. The procedure entailed small screws to
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence fasten a steel plate in Rosit’s mandible (a bone that composes the
each of the following four elements namely: a.) the duty owed by jaw). Dr. G, assuming that Rosit cannot pay for the same, and
the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient because there were no small screws available on hand, he cut large
relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or screws to make them smaller. He then used those screws to fasten
standards established by his profession; b.) the breach of the duty the metal plate.
by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable
standard of care; c.) the causation, is, there must be a reasonably The screws aligned the mandible but were touching his molar
close and casual connection between the negligent act or omission (kanang large nga teeth sa rear sa baba). So a dentist, Dr Pangan,
and the resulting injury; and d.) the damages suffered by the patient. opined that a second operation was necessary and the operation was
improperly done. Rosit went to Dr. Gestuvo to demand a loan to
LISANIE
defray the expenses, Dr. G gave him P4500. The procedure was locations these would not have struck Rosit’s teeth causing
done and Rosit after 3 days can talk and eat normally him pain and forcing him to undergo corrective surgery.
He knew the screws were too big, because it was cut by
Thereafter, Rosit asked Dr. G for 140,000 pertaining to operation him to a smaller size. He knew the screws were available
expenses and another 50,000 for a future procedure that would in the area, but he never bothered to get them. An
remove the screws in his jaw. Dr. G refused average man of common intelligence would know that
striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a screw
Hence this action for damages was filed against DDH and Dr. G would cause severe pain. Thus, the first essential requisite
is present in this case.
RTC – DDH not liable for it was not negligent in exercising
supervision over Dr. G. The latter was however found to be negligent Regarding the second element, Dr Gestuvo was the only
and was liable for the damages that he incurred as well as attorney’s one operating on Rosit and he was in charge of his
fees. Basis was res ipsa loquitor. RTC said that expert medical operation
testimony may be dispensed with because the injury itself provides
proof of negligence Third element, It was not shown that Rosit's lung disease
could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he
CA – Modified it, deleting the monetary awards in favor of Rosit. It suffered because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo
gave credence to Dr. Pangan’s letter that Dr. Gestuvo did not installed hit Rosit's molar
commit gross negligence
3. Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to make an
"informed consent"
I ssue: What is more damning for Dr. Gestuvo is his failure to

inform Rosit that such smaller screws were available in
Whether the appellate court correctly absolved Dr. Gestuvo from Manila, albeit at a higher price. 16 As testified to by Dr.
liability. Gestuvo himself
R uling: There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in

a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed
NO. consent:
1. There are four elements involved in a medical negligence (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those
causation. risks;
(3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
restrictions on one's conduct. The standard in turn refers otherwise would not have consented to; and
to the amount of competence associated with the proper (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.
discharge of the profession. A physician is expected to use
at least the same level of care that any other reasonably First and Second Dr. G had the duty but did not inform
competent doctor would use under the same Rosit of the risk involved in using larger screws
circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician Third, had Rosit been informed, he would not have agreed
fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury to the operation
results to the patient as a result of this breach, the Fourth, as a result, Rosit suffered pain and was injured
physician is answerable for negligence.
2. R es I psa Loquitor is applicable

4. Dr. Pangan’s affidavit is inadmissible because it is hearsay
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied evidence due to the affiant not taking the witness stand
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the Hence dam ages are proper, CA decision set aside, R TC
standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa decision reinstated
loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence – Solidum v PP
(cited in case) CF: DOCTR I NE OF COM M ON K NOW LEDGE
Requisites: CARLOS BORROM EO V FAM I LY CARE HOSP I TAL I N C. (G.R .

(1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily N O. 191018)
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury Facts:
was under the exclusive control of the person charged; On July 13, 1999, the Borromeo brought his wife to the Family Care
and Hospital because she had been complaining of acute pain at the
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any lower stomach area and fever for two days. She was admitted at the
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso.
Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute

appendicitis. However, there was insufficient data to rule out other
First element was proven when Rosit proved that one of possible causes and to proceed with an appendectomy. Thus, he
the screws struck his molar. Had Dr. Gestuvo used the ordered Lilian’s confinement for testing and evaluation. However, the
right size of screws, and placed the same in the proper
LISANIE
tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced
appendicitis. Lilian abruptly developed an acute surgical abdomen. physician. Thus, a pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the
standard of care required of an anesthesiologist and an autopsy
On July 15, 1999, Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in infectious diseases.
laparotomy on Lilian because of the findings on her abdomen and his Xxxx
fear that she might have a ruptured appendix. During the operation,
Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute appendicitis. Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso’s
He proceeded to remove her appendix which was already infected alleged negligence. His testimony could not have established the
and congested with pus. The operation was successful. standard of care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed
Dr. Inso’s failure to observe this standard. His testimony cannot be
Six hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was relied upon to determine if Dr. Inso committed errors during the
informed that her blood pressure was low. After assessing her operation, the severity of these errors, their impact on Lilian’s
condition, he ordered the infusion of more intravenous (IV) fluids probability of survival, and the existence of other diseases/condition.
which somehow raised her blood pressure. Subsequently, a nurse
informed him that Lilian was becoming restless. Dr. Inso immediately xxxx
went to Lilian and saw that she was quite pale. He immediately The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift
requested a blood transfusion. Lilian did not respond to the blood the burden of evidence onto the respondent. Res ipsa loquitur,
transfusion even after receiving two 500 cc-units of blood. literally, “the thing speaks for itself;” is a rule of evidence that
presumes negligence from the very nature of the accident itself
Eventually, an endotracheal tube connected to an oxygen tank was using common human knowledge or experience.
inserted into Lilian to ensure her airway was clear and to
compensate for the lack of circulating oxygen in her body from the The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a
loss of red blood cells. Nevertheless, her condition continued to kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
deteriorate. that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence;
At this point, Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian had Disseminated and (3) that the injury suffered must not have been due to any
Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), a blood disorder characterized by voluntary action or contribution from the injured person. The
bleeding in many parts of her body caused by the consumption or concurrence of these elements creates a presumption of negligence
the loss of the clotting factors in the blood. However, Dr. Inso did that, if unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiff’s burden of proof.
not have the luxury to conduct further tests because the immediate Xxxx
need was to resuscitate Lilian.
The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the
Dr. Inso and the nurses performed CPR on Lilian. Dr. Inso also defendant’s alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately
informed her family that there may be a need to re-operate on her, apparent to a layman. These instances require expert opinion to
but she would have to be put in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU). establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not
Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an ICU because it was only applicable to cases where the actual cause of the injury had been
a secondary hospital and was not required by the Department of identified or established. While this Court sympathizes with the
Health to have one. Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with the petitioner’s loss, the petitioner failed to present sufficient convincing
Muntinlupa Medical Center (MMC) which had an available bed. Upon evidence to establish: (1) the standard of care expected of the
reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate. respondent and (2) the fact that Dr. Inso fell short of this expected
Unfortunately, Lilian passed away despite efforts to resuscitate her. standard. Considering further that the respondents established that
the cause of Lilian’s uncontrollable bleeding (and, ultimately, her
According to the autopsy report, Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause death) was a medical disorder – Disseminated Intravascular
of Lilian’s death was haemorrhage due to bleeding petechial blood Coagulation – we find no reversible errors in the CA’s dismissal of
vessels: internal bleeding. He further concluded that the internal the complaint on appeal.
bleeding was caused by the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening in the repair site.
He opined that the bleeding could have been avoided if the site was
repaired with double suturing instead of the single continuous suture
repair that he found.
Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages

against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of medical negligence

(NO)
Ruling: A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard

of care and exercise the degree of skill, knowledge, and training
ordinarily expected of other similarly trained medical professionals
acting under the same circumstances. A breach of the accepted
standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders
the defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient.
The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably

competent members of the profession practicing the same field of
medicine. Because medical malpractice cases are often highly
technical, expert testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the
standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the
circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the
acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe
the industry standard caused injury to his patient.
LISANIE
attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on
e. Burden of P roof record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of
the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless body be
DR. FI LOTEO A. ALANO, petitioner, vs. ZENAI DA M AGUD- categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.
LOGM AO, respondent.
A careful reading of the memorandum shows that petitioner
Facts: Arnelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical instructed his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable
Center by sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw him fall from the efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even
overpass in Cubao, Quezon City. There, his patient’s data sheet enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the
identified him as Angelito Lugmoso. Considering that his patient would reach said relatives. In fact, announcements were
deterioration progressively deteriorated, and no vacancy was made through radio and television, the assistance of police
available at the ICU of East Avenue Medical Center, and upon authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was
recommendation by a resident physician of the National Kidney notified.
Institute (NKI) who also does the rounds at EAMC, Logmao/Lugmoso
was transferred to NKI. His name was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso The memorandum also clearly stated that permission or
at the NKI. authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the
deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable
Since there being no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, the transplant law (RA No. 349) had been complied with. Such instructions reveal
coordinator, was instructed to locate his family by enlisting the that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to
assistance of the police and the media. Dr. Ona, requested the exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the
Laboratory Section to conduct cross-matching and tissue typing, so deceased. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only
that if Angelito expires despite the necessary medical care and being granted I F the Departm ent of Surgery has com plied
management, and found a suitable organ donor, provided his family w ith all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not
would consent to it, his organs could be detached and transplanted have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the
promptly to a compatible beneficiary. Jennifer secured the patient doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions,
data of Angelito from EAMC and contacted several television and obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
radio stations for the purpose of locating the family of Lugmoso. She requirements of the law.
also sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police to locate
the whereabouts of Angelito’s family. ON BUR DEN OF PROOF
Angelito was eventually pronounced dead, hence, Dr. Ona set in Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence
motion the removal of organs of Angelito for organ transplantation. that doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, "in civil cases, it
He sought permission from the Executive Director, Dr. Filoteo Alano is a basic rule that the party m aking allegations has the
(defendant-petitioner), who issued a Memorandum approving the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The
transplant as long as all the requisite requirements had been parties m ust rely on the strength of their ow n evidence and
complied with and the NBI had been informed of the planned not upon the w eakness of the defense offered by their
transplant. The NBI thru Dr. Maximo Reyes gave verbal approval to opponent." Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of
the planned transplant. One kidney and the pancreas were around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be
transplanted to other patients. A doctor then made arrangements considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to
with Funerario Oro for the embalmment of the remains of Angelito present any expert witness to prove that given the medical
for a period of 15 days to afford more time for the relative of technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors
Angelito to locate his remains. could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal
organs for transplantation.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing the
successful organ transplant. A cousin of Angelito heard on the radio W HEREFOR E, the petition is GR AN TED. The Decision of the Court
that the donor was a certain Angelito Lugmoso who is now at of Appeals is R EVERSED and SET ASI DE. The complaint against
Funeraria Oro. Sensing a vague resemblance to Angelito Logmao’s petitioner is hereby DI SM I SSED. SO ORDERED.
name, she reported it to his mother, Zenaida Logmao. When they
went to Funeraria Oro to see the remains, it was there that they BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo
discovered the remains of Angelito in a cheap casket. Previously,
Arnelito’s sister Arlen reported on March 3, 1988 that her brother, Facts:
Arnelito did not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao.
Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena), surviving spouse of the late Balbino Lanuzo,
Because of this discovery, Zenaida filed a complaint for damages. filed a complaint for damages against BJDC Construction. The
Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of company was the contractor of the re-blocking project to repair the
Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his damaged portion of one lane of the national highway at San Agustin,
true identity. Only Dr. Filoteo Albano was held liable for damages by Pili, Camarines Sur.
the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with
modification, by reducing the award of damages. Dr. Alano then filed She alleged that the cause of her husband’s death was the
his appeal before the Supreme Court. company's failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of
the project which caused Balbino's Honda motorcycle to sidesweep
I ssue: Whether or not Dr. Alano can be held liable for damages. To the road barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of
be able to answer this, the question of whether respondent's the road, causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash
sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in on the newly cemented road.
granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal
organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead. BJDC denied Nena's allegations of negligence, insisting that it had
installed warning signs (SLOW DOWN ROAD UNDER REPAIR AHEAD
R uling: Petitioner is not liable. It should be emphasized that the hung approximately 100 meters before the re-blocking site) and
internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at
been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by the time of the incident, the lights were working and switched on;
respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be that its project was duly inspected by the Department of Public
LISANIE
Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application here. For
the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to
satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists. exist, namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (b) it is caused by an
The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
brought about by his own negligence. Balbino was not wearing any defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would
helmet at that time, and the accident occurred while Balbino was make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
overtaking another motorcycle; and that the police report also stated
that the road sign/barricade installed on the road had a light. Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence
cannot be fairly ascribed to the com pany considering that it
The RTC decided in favor of the construction company because the has show n its installation of the necessary w arning signs
plaintiff DID NOT present an eyewitness account of the death of and lights in the project site. I n that contex t, the fatal
their decedent. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled accident w as not caused by any instrum entality w ithin the
that the testimony of the company’s flagman and the police’ were ex clusive control of the com pany. In contrast, Balbino had the
self-serving. exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle.
The records disclose that he himself did not take the necessary
I ssue: precautions. As Zamora, the flagman declared, Balbino overtook
Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino? another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could
not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off
R uling: his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. This was corroborated
by police officer Corporal. This causation of the fatal injury went
The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and ruled that the uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did
not establish by preponderance of evidence that the Moreover, by the time of the accident, the projeect had been going
negligence on the part of the com pany w as the prox im ate on for more than a month and was already in the completion stage.
cause of the fatal accident of Balbino. Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from
his residence and the school where he then worked as the principal,
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could the
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for
by the am ount of evidence required by law . It is basic that it cannot be denied that Balbino's motorcycle was equipped with
whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see
allegation is not evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still occurred
burden to prove. surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of care
expected of him as a prudent motorist.
I n civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party w ho w ould
be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal
of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay
allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of opined to be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road
Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown
impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet at
defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability. the time of the accident, he was guilty of negligence in that respect.
Had he worn the protective head gear or helmet, his untimely death
The court noted that the Lanuzo heirs argued in the trial and would not have occurred.
appellate courts that there was a total om ission on the part of the
company to place illuminated warning signs but in the appeal, they The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the
contented that the company failed to put up adequate lighting and company was not negligent in ensuring safety at the project site. All
the required signs. the established circumstances showed that the proximate and
immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own negligence.
During the trial, the court noted that the w itnesses of the Hence, the Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.
plaintiffs w ere not consistent on their recollections of the
significant detail of the illum ination of the site (one saying
that lights were actually installed while another said that he only saw
gas lamps and not light bulbs, another said that it was only dark
when he passed on the night prior to the accident).
In contrast, the company refuted the allegation of inadequate

illumination through the account of its flagman and the police
investigator who arrived at the scene of the accident. Two witnesses
also corroborated their statement that gas lamps and light bulbs
were installed at the time of the accident. There was a documentary
evidence (an investigation report) which indicated the finding of the
police investigator on the presence of illumination at the project site.
Additionally, the company submitted the application for lighting
permit covering the project site to prove the fact of installation of the
electric light bulbs in the project site.
The testimonies of the flagman and the police officer were not self-
serving as the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to examine
the veracity of their statements through cross-examine and other
methods.
LISANIE
V. DEFENSES
FE CAYAO-LASAM v. R AM OLETE, G.R. N o. 159132, Decem ber

a. Com plete Defenses 18, 2008
a.1 P laintiff’s ow n negligence FACTS:
P AULAN VS SAR ABI A GR N o. L-10542 July 31, 1958 On July 28, 1994, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha)
was admitted to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) due to vaginal
Facts: bleeding. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing
the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation. The following day, Editha’s repeat
On July 25, 1951, a truck owned and operated by Zacarias Sarabia pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus’ weak cardiac
and driven by Emilio Celeste fell into a creek after it collided with pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to Editha’s
another truck of the Mary Lim Line. As a result of the collision, persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner performed a
Gaudencio Basco who was one of the passengers of Sarabia’s Truck Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa."
died. On April 19, 1955, Basco’s widow and heirs filed a complaint
against Zacarias Sarabia and Emilio Celeste for compensation and
damages. On July 11, 1955 Sarabia filed a third-party complaint On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC,
against driver of the truck of Mary Lim Line and a certain Quintin Lim. as she was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Dr.
The third-party complaint was amended on December 20, 1955 Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the
replacing Quintin Lim with the name of Maria M. Lim. Maria Lim filed latter’s womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to
a motion to dismiss contending among others that the action has have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus.
already prescribed. Sarabia argued that the computation of the Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a
presriptive period should be counted from April 19, 1955 the date result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
when the main action was filed against them.
Editha and her husband filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence and
I ssue: Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC).
Whether or not the action already prescribed
The Board of Medicine of the PRC rendered a Decision exonerating
Held:
petitioner from the charges filed against her.
Yes. The action which appellants(Sarabia) desire to press against
appellee (Lim) is really one based on quasi-delict which prescribes in Respondents went to the PRC on appeal. The PRC rendered a
four years, and this period having already expired when the action Decision reversing the findings of the Board and revoking petitioner’s
was taken, it is obvious that the action has prescribed. Thus, in the authority or license to practice her profession as a physician.
third-party complaint against the appelle it is alleged that the
collision “was the exclusive, direct and immediate result of the
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review
felonious, negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent driving of the
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her
TPU truck of Mary Lim Line No. 108 by Juan Cadungon xxx without
petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
any regard for traffic laws, and regulations and vehicle laws as to
petition was dismissed by the CA citing that neither Rule 43 nor Rule
speed, blowing of horn, right of way and other rules”, which truck is
65 was a proper remedy. Hence, this petition.
owned and operated by appellee. And Article 1146 of the New Civil
Code provides that an action based “upon a quasi-delict”prescribes in
four years. I SSUE:
The law ordinarily provides that the period during which an action W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence and malpractice.
may be brought shall be computed from the time the right of action
accrues (Articles 1144 & 1149, New Civil Code), but nothing is
provided in this respect with regard to an action based on a quasi- HELD:
delict, Article 1146 (New Civil Code) simply provides that the action
shall be instituted within four years. There being no provision as to Worthy to mention that the fact that the PRC was not among those
when shall the period of four years commence to run, the provision enumerated in the list of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 does not
of Article 1150 shall apply, which reads: “The time for prescription by its fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of the said
for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which Rule. The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be appeals from awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of any
brought.” Evidently, the day therein referred to is that of the collision, quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
for an action based on a quasi-delict can be brought now
independently of the criminal action and even regardless of the
outcome of the latter (Article 31, New Civil Code). There can There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty,
therefore be no dispute that the action of appellants against the breach, injury and proximate causation.
appellee should have been brought within the period of four years
counted from July 25, 1951. A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed
the services of the petitioner. As Editha’s physician, petitioner was
duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of
skill and care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon,
whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes
actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the
determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof,
LISANIE
expert testimony is essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the
injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the
light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
BJDC CONSTR UCTI ON v. N ENA E. LAN UZO, CLAUDETTE E.
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to
LAN UZO, JAN ET E. LAN UZO, JOAN BER NABE E. LAN UZO, AND
causation.
R YAN JOSE E. LAN UZO
( M arch 24, 2014)
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert
testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do Facts
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would
have done. BJDC Construction was the contractor of the re–blocking project to
repair the damaged portion of one lane of the national highway at
San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur. One night, Balbino met an
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr.
unfortunate accident. Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the
Augusto M. Manalo, who was a specialist in gynecology and
road barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of the
obstetrics. He testified that the D & C procedure was not the
road, causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on
proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s uterus resulting in her
the newly cemented road, resulting in his instant death. This then
hysterectomy. From his expert testimony, the D&C procedure was
prompted Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena), his wife, to file a complaint for
conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same
damages1 against BJDC Construction.
level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was
Nena claimed that the accident happened because the construction
nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.
company did not provide adequate lighting on the site, while BJDC
countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil the motorcycle rider himself (for not wearing a helmetand overtaking
action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The another motor, which led to the accident), and not their fault for
defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 they installed warning signs and lights along the highway and on the
of the Civil Code are: barricades of the project. The trial court decided in favor of the
construction company, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
Art. 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the decision and ruled for Nena, basing its decision on res ipsa loquitor.
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the I ssue Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, Balbino?
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Held BJDC not liable for it was Balbino’s own negligence that was
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of the proximate cause of the accident.
Medicine that petitioner advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or
four (4) days after the D&C. However, complainant failed to do so.
This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that 1. burden of proof: SC ruled that he Lanuzo heirs, the parties
the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of
interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could have examined evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the
her thoroughly. proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino. The witnesses
presented by the Lanuzo heirs were found not to be reliable by the
Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which court (The court declared their testimonies regarding illumination
could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a inconsistent.) compared to the witnesses presented by BJDC (an
follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about employee and police present that night, who testified the presence
Editha’s own injury. of abundant warning signs and that Balbino was overtaking at the
time of the accident).
Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, Related laws re burden of proof:
in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the
immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases,
own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in like this one, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
defiance of petitioner’s orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s case by a preponderance of evidence.
injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the
injury. Meaning or preponderance of evidence (Raymundo v. Lunaria:)
x x x is meant that the evidence as a whole
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA reversed and the decision of adduced by one side is superior to that of the
the Board of Medicine is affirmed. other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the
term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater
weight of the credible evidence.” It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.
Definition of negligence that will make a person liable for

damages(Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court)
“the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations
LISANIE
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not
Ex ception: Doctrine of Attractive N uisance
do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(t)he failure
to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, TAYLOR v. M AN I LA ELECTRI C R AI LR OAD & LI GHT CO., supra.
and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers I SSUE:
injury.’” In order that a party may be held liable
for damages for any injury brought about by the
negligence of another, the claimant must prove W/N defendant company is liable to plaintiff for damages for having
that the negligence was the immediate and negligently failed to provide security measures to prevent the
proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause general public from entering its premises.
is defined as “that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient HELD:
intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have
occurred.” Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in
2. res ipsa loquitor is inapplicable; the prox im ate cause of leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which
balbino’s death w as his ow n negligence resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any
wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result
For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
to exist, namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not where they were found by the plaintiff.
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or On this score, the doctrine of implied invitation is applicable. In the
defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. implied license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of
others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with
Second element is lacking, for BJDC was not found to be negligent. exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may
BJCD it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and,
lights in the project site. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises things
control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. tempting to children, the same implication should arise.
Third element is also lacking, for it was Balbino’s negligence that led
to the accident. He overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's
and he was not wearing a helmet (a doctor testified that it was head property without defendant's express invitation or permission would
landing on cement that caused the death. Had he worn a helmet, not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred
this could have been prevented). there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, we are of opinion
that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project, had been going defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
on for more than a month and was already in the completion stage. proximate cause of the injury, and, on the other hand, we are
Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
his residence and the school where he then worked as the principal, putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and
Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries
it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was equipped with thus incurred.
headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see
the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still occurred The doctrine of implied invitation does not apply where the said
surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of care youth has not been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately
expected of him as a prudent motorist. cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents,
knowing that his action would result in an explosion.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than
the average boy of his age; and the record discloses throughout that
he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. True, he
may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the
contents of the cap, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.
We are satisfied that while it may be true that these injuries would
not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's
own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
LISANIE
HI DALGO EN TERP RI SES, I N C. v. BALANDAN , 91 P hil 488 a.2. Assum ption of R isk
FACTS: Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
installed two tanks full of water for cooling purposes of its engine.
damages to be awarded.
While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks
themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers.
Through the wide gate entrance, motor vehicles hauling ice and AFI ALDA VS. HI SOLE and HI SOLE
persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily G.R. N o. L-2075, N ovem ber 29, 1949
enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned
on the gate. On April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, an 8 FACTS: Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as
year old boy, while playing with and in company of other boys of his caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending
age entered the factory premises through the gate, while bathing in the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as a
one of the said tanks, sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be consequence of his injuries. His elder sister then filed a case for
fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia damages.
secondary to drowning."
The lower court held that the owner of an animal is answerable only
for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to
The CA and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to
been negligent or at fault.
adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons
entering its premises.
I SSUE: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when
damage is caused to its caretaker.
I SSUE:
HELD: No. The animal was in custody and under the control of the
W/N the said tanks constitute an attractive nuisance. caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the
HELD: animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
The doctrine of attractive nuisance may be stated, as: One who take the consequences.
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances
of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of
thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies
fault of the person who has suffered damage.
of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao
location.
gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the
animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this injury to any one, including himself.
danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger, (he) is not liable
because of having created an "attractive nuisance.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc.

is absolved from liability.
LISANIE
constant vigilto prevent or avoid any probable incident that might
imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did
that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men
I LOCOS N OR TE CO., v. CA, GR N o. 53401, N ov. 6, 1989
(linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.
FACTS:
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now
absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
Inn the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or
strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for
5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, when the floodwaters were his own negligent conduct or omission"
beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out of
the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner
Street, Laoag City, and proceeded towards the direction of the Five
finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the
Sisters Emporium to look after her merchandise therein that might
surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the
have been damaged. The deceased was followed by Aida Bulong and
comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. A person is
Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a
excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents
distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly,
to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in
two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them because on the
peril. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property,
spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling
a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon
Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred,
their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to the deceased,
was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
but he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be
Thereafter, Yabes requested the police to ask the people of barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the petitioner's negligence.
electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero
Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house
CALALAS v. CA, supra.
were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an I SSUE:
electric post.
W/N Calalas is liable for damages to private respondent, Sunga.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased
against INELCO. INELCO contends that the deceased could have
HELD:
died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence
attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it
was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, The petition has no merit.
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent. Petitioner conjectures
that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on, The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-
her gate that fateful day. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was filed therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
with the CA which reversed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
petition.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the Civil Code
requires extraordinary diligence from common carriers with regard to
I SSUE: the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers.
W/N the CA erred in not applying the legal principle of "assumption
of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting Petitioner breached the contract of carriage on two scores. First, as
damages. found by the CA, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
HELD: the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. This is a violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
In order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that
the deceased was electrocuted when she tried to open her steel gate, Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more
which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the violation of §32(a) of the same law.
switch to said burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation,
not backed up with evidence. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in
a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. In transporting passengers.
times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City,
extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
LISANIE
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied lower court’s findings of fact.
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many
victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
N I K KO HOTEL M ANI LA GARDEN, ET.AL., v. R EYES, GR N o. wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
154259, FEB. 28, 2005 testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
FACTS:
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any
damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s
Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety
name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that in the evening of 13 October 1994,
and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Dr. Violeta Filart invited him to join her
in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of
the hotel’s manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. At the penthouse, they first had
their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with
the party of Dr. Filart. When dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at
the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment,
he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who was Hotel
Nikko’s Executive Secretary. In a loud voice and within the presence
and hearing of the other guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the
party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na
lang"). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr.
Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored
him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, while
he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Mr.
Reyes claims damages in an action instituted against the hotel, Ms.
Lim and Dr. Filart.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the
party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the
latter and claimed that she asked the latter to leave in the most
discreet manner.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim . The trial court likewise
ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of
the party as he was uninvited. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling
of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes.
I SSUE:
W/N the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria considering that Mr. Reyes, by its own account, is a gate
crasher.
HELD:
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the

doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners,
however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked
to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not
to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
LISANIE
bear the entire face value of the check due to its negligence in failing
to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary
period as provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing House Rules and
a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of
Regulations. In its answer, respondent charged petitioner with gross
Supervening N egligence; Doctrine of Discovered P eril; or the
negligence for accepting the post-dated check in the first place. It
“Hum anitarian” Doctrine
contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the loss.
P I CART vs. SM I TH, supra.
The Arbitration Committee rendered its Decision in favor of
I SSUE: petitioner and against the respondent. Respondent filed a petition for
review in the RTC but it affirmed with modification the Arbitration
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence to be liable for damages. Committee’s decision by deleting the award of attorney’s fees. Hence,
the present petition.
HELD:
I ssue:
Defendant is liable.
Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this
case
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to
assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper
side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was R uling:
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must
in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to Yes
cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
As well established by the records, both petitioner and
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within
respondent were admittedly negligent in the encashment of a check
the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a
post-dated one year from its presentment. The doctrine of last clear
place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. Moreover, in situations
where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to
Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of
road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also such loss or injury.
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these
In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to it
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification
other party.
procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if
only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it
ALLI ED BANK I NG CORP ORATI ON, Petitioner, vs. BANK OF THE could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date
P HI LI P P I N E I SLAN DS, Respondents. written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could
have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus
FACTS: dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof
to the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent
negligence of the petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for
A check in the amount of 1M payable to "Mateo Mgt. deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent the amount
Group International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and credited to the payee’s account covering the check.
accepted at petitioner's Kawit Branch. The check, post-dated "Oct. 9,
2003", was drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva)
with respondent BPI. Thereafter, MMGI’s account was closed and all In another case decided by the Supreme Court, it held
the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered petitioner bank as the culpable party under the doctrine of last clear
the debit of 1M from his account. In response to Silva’s complaint, chance since it had, thru its teller, the last opportunity to avert the
respondent credited his account with the aforesaid sum. injury incurred by its client simply by faithfully observing its own
validation procedure, it nevertheless ruled that the plaintiff depositor
(private respondent) must share in the loss on account of
Respondent returned a photocopy of the check to its contributory negligence. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
petitioner for the reason: "Postdated." Petitioner, however, refused the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
to accept and sent it back to respondent. Thereafter, the check was damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
tossed several times from petitioner to respondent, and back to and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
petitioner, until respondent requested the PCHC to take custody of care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the check. PCHC encouraged respondent to submit the controversy the damages to be awarded. W hile it is true that petitioner
for resolution thru the PCHC Arbitration Mechanism. BP I ’s negligence m ay have been the prox im ate cause of the
loss, respondent CBC’s negligence contributed equally to the
However, it was petitioner who filed a complaint before success of the im postor in encashing the proceeds of the
the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent should solely forged checks. Considering the comparative negligence of the 2
LISANIE
banks, we rule that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied evidence on record which clearly shows that there was enough space
by allocating the loss on a 60-40 ratio. to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger.
Moreover, at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was

P ANTR AN CO N OR TH EX P RESS, I N C. V. BAESA
speeding towards Manila. By the time David Ico must have realized
G.R. N OS. 79050-51, [N OVEM BER 14, 1989]
that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too
late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The
Facts: The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children
speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented David
Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico
Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in
and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons,
time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney
were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at
driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision,
Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger
by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner
have been discovered" [Ong v. Metropolitan Water
thereof. From Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan
District, supra]. prcd
to deliver some viands to one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San
Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of
the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam
petitioner's driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming
River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding
jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately
towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on
upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the
its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while
sole and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
would not have occurred. There was no supervening or intervening
negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would have made
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and
the prior negligence of petitioner's driver a mere remote cause of the
Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa,
accident.
died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney
was extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the
II. R e: The issue of liability of petitioner as an em ployer
PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez
to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez
gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of petitioner
has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.
and the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O.
the selection of its employees but also in adequately supervising
Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for
their work rests with the petitioner. Contrary to petitioner's claim,
damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
there is no presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and
safety standards were observed. The mere issuance of rules and
Defense of PANTRANCO: The late David Ico's alleged negligence is
regulations and the formulation of various company policies on
the proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of due
safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are not
diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the
Ramirez.
negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show
that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment
Held:
procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were
I.
followed. Petitioner failed to do this. Hence, the Court finds no
The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in
cogent reason to disturb the finding of both the trial court and the
this case.
Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by the petitioner,
For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the
which consists mainly of the uncorroborated testimony of its Training
person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident
Coordinator, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of
negligence against petitioner.
due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid
an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known
III. R e: Aw ard of Dam ages
the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When
error in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning
he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on
capacity of the deceased victims. While it is true that private
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
respondents should have presented documentary evidence to
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver
support their claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the
will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
deceased victims, the absence thereof does not necessarily bar the
approaching from the opposite direction.
recovery of the damages in question. The testimony of Fe Ico and
Francisca Bascos as to the earning capacity of David Ico, and the
As held by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R.
spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from
No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist who is
which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the
properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is generally
damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased
entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle coming towards him
victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity
on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic. There was
of a deceased victim, the court can consider the nature of his
nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its
occupation, his educational attainment and the state of his health at
own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane by
the time of death.
anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate
driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver
In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the
Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no
time of his death in 1981 and was driving his own passenger jeepney.
choice but to swerve the steering wheel to the left and encroach on
The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years
the jeepney's lane because there was a steep precipice on the right
old at the time of their death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree
[CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is belied by the
holder and the proprietor of the Cauayan Press, printer of the
LISANIE
Cauayan Valley Newspaper and the Valley Times at Cauayan, Isabela. overrode the painted stripe by twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was
Marilyn Baesa graduated as a nurse in 1976 and at the time of her still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true
death, was the company nurse, personnel manager, treasurer and center line of the road and well inside its own lane when the
cashier of the Ilagan Press at Ilagan, Isabela. Respondent court duly accident occurred. By this same reckoning, since it was
considered these factors, together with the uncontradicted unquestionably the jeep that rammed into the stopped truck, it may
testimonies of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos, in fixing the amount of also be deduced that the jeep was at the time travelling beyond its
damages for the loss of earning capacity of David Ico and the own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck by at least the
spouses Baesa. same 11-centimeter width of space.
Re: Award compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa
Nor was the IAC correct in finding that Zacarias had acted
and Marcelino Baesa.
negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his
Respondent court awarded to plaintiff (private respondent) Maricar
lane upon spying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own
Baesa Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as "compensatory
lane, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way. And even
damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa." In
supposing that he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming
other words, the Court of Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand
to a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away cannot be
Pesos (P15,000.00) as indemnity for the death of Harold Jim Baesa
considered an unsafe or imprudent action, there also being
and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for the death of
uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was "zigzagging” and hence
Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous.
no way of telling in which direction it would go as it approached the
truck.
In the case of People v. de la Fuente, the indemnity for the death of
a person was fixed by this Court at Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00). Maricar Baesa should therefore be awarded Sixty It was rather Engr. Calibo’s negligence which was the proximate
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of her cause of the accident. Evidence and testimonies show that the jeep
brothers, Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand had been “zigzagging” or was driven erratically at that time and that
Pesos (P30,000.00) for the death of each brother. its driver had been on a drinking spree on the occasion prior.
GLAN P EOPLE’S LUM BER v. I AC, GR N o. 70493, M ay 18, 1989 Even, however, ignoring theof negligence on the part of Calibo, and
assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as
FACTS:
it was, the physical facts, would still absolve the latter of any
actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last
Engr. Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep owned by the clear chance.
Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as
it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the
Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a
direction of Davao City in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that
distance of one hundred fifty meters. It is also admitted that the
time, the cargo truck, driven by defendant Zacarias and owned by
truck was already at a full stop while the jeep was still 30 meters
petitioners herein, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City
away when thereafter, the latter plowed into the truck. From these
had just crossed said bridge. The cargo truck and the jeep collided
facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had
as a consequence of which Engr Calibo died while Roranes and Patos
the last clear chance to avoid the accident, by stopping in his turn or
sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. After the impact,
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had
the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few
sufficient time to do. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize
meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels
that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to
on the road.
expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve
and leave him a clear path.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of
the late Engr Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
DE R OY vs. CA, January 29, 1988
The Trial Court ruled that plaintiffs were unable to establish the
FACTS:
negligence of defendant and thus, dismissed the case. The trial
court’s decision was reversed upon appeal to the IAC.
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
I SSUE:
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
W/N petitioner is answerable for the death of Engr. Calibo owing to warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to
the negligence of its employee, Zacarias. the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
HELD: The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross

negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
The petition is meritorious. The IAC’s decision is reversed.
Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied

I SSUE:
the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred" is, based on
nothing more than the showing that at the time of the accident, the
truck driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted center line of W/N petitioners are free of liability since respondents had the last
the road into the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25) clear chance of avoiding the incident.
centimeters. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence,
the actual center line of the road was not that indicated by the
HELD:
painted stripe, that although it was not disputed that the truck
LISANIE
The petition is denied. the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to
petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that
street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and
This Court finds that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion
location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under
him and his wife to danger; hence he is solely responsible for the
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of
consequences of his imprudence.
a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from
its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.” ONG vs. M CW D, 104 P hil 397
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private FACTS:
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
its Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon City to which people are invited
of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents,
and nominal fees are charged.
is inapplicable to this case.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old boy,

P LDT vs. CA, GR N o. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989
and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, arrived at the defendant's
swimming pools. This has been the 5th or 6th time that the three
FACTS: brothers had gone to said natatorium. After paying the requisite
admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools
where the water was shallow. Later on, Dominador Ong told his
Private respondents spouses Esteban instituted a case against
brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining
petitioner company for the injuries they sustained in the evening of
building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and
July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell
Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT.
and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a
The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to
bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty
notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva.
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area
The trial court issued a decision in favor of the private respondents.
informed one Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. However, after
under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard
granting a second motion for reconsideration, the CA set aside its
Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into
original decision and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.
the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of
Hence, this petition.
Dominador Ong from the bottom. Manual artificial respiration was
applied. Despite medical attention by the nurse and Dr. Ayuyao of
I SSUE: UP, the boy died.
W/N petitioner company is liable to private respondents for the Plaintiffs instituted a case to recover damages from defendant for
injuries sustained by the latter. the death of their son in the said swimming pool operated by
defendant. After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint.
HELD: Hence, this petition.
The petition is meritorious. I SSUE:
As evidenced by the factual findings of respondent court, private Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
respondents’ jeep were running along the inside lane of Lacson negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle
street when it suddenly swerved (as shown through the tiremarks) plaintiffs to recover damages.
from the left and thereafter hit the accident mound. Petitioner
company cannot be held liable to the private respondents. The HELD:
accident had not occurred due to the absence of warning signals but
rather the abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
The trial court’s decision is hereby affirmed.
Secondly, the jeep was not running at 25kph when the accident
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a
occurred, otherwise it would not have hit the accident mound since
patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety,
at that speed, it could easily apply its brakes on time.
without the fault of the patron, he is not in any sense deemed to be
the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within
From the above findings, the negligence of respondent Antonio his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself
Esteban was not only contributory but rather the very cause of the from any presumption of negligence. Thus in Bertalot vs. Kinnare,
occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their right to supra, it was held that there could be no recovery for the death by
recover damages. The only purpose of warning signs was to inform drowning of a fifteen-year boy in defendant's natatorium, where it
and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The appeared merely that he was lastly seen alive in water at the shallow
private respondents already knew of the presence of said end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen minutes later was
excavations. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT discovered unconscious, and perhaps lifeless, at the bottom of the
for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and pool, all efforts to resuscitate him being without avail.
reasonable care was the cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid
LISANIE
Appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the I SSUE:
lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
W/N petitioners are liable to respondents for the damages incurred
Appellant posits that even if it be assumed that the deceased is as a result of the vehicular accident.
partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still appellee may
be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason
HELD:
that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.
The petition is meritorious.

We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the
record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the The testimony of respondents’ witness, Gamera, that the vehicular
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez tried
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 de Peralta and encroached
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided on the lane of the owner-type jeep, which resulted in the collision,
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. was refuted by PO3 de Peralta, who testified that the passenger jeep
Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the behind the passenger jeep.
negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the
responsible for the consequences of the accident." owner-type jeep, and one of its wheels was detached and stayed
immobile at the place of collision. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez,
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming who investigated the incident, found that the collision took place on
pool and it being apparent that he went there without any the western lane of the national highway or the lane of the
companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the owner-type
regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that encroached on the lane of the
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to passenger jeep.
it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal
of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be
it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a
now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee.. way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a
ACHEVAR A vs. R AM OS, GR N o. 175172, Sept. 29, 2009 general but definite class of risks.
FACTS: Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a
zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway,
Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the
Respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children filed with the
owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint for damages against petitioners
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by
Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the
stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road and
death of Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her
letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward;
two children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April 22, 1995
hence, the collision occurred. The CA correctly held that Benigno
at the national highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take
Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep
such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would
which was involved in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was
ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which proximately
impleaded as the husband of the operator.
caused injury to another.
Respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger

On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of
jeep in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to
gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the
overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on
highway.
the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo
Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death.
Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were
diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle
of the passenger jeep. on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while
Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road
upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. However, when the
Petitioners denied Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and
owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep,
bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that
Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered the passenger jeep
Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he
toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was
saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south and heading north,
at this point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost
running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the
control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had the last
road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards
opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep
the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep
towards the right shoulder of the road.
continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left
side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo
Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the
which he very well knew had a mechanical defect. plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the
defendant − who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so − is made liable for all the consequences of
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
LISANIE
However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by R ULI N G:
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered. The petition lacks merit.
1. The petitioner’s negligence w as the prox im ate cause of

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case,
the accident.
because even if it can be said that it was Valdez who had the last
chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for
on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
damages caused by a person's act or omission constituting fault or
opportunity to avoid the collision.
negligence. It states:
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and was no pre-existing contractual relation between
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall by the provisions of this chapter.
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, negligence was defined
In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to exercise reasonable as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
care and caution. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the protection of
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code. the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
P HI LI P P I N E N ATI ONAL R AI LW AYS COR P ORATI ON v. other person suffers injury.[18] To determine the existence of
VI ZCAR A negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
FACTS: an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crop and with him were 5 the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
companions. While crossing the railroad track, a PNR train, then negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
being operated by respondent Estranas, suddenly turned up and personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
instantaneous death of Reynaldo and his 3 companions while the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
other 2, Joel and Dominador, sustained serious physical injuries. that.
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at As the RTC ruled, and subsequently affirmed by the CA, it was the
the railroad crossing. Additionally, the Stop, Look and Listen signage petitioners failure to install adequate safety devices at the railroad
was poorly maintained. The Stop signage was already faded while crossing which proximately caused the collision, and we found no
the Listen signage was partly blocked by another signboard. compelling reason to disturb the same.
Joel and Dominador, together with the heirs of the deceased victims Petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists
filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train.
alternate driver of the train. In their complaint, the respondents Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop, Look and Listen
alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence,
injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioners inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable
gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look
prevent injury to persons and properties. and Listen signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an
the RTCs finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners. It indication of negligence. Hence, they were rightfully held liable for
concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's damages.
failure to install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars
or safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause of the 2. There w as no contributory negligence on the part of the
accident. respondents.
ISSUES:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the proximate party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
cause of the accident was the negligence of the petitioner. which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for
2. Whether or not the CA erred in finding negligence on the his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of
part of the petitioners or erred in not finding at the least ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring
contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
3. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the doctrine of
last clear chance finds no application in the instant case. Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to
their injury when they were not even aware of the forthcoming
LISANIE
danger. The accident would not have happened had the petitioners
installed reliable and adequate safety devices along the crossing to
ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the same.
a.4. Em ergency R ule
3. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
VALEN ZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later FACTS:
in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence
of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma.
the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her
consequences arising therefrom. restaurant to her home. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a where there were people, to solicit help if needed since rear right tire
person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition,
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to she parked along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights, alighted
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was
Here, the proximate cause of the collision was petitioner’s negligence standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to
in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped
railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li. Because
jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car
unfortunate incident which befell them. Thus, absent preceding of the defendant and then fell to the ground. Plaintiff's left leg was
negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear severed up to the middle of her thigh and was eventually fitted with
chance cannot be applied. an artificial leg.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent and alleged that

GR EENSTAR EX P RESS V. UNI VER SAL R OBI N A (N O DI GEST when he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of
AVAI LABLE) Aurora Blvd. he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake
Street, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80
kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively
swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device,
and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the
plaintiff's car was improperly parked.
Both the trial court and the CA found for petitioner. However, the
latter modified the former’s decision in reducing the amount of
damages. Hence, this petition.
I SSUE:
W/N petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence to

preclude her from claiming damages.
HELD:
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty
of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured

party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard
or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point
of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor

who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no
such situation.
LISANIE
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds  All the passengers of the Nissan Pathfinder died while the
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much occupants of the trucks escaped serious injuries and death.
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the  As their letters to the registered owners of the trucks demanding
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake compensation for the accident were ignored, the 4 minor children
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better of the Mangalinao spouses through their legal guardian,
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. consequently a Complaint for damages based on quasi-
delict, before the RTC; they impleaded the drivers Loreto and
Antonio, as well as the registered owners of the Fuso and the
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy
Isuzu trucks, namely Orix and Sonny, respectively. The children
night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both
imputed recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on the truck
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
drivers for the deaths of their sister and parents; while they hold
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search
Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of
for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
respective drivers. The children demanded payment of more than
stop and assess the emergency because the hobbling vehicle would
P10.5 million representing damages and attorney’s fees.
be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
 Orix in its Motion to Dismiss interposed that it is not the actual
owner of the Fuso truck. It already sold the Fuso truck to MMO
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the Trucking owned by Manuel Ong (Manuel). The latter being the
standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be alleged owner at the time of the collision, Orix filed a Third Party
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances Complaint against Manuel
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower  Sonny and Antonio attributed fault for the accident solely on
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a Loreto’s reckless driving of his truck which suddenly stopped and
sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was slid across the highway. They claimed that Sonny had exercised
evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. the expected diligence required of an employer; that Antonio had
been all along driving with care; and, that with the abrupt and
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was unexpected collision of the vehicles before him and their
the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. The circumstances precarious proximity, he had no way of preventing his truck from
established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly hitting the Pathfinder. For failing to file any responsive pleading,
demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi both Manuel and Loreto were declared in default.
Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at
about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle R TC = issued a Decision finding Sonny, Antonio, Loreto and Orix
rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on liable for damages; ruled in favor of Orix anent its third party
record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under complaint, the latter having sufficiently proven that Manuel of
these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing MMO Trucking is the real owner of the Fuso.
conditions on the road were significantly lessened.
CA = affirmed the factual findings of the trial court of reckless
driving; held that it may be true that it was the Nissan Pathfinder
ORI X M ETRO LEASI N G AN D FI NANCE CORP ORATI ON vs which first hit and bumped and eventually crashed into the Fuso
M ANGALI N AO truck. However, this would not have happened if the truck did not
GR N o. 174089 January 25, 2012 swerve into the lane of the Nissan Pathfinder. As afore-mentioned
[sic], the latter had no way then to avoid a collision because it
A multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) was about to overtake the former; ruled that Orix, as the
resulting in the death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including registered owner of the Fuso, is considered in the eyes of the law
the parents and a sibling of the surviving orphaned minor heirs, and of third persons responsible for the deaths of the passengers
compelled the latter to file an action for damages against the of the Pathfinder, regardless of the lack of an employer-employee
registered owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that relationship between it and the driver Loreto.
collided with their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder (Pathfinder).
I SSUE:
FACTS:  Whether or not petitioners are guilty of negligence?
 Three vehicles were traversing the two-lane northbound NLEX in
the vicinity of Barangay Tibag, Pulilan, Bulacan. It was raining that R ULI N GS:
night. The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the lower courts
 Anacleto Edurese, Jr. (Edurese) was driving a Pathfinder carrying is binding
Isabela-bound passengers who were the owners of said vehicle,  Fuso had lost control, skidded to the left and blocked the way of
spouses Roberto and Josephine Mangalinao (Mangalinao spouses), the Pathfinder, which was about to overtake. The Pathfinder had
their daughter Marriane, housemaid Andres and helper Jebueza. absolutely no chance to avoid the truck. Instead of slowing down
 Before them on the outer lane was a Pampanga-bound Fuso 10- and moving towards the shoulder in the highway if it really
wheeler truck (Fuso), driven by Loreto Lucilo (Loreto), which was needed to stop, it was very negligent of Loreto to abruptly hit the
then already moving in an erratic and swerving motion. Following brake in a major highway wherein vehicles are highly likely to be
behind the Pathfinder was another 10-wheeler truck, an Isuzu at his rear. He opened himself up to a major danger and naturally,
Cargo (Isuzu), driven by Antonio. a collision was imminent.
 Just when the Pathfinder was already cruising along the NLEX’s  The exact positions of the vehicles upon a perusal of the sketch
fast lane and about to overtake the Fuso, the latter suddenly would show that both the Pathfinder and the Isuzu rested on the
swerved to the left and cut into the Pathfinder’s lane thereby highway diagonally. The left part of the former occupied the right
blocking its way. As a result, the Pathfinder hit the Fuso’s left door portion of the inner lane while the rest of its body was already on
and left body. The impact caused both vehicles to stop in the the outer lane, indicating that it was about to change lane, i.e., to
middle of the expressway. Almost instantly, the inevitable pileup the inner lane to overtake. Meanwhile, the point of collision
happened. Although Antonio stepped on the brakes, the Isuzu’s between the Pathfinder and the Isuzu occurred on the right
front crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder leaving it a total portion of the outer lane, with the Isuzu’s front part ramming the
wreck. Pathfinder’s rear, while the rest of the 10-wheeler’s body lay on
the shoulder of the road.
LISANIE
 Isuzu is NOT without fault. The smashed front of the Isuzu
strongly indicates the strong impact of the ramming of the rear of
the Pathfinder that pinned its passengers. Furthermore, Antonio
a.5. P rescription
admitted that despite stepping on the brakes, the Isuzu still
suddenly smashed into the rear of the Pathfinder causing
extensive damage to it, as well as hitting the right side of the Fuso. Art. 1150. “The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when
These militate against Antonio’s claim that he was driving at a there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
safe speed, that he had slowed down, and that he was three cars counted from the day they may be brought.”
away. Clearly, the Isuzu was not within the safe stopping distance
to avoid the Pathfinder in case of emergency. CAPUNO vs. P EP SI , GR N o. L-19331, Apr. 30, 1965
 Thus, the ‘Em ergency R ule’ invoked by petitioners will not apply.
Such principle states: [O]ne w ho suddenly finds him self in a
place of danger, and is required to act w ithout tim e to FACTS:
consider the best m eans that m ay be adopted to avoid the
im pending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to A vehicular collision occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit,
adopt w hat subsequently and upon reflection m ay appear Pampanga which involved a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon
to have been a better m ethod, unless the em ergency in Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal
w hich he finds him self is brought about by his ow n to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan
negligence. and Rizalina Paras.
 Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night,
Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and
increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence.
would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him The information was subsequently amended to include claims for
or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive damages by the heirs of the three victims.
wreck to the vehicle in front.
The appearance and intervention of Prosecutor Atty. Navarro for
Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso truck is liable to the heirs presentation of evidence for damages was disallowed. No appeal
of the victims of the mishap was taken from the order.
 Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate
itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Judgment on the criminal case was rendered on April 15, 1959,
acquitting the accused Elordi. Prior thereto, or on September 26,
Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless
1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for
prim arily liable for the dam ages or injury the truck
damages against the Pepsi Company and Elordi. Appellee moved to
registered under it have caused. It has already been explained:
dismiss the said action relying on the ground of prescription among
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would others. The motion was dismissed by the Court a quo. Hence, this
appeal.
be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to
escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an
indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property I SSUE:
with which to respond financially for the damage or injury
done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is
W/N the action for damages has prescribed.
usually without means to discover or identify the person
actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means
other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor HELD:
Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The
protection that the law aims to extend to him would The action has prescribed.
become illusory were the registered owner given the
opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.
 Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by The present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-
the real or actual owner of the amount that they may be required delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which Orix 1146, Civil Code). Appellants' intervention in the original action was
rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order. And when
the owner of the Fuso, Manuel. they commenced the present civil action on September 26, 1958 the
criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose
to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code
In filing the civil action, appellants considered it as entirely

independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of
the Civil Code.
In other words, the civil action for damages could have been
commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their
decedent, Capuno and the same would not have been stayed by the
filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence.
But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or
after the lapse of more than five years.
The contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case

was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi
is incorrect notwithstanding that appellants had neither waived the
LISANIE
civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said
reservation was not necessary; as without having made it they could platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such
still file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability,
the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, the institution nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as
of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. damages must be set aside.
b. I ncom plete/ P artial Defense R AKES vs. ATLANTI C GULF, supra.(See under ACT OR
OMISSION)
b.1. Doctrine of Contributory N egligence
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if DAVI D TAYLOR V. THE M AN I LA ELECTRI C R AI LR OAD AND
his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate LI GHT COM P AN Y
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the G.R. N O. L-4977. M ARCH 22, 1910
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. Facts:
Defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a

street railway and electric light system in City of Manila. Its power
plant, situated in a small island called Isla del Provisor, can be
N ATL TR AN SM I SSI ON COM I SSI ON V. GLODEL BR OKER AGE
reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge.
(N O DI GEST AVAI LABLE)
David Taylor (15 years old) with Manuel Claparols (12 years old),
crossed the footbridge of Isla del Provisor to visit one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who promised to make them a cylinder
P HI L. N ATI ONAL R AI LW AYS vs. TUPANG, GR N o. 55347, Oct. for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Murphy was not in his
4, 1985 quarters, they spent some time wandering about the company’s
premises. They walked across the open space where the company
dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. It was there that
FACTS: they found 20-30 brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
After discussing on the ownership of the case and their right to take
On September 10, 1972, Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff them, the boys picked up all they could find and carried them home.
Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to After crossing the footbridge, they met Jesse Adrian (less than 9
some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, years old) and the three of them went to the house of Manuel where
for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its they made series of experiments with the caps. When they opened
trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, one of the caps, they found that it was filled with yellowish
Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. substance. They got matches and David held the cap while Manuel
applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed
causing injuries to all three. David was struck in the face by several
Both the CFI and the CA held PNR liable for damages for breaching particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to
the contract of carriage. the extent that the surgeons had to remove it.
I SSUE:
David filed an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and
other injuries.
W/N deceased Tupang was guilty of contributory negligence.
I ssue:
HELD:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff?
The appellate court found that the train boarded by the deceased
Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other
R uling:
passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between
the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did
Entry of the plaintiff upon defendant’s property without the latter’s
not even stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
express invitation or permission would NOT relieve the defendant
person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
from responsibility for injuries incurred by the plaintiff, without fault
on the latter’s part.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their
destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. However, under all the circumstances of this case, the negligence of
Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was NOT
the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. It was the
obligation under the contract of carriage. act of cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents which was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff.
required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with
contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform On Contributory N egligence
between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
LISANIE
While there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the
expressly lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
provisions by the Supreme Court of Spain and by this court in Rakes frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific, clearly deny the plaintiff the right to The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
recover damages, in whole or in part. not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
In Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific, Court said that fault or
negligence is the source of obligation when between such negligence
JARCO M AR KETI N G COR P . vs. CA, 321 SCR A 377
and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the
injury produced should not be the result of the acts or omissions of a
third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although FACTS:
such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less
when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the On 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH AGUILAR were at the 2nd
negligence of the injured party himself. floor of Syvel's Department Store owned by herein petitioner.
CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
Where the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a
casualty, defendant must be exonerated. loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter’s body on
the floor pinned by the store's gift-wrapping counter. ZHIENETH was
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center but died a few days later.
injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident
and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could Petitioners denied any liability claiming that CRISELDA was negligent
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to
it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances.
ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she
In the present case, the immediate cause of the explosion was his climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse. Petitioners also
own act, and that having contributed to the principal occurrence, as emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong
one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its
construction.
BANAL & EN VERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRI C & HOUSE
P LANT, 54 P hil 327 Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to
the conclusive presumption that a child below nine years is incapable
of contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at six years old,
FACTS:
was already capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically
impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. Also, the
On the evening of April 10, 1925, a procession was held in Tacloban, testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo Gonzales,
Leyte attended by Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the
Bernal. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners'
passed along a public street. The little girl was allowed to get a short theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that
distance in advance of her mother and her mother’s friends. When in when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an replied, "Nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter
automobile appeared from the opposite direction which frightened just fell on me."
the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the
street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter coming The Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners finding that the
from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her proximate cause of ZHIENETH’s injuries was the negligence of the
companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the latter and that of her mother. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the
hot water. She was taken to the provincial hospital but thereafter decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
died. Dr. Benitez, who attended the child, certified that the cause of
death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body.” I SSUE:
The trial court found that the company was negligent but dismissed W/N petitioners should be absolved from liability because of private
the case having ruled that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory respondent’s negligence.
negligence.
HELD:
I SSUE:
We deny the petition.Under the circumstances, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have
W/N Enverso was guilty of contributory negligence. lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord
credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter.
HELD:
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to keep and
maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their
We are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion
negligence. Petitioner was informed of the danger posed by the
of the trial judge to the effect that the sudden death of the child
unstable counter. Yet, it neither initiated any concrete action to
Purification Bernal was due principally to the nervous shock and
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees
organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns from the hot
and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
water.
done.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal
street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
LISANIE
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause
presumption that favors children below nine years old in that they him harm or put his life in danger.
are incapable of contributory negligence.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they
account, exempt from criminal liability. Since negligence may be a accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only
felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. in the area.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence,
assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable
and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not CADI EN TE vs. M ACAS, GR N o. 161846, N ov. 14, 2008
have caused the counter to collapse.
FACTS:
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, , at the intersection
hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high
clutch when she signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable and school student Bithuel Macas was standing on the shoulder of the
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. road. Rosalinda was about two and a half meters away from the
respondent when the latter was bumped and run over by a Ford
N APOCOR vs. CASI ON AN , GR N o. 165969, N ov. 27, 2008 Fiera, driven by Cimafranca. Respondent was rushed to the hospital
where both his legs were amputated in order to save his life.
FACTS:
Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner,
time of the incident that claimed his life. He worked as a pocket Atty. Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident
miner. happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged
that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Jalipa with the understanding that
A trail existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by the latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the registration.
members of the community. Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC
installed high-tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. The victim's father filed a complaint for torts and damages against
Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC. Cadiente later filed a third-
reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten party complaint against Jalipa.
feet.
The RTC held Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and severally liable to
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, respondent. Such decision was affirmed by the CA.
were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining.
Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. I SSUE:
Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the
NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place. W/N victim is guilty of contributory negligence.
As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he was W/N petitioner is absolved from liability by the fact that he was no
carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Thereafter, longer the owner of said vehicle.
Melchor saw Noble fall to the ground. He rushed to Noble and shook
him but the latter was already dead. HELD:
Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents. The petition is without merit.
I SSUE: In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the
victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented
W/N Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence so as to portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was
mitigate NAPOCOR’s liability. intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as
those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder.
HELD: Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said
uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented
As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and
feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim.
transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the
bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford
would not have been electrocuted. Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the highway
would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over.
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s part. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the
respondent was negligent.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls Coming now to the second issue, this Court has recently reiterated in
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co.,
protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act Inc.,that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already
LISANIE
sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody
whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were
instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As
VI. LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION
employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages
caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their
assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. To
a. By tortfeasor avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an
employer must present convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
LOADM ASTER S vs . GLODEL supervision of his employee. In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
FACTS: Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary

diligence for failing to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply
An insurance policy was issued by R&B Insurance in favor of with the undertaking to safely transport the subject transport the
Columbia to insure the shipment of electric copper cathodes against subject cargo to the designated destination.
All Risks to which Colombia engaged the services of Glodel for the
release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters
subsequent delivery to its warehouse which in turn engaged the and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered
services of herein petitioner, Loadmasters, for the use of its delivery by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting
trucks. damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is
Of the 12 trucks used to deliver the cargoes, only 11 reached the sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without
destination. The missing truck was later recovered but without the which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one
loaded cargoes. Because of said incident, a claim for insurance of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have
indemnity was filed and subsequently paid for by R&B Insurance. resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
both Loadmasters and Glodel seeking reimbursement of the amount
it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is
that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where
from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
RTC held Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the cargo. CA more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the
affirmed the RTC decision and in addition held that whatever liability direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
the latter owes to R&B Insurance as insurance indemnity must impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
likewise be the amount that the petitioner must pay. injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where
their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
I SSUES: party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not Loadmasters should be held liable to pay Glodel for
the damages the latter paid as a result of the cargos lost in the
hands of Loadmasters.
R ULI N G:
NO. Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R&B
for the loss of the cargo. Loadmasters may not have a direct
contractual relation with Columbia but it is liable for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 of the NCC. Pertinent is the ruling
enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service,
Inc v Phoenix Assurance Company of New York/ McGee & Co., Inc.
where the Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a
contractual relationship. However, for failing to properly interpose a
cross-claim against Loadmaster, it cannot seek therefore seek
judicial sanction against Loadmasters. A cross-claim not set up shall
be barred and it cannot be set up for the first time on appeal
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated

from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to
observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case,
as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
LISANIE
cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses
had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of
a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell
b. Vicarious Liability
could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys
to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around
b.1. By parents or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the
other key was.
LI BI V. I AC
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law
Facts: in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in
she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite
the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at
Julie Ann with demands for the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio's gun was
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were
Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from and knowing the activities of their children who, for all
January 7 to 13, 1978. they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single being drug informers, or even drug users. Neither was a
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell,
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private thereof, holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
streets of the same city.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides: 'The father,
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, posited their responsible for the damages caused by their minor
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial children who live in their company.'
evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical
facts. Gotiong spouses submitted that Wendell caused her death by 2. We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Libi spouses on what appears from all indications was a crime
rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity,
whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor
work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
(CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann
to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification. L We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts
of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case in the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and,
in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily
I ssue/ s: 1. Whether the parents of Wendell Libi are liable under Art. liable.
2180.
2. Whether or not their liability, if they are to be held Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not
liable, is merely subsidiary. subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180
provides that "(t) he responsibility treated of in this article
R uling: shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
RTC: Complaint is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. to prevent damages." We are also persuaded that the
CA: Ruled in favor of Gotiong spouses. liability of the parents for felonies committed by their
minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary
SC:
1. Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due

diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should
not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor
son, is not borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified

that her husband, Cresencio Libi owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the
safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag,
all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never
seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was
no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly,
LISANIE
Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
CUADR A vs. M ON FORT, GR N o. L-24101, Sept. 30, 1970
parents, the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
FACTS: from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School. On July 9, living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor
1962 they were assigned to weed the grass in the school premises. been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
While thus engaged Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she adoption.
said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
the latter turned around, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some indispensable parties to the action. The CA dismissed the appeal
powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and had to undergo having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition.
surgical operation twice. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria
Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. I SSUE:
The parents instituted a suit in behalf of their minor daughter against Whether the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father. The RTC ruled in sustained by Jennifer Tamargo.
favor of plaintiff to which the defendant appealed to SC on pure
questions of law. HELD:
I SSUE: This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or

the doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable
W/N Alfonso Monfort can be held liable for the acts of his child which for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
caused damage to the Cuadra daughter. others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
HELD: consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their
parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the disciplining of the child.
fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with
act or omission is that of one person for whom another is its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180 performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the
under the principle of vicarious liability. The presumption of liability is child who is in their custody and control. The parental dereliction is,
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted by proving that of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
prevent damage." exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It
or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual
where it was his duty to send her and where she was under the care custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused suit for damages.
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given
and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no
TAM AR GO vs. CA, GR N o. 85044, June 3, 1992 actual or physically custody over the adopted child. To hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
FACTS: spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial
incident. court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Rapisura amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This
petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is,
after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
LISANIE
b.2. By Guardians
b.3. By Ow ners and M anagers of Establishm ents CASTI LEX I N DUSTRI AL COR P . vs. VASQUEZ G.R. N o. 132266
Decem ber 21, 1999
SP S. VI LORI A V. CONTI N ENTAL AI R LI NES (N O DI GEST
AVAI LABLE) FACTS:
P HI L. RABBI T LI N ES, I N C. vs. P HI L-AM ER I CAN On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Vasquez,
FORW AR DERS, I N C. G.R. N o. L-25142 M arch 25, 1975 was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He
was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a
FACTS: rotunda) but only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was manager of Appellant
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux
owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national Pick-up. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company
highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña
driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in
Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
and the bus was damaged. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
As a result of the incident, a complaint for damages was filed against stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda. The CFI Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's hospital where he died a few
dismissed the case as to Balingit citing that the latter was not the days after.
manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the
Civil Code. An action for damages was commenced by the parents of the
deceased against Abad and Castilex. The trial court ruled in favor of
I SSUE: private respondents. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the
What is the meaning of “manager” as used in Art.2180 of the NCC? liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the
former.
HELD:
I SSUE:
The Civil Code provides:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of a company-issued vehicle.
persons for whom one is responsible.
HELD:
xxx xxx xxx
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once
occasion of their functions. this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
industry.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that
xxx xxx xxx the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the
scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient
to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said
We are of the opinion that the term manager does not include the vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the
manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of course or scope of his employment.
article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer". In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime
work at the petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan,
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi- Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente
delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil- Osmeña, Cebu City where he had snacks with friends. It was when
American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question
already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an occurred. A witness then testified that at the time of the incident,
employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, ABAD was with a woman inside his car.
Inc.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own
not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular
LISANIE
accident which was about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988. ABAD's Thus, in order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been of Article 1311, referred to as a stipulation pour autrui, may demand
completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting parties clearly and
any relation to his duties as a manager. deliberately conferred a favor to the third person - the favor is not
merely incidental; (4) The favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no favor before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a represent, or are not authorized, by the third party. However, none
family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and of the foregoing elements obtains in this case.There is absolutely
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the nothing in the said contract that would indicate any obligation and/or
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons
such as herein plaintiffs-appellees.
Moreover, the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the
b.4. By Em ployers contract between the parties herein was one of lease as defined
under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It has been held that the act of
SP S M AM ARI L V. BOY SCOUTS OF THE P HI LI P P I N ES parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a
lease. The agreement with respect to the ingress and egress of Sps.
Facts: PUJ operators Sps. Mamaril would park their 6 passenger Mamaril's vehicles were coordinated only with AIB and its security
jeepneys every night at BSP’s compound in Malate, Manila for a fee guards, without the knowledge and consent of BSP. Accordingly, the
of P300.00 per month for each unit. One day, one of the vehicles mishandling of the parked vehicles that resulted in herein
was missing and was never recovered. According to the security complained loss should be recovered only from the tort feasors
guards Peña and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency with whom BSP had (Peña and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB; and not against the
contracted for its security and protection, a male person who looked lessor, BSP.
familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound. Sps.
Mamaril prayed that Peña and Gaddi, together with AIB and BSP, be BALI W AG TR AN SI T I N C. vs. CA G.R. N o. 116624 Septem ber
held liable for: (a) the value of the subject vehicle; (b) amount 20, 1996
representing daily loss of income/boundary reckoned from the day
the vehicle was lost; (c) exemplary damages; (d) moral damages; (e) FACTS:
attorney's fees; and (f) cost of suit.
On 2 November 1990, petitioner's Baliwag Transit Bus No. 117 was
BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal for repair of its brake system.
directly deal with AIB with respect to the manner by which the Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the
parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself matters so that proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel
expressly stated that the "Management shall not be responsible for then alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the gas
loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein." It also tank.
claimed that Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service
Contract. Apart from not being parties thereto, its provisions cover Shortly after, Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver's seat.
only the protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something was hit. When he went
down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground
Issue: Whether or not BSP may be held liable for the loss of the bleeding and convulsive, sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and
vehicle caused by the negligence of its security guards. another bus parked thereat. Mario Dionisio was rushed to the
hospital but died a few days after.
Held:
Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged by private
NO. The proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was respondents Divina Vda. de Dionisio, for herself and in behalf of her
the negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an minor children. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private
unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle. The records are respondents. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this
bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Neither will petition.
the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code apply in this case. Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security I SSUE:
guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. No
employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the W/N Baliwag Transit is liable solidarily with Fidel for the death of
security guards assigned in its premises. Sps. Mamaril are not parties Dionisio.
to the Guard Service Contract. Guard Service Contract between
defendant-appellant BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is HELD:
purely between the parties therein.
The petition must fail. The circumstances clearly show that the
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and proximate cause of the death of Dionisio was the negligence of
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from driver Fidel when he failed to take the necessary precaution to
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or prevent the accident. Driver Fidel should have parked the bus
by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the properly and safely. After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman
property he received from the decedent. If a contract should contain to fill the tank, he should have placed a stopper or any hard object
some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking the necessary
fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor precaution he boarded Bus No. 117 causing it to move and roll,
before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a pinning down the deceased which resulted in his eventual death. The
person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly reckless imprudence of Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of
and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. offended party for damages together with his employer.
LISANIE
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school
on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the
in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.
such selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal
showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and considered as an extra-curricular activity.
supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for
quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by the
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. Petitioner's principal of the planning of the picnic by the students and their
failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence
a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of
make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him. Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence.
ST. FRANCI S HI GH SCHOOL vs. CA, G.R. N o. 82465 February
25, 1991 Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-
teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
FACTS: spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the
section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward
Francis High School, joined a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact,
and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who
are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in
During the picnic and while the students were in the water, one of First Aid application and swimming. The records also show that both
the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was the child.
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts
to resuscitate him ashore failed. FI LAM ER CHRI STI AN I N STI TUTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 75112
October 16, 1990
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages
against the St. Francis High School and the teachers, contending that FACTS:
the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to
exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an 82-year old retired
preventing their son's drowning. schoolteacher, was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner
Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan,
The trial court found in favor of the respondents but absolved the Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the
school from liability. The CA, upon appeal, ruled in favor of evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan,
respondents and held the school liable under the doctrine in Art. Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized.
2180 of the NCC.
Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after
I SSUE: having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the
wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident.
W/N St. Francis High School is liable for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo by applying Art. 2180 of the NCC. Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages. The trial court
rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha
HELD: to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party to the case. The
Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto.
The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant case, petitioners
are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence I SSUE:
of those under them.
W/N the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
HELD:
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. We
for whom one is responsible. agree.
xxx xxx xxx In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions
of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their reads:
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged Sec. 14.W orking scholars. — There is no employer-
in any business or industry. employee relationship between students on the one hand, and
schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of
held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission charge; provided the students are given real opportunity,
which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to
employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. finish their chosen court under such arrangement.
LISANIE
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over
Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha Venturina after his selection. Petitioner did not present any proof
belongs to that special category of students who render service to that she drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines
the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any
petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic
to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner
sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the
Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
company payroll.
In sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents for the negligent
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on
and imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, under Article 2180 of
Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot the Civil Code is both manifest and clear.
be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time
of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was
not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty SYK I vs. BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149 October 23, 2003
was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning
before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the jeep from the FACTS:
authorized driver and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner
resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three
within the ambit of his assigned tasks. It is but fair therefore that companions flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Espina and
Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. owned by Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger
jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the
YAM BAO vs. ZUI GA, G.R. N o. 146173. Decem ber 11, 2003 boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Sablayan
and owned by petitioner Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger
FACTS: jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common

Petitioner Yambao is the registered owner of Lady Cecil and Rome
carrier’s contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Pisuena, the
Trans passenger bus. On May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the
owner of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Syki, the owner
petitioner was being driven by Venturina along EDSA. Suddenly, the
of the truck;, and Sablayan, the driver of the truck.
bus bumped Zuiga, a pedestrian. Zuiga thereafter died despite being
given medical attention.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Pisuena but ordered
petitioner Syki and Sablayan, to pay respondent Begasa, jointly and
Private respondents, as legal heirs of Zuiga, filed a Complaint against severally, actual and moral damages plus attorney’s fees. The CA
petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages. Both the trial court affirmed the decision in toto.
and the CA ruled in favor of private respondents. Hence, this petition.
I SSUE:
I SSUE:
W/N petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of his employees as to absolve him from
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a liability.
family in the selection and supervision of her employees, thus
absolving her from any liability. HELD:
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris familias" in the

Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must
and supervision of her driver deserves but scant consideration. Her fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence,
allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased
his drivers license and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure
nature of the testimony.
to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and
clearances. Moreover, as the court a quo aptly observed, petitioner
Petitioner testified that before he hired Sablayan, he required him to
contradicts herself. She declared that Venturina applied with her
submit a police clearance in order to determine if he was ever
sometime in January 1992 and she then required him to submit his
involved in any vehicular accident. He also required Sablayan to
license and clearances. However, the record likewise shows that she
undergo a driving test with conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca.
did admit that Venturina submitted the said requirements only on
May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal accident itself. In other
Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand, testified that
words, petitioners own admissions clearly and categorically show
Sablayan passed the driving test and had never figured in any
that she did not exercise due diligence in the selection of her bus
vehicular accident except the one in question.
driver.
Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police clearance
In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his given to him by Sablayan, nor the results of Sablayan’s driving test.
license and clearances when he applied with petitioner, the latter still Petitioner also did not present records of the regular inspections that
fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. his mechanic allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-
Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to the serving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic are, without doubt,
extent of verifying Venturinas qualifications, safety record, and insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was
driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. Accordingly,
negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus, remains we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable
unrebutted. for the injuries suffered by respondent.
LISANIE
Petitioners spouses Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint
for damages against respondents.
AGUI LA vs. BALDOVI SO, G.R. N o. 163186 February 28, 2007
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the CA absolved
FACTS: Miguel from liability upon appeal, citing that the latter was not the
employer of Lozano. Hence, this petition.
On April 19, 1993, Lisbos was driving, along EDSA in Caloocan City, a
van, registered under the name of petitioner Reyes. The van
sideswiped Fausto who was walking along the pedestrian lane and I SSUE:
crossing EDSA. Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries,
and was brought to the hospital but subsequently died. May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts
of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor
Fausto’s wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children filed before the RTC pedestrian?
a complaint for damages against Lisbos, Reyes, Emerlito F. Aguila,
the actual operator and possessor of the van, and Times Surety and
Insurance Company, the insurer of the van under a third-party HELD:
liability insurance contract.
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The CA denied the application in the present case.
appeal ruling that Reyes and Aguila has lost their right to appeal.
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees,
I SSUE:
the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee
was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That
Do the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision
the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the
after the original decision had become final and executory?
employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit
act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
HELD: functions entrusted to him.
We find petitioners’ contentions devoid of merit.
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be
While the Resolution dated August 13, 2001, correcting the March 7, assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship
2000 Decision, stated that the name of Lisbos was inadvertently by preponderant evidence
included in the dispositive portion, hence, said name was ordered
stricken off, the ensuing Amended Decision rendered on August 13, In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if
2001 is null and void because any amendment or alteration made Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable
which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null for the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an
and void. employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves:
(1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or
Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original decision holding other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method
the petitioners, Lisbos, and the insurance company solidarily liable. of doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or
In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is dismissal.
direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. Thus, even if the driver
was included albeit not served with summons, petitioners are directly Applying the foregoing test, it was the Municipality of Koronadal
and primarily liable. Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident.
and registered owner or possessor-operator of the van, respectively, It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the
are solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180 in relation to municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel
Articles 2184 and 2194 of the Civil Code. during the time of the accident is of no moment.
SP S. JAYM E vs. AP OSTOL, G.R. N o. 163609 N ovem ber 27, Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
2008 instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable.
Mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the
passenger has control over the vehicle.
FACTS:
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato and his direct employer.
was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee of the Municipality. The pick-up truck was registered under
the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of
Ernesto Simbulan.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who

was then crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok,
South Cotabato.
Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention,

Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
LISANIE
employer's subsidiary liability and, at the same time, absurd because
we will be faced with a situation where the employer is held
subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being previously
Com pare: Subsidiary Liability under Art. 103 of the R P C
established.
SP S. FR AN CO vs. I AC, G.R. N o. 71137 October 5, 1989 Thus the present case must be decided on the basis of civil liability
of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its employee and
FACTS: not subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the RPC.
On October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco BER M UDEZ vs. HON. M ELENCI O-HER RERA, G.R. N o. L-32055
Bus he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck parked along February 26, 1988
the cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga,
Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus FACTS:
driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the
two vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality. A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun
Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of
The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers and two plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which
passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay. caused his death. As a result, a criminal case filed against Pontino.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed in the said criminal case "A Reservation to
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini File Separate Civil Action."
Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs.
Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for
action for damages. damages. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence constituted a quasi-
The trial court in its decision said that the act of the Franco Bus delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to
driver was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their
obligation arising from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court
from Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Said decision was affirmed by the decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant
IAC. Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case
against Pontino until after the criminal case is finally terminated.
I SSUE: Hence, this appeal.
Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein I SSUE:

private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict.
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded
HELD: on crime or on quasi-delict.
HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between
the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the We find the appeal meritorious.
employer's primary liability under the NCC which is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Article To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract,
103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows: crime and quasi-delict. According to appellant, her action is one to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime. It is now settled that for
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to present:
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen, (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties; duties;
While the second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177 and 2180 (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil
of the Civil Code. liability;
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry.
a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor
and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be
to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be subsidiarily liable.
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal
action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice
corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
Article 103. delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses
the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted. Thus, act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that the diligence of a good father of the family.
their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability.
Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible. In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved
To hold the employer liable under Article 103 of the RPC sans prior their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did
conviction is erroneous. It is erroneous because the conviction of the not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the
LISANIE
would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for
ALVAREZ vs. CA, G.R. N o. L-59621 February 23, 1988 further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. These do not exist
in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in
FACTS: the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil
Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide in the CFI of action to be filed.
Quezon Province. After trial, the court rendered judgment against
the accused. CEREZO vs. TUAZON, G.R. N o. 141538 M arch 23, 2004
The accused appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court's FACTS:
decision but deleted that part thereof making herein petitioner, as
employer of Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for payment of the On 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger collided with a
adjudged indemnities to the offended parties, ruling that -- tricycle. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint
for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and bus
Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this action. It is true that driver Foronda.
the judgment of conviction in the criminal case binds the person
subsidiarily liable with the accused, and it is therefore the duty The trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no
of the employer to participate in the defense. The law, however, pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because there was no service
does not authorize that the subsidiary liability of the employer of summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for
be adjudged in the criminal action. This is because, in the the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs.
criminal proceeding, the employer, not being a party, is denied Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
the opportunity to present his defense against such subsidiary
liability. Due regard to due process and observance of Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from judgment, petition for
procedural requirements demand that a separate action should certiorari and annulment of judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insisted that trial
be filed against the supposed employer to enforce the court never acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the RPC. no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses
claimed was an indispensable party. All of the actions were denied
The CA’s decision was not appealed. Meanwhile, on 14 December for lack of merit.
1978, Pajarito v. Seneris was decided by this Court, holding inter alia
that-- I SSUE:
Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a W/N Foronda was an indispensable party to the action so as to
defendant employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability.
103 of the Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer
not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also with HELD:
regard to its amount, . . . in the action to enforce the
employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other function The petition has no merit.
than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in
the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal
if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of
Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the
In view of the foregoing principles, it would serve no important Revised Penal Code.
purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent
action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a
subsidiary civil liability. At any rate, the proceeding for the delict under Article 103 of the RPC, or may give rise to an action for
enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the NCC. An aggrieved party may
as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. choose between the two remedies.
After finality of the CA judgment, the case was remanded to the RTC Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict.
for execution on the strength of the Pajarito decision. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable
party to the case.
I SSUE:
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary
W/N a separate civil action is necessary to enforce the employer’s and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary liability. subsidiary. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the
HELD: employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of
The petition is not impressed with merit. negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically arises upon his In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the
employee's conviction, and subsequent proof of inability to pay. In subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the
this light, the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a employee as provided in Article 103 of the RPC. To hold the
procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved
recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judicially-declared party must initiate a criminal action where the employee’s delict and
criminally negligent act. corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action
proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-
to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint
LISANIE
Cf: R egistered Ow ner R ule
L.G. FOODS CORP ORATI ON vs. HON. P AGAP ON G- CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS I N TERNATI ON AL I N C. V.
AGRAVI ADOR, G.R. No. 158995 Septem ber 26, 2006 ABEJAR
FACTS: Doctrine:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the - The plaintiff may first prove the ER’s ownership of the vehicle
spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the involved in a mishap by presenting the vehicle’s registration in
petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Yeneza. Charles evidence. Thereafter, a disputable presumption that the
died as a result of the accident. requirements for an ER’s liability under Art. 2180, CC have been
satisfied will arise. The burden of evidence then shifts to the
A criminal case was filed against the driver. Unfortunately, before defendant to show that no liability under Art. 2180 has ensued. This
the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide. case harmonizes the requirement of Art. 2180, in relation to Art.
On account thereof, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case. 2176, and the so-called “registered-owner rule”
Thereafter, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages - It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that
against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically harmonizes it with Arts. 2176 and 2180, CC. Rules must be
alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence construed in a manner that will harmonize them with other rules so
in the selection and supervision of their employees. as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence—Art.
2180 should defer to the registered-owner rule, but it was never
The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally stated that Art. 2180 should be completely abandoned.
arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability
against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC. Legend:
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The CA R - Reyes, the victim E - Espinosa, the witness A - Abejar, res. and
denied the petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court. aunt of R B - Bautista, the driver of the van C - Caravan, pet. and
employer of B EE - Employee ER - Employer RO - Registered-owner
I SSUE: ROR - Registered-owner Rule
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article Facts: - 13 July 2000: R was walking along the westbound lane of
103 of the RPC or derived from Article 2180 of the NCC. Sampaguita St., United Paranaque Subd. IV, Paranaque City. An L-
300 van was traveling along the east-bound lane opposite R. To
HELD: avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit R. E
went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van and told the
The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were driver, B, to bring R to the hospital. Instead, B left the van parked
suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. inside a nearby subdivision (with R still in the van). Fortunately, an
Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi- unidentified civilian helped and drove R to the hospital.
delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress,
the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and - C, a corporation engaged in organizing travels and tours, was the
negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, registered owner of the van. B was C's EE and was assigned to drive
as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and the van as its service driver.
supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could
have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of - C shouldered the hospital expenses of R, but R died two days after
their 7-year old son. the accident.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is - A, R’s paternal aunt and the person who raised her since R was 9
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against y.o., filed a Complaint for damages against B and C in RTC
the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such Paranaque. A alleged that B was an EE of C and that C is the
employee. registered owner of the van.
- Summons could not be served on B, so A moved to drop B as a

defendant—RTC granted.
- RTC found that B was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. RTC
awarded damages in favor of A . C’s MR was denied.
CA affirmed with modification RTC’s decision . 2 C’s MR was denied.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari (on CA decision).
- C’s Arguments:
• A has no personality to bring this suit because she isn’t a real

party-in-interest
• A doesn’t exercise legal or substitute parental authority, nor is she

the judicially appointed guardian of or only living relative of R, nor
the executor or administrator of the estate of R.
• Only the victim or the heirs can enforce an action on culpa

aquiliana (such as A’s action for damages).
LISANIE
• A didn’t offer documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that B - Although R was already 18 y.o. when she died (thus she had
acted within the scope of his assigned tasks when the accident already reached the age of majority and was emancipated), and
occurred. - According to C, B’s tasks only pertained to the transport parental authority is terminated upon emancipation, A continued to
of company personnel or products support and care for R—the relationship remained the same. “The
anguish and damage caused to [A] was by [R’s] death was no
• C argues it exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the different because of [R’s] emancipation”
selection and supervision of its EEs.
- In any case, termination of A’s parental authority is not an
• A should not have been awarded damages, and questions the insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint. -
Certificate provided by A as proof of expenses since its signatory The Court has held that Art. 1902, Old CC/Art. 2176 , N e w C C i s b
(Julian Peñaloza) was not present in court and that C was denied the r o a d e n o u g h t o accommodate even plaintiffs who are not
right to cross-examine him. And that the Certificate constitutes relatives of the deceased.
hearsay.
I I . Yes, C is liable.
• C contends that based on Art. 2206(3), CC A isn't entitled to moral
damages because C acted in good faith. - A’s Complaint is anchored on an ER’s liability for quasi-delict
provided in Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2176, CC.
• That C should not be held solidarity liable with B since B was
already dropped as a party. - - It was not fatal to A’s cause that she herself did not adduce proof
that B acted within the scope of his authority. It was sufficient that A
proved that C was the registered owner of the van that hit R.
- A’s Arguments: - According to the Court, two rules must be considered:
• C failed to provide proof that it exercised the requisite diligence in 1. Art. 2180’s specification that “[ERs] shall be liable for the damages
the selection and supervision of B. caused by their [EEs]…acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks[.]”
• CA ruling on damages should be upheld
2. The operation of the registered-owner rule (ROR) that registered
• Since C is the registered owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of
and solidarity liable for the tortious acts of B. their vehicles. - These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to
cases in which the ER is also the registered owner of the vehicle.
- Art. 2180 requires proof of two things:

I ssues: I. WON A is a real party-in-interest who may bring an action
for damages against C on account of R’s death—YES. 1. An ER-EE relationship between the driver and owner; and 2. That
the driver acted within the scope of his/her assigned tasks.
II. WON C should be liable as an ER, pursuant to Art. 2180, CC—YES.
PETITION DENIED. Ratio is discussed below. Important points are - On the other hand, applying the ROR only requires the plaintiff to
underscored. prove that defendant-ER is the registered-owner (RO) of the vehicle.
I . Yes, A is a real party-in-interest. - ROR can be seen as early as in the case of Erezo, et al. v. Jepte
(1957) where this Court explained that the registration of motor
- A exercised substitute parental authority and suffered actual loss vehicles, as required by Sec. 5(a), RA 4136 (Land Transportation and
Traffic Code), was necessary “not to make said registration the
- A properly filed an action based on quasi-delict and she is a real operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred,… but to
party-in-interest, which is defined in Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public
CivPro which states that “xxx the party who stands to be benefited highway[.]” Its “main aim…is to identify the owner so that if any
or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real on a definite individual, the registered owner.”
party-ininterest.”
Erezo v. Jepte (notwithstanding Castilex v. Vasquez ) relied on Art.
- The Court also looked at Art. 216 and 233, FC to identify persons 2180, CC even though 3 the ER was also the RO of the vehicle. The
who exercise substitute parental authority. ROR was not mentioned.
- R’s parents and paternal grandparents are deceased, and the - In Castilex v. Vasquez, the Court absolved Castilex of liability
whereabouts of her maternal grandparents are unknown. There is no reasoning that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the
record of R having siblings. A took custody of R when R was a child negligent EE was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks, which
and A assumed the role of parent and exercised parental authority Vasquez failed to do.
over R.
The Court outlined the process necessary for an ER to be held liable
- Consistent with Art. 220, FC, A supported R’s education and for the acts of its EE: •Under the 5th par. of Art. 2180, WON
provided for her personal needs— A treated R as her own daughter. engaged in any business or industry, an ER is liable for the torts
- A’s right to proceed against against C is based on two grounds: committed by the EE within the scope of his assigned tasks. It is
necessary to establish the ER-EE relationship and once this is done,
• A suffered actual personal loss. • A is capacitated to do what R’s the plaintiff must show that the EE was acting within the scope of his
actual parents would have been to do. assigned task when the tort was committed.
- Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank , 4 recognized the seeming

conflict between Art. 2180 and the ROR and applied the latter. The
LISANIE
SC here reiterated the pronouncements in Erezo v. Jepte in ruling - For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements of
that the bank, as the RO of the vehicle, was primarily liable to the Article 2180 have been satisfied, petitioner must be held liable.
plaintiff. The SC here concluded that the LC erred when it concluded
that the bank was not liable simply because (a) petitioner did not Side matters:
prove that Borja was acting as the bank’s vice president at the time
of the accident; and (b) Borja had, according to respondent bank, - C’s argument that it should be excused from liability because B was
already bought the car at the time of the mishap. For as long as the already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The liability
respondent bank remained the registered owner of the car involved imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It does not
in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability. depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.
- Preference for the ROR became more pronounced in Del Carmen, •Otherwise, it would render impotent the rationale of the motor
Jr. v. Bacoy which reiterated Aguilar, stating that “[d]espite Art. registration law in fixing liability on a definite person.
2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as
said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning •B was not an indispensable part under Sec. 7, Rule 3 of the 1997
accidents involving registered motor vehicles…” Rules of CivPro. Rather, he was a necessary party under Sec. 8.
- Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas stated that the RO of a vehicle •Indispensable Party: parties-in-interest without whom no final
can no longer use the defenses found in Art. 2180. determination can be had of an action—non-inclusion is debilitating.
The presence of indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise
- In Mendoza v. Sps. Gomez the Court said: “However, Aguilar, Sr., of juridical power and when an indispensable party is not before the
Del Carmen, Filcar, and Mendoza should not be taken to mean that court, the action should be dismissed.
Art. 2180, CC should be completely discarded in cases where the
registered-owner rule finds application. As acknowledged in Filcar, •Necessary Party: presence is not imperative, and absence is not
there is no categorical statutory pronouncement in the Land debilitating. Nevertheless, it is preferred that they be included in
Transportation and Traffic Code (LTTC) stipulating the liability of a order that relief may be complete.
registered owner. The source of a registered owner’s liability is not a
distinct statutory provision, but remains to be Arts. 2176 and •SC: C could have opted to file a cross-claim against B as its remedy.
2180,CC”
•C’s interest and liability is distinct from that of its driver. -
- It is imperative to apply the ROR in a manner that harmonizes it Regardless of C’s ER-EE relationship with B, liability attaches to C on
with Arts. 2176 and 2180, CC. Rules must be c o n s t r u e d i n a m account of its being the RO of a vehicle that figures in a mishap.
a n n e r t h a t w i l l harmonize them with other rules so as to form
a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence—Art. 2180 should •A determination of C’s liability as owner can proceed independently
defer to the ROR, but it was never stated that Art. 2180 should be of a consideration of how B conducted himself as a driver. While
completely abandoned. certainly it is desirable that a determination of B’s liability be made
alongside that of the owner of the van he was driving, his
- Appropriate Approach: Where both apply 1. Plaintiff must establish noninclusion in these proceedings does not absolutely hamper a
that the ER is the RO of the vehicle 2. There then arises a disputable judicious resolution of A’s plea for relief.
presumption that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been proven
and as a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to - CA committed no reversible error when it awarded actual damages
show that no liability under Art. 2180 has arisen. to A, which was based on the Certificate issued by Peñaloza showing
that A paid P35k for funeral expenses. The Certificate was not
- This disputable presumption, insofar as the RO in relation to the hearsay evidence.
actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and
the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving •Evidence is hearsay when its probative value is based on the
forward with the evidence. - Registration of the vehicle is accessible personal knowledge of a person other than the person actually
to the public. Recall that A presented a copy of the Certificate of testifying.
Registration of the can that hit R— this attests to C's ownership of
the van, which C did not dispute. •A herself identified the Certificate. She testified that she incurred
funeral expenses amounting to P35k, that she paid this amount to
- In order to satisfactorily overcome the presumption, C should have: Peñaloza, and that she was present when Peñaloza signed the
1. Showed that it had no ER-EE relationship with B 2. That B acted Certificate.
outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or 3. That it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision •A had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by the
of B. Certificate, i.e., that she spent P35k for the funeral expenses of R. -
CA likewise did not err in awarding civil indemnity and exemplary
- They failed: 1. C admitted that B was its EE at the time of the damages (based on Art. 2206 and 2231, CC). - CA and RTC found B
accident; 2. C was unable to prove that B was acting outside the grossly negligent in driving the van and concluded that B’s gross
scope of his assigned tasks. C 5 presented no positive evidence to negligence was the proximate cause of R’s death. Negligence and
show that B was acting in his private capacity at the time of the causation are factual issues. Findings of fact, when established by
incident; 3. C failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence. the TC and affirmed by the CA, are binding on this court unless they
C contented itself with B’s submission of a nonprofessional driver’s are patently unsupported by evidence or unless the judgment is
license . 6 grounded on a misapprehension of facts.
- Employing a person holding a nonprofessional driver’s license to •Neither has C presented evidence disputing the finding of the LCs.
operate another’s motor vehicle violates Sec. 24, LTTC —C did not As such, these finding cannot be disturbed on appeal. - For deaths
only 7 fail to exercise due diligence in selecting B, it also committed caused by quasi-delict, the recovery of moral damages is limited to
an actual violation of law. the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants
of the deceased. Persons exercising substitute parental authority are
- C’s act of providing copies of memoranda and company rules was to be considered ascendants for the purpose of awarding moral
insufficient because they failed to prove actual compliance8 damages.
LISANIE
Defense: Due diligence in the Selection and Supervision of JUANI ZA vs. JOSE, G.R. N o. L-50127-28 M arch 30, 1979
Em ployees
FACTS:
OUR LADY OF LOURDES V. SP S ROM EO AN D R EGI N A
CAPANZANA (2017 CASE- P LEASE R EAD FULL TEX T) Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger
jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the
Philippine National Railways which resulted in the death to 7 and
physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. At the time of the accident,
b.5. Ow ner of Vehicle Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting
with defendant-appellant, Arroyo, for 16 years in a relationship akin
I n the vehicle to that of husband and wife.
N ot in the vehicle The CFI rendered a decision against Jose and Arroyo. The lower
court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil
Code which reads:
DUAVI T vs. CA, G.R. No. 82318 M ay 18, 1989
When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but
FACTS: they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar were aboard a jeep. or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
Catuar was driving the said jeep and while approaching Roosevelt on co-ownership.
Avenue, Catuar slowed down. Suddenly, another jeep driven by
defendant Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep. Catuar was I SSUE:
thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken and he
sustained contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff Sarmiento W/N Arroyo who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be
was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured. held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered
owner of the same.
The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Sabiniano as driver,
and against Duavit as owner of the jeep. HELD:
Defendant Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep, The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the NCC requires
denied that the other defendant (Sabiniano) was his employee. that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to
Defendant Sabiniano categorically admitted that he took the jeep Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage
from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or with Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo
authority of the latter cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. There is therefore no basis for
the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and
The trial court found Sabiniano negligent but absolved Duavit from physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney. It is
liability. Upon appeal, the CA rendered the decision holding the settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a
petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano. public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of
I SSUE: the passengers therein.
AN ONUEVO vs. CA, supra.

W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can
be held liable under Article 2180 of the NCC when the said vehicle
was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the FGU I N SURANCE COR P . vs. CA, G.R. N o. 118889 M arch 23,
consent of the latter. 1998
HELD: FACTS:
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot On 21 April 1987, 2 vehicles, cruising along EDSA, figured in a traffic
be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same accident. The car owned by Soriano was being driven by Jacildone,
was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not while the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR, was driven by
employed by him. Dahl-Jensen as lessee. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer
Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left
Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in side of the car of Soriano.
tire mishap but completely denies having employed the driver
Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of
jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter. By way of
therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR for quasi-
negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee delict. Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since
would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a he was no longer staying at his given address. Both the RTC and CA
stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
vehicle. claim of subrogation.
LISANIE
I SSUE:
May an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car b.6. By State

company for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the
rented vehicle?
R EP UBLI C vs. HON. P ALACI O, G.R. N o. L-20322 M ay 29,
HELD: 1968
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in FACTS:

upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the following requisites must Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a case against the Handong Irrigation
concur: Association, Inc. to recover possession, with damages, of a lot
located in Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; entered and occupied.
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, filed an urgent
motion to lift the order of garnishment against the deposits and/or
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the Unit at the PNB, Manila, for the reason that the funds subject matter
plaintiff. thereof are public funds and exempt from attachment or execution.
Upon denial of this motion, the Solicitor General commenced the
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the CA. The appellate
existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of FILCAR, court sustained the propriety of the said order. Hence, this petition
because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently for review.
established. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to
Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle I SSUE:
his personal liability. FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
Art. 2180 is not applicable in this case. FILCAR being engaged in a W/N the pump irrigation trust fund may be garnished to satisfy a
rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl- money-judgment against the Handog Irrigation Asso.
Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as
employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be HELD:
responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter.
An infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring
the fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit
CADI EN TE vs. M ACAS, supra. was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to
invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU
liability thus arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts
caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the
acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties There
being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was
authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable
therefor.
M ERI TT vs. GOV’T OF THE P HI L. I SLAN DS, G.R. N o. L-11154

M arch 21, 1916
FACTS:
Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue when the General
Hospital ambulance turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long
before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft
Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn and in violation
of the Motor Vehicle Act, by which movement it struck the plaintiff.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely

injured that, as a consequence, plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of
his work as a contractor.
I SSUE:
W/N the gov’t can be held liable for the damages resulting from the
negligence of the chauffeur.
LISANIE
HELD: I SSUE:
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the W/N Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally
Government by virtue of Act No. 2457 “in order to fix the with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the Caperiña.
ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of HELD:
said collision, . . . ."
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, provide:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature
admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding
and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions,
parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
controversies with the estate. It did not pass upon the question of are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who
liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the live with them.
state's immunity from suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by under their custody.
the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the
shall be applicable. damages in question because at the time the Dante committed the
negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these
case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident.
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts
executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Here
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the
regulated by law and the regulations." parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of
It is, therefore, evidence that the is only liable for the acts of its that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father is obvious.
This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they
b.7. By Teachers exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them
EX CONDE vs. CAPUNO, G.R. N o. L-10134 June 29, 1957 and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the
other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
FACTS: moderation". The only way by which they can relieve themselves of
this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
Dante Capuno was a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School good father of a family to prevent the damage. This, defendants
and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade upon instruction of the failed to prove.
city school's supervisor. From the school, Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of SP S.P ALI SOC vs. BRI LLAN TES, G.R. N o. L-29025 October 4,
the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They 1971
have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a FACTS:
consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante,
was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio Daffon
that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it were classmates in Manila Technical Institute. On March 10, 1966,
when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the
upon instruction of his teacher. laboratory room. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio Daffon were working on
a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them.
Delfin Capuno contends that he is not liable for damages since at the Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
time of the incident, he was not in supervision, custody and control foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on
of his son. The RTC sustained the defense and the case was certified the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the
by the CA to the SC on the ground of pure questions of law. face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc
retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him
LISANIE
and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. First aid was administered
to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a
hospital where he eventually died.
AM ADOR A vs. CA, G.R. N o. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Plaintiff-appellants, as parents of the deceased, filed a case against
Daffon, Brillantes as member of the Board of Directors of the FACTS:
Institute, Valenton as president and Quibulue as instructor thereof.
Alfredo Amadora was a graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-
The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict Recoletos. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court, however, their school, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the hit Alfredo.
Manila Technical Institute, ruling that teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be only liable for damages The herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
caused by their pupils and students and apprentices where the latter damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de
are under their custody. San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with Damon and two other
I SSUE: students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped. The trial court held the remaining
W/N defendants-school officials are liable as tortfeasors with defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the CA, however, the
defendant Daffon for damages resulting from Palisoc’s death. decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved.
HELD:
I SSUE:
The Court holds that under the Art. 2180 of the NCC, defendants
head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute are liable jointly W/N Art. 2180 was applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the learning.
school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes
as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school W/N the students were in the custody of the school at the time of
itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly the incident as the semester had already ended.
impleaded as party defendant.
HELD:
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In the law of nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he,
school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and
protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
students. . whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants- would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability
fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his would attach to the teacher or the school head.
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated
above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
attendance in the school. There is nothing in the law that requires case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the
that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on
tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the teacher?
the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
present decision. . the head of the school of arts and trades exercises a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. By contrast,
the head of the academic school is not as involved with his students
and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were
the persons directly dealing with the students. Consequently, while
he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head
LISANIE
of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed
could be so blamed. armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his
appointment from the AFP and received his salary from the AFP, as
It is conceded that the custody requirement signify that that the well as orders from Captain Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio
student should be within the control of the school authorities at the Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit. Abon was also a commerce student
time of the occurrence of the injury. However, this does not of the BCF.
necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester. On 3 March 1977, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result,
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, the responsibility of Napoleon Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of
the school authorities over the student continues. At the time Alfredo the crime of Homicide.
Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he impleading Abon, Ungos (ROTC Commandant), school officials and
was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or the BCF as party defendants. The Trial Court rendered a decision in
merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he favor of Castro. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court
was there for a legitimate purpose. affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who I SSUE:

must answer for his students' torts. It is not necessary that at the
time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position W/N petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages
to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child
and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, HELD:
for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the
parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the
premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
exercised over him. embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates
a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Each of leave the school premises, or the area within which the school
them was exercising only a general authority over the student body activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or
immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student contemplated in the law.
was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that
day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Abon cannot be
the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in- considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the
charge of Alfredo's killer. custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no liable with Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Damon or that he had waived observance of the rules and Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Ungos,
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His ROTC Unit Commandant, had instructed Abon "not to leave the
absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against office and to keep the armory well guarded." Apart from negating a
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school
that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to
the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically be held liable, this circumstance shows that Abon was supposed to
absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior,
that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the ST. M ARY’S ACADEM Y vs. CARP I TANOS, G.R. N o. 143363.
school regulations, in maintaining that discipline. February 6, 2002
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly FACTS:

liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the for the school year 1995-1996. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy,
tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly,
them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students
offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
connection with such custody. Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
SALVOSA vs. I AC, G.R. N o. 70458 October 5, 1988 same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos
FACTS: died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution. Thereafter, his parents filed a case for damages against James
However, it is also an institution of arts and trade. Daniel II and his parents, Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy. The
LISANIE
RTC found the St. Mary’s Academy liable while Daniel’s parents were
subsidiarily liable. Villanueva was absolved from liability. Said
decision was affirmed by the CA.
I SSUE: b.8. Defense: Diligence of a Good Father of Fam ily
W/N petitioner is liable for the death of Carpitanos.
HELD: c. P rovinces, Cities and M unicipalities
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special JI M ENEZ vs. CI TY OF M ANI LA, G.R. N o. 71049 M ay 29, 1987
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; FACTS:
or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he, together with his
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater.
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of On his way home, he stepped on an uncovered opening obscured by
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck
or custody. inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of petitioner.
After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the companions helped him hobble home. Petitioner became ill and his
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of leg swelled with great pain and was thereafter hospitalized. After
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal discharge, he had to walk around in crutches. His injury prevented
connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to him from attending to the school buses he is operating.
show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim. Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana
Evidence shows, and this the respondents did not dispute, that the Public Market had been placed. The trial court dismissed the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner complaint. Upon appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic Integrated
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the Corporation liable for damages but absolved respondent City of
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Manila.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of I SSUE:
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. W/N the IAC erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila
The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated
cause of the accident. Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the HELD:
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. The registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be The petition is impressed with merit.
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.” Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the
the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held third persons for any cause attributable to it.
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable
under the Revised Charter of Manila which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons
or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or any other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or supervision.
Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila refers to liability

arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof,
while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective
LISANIE
streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is
therefore decisive on this specific case.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works GUI LATCO vs. CI TY OF DAGUP AN, G.R. N o. 61516 M arch 21,
belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility 1989
is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public FACTS:
building in question.
Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and
Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between supervision of the City of Dagupan) when she accidentally fell into a
respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under manhole. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized and
the control of the former. operated on. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the
present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter,
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to as she has difficulty of locomotion.
exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe
for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioner. On appeal, the
appellate court reversed the lower court findings on the ground that
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that
the middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez
covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner could not have Boulevard.
fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. The City is therefore liable for I SSUE:
the injury suffered by the petitioner.
W/N control or supervision over a national road by the City of
CI TY OF M AN I LA vs. TEOTI CO, G.R. N o. L-23052 January Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
29, 1968 accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: HELD:
Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. We grant the petition.
Burgos Avenue as he stepped down from the curb of the street to
board a jeepney. Teotico suffered serious injuries due to the fall. Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the defective road or street
to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach.
As a consequence thereof, Teotico filed a complaint for damages The article only requires that either control or supervision is
against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, exercised over the defective road or street.
city treasurer and chief of police. The complaint was dismissed by
the CFI. The decision was affirmed by the CA except insofar as the In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the
City of Manila was concerned which was ordered to indemnify charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who
Teotico. Hence, this appeal. has the following duties:
I SSUE: Sec. 22.The City Engineer--His powers, duties and

compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in
W/N the City of Manila is liable for the damages incurred by Teotico. charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He
shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos
HELD: per annum. He shall have the following duties:
The CA applied the Civil Code instead of Act. No. 409 (Charter of xxx
Manila), and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special (j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of
law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and
subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect
of Manila. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 constitutes a particular and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by connection with the public sewer system.
reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control xxx
or supervision.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila.
LISANIE
d. P roprietors of building, engineer, architect, e. Collateral Source R ule

contractor
M I TSUBI SHI V. M I TSUBI SHI
DE R OY VS. CA
Facts:
FACTS:
 The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners The parties CBA covered P40,000 hospitalization insurance benefits.
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family After expiration, they executed another and increasing the amount to
of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents P50,000. The room and board expenses were also increased from
and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. P300 to P375. On separate occasions, Calida, Oabel and Martin filed
 Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate for their claims for reimbursement of hospitalization expenses of
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the their dependents.
former failed to do so.
Mitsubishi paid only a portion of the claims. The three claimed that
R TC = rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross they deserve more under their CBA. Mitsubishi contended that
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. double insurance would result because they have already received
CA = affirmed RTC decision in payment of portions of the claims from other health insurance
providers. The voluntary arbitration favored the three saying that the
 On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to CBA does not prohibit reimbursement even if there is presence of
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to other health insurers. CA reversed the decision saying that Mitsubishi
file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by will only be liable to amounts not covered by other health insurance.
the appellate court
Issue:
I SSUES:
1. Whether or not the denial of petitioners' motion for extension of WON the collateral source rule would apply.
time to file a motion for reconsideration was proper.
2. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the injuries to private Ruling:
respondents and the death of Marissa, their daughter.
Collateral source rule was originally applied to tort cases wherein the
R ULI N G: defendant is prevented from benefitting from the plaintiff’s receipt of
1. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, money from other sources. Under this rule, if an injured person
Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for receives compensation for his injuries from a source wholly
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Petitioners independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted
contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the
be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication tortfeasor. The collateral source rule applies in order to place the
of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the responsibility for losses on the party causing them.
subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the Thus, it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances
publication of Suprem e Court decisions in the Official under which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to companies, regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating
their becom ing effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as the losses. Here, it is clear that Mitsubishi is a no-fault insurer.
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, the dependents of its employees which had already been paid by
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of separate health insurance providers of said dependents.
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
2. Petitioner is liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which

provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. Nor
was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if
only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded,
since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied
to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
LISANIE
VII. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
a. P ossessor of Anim als (Art. 2183)

b. M anufacturers and processors of foodstuffs (Art. 2187)
Article 2183.The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, Article 2187.Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
fault of the person who has suffered damage. contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
VESTI L V. COURT OF AP PEALS, 179 SCR A 47 P ASCUAL VS FORD M OTOR
FACTS: Facts:
Petitioner Olivia Pascual (Pascual) bought a second-hand Ford E-150
Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she vehicle. On April 7, 2008, Pascual's driver was driving the vehicle at
died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the moderate speed along the National Highway, when the vehicle's
latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The right axle broke causing its wheel to be detached. Pascual and the
Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On other passengers suffered physical injuries and were rushed to a
appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the hospital. Pascual demanded that respondents Ford Motor Company
Uys. The Vestils are now before the Supreme Court. They prayed to Philippines, Inc. (FMCI) and Ford Group Philippines, Inc. (FGPI) pay
set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that damages resulting from the incident. The FMCI is a Ford
of the trial court. manufacturer, while the FGPI is a Ford distributor in the Philippines.
I SSUE: Pascual filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against

the FGPI and the FMCP with the RTC. Pascual claims that the FMCI
WON Purita Vestil is the owner of the house or of the dog left by her and the FGPI are strictly liable for the defective vehicle.
father as his estate has not yet been partitioned. In their answer, the FMCI and the FGPI assert that Pascual cannot
claim the manufacturer's warranty or warranty against hidden
HELD: defects because: (1) the vehicle was bought at second hand; and (2)
the vehicle's warranty to the purchaser had expired two years after
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based the vehicle was bought from an authorized Ford dealer on November
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the 15, 2000.
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on The FMCI and the FGPI presented their sole expert witness who
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who investigated and examined the vehicle and testified that the rear leaf
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for spring of the vehicle had been repaired and altered by non-Ford
the damage which such animal may cause. authorized dealer/s to enable it to carry a heavy load beyond the
vehicle's weight capacity. The heavy load stress was absorbed by the
Petition is denied. axle shock which caused it to break.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant is liable to the petitioner?
Held:
No. The following must be present before a manufacturer or seller
may be held liable for any damage caused by the product:
first, proof that the product in question was defective;
second, the defect must be present upon the delivery or
manufacture of the product; or when the product left the
seller's or manufacturer's control; or when the product was sold to
the purchaser; and
third, the product must have reached the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition it
was sold. (emphases supplied)
Pascual did not present proof that the vehicle was defective upon its
manufacture. The alteration in the vehicle's rear axle after the
vehicle was sold is a substantial change in the vehicle's condition.
Hence, the FMCI, as manufacturer, and the FGPI, as
seller/distributor, cannot be held liable for any damage caused by
the vehicle's defect.
We also find that the strict liability in torts is not applicable against
the FMCI and the FGPI. Pascual cites the California Supreme Court
Case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 33 to support her
claim on the applicability of strict liability in torts. According to
Greenman:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he

places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
LISANIE
injury to a human being. . . . The purpose of such liability
is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
fromdefective products are borne by the manufacturers d. Allied Law s: Sec 97-102, Consum er Act; Sec. 31,
that put such products on the market rather than by the Corporation Code
injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves. . . . Implicit in the machine's presence on the P HI L. CON SUM ER ACT | | CHAPTER V | | LI ABI LI TY FOR
market, however, was arepresentation that it would safely P R ODUCT AN D SER VI CE
do the jobs for which it was built. (emphases supplied)
Art. 97.Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or foreign
Greenman involved a purchaser who bought a defective power tool manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress,
first hand from a retailer. On the other hand, the present case independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects
involves a second-hand vehicle which was bought from an resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and
unidentified person. Even assuming that the Greenmancase is erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or
applicable, the FMCI and the FGPI are not liable because their packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or
representation as to the vehicle's weight capacity is limited. The inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof.
vehicle will safely do the job for which it was built subject to the
vehicle's weight capacity. The alteration of the vehicle's rear axle to A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully
carry more weight beyond the vehicle's capacity is outside the expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration,
FMCI's and the FGPI's representation of its product. including but not limited to:
(a) presentation of product;

CHI QUI TA BR AN DS, I N C. V. HON. OM ELI O GR 189102 (2017
CASE, R EAD I N FULL) (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
(c) the time it was put into circulation.
c. Head of Fam ily (Art. 2193) A product is not considered defective because another better quality
product has been placed in the market.
Article 2193.The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held
falling from the same. liable when it evidences:
DI N GCONG V. K AN AAN, 72 P HI L 14 (a) that it did not place the product on the market;
FACTS: (b) that although it did place the product on the market
such product has no defect;
Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house
owned by Saenz. The brothers established the central hotel in the (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault.
building where they were the managers. A guest, Echivarria,
occupied room 10 of the hotel for P30 per month. Kanaans occupied Art. 98.Liability of Tradesman or Seller. - The tradesman/seller is
the lower floor of the hotel where they established a bazaar. likewise liable, pursuant to the preceding article when:
Echivarria let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were
undergoing repairs. A bucket was placed underneath the leaking (a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder,
faucet to catch the dripping water – the bucket overflowed. Water producer or importer;
seeped through the floor – the merchandise in the bazaar below got
wet and damaged worth around P1T. (b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of
the manufacturer, producer, builder or importer;
Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers
(brothers Dingcong) and Echivarria. CFI absolved 1 Dingcong (c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods. The
brother only (because one had already died) but held Echivarria party making payment to the damaged party may exercise
liable. CA reversed – holding Dingcong liable for the damages. the right to recover a part of the whole of the payment
made against the other responsible parties, in accordance
I SSUE: with their part or responsibility in the cause of the damage
effected.
W/N the manager can be held liable.
Art. 99.Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable
HELD: for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to
consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as
YES. well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and
hazards thereof.
Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for
the damage caused by things that are thrown or falling from the The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the
hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil). Echivarria was a guest of the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant
hotel and although he was the direct cause of the damage, Dingcong circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of the family. He
knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, presumed that (a) the manner in which it is provided;
the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a
bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks. (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be
expected of it;
(c) the time when it was provided.

LISANIE
A service is not considered defective because of the use or Art. 102. Liability for Service Quality Imperfection. - The service
introduction of new techniques. supplier is liable for any quality imperfections that render the
The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven: services improper for consumption or decrease their value, and for
those resulting from inconsistency with the information contained in
(a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; the offer or advertisement, the consumer being entitled to demand
alternatively at his option:
(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
(a) the performance of the services, without any additional
Art. 100.Liability for Product and Service Imperfection. - The cost and when applicable;
suppliers of durable or nondurable consumer products are jointly
liable for imperfections in quality that render the products unfit or (b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid,
inadequate for consumption for which they are designed or decrease with monetary updating without prejudice to losses and
their value, and for those resulting from inconsistency with the damages, if any;
information provided on the container, packaging, labels or publicity
messages/advertisement, with due regard to the variations resulting (c) a proportionate price reduction.
from their nature, the consumer being able to demand replacement
to the imperfect parts. Reperformance of services may be entrusted to duly qualified third
parties, at the supplier's risk and cost.
If the imperfection is not corrected within thirty (30) days, the
consumer may alternatively demand at his option: Improper services are those which prove to be inadequate for
purposes reasonably expected of them and those that fail to meet
(a) the replacement of the product by another of the same the provisions of this Act regulating service rendering.
kind, in a perfect state of use;
COR P ORATI ON CODE | | TI TLE III || BOARD OF
(b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, DI R ECTOR S/ TR USTEES/ OFFI CER S
with monetary updating, without prejudice to any losses
and damages;
Sec. 31.Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or
trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently
(c) a proportionate price reduction.
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or
The parties may agree to reduce or increase the term specified in
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty
the immediately preceding paragraph; but such shall not be less as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for
than seven (7) nor more than one hundred and eighty (180) days. all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.
The consumer may make immediate use of the alternatives under
the second paragraph of this Article when by virtue of the extent of
the imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect parts may When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in
jeopardize the product quality or characteristics, thus decreasing its violation of his duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in
value. respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence,
If the consumer opts for the alternative under sub-paragraph (a) of as to which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own
the second paragraph of this Article, and replacement of the product behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for the corporation and must
is not possible, it may be replaced by another of a different kind, account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
mark or model: Provided, That any difference in price may result corporation.
thereof shall be supplemented or reimbursed by the party which
caused the damage, without prejudice to the provisions of the
second, third and fourth paragraphs of this Article.
Art. 101. Liability for Product Quantity Imperfection. - Suppliers are

jointly liable for imperfections in the quantity of the product when, in
due regard for variations inherent thereto, their net content is less
than that indicated on the container, packaging, labeling or
advertisement, the consumer having powers to demand,
alternatively, at his own option:
(a) the proportionate price;
(b) the supplementing of weight or measure differential;
(c) the replacement of the product by another of the same

kind, mark or model, without said imperfections;
(d) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid,

with monetary updating without prejudice to losses and
damages if any.
The provisions of the fifth paragraph of Article 99 shall apply to this

Article.
The immediate supplier shall be liable if the instrument used for

weighing or measuring is not gauged in accordance with official
standards.
LISANIE
VIII. NATURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY
a. Betw een Tortfeasors: Solidary
Article 2194.The responsibility of two or more persons who are I SSUE:

liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
W/N there is forum shopping.
b. N o double recovery for sam e act or om ission
Article 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to HELD:

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing The argument is untenable. There is no forum shopping.
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Anent the second issue, petitioners posit that since the issues before
COCA-COLA V. SOCI AL SECUR I TY COM M I SSI ON , GR N O. the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot make a ruling
159323, JUL 31, 200 on the issue presented before it without necessarily having a direct
effect on the issue before the NLRC. Thus, petitioners contend, Dr.
FACTS: Climaco was guilty of forum shopping.
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a corporation engaged in Again, We turn down the contention.
the manufacture and sale of softdrink beverages, Co-petitioner Eric
Montinola was the general manager of its plant in Bacolod City, Admittedly, Dr. Climaco’s basis in filing the cases before the NLRC
Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former retainer physician at the and the SSC is his Retainer Agreement with the company. This does
company’s’ plant in Bacolod City. not mean, however, that his causes of action are the same:
xxx Some authorities declare the distinction between demands

In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer or rights of action which are single and entire and those which
Agreement for one year, with a monthly compensation and where he are several and distinct to be that the former arise out of one
may charge professional fees for hospital services rendered in line and the same act or contract and the latter out of different acts
with his specialization. The agreement further provided that either or contracts. This rule has been declared to be unsound,
party may terminate the contract upon giving thirty (30)-day written however, and as evidence of its unsoundness, reference has
notice to the other. been made to the fact that several promissory notes may, and
often do, grow out of one and the same transaction, and yet
Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no employee- they do not constitute an entire demand. The better rule is that
employer relationship shall exist between the company and Dr. the bare fact that different demands spring out of the same or
Climaco while the contract is in effect. In case of its termination, Dr. contract does not ipso facto render a judgment on one a bar to
Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee as may be due him a suit on another, however distinct. It is clear that the right of a
at the time of termination. plaintiff to maintain separate actions cannot be determined by
the fact that the claims might have been prosecuted in a single
action. A plaintiff having separate demands against a defendant
Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the DOLE and the SSS whether may, at his election, join them in the same action, or he may
he was an employee of the company. Both agencies replied in the prosecute them separately, subject of the power of the court to
affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before the order their consolidation. There may be only one cause of
NLRC. In his complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee action although the plaintiff is entitled to several forms and
of the company and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost kinds of relief, provided there is not more than one primary
of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, right sought to be enforced or one subject of controversy
Christmas bonus and all other benefits. presented for adjudication. (Underscoring supplied)
During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its As the SSC and the CA correctly observed, different laws are
Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed applicable to the cases before the two tribunals. The Labor Code and
another complaint for illegal dismissal against the company before pertinent social legislations would govern the cases before the NLRC,
the NLRC. He asked that he be reinstated to his former position as while the Social Security Law would govern the case before the SSC.
company physician of its Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority Clearly, as the issues pending before the NLRC and the SSC are
rights, with full payment of backwages, other unpaid benefits, and diverse, a ruling on the NLRC cases would not amount to res judicata
for payment of damages. in the case before the SSC.
c. R equirem ent as to R eservation

Meantime, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed
with the SSC in Bacolod City, a petition praying, among others, that
R ule 111, Section 3, 2000 R ules of Crim inal P rocedure
petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him
for compulsory social security coverage.
Sec. 3.W hen civil action m ay proceed independently. – In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that there is no offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
employer-employee relationship between the company and Dr. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
Climaco; and that his services were engaged by virtue of a Retainer however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
Agreement.. same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
LISANIE
DBP V. CA, ET. AL., GR N O. 137916, DEC. 8, 2004
d. M anner of enforcem ent distinguished from : FACTS:
d.1 culpa crim inal On 1980, Gotangco spouses secured a loan for their poultry project
in Palayan City from the DBP in the amount of P121, 400.00. They
d.2 culpa contractual then executed a real estate mortgage over the parcels of land.
Eventually, Gotangco as vendors, executed in favor of Cucio a
IX. SPECIAL TORTS
contract to sell over the seven parcels of land mortgaged to DBP for
P50,000.00, payable in two installments and upon full payment of
the purchase price, the Spouses shall execute a deed of sale over
QUEZON CI TY GOVER NM ENT, ET. AL. V. DACAR A, GR N O. the said parcels of land in favor of Cucio.
150304, JUNE 15, 2005
After the Gotangco applied with the DBP for the restructuring of their
FACTS: loan, on 1988, the poultry farm of the spouses and the
improvements thereon were gutted by fire. Then DBP wrote the
Dacara Jr., driving a Toyota Sedan, rammed into a pile of diggings in spouses demanding payment of the balance of their loan within 10
Quezon City which was repaired by the latter. The car turned turtle days from notice thereof. However, the spouses failed to respond or
which results to his injury. pay their account with the DBP.
Dacara Sr., in his son’s behalf, sought indemnification from Quezon Cucio then filed a complaint against the Spouses and the DBP with
City Government. the RTC for injunction and damages. Cucio alleged that despite his
payment of the full purchase price of the 7 parcels of land and his
Petitioner City Government argued that they were not negligent demands for the turnover of the owner's duplicates of the said title
because they placed all precautionary signs to alert the public of a to the Spouses Gotangco, the DBP refused to do so. He further
roadside construction and it is Dacara Jr’s sole negligence that alleged that the DBP even demanded the payment of the interest on
causes the accident. the loan account of the Spouses. Furthermore, Gotangco refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale of the said parcels of land in his
I SSUE: favor.
W/N CA gravely erred in not holding Dacara as negligent at the time In its answer, DBP admitted that it charged Cucio interest on the
of incident. Spouses Gotangco's loan; however, it denied that it consented to the
transaction between the Spouses Gotangco relative to the 7 parcels
HELD: of land claimed by Cucio. While the case was pending, the DBP
informed the Spouses that it was going to have the mortgage
Proximate cause is any cause that produces injury in a natural and foreclosed for their failure to settle their account.
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate HELD:
cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. The There is no sufficient basis for the award of moral damages in favor
unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment of the respondent spouses based on Article 19 of the New Civil Code
that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the accident as a result of petitioner's application for foreclosure of real estate
bars the SC from supplanting their findings and substituting these mortgage.
with their own.
Abuse of right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, on which the
Petitioners belatedly point out that Dacara Jr. was driving at the RTC anchored its award for damages and attorney's fees, provides:
speed of 60 kph when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly
above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light Art. 19 . Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
traffic. These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
any time during the trial which is a violation of the long-entrenched and observe honesty and good faith.
rule that issues not raised during the trial cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. The elements of abuse of rights are the following:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision. Good faith is

presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same.
The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the

petitioner. The bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage cannot give rise to the
conclusion that the petitioner did so with malice, to harass the
Spouses.
LISANIE
Petition is partially granted and the award for moral damages is made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or
deleted. class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more
difficult it is for an individual member to show that he was the
person at whom the defamation was directed. If the defamatory
statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons,
M VRS P UBLI CATI ON S, ET.AL. V. I SLAM I C DA’W AH COUNCI L they applied to any member of the group, and an individual member
OF THE P HI L, ET.AL., GR N O. 135306, JAN 28, 2003 could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory
language was used toward a small group or class, including every
FACTS: member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to
each member so that each could maintain an action.
Respondent Islamic Council filed a complaint for the alledgedly
libelous statement which is published in Bulgar which reads as Therefore the statements published by petitioners in the instant case
follows: did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who
were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.
“ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social
sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?Para sa kanila ang censure pointedly resulting in damages since the word "Muslim" is
mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided
kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites,
kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing the Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions.
araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag
nilang 'Ramadan'.” Ergo, the petition is granted.
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and LAGON V. CA, ET. AL., GR N O.119107, M AR . 18, 2005
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the
God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance FACTS:
but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the
Muslims and Islam in the entire country. Petitioner Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two
parcels of land located at S. Kudarat. A few months after the sale,
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and
action since the persons allegedly defamed were not identified but damages against petitioner before the RTC.
the appellate court reversed; hence, this petition.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that
I SSUE: he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over
3 parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat beginning 1964. One of the
W/N the statement is defamatory. provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up
commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants.
HELD: The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent
private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the
actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed,
abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. In When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his
the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was rent to the administrator of her estate. But when the administrator
allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the
defamed could not be identifiable private respondents have no buildings he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing
individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting
allegedly disparaged. rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter,
accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander — the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.
one being, in general, written, while the other in general is oral. In
either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the
and good name. This is a "relational interest" since it involves the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the
opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the
plaintiff. The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation — deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondent's
the interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying one's reputation as leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering the property
good as one's character and conduct warrant. The mere fact that the when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry
plaintiff's feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not enough revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.
to create a cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that
something be communicated to a third person that may affect the I SSUE:
opinion others may have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged
communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to W/N the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the
hurt plaintiff's reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing in the supposed existence of private respondent's lease contract with the
community. late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
petitioner should be held liable for damages.
The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one
that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in HELD:
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him. In order for one to maintain an The court laid down the elements of tortuous interference with
action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that the contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge
plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and
LISANIE
(c) interference of the third person without legal justification or I SSUE:
excuse.
W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision in toto. It insists that
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease respondents were guilty of malicious interference.
contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly
did not inform him of any existing lease contract. Even assuming HELD:
that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not
sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Petitioner may To prove that respondents were guilty of malicious interference,
be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for petitioner had to show the following: the existence of a valid
his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To contract, knowledge by respondents that such a contract existed and
sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acts (done in bad faith and without legal basis) by respondents
acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious which interfered in the due performance by the contracting parties of
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference their respective obligations under the contract. Apart from the fact
cannot be justified. that these matters were factual (and therefore beyond SC’s mandate
to review), petitioner failed to prove entitlement to the relief it was
Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the seeking.
renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that
he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that respondents were
in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous not guilty of malicious interference because no contract was ever
interference was never established. perfected between petitioner and CMB. Because all petitioner
presented to SC were reiterations of its arguments in the courts a
In sum, the court ruled that inasmuch as not all three elements to quo. Ergo, there is no reason to disturb the decision of the CA.
hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner
cannot be made to answer for private respondent's losses. Hence, the petition is denied.
Hence, the petition is granted.
U-BI X V. M I LLI K AN, GR N O.173318, SEP T. 23, 2008
FACTS:
On 1998, respondent Milliken & Company (M&C) designated

petitioner U-Bix Corporation as its authorized dealer of Milliken
carpets in the Philippines. Under the dealership agreement,
petitioner undertook to market Milliken carpets and to keep on hand
samples for the local market and stock sufficient to cover market
demand. M&C, on the other hand, bound itself to support petitioners
marketing efforts and projects.
In 1999, M&C informed petitioner (at that time its lone Philippine
dealer) that an international corporate client, Chase Manhattan Bank
(CMB), was furnishing its Manila office. Petitioner immediately
formed a team headed by its creative vice president, Carmen Huang,
(with respondent Onofre Eser as team member) to work on the CMB
project. Later, CMB awarded the supply contract to respondent
Projexx which, like petitioner, had in the meantime become a dealer
of Milliken carpets. Eser resigned from petitioner and joined Projexx.
On 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract, torts and

damages against M&C, Sylvan Chemical Company, Wilfred Batara,
Projexx and Eser in the RTC of Makati. According to petitioner, M&C
violated the dealership agreement when it designated Projexx as an
authorized dealer of Milliken carpets; thus it was guilty of breach of
contract. It also claimed that Projexx, with the help of Sylvan and
Batara, poached the CMB project from it. Moreover, Projexx allegedly
hired Eser because he had worked on the CMB project while in the
employ of petitioner. Thus, they were guilty of malicious interference.
In their answer, M&C, Sylvan and Batara averred that since

petitioner was unacceptable to CMB, M&C designated Projexx as
authorized dealer. Moreover, petitioner neither submitted an
accomplished dealer project registration form nor complied with the
rules for project registration. It never specified the CMB project.
Therefore, petitioner never earned a right over it. Projexx and Eser,
on the other hand, contended that since no contract was perfected
between petitioner and CMB, petitioner never acquired any
proprietary interest in the project.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and aggrieved, petitioner appealed

but the CA affirmed RTC ruling in toto. Hence, this petition.
LISANIE
X. KINDRED TORTS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE application of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
R EYES V SI STER S OF M ER CY Hospital G.R . 130547 October 3, caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
2000 charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. The
FACTS: contention is without merit. In this case, while it is true that the
patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance
Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. Five was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about
days before his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring
from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic,
some home medication he was taking, which consisted of analgesic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been
antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor. suffering from a serious illness and professional medical help came
too late for him. Respondents alleged failure to observe due care
On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify
his wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico who application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion
gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. on the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care
Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the locality, as the clinic had required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the
been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per month Suspecting correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be
that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.
Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on
Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and DR. EM M ANUEL JARCI A, JR. and DR. M ARI LOU BASTAN vs.
malarial smear were also made After about an hour, the medical P EOPLE OF THE P HI LI P P I N ES
technician submitted the results of the test from which Dr. Rico
concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. As her shift was Facts:
only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr.
Marvie Blanes. Dr. Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the Mrs. Santiago lodged a complaint with the NBI against petitioners for
evening. She also took Jorge’s history and gave him a physical alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son to suffer
examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that Jorge had physical injuries. NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab and was
typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency treatment,
fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic where an X-ray of the victim’s ankle was ordered. The result showed
chloromycetin be done on Jorge. As she did not observe any adverse no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia. Dr. Bastan made her own
reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first examination of the victim and informed Mrs. Santiago that there was
five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on Jorge no need to examine the upper leg since it was only the ankle that
at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about was hit. Eleven (11) days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of
three hours later just before midnight. At around 1:00 a.m. of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot. Mrs. Santiago
January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorge’s temperature rose brought him back to the hospital where X-ray revealed a right mid-
to 41°C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone.
distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him
under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered NBI indorsed the matter to the Office of the Prosecutor and a
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patient’s convulsions. When criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical
he regained consciousness, the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes Injuries was filed against petitioners. RTC found petitioners guilty
whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Imprudence
pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not. After about 15 minutes, Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries. CA affirmed the RTC decision
however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his in toto, applying the doctrine of res ipsaloquitor.
convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures
taken before and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, I ssues:
however, did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis,
a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane 1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsaloquitor applies.
due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., 2) Whether or not petitioners are liable for criminal negligence.
Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his death was
“Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid R uling:
fever.” 1) No, second requisite absent. The requisites for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident was of a kind
I SSUE: which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
W/N petitioner is entitled to damage applying res ipsa loquitur? exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of
HELD: the person injured.
No. There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, The circumstances that caused patient Roy, Jr.'s injury and the
and that is under thedoctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, courts of series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to
other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. It was established that
an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which they are mere residents of the Manila Doctors Hospital at that time
was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong who attended to the victim at the emergency room.
part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a
tooth while patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his 2)No, elements not proven. It can be gleaned from the testimony of
tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient was under the influence Dr. Tacata that a thorough examination was not performed on Roy,
of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, Jr. As residents on duty at the emergency room, petitioners were
among others. Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the expected to know the medical protocol in treating leg fractures and
LISANIE
in attending to victims of car accidents. There was, however, no
precise evidence and scientific explanation pointing to the fact that
the delay in the application of the cast to the patient's fractured leg CRUZ VS AGAS
because of failure to immediately diagnose the specific injury of the
patient, prolonged the pain of the child or aggravated his condition FACTS:
or even caused further complications. Any person may opine that
had patient Roy, Jr. been treated properly and given the extensive X- In his Complaint-Affidavit5 for Serious Physical Injuries through
ray examination, the extent and severity of the injury, spiral fracture Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against Dr. Agas, Dr.
of the mid-tibial part or the bigger bone of the leg, could have been Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in May 2003, he engaged
detected early on and the prolonged pain and suffering of Roy, Jr. the services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC)for a medical check-
could have been prevented. But still, that opinion, even how logical it up; that after being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003,he
may seem would not, and could not, be enough basis to hold one underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid tests conducted
criminally liable; thus, a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners' guilt. by the employees and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29,
2003, he was sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a
The Court, nevertheless, finds the petitioners civilly liable for their scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because the specialist
failure to sufficiently attend to Roy, Jr.'s medical needs when the assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he
latter was rushed to the ER.Dr. They were remiss of their duties as gave the colonoscopy results to the attending female
members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of anesthesiologist for the information and consideration of the
argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough assigned specialist; that, thereafter, he was sedated and the
evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he regained
another doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of consciousness, he felt that something went wrong during the
assuring him and his mother that everything was all right. procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold clammy perspiration and
experienced breathing difficulty; that he could not stand or sit
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan cannot pass on the liability to the taxi upright because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his
driverwho hit the victim. It may be true that the actual, direct, abdomen; that when he was about to urinate in the comfort room,
immediate, and proximate cause of the injury (fracture of the leg he collapsed; that he tried to consult the specialist who performed
bone or tibia) of Roy, Jr. was the vehicular accident when he was hit the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be found; and that his
by a taxi. The petitioners, however, cannot simply invoke such fact cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe his critical
alone to excuse themselves from any liability. If this would be so, condition and immediately referred him to the surgical department
doctors would have a ready defense should they fail to do their job which suspected that he had hemorrhage in his abdomen and
in attending to victims of hit-and-run, maltreatment, and other advised him to undergo an emergency surgical operation.
crimes of violence in which the actual, direct, immediate, and
proximate cause of the injury is indubitably the act of the
perpetrator/s.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who
On the presence of physician-patient relationship performed the colonoscopy procedure but the latter insisted that
When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician- nothing went wrong.
patient relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the
physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the Defense of Dr. Agas
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove
care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. The physician has the the basic elements of reckless imprudence or negligence. He averred
obligation to use at least the same level of care that any other that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he did not know that he
reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition would perform the procedure. He explained that before the start of
under similar circumstances. the colonoscopy procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and
review his medical history which was taken earlier by a fellow
Notably, the Roy Jr. and his mother went to the ER for an immediate gastrointestinal physician. He claimed that the gastroscopy and
medical attention. The petitioners allegedly passed by and were colonoscopy procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were completely
requested to attend to the victim. They obliged and examined the successful considering that the latter did not manifest any significant
victim, and later assured the mother that everything was fine and adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that
that they could go home. Clearly, a physician-patient relationship his vital signs were normal throughout the procedure.
was established between the petitioners and the patient Roy, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Agas should be held liable?
HELD:
No, Dr. Agas should not be held liable.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the
injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3)
the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would
not have happened if those who had control or management used
proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant.
Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury.12
LISANIE
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his purported On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still
negligence in performing the colonoscopy on Dr. Cruz was not suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a
immediately apparent to a layman to justify the application of res piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed
ipsa loquitur doctrine. about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to
extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained by then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Cruz was due to the abnormal condition and configuration of his
sigmoid colon which was beyond his control considering that the said Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains
condition could not be detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr. intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
Agas adequately explained that no clinical findings, laboratory tests, General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez
or diagnostic imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a
tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could have detected this foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
condition prior to an endoscopic procedure. Specifically, Dr. Agas infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her
wrote: reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina.
Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus,
On the other hand, in the present case, the correlation between in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.
petitioner’s injury, i.e., tear in the serosa of sigmoid colon, and the
colonoscopy conducted by respondent to the petitioner clearly Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for
requires the presentation of an expert opinion considering that no damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
perforation of the sigmoid colon was ever noted during the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that
laparotomy. It cannot be overemphasized that the colonoscope the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze
inserted by the respondent only passed through the inside of inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of
petitioner’s sigmoid colon while the damaged tissue, i.e., serosa, negligence.
which caused the bleeding, is located in the outermost layer of the
colon. It is therefore impossible for the colonoscope to touch, scratch, Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation
or even tear the serosa since the said membrane is beyond reach of Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence
the colonoscope in the absence of perforation on the colon and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1690. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the
case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States.
P R OFESSI ONAL SER VI CES, I N C. V. AGAN A, GR N O.126297,
JAN.31, 2007 AND GR NO.126297, FEB. 2, 2010 On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases,
Natividad died and was duly substituted by children (the Aganas).
FACTS:
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr.
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. On
General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and appeal, the CA rendered judgment that the case against defendant-
bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes is DISMISSED, and with the
Miguel Ampil, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the pronouncement that defendant-appellant Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to
sigmoid." reimburse defendant-appellant PSI whatever amount the latter will
pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees.
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the
Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on I SSUES AN D R ULI N G:
Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had
spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain 1. W hether the CA erred in holding Dr. Am pil liable.
portions of it.
No. The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken
Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, together, as specified by the Court of Appeals, directly point to Dr.
Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. Ampil as the negligent party, thus:
126467, to perform hysterectomy on her.
First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took control the bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation.
over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding the surgery noted in their report that the ‘sponge count (was)
Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses lacking 2’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a
entered these remarks: ‘search was done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue
for closure’ x x x.
"sponge count lacking 2
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was
for closure." performed.
She was released from the hospital but experienced excruciating An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
pain and was told by Dr. Ampil that it was the natural consequence complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled
of the surgery. On May 9, 1984, Natividad went to the United States that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound
to seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence
laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so
Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines. inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence.
LISANIE
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. "
experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he
been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate
our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has negligence which have gained acceptance in the determination of a
ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient. hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals. The
present case serves as a perfect platform to test the applicability of
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, these doctrines, thus, enriching our jurisprudence.
medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a
patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding
do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel,
have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as the
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because
injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading
injury and proximate causation. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists.
proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of
closing the incision despite the information given by the attending The question in every case is whether the principal has by his
nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of
ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature
2. W hether the CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent
Liability has authority to perform the particular act in question.
No. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City
the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated
connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We
stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he concur with the CA’s conclusion that it "is now estopped from
was the "Captain of the Ship." To our mind, it was this act of passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly
ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces paraded in the public directory leading the public to believe that it
of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s vouched for their skill and competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is
body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital,
caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services.
3. W hether or not res ipsa loquitor w ill lie. Premised on the doctrine of corporate negligence, the trial court held
that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty. Its liability is
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter
against Dr. Fuentes on the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure
of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and
of gauze were left inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie evidence concealment about the gauzes. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the
of Dr. Fuentes’ negligence. attending nurses’ report, to investigate and inform Natividad
regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step
injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) in fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only
the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180
not have happened if those who had control or management used of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under
proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Article 2176.
Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and
management of the thing which caused the injury."
We find the element of "control and management of the thing which

caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur will not lie.
4. W hether P SI I s Liable for the N egligence of Dr. Am pil
PSI, is not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its
own negligence under Article 2176.
In Ramos v. Court of Appeals that for purposes of apportioning

responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control
over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. In assessing
whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence
LISANIE
forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form and substance or if
he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may
GARCI A-R UEDA V. P ASCASI O, ET.AL., GR N O.118141, SEP T. proceed with the investigation of the complaint if, in his view, it is in
5, 1997 due and proper form.
FACTS: Does the instant case warrant a departure from the foregoing
general rule? When a patient dies soon after surgery under
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, circumstances which indicate that the attending surgeon and
underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of anaesthesiologist may have been guilty of negligence but upon their
a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo being charged, a series of nine prosecutors toss the responsibility of
Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes conducting a preliminary investigation to each other with
was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, contradictory recommendations, "ping-pong" style, perhaps the
Florencio died of complications of "unknown cause," according to distraught widow is not to be blamed if she finally decides to accuse
officials of the UST Hospital. the City Prosecutors at the end of the line for partiality under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Nor may she be entirely faulted
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested for finally filing a petition before this Court against the Ombudsman
the NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, for grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint against said
the NBI ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the City Prosecutors on the ground of lack of evidence. Much as we
attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its sympathize with the bereaved widow, however, this Court is of the
findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. opinion that the general rule still finds application in instant case. In
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless other words, the respondent Ombudsman did not commit grave
Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. abuse of discretion in deciding against filing the necessary
information against public respondents of the Office of the City
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor.
Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, in the "interest of justice and
peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the case be re- R AM OS V. CA, ET.AL.,GR N O. 124354, DEC. 29, 1999
raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the
petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. FACTS:
Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement
that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a Erlinda Ramos underwent an operation known as cholecystectomy
corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner (removal of stone in her gallbladder) under the hands of Dr. Orlino
filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Hosaka. He was accompanied by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, an
Prosecutor Dimagiba. anesthesiologist which Dr. Hosaka recommended since Ramos (and
her husband Rogelio) did not know any.
Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative The operation was schedule at 9am of June 17, 1985 but was
"pingpong" continued when the case was again assigned to another however delayed for three hours due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes Dr. Gutierrez subsequently started trying to intubate her. And at
be included in the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless around 3pm, Erlinda was seen being wheeled to the Intensive Care
Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was Unit (ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife
pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was
Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any released from the hospital only four months later or on November 15,
wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City 1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose
Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. condition until she died on August 3, 1999. RTC ruled in favor of the
Guerrero. petitioners, holding the defendants guilty of, at the very least,
negligence in the performance of their duty to plaintiff-patient
Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Erlinda Ramos.
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 3 against Prosecutors Guerrero,
Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes On appeal to CA, the said decision was reversed – dismissing the
before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, complaint against the defendants, Hence this petition.
the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the
complaint for lack of evidence. I SSUE:
In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of W/N the private respondents are liable for the injury caused to
the Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government Erlinda and her family?
prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner
faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion,
refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public
respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. HELD:
No. 3019.
YES.
I SSUE:
We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the
May this Court review the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman? presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and
their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition.
HELD:
Dr. Gutierrez (anesthesiologist) is held liable for failure to perform
In the exercise of its investigative power, this Court has consistently the necessary pre-operative evaluation which includes taking the
held that courts will not interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or patient's medical history, review of current drug therapy, physical
the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the examination and interpretation of laboratory data.
averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint
LISANIE
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw
Erlinda for thefirst time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June
1985. Before this date, noprior consultations with, or pre-operative SP S.FLORES V. SP S.P I N EDA, GR N O.158996, N OV. 14, 2008
evaluation of Erlinda was done by her.Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of thephysiological make-up FACTS:
and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informedof the
possible difficulties she would face during the administration of Teresita Pineda was a 51-year old unmarried woman. She consulted
anesthesia toErlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her on April 17, 1987 her townmate, Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her
patient for the first time onlyan hour before the scheduled operative medical condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of
procedure was, therefore, an act ofexceptional negligence and appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal
professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioningprudence and bleeding. Dr. Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for
vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the the history of her monthly period to analyze the probable cause of
physician'scenturies-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this the vaginal bleeding. He advised her to return the following week or
medical procedure is,therefore, a clear indicia of her to go to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City
negligence.Having failed to observe common medical standards in for a general check-up. As for her other symptoms, he suspected
pre-operative managementand intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez' that Teresita might be suffering from diabetes and told her to
negligence resulted in cerebral anoxiaand eventual coma of Erlinda. continue her medications.
Dr. Hosaka, being the head of the surgical team (“captain of the Teresita did not return the next week as advised. However, when
ship”), it was his responsibility to see to it that those under him her condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his
perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's UDMC clinic on April 28, 1987 with her sister, Lucena Pineda. Lucena
negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper later testified that her sister was then so weak that she had to lie
authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper down on the couch of the clinic while they waited for the doctor.
anesthesia protocols. Furthermore, it does not escape us that When Dr. Fredelicto arrived, he did a routine check-up and ordered
respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a Teresita's admission to the hospital. In the admission slip, he
different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and directed the hospital staff to prepare the patient for an "on call"
was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because D& C operation to be performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores.
of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist The hospital staff forthwith took her blood and urine samples for the
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss laboratory tests which Dr. Fredelicto ordered.
in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal
responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition. Based on these preparations, Dr. Felicisima proceeded with the D&C
operation with Dr. Fredelicto administering the general anesthesia.
Notwithstanding the general denial made by respondent hospital to Teresita's complete laboratory examination results came and her
the effect that the respondent doctors (referred to as “consultants”) urinalysis showed a three plus sign (+++) indicating that the sugar
in this case are not their employees, there is a showing that the in her urine was very high. She was then placed under the care of Dr.
hospital exercises significant control in the hiring and firing of Amado Jorge, an internist.
consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital
premises. By April 30, 1987, Teresita's condition had worsened. She
experienced difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the care unit. Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code Diabetes M ellitus Type I I . Insulin was administered on the
which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but patient, but the medication might have arrived too late. Due to
also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a complications induced by diabetes, Teresita died in the morning of
relationship of patria potestas. May 6, 1987.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial Believing that Teresita's death resulted from the negligent handling
of itsresponsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce of her medical needs, her family (respondents) instituted an action
evidence showingthat it exercised the diligence of a good father of a for damages against petitioner spouses.
family in the hiring andsupervision of the latter. It failed to adduce
evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised I SSUE:
over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a
similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its W/N sps Dr. Fredelicto and Dr. Felicisima were guilty of medical
burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do malpractice.
this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with
its physiciansfor Erlinda's condition. HELD:
YES.
The respondents' claim for damages is predicated on their allegation

that the decision of the petitioner spouses to proceed with the D&C
operation, notwithstanding Teresita's condition and the laboratory
test results, amounted to negligence. On the other hand, the
petitioner spouses contend that a D&C operation is the proper and
accepted procedure to address vaginal bleeding - the medical
problem presented to them. Given that the patient died after the
D&C, the core issue is whether the decision to proceed with the D&C
operation was an honest mistake of judgment or one amounting to
negligence.
LISANIE
Elem ents of a M edical N egligence Case observe the standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic
patients undergoing surgery. Whether this breach of duty was the
A medical negligence caseis a type of claim to redress a wrong proximate cause of Teresita's death is a matter we shall next
committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to determine.
or the death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a
medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and 8. DR. R UBI LI , petitioner, vs. SP OUSES R EYNALDO
proximate causation. and LI N A SOLI M AN, as parents/ heirs of deceased
Angelica Solim an, respondents.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on G.R. N o. 165279 June 7, 2011
one's conduct. The standard in turn refers to the amount of
competence associated with the proper discharge of the profession. Facts
A physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that Angelica, 11-years old, was suffering from osteosarcoma,
any other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same osteoblastic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone
circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to which usually afflicts teenage children. Angelica’s right leg was
comply with these professional standards. If injury results to the amputated in order to remove the tumor. To minimize the chances
patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading,
negligence. chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo, who then referred
Angelica to Dr. Li, a medical oncologist.
We find that reasonable prudence would have shown that diabetes
and its complications were foreseeable harm that should have been During the consultations with respondents, the Dr Li explained the
taken into consideration by the petitioner spouses. If a patient following side effects of chemotherapy treatment: (1) falling hair; (2)
suffers from some disability that increases the magnitude of risk to nausea and vomiting; (3) loss of appetite; (4) low count of white
him, that disability must be taken into account so long as it is or blood cells, red blood cells and platelets; (5) possible sterility due to
should have been known to the physician. And when the patient is the effects on the ovary; (6) damage to the heart and kidneys; and
exposed to an increased risk, it is incumbent upon the physician to (7) darkening of the skin especially when exposed to sunlight.
take commensurate and adequate precautions.
During the first cycle of chemotherapy treatment, she suffered skin
Taking into account Teresita's high blood sugar, Dr. Mendoza opined discoloration, difficulty in breathing, loose bowel movement, spasm
that the attending physician should have postponed the D&C and numbness, convulsions, and eventually profuse bleeding due to
operation in order to conduct a confirmatory test to make a low platelet count. She died 11 days after the administration of the
conclusive diagnosis of diabetes and to refer the case to an internist first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen.
or diabetologist. This was corroborated by Dr. Delfin Tan (Dr. Tan),
an obstetrician and gynecologist, who stated that the patient's Sps Soliman filed a damage suit against Dr Li, several other doctors,
diabetes should have been managed by an internist prior to, during, and SLMC. They claimed that they would not have given their
and after the operation. consent to chemotherapy had Dr Li not falsely assured them of its
side effects.
That the D&C operation was conducted principally to diagnose the
cause of the vaginal bleeding further leads us to conclude that it was Dr. Vergara, a medico-legal officer, testified that the findings in the
merely an elective procedure, not an emergency case. In an elective medico-legal report on Angelica’s condition can be attributed to the
procedure, the physician must conduct a thorough pre-operative chemical agents in the drugs, which caused platelet reduction
evaluation of the patient in order to adequately prepare her for the resulting to bleeding sufficient to cause the victims death. Dr.
operation and minimize possible risks and complications. The Balmaceda, a Medical Specialist of the DOH’s Operational and
internist is responsible for generating a comprehensive evaluation of Management Services charged with receiving complaints against
all medical problems during the pre-operative evaluation. hospitals, stressed that the patient or relatives must be informed of
all known side effects based on studies and observations, even if
Significantly, the evidence strongly suggests that the pre-operative such will aggravate the patient’s condition.
evaluation was less than complete as the laboratory results were
fully reported only on the day following the D&C operation. Dr. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding Dr Li not liable for
Felicisima only secured a telephone report of the preliminary damages as she observed the best known procedures and employed
laboratory result prior to the D&C. This preliminary report did not her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of
include the 3+ status of sugar in the patient's urine - a result highly chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient
confirmatory of diabetes. died.
Because the D&C was merely an elective procedure, the patient's On appeal, the CA, while concurring with the trial court’s finding that
uncontrolled hyperglycemia presented a far greater risk than her on- there was no negligence committed in the administration of
and-off vaginal bleeding. The presence of hyperglycemia in a chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that Dr Li failed to fully
surgical patient is associated with poor clinical outcomes, and explain to the respondents all the known side effects of
aggressive glycemic control positively impacts on morbidity and chemotherapy. The CA stressed that since the spouses have been
mortality. Elective surgery in people with uncontrolled diabetes told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily
should preferably be scheduled after acceptable glycemic control has consented thereto. Had those other side effects was made known
been achieved. According to Dr. Mercado, this is done by which gravely affected their child -- such as carpo-pedal spasm,
administering insulin on the patient. sepsis, decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and
eventual death – the spouses could have decided differently or
The prudent move is to address the patient's hyperglycemic state adopted a different course of action which could have delayed or
immediately and promptly before any other procedure is undertaken. prevented the early death of their child.
In this case, there was no evidence that insulin was administered on
Teresita prior to or during the D&C operation. Insulin was only I ssue:
administered two days after the operation. Whether Dr. Li is guilty of negligence for non-disclosure of all
possible side effects of chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding
The above facts, point only to one conclusion - that the petitioner that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.
spouses failed, as medical professionals, to comply with their duty to
LISANIE
R uling:
Dr. Li is not liable. R AM OS v. CA
There are four essential elements that must be proven in a FACTS:

malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1)
the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to Editha Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints
disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to stone in her gall bladder. Because of this, she sought professional
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) advice and underwent examinations which indicated she was fit for
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an surgery at the DLSMC. She subsequently underwent cholecystectomy
informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to significant as suggested by Dr. Hosaka who sought the assistance of
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have anesthesiologist, Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez.
altered her decision to undergo it.
During the day of surgery, Dr. Hosaka arrived very late. Something
There was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the went wrong with the way Dr. Gutierrez intubated Editha as being
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s heard her say “ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
parents. They could not have been unaware in the course of initial pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.” Editha was taken to the ICU
treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity, that her shortly after and stayed there for almost a month and was released
immune system was already weak on account of the malignant from the hospital 4 months thereafter. But she was in a comatose
tumor in her knee. When Dr Li informed them beforehand of the side condition since then.
effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and
red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez were asked by the hospital to explain and
damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the informed that Editha had bronchospasm.
part of the doctor that the parents understood very well that the
severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients Petitioners filed for damages against the doctors alleging negligence
undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the in the management and care of Editha. RTC favored the petitioners
disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even but CA reversed this.
with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined
by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications ISSUE:
of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or
sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk Whether or not the doctors and DLSMC should be liable for the
that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical condition of Editha.
procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the
general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed. RULING:
Further, medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a recognition of the postulate that,
expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature
the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
This is because the latter possess unusual technical skills which negligence on the part of the person who controls the
laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating, instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some
hence the indispensability of expert testimonies. explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. The
damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall
The testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa
Medical Specialist of the DOH's Operational and Management loquitur, considering that a sound and unaffected member of the
Services charged with receiving complaints against hospitals, does body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is
not qualify as expert testimony to establish the standard of care in unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the
obtaining consent for chemotherapy treatment. physicians.
In the absence of expert testimony, the Court is hesitant in defining

The fundamental element is the "control of the instrumentality"
the scope of mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice based on
which caused the damage.
lack of informed consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that,
even in foreign jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one,
as follows: Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting
injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
As we progress toward the twenty- exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
first century, xxx the legal standard of application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
disclosure is not subject to construction as evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what
a categorical im perative. Whatever formulae occurred but how and why it occurred.
or processes we adopt are only useful as a
foundational starting point; the particular The liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not
quality or quantity of disclosure w ill predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an
rem ain inex tricably bound by the facts of operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment
each case. Nevertheless, juries that ultimately as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda.
determine whether a physician properly
informed a patient are inevitably guided by what Dra. Gutierrez failed to perform pre-operative evaluation of the
they perceive as the common expectation of the patient which, in turn, resulted to a wrongful intubation. This was
medical consumers/reasonable person in the the proximate cause of Editha’s comatose condition. Private
patients position when deciding to accept or respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the first
reject a recommended medical procedure. intubation was a failure.
It was Dr. Hosaka’s responsibility to see to it that those under him

LISANIE
perform their task in the proper manner. His negligence can be legions of authorities to the effect that
found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not such act is negligence per se.
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded
resulted in Erlinda's condition. exemplary damages against Dr. Mendoza when, under Article 2229
of the Civil Code,exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral
DLSMC, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over
damages. Exemplary damages may also be awarded in cases of
respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
gross negligence. 4
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it.
the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In He must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and
neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, DLSMC materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up
thereby failed to discharge its burden and is consequently solidarily have been correctly done. To provide an example to the medical
responsible with its physicians. profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending
to a patient's health, the award of exemplary damages in this case is
With regard to the amount of damages due, temperate damages can in order.
and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. Petitioners
were awarded 1.5M for temperate damages, 2M for moral damages
for the family's moral injury and suffering and 100K as exemplary DOCTRI N E OF I N FOR M ED CONSEN T
damages.
LI V. SP S. SOLI M AN , supra
M ENDOZA VS. CASUM PANG, G.R. NO. 197987. MARCH 19, 2012
CASUM PANG V. COR TEJO
Facts:
Facts:
On February 13, 1993 Josephine underwent hysterectomy and
myomectomy that Dr. Mendoza performed on her at the Iloilo
Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo
Doctors' Hospital. After her operation, Josephine experienced
(Edmer), to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital
recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting. Three months after the
(SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain,
operation, she noticed while taking a bath something protruding
and fever. Dr.RamoncitoLivelo (Dr.Livelo) initially attended to and
from her genital. She tried calling Dr. Mendoza to report it but the
examined Edmer and diagnosed him with "bronchopneumonia."She
latter was unavailable. Josephine instead went to see another
was thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr.Casumpang), a
physician, Dr. Edna Jamandre-Gumban, who extracted a foul
paediatrician. Dr.Casumpang confirmed the initial diagnosis of
smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix.
"Bronchopneumonia."Mrs. Suspicious was suspicious about his son's
The discovery of the gauze and the illness she went through illness, Mrs.Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention and
prompted Josephine to file a damage suit against stated that Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and
Dr. Mendoza before the RTC of Iloilo City. Because Josephine died stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr.Casumpang about the
before trial could end, her husband and their children substituted her traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Despite these pieces of
in the case. She was a housewife and 40 years old when she died. information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if
Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs.Cortejo that Edmer's
RTC rendered against the physician. On Motion for Reconsideration, illness is bronchopneumonia.
it was reversed. On appeal to CA, the original decision of the RTC
was reinstated. CA held that Dr. Mendoza committed a breach of her Dr. Miranda came in due to request and conducted a physical check-
duty as a physician when a gauze remained in her patient's body up covering Edmer's head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and
after surgery. The CA denied her motion for reconsideration. abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing
fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever. Upon seeing
I ssue: Dr. Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood specimen,
and reported that Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain
Whether or not Dr. Mendoza is guilty of negligence. and difficulty in moving his right leg.Dr. Miranda called up
Dr.Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer's
Held: condition. Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several
procedures done including: hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing,
As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other blood transfusion and tourniquet tests. She advised Edmer's parents
surgical operation. And it would be much unlikely for her or for any that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from
woman to inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court held "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr.Casumpang arrived
in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana: 3 at Edmer's room and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive
Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent consented. Since the ICU
An operation requiring the placing of was then full, Dr.Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they
sponges in the incision is not com plete hire a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on
until the sponges are properly rem oved, transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
and it is settled that the leaving of Dr.Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the
sponges or other foreign substances in patient's clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon
the w ound after the incision has been examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever
closed is at least prim a facie negligence Stage IV" that was already in its irreversible stage.
by the operating surgeon. To put it Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. His Death
sim ply, such act is considered so Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
inconsistent w ith due care as to raise an Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
inference of negligence. There are even
LISANIE
Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and The hospital's liability is not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil
erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an Code, but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or
action for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: agency by estoppel.There is No Employer-Employee Relationship
Dr.Casumpang and Dr. Miranda (collectively referred to as the between SJDH and the Petitioning Doctors.
"petitioners") before the RTC of Makati City. Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH
exercised any degree of control over the means, methods of
I ssues: procedure and manner by which the petitioning doctors conducted
and performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their
1.Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable diagnosis and treatment. Likewise, no evidence was presented to
lack of precaution" in diagnosing and in treating the patient; show that SJDH monitored, supervised, or directed the petitioning
2. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarily liable with the doctors in the treatment and management of Edmer's case. In these
petitioning doctors; lights, the petitioning doctors were not employees of SJDH, but were
3. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the mere independent contractors.
petitioners' negligent act/omission and the patient's resulting death.
SJDH is Solidarity Liable Based on The Principle of Agency or
R uling: Doctrine of Apparent Authority. Despite the absence of employer-
employee relationship between SJDH and the petitioning doctors,
1. The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors' SJDH is not free from liability.
negligence in diagnosing and treating the deceased. It is a medical As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its
malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong independent contractors. However, it may be found liable if the
committed by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent of
the death of, a patient. As the term is used, the suit is brought the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of
whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet apparent authority.
the standards demanded by his profession, or deviates from this For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a
standard, and causes injury to the patient. plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a
To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
this case, the deceased patient's heir) must prove that the doctor individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or
either failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the
done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the
and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient.34 The hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the
patient's heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action. plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit 3. To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causal relation between the negligence and the injury. This
injury; and (4) proximate causation.Duty refers to the standard of connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any
behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct. It requires proof intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be
of professional relationship between the physician and the patient. the proximate cause of the injury. The injury or damage is
Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to proximately caused by the physician's negligence when it appears,
the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability. based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence
A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the
the services of a physician, and the latter accepts or agrees to injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable
provide care to the patient. The establishment of this relationship is consequence of the physician's negligence.
consensual, and the acceptance by the physician essential. The mere In this case, respondent successfully proved the element of
fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, causation.
advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless the
physician agrees.
The consent needed to create the relationship does not always need
to be express. In the absence of an express agreement, a physician-
patient relationship may be implied from the physician's affirmative
action to diagnose and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in
such diagnosis and/or treatment. The usual illustration would be the
case of a patient who goes to a hospital or a clinic, and is examined
and treated by the doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on the
established and customary practice in the medical community that a
patient-physician relationship exists.
Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of
care follows. The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at
least the same standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a medical condition under similar
circumstances.Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply
with, or improperly performs his duties under professional standards.
This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each
individual case.
If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or
in health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient
to damages.
2. YES
The respondent submits that SJDH should not only be held
vicariously liable for the petitioning doctors' negligence but also for
its own negligence. He claims that SJDH fell short of its duty of
providing its patients with the necessary facilities and equipment.
LISANIE
R uling: Petitioner is not liable. It should be emphasized that the
internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had
ORGAN DON ATI ON AN D TR AN SP LANTATI ON been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by
respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be
attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on
DR. FI LOTEO A. ALANO, petitioner, vs. ZENAI DA M AGUD- record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of
LOGM AO, respondent. the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless body be
categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.
Facts: Arnelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical
Center by sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw him fall from the A careful reading of the memorandum shows that petitioner
overpass in Cubao, Quezon City. There, his patient’s data sheet instructed his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable
identified him as Angelito Lugmoso. Considering that his efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even
deterioration progressively deteriorated, and no vacancy was enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the
available at the ICU of East Avenue Medical Center, and upon patient would reach said relatives. In fact, announcements were
recommendation by a resident physician of the National Kidney made through radio and television, the assistance of police
Institute (NKI) who also does the rounds at EAMC, Logmao/Lugmoso authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was
was transferred to NKI. His name was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso notified.
at the NKI.
The memorandum also clearly stated that permission or
Since there being no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, the transplant authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the
coordinator, was instructed to locate his family by enlisting the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable
assistance of the police and the media. Dr. Ona, requested the law (RA No. 349) had been complied with. Such instructions reveal
Laboratory Section to conduct cross-matching and tissue typing, so that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to
that if Angelito expires despite the necessary medical care and exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the
management, and found a suitable organ donor, provided his family deceased. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only
would consent to it, his organs could be detached and transplanted being granted I F the Departm ent of Surgery has com plied
promptly to a compatible beneficiary. Jennifer secured the patient w ith all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not
data of Angelito from EAMC and contacted several television and have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the
radio stations for the purpose of locating the family of Lugmoso. She doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions,
also sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police to locate obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
the whereabouts of Angelito’s family. requirements of the law.
Angelito was eventually pronounced dead, hence, Dr. Ona set in ON BUR DEN OF PROOF
motion the removal of organs of Angelito for organ transplantation.
He sought permission from the Executive Director, Dr. Filoteo Alano Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence
(defendant-petitioner), who issued a Memorandum approving the that doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, "in civil cases, it
transplant as long as all the requisite requirements had been is a basic rule that the party m aking allegations has the
complied with and the NBI had been informed of the planned burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The
transplant. The NBI thru Dr. Maximo Reyes gave verbal approval to parties m ust rely on the strength of their ow n evidence and
the planned transplant. One kidney and the pancreas were not upon the w eakness of the defense offered by their
transplanted to other patients. A doctor then made arrangements opponent." Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of
with Funerario Oro for the embalmment of the remains of Angelito around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be
for a period of 15 days to afford more time for the relative of considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to
Angelito to locate his remains. present any expert witness to prove that given the medical
technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing the could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal
successful organ transplant. A cousin of Angelito heard on the radio organs for transplantation.
that the donor was a certain Angelito Lugmoso who is now at
Funeraria Oro. Sensing a vague resemblance to Angelito Logmao’s W HEREFOR E, the petition is GR AN TED. The Decision of the Court
name, she reported it to his mother, Zenaida Logmao. When they of Appeals is R EVERSED and SET ASI DE. The complaint against
went to Funeraria Oro to see the remains, it was there that they petitioner is hereby DI SM I SSED. SO ORDERED.
discovered the remains of Angelito in a cheap casket. Previously,
Arnelito’s sister Arlen reported on March 3, 1988 that her brother,
Arnelito did not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao.
R elated Law : RA N o. 9439
Because of this discovery, Zenaida filed a complaint for damages.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of
Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his
true identity. Only Dr. Filoteo Albano was held liable for damages by
the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with
modification, by reducing the award of damages. Dr. Alano then filed
his appeal before the Supreme Court.
I ssue: Whether or not Dr. Alano can be held liable for damages. To
be able to answer this, the question of whether respondent's
sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in
granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal
organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.
LISANIE
PART 2. DAMAGES b.1. Dam age
I. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS b.2. I njury
c. K inds of dam ages recoverable

a. Dam ages, defined
Art. 2197, NCC.Damages may be:
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, I N C., vs. ER NESTO
V. YU and M AN UEL C. YUHI CO, (1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
FACTS: This case is a continuation of Yu vs. The Orchard Gold & (3) Nominal;
Country Club, Inc. The relevant facts are as follows: (4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
Yu and Yuhico went to Orchard Golf to play golf w/ another member (6) Exemplary or corrective.
of the club. At the last minute, they were informed that the other
member could not play with them. Due to the “no twosome” policy
of Orchard contained in their handbook prohibiting less than 3
players from playing on weekends an public holidays before 1pm. Yu
decided to convince Orchard’s assistant golf director to allow them to
play. The latter refused. Yu then shouted invectives at the assistant
golf director. Thus w/o the latter’s permission, they were able to
play. The lower court ruled by saying that the Orchard’s decision
suspending Yu and Yuhico is declared void. Orchard is likewise
directed to pay moral, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs of litigation
I SSUE: W/N the damages claimed could be awarded?
HELD: No.
Yu and Yuhico acknowledged that there was an offense committed.

Similarly Yuhico admitted that he was aware or had prior knowledge
of Orchard’s policy against twosomes, contained in their handbook.
However, they asserted that such policy was relaxed by the
management when a member would not be prejudiced. However,
the court ruled that such claim is based not on concrete examples.
No specific instance as to when and under what circumstance the
supposed relaxation took place was cited
As to the purported damages, Yuhico stated that he became the butt

of jokes of a another group of member-golfers in the club. Also, Yu
said that his friends in business started to evade him. Respondents
could not however present any testimonial/documentary evidence to
bolster their claims.
Thus, contrary to the findings of the trial courrt’s findings, there is no

factual/legal basis to grant moral/exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit in favor of respondents. The damages suffered,
if there are any, partake of the nature of a damnum absque injuria.
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure
suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a person's
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of

evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in
order to oblige them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a
result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership
in the Club is a privilege. Regular members are entitled to use all the
facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and
regulations. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental
anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be true, was brought
upon them by themselves for deliberately and consciously violating
the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that respondents
were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to
compensate them
b. Dam ages distinguished from

LISANIE
II. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim's line of
work, no documentary evidence is available; (b) the victim was
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
a. Definition wage under current labor laws. . .
Art. 2199, N CC.Except as provided for by law or stipulation, one is In the instant case, the victim was nineteen (19) years old at the
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss time of his death and earning P1,600.00 monthly as a farm laborer.
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is Thus, his heirs are entitled to receive an award for lost earnings in
referred to as actual or compensatory damages. accordance with the following formula: 2/3 (80 - ATD [age at time of
death]) x (GAI [gross annual income]) - 80% GAI. 7 Thus —
Art. 2200, N CC.Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not
only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which 2/3 (80-19) x (P1,600 x 12) - 80% (P1,600.00 x 12)
the oblige failed to obtain.
2/3 (61) x P19,200 - 80% (P19,200)
b. Com ponents of actual dam ages
40.67 x [P19,200 - P15,360]
b.1. value of loss suffered (daño em ergente) – Art. 2200
40.67 x P3,840 = P156,172.80
b.2 profits not obtained or realized (lucro cesante) – Art.
2200 ==========
b.3. loss of earning capacity for personal injury On the basis of the above computation, the heirs of the deceased
Romeo Boteja Jr. are entitled to receive P156,172.80 from accused-
b.3.1. Form ula in determ ining loss of earning capacity appellant Jesus Muyco.
2/3 x (80 – ATD) x GAI
P EOPLE V. M UYCO, 331 SCRA 192 VI CTOR Y LI N ER V. GAM M AD, ET.AL., GR N O.159636, N OV.
25, 2004
FACTS:
FACTS:
JESUS MUYCO and ARNULFO MUYCO, cousins, were charged with
murder for the death of Romeo Boteja Jr. on 13 May 1995. Only On March 14, 1996, respondent’s wife Marie Grace Pagulayan-
Jesus Muyco was apprehended while Arnulfo Muyco remains at large. Gammad was on board an air-conditioned Victory Liner bus bound
On 11 September 1997 the RTC, found Jesus guilty as charged and for Tuguegarao, Cagayan from Manila. The bus while running at a
correspondingly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the high speed fell on a ravine which resulted in the death of Marie
heirs of Romeo Boteja Jr. P30,000.00 as death indemnity and Grace and physical injuries to other passengers. Respondent and
P27,000.00 as funeral expenses. heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for damages arising from
culpa contractual against petitioner.
I SSUE:
Both trial and appellate courts rendered decision in favor of
Are the heirs of Romeo Boteja, Jr. entitled to claim damages for loss respondents as follows:
of earning capacity?
1. Actual Damages in the amount of P88,270.00;
HELD:
2. Compensatory Damages in the amount of P1,135,536,10;
Yes.
3. Moral and Exemplary Damages in the amount of P400,000.00;
Supreme Court notes that the trial court failed to award damages for and
loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of Leticia Boteja to
this effect. In People v. Dizon, this Court discussed the requisites for 4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the sum of the actual,
such award — compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages herein adjudged.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to I SSUE:

substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity. In People v.
Verde, the non-presentation of evidence to support the claim Was the award of damages proper?
for damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent this
Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the HELD:
victim's wife as to earning capacity of her murdered husband,
who was then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a No.The award of damages should be modified.
tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award.
Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, holds the
In this case, Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the time of common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in
his death and was earning a daily wage of P100.00 as a construction the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity
worker. As in People v. Verde, this Court is inclined to grant the for death, (2) indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of damages.
documentary evidence. To be able to claim damages for loss of
earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to
there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed indemnity for the death of Marie Grace which under current
earning less than the minimum wage under the current labor laws jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.00.
LISANIE
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased’s death, and actual damages, although the amount of the latter award
earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, was modified.
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
I SSUE:
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor Were the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals proper?
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) HELD:
the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.
No. It should be modified.
Here, the trial court and the CAcomputed the award of
compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity only on the basis The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
of the testimony of respondent Rosalito that the deceased was 39 provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Compensation of this
years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to
Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per annum earn money.
when she died. No other evidence was presented. The award is
clearly erroneous because the deceased’s earnings does not fall
within the exceptions. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate
the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the
respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.
The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by the CA
should be further reduced. In People v. Duban, it was held that only In this case, the records show that respondent’s husband
substantiated and proven expenses or those that appear to have was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca,
been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual
of the victim will be recognized. A list of expenses (Exhibit "J"), and income of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a
the contract/receipt for the construction of the tomb (Exhibit "F") in Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year
this case, cannot be considered competent proof and cannot replace 1990, which showed that respondent’s husband earned a gross
the official receipts necessary to justify the award. Hence, actual income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use the
damages should be further reduced to P78,160.00, which was the Certificate and respondent’s testimony as bases for fixing the gross
amount supported by official receipts. annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before
respondent’s husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no
P HI L HAW K COR P V. VI VI AN TAN LEE, GR N O. 166869, FEB. documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived
16, 2010 from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as
regards such income cannot be considered.
FACTS:
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings,
Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC a Complaint against petitioner not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the
Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings
damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In the absence
occurred on March 17,. The accident involved a motorcycle, a of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses
passenger jeep, and a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of
Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net
Avila. The accident resulted in the death of respondent’s husband, income (gross income less necessary expenses).
Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries. Respondent
sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as
and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical follows:
and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycle’s repair,
attorney’s fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income –
Reasonable and Necessary Expenses
Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing and
operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded
one million pesos a year in revenue. They also had a copra business, X = [2/3 (80-age at the time of death)] x [(GAI) – 80% of GAI
which gave them an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a
year. X = [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 - P800,000.00
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court X= 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 - P100,000.00 (Living Expenses)
awarded respondent the sum of P745,575.00, representing loss of
earning capacity (P590,000.00) and actual damages (P155,575.00
for funeral expenses), plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On X= 30/3 x P100,000.00
appeal, the CA sustained the award by the trial court for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his
LISANIE
X= 10 x P100,000.00 paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court,
X= P1,000,000.00
unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not
The CA also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in caused by the defendant, had no
connection with the death, wake, and interment of respondent’s earning capacity at the time of his
husband in the amount of P154,575.30, and the medical expenses of death
respondent in the amount of P168,019.55. - The wife of CAAT was able to testify and present
documentary evidence as to the earning capacity of the
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, deceased at the time of the death
such as receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of - As a guide, the SC laid down factors in computing the
the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning
victim. A review of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed capacity of deceased:
that the funeral and related expenses amounted only to o The number of years on the basis of which the
P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted damages shall be computed. This is based on
only to P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in actual the formula (2/3 x 80 Ð age of the deceased at
damages. the time of his death = life expectancy)
o The rate at which the losses sustained by the
P EOPLE VS ASI LAN heirs of the deceased should be fixed.
 Net income is arrived at by deducting
the amount of the victimÕs living
Facts:
expenses from the amount of his
gross income
- Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct
- The loss of earning capacity of Asilan is thus computed as
Assault with murder
follows:
- The allegations were that the said accused conspired with
- Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual
another person whose name was still unknown to
income Ð living expenses]
feloniously attack, and assault POI CAAT, a member of the
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross
Philippine National Police while in the performance of his
annual income Ð 50% of gross annual income]
duty of handcuffing the at large co-conspirator for illegal
possession of a deadly weapon.
- It was alleged that the accused repeatedly stabbed CAAT
with a fan knife and shooting him with CAAT’s own gun.
This led to his demise
R TC
- Found Asialn guilty of murder but not of direct assault

- RTC held that witnesses had positively identified him as
the malefactor
- As to damages, the RTC found the prosecution’s evidence,
which consisted of Adova’s wife testimony, and the
receipts of the expenses she incurred in Adovas
hospitalization, wake, and burial, sufficient to award moral
and actual damages.
CA
- Affitmed
I ssue: W / on the aw ard of dam ages w ere proper?
Held:
- The award of damages should be increased

- As to actual damages, AdovasÕs widow, Irene Adovas,
presented the receipts showing that she paid ₱25,224.00
to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Inc., as hospital expenses,
35,000.00 to Marulas Memorial Homes and ₱20,000.00 to
Funeraria Saranay as funeral expenses
- Art 2206 of the Civil Code states that
o The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
 (1) The defendant shall be liable for
the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be
LISANIE
b.4. Attorney’s fees and interest with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly
confirmed in writing by the heirs. Petitioner avers that pursuant to
said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as follows:
Art. 2208, N CC.In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the
except: attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be
P30,000.00.
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I.
to protect his interest; Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff; The trial court ordered that the motion for confirmation be granted,
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding which was eventually set aside by the respondent court for being
against the plaintiff; premature, there being a pending case in the SC.
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith
in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and I SSUE:
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support; Did the respondent court err in setting aside the trial court’s order?
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers; HELD:
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation
and employer’s liability laws; No.
(9) In separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from
a crime; Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were
should be recovered. less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said
court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but
an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
rendered . It also rests on the assumption that the court trying the
reasonable.
case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and
extent of the lawyer's services.
Art. 2209, N CC.If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum
of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award
interest, which is six per cent per annum. is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant,
not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the
Art. 2212, N CC. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's
time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services,
upon this point. with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the
debtors.
QUI R AN TE V. I AC, GR N O.73886, JAN. 31, 1989
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners
chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper
FACTS: remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the
respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is
Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on
building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court "may or may not
American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola family of the total
bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. Since the main case
his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not
Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and
GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN before the RTC of Manila for damages, the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure
with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO for gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for
indemnification. recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client. Thus, it was
ruled that:
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the
contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff ... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main
actual, as well as moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees. litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the
A writ of execution was then issued by the trial court. The petition disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only
for the quashal of the writ of execution was denied by the appellate arises when something has been recovered from which the fee
court and hence, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, which is to be paid.
remained pending at this time.
In the meantime, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial

court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him,
there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola
LISANIE
P N B V. CA, AP RI L 25, 1996 P ADI LLO V. CA, 371 SCRA 27

FACTS:
FACTS:
A check drawn against petitioner PNB in the amount of P97,650.00
was issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture payable to F. This case is a petition for declaratory relief and damages initiated by
Abante Marketing. F. Abante Marketing, a client of Capitol City petitioner Veronica Padillo against respondent Tomas Averia, Jr.
Development Bank (Capitol), deposited the questioned check in its Padillo alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of a land
savings account with said bank. In turn, Capitol deposited the same located in Quezon Provincewhich she purchased from Marina M. de
in its account with the PBCom which, in turn, sent the check to Vera-Quicho and Margarita de Vera. Petitioner ascribed fault upon
petitioner for clearing. Petitioner cleared the check as good and, Averia with unlawful refusal to turn over the property in her favor;
thereafter, PBCom credited Capitol's account for the amount stated and that respondent Averia even instituted a suit for rescission of 2
in the check. However, petitioner returned the check to PBCom and deeds solely for harassment and dilatory purposes although the suit
debited PBCom's account for the amount covered by the check, the actually established petitioner's right of ownership over the subject
reason being that there was a "material alteration" of the check property.
number. PBCom, as collecting agent of Capitol, then proceeded to
debit the latter's account for the same amount. On the other hand, Judgment was eventually rendered in favor of Padillo and ordering
Capitol could not, in turn, debit F. Abante Marketing's account since Averia to vacate and surrender the possession of the lot and to pay
the latter had already withdrawn the amount of the check. Capitol petitioner damages including attorney’s fees in the sum of
filed a civil suit with the RTC against PBCom which, in turn, filed a P107,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance in the hearing of the
third-party complaint against petitioner for reimbursement/indemnity case and litigation expenses of P10,000.00.
with respect to the claims of Capitol. Petitioner, on its part, filed a
fourth-party complaint against F. Abante Marketing. I SSUE:
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff Capitol and Should the monetary award for damages granted by the trial court
ordered PBCom to pay damages including attorney’s fees, which in be sustained?
turn shall be reimbursed by petitioner PNB. The respondent court
however, modified the judgment by exempting PBCom from liability
to Capitol for attorney’s fees. HELD:
I SSUE: No.
With respect to attorney's fees, the award thereof is the exception

Should attorney’s fees be deleted in the award for damages? rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every
time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium
HELD: should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees as part of
damages are not the same as attorney's fees in the concept of the
amount paid to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
Yes. SC ruled that the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees is
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
hereby deleted. In their respective decisions, the trial court and the
for the legal services he has rendered to the latter, while in its
Court of Appeals failed to explicitly state the rationale for the said
extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as
award.
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the
prevailing party.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court
and depends upon the circumstances of each case. However, the Attorney's fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances
discretion of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for
the Civil Code of the Philippines demands factual, legal and equitable the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case
justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a within the exception and justify the grant of such award, and in all
premise and improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It cases it must be reasonable. Thereunder, the trial court may award
becomes a violation of the proscription against the imposition of a attorney's fees where it deems just and equitable that it be so
penalty on the right to litigate. The reason for the award must be granted. While we respect the trial court's exercise of its discretion in
stated in the text of the court's decision. If it is stated only in the this case, we find the award of the trial court of attorney's fees in
dispositive portion of the decision, the same shall be disallowed. As the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (P107,000.00) plus
to the award of attorney's fees being an exception rather than the One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per appearance in the hearing of
rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law the case and litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos
that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant (P10,000.00), to be unreasonable and excessive. Attorney's fees as
of the award. part of damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the
expense of the losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably reduced
to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
LISANIE
of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the "second group"
varied on the commencement of the running of the legal interest.
EASTER N SHI P P I N G LI N ES, I N C. V. CA, 234 SCR A 78 (1994)
Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest
FACTS: from the date of the decision of the court a quo, explaining that "if
the suit were for damages, 'unliquidated and not known until
This is an action against defendants shipping company (Eastern definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after
Shipping Lines), arrastre operator (Metro Port Service, Inc.) and proof,' then, interest 'should be from the date of the decision.'"
broker-forwarder (Allied Brokerage Corporation) for damages
sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual
insurer-subrogee (Mercantile Insurance Co.) who paid the consignee circumstances may have called for different applications, guided by
the value of such losses/damages. the rule that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the
equities of each case, on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may
Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan not be unwise, by way of clarification and reconciliation, to suggest
for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant the following rules of thumb for future guidance.
Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured under plaintiff's
Marine Insurance Policy. Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila, it I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,
was discharged unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor
Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order, which can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
damage was unknown to plaintiff. When defendant Allied Brokerage "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
Corporation received the shipment from defendant Metro Port recoverable damages.
Service, Inc., one drum was found opened and without seal. When
defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries of the II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
shipment to the consignee's warehouse, the latter excepted to one actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as
drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
adulterated/fake. As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff
was compelled to pay the consignee P19,032.95 under the 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants. money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
Both trial and appellate courts rendered judgments ordering earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P19,032.95, with the the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
present legal interest of 12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
date of filing of this complaints, until fully paid. extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
I SSUES:
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
Whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
from the date the decision appealed from is rendered; and whether rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the
(12%) or six percent (6%). demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
HELD: certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim
is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but
Concededly, there have been seeming variances in our jurisprudence when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
as to the issues involved in this case. The cases can perhaps be time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only
classified into two groups according to the similarity of the issues from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time
involved and the corresponding rulings rendered by the court. the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of
In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
either the 6% (under the Civil Code) or 12% (under the Central Bank adjudged.
Circular) interest per annum. It is easily discernible in these cases
that there has been a consistent holding that the Central Bank 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum applies only to loans becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
that the 6% interest under the Civil Code governs when the interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of forbearance of credit.
damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common Petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
time frame in the computation of the 6% interest per annum has the MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT
been applied, i.e., from the time the complaint is filed until the (6%) on the amount due computed from the decision of the court a
adjudged amount is fully paid. quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT
(6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision
The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the until the payment thereof.
application of the 6% or 12% interest per annum, depending on
whether or not the amount involved is a loan or forbearance, on the
one hand, or one of indemnity for damage, on the other hand.
Unlike, however, the "first group" which remained consistent in
holding that the running of the legal interest should be from the time
LISANIE
from September 27, 2000 when respondent-spouses formally
demanded the return of their money and not from October 1993
ESTORES vs. SP OUSES AR TURO and LAUR A SUP AN GAN when the contract was executed as held by the RTC.
Re: Imposition of 12% interest in a contract involving a

conditional deed of sale and not a loan
P etitioner’s Argum ents
On October 3, 1993, petitioner Estores and respondent-spouses Petitioner insisted that she is not bound to pay interest on
Supangan entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale where Estores the P3.5 million because the Conditional Deed of Sale only
offered to sell and respondent-spouses offered to buy a parcel of provided for the return of the downpayment in case of failure to
land at Naic, Cavite for the sum of P4.7 million. comply with her obligations. Petitioner also argues that the
award of attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent-spouses is
The parties stipulated: unwarranted because it cannot be said that the latter won over
1. Vendor will secure approved clearance from DAR requirements of the former since the CA even sustained her contention that the
which are (sic): imposition of 12% interest compounded annually is totally
a) Letter request uncalled for.
b) Title R espondent-spouses’ Argum ents
c) Tax Declaration Respondent-spouses aver that it is only fair that interest be
d) Affidavit of Aggregate Landholding – Vendor/Vendee imposed on the amount they paid considering that petitioner
e) Certification from the Prov’l. Assessor’s as to Landholdings of failed to return the amount upon demand and had been using
Vendor/Vendee the P3.5 million for her benefit. Moreover, it is undisputed that
f) Affidavit of Non-Tenancy petitioner failed to perform her obligations to relocate the house
g) Deed of Absolute Sale outside the perimeter of the subject property and to complete
4. Vendee shall be informed as to the status of DAR clearance the necessary documents. As regards the attorney’s fees, they
within 10 days upon signing of the documents. claim that they are entitled to the same because they were
6. Regarding the house located within the perimeter of the subject forced to litigate when petitioner unjustly withheld the amount.
[lot] owned by spouses [Magbago], said house shall be moved Besides, the amount awarded by the CA is even smaller
outside the perimeter of this subject property to the 300 sq. m. area compared to the filing fees they paid.
allocated for [it]. Vendor hereby accepts the responsibility of seeing
to it that such agreement is carried out before full payment of the SC R uling:
sale is made by vendee. Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in
7. If and after the vendor has completed all necessary documents the contract.
for registration of the title and the vendee fails to complete We sustain the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it is
payment as per agreement, a forfeiture fee of 25% or proper to impose interest notwithstanding the absence of
downpayment, shall be applied. However, if the vendor fails to stipulation in the contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code
complete necessary documents within thirty days without any expressly provides that "[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the
sufficient reason, or without informing the vendee of its status, court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of
vendee has the right to demand return of full amount of down contract." In this case, there is no question that petitioner is
payment. legally obligated to return the P3.5 million because of her failure
9. As to the boundaries and partition of the lots (15,018 sq. m. and to fulfill the obligation under the Conditional Deed of Sale,
300 sq. m.) Vendee shall be informed immediately of its approval by despite demand. She has in fact admitted that the conditions
the LRC. were not fulfilled and that she was willing to return the full
10. The vendor assures the vendee of a peaceful transfer of amount of P3.5 million but has not actually done so. Petitioner
ownership. enjoyed the use of the money from the time it was given to
her until now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation
from the date of demand, i.e., on September 27, 2000.
Almost seven years from the time of the execution of the
contract and after payment of P3.5 million, Estores still failed to The interest at the rate of 12% is applicable in the instant case.
comply with her obligation as provided in paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 9 Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the applicable
and 10 of the contract. Respondent-spouses demanded the rate of interest "shall be computed in accordance with the
return of the paid amount. Estores acknowledged receipt of stipulation of the parties." Absent any stipulation, the applicable
the P3.5 million and promised to return the same within 120 rate of interest shall be 12% per annum "when the obligation
days. Respondent-spouses were amenable to the proposal arises out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods or credits.
provided an interest of 12% compounded annually shall be In other cases, it shall be six percent (6%)."
imposed on the P3.5 million. Petitioner still failed to return the
amount thus respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for sum of The parties did not stipulate as to the applicable rate of interest.
money before the RTC Malabon against Estores as well as Arias But even if the transaction involved a Conditional Deed
who allegedly acted as petitioner’s agent. of Sale, can the stipulation governing the return of the
m oney be considered as a forbearance of m oney w hich
I ssue: required paym ent of interest at the rate of 12% ? W e
1. Whether or not it is proper to impose interest for an obligation believe so.
that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the
absence of stipulation of the parties. In Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, "forbearance"
2. Whether 6% or 12% interest rate applies was defined as a "contractual obligation of lender or creditor to
refrain during a given period of time, from requiring the
R TC R uling: respondent-spouses entitled to interest but only at borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and
the rate of 6% per annum and not 12% as prayed by them. It payable." This definition describes a loan where a debtor is given
also found respondent-spouses entitled to attorney’s fees as they a period within which to pay a loan or debt. In such case,
were compelled to litigate to protect their interest. "forbearance of money, goods or credits" will have no distinct
CA R uling: affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding the imposition definition from a loan.
of 6% interest proper. However, the same shall start to run only
LISANIE
We believe however, that the phrase "forbearance of money,
goods or credits" is meant to have a separate meaning from a
loan, otherwise there would have been no need to add that SUNGA-CHAN V. CA, GR N O. 164401, JUNE 25, 2008
phrase as a loan is already sufficiently defined in the Civil Code.
Forbearance of money, goods or credits should therefore refer to FACTS:
arrangements other than loan agreements, where a person
acquiesces to the temporary use of his money, goods or credits
In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in
pending happening of certain events or fulfillment of certain
the marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. For convenience, the
conditions.
business, Shellite, was registered as a sole proprietorship in the
name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership arrangement called for equal
In this case, the respondent-spouses parted with their money
sharing of the net profit. After Jacinto’s death in 1989, his widow,
even before the conditions were fulfilled. They have therefore
petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth
allowed or granted forbearance to the seller to use their money
Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua’s consent.
pending fulfillment of the conditions. They were deprived of the
Chua’s subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up
use of their money for the period pending fulfillment of the
went unheeded, prompting him to file on June 22, 1992 a Complaint
conditions and when those conditions were breached, they are
for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and
entitled not only to the return of the principal amount paid, but
Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
also to compensation for the use of their money. And the
Attachment.
compensation for the use of their money, absent any stipulation,
should be the same rate of legal interest applicable to a loan
since the use or deprivation of funds is similar to a loan. RTC rendered judgment finding for Chua, which decision was
subsequently upheld by the CA and SC. Said RTC decision then
Petitioner’s unwarranted withholding of the money which became final and executory. Petitioners, citing Article 2213 of the
rightfully pertains to respondent-spouses amounts to Civil Code, fault the trial court for imposing, in the execution of its
forbearance of money which can be considered as an involuntary final judgment, interests on what they considered as unliquidated
loan. claims. Petitioners also question the imposition of 12% interest on
the claimed monthly profits of PhP 35,000, reckoned from 1988 to
Thus, the applicable rate of interest is 12% per annum October 15, 1992. To petitioners, the imposable rate should only be
in pursuant to the guidelines set in Eastern Shipping 6% and computed from the finality of the RTC’s underlying decision,
Lines, I nc. v. CA. (see digest before this) i.e., from December 20, 2001.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and its

I SSUES:
predecessor case, Reformina v. Tongol both involved torts cases
and hence, there was no forbearance of money, goods, or
credits. Further, the amount claimed (i.e., damages) could not Can the RTC impose interest on a final judgment of unliquidated
be established with reasonable certainty at the time the claim claims? Was the imposed interest rate proper? How much should the
was made. Hence, we arrived at a different ruling in those cases. interest be?
Since the date of demand which is September 27, 2000 was HELD:
satisfactorily established during trial, then the interest rate of
12% should be reckoned from said date of demand until the
principal amount and the interest thereon is fully satisfied. The petition is partly meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The May 12, In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., the Court held that the legal interest at
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83123 12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the rate of interest shall adjudged only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of money.
be twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from September And for transactions involving payment of indemnities in the concept
27, 2000 until fully satisfied. The award of attorney’s fees is of damages arising from default in the performance of obligations in
further reduced to P50,000.00. general and/or for money judgment not involving a loan or
SO ORDERED forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art.
2209 pertinently provides:
Art. 2209.If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be
the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has been
described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor
to repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition

of interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12%
per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans
or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as well as to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while
the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies "when
LISANIE
the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of out that the AF agents did not check in his baggage and since he
damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of had to retrieve his bags at the baggage area, he missed his
obligations in general," with the application of both rates reckoned connecting flight; (5) he had to shoulder his extended stay in Paris
"from the time the complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount for AF’s failure to make good its representation that he would be
is fully paid." In either instance, the reckoning period for the given a complimentary motel pass and (6) he was given a computer
commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be subject print-out of his flight reservation for Manila but when he went to the
to the condition "that the courts are vested with discretion, airport, he was told that the flight was overbooked. It was only when
depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest." he made a scene that the AF agent boarded him on an AF flight to
Hongkong and placed him on a connecting Philippine Airlines flight to
Manila.
Guided by the foregoing rules, the award to Chua of the amount
representing earned but unremitted profits, i.e.. PhP 35,000 monthly,
from January 1988 until May 30, 1992, must earn interest at 6% per The RTC found that AF breached its contract of carriage and that it
annum reckoned from October 7, 1997, the rendition date of the was liable to pay P200,000 actual damages, P1 million moral
RTC decision, until December 20, 2001, when the said decision damages, P1 million exemplary damages and P300,000 attorney’s
became final and executory. Thereafter, the total of the monthly fees to respondent. The appellate court affirmed the award of P1
profits inclusive of the add on 6% interest shall earn 12% per annum million moral damages and P300,000 attorney’s fees. However, it
reckoned from December 20, 2001 until fully paid, as the award for reduced the actual damages to US$906 (or its peso equivalent).
that item is considered to be, by then, equivalent to a forbearance of
credit. Likewise, the PhP 250,000 award, representing the goodwill
The CA also decreased the exemplary damages from P1 million to
value of the business, the award of PhP 50,000 for moral and
P300,000. The CA further imposed interest at the rate of 6% p.a.
exemplary damages, PhP 25,000 attorney’s fee, and PhP 25,000
from the date of extrajudicial demand until full satisfaction, but
litigation fee shall earn 12% per annum from December 20, 2001
before judgment becomes final. From the date of finality of the
until fully paid.
judgment until the obligation is totally paid, 12% interest p.a. shall
be imposed.
Anent the impasse over the partnership assets, we are inclined to
agree with petitioners’ assertion that Chua’s share and interest on
I SSUE:
such assets partake of an unliquidated claim which, until reasonably
determined, shall not earn interest for him.
Is the CA correct in its imposition of interests?
The October 7, 1997 RTC decision clearly directed petitioners to
render an accounting, inventory, and appraisal of the partnership HELD:
assets and then to wind up the partnership affairs by restituting and
delivering to Chua his one-half share of the accounted partnership Yes.
assets. The directive itself is a recognition that the exact share and
interest of Chua over the partnership cannot be determined with
reasonable precision without going through with the inventory and Both the RTC and the CA have competently ruled on the issue of
accounting process. In fine, a liquidated claim cannot validly be respondent’s entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees as they
asserted without accounting. In net effect, Chua’s interest and share properly laid down both the factual and legal bases for their
over the partnership asset, exclusive of the goodwill, assumed the respective decisions. We see no reason to disturb their findings.
nature of a liquidated claim only after the trial court, through its
November 6, 2002 resolution, approved the assets inventory and The above liabilities of AF shall earn legal interest pursuant to the
accounting report on such assets. Court’s ruling in Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Estrella, citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA.
Considering that Chua’s computation of claim, as approved by the
trial court, was submitted only on October 15, 2002, no interest in Pursuant to this ruling, the legal interest is 6% p.a. and it shall be
his favor can be added to his share of the partnership assets. reckoned from April 25, 2007 when the RTC rendered its judgment,
not from the time of respondent’s extrajudicial demand. This must
AI R FRANCE V. DE CASTRO, GR N O. 188691, OCT. 31, 2009 be so as it was at the time the RTC rendered its judgment that the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained. Then, from the time this decision becomes final and
FACTS: executory, the interest rate shall be 12% p.a. until full satisfaction.
Respondent John Anthony de Camilis filed a case for breach of

contract of carriage, damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner
Air France Philippines/KLM Air France (AF).
Respondent alleged that he went on a pilgrimage with a group of

Filipinos to selected countries in Europe. According to respondent: (1)
AF’s agent in Paris failed to inform him of the need to secure a
transit visa for Moscow, as a result of which he was denied entry to
Moscow and was subjected to humiliating interrogation by the police;
(2) another AF agent (a certain Ms. Soeyesol) rudely denied his
request to contact his travel companions to inform them that he was
being sent back to Paris from Moscow with a police escort; Ms.
Soeyesol even reported him as a security threat which resulted in his
being subjected to further interrogation by the police in Paris and
Rome, and worse, also lifted his flight coupons for the rest of his trip;
(3) AF agents in Rome refused to honor his confirmed flight to Paris;
(4) upon reaching Paris for his connecting flight to Manila, he found
LISANIE
sufficiently established, that is, that the claimant must submit proof
that it was in fact damaged because of petitioner's act or omission.
c. Ex tent of R ecoverable Dam ages
The stipulation of facts of the parties does not at all show that
c.1. I n contracts and quasi-contracts w here there is – private respondent intended to sell, or would sell or would have sold
the stocks in question on specified dates. While it is true that shares
c.1.a. good faith on obligor of stock may go up or down in value (as in fact the concerned shares
here really rose from fifteen (15) centavos to twenty three or twenty
Art. 2201, NCC.In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for four (23/24) centavos per share and then fell to about two (2)
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that centavos per share, still whatever profits could have been made are
are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the purely SPECULATIVE, for it was difficult to predict with any decree of
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have certainty the rise and fall in the value of the shares. Thus this Court
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. has ruled that speculative damages cannot be recovered.
It is easy to say now that had private respondent gained legal title to
BATONG BUHAY V. CA, 147 SCRA 4
the shares, it could have sold the same and reaped a profit of
P5,624.95 but it could not do so because of petitioner's refusal to
FACTS:
transfer the stocks in the former's name at the time demand was
made, but then it is also true that human nature, being what it is,
Defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. issued Stock Certificate No. private respondent's officials could also have refused to sell and
16807 covering 62,495 shares with a par value of P0.01 per share to instead wait for expected further increases in value.
Francisco Aguac who was then legally married to Paula G. Aguac, but
the said spouses had lived separately for more than 14 years prior to
the said date. On December 16, 1969, Francisco Aguac, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, sold his 62,495 shares covered c.1.b. bad faith in obligor
by Stock Certificate No. 16807 for the sum of P9,374.70 in favor of
the plaintiff, Inc. Mining Corporation. GEN ERAL EN TER P RI SES V. LI AN GA BAY, 11 SCR A 73
When Batong Buhay was about to effect the cancellation of Stock FACTS:
Certificate No. 16807 and transfer the 62,495 shares covered
thereby to the plaintiff, it received a letter from Paula G. Aguac Defendant seeks the reconsideration of the SC decision rendered on
advising it to withhold the transfer of the subject shares of stock on August 31, 1964 on the grounds that the amount of P400,000.00
the ground that the same are conjugal property. The defendants awarded to plaintiff as lucrum cessans is not justified considering the
justify their refusal to transfer the shares of stock of Francisco Aguac evidence available; that assuming the agreement entered into
in the name of the plaintiff in view of their apprehension that they between the parties to be valid, defendant is not guilty of breach
might he held liable for damages under Article 173 of the Civil Code. thereof because its obligation to supply the monthly two million
board feet for the remainder of the period of the agreement was not
In view of the defendant's inaction on the request for the transfer of mandatory but conditional, aside from the fact that it had the right
the stock certificate in its name, the plaintiff commenced this action to suspend the operation of the agreement under the proviso
praying that the defendants be ordered to issue and release the contained in paragraph 8 thereof; that the request of defendant for
transfer stock certificate covering 62,495 shares of defendant Batong the renegotiation of the prices of logs which was refused by plaintiff
Buhay, formerly registered in the name of Francisco Aguac, in favor was a right expressly granted to it in paragraph 2 of said agreement;
of the plaintiff, and for the recovery of compensatory, exemplary and and that the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees to
corrective damages and attorney's fees. plaintiff is unjustified.
The trial court handed down its judgment ordering the defendant As a basis for the actual damages awarded to plaintiff we stated in
(herein petitioner) to effect the transfer of the shares but private our decision that "whether logs were delivered to plaintiff, plaintiff
respondent Inc. Mining Corporation appealed to the CA anchored on earned the commission. Had defendant continued to deliver the logs
the lower court's alleged failure to award damages for the wrongful plaintiff could have continued earning its commission in much the
refusal of petitioner to transfer the subject shares of stock and same way as in previous shipments." Had the operation not been
alleged failure to award attorney's fees, cost of injunction bond and stopped, plaintiff would have undoubtedly continued the flow of
expenses of litigation. sales in pursuance of the agreement. But defendant prevented this
for reasons of its own.
I SSUE:
I SSUE:
May the CA award damages by way of unrealized profits despite the
absence of supporting evidence, or merely on the basis of pure Was the award of damages for lucrum cessans justified?
assumption, speculation or conjecture; or can the respondent
recover damages by way of unrealized profits when it has not shown HELD:
that it was damaged in any manner by the act of petitioner?
Yes.
HELD:
We only need to emphasize that, since defendant is guilty of
SC answered in the negative. Speculative damages cannot be breaking the agreement for reasons purely of its own, in disregard of
recovered. its express covenant, it held itself liable for all consequential
damages that may result from such breach, whether foreseen or
The petitioner alleges that the appellate court gravely and unforeseen, and one of the items that may be considered in
categorically erred in awarding damages by way of unrealized profit determining said damages is the failure to realize whatever profits
(or lucro cesante) to private respondent. Petitioner company also could have been earned during the remaining life of the agreement.
alleges that the claim for unrealized profit must be duly and It is not, therefore, proper to base such damages purely in
transactions that had been accomplished in the past and ignore
LISANIE
those that could have been accomplished in the future. As the law Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory
says, in case of fraud or bad faith, "the obligor shall be responsible damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense
for all damages that may be reasonably attributed to the non- for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of
performance of the obligation" (Article 2201, new Civil Code). natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has
been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to
c.2. I n crim es and quasi-delicts impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts,
actual damages include all the natural and probable
Art. 2202, N CC.In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are
for all the damages which are the natural and probable two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not of what a person already possesses (daño emergente), and the
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
M ARI K I NA AUTO LI N E TRANSP ORT COR P ORATI ON V. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
P EOPLE, ET.AL., GR N O. 152040, M AR CH 31, 2006 evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is to
establish one’s case by a preponderance of evidence which means
FACTS: that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to
that of the other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial must prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
apartment. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
the owner-operator of a passenger bus. Suelto, its employee, was obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring
assigned as the regular driver of the bus. whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be
pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises,
Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus when it speculations or conjectures.
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the
commercial apartment owned by Valdellon, causing damage thereon. We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent
in damage to property against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate would amount to P55,000.00. Accordingly, private respondent is
civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. entitled to P55,000.00 actual damages.
During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the c.3. I n crim es and quasi-delicts resulting in death
terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced in
evidence a receipt for P35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993, issued Art. 2206, N CC.The amount of damages for death caused by a
by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator for "carpentry, masonry, crime or quasi-delict shall be at least Three thousand pesos, even
welding job and electrical [work]." though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
The trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of earning
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
property, and ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way of actual and compensatory case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. CA rendered deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
judgment affirming the decision of the trial court, but the award for caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
actual damages was reduced to P100,000.00. time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
I SSUE: the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of
Was the award for actual damages proper? testate or intestate succession, may demand support from
the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
HELD: five years the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
No. ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the accused.
We agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed
to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident
amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by
respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent
were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R.
Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the
BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for
P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding,
and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify
on his estimation.
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already
possesses (daño emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive,
as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
As expostulated by the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
LISANIE
Is the petitioner entitled to moral damages?
d. M itigation and assessm ent of actual dam ages HELD:
Art. 2203, NCC.The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the Yes.
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question. We feel it is not enough to say that the private respondent rectified
its records and credited the deposit in less than a month as if this
Art. 2214, N CC.In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the were sufficient repentance. The error should not have been
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. committed in the first place. The respondent bank has not even
explained why it was committed at all. It is true that the dishonored
e. Subrogatory R ight of I nsurer checks were, as the Court of Appeals put it, "eventually" paid.
However, this took almost a month when, properly, the checks
Art. 2207, N CC.If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he should have been paid immediately upon presentment.
has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or
loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, As the Court sees it, the initial carelessness of the respondent bank,
the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the aggravated by the lack of promptitude in repairing its error, justifies
insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the the grant of moral damages. This rather lackadaisical attitude toward
contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not the complaining depositor constituted the gross negligence, if not
fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to wanton bad faith, that the respondent court said had not been
recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. established by the petitioner.
We also note that while stressing the rectification made by the

respondent bank, the decision practically ignored the prejudice
suffered by the petitioner. This was simply glossed over if not,
III. MORAL DAMAGES
indeed, disbelieved. The fact is that the petitioner's credit line was
canceled and its orders were not acted upon pending receipt of
a. Definition actual payment by the suppliers. Its business declined. Its reputation
was tarnished. Its standing was reduced in the business community.
Art. 2217, N CC.Moral damages include physical suffering, mental All this was due to the fault of the respondent bank which was
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded undeniably remiss in its duty to the petitioner.
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be Article 2205 of the Civil Code provides that actual or compensatory
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s damages may be received "(2) for injury to the plaintiff s business
wrongful act or omission. standing or commercial credit." There is no question that the
petitioner did sustain actual injury as a result of the dishonored
b. P urpose checks and that the existence of the loss having been established
"absolute certainty as to its amount is not required." Such injury
SI M EX I N TERN ATI ONAL V. CA, GR N O. 88013, M AR CH 19, should bolster all the more the demand of the petitioner for moral
1990 damages and justifies the examination by this Court of the validity
and reasonableness of the said claim.
FACTS:
We agree that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
The petitioner is a private corporation engaged in the exportation of defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may
food products. It buys products from various local suppliers and then have suffered. In the case at bar, the petitioner is seeking such
sells them abroad. Most of its exports are purchased by the damages for the prejudice sustained by it as a result of the private
petitioner on credit. The petitioner was a depositor of the respondent respondent's fault. The respondent court said that the claimed losses
bank and maintained a checking account. On May 25, 1981, the are purely speculative and are not supported by substantial evidence,
petitioner deposited to its account in the said bank the amount of but it failed to consider that the amount of such losses need not be
P100,000.00. Subsequently, the petitioner issued several checks established with exactitude precisely because of their nature. Moral
against its deposit but was surprised to learn later that they had damages are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. Article 2216 of
been dishonored for insufficient funds. the Civil Code specifically provides that "no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
As a consequence, petitioner received various letters of demand, exemplary damages may be adjudicated." That is why the
threatening prosecution if the dishonored check issued to it was not determination of the amount to be awarded (except liquidated
made good. Deliveries of the order made by petitioner were withheld; damages) is left to the sound discretion of the court, according to
and petitioner’s credit line was cancelled. The petitioner complained "the circumstances of each case."
to the respondent bank on June 10, 1981. Investigation disclosed
that the sum of P100,000.00 deposited by the petitioner had not
been credited to it. The error was rectified on June 17, 1981, and
the dishonored checks were paid after they were re-deposited.
Petitioner then filed a complaint claiming from the private

respondent moral damages and exemplary damages plus attorney's
fees, and costs. Both trial and appellate courts rendered holding that
moral and exemplary damages were not called for under the
circumstances.
I SSUE:
LISANIE
aw ard designed to com pensate the claim ant for actual injury
suffered and not to im pose a penalty on the w rongdoer, and
M AKABALI V. CA, GR N O.46877, JAN. 22, 1988 are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint.
FACTS: As reflected in the records of the case, the CA was in agreement

with the findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish,
Petitioner Georgina Makabali had just graduated from the College of embarrassment and mental sufferings due to failure of private
Medicine, UP, and as a graduation gift from her father, was given a respondent to perform its obligation to the petitioners. According to
trip to Hongkong. Since she had never been abroad, her parents the CA, private respondent acted in wanton disregard of the rights of
insisted that she be accompanied by her sister and co-petitioner petitioners. These pronouncements lay the basis and justification for
Lourdes Cynthia Makabali, a schoolteacher. this Court to award petitioners moral and exemplary damages.
Petitioners availed of the package tour to Hong Kong offered by In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
private respondent Baron Travel Corporation. Petitioners were especially the social standing of petitioners and the embarrassment
assured that they would be going with a group of thirteen other and humiliation suffered by them, the anxiety they must have felt in
travelers to be led by a tour guide, a certain Mr. Arsenio Rosal, and their first journey to a foreign land under uncertain circumstances
that a representative of private respondent would see them off at and with meager funds which could run out any time, We are
the Manila International Airport to give them final instructions. inclined to award damages to the petitioner more than what was
Petitioners were also that they would be lodged at the President awarded by the CA.
Hotel in Hongkong.
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within the
However, none of these assurances happened. Nobody met limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore
petitioners at the airport and they met no one from the supposed it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of
tour group. They looked for and found a certain Mr. Arsenio Rosal P5,000.00 is minimal compared to the sufferings and embarrassment
who, to their embarrassment, protested that he was not a tour guide of petitioners who left Manila with high spirits and excitement hoping
but a business executive working with International Harvester to enjoy their first trip to a foreign land only to be met with
Macleod, Inc. and who was going to Hongkong as a paying uncertainties and humiliations.
passenger. Moreover, there had been no accommodations reserved
for them at the President Hotel.
As a consequence, petitioners had to scrimp on their limited budget

for fear that their meager pocket money would not be enough to pay
for their hotel bills. All these caused them sleepless nights because
of great worry, mental anguish and public humiliation. An action for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs was filed
by the petitioners. Trial Court rendered judgment in petitioner's favor
but awarded them only P500.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
CA increased the award to P5,000.00.
I SSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to more than the P5,000.00 award as

moral and exemplary damages?
HELD:
Yes.
To begin with, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of

what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.
Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral damages which
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
We (SC) have awarded moral and exemplary damages depending

upon the facts attendant to each case. It will also be noted that We
gave separate awards for moral and exemplary damages. This is as
it should be because the nature and purposes of said damages are
different. While moral damages have to do with injury personal to
the awardee, such as physical suffering and the like, exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.
It is essential however, in the award of damages that the claimant

must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the
factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to
defendant's acts. This is so because m oral dam ages, though
incapable of pecuniary estim ation, are in the category of an
LISANIE
damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously, For these the law taxes costs.
c. Burden of P roof; Quantum of Evidence
Conformably with settled jurisprudence and in agreement with
P N B V. CA, GR N O. 45776, M AR CH 30, 1988 petitioner's contention, We find the conclusion of respondent
appellate court that the filing of Civil Case No. 4507 was not made
FACTS: maliciously and in a wanton manner inconsistent with its award of
moral and exemplary damages in the reduced amount of P10,000.00.
Private respondent Napoleon Navarro was an employee of petitioner
PNB. Navarro falsified and/or forged checks and appropriated to In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered
himself the proceeds in the aggregate amount of P28,683.77. PNB by respondents spouses Medina and Lopez for having been made
filed a civil case against Navarro to recover the sum defalcated in the defendants in Civil Case No. 4507 is not that kind of anxiety which
amount of P 13,906.81 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary would warrant the award of moral damages. The worries and
attachment against the properties of Napoleon Navarro. While the anxieties suffered by respondents spouses Medina and Lopez were
writ of preliminary attachment was in the process of issuance, a only such as are usually, caused to a party haled into court as a
Deed of Sale of Real Property and Dwelling House was executed by defendant in a litigation. Therefore, there is no sufficient justification
respondents Navarro and Patricia Cruz in favor of the other for the award of moral damages, more so, exemplary damages.
respondents spouses Vicente Medina and Leticia Lopez over the
former's properties. Subsequently, a new transfer certificate of title R AAGAS V. R AYA, 22 SCR A 839
was issued in the names of spouses Vicente Medina and Leticia
Lopez. FACTS:
PNB then filed another civil case No. 4507 against respondents Spouses Raagas filed a complaint against spouses Traya and
Napoleon C. Navarro and his wife Patricia Cruz and the spouses Canciller alleging that while the latter was "recklessly" driving a truck
Vicente Medina and Leticia Lopez for the annulment of the aforesaid owned by spouses Traya, said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-
Deed of Sale and the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title. year old son Regino causing his instantaneous death. In their answer
An answer with counterclaim was filed by the defendants Vicente with counterclaim, the defendants specifically deny that Canciller was
Medina and Leticia Lopez alleging good faith in the acquisition of the "driving recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that the
property in question and seeking payment of damages. truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and on
the right side of the road"; that it was the child who "rushed from an
The lower court finds PNB liable to Medina and Lopez for moral and unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left
exemplary damages of P100,000.00. CA modified said judgment by rear tire of the said truck and died", and consequently the
decreasing the amount awarded to P10,000.00 only, anchored on its defendants are not to blame for the accident which was "entirely
finding that PNB had not acted maliciously and in a wanton manner attributable to an unforeseen event" or due to the fault of the child
in filing the civil case against Medina and Lopez. and negligence of his parents; that the defendant-spouses have
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
I SSUE: driver Canciller.
Was the award for moral damages justified? Plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the claim
that the defendants' answer not only "failed to tender an issue" but
HELD: as well "admitted material allegations" of the complaint. The trial
court rendered a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the
No. defendants, jointly and severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral for moral damages, P1,000 actualdamages, P1,000 for attorney's
damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the fees, and the costs."
discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant
satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis of the I SSUE:
damages and its causal relation to defendant's acts. This is so
because moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation, Did the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the the pleadings?
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or HELD:
exemplary damages.
No.
For moral damages to be awarded, the law requires a wrongful act
or omission attributable to petitioner as the proximate cause of the It is our view that the court erred. The plaintiffs' claim for actual,
mental anguish suffered by private respondents spouses Vicente E. moral, nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the
Medina and Leticia Lopez. Respondent appellate court categorically averment in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have no
ruled in the negative yet awarded moral and exemplary damages in knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the reduced amount of P10,000.00 in favor of aforesaid respondent the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being
spouses. This brings to light Our ruling in Boysaw v. Interphil that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen
Promotions, Inc. which enunciates that: event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his
parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue.
In order that a person may be made liable to the payment of
moral damages, the law requires that his act be wrongful. The We held that even if the allegations regarding the amount of
adverse result of an action does not per se make the act damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer,
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral such damages are not deemed admitted. We declared in no
damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that a
on the right to litigate such right is so precious that moral court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that
LISANIE
damage had been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount. concept of damages should not be imposed simply because a
Finally, in Malonzo vs. Galang et. al., L-13851, July 27, 1960, we complaint is found unmeritorious by the courts.
reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not necessary in
order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, The amount of attorney's fees, on the other hand, is addressed to
essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the the sound discretion of the court. It may be awarded along with
factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to defendant's expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, in cases where the
acts." court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances of the
case. And when as in this case, the defendant public officer was
The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full- sued in his private capacity for acts done in the performance of
blown trial on the merits at which the parties will be afforded every official duty required by law, and was forced to employ the services
opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective of private counsel to defend his rights, it is but proper that attorney's
contentions and defenses. fees be charged against the plaintiff. Nominal damages may also be
adjudicated. We believe the award of P2,000.00 attorney's fees and
SAN M I GUEL BR EW ER Y, I N C. V. M AGN O, 21 SCR A 292 P100.00 nominal damages, is just and equitable in the premises.
FACTS: c.1. As distinguished from actual dam ages
The Municipal Board of Butuan City passed several ordinances

imposing taxes on the sale of beverages, liquors, and soft drinks.
San Miguel Brewery eventually stopped paying these taxes and
thereby incurred in back taxes. Verbal and written demands were
unheeded. Accordingly, Magno, the City Treasurer, with the approval
of the Mayor of Butuan City issued a warrant of distraint and levy
against the properties of the San Miguel Brewery; a notice of seizure
by virtue of the warrant of distraint and levy was served, and the
company voluntarily surrendered the two (2) delivery trucks seized
under the warrant to the said City Treasurer.
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. instituted the present action praying for an
order directing the defendant to release the delivery trucks seized
and to order defendant to pay to the plaintiff damages. Said action
was instituted against defendant Magno in his individual capacity,
and not in his official capacity as City Treasurer. In his answer,
Magno interposed the defense that in seizing the delivery trucks of
the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., he was acting, and was in the
performance of his official duty, as Treasurer of Butuan City, and,
cannot be held liable to pay to the company any damages. He set up
a counterclaim of P40,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively, allegedly sustained by him and the
members of his family on account of the shock, fright, wounded
feelings, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, and social
humiliation they suffered by reason of the filing of the case against
him by the plaintiff, plus attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00.
Trial court dismissed the complaint filed by San Miguel and ordered it
to pay Magno P2,000.00 in damages, P1,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and costs.
I SSUE:
Was it proper for the trial court to award damages in favor of Magno?
HELD:
No.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be

pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court (Article 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential
that the claimant should satisfactorily prove the existence of the
factual basis of the damages (Article 2217) and its causal connection
to defendant's acts. This is so, because moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award,
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrong-doer. Neither may we consider
the award as exemplary damages, because the mere findings that
certain allegations in the complaint are not true, and the plaintiff
committed a mistake in instituting the action against the wrong party,
do not justify the award of this kind of damages. Penalty in the
LISANIE
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
d. W hen aw ardable, w hen not
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
Art. 2218, N CC.In the adjudication of moral damages, the collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be considered. interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
Art. 2219, N CC.Moral damages may be recovered in the following grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in
and analogous cases: said agreements. (As amended by Section 9, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989).
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; TULFO V. P EOPLE, GR N O.161032, SEP T. 16, 2008
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage; FACTS:
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search; Petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamationl editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor,
(8) Malicious prosecution; and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; the daily tabloid Remate, was charged with the crime of libel by Atty.
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Article 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs in connection with the
30, 32, 34 and 35. publication of the derogatory and defamatory articles written by
Tulfo, wherein the complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a
The parents of the female seduced or abducted, raped, or corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth.
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages. Atty. Ding So testified that petitioner Tulfo’s act of imputing upon
him criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters dishonor, discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
named. co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and
employees and superior officers in the Bureau of Customs, and
Art. 2220, N CC.Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for among ordinary persons who had read said articles. He said it also
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental anguish,
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies wounded feelings, intrigues, and embarrassment.
to breached of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. The RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime charged and ordered
them to pay Atty. Ding So the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND
Art. 309, N CC.Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or (P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE MILLION
wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an additional
deceased for damages, material and moral. amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), by
way of exemplary damages. CA affirmed.
Art. 217, Labor Code.Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and
the Com m ission. – (a) Except as otherwise provided under this I SSUE:
Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the Was the award of damages proper?
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension,
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases HELD:
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
No.
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art.
2199 of the Civil Code provides, except as provided by law or by
2. Termination disputes; stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and There was no showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the
other terms and conditions of employment; complainant Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be
measured, the award of actual damages cannot stand.
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to
arising from the employer-employee relations; compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the court, it is
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by
or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A
for reinstatement.
LISANIE
causal relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages
referred to in the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or becomes erroneous.
proceeding on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other
hand; i.e. the first must be the proximate cause and the latter the
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without
direct consequence thereof.
proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination of the
amount is discretionary on the court.Though incapable of pecuniary
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for
estimation, moral damages are in the nature of an award to
that Atty. So deserves the award of moral damages. Justification for compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for
the award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil some reason can not be proven. However, in awarding moral
Code, which states that moral damages may be recovered in cases damages, the following should be taken into consideration:
of libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. As the cases
involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within the
ambit of Art. 2219(7). (1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the
claimee's acts.
Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or
compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or compensatory (2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as
damage was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.
the offended party’s right to recover moral damages.
And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to (3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on
state at this juncture that Tulfos libelous articles are abhorrent not any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.
only because of its vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself,
but also because of their impact on members of his family, especially In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish
on the children and possibly even the childrens children. suffered by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the
petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her
The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from
Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, In criminal offenses, exemplary attending social and civic activities.
damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only
to the offended party. No aggravating circumstances accompanied
during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of
the commission of the libelous acts; thus, no exemplary damages
moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of damages,the
can be awarded.
moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and
again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges
GUI LATCO V. CI TY OF DAGUP AN, supra.
to award damages without basis,resulting in exorbitant amounts.
FACTS:
Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the
discretion of the trial court under preceding jurisprudence, the
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Guilatco ordering amount of moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.
defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the
amount of P 15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical and
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly
other expenses, P 7,420.00 as lost income for one year and P 450.00
pointed out the basis:
as bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral damages, P 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation
expenses, plus costs. The appellate court reversed the lower court To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that
findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the the Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or
plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and
supervision" over Perez Boulevard. responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are
engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on
their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately
I SSUE:
cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to
the poor pedestrians.
Were the aforementioned damages properly awarded?
HELD:
No.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control
or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability
of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is
clear.
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner

in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven
expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded
off the amount. In determining actual damages, the court cannot
rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount.
LISANIE
FI LI N VEST V. M ENDEZ
LOP EZ V. P ANAM , 16 SCR A 431
Facts:
FACTS:
Mendez purchased a Ford Cartina from Davao Motor Sales Company
and to secure the balance, he executed a promissory note and Petitioner, then Senator Fernando Lopez, along with his wife,
chattel mortgage in favor of Davao Motor Sales Company. Davao daughter, and son-in-law, purchased first class accommodation
Motor assigned its rights, title and interest in the PN and chattel tickets in Flight No. 2 of Pan American World Airways. On the day of
mortgage to Filinvest. Mendez failed to pay his monthly installments their scheduled flight however, PAN-AM informed them that they
in February, March and April due in the PN so the Filinvest sent could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first
written demands. Mendez paid through a check which was returned class passengers, and stating that they could not go in that flight
on the ground of insufficient funds. Filinvest filed an action for unless they took the tourist class therein. Senator Lopez and party
recovery of personal property and/or sum of money against Mendez. were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San
Francisco as tourist passengers.
The car was taken away from him on the day he used the car to
fetch a certain Col. Coronel to go to a conference, but after pleading, Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party
the financing company released the car to Mendez. Filinvest filed a against PAN-AM. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by
motion in court seeking the dismissal of the case saying that the defendant, plaintiffs asked for P500,000 actual and moral damages,
obligation of the plaintiff has already been updated. After this, P100,000 exemplary damages, P25,000 attorney's fees plus costs.
Mendez filed a complaint for Solutio Indebiti and damages alleging Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
that the seizure order was illegal as the unpaid installments had defendant, which is accordingly ordered to pay the plaintiffs the
previously been updated by the clearing of the check and that following: (a) P150,000.00 as moral damages; (b) P25,000.00 as
petitioner was without right to claim from him the repossession exemplary damages; with legal interest on both from the date of the
expenses and that due to the alleged unjustified repossession and filing of the complaint until paid; and (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's
the factual circumstances attendant thereto, he is entitled to moral fees; and the costs of this action.
damages.
I SSUE:
Issue:
Was the award of moral damages justified?
WON moral damages can be rewarded.
R uling:
Ruling:
No. It should be modified.
No. The award for moral damages has no factual basis. The
testimony of the driver of Mendez shows that the car was seized at
Addressing ourselves now to the question of damages, it is well to
the residence of the respondent while the said driver was cleaning
state at the outset those rules and principles. First, moral damages
the same. It is, therefore, not true that the respondent was
are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted
humiliated and embarrassed before his visitor and among those
fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil Code). Second, in
attending the seminar. The rule is settled that moral damages
addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may
cannot be rewarded in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or
be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
fraud or bad faith.
breach of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Articles 2229,
2232, New Civil Code). And, third, a written contract for an
attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec.
24, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of

defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the
latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class
tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist
class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class
passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found
among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as
tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such,
contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual
undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International

carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. And he
was former Vice-President of the Philippines. For the moral damages
sustained by him, therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate.
Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige
and therefore his humiliation. In addition she suffered physical
discomfort during the 13-hour trip. Accordingly, considering the
totality of her suffering and humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J.
Lopez of P50,000.00 for moral damages will be reasonable. Mr. and
Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate members
LISANIE
of the family of Senator Lopez. They formed part of the Senator's Lao was not motivated by malice in making the affidavit upon which
party as shown also by the reservation cards of PAN-AM. As such the fiscal based the filing of the information against Espiritu. He
they likewise shared his prestige and humiliation. For their social executed it as an employee, a salesman of the St. Joseph Lumber
humiliation, therefore, the award to them of P25,000.00 each is from whom Espiritu made his purchases of construction materials
reasonable. and who, therefore, had personal knowledge of the transaction.
Although the prosecution of Espiritu for estafa did not prosper, the
LAO V. CA, GR N O. 80808, JULY 11, 1991, 199 SCR A 58 unsuccessful prosecution may not be labelled as malicious. "Sound
principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have
FACTS: free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of
their rights without later having to stand trial for instituting
Petitioner Dennis Lao was an employee of St. Joseph Lumber, owned prosecutions in good faith" (Buenaventura vs. Sto. Domingo, 103
by the private respondent, Chan Tong. St. Joseph Lumber filed a Phil. 239).
collection suit against a customer, the private respondent, Benjamin
Espiritu, for unpaid purchases of construction materials. St. Joseph In view of the foregoing circumstances, the judgment against Lao
Lumber also filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Espiritu, was a nullity and should be set aside. Its execution against the
based on the same transaction. Since the petitioner was the petitioner cannot be allowed to proceed.
employee who transacted business with Espiritu, he was directed by
his employer, Chan Tong, to sign the affidavit or complaint prepared GUTI ER REZ V. VI LLEGAS, 8 SCR A 527
by the firm's, lawyer, Attorney Manuel Querubin. The case was
however later dismissed because the court believed that Espiritu's FACTS:
liability was only civil, not criminal.
Plaintiff and the defendants are the only legal heirs of the late Irene
Hence, Espiritu filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Santos, who died intestate. The defendant, Jose D. Villegas, is the
the petitioner and St. Joseph Lumber, praying that the defendants surviving spouse, while the plaintiff, Adela Santos Gutierrez, and the
be ordered to pay him P500,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as other defendant, Rizalina Santos Rivera, are the nieces of the said
actual damages, and P100,000 as attorney's fees. Petitioner alleged decedent. A few days after the death of Irene Santos, a petition for
that he acted only as agent or employee of St. Joseph Lumber when the administration of her estate was filed and granted by the court.
he executed the affidavit which his employer submitted to the Thereafter Jose D. Villegas qualified as the administrator of the
investigating fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation of estate. Adela Santos Gutierrez signed a four-page document written
his employer's estafa charge against Espiritu. in Tagalog, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan At Salinan", purporting to
be a sale of her share and participation in the estate in favor of
Decision was rendered by the trial court in favor of Espiritu ordering Rizalina Santos Rivera, in consideration of P50,000.00, payable in
the defendants Lao and St. Joseph Lumber to pay jointly and installments. The plaintiff also signed a "Manifestation" purporting to
severally to Espiritu the sums of P100,000 as moral damages, P5,000 inform the probate court that the plaintiff had sold all her rights,
as attorney's fees, and costs. Lao appealed to CA but it was interests, and participation in the estate to Rizalina Santos Rivera.
dismissed.
However, the plaintiff filed the present case to annul the aforesaid
I SSUE: deed of sale on grounds of fraud and mistake. The defendants
answered denying the charges, and counterclaimed for P200,000.00
May the damages awarded to the defaulting debtor be satisfied by moral and exemplary damages and P50,000.00 attorneys' fees,
execution against the employee's property since his employer's because of the allegedly malicious charges and filing of the suit.
business has already folded up?
The trial court rejected the pretensions of both parties, dismissing
HELD: the complaint as well on the counterclaim. Whereupon, plaintiffs and
defendants regularly appealed to this Court directly, the amounts
No. involved being in excess of P200,000.00. Both parties appealed.
Lao had a valid defense to the action for malicious prosecution (Civil I SSUE:
Case No. 84-M) because it was his employer, St. Joseph Lumber, not
himself, that was the complainant in the estafa case against Espiritu. Did the lower court err in dismissing the complaint and counterclaim?
It was Chan Tong, the owner of the St. Joseph Lumber, who, upon
advice of his counsel, filed the criminal complaint against Espiritu. HELD:
Lao was only a witness in the case. He had no personal interest in
the prosecution of Espiritu for he was not the party defrauded by No. We find no reason for disturbing the decision appealed from, and,
Espiritu. He executed the affidavit which was used as basis of the therefore, the same is hereby affirmed.
criminal charge against Espiritu because he was the salesman who
sold the construction materials to Espiritu. He was only an agent of The facts, as shown by the record, do not support the plaintiff's
St. Joseph Lumber, hence, not personally liable to the party with conclusions. The alleged indicia of fraud upon which she rests her
whom he contracted. case are backed only by her own uncorroborated testimony, which is
contradicted by that of defendants and their witnesses. Her alleged
To maintain an action for damages based on malicious prosecution, poor eye-sight has not been shown with convincing evidence, but,
three elements must be present: First, the fact of the prosecution on the contrary, during the trial, she readily identified a letter from
and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, even without eyeglasses. Plaintiff
and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; second, has herself testified that she needed money to engage in business in
that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable Mindoro. The defendants, on the other hand, proved in convincing
cause; and third, the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal detail the circumstances surrounding the execution of the questioned
malice. deed through their own testimony, that of the instrumental
witnesses, and the notary public. Under the present situation, the
Lao was only a witness, not the prosecutor in the estafa case. The careful preparation of the document cannot be taken against the
prosecutor was his employer, Chan Tong or the St. Joseph Lumber. defendants as an indication of fraud, in the absence of other
evidence manifesting a scheme to commit it and which would link
LISANIE
the lawyer who caused its preparation. All the foregoing HELD:
circumstances pointed to by the plaintiff as badges of fraud do not
stand unexplained, while, on the other hand, there are certain No.
questions which have not been satisfactorily explained by the
plaintiff. Articles 2219 and 2220 (also 1764 and 2206) of the Civil Code
indicate the cases where moral damages may be recovered. The
Turning now to the defendant's appeal, we are not disposed to vary instant litigation does not fall within any of the enumerated cases.
the lower court's refusal to award them damages and attorney's fees. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned
Such awards are primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and it in those articles. Hence, defendants' claim for moral damages cannot
has found no facts upon which such award can be made. Not only be sustained. The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation
were the allegations of fraud in plaintiff's complaint privileged in that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages
character, but her failure to seek an amicable settlement before filing contemplated in the law.
suit, as required of relatives by Article 222 of the Civil Code, has not
been pleaded either by answer or motion to dismiss. As to m oral "The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act
dam ages, the record show s no proof of m ental suffering on wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.
the part of defendants upon w hich the aw ard can be based. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
In addition, the absence of actual damages, moral, temperate, or litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
compensatory, blocks the grant of exemplary damages (Civil Code, charged on those who may exercise it erroneously."
Article 2234).
Since no compensatory and moral damages have been awarded in
R AM OS V. R AM OS, 61 SCR A 284 this case, defendants' claim for exemplary damages, which was
ventilated for the first time in their appellants' brief, may be as an
FACTS: afterthought, cannot be granted(Art. 2229, Civil Code).
When the spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died, they GALANG V. CA, 4 SCRA 55
were survived by their three legitimate children named Jose, Agustin
and Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his seven natural FACTS:
children named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria
and Federico. A special proceeding was then instituted for the
This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit
settlement of the intestate estate of the said spouses.
to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff
Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of
A project of partition was submitted and was eventually approved by
Rodrigo Quinit to marry her. It appears that plaintiff and Rodrigo
the court. The sum of P1,785.35, as the legal share of each natural
Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo's parents were strongly opposed
child, was the amount which was indicated in the project of partition
to their marriage. In due course, the CFI of Baguio rendered a
and which was to be satisfied in cash. According to the natural
decision sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay the
children however, they did not know that intestate proceedings were
sums of P275.00, by way of actual damages, P5,000.00, as moral
instituted for the distribution of the estate of their father. They never
damages, and P500.00, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. On
received any sum of money in cash – the alleged insignificant sum of
appeal, taken by the defendants, the CA absolved Maximino Quinit,
P1,785.35 each – from said alleged guardian as their supposed share
and accordingly, reversed said decision insofar as he is concerned,
in the estate of their father under any alleged project of partition.
and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the awards
They only discovered later on that the property administered by their
for moral damages and attorney's fees. The case is before us on
elder brother Jose had a Torrens Title in the name of his widow,
appeal by certiorari taken by plaintiff Beatriz Galang.
Gregoria, and daughter, Candida, when plaintiff Modesto's children
insisted and inquired from the Register of Deeds sometime in 1956
or 1957. Plaintiffs did not intervene in the intestate proceedings for I SSUE:
(the) settlement of the estate of their brother Jose as they did not
know of it. Is Beatriz Galang entitled to an award of moral damages?
Plaintiffs, who are the natural children, were thus constrained to
bring the present suit seeking for the reconveyance in their favor by HELD:
defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband Jose Bayor
of their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in No.
accordance with article 840 of the old Civil Code and attorney's fees
in the sum of P10,000 plus costs and expenses of this litigation".
Plaintiff maintains that the CA had erred in the appreciation of the
The CFI dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and held that the intestate evidence, but the findings of said Court on the credibility of said
estate of Martin Ramos was settled in Civil Case No. 217, which was evidence are beyond our power of review on appeal by certiorari and,
terminated on March 4,1914, and that the judgment therein is res consequently, conclusive upon us.
judicata and bars any litigation regarding the same estate.
Defendants Granada Ramos, Gregoria T. Ramos, Candida Ramos, It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral
Jose Bayor and Agustin Ramos appealed from the lower court's damages to plaintiff, who insists that moral damages for breach of
decision insofar as it ignored their counterclaim for P50,000 as moral promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question
damages and P10,000 as attorney's fees. The defendants argue that has already been settled adversely to plaintiff's pretense in
plaintiffs' action was baseless and was filed in gross and evident bad Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628 (September 30, 1960).
faith. It is alleged that the action caused defendants mental anguish,
wounded feelings, moral shock and serious anxiety and compelled
them to hire the service of counsel and incur litigation expenses.
I SSUE:
Are the defendants entitled to an award of moral damages?

LISANIE
the sum of P4,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Ramon Lira,
Jr. and the amount of P4,000.00 for attorney's fees and other
M ERCADO V. LI R A, 3 SCRA 124 expenses of litigation, fair and reasonable (par. 11, Art. 2208,
N.C.C.).
FACTS:
With respect to Nita Lira, it is alleged that the respondent CA erred
Gonzalo Mercado and others were the owners and operators of the in not awarding moral damages to petitioner Nita Lira for physical
Laguna Transportation Company. In the afternoon of April 21, 1951, injuries and mental suffering sustained by her, resulting from breach
while its passenger bus was making the trip from Batangas to Manila, of the special contract of carriage caused by the negligence of the
the left front tire of the bus blew out and sent it swerving gradually respondents, contending that her case is analogous to cases of
toward the left side of the road, over the shoulder and into a ravine "quasi delicts causing physical injuries" for which the new Civil Code
some 270 meters away. From the wreckage, the bodies of the authorizes indemnification for moral damages in favor of the injured
passengers, several dead, others injured, were recovered, and party (par. 2, Art. 2219 N.C.C.). Several cases have reached this
among the fatalities was Ramon Lira, Jr. (24), son of Mr. and Mrs. Court raising the same question, among them is the case of Paz
Ramon Lira, Sr. and injured Nita Lira. Two cases for recovery of Fores v. Irene Miranda, G.R. No. L-12163, March 4, 1959 — the facts
damages were commenced against the owners and operators. As to of which are identical to those of the present one. This Court,
moral damages, among others, Mercado were sentenced to pay speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said —
4,000.00 in Civil Case No. 104 for mental anguish; and 2,000.00 in
Civil Case No. 107 for her physical and mental suffering. . . . .. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly
ruled (Cachero v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., G.R. No. L-
On appeal to the CA, however, the award of moral damages to Nita 8721, May 23, 1957; Necesito, et al. v. Paras, G.R. Nos. L-
Lira was deleted. In other words, in the case involving the death of 10605-10606, June 30, 1958), that moral damages are not
Ramon Lira, Jr., the CA granted moral damages, and in the case of recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the
physical injuries caused upon Nita Lira, moral damages awarded her, contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
were eliminated. the new Civil Code.
I SSUE: By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately

becomes apparent that:
Were the respective awards of moral damages justified?
(a) In cases of breach of contract (including one transportation)
HELD: proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately
injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral
Yes. damages; and
Article 2206 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that the (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in
amount of damages for death shall be "at least three thousand pesos, the descriptive term 'analogous cases used in Art. 2219; not
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances." In only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages
other words, the amount of damages to be awarded for the death of that are caused by contractual breach, but because the
a passenger may be more than P3,000.00. It is argued that the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly
award for moral damages for mental anguish caused by the death of excludes the cases where there is a 'preexisting contractual
a passenger is not obligatory, and that the amount should only be relation between the parties.'
nominal if the heirs have already been compensated substantially for
the death of the deceased. Article 2206 states further that "In The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration
addition" to the amount of at least P3,000.00 to be awarded for the is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Art.
death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
damages as a consequence of the death of their deceased kin, which deceased passenger to 'demand moral damages for mental anguish
simply means that once the above-mentioned heirs of the deceased by reason of the death of the deceased'. But the exceptional rule of
claim compensation for moral damages and are able to prove that Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured
they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty of the court to passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it
award moral damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think
with the mental anguish suffered by them. In the Civil Code, nominal it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not
damages are treated separately from moral damages. Any amount per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the
that should be awarded as nominal damages, should not be part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence
confused or interlinked with moral damages which, by itself, is a of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the CA.
distinct class of damages. Of course, the amount of moral damages
to be awarded, should be such as may be reasonable and just under
the circumstances in a given case. Petitioners' claim that as the other
damages awarded to said respondents are already excessive, the
award for moral damages should be reduced to P500.00. But the
Court of Appeals found the other damages not to be excessive, and
as far as this factual finding is concerned, we are not authorized to
rule otherwise. In fact, the petition limits the issues only to the
reasonableness of the P4,000.00 awarded by the Court of Appeals as
moral damages and the other amount of P4,000.00 as attorney's
fees. Considering the mental anguish and sorrow that must
accompany and overwhelm the parents upon the tragic death of a
son, and considering the nature and extent of the services rendered
by counsel for respondents and other circumstances of the case, we
believe the awards given by the Court of Appeals to respondents in
LISANIE
P ER M EX V. N LRC, 323 SCR A 231 YASON A V. DE R AM OS, GR N O. 156339, OCT. 6, 2004
FACTS: FACTS:
Petitioner Permex, Inc., a company engaged in the business of In November 1971, Aurea Yasoña went to the house of Jovencio de
canning tuna and sardines, with its co-petitioners Edgar Lim and Ramos to ask for financial assistance in paying their loans to PNB,
Jean Punzalan, its Manager and Personnel Manager, respectively, otherwise their residential house and lot would be foreclosed.
terminated private respondent Emmanuel Filoteo from employment Inasmuch as Aurea was his aunt, Jovencio acceded to the request.
allegedly for flagrantly and deliberately violating company rules and They agreed that, upon payment by Jovencio of the loan to PNB, half
regulations. More specifically, he was dismissed allegedly for of Yasoñas’ subject property would be sold to him. Jovencio paid
falsifying his daily time record. Aurea’s bank loan. As agreed upon, Aurea executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Jovencio over half of the lot consisting of
The dismissal arose from Filoteo's alleged violation of Article 2 of the 123 square meters. Thereafter, the lot was surveyed and separate
company rules and regulations. titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in
the names of Aurea and Jovencio.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Filoteo
appealed to the NLRC. Finding merit therein, NLRC reversed and set Twenty-two years later, in August 1993, Aurea filed an estafa
aside the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners were hereby complaint against brothers Jovencio and Rodencio de Ramos on the
ordered to pay complainant separation pay and backwages, as well ground that she was deceived by them when she asked for their
as moral and exemplary damages. assistance in 1971 concerning her mortgaged property. The criminal
complaint for estafa was dismissed for lack of evidence. On account
I SSUE: of this dismissal, Jovencio and Rodencio filed a complaint for
damages on the ground of malicious prosecution, alleging that the
Was it proper for the NLRC to award moral damages to Filoteo? filing of the estafa complaint against them was done with malice and
it caused irreparable injury to their reputation, as Aurea knew fully
HELD: well that she had already sold half of the property to Jovencio.
No. Notwithstanding the fact that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Jovencio and Rodencio,
discretion in ruling that the private respondent was illegally and the defendants therein were ordered to pay damages in the
dismissed, still, that doesn’t guarantee an award for moral damages. amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages; P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs.
All told we see no reason to find that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that private respondent was illegally I SSUE:
dismissed. Hence we concur in that ruling. Nonetheless, we find that
the award of moral and exemplary damages by the public Was the award proper?
respondent is not in order and must be deleted. Moral damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was tainted by HELD:
bad faith or fraud, or where it constituted an act oppressive to labor,
and done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public Yes.
policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal
was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner. None of In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been
these circumstances exist in the present case. defined as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been
GUTI ER REZ V. VI LLEGAS, 8 SCR A 528, SUP RA instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein." To constitute "malicious prosecution," there
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false
and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution.
In this case, however, there is reason to believe that a malicious

intent was behind the filing of the complaint for estafa against
respondents. All the pieces of evidence indicate that Aurea had long
acknowledged Jovencio’s ownership of half of the property.
Furthermore, it was only in 1993 when petitioners decided to file the
estafa complaint against respondents. If petitioners had honestly
believed that they still owned the entire property, it would not have
taken them 22 years to question Jovencio’s ownership of half of the
property. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the
circumstances is that Aurea knew all along that she was no longer
the owner of Jovencio’s portion after having sold it to him way back
in 1971. Likewise, other than petitioners’ bare allegations, no other
evidence was presented by them to substantiate their claim.
Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the

elements of (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. These
LISANIE
two elements are present in the present controversy. Petitioners Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith
were completely aware that Jovencio was the rightful owner of the attended petitioner’s dishonor of respondent’s credit card. For, as
lot covered by TCT No. 73251, clearly signifying that they were found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in
impelled by malice and avarice in bringing the unfounded action. suspending the Visa card because Calderon exceeded his credit limit
and failed to pay prior credit purchases.
EQUI TABLE BANK I NG CORP . V. CALDER ON, GR N O. 156168,
DEC. 14, 2004 Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the
dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material distinction
FACTS: between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI
Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
Respondent Calderon, a reputable businessman, applied and was
issued an Equitable International Visa card by petitioner EBC. When Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
Calderon was in Hong Kong with friends, he purchased some items hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
at a Gucci store using his Visa card. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must
from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors. remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he called damnum absque injuria.
bought.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
Upon his return to the Philippines, Calderon filed a complaint for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
damages against EBC, and claiming that he suffered much torment injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
and embarrassment on account of EBC’s wrongful act of the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card. responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured
The trial court, concluding that "defendant bank was negligent if not in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
in bad faith, in suspending, or ‘blacklisting’ plaintiff’s credit card duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
without notice or basis", rendered judgment in favor of Calderon and may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
ordered EBC to pay Calderon US$150.00 as actual damages; proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages; P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages; attorney’s fees and costs. CA modified said In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of
judgment by awarding costs of suit and reducing moral damages to damnum absque injuria.
P100,00.00 while the rest of the awards are deleted.
SAVELLAN O, ET. AL., V. N OR THW EST AI R LI N ES, GR N O.
I SSUE: 151783, JULY 8, 2003
Did the CA err in holding that respondent is entitled to moral FACTS:

damages?
Petitioners Victorino Savellano, a mayor of Ilocos Sur; his wife
HELD: Virginia, a businesswoman; and his son, Deogracias, Vice-Governor
of Ilocos Sur, filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Yes. Northwest Airlines (NW) for what they claimed to be the humiliation
and inconvenience they suffered in the hands of its personnel.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, When petitioners departed from the US on board NW flight bound
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. However, to be for Manila, the pilot made an emergency landing in Seattle after
entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one merely announcing that a fire had started in one of the plane's engines. In
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a Seattle, they were housed for a night in a hotel where they were told
result of the actuations of the other party. In Philippine Telegraph & that they’ll be in a flight to Manila by morning. However, instead of
Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we have had the flying to Manila, they were board on a flight to Los Angeles for a
occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met in order that moral connecting flight to Manila. In LA, before boarding a flight for Manila
damages may be recovered, viz: via Seoul, some of petitioners’ hand-carried items were not allowed
to be placed inside the passenger’s baggage compartment. Upon
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of their arrival in Manila, they found out that some of their valuables
besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological were lost.
suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or
omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The CA ruled that
act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the petitioners had failed to show respondent's bad faith, negligence or.
damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case Hence, it held that there was no basis for the RTC's award of moral
is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned and exemplary damages. Neither did it find any reason to grant
by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. attorney's fees.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, I SSUE:

moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross Did the CA err in deleting the RTC’s award of moral damages?
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligations. Verily, the breach must be wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
LISANIE
faith is presumed, while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be
proved by the party alleging it.
HELD:
In the absence of bad faith, ill will, malice or wanton conduct,
No. respondent cannot be held liable for moral damages. Article 2219 of
the Civil Code22 enumerates the instances in which moral damages
When, as a result of engine malfunction, a commercial airline is may be awarded. In a breach of contract, such damages are not
unable to ferry its passengers on the original contracted route, it awarded if the defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or
nonetheless has the duty of fulfilling its responsibility of carrying with malice or bad faith. Insufficient to warrant the award of moral
them to their contracted destination on the most convenient route damages is the fact that complainants suffered economic hardship or
possible. Failing in this, it cannot just unilaterally shuttle them, that they worried and experienced mental anxiety.
without their consent, to other routes or stopping places outside of
the contracted sectors. However, moral damages cannot be awarded Nevertheless, herein petitioners will not be totally deprived of
without proof of the carrier's bad faith, ill will, malice or wanton compensation. Nominal damages may be awarded as provided by
conduct. Neither will actual damages be granted in the absence of the Civil Code. Nominal damages are recoverable if no actual,
convincing and timely proof of loss. But nominal damages may be substantial or specific damages were shown to have resulted from
allowed under the circumstances in the case herein. the breach. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, respondent may be held circumstances.
liable for damages suffered by petitioners in accordance with Articles
1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code, which state: CHI N A AI R LI N ES V. CHI OK, GR N O. 152122, JULY 30, 2003
"Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations FACTS:

are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages." Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines, Ltd. (CAL) airline
(Emphasis supplied) passenger ticket for air transportation covering Manila-Taipei-
Hongkong-Manila. Said ticket was exclusively endorseable to
"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for Philippine Airlines, Ltd. (PAL for brevity). Chiok took his trip from
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those Manila to Taipei using the CAL ticket. When he arrived in Taipei, he
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach went to the CAL office and confirmed his Hongkong to Manila trip on
of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could board PAL Flight No. PR 311. The CAL office attached a yellow
have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was sticker appropriately indicating that his flight status was OK. The PAL
constituted." office confirmed his return trip on board Flight No. PR 311 and
attached its own sticker. However, said PAL Flight No. 311 was
"In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the cancelled due to a typhoon in Manila, and passengers were
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be automatically rebooked for the next day. When Chiok went to the
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the airport the next day, he was informed that his name did not appear
obligation." in PAL’s computer list of passengers and therefore could not be
permitted to board. And when he sought to recover his luggage, he
Petitioners impute oppression, discrimination, recklessness and discovered that his new Samsonite was lost.
malevolence to respondent. We are not convinced. There is no
persuasive evidence that they were maliciously singled out to fly the Thereafter, Chiok proceeded to PAL’s Hongkong office and
Seattle-Los Angeles-Seoul-Manila route. The records show that confronted PAL’s reservation officer, Carie Chao, who previously
respondent was impelled by sincere motives to get petitioners to confirmed his flight back to Manila. Chao told Chiok that his name
their final destination by whatever was the most expeditious was on the list and pointed to the latter his computer number listed
course — in its judgment, if not in theirs. Though they claim that on the PAL confirmation sticker attached to his plane ticket, which
they were not accommodated on Flight 27 from Seattle to Tokyo number was ‘R/MN62’. Chiok then decided to use another CAL ticket
because respondent had taken on Japanese passengers, petitioners and asked Chao if this ticket could be used to book him for the said
failed to present convincing evidence to back this allegation. In the flight. The latter, once again, booked and confirmed the former’s trip.
absence of convincing evidence, we cannot find respondent guilty of Later, Chiok went to the PAL check-in counter and it was Carmen
bad faith. who attended to him. In the ensuing commotion, Chiok lost several
valuables.
Petitioners cite the cases of Lopez v. Pan American World Airways,
Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. and Ortigas Jr. v. Consequently, Chiok filed a complaint for damages, against PAL and
Lufthansa German Airlines to support their claim for moral and CAL, alleging that despite several confirmations of his flight,
exemplary damages. defendant PAL refused to accommodate him in Flight No. 307, for
which reason he lost the business option aforementioned. He also
To summarize, in Lopez despite sufficient time — one month — to alleged that PAL’s personnel, specifically Carmen, ridiculed and
inform the passengers of what had happened to their booking, the humiliated him in the presence of so many people. Further, he
airline agent intentionally withheld that information from them. In alleged that defendants are solidarily liable for the damages he
Zulueta, the passenger was deliberately off-loaded after being suffered, since one is the agent of the other.
gravely insulted during an altercation. And in Ortigas, the passenger
was intentionally downgraded in favor of a European. RTC held CAL and PAL jointly and severally liable for damages. CA
affirmed and ruled that the airline’s negligence was the proximate
These cases are different from and inapplicable to the present case. cause of Chiok’s excoriating experience, thus sustaining the award of
Here, there is no showing that the breach of contract was done with moral and exemplary damages.
the same entrepreneurial motive or self-interest as in Lopez or with
ill will as in Zulueta and Ortigas. Petitioners have failed to show I SSUE:
convincingly that they were rerouted by respondent to Los Angeles
and Seoul because of malice, profit motive or self-interest. Good Is CAL liable to pay damages?
LISANIE
HELD: confirmation of his flight -- not only once, but twice -- by personally
going to the carrier’s offices where he was consistently assured of a
Yes. seat thereon -- PAL’s negligence was so gross and reckless that it
amounted to bad faith.
It is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was
between petitioner and respondent, with the former endorsing to In view of the foregoing, we rule that moral and exemplary damages
PAL the Hong Kong-to-Manila segment of the journey. Such contract were properly awarded by the lower courts.
of carriage has always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single
operation. e. Latest rule on corporations
In the instant case, PAL acted as the carrying agent of CAL. CAL M AM BULAO LUM BER V. P N B, 22 SCRA 359
cannot evade liability to respondent, even though it may have been
only a ticket issuer for the Hong Kong-Manila sector. FACTS:
M oral and Ex em plary Dam ages Plaintiff applied for a P155,000 industrial loan with PNB, to which
only P100,000 was approved. To secure the payment of the loan, the
Both the trial and the appellate courts found that respondent had plaintiff mortgaged to PNB a parcel of land, together with the
satisfactorily proven the existence of the factual basis for the buildings and improvements existing thereon, situated in Camarines
damages adjudged against petitioner and PAL. Moral damages Norte, as well as various sawmill equipment, rolling unit and other
cannot be awarded in breaches of carriage contracts, except in the fixed assets of the plaintiff, all situated in its compound in the
two instances contemplated in Articles 1764 and 2220 of the Civil aforementioned municipality. When plaintiff failed to pay the
Code, which we quote: amortization on the amounts received to and received by it, PNB
made repeated demands to pay its obligation but such demands
"Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall went unheeded. Upon inspection and verification made by
be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, employees of the PNB, it was found that the plaintiff had already
concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death stopped operation.
of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common
carrier. PNB then sent a letter to Anacleto Heraldo, the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff, requesting him to take possession of the parcel of land,
xxx xxx xxx together with the improvements existing thereon, and to sell it at
public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid obligation of the
"Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground plaintiff. Anacleto Heraldo then took possession of the chattels
for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under mortgaged by the plaintiff and made an inventory thereof. Upon
the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule plaintiff’s request, the foreclosure sale of mortgaged chattels was
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted extended. However, the foreclosure sale of the parcel of land was
fraudulently or in bad faith." (Italics supplied) held and sold to PNB.
There is no occasion for us to invoke Article 1764 here. We The trial court rendered the decision appealed from which sentenced
must therefore determine if CAL or its agent (PAL) is guilty of the Mambulao Lumber Company to pay to the defendant PNB the
bad faith that would entitle respondent to moral damages. sum of P3,582.52 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum.
Plaintiff appealed.
In Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, we defined bad faith as a
breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. I SSUE:
In the case at bar, the known duty of PAL was to transport herein Is the appellant entitled to an award of moral damages?
respondent from Hong Kong to Manila. That duty arose when its
agent confirmed his reservation for Flight PR 311, and it became HELD:
demandable when he presented himself for the trip. It is true that
due to a typhoon, PAL was unable to transport respondent on Flight No.
PR 311. This fact, however, did not terminate the carrier’s
responsibility to its passengers. PAL voluntarily obligated itself to Herein appellant's claim for moral damages, however, seems to have
automatically transfer all confirmed passengers of PR 311 to the next no legal or factual basis. Obviously, an artificial person like herein
available flight, PR 307, on the following day. That responsibility was appellant corporation cannot experience physical sufferings, mental
subsisting when respondent, holding a confirmed ticket for the anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or
former flight, presented himself for the latter. social humiliation which are basis of moral damages. A corporation
may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a
In the present case, we stress that respondent had repeatedly ground for the award of moral damages. The same cannot be
secured confirmations of his PR 311 flight -- initially from CAL and considered under the facts of this case, however, not only because it
subsequently from the PAL office in Hong Kong. The status of this is admitted that herein appellant had already ceased in its business
flight was marked "OK" on a validating sticker placed on his ticket. operation at the time of the foreclosure sale of the chattels, but also
That sticker also contained the entry "RMN6V." Ms Chan explicitly for the reason that whatever adverse effects of the foreclosure sale
acknowledged that such entry was a computer reference that meant of the chattels could have upon its reputation or business standing
that respondent’s name had been entered in PAL’s computer. would undoubtedly be the same whether the sale was conducted at
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, or in Manila which is the place
Since the status of respondent on Flight PR 311 was "OK," as a agreed upon by the parties in the mortgage contract.
matter of right testified to by PAL’s witness, he should have been
automatically transferred to and allowed to board Flight 307 the But for the wrongful acts of herein appellee bank and the deputy
following day. Clearly resulting from negligence on the part of PAL sheriff of Camarines Norte in proceeding with the sale in utter
was its claim that his name was not included in its list of passengers disregard of the agreement to have the chattels sold in Manila as
for the November 24, 1981 PR 311 flight and, consequently, in the provided for in the mortgage contract, to which their attentions were
list of the replacement flight PR 307. Since he had secured timely called by herein appellant, and in disposing of the chattels in
LISANIE
gross for the miserable amount of P4,200.00, herein appellant enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements
should be awarded exemplary damages in the sum of P10,000.00. that will serve to obviate then moral suffering he has undergone. It
The circumstances of the case also warrant the award of P3,000.00 is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
as attorney's fees for herein appellant. spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
Com pare w ith: exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
ABS-CBN BR OADCASTI N G CORP . V. CA, GR N O.128690, JAN . prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.
21, 1999
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a
FACTS: corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and
Viva gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. In mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
one of their dealings, a package proposal of Viva was discussed, nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao
through respondent Vicente Del Rosario. Said Viva package film offer Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if
includes 104 films for a total price of 60 Million. However, according it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
to ABS-CBN General Manager Eugenio Lopez III, he and Mr. Del humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for
Rosario allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN was granted exclusive film damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
rights to fourteen films for a total consideration of P36 million. Del
Rosario denied having made any agreement with Lopez regarding There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or
the 14 Viva films. Meanwhile, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it
Republic Broadcasting Corporation (RBS) discussed the terms and had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal
conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the rejection of submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse
the same package by ABS-CBN. On the other hand, ABS-CBN made a result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
counter-proposal covering 53 films for a consideration of P35 Million, subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to
but said counter-proposal denied as Viva would not sell anything less impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a
than the package of 104 films for P60 million pesos. Hence, RBS was person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.
eventually granted the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produced
and/or acquired films including the 14 films subject of the present Com pare w ith
case.
N APOCOR V. P HI LI P P BROTHER S OCEANI C, I N C. , 369 SCRA
ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance 629
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order against private respondents RBS, VIVA, and Del FACTS:
Rosario. RTC then issued a TRO enjoining private respondents from
proceeding with the airing, broadcasting, and televising of the Petitioner NAPOCOR issued invitations to bid for the supply and
fourteen VIVA films subject of the controversy. Private respondents delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas
filed counterclaim against ABS-CBN. When RTC issued an order Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant. Respondent PHIBRO prequalified
dissolving the TRO, ABS-CBN then filed with the CA a petition and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public
challenging said order. CA dismissed the petition. bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. As the winning
tenderer, PHIBRO then becomes the seller, which shall arrange and
In the meantime, RTC rendered judgment in favor of RBS and Viva provide gearless bulk carrier for the shipment of coal to arrive at
and ordered ABS-CBN to pay damages which include P5 million by discharging port on or before thirty (30) calendar days after receipt
way of moral damages. CA agreed with the RTC. The appellate court, of the Letter of Credit by PHIBRO. Due to industrial disputes and
however, reduced the awards of moral damages to P2 million. strikes in Australia, PHIBRO wasn’t able to ship and deliver the
imported coal on the stipulated time.
I SSUE:
Consequently, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of
Is RBS (a corporation) entitled to moral damages? coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding but NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application
HELD: for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum
requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real
No. reason for the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy
NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay in the delivery of
As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, the first coal shipment.
Book IV of the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof defines what are
included in moral damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages against
where they may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral NAPOCOR. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHIBRO,
damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the and awarded it moral damages in the amount of $100,000. CA
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of Article 2219,
thereof which reads: I SSUE:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, Was the award of moral damages proper?
30, 32, 34, and 35.
HELD:
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered. and not to No.
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to
enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to
LISANIE
First, it must be stressed that NAPOCOR was not bound under any broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her. Hence,
contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements. In fact, FBNI filed the petition for review.
NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids. Since there
is no evidence to prove bad faith and arbitrariness on the part of the
I SSUE:
petitioners in evaluating the bids, we rule that the private
respondents are not entitled to damages representing lost profits. In
other words, NAPOCOR did not abuse its rights nor did it act unjustly Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
in disqualifying PHIBRO from the public bidding.
HELD:
Hence, the award of moral damages is likewise improper. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover, moral
damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation. While A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because,
it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moral damages, it unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or
cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
natural person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that anguish or moral shock. The CA cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB,
an individual has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a et al. to justify the award of moral damages. However, the Court’s
corporation to suffer mental anguish. In LBC Express, Inc. v. Court statement in Mambulao that “a corporation may have a good
of Appeals, we ruled: reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award
of moral damages” is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim
"Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article
A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical
legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can
therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim
Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se,
system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life — all of the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest
which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled
person." goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the
plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a
FI LI P I N AS BR OADCASTI N G N ETW OR K V. AGO M EDI CAL AN D condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case,
EDUCATI ONAL CENTER, GR N O.141994, JAN. 17, 2005 the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral
damages. However, the Court found the award of P300,000 moral
FACTS: damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the
broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any
substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, the
“Exposé” is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo ‘Mel’ Court reduced the award of moral damages from P300,000 to
Rima and Hermogenes ‘Jun’ Alegre. Exposé is aired every morning P150,000.
over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (“FBNI”). “Exposé” is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay R EP UBLI C V. TUVERA, GR N O.148246, FEB. 16, 2007
municipalities and other Bicol areas. In the morning of 14 and 15
December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged FACTS:
complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical
and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (“AMEC”) The instant action originated from a civil complaint for restitution
and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, and damages filed by the Republic against Marcos and his longtime
AMEC and Angelita Ago, as Dean of AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed aide Juan Tuvera, who was then Presidential Executive Assistant of
a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre. The President Marcos; as well as Tuvera's son Victor and a corporation
complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning the younger Tuvera had controlled, Twin Peaks Development
institution. With the supposed exposés, FBNI, Rima and Alegre Corporation. Twin Peaks was able to engage in logging operations by
“transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs’ virtue of the Timber License Agreement granted by the then
reputation.” AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly President Marcos. When Marcos was ousted, Pres. Cory Aquino
failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its assumed the presidency. Among her first acts as President was to
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed establish the PCGG, tasked with tracking down the ill-gotten wealth
an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and procured by Marcos, his family, and associates during his 20-year
true. rule. PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all assets, properties,
records, documents, and shares of stock of Twin Peaks on the
The trial court rejected the broadcasters’ claim that their utterances ground that all the assets of the corporation are ill-gotten wealth for
were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. having been acquired directly or indirectly through fraudulent and
The broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them illegal means. PCGG, in behalf of the Republic, filed the complaint
to show good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court which is now the subject of this petition. Through the Complaint, the
found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and Republic sought to recover funds allegedly acquired by said parties in
supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from the charge, the flagrant breach of trust and fiduciary obligations with grave abuse of
trial court ruled that Rima’s only participation was when he agreed right and power in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the
with Alegre’s exposé. The trial court found Rima’s statement within Republic of the Philippines. The complaint prayed that respondents
the “bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press.” pay moral damages, among others.
Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and
AMEC and Ago, on the other, appealed the decision. The CA affirmed I SSUE:
the trial court’s judgment with modification. The appellate court
made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court Is the Republic entitled to moral damages?
denied Ago’s claim for damages and attorney’s fees because the
LISANIE
agreement (principal contract) whenever it issues a surety bond, or
to be submitted later if not yet in the possession of the assured, and
HELD: in case of failure to submit the said written agreement, the surety
contract will not be binding despite payment of the premium.
No.
On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of respondent. Hence, the present
The claim for moral damages by the Republic deserves short shrift. petition.
The claimant in this case is a juridical person.
I ssue:
As explained Filipinas Broadcasting v. AMEC-BCCM, a juridical person
is not entitled to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. (1) Whether a surety is liable to the creditor in the absence of
It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in a written contract with the principal.
Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of (2) Whether petitioner is entitled to moral damages.
defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not involve
any of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an Held:
intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the
Republic could sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein. Any (1) A surety contract is merely a collateral one, its basis is the
lawyer for the Republic who poses a claim for moral damages in principal contract or undertaking which it
behalf of the State stands in risk of serious ridicule. secures. Necessarily, the stipulations in such principal
agreement must at least be communicated or made known
to the surety particularly in this case where the bond
FLT P R I M E I N SURANCE COR P ORATI ON v. CHEVRON expressly guarantees the payment of respondents fuel
P HI LI P P I N ES, I N C. products withdrawn by Fumitechniks in accordance with
[G.R . N o. 177839, January 18, 2012] the terms and conditions of their agreement. The bond
specifically makes reference to a written agreement. It is
basic that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
Facts: doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
Respondent Chevron Philippines, Inc. sued petitioner FLT Prime
Insurance Corporation for the payment of unpaid oil and petroleum Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
purchases made by its distributor Fumitechniks Corporation between the parties and should be complied with in good
(Fumitechniks). faith. Respondent is charged with notice of the specified
form of the agreement or at least the disclosure of basic
Fumitechniks, had applied for and was issued Surety Bond by terms and conditions of its distributorship and credit
petitioner for the amount of P15,700,000.00. As stated in the agreements with its client Fumitechniks after its
attached rider, the bond was in compliance with the requirement for acceptance of the bond delivered by the latter. However, it
the grant of a credit line with the respondent to guarantee never made any effort to relay those terms and conditions
payment/remittance of the cost of fuel products withdrawn within of its contract with Fumitechniks upon the commencement
the stipulated time in accordance with the terms and conditions of of its transactions with said client, which obligations are
the agreement. covered by the surety bond issued by petitioner. Contrary
to respondents’ assertion, there is no indication in the
Fumitechniks defaulted on its obligation. The check dated December records that petitioner had actual knowledge of its alleged
14, 2001 it issued to respondent in the amount of P11,461,773.10, business practice of not having written contracts with
when presented for payment, was dishonored for reason of Account distributors; and even assuming petitioner was aware of
Closed. In a letter, respondent notified petitioner of Fumitechniks such practice, the bond issued to Fumitechniks and
unpaid purchases in the total amount of P15,084,030.30. accepted by respondent specifically referred to a written
agreement.
Simultaneously, a letter was sent to Fumitechniks demanding that (2) Finally, we hold that the trial court correctly dismissed
the latter submit to petitioner, among others: copy of petitioners counterclaim for moral damages and attorney’s
the agreement secured by the Bond, together with copies of fees. The filing alone of a civil action should not be a
documents such as delivery receipts. ground for an aw ard of m oral dam ages in the sam e
w ay that a clearly unfounded civil action is not
Fumitechniks through its counsel wrote petitioners counsel informing am ong the grounds for m oral dam ages. Besides, a
that it cannot submit the requested agreement since no such juridical person is generally not entitled to m oral
agreement was executed between Fumitechniks and respondent. dam ages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot ex perience physical suffering or such
Consequently, petitioner advised respondent of the non-existence of sentim ents as w ounded feelings, serious anx iety,
the principal agreement as confirmed by Fumitechniks. Petitioner m ental anguish or m oral shock. Although in some
explained that being an accessory contract, the bond cannot exist recent cases we have held that the Court may allow the
without a principal agreement as it is essential that the copy of the grant of moral damages to corporations, it is not
basic contract be submitted to the proposed surety for the automatically granted; there m ust still be proof of the
appreciation of the extent of the obligation to be covered by the ex istence of the factual basis of the dam age and its
bond applied for. causal relation to the defendants acts. This is so
because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint as estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
well as petitioners counterclaim. Said court found that the terms and compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
conditions of the oral credit line agreement between respondent and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. There is no
Fumitechniks have not been relayed to petitioner and neither were evidence presented to establish the factual basis of
the same conveyed even during trial. In holding that petitioner petitioners claim for moral damages.
cannot be held liable under the bond it issued to Fumitechniks, the
RTC noted the practice of petitioner to attach a copy of the written
LISANIE
IV. NOMINAL DAMAGES HELD:
While it is true that denouncing a crime is not negligence under

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of which a claim for moral damages is available, still appellants are
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, liable under the law for nominal damages. The fact that appellee did
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of not suffer from any loss is of no moment for nominal damages are
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, maybe vindicated or
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in any loss suffered by him (Article 2221, New Civil Code). These are
every case where any property right has been invaded. damages recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual
GO V. I AC, GR N O. 68138, M AY 13, 1991 present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of
contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever
FACTS: have been or can be shown. They are not intended for
indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition
Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen and retired employee of the of a right violated or invaded. And, where the plaintiff as in the case
US Federal Government. He had been a visitor in the Philippines at bar, the herein appellee has established a cause of action, but
since 1972. As pensionado of the U.S. government, he received was not able to adduce evidence showing actual damages then
annuity checks in the amounts of $ 67.00 for disability and $ 620.00 nominal damages may be recovered. Consequently, since appellee
for retirement. has no right to claim for moral damages, then he may not likewise
be entitled to exemplary damages. Considering that he had to
In January, 1975, Jazmin failed to receive one of the checks on time defend himself in the criminal charges filed against him, and that he
thus prompting him to inquire from the post offices at Mangatarem was constrained to file the instant case, the attorney's fees to be
and Dagupan City. As the result of his inquiries proved unsatisfactory, amended (sic) to plaintiff should be increased to P3,000.00.
Jazmin wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission, Bureau of
Retirement at Washington, D.C. complaining about the delay in M EDI NA V. CRESEN CI A, L-8194, JULY 11, 1956
receiving his check. Thereafter, he received a substitute check which
he encashed at the Prudential Bank. FACTS:
Meanwhile, on April 22, 1975, Agustin Go, in his capacity as branch On May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque,
manager of the then Solidbank in Baguio City, allowed a person smashed into a Meralco post resulting in the death of Vicente Medina,
named "Floverto Jazmin" to open Savings Account by depositing two one of its passengers. A criminal case for homicide through reckless
(2) U. S. treasury checks in the respective amounts of $1810.00 and imprudence was filed against to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs
$913.40 equivalent to the total amount of P 20,565.69, both payable of the deceased, however, reserved their right to file a separate
to the order of Floverto Jasmin of Maranilla St., Mangatarem, action for damages, and brought suit against the driver Brigido
Pangasinan and drawn on the First National City Bank, Manila. Avorque and Appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner
and operator of the jeepney in question. Defendant Cresencia
Thereafter, the deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank for answered, disclaimed liability on the ground that he had sold the
clearance. Inasmuch as Solidbank did not receive any word from the jeepney in question; that the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by
drawee bank, after three (3) weeks, it allowed the depositor to one buyer after another, until the vehicle was purchased by Rosario
withdraw the amount indicated in the checks. On June 29, 1976 or Avorque, the absolute owner thereof at the time of the accident;
more than a year later, the two dollar checks were returned to making her a co-Defendant; which admitted having purchased the
Solidbank with the notation that the amounts were altered. aforesaid jeepney but alleged in defense that she was never the
public utility operator thereof. The trial court rendered judgment
Jazmin received radio messages requiring him to appear before the against Cresencia, jointly and severally with the driver Brigido
Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Benguet on September 7, Avorque, for P6,000 compensatory damages, P30,000 moral
1976 for investigation regarding the complaint filed by Go against damages, P10,000 exemplary damages, P10,000 nominal damages,
him for estafa by passing altered dollar checks. Jazmin denied that P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs, while Defendant Rosario Avorque
he was the person whose name appeared on the checks; that he was absolved from liability. From this judgment, Defendant
received the same and that the signature on the indorsement was Cresencia appealed.
his. He likewise denied that he opened an account with Solidbank or
that he deposited and encashed therein the said checks. Eventually, I SSUE:
the investigators found that the person named "Floverto Jazmin"
who made the deposit and withdrawal with Solidbank was an Who is ultimately liable to pay damages?
impostor.
HELD:
Jazmin filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against
herein petitioners. In their answer, the defendants contended that Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof
the plaintiff had no cause of action against them because they acted should be notified to the Public Service Commission so that the latter
in good faith in seeking the "investigative assistance" of the may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the public. As
Philippine Constabulary on the swindling operations against banks by the sale of the jeepney here in question was admittedly without the
a syndicate which specialized in the theft, alteration and encashment approval of the PSC, Appellant herein, Guillermo Cresencia continued
of dollar checks. The lower court found that Go was negligent in to be liable to the Commission and the public for the consequences
failing to exercise "more care, caution and vigilance" in accepting the incident to its operation being the registered owner and operator
checks for deposit and encashment. thereof. Wherefore, the lower court did not err in holding him, and
not the buyer Rosario Avorque, responsible for the damages
I SSUE: sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente Medina
resulting from the reckless negligence of the jeepney’s driver, Brigido
Propriety of the appellate court's award of nominal damages and Avorque.
attorney's fees to private respondent
LISANIE
Plaintiffs’ action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employer’s subsidiary plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
carrier’s contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this reason that
there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the
Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in court, according to the circumstances of the case. Considering the
culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the degree of
or secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and negligence committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not depositing on
1759, New Civil Code). time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the
extension period granted by the court, which brought about the
The propriety of the damages awarded has not been questioned. refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount
Nevertheless, it is patent upon the record that the aw ard of of P200 awarded by the trial court to the appellant as nominal
P 10,000 by w ay of nom inal dam ages is untenable as a damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless, considering that
m atter of law , since nom inal dam ages cannot co-ex ist w ith nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for
com pensatory dam ages. The purpose of nom inal dam ages is the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that
to vindicate or recognize a right that has been violated, in even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it
order to preclude further contest thereon; “and not for the was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering
purpose of indem nifying the P laintiff for any loss suffered by the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000
him ” (Articles 2221, 2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court below the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive.
has already awarded compensatory and exemplary damages that are After weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount awarded
in themselves a judicial recognition that Plaintiff’s right was violated, to the appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed.
the award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper.
Anyway, ten thousand pesos cannot, in common sense, be deemed
“nominal”.
VEN TENI LLA V. CENTI N O, GR N O. L-14333, JAN . 28, 196
In Civil Case entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs. Edilberto Alejandrino and

Aida G. Alejandrino, Ventanilla retained the service of Atty. Gregorio
Centeno to represent him and prosecute the case. It was an action
for the recovery of P4,000.00 together with damages. Plaintiff Oscar
Ventanilla after receiving the letter and copy of the decision went to
see Atty. Centeno, which then informed him that he intended to
appeal and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff, however, did not leave with
Atty. Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond.
About the middle of Aug. 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the
plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. The plaintiff
Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and
because use of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal
bond, decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00. He went to the
office of Atty. Centeno but was informed by the clerk that Atty.
Centeno was in Laguna campaigning for his candidacy. Plaintiff then
issued the check for P60.00 as appeal bond and delivered the same
to the clerk with instruction to give the same to Atty. Centeno upon
his arrival.
Atty. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his office, encashed

the check and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the
appeal bond. The check was allegedly not accepted because the
period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that
time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired.
The appellant claims that the trial court erred in not ordering the
appellee to pay him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or
moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the
appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000
as nominal damages; and in not ordering the appellee to pay the
appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee.
I SSUE: WON the TC erred in awarding only P200 instead of P2000

as nominal and other damages.
HELD:
Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages

awarded by the trial court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new
Civil Code provides:
LISANIE
V. TEMPERATE OR MODERATE
BP I I N VESTM ENT V. DG CARREON, 371 SCR A 58

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered Petitioner BPI Investments was engaged in money market operations.
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but Respondent D.G. Commercial Corporation was a client of petitioner
its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with and started its money market placements in September, 1978. The
certainty. individual respondents, spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon and
Josefa M. Jeceil also placed with BPI Investments their personal
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the money in money market placements.
circumstances.
On November 15, 1979, D.G. Carreon placed with BPI Investments
P LEN O V. CA, GR N O. 56505, M AY 9, 1988 P318,981.59 in money market placement with a maturity term of
thirty two days, or up to December 17, 1979, at a maturity value of
FACTS: P323,518.22. BPI Investments issued the corresponding sales order
slip for straight sale and confirmation slip.
Florante de Luna was driving a delivery truck owned by Philippine
Paper Products Inc. at great speed along South Super Highway in BPI Investments paid D.G. Carreon twice in interest of the amount of
Taguig when he bumped the van driven by Maximo Pleno. The bump P323,518.22, representing a single money market placement, the
caused Pleno’s van to swerve to the right and crash into a parked first on December 12, 1979, and the second on December 17, 1979.
truck. As a result, Pleno was hospitalized and his van was wrecked. According to petitioner, their bookkeeper made an error in posting
Pleno sued and was awarded actual, temperate, moral, exemplary "12-17" on the sales order slip for "12-12." BPI Investments claimed
damages and attorney’s fees by the trial court. However, the CA that the same placement was also booked as maturing on December
reduced the amount of temperate and moral damages given because 12, 1979.
they were ‘too high’.
On April 21, 1982, BPI Investments wrote respondents Daniel
I SSUE: Carreon and Aurora Carreon, demanding the return of the
overpayment of P410,937.09. The respondents asserted that there
W/N the CA erred in reducing the amount of temperate damages were no overpayment and asked for time to look for the papers.
awarded? Upon the request of BPI Investments, the spouses Daniel and Aurora
Carreon sent to BPI Investments a proposed memorandum of
HELD: agreement.
The CA erred in reducing the award of temperate damages. BPI Investments, without responding to the memorandum and
Temperate damages are included within the context of proposal of D.G. Carreon filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of
compensatory damages. Inarriving at a reasonable level of money against D.G. Carreon. On May 14, 1982, the trial court issued
temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guidedby our an order for preliminary attachment after submission of affidavit of
ruling that there are cases where from the nature of the case, merit to support the petition, and the posting of a bond in the
definite proof ofpecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court amount of P200,000.00. However, on October 8, 1982, the trial court
is convinced that there has beensuch loss.For instance, injury to lifted the writ of attachment.
one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm isoften
hard to show certainty in terms of money. The judge should be On July 30, 1982, respondents D.G. Carreon filed with the trial court
empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases,rather an answer to the complaint, with counterclaim. D.G. Carreon asked
than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the for compensatory damages in an amount to be proven during the
defendant'swrongful act. trial; spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon asked for moral damages of
P1,000,000.00 because of the humiliation, great mental anguish,
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt sleepless nights and deterioration of health due to the filing of the
that Pleno is an entrepreneur and the founder of his own corporation, complaint and indiscriminate and wrongful attachment of their
the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an property, especially their residential house and payment of their
industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line and if money market placement of P109,283.75. Josefa Jeceil asked for
not for the incident, might have pushed them through. His actual moral damages of P500,000.00, because of sleepless nights and
income however has not been sufficiently established so that this mental anguish, and payment of her money market placement of
Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or P73,857.57; all defendants claimed for exemplary damages and
moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of attorney's fees of P100,000.00.
earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to
a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double vision in his I SSUE
left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some
inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in Whether the claimed damages are proper.
social life.
R ULI N G
The law on exemplary damages is found in Section 5, Chapter 3,

Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. These are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are
recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances;
in quasi-delicts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in
contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.30
LISANIE
BPI Investments did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, However, it is also apparent that the spouses Deang suffered
oppressive, or malevolent manner, when it asked for preliminary financial damage because of the loss of the owners' duplicate copy
attachment. It was just exercising a legal option. The sheriff of the of the title. Temperate damages may be granted.
issuing court did the execution and the attachment. Hence, BPI
Investments is not to be blamed for the excessive and wrongful "Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are
attachment. more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
There is no doubt, however, that the damages sustained by been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
respondents were due to petitioner's fault or negligence, short of case, be proved with certainty."
gross negligence. Temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been GSIS submits that there must be proof of pecuniary loss. This is
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be untenable. The rationale behind tem perate dam ages is
proved with certainty.32 The Court deems it prudent to award precisely that from the nature of the case, definite proof of
reasonable temperate damages to respondents under the pecuniary loss cannot be offered. W hen the court is
circumstances.33 convinced that there has been such loss, the judge is
em pow ered to calculate m oderate dam ages, rather than let
GSI S V. DEANG, 365 SCR A 613 the com plainant suffer w ithout redress from the defendant's
w rongful act.
FACTS
The award of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in temperate
Sometime in December 1969, the spouses Deang obtained a housing damages is reasonable considering that GSIS spent for the
loan from the GSIS in the amount of eight thousand five hundred reconstitution of the owners' duplicate copy of the title.
pesos (P8,500.00). Under the agreement, the loan was to mature on
December 23, 1979. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted over the spouses' property.As required by the mortgage
deed, the spouses Daeng deposited the owner's duplicate copy of P EOPLE VS YR AT
the title with the GSIS.
Facts:
Eleven (11) months before the maturity of the loan, the spouses
Deang settled their debt with the GSIS and requested for the release Appellants were charged and convicted with murder for the death of
of the owner's duplicate copy of the title since they intended to
Benjamin Aca-ac. Evidence showed that the victim was suddenly
secure a loan from a private lender and use the land covered by it as
collateral security for the loan of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shot frontally by Yratafter being hit by Yrat with the butt of his gun
which they applied for with one Milagros Runes. However, personnel from behind while Jimena boxed the victim on the face. The trial
of the GSIS were not able to release the owner's duplicate of the title court awarded damages for loss of earning capacity and funeral
as it could not be found despite diligent search. expenses on the lone testimony of the deceased's wife and civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. This appeal assails the
Satisfied that the owner's duplicate copy of the title was really lost, finding of treachery by the trial court claiming that the deceased was
GSIS commenced the reconstitution proceedings with the CFI of
shot frontally.
Pampanga for the issuance of a new owner's copy of the same. The
GSIS then issued a certificate of release of mortgage and thereafter,
released the reconstituted copy of the owner’s duplicate of title. I ssue:
On July 6, 1979, the spouses Deang filed with the CFI, Angeles City Whether or not temperate damages is proper?
a complaint against GSIS for damages, claiming that as result of the
delay in releasing the duplicate copy of the owner's title, they were Held:
unable to secure a loan from Milagros Runes.
In lieu of the aforesaid damages, the heirs of the deceased Benjamin
In its defense, GSIS explained that the owners' duplicate copy of the Aca-ac should be awarded the amount of P15,000.00 as temperate
title was released within a reasonable time since it had to conduct
damages pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides
standard pre-audit and post-audit procedures to verify if the spouses
Deang's account had been fully settled. that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount cannot, from
I SSUE: the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Whether the GSIS is liable for a negligent act of its employee acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks?
HELD:
GSIS is liable for damages. In a breach of contract, moral damages

are not awarded if the defendant is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. The fact that the
complainant suffered economic hardshipor worries and mental
anxietyis not enough. There is likewise no factual basis for an award
of actual damages. Actual damages to be compensable must be
proven by clear evidence. A court cannot rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guess work" as to the fact and amount of damages,
but must depend on actual proof.
LISANIE
Hence, Panacor and Arizona filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Premiere Bank. Then, Iba-Finance
P R EM I ER E DEVELOP M ENT BANK V. CA, GR N O. 159352, filed a complaint-in-intervention praying that judgment be rendered
AP RI L 14, 2004 ordering Premiere Bank to pay damages in its favor.
On or about October 1994, Panacor acquired an exclusive I SSUE:

distributorship of products manufactured by Colgate. To meet the
capital requirements of the exclusive distributorship, which required W/N petitioner is liable in the downgrading of the loan of loan of
an initial inventory level of P7.5 million, Panacor applied for a loan of respondents to support an award of actual and exemplary damages.
P4.1 million with Premiere Development Bank. After an extensive
study of Panacor’s creditworthiness, Premiere Bank rejected the loan R ULI N G:
application and suggested that its affiliate company Arizona should
instead apply for the loan on condition that the proceeds thereof In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere
shall be made available to Panacor. Eventually, Panacor was granted assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend
a P4.1 million credit line and as suggested, Arizona, which was an on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding
existing loan client, applied for and was granted a loan of P6.1 the actual amount of loss.
million, P3.4 million of which would be used to pay-off its existing
loan accounts and the remaining P2.7 million as credit line of Even if not recoverable as compensatory damages, Panacor may still
Panacor. be awarded damages in the concept of temperate or moderate
damages. When the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
As security for the P6.1 million loan, Arizona, represented by its Chief suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
Executive Officer Pedro Panaligan and spouses Pedro and Marietta proved with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered.
Panaligan in their personal capacities, executed a Real Estate Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature
Mortgage against a parcel of land. of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced,
although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
Since the P2.7 million released by Premiere Bank fell short of the some pecuniary loss.
P4.1 million credit line which was previously approved, Panacor
negotiated for a take-out loan with Iba Finance Corporation in the It is obvious that the wrongful acts of Premiere Bank adversely
sum of P10 million, P7.5 million of which will be released outright in affected, in one way or another, the commercial credit of Panacor,
order to take-out the loan from Premiere Bank and the balance of greatly contributed to, if not, decisively caused the premature
P2.5 million (to complete the needed capital of P4.1 million with stoppage of its business operations and the consequent loss of
Colgate) to be released after the cancellation by Premiere of the business opportunity. Since these losses are not susceptible to
collateral mortgage on the property. Pursuant to the said take-out pecuniary estimation, temperate damages may be awarded.
agreement, Iba-Finance was authorized to pay Premiere Bank the
prior existing loan obligations of Arizona in an amount not to exceed R AM OS, ET. AL. V. CA, ET. AL., supra.
P6 million.
I SSUE:
On October 5, 1995, Iba-Finance sent a letter to Ms. Arlene R.
Martillano, officer-in-charge of Premiere Bank’s San Juan Branch, The propriety of the award for damages.
informing her of the approved loan in favor of Panacor and Arizona,
and requesting for the release of TCT No. T-3475. Martillano, after HELD:
reading the letter, affixed her signature of conformity thereto and
sent the original copy to Premiere Bank’s legal office. Premiere Bank
sent a letter-reply to Iba-Finance, informing the latter of its refusal The trial court awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be
to turn over the requested documents on the ground that Arizona P616,000.00) in compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to
had existing unpaid loan obligations and that it was the bank’s policy its being updated" covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to
to require full payment of all outstanding loan obligations prior to the 15 April 1992, based on monthly expenses for the care of the patient
release of mortgage documents. estimated at P8,000.00. At current levels, the P8000/monthly
amount established by the trial court at the time of its decision
On October 19, 1995, Panacor and Arizona executed in favor of Iba- would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based
Finance a promissory note in the amount of 7.5 million. Thereafter, care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not even
Iba-Finance paid to Premiere Bank the amount of P6,235,754.79 arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the
representing the full outstanding loan account of Arizona. Despite patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and
such payment, Premiere Bank still refused to release the requested proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring home the
mortgage documents specifically, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT patient to avoid mounting hospital bills.
No. T-3475.
And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be
On November 2, 1995, Panacor requested Iba-Finance for the transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill
immediate approval and release of the remaining P2.5 million loan to for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet
meet the required monthly purchases from Colgate. Iba-Finance minimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount
explained however, that the processing of the P2.5 million loan of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence
application was conditioned, among others, on the submission of the should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 3475 and the cancellation by the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at
Premiere Bank of Arizona’s mortgage. Occasioned by Premiere home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil Code
Bank’s adamant refusal to release the mortgage cancellation on actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties.
document, Panacor failed to generate the required capital to meet its
distribution and sales targets. On December 7, 1995, Colgate
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed
informed Panacor of its decision to terminate their distribution
by the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. Our
agreement.
rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at
the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act
LISANIE
of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be
liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account
those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. P T & T V. CA, GR N O.139268, SEP T. 3, 2002
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if Felicitas B. Sipe, resident of Surralah, Cotabato remitted to her
they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, sister-in-law, Lolita Sipe Escara, two telegraphic money orders
should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and through PT&T. The money orders, one for P2,000.00 and the other
proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary for P1,000.00, originated from Marbel, South Cotabato. Plaintiff was
loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of then studying for a doctoral degree in Education at the U.P Diliman.
the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate According to the plaintiff, the money was sent for the purpose of
damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or paying for her tuition fee for one semester at the U.P.; paying for
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and her fare to go back to Cotabato to enable her to complete the
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no requirements for a job promotion; and paying for the cost of the
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are medical consultation of her son who is sick of diabetes.
provided for. As it would not be equitable — and certainly not in the
best interests of the administration of justice — for the victim in such Despite several inquiries about the remittance in her favor, PT&T
cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in insisted that there was no money transmitted to Lolita. Upon Lolita
seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously request, Cabalit , the branch cashier of PT&T Cubao, issued a
awarded — temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given certification that no telegraphic money order in favor of plaintiff was
as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, received by PT&T.
should take into account the cost of proper care.
Subsequently, Cabalit informed plaintiff that the money being
claimed by her did not come from Surralah but from Marbel, South
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home- Cotabato. On August 22, 1990, an attempt was made by PT&T to
based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that deliver the telegraphic money order at plaintiffs dormitory but she
condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for was not around. On September 10, 1990, plaintiff received from
compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the PT&T two checks representing the amount remitted to her. However,
onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the plaintiff was not able to encash the checks at once because the bank
interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages did not have a clearance from PT&T. Finally, on September 14, 1990,
would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in plaintiff was able to encash the checks.
a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be
compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at Aggrieved by the delay in the delivery of the remittance, plaintiff
home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be filed a complaint for damages against PT&T and Louie Cabalit. In her
grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of complaint, she alleged that the delay was the cause of her failure to
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. enroll for one semester at the U.P.; to complete her requirements for
a job promotion; and to bring her son to the doctor for medical
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident consultation.
occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years
now. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by I SSUE:
her husband and children, who, in the intervening years have been
deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. W/N PT&T negligence warrants the awarding of damages to
respondent.
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the
HELD:
care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the
temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if
The breach of an obligation because of fraud, negligence or delay or
petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. The
of a contravention by any means of the tenor of that obligation
husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live
opens the defaulting obligor to possible liability for damages.
with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any
hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives
around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals The Court of Appeals was correct in deleting the award made by the
to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the trial court of actual damages where proof of pecuniary loss, in an
respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of action based on culpa contractual, is essential.
the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is
clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of In the case at bar, the appellate court itself did not see any clear
P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. indication of bad faith or gross negligence amounting to bad faith on
the part of petitioners. It would be error to make an award of moral
damages to private respondent merely because petitioner
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of corporation was unable to effect immediate delivery of the money
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature sent through it in two money orders, one for P2,000.00 and the
of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued other for P1,000.00.
at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
Neither can the award of exemplary damages be sustained.
Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right.
Although such damages need not be proved, plaintiff must first show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages
before a court can favorably consider an award of exemplary
damages
LISANIE
Still, of course, petitioner corporation is not totally free from liability. pecuniary loss herein.Still, jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is
It may have had good reasons, but it has not been able to overcome clear that temperate damages may be awarded even in instances
thereby its burden to prove a valid excuse, for the breach of where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with
agreement such as by proving, among other possible legal grounds, certainty.
fortuitous event to account for its failure. The breach would have
justified a recovery of actual damages but, there being no adequate Notwithstanding the language of Article 2224, a line of jurisprudence
proof of pecuniary loss found by the appellate court, such damages has emerged authorizing the award of temperate damages even in
cannot be awarded. Neither moral nor exemplary damages have cases where the amount of pecuniary loss could have been proven
been justified, as hereinbefore explained, as to warrant any recovery with certainty, if no such adequate proof was presented. The
thereof. The Court thus is left with two alternative possibilities an allowance of temperate damages when actual damages were not
award of temperate or moderate damages or an award of nominal adequately proven is ultimately a rule drawn from equity, the
damages. principle affording relief to those definitely injured who are unable to
prove how definite the injury. There is no impediment to apply this
Temperate or moderate damages may only be given if the court doctrine to the case at bar, which involves one of the most daunting
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but that its amount and noble undertakings of our young democracy–the recovery of ill-
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The gotten wealth salted away during the Marcos years. If the doctrine
factual findings of the appellate court that respondent has failed to can be justified to answer for the unlawful damage to a cargo truck,
establish such pecuniary loss or, if proved, cannot from their nature it is a compounded wrath if it cannot answer for the unlawful
be precisely quantified precludes the application of the rule on exploitation of our forests, to the injury of the Filipino people. The
temperate or moderate damages. The result comes down to only a amount of P1,000,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.
possible award of nominal damages. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a
recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for showing that the plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows for
any loss suffered by him. The court may award nominal damages in the award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages
every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157 cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the courts are empowered
of the Civil Code or, generally, in every case where property right is to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Ill-gotten
invaded. wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages by way
of example or correction for the public good should be awarded.
R EP UBLI C V. TUVERA, supra. Fewer causes of action deserve the stigma left by exemplary
damages, which "serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
I SSUE incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." The obtention of the
timber license agreement by Twin Peaks through fraudulent and
W/N respondents are liable to pay moral, temperate and exemplary illegal means was highlighted by Juan Tuvera’s abuse of his position
damages as Presidential Executive Assistant. Considering the expanse of forest
land exploited by respondents, the volume of timber that was
HELD necessarily cut by virtue of their abuse and the estimated wealth
acquired by respondents through grave abuse of trust and public
It bears to the most primitive of reasons that an action for recovery office, it is only reasonable that petitioner be granted the amount of
of sum of money must prove the amount sought to be recovered. In P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
the case at bar, the Republic rested its case without presenting any
evidence, documentary or testimonial, to establish the amount that P HI L. HAW K COR P . V. VI VI AN TAN LEE, supra.
should be restituted to the State by reason of the illegal acts
committed by the respondents. There is the bare allegation in the I SSUE:
complaint that the State is entitled to P48 million by way of actual
damages, but no single proof presented as to why the State is Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and
entitled to such amount. whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of
Appeals are proper.
Actual damages must be proven, not presumed. The Republic failed
to prove damages. It is not enough for the Republic to have HELD:
established, as it did, the legal travesty that led to the wrongful
obtention by Twin Peaks of the TLA. It should have established the The CA correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of
degree of injury sustained by the State by reason of such wrongful P10,000.00 for the damage caused on respondent’s motorcycle.
act. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
The claim for moral damages deserves short shrift. The claimant in suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
this case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical person. A proved with certainty." The cost of the repair of the motorcycle was
juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence
unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or presented was merely a job estimate of the cost of the motorcycle’s
such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental repair amounting to P17, 829.00. The CA aptly held that there was
anguish or moral shock. no doubt that the damage caused on the motorcycle was due to the
negligence of petitioner’s driver. In the absence of competent proof
However, there is sufficient basis for an award of temperate of the actual damage caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of
damages, also sought by the Republic notwithstanding the fact that its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in
a claim for both actual and temperate damages is internally the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the circumstances
inconsistent. Temperate or moderate damages avail when "the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount In fine, CA correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of
cannot from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty." The respondent’s husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for
textual language might betray an intent that temperate damages do the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the
not avail when the case, by its nature, is susceptible to proof of damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court
pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could have proved overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for
LISANIE
by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is 4. Deleted the award of attorney’s fees2
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is I ssue:
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.
Whether the modification was proper.
TAN ET. AL. V. OM C CARRI ER S AN D BONI FACI O ARAM BALA
GR No. 190521, January 12, 2011 R uling:
Parties: Partly.
 Petitioners – Leticia Tan, Myrna Medina, Marilou Spooner,
Rosalinda Tan, And Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tem perate dam ages in lieu of actual dam ages
Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan, And Mark Allan Tan, represented herein
by their mother, Leticia Tan. Actual damages to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof,
 Respondents – OMC Carriers, Inc. and Bonifacio Arambala but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
Facts: determining the fact and amount of damages. Credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
On November 24, 1995, Bonifacio Arambala was driving a trailer
truck owned by OMC Carriers, Inc. when the truck suddenly lost its In this case, petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any
brakes. Bonifacio and his companion both jumped out and receipt to support their claim for actual damages to prove the
abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck rammed into the house monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring
and tailoring shop owned by Leticia Tan and her husband Celedonio shop when the truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual damages
Tan, instantly killing the latter who was standing at the doorway of for the house and tailoring shop can be awarded.
the house at the time.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages
Petitioners, Leticia Tan et al. filed a complaint for damages against suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages,
respondents OMC Carriers and Bonifacio Arambala, alleging that the which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case,
accident occurred due to OMC’s gross negligence in not properly definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the
maintaining the truck, and to Arambala’s recklessness in abandoning court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary
the moving truck. loss.
Petitioners thus pray that respondents be held jointly and severally Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides:
liable for the following:
1. Actual damages, which include damage to their properties, “Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
funeral expenses and loss of earning capacity less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
2. Moral damages finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
3. Exemplary damages cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.”
4. Attorney’s fees
Here, the photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show
Respondents denied any liability, claiming that the damage was the extent of the damage done to the house, the tailoring shop and
caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded due to the the petitioners' appliances and equipment. Irrefutably, this damage
slippery condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil. was directly attributable to Arambala's gross negligence in handling
OMC's truck. From the attendant circumstances and given the
Ruling of the RTC property destroyed, the amount of P200,000 is a fair and sufficient
award by way of temperate damages.
The RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to
petitioners for damages. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, it Tem perate dam ages in lieu of loss of earning capacity
was unusual for a truck to suddenly lose its brakes. The fact that the
truck rammed into petitioners’ house raised the presumption of CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss
negligence on the part of respondents. of earning capacity.
Moreover, the damage was not due to fortuitous event. Even with oil As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate
on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any precautionary the claim for loss of earning capacity, except if (1) the deceased is
measure to prevent the truck from skidding off the road. Besides, self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
the alleged oil on the road did not also explain why the truck lost its current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the
brakes. Had OMC done a more rigid inspection of the truck before its fact that in the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is
use, the defective brake could have been discovered. available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings on the issues of respondents’

negligence and liability for damages. However, it modified the 2 Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, assert that
the CA erred when it modified the award of damages, for the following reasons:
damages awarded in the following manner: 1. The reduction of the award of actual damages was improper since the damages
1. Reduced the actual damages award from P355,895 to P72,295 primarily refer to the value of their destroyed property and not the cost of repairing
for only said amount was duly supported by official receipts or replacing them, which value cannot be evidenced by receipts.
2. The deletion of the award for loss of earning capacity was improper as Celedonio Tan
2. Deleted the award for loss of earning capacity for failure to
was a self-employed tailor, and in said line of work, no documentary evidence is
substantiate the same with reasonable certainty available.
3. Reduced the exemplary damages from P500,000 to P200,000 3. The reduction of exemplary fees was improper as respondents acted with bad faith
when they fabricated the “oil slick on the road” story, when investigation reports
provide otherwise.
4. The deletion of the award of attorney’s fees was improper as they are entitled to the
same under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
LISANIE
Prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned petitioner on the cause of the fire as would absolve liability. The
approximately P156,000 a year, or P13,000 a month. At the time of doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is being used.
his death in 1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage was P145.00,
or P3,770 per month. Celedonio's alleged monthly income of P13,000 With respect to the actual damages, as noted the trial court and CA
greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage. Thus, the awarded respondent in the amount of US$67,535.61 to be converted
exception set forth above does not apply. in current Philippine currency. However, the receipts submitted by
respondent do not accurately reflect the items in the container van
Nonetheless, temperate damages may be awarded in lieu of actual and, therefore, cannot be the basis for a grant of actual damages. As
damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is provided under the civil code when there is no sufficient proof under
plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the actual damages, temperate or moderate damages will apply. The
allegation of the injured party’s actual income. amount thereof is usually left to the sound discretion of the courts
but the same be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate
In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.
was never disputed. Petitioners, excluding Leticia Tan, were all In this case, temperate damages in the amount of P350, 000.00 is
minors at the time the petition was filed and they all relied mainly on deemed equitable.
the income earned by their father from his tailoring activities for their
sustenance and support. Under these facts and taking into account
the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, petitioners are SP S. DI ONI SI O ESTR ADA V. P HI L. R ABBI T BUS LI N ES (2017
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P300,000 to CASE, R EAD I N FULL)
compensate for damages for loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased.
R eduction of ex em plary dam ages proper
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not
intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. Thus, the
CA's reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners
from P500,000 to P200,000 is proper.
Attorney’s fees in order
In view of the award of exemplary damages, it us also proper to

award the petitioners attorney's fees, in consonance with Article
2208 (1) of the Civil Code. The award of attorney's fees, equivalent
to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, is just and
reasonable under the circumstances.
BUT SEE:
I N TERN ATI ONAL CONTAI NER TER M I N AL SER VI CES, I N C., V.

CELESTE CHUA, GR N O. 195031, M AR CH 28, 2014
Facts: On April 2, 1997, the twenty feet container van loaded with
the personal eefects of Celeste Chua arrived at the North Harbor,
Manila form Oakland, California. On same date, it was unloaded from
the vessel and was placed in a depot belonging to the petitioner for
safekeeping pending inspection.
On the date scheduled for inspection, the depot of the petitioner was
gutted with fire and the respondent’s container and 44 others, were
burned. In a survey, 70% of the things contained in the van was
found to be totally burt while 30% was wet, dirty and unusuable.
Respondents demanded reimbursement for the value of the goods.
In its answer, petitioner admitsthat it accepted, in good order the
respondent’s container van for storage and safekeeping at its depot,
it denies its negligence and asserted that the fire was a forfituous
event and have exercise the required diligence. The trial court
rendered a decision that petitioner to pay respondent actual
damages.
I ssue: Whether or not Petitioner International Container Terminal

Services was negligent and the correct amount of actual damages.
Held: Petitioner is negligent, under the circumstances of the case,

petitioner is liable to the respondent as admitted by petitioner during
the pre-trial case, absent any justifiable explanation on the part of
LISANIE
VI. LIQUIDATED
HL CARLOS CON STRUCTI ON V. M ARI N A P R OP ERTI ES CORP .,

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the GR NO.147614, JAN . 29, 2004
parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
FACTS
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity
or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION (MPC) is engaged in the
unconscionable. business of real estate development. It entered into a contract with
H.I. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. (HLC) to construct Phase III of a
LAM BERT V. FAX , 26 P HI L 588 condominium complex called MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT. The original completion date of the project was May 16,
Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the 1989, but it was extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period
retail book and stationery business, found itself in such condition until November 30, 1989. On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted
financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, this case for sum of money against not only MPC but also against the
together with many others, agreed to take over the business, latter’s alleged president, [Respondent] Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco)
incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective and [Respondent] Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of various
credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the sums with an aggregate amount of P14 million pesos, broken down
two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar as follows: a. P7,065,885.03 for costs of labor escalation, change
& Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was orders and material price escalation;
completed plaintiff and defendant entered into the an agreement,
including: Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other I SSUE
the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos as liquidated damages,
unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other W/N H.L. is liable for actual and liquidated damages for failing to
disposition be obtained. finish the construction it undertook to complete
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, HELD

1911, sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of
the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of Yes. Petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations. It could not
the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc. This sale was made by the totally pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor,
defendant against the protest of the plaintiff and with the warning because the latter was allowed to terminate the services of the
that he would be held liable under the contract hereinabove set forth. contractor.
I SSUE Either party shall have the right to terminate the contract for reason
of violation or non-compliance by the other party of the terms and
W/N Courts are authorized to reduce the penalty set in the contract. conditions herein agreed upon. As of November 1989, petitioner
accomplished only approximately 80 percent of the project. In other
HELD words, it was already in delay at the time. In addition,
EngineerMiranda testified that it would lose money even if it finished
Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction the project; thus, respondents already suspected that it had no
and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a intention of finishing the project at all. Petitioner was in delay and in
contract for the parties. The appellee urges that the plaintiff cannot breach of contract. Clearly, the obligor is liable for damages that are
recover for the reason that he did not prove damages, and cites the natural and probable consequences of its breach of obligation. In
numerous American authorities to the effect that because order to finish the project, the latter had to contract the services of a
stipulations for liquidated damages are generally in excess of actual second construction firm for P11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered
damages and so work a hardship upon the party in default, courts actual damages in the amount of P4,604,579 for the completion of
are strongly inclined to treat all such agreements as imposing a the project. Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as
penalty and to allow a recovery for actual damages only. provided in the Contract. Liquidated damages are those that the
parties agree to be paid in case of a breach. As worded, the amount
It is the rule that parties who are competent to contract may make agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to
such agreements within the limitations of the law and public policy delays in the completion of the project. Under Philippine laws, these
as they desire, and that the courts will enforce them according to damages take the nature of penalties. A penal clause is an accessory
their terms. undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach.
The only case recognized by the Civil Code in which the court is
authorized to intervene for the purpose of reducing a penalty
stipulated in the contract is when the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly fulfilled and the court can see that the person
demanding the penalty has received the benefit of such or irregular
performance.
In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and

liquidated damages, so far as legal results are concerned. Whatever
differences exists between them as a matter of language, they are
treated the same legally. In either case the party to whom payment
is to be made is entitled to recover the sum stipulated without the
necessity of proving damages. Indeed one of the primary purposes
in fixing a penalty or in liquidating damages, is to avoid such
necessity.
LISANIE
VII. EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES
SCOTT CON SULTANTS & R ESOURCES DEV’T COR P ., I N C. V.

CA, ET.AL., GR NO.112916, M AR. 16, 1995 a. N ature
FACTS: Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc. entered into a contract with temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
defendant Philrock on November 18, 1987 for the latter to operate
San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc.'s Industrial Permit No. 40 for a Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
period of five (5) years. Subsequently, on February 9, 1990, San further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions,
Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc. notified the defendant that it is as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and
unilaterally terminating the contract for being "one-sided." Five days assigns.
thereafter, or on February 14, 1990, San Mateo Mines Exploration,
Inc. entered into a mining exploration contract with the petitioner Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
corporation, which includes the operation of Industrial Permit No. 40. nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
Petitioner corporation instituted the complaint herein alleging that when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
because of the existing activity in the mining claim area, defendant its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with
has prevented, impeded and/or otherwise denied petitioner access to certainty.
its legitimate area of activity. Defendant, on the other hand, files a
third party complaint against San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc., for Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
allegedly breaching their contract having terminated the contract on circumstances.
the basis of it being “one sided.”
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
The trial court found that a mining permit is for the exclusive use of parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
the permittee. As a consequence thereof, the permittee can take one
operator at a time, and he is to operate within the area while the Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity
agreement subsists. or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Philrock Sentencing
the petitioner to pay the defendant the sum of P800,000.00 as Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the
compensatory or actual damages; P300,00.00 as moral damages, defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing
the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the sum of upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure
P50,000:00 as attorney's fees. The CA affirmed the decision of the of damages, and not the stipulation.
trial court except as to the award of moral damages which it deleted
on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses did not prove Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
that the private respondent's good reputation was besmirched. example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
I SSUE
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the
W/N petitioner is liable for the damages awarded to the defendant. civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate
HELD and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
No. Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if

the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Just as in the case of moral damages, there was no credible proof of
actual damages. The trial court made no specific finding on the Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
extent thereof. Yet, in the dispositive portion of its decision, it exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
awarded compensatory and actual damages in the staggering reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
amount of P800,000.00. How the award of P800,000.00 was arrived
at was never shown. It remains a pure speculation. Article 2199 of Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to adequate right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as is duly adjudicated.
proved.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not
Both decisions do not as well state the justification for the award of be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
exemplary damages of P50,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. There was, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
therefore, no legal basis for the award of exemplary damages since damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
the private respondent was not entitled to moral, temperate, or consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
compensatory damages and there was no agreement on stipulated liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be
damages. entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not
for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
The awards of actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees in the challenged decision are DELETED. Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced
in advance shall be null and void.
LISANIE
depending upon the amount ofcompensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant;
b. W hen aw ardable
(2) the claimant mustfirst establish his right to moral,
SULP I CI O LI N ES V. SESAN TE (N O DI GEST AVAI LABLE) temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages;and
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the
award would beallowed only if the guilty party acted in a
DE LEON V. CA, GR N O. L-31931, AUG. 31, 1988 wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive ormalevolant manner.
FACTS The entitlement to moral damages having been established the

award of exemplary damages is proper. And while the award of
Sps. Briones were registered owners of the fishpond situated at San moral and exemplarydamages in an aggregate amount may not be
Roque, Paombong, Bulacan. Said property was mortgaged twice to the usual way of awarding said damagesthere is no question of Dr.
secure a loan obtained from, initially Hermogenes Tantoco but was Tantoco's entitlement to moral and exemplary damage. The amount
later on assigned to, Dr. Cornelio Tantoco, Hermogenes’ father, in should be reduced, however, for being excessive compared to
the amounts of P20,000 and P68,824 (the later having a 10% theactual losses sustained by the aggrieved party. In the case at bar,
interest per annum). Both mortgages were duly registered and duly the Court of Appeals found onFebruary 21, 1970 that the
annotated at the back of the TCT. While these two mortgages were outstanding balance of the disputed loan was P64,921.69.Twenty
still subsisting the Sps. Briones sold the fishpond to plaintiff Sps. De five percent thereof is P16,230.00 but considering the depreciation
Leon (Fortunato and Juana) in the amount of P120,000.00. of thePhilippine peso today, it is believed that the award of moral
and exemplary damagesin the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable.
Of the amount of P120,000.00, the Sps. Briones actually received
only the amount of P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the amount of OCTOT VS. YBAN EZG.R. N O. L48643, JANUARY 18, 1982 |
P89,000.00 was withheld by the Fortunato de Leon who assumed to 111 SCRA 79
answer the mortgage indebtedness of the Briones to the Tantocos.
After the sale Sps. De Leon satisfied the mortgage loan of FACTS:
P20,000.00 including 10% interest per annum to Hermogenes
Tantoco who then accordingly executed a deed of discharge of Octot was a Government Employee who held the position of Security
mortgage, but the mortgage in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in the Guard. Pursuant to PD 6, he was dismissed from the service as he
amount of P68,824 was not satisfied. had a pending libel case against him. Later on he was acquitted from
the criminal case. Alfredo Imbong then filed a request for Octot’s
On February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the reinstatement. The request was favorably acted upon by all levels.
Dr. Cornelio. Trying to set the record straight, Dr. Cornelio clarified The papers were sent to Octot stating that his request for
their total obligation including the agreed interest amounted to reinstatement may be given due course pursuant to LOI 647. Octot
P88,888.98. Hence the above mentioned PNB check will be held in failed to appear and so he was personally furnished with the
abeyance pending remittance of the total obligation after which the necessary papers to be filed to support his appointment. Octot sent a
necessary document will be executed. On May 8, 1962 the Sps. De letter again asking for reinstatement. The regional health director
Leon filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan then instructed Octot to appear to furnish the necessary documents.
against defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco for discharge of mortgage. Octot did not appear but filed a case for mandamus for his
reinstatement.As his reinstatement was never disputed, he was
RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered for Sps. De Leon to pay Dr. reinstated.
Cornelio the sum of P64,921.60 with interest thereon at 10% p.a.;
payment of the sum of P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages, I SSUES
and further sum of P10,000 as attorney’s fees On appeal, CA
affirmed the judgment of trial court with modification respecting the W/N Octot can claim exemplary damages
award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
HELD
I SSUE
No. The delay in the reinstatement of Octot was due to his own fault.
W/N the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper? Also seeing as there was no Bad Faith involved and that it doesn’t
involve the situations under 2219 and 2220, moral damages cannot
HELD be claimed.
YES. Respondent Court found malice in De Leon's refusal to satisfy No. Exemplary damages are not usually recoverable in a mandamus
Dr. Tantoco’s lawful claim and in their subsequent filing of the case unless thedefendant patently acted with vindictiveness and
present case against the latter, and took into consideration the wantonness. It is granted by way ofexample or correction for the
worries and mental anxiety of latter as a result thereof. public good.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, Requisites:

serious anxiety,besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation andsimilar injury. Though incapable of -They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in
pecuniary computation, moral damages may berecovered if they are addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act oromission.On be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
the other hand, jurisprudence sets certain conditions when depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
exemplary damagesmay be awarded, to wit: may be awarded to the claimant.
(1) They may be imposed by way of example or correctiononly -The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate,
in addition, among others, to compensatory damages and liquidated or compensatory damages.
cannot be recoveredas a matter of right, their determination
LISANIE
-The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the overpayment of P410,937.09.[2] They discussed the matter with BPI
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a Investments.The respondents asserted that there was no
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. overpayment and asked for time to look for the papers. Upon the
request of BPI Investments, the spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon
sent to BPI Investments a proposed memorandum of agreement,
dated May 7, 1982.
BP I I N VESTM ENT VS. DG CARREON
On May 10, 1982, BPI Investments, without responding to
the memorandum and proposal of D. G. Carreon filed a
complaint[4] for recovery of a sum of money against D. G. Carreon
The Facts with preliminary attachment.
D.G. Carreon asked for com pensatory dam ages in an am ount

to be proven during the trial; spouses Daniel and Aurora
Petitioner BPI Investment Corporation (BPI Investments), Carreon asked for m oral dam ages of P 1,000,000.00 because
formerly known as Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, of the hum iliation, great m ental anguish, sleepless nights
was engaged in money market operations. Respondent D. G. and deterioration of health due to the filing of the com plaint
Commercial Corporation was a client of petitioner and started its and indiscrim inate and w rongful attachm ent of their
money market placements in September, 1978. The individual property, especially their residential house and paym ent of
respondents, spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon and Josefa M. their m oney m arket placem ent of P 109,283.75. Josefa Jeceil
Jeceil also placed with BPI Investments their personal money in asked for m oral dam ages of P500,000.00, because of
money market placements. sleepless nights and m ental anguish, and paym ent of her
m oney m arket placem ent of P 73,857.57; all defendants
On November 15, 1979, D. G. Carreon Commercial claim ed for ex em plary dam ages and attorneys fees
Corporation (D. G. Carreon, for brevity) placed with BPI of P 100,000.00.
Investments P318,981.59 in money market placement with a
maturity term of thirty two days, or up to December 17, 1979, at a
maturity value of P323,518.22. BPI Investments issued the I SSUES:
corresponding sales order slip for straight sale and confirmation slip.
On December 12, 1979, there appeared in BPI Investments (1) W/N petitioner guilty of gross negligence in the handling
ledger due D. G. Carreon an amount of P323,518.22, which is the of the money market placement of respondents.
exact amount to mature on December 17, 1979. D. G. Carreon did (2) W/N moral damages may be awarded.
not make any money placement maturing on December 12, 1979. As (3) W/N temperate or moderate damages may be awarded.
a result of this, Mr. Celso Abrantes, an officer of BPI Investments
called up Aurora Carreon about the money market placement
The Courts R uling
supposedly maturing on December 12, 1979. Aurora Carreon
instructed Abrantes to roll over the amount of P323,518.22, for
another thirty days at 19% interest to mature on January 11,
(1) We find petitioner not guilty of gross negligence in the
1980. A sales order slip and a confirmation slip were executed dated
handling of the money market placement of respondents. Gross
December 12, 1979.
negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight
care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
On December 17, 1979, BPI Investments credited D. G.
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
Carreon with another P323,518.22 via roll over of P300,000.00, for a
avoid them.[28]
term of one hundred twenty days at 19% interest maturing on April
15, 1980, and P23,518.22, paid out in cash. A sales order slip for
straight sale and a confirmation slip were executed. BPI Investments However, while petitioner BPI Investments may not be guilty of
paid the money placement on April 16, 1980. The money placement gross negligence, it failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
in the amount of P319,000.00 that matured on April 16, 1980 was that D. G. Carreon indeed received money in excess of what was due
again rolled over for a term of sixty one days at 19% interest them. The alleged payments in the complaint were admitted by
maturing on June 16, 1980, with a maturity value plaintiff itself to be withdrawals from validly issued commercial
of P329,443.81. The amount was again rolled over for a term of papers, duly verified and signed by at least two authorized high-
thirty days at 18% interest maturing on July 16, 1980, and again ranking officers of BPI Investments.[29]
rolled over for another thirty days at 18% interest.
BPI Investments paid D. G. Carreon twice in interest of the The law on exemplary damages is found in Section 5, Chapter 3,
amount of P323,518.22, representing a single money market Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. These are imposed by way of
placement, the first on December 12, 1979, and the second on example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
December 17, 1979.According to petitioner, their bookkeeper made temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are
an error in posting 12-17 on the sales order slip for 12-12. BPI recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the
Investments claimed that the same placement was also booked as crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances;
maturing on December 12, 1979.Aurora Carreon instructed BPI in quasi-delicts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in
Investments to roll over the whole amount of P323,518.22 for contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
another thirty days, or up to January 11, 1980, at 19% interest. BPI fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.[30]
Investments claimed that roll overs were subsequently made from
maturing payments on which BPI Investments had made over
payments at a total amount of P410,937.09, wherein all payments BPI Investments did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
were evidenced by checks issued by BPI Investments to respondents. oppressive, or malevolent manner, when it asked for preliminary
attachment. It was just exercising a legal option. The sheriff of the
On April 21, 1982, BPI Investments wrote respondents issuing court did the execution and the attachment. Hence, BPI
Daniel Carreon and Aurora Carreon, demanding the return of the Investments is not to be blamed for the excessive and wrongful
LISANIE
attachment. Whether CA erred in reducing the amounts of damages awarded by
the RTC despite sufficient evidence
As to the finding of the appellate court that the filing of the case Ruling: Affirmed
aggravated and eventually caused the death of two of the In the present case, records show that when bus driver Salvaa
respondents, we agree with the petitioner that such correlation is overtook the jeepney in front of him, he was rounding a blind curve
bereft of basis and is far fetched. along a descending road. Considering the road condition, and that
there was only one lane on each side of the center line for the
movement of traffic in opposite directions, it would have been more
(2) The award of moral damages and attorneys fees is also prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper place. Having thus
not in keeping with existing jurisprudence. Moral damages may be encroached on the opposite lane in the process of overtaking the
awarded in a breach of contract when the defendant acted in bad jeepney, without ascertaining that it was clear of oncoming traffic
faith, or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in that resulted in the collision with the approaching dump truck driven
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation. Finally, with the by deceased Asumbrado, Salvaa was grossly negligent in driving his
elimination of award of moral damages, so must the award of bus. He was remiss in his duty to determine that the road was clear
attorneys fees be deleted.[31] and not to proceed if he could not do so in safety.
Consequently, the CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary

There is no doubt, however, that the damages sustained by damages, which the law grants to serve as a warning to the public
respondents were due to petitioners fault or negligence, short of and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious
gross negligence. actions. However, the award should be tempered as it is not
intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another.9 Thus, the
Court reinstates the separate awards of exemplary damages to
(3) Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the
petitioners in the amount of P50,000.00.
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
With respect to Bao, the award of moral damages for the loss of his
certainty.[32] The Court deems it prudent to award reasonable
dump truck was correctly deleted since the damage to his vehicle
temperate damages to respondents under the circumstances.[33]
was not shown to have been made willfully or deliberately. However,
the Court finds the grant of P100,000.00 as temperate damages for
As to the claim for payment of the money market placement of the damaged vehicle to be insufficient considering its type as a 10-
Josefa Jeceil, the trial court may release the deposited amount of wheeler dump truck and its good running condition at the time of the
P73,857.57 to petitioner as the consignation was not proper or incident. Instead, the Court finds the amount of P400,000.00 as fair
warranted. and reasonable under the circumstances. With respect to the
adjudged lost income from the dump truck, the Court sustains, for
being just and equitable, the award of temperate damages in the
BANO V BACHELOR EX P RESS, GR 191703, M AR CH 12, 2012 sum of P200,000.00.
Facts: On the other hand, the Court upholds the grant to petitioner Heirs of
In the early afternoon of November 6, 1993, respondent Wenifredo P19,136.90 as actual damages corresponding to the pecuniary loss
Salvaa (Salvaa) was driving the bus owned by respondent Bachelor that they have actually sustained, P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc. with plate number LVD-273 and body the reduced awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
number 4042 (Bus 4042) along the national highway at Magdum, P415,640.16 as loss of earning capacity of the deceased Asumbrado,
Tagum City bound for Davao City. At about 1:20 in the afternoon, he which are all in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.11
overtook a Lawin PUJ jeepney while negotiating a blind curve in a
descending road at Km. 60, causing him to intrude into the opposite Finally, the attorney's fees of P50,000.00 as awarded by the CA is
lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of petitioner increased to P100,000.00 considering the length of time that this
Cresencio Bao (Bao) running uphill from the opposite direction. The case has been pending, or a period of about 18 years since the
collision resulted in damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death complaint a quo was filed on March 11, 1994.
of the truck driver, Amancio Asumbrado (Asumbrado), and serious
physical injuries to bus driver Salvaa.
On March 11, 1994, Bao and the heirs of Asumbrado (collectively

called petitioners) filed a complaint4 for quasi-delict, damages and
attorney's fees against respondents, accusing Salvaa of negligently
driving Bus 4042 causing it to collide with the dump truck.
Respondents denied liability, claiming that prior to the collision, Bus

4042 was running out of control because of a problem in the
steering wheel system which could not have been avoided despite
their maintenance efforts. Instead, they claimed that Asumbrado had
the last clear chance to avoid the collision had he not driven the
dump truck at a very fast speed.
RTC – Salvaa liable

CA – affirmed
Issue:
Whether respondent Salvaa was grossly negligent in continuing to
drive the bus even after he had discovered the malfunction in its
steering wheel
LISANIE
VIII. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES HELD:
On the above facts and circumstances, it should be difficult to

Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be conclude that the COLLECTION CASE was a clearly unfounded civil
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or action. It is not clear that the account of the PANGANIBANS had
mitigating circumstances. already been paid as of February 12, 1975. Under Article 1249 of the
Civil Code, payment should be held effective only when PNB Check
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the No. 32058 was actually cashed by, or credited to the account of,
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. INHELDER. If that did not eventuate on or before February 12, 1975,
and there is no proof that it did, the account would still be unpaid,
Art. 2215 . In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court and the complaint in the COLLECTION CASE, technically, could not
may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than be considered as substantially unfounded.
the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following
instances: It is true that when the check of the PANGANIBANS was received on
February 5, 1975, the better procedure would have been to withhold
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of a complaint pending determination of whether or not the check was
the contract; good. If dishonored, that would be the time to file the complaint.
That procedure was not followed because of the failure of the
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result corresponding advice which could have been given to Atty. Fajardo
of the contract; by the INHELDER Credit and Collection Manager. But the lack of that
advice should not justify qualifying the COLLECTION CASE as clearly
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, unfounded.
that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
It should also be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does not
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event; render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be
unsuccessful. Judicial discretion granted to the Courts in the
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has assessment of damages must always be ex with balanced restraint
done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury. and measured objectivity.
Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the At this juncture, it may not be amiss to remind Trial Courts to guard
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages against the award of exhorbitant damages that are way out of
resulting from the act or omission in question. proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case and which,
time and again, this Court has reduced or eliminated. Judicial
I N HELDER COR PORATI ON V. CA, GR N O. L-52358, 122 SCR A discretion granted to the Courts in the assessment of damages must
576 always be ex with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. The
appealed judgment is hereby set aside.
FACTS
R AAGAS V. TR AYA, ET. AL., GR N O.L-20081, FEB. 27, 1968
INHELDER is engaged in the manufacture and sale of medicines and
drug. McGaw Baxter Laboratories, Inc. appears to be another FACTS
Company also having its principal office on the same location as
INHELDER. The PANGANIBANS, physicians, are the owners of the The complaint filed by the spouses Melquiades Raagas and Adela
DOCTOR's CLINIC. On December 29, 1972, DOCTOR's CLINIC Laudiano Raagas against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido
purchased medicines and drugs from INHELDER in the amount of Canciller, alleges that on or about April 9, 1958, while the latter was
P1,385.10, payable in installments. The PANGANIBANS were able to "recklessly" driving a truck owned by his co-defendants, along the
pay the amount of P824.10 for that purchase, leaving a balance of public highway in MacArthur, Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the
P561.00 which had remained unpaid for approximately two years. plaintiffs' three-year old son Regino causing his instantaneous death.
Atty. Fajardo of INHELDER sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS On the other hand, the defendants specifically deny that Canciller
requesting settlement of the said amount of P561.00. In their reply, was "driving recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that
the PANGANIBANS requested a statement of account. Thereafter or the truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and
on February 12, 1975, a collection case was filed. on the right side of the road"; that it was the child who "rushed from
an unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the
On February 19, 1975, INHELDER sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS left rear tire of the said truck and died", and consequently the
"acknowledging the receipt of the PNB Check No. 32058 in the defendants are not to blame for the accident which was "entirely
amount of P561.00 representing full payment of the ('PANGANIBANS') attributable to an unforeseen event" or due to the fault of the child
account with INHELDER". and negligence of his parents; that the defendant-spouses have
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
PANGANIBANS have alleged That during the hearing of the instant driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946.
case, undersigned counsel showed to the Court plaintiffs' receipts to
the effect that several days before the malicious and unfounded On June 24 it TC rendered a judgment on the pleadings,
complaint was filed before said Court. condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay "to the
plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of their child Regino
The trial court awarded damages totaling P212,550.00 in favor of the Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, P1,000 actual
Panganibans. Such amount was reduced upon appeal to the CA. damages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs."
I SSUE: I SSUE:
W/N the Collection Case is considered unfounded and malicious W/N the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on
enough to warrant damages. the pleadings alone.
LISANIE
HELD:
No, court erred on this effect. The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral,
nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment
in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that
the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event
and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents."
Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue.
Jurisprudence dictates that even if the allegations regarding the
amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in
the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. Actual
damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on
"speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend on actual proof that damage had been
suffered and on evidence of the actual amount. Finally, in Malonzo
vs. Galang et. al., we reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation
is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the
existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation
to defendant's acts."
The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full-

blown trial on the merits at which the parties will be afforded every
opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective
contentions and defenses.
P EOPLE V. JUGUETA (2016 CASE, R EAD I N FULL)

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LISANIE

FA C TS: o Article 2176: QUASI DELICT

W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

 failure to observe for the protection of the interest of

(c) There must be a direct causal connection between the

CHI LD LEAR NI N G V. TAGORI O, GR N O.150920, NOV. 25,

W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other

(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or

Difference between fault and negligence:

JOSEP H V. BAUTI STA, GR NO.L-41423, FEB. 23, 1989

May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the damages

Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has been

 Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence cases, the

(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability

The petition for review lacks merit.

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on

Culpa contractual Culpa BMT AND TMBI appealed.

OCHOA VS. G & S TR AN SP OR T, G.R. NO. 170071, M ARCH 9, Issues:

The award of moral damages should be modified

Moral and exemplary damages are based on different jural

FACTS: AI R FR AN CE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCR A 155

Even if there is a contact, it’s possible to take it as separate cause of FACTS:

Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.

II. ACT OR OMISSION I SSUE:

W/N petitioner is negligent for the accident resulting to the death of

I SSUE: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence as to give

Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an

Decisions of the lower courts:

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a

1. W/N both private respondents can be held liable for damages.

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.

Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir's

. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, Proximate Cause

FACTS: Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the

CA held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving

WoN petitioner, as employer of the Ceres Bus driver, liable under

Article 2180 of the Civil Code imputing fault or negligence on the

N OTE: At the tim e of the incident, Jabon w as prohibited

A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation

Petitioners argument deserves scant consideration.

Under the New Civil Code, it is presum ed that a person driving

To suggest that De los Santos w as equally negligent based

Translation: “The thing speaks for itself.” FA CTS:

DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF

RULE OF EVIDENCE: I SSUES:

b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT

I ssue: What is more damning for Dr. Gestuvo is his failure to

R uling: There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in

2. R es I psa Loquitor is applicable

Requisites: CARLOS BORROM EO V FAM I LY CARE HOSP I TAL I N C. (G.R .

Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute

Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of medical negligence